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ENGLISH LANGUAGE

BY

J. N. LARNED

WITH NUMEROUS HISTORICAL MAPS FROM ORIGINAL STUDIES AND DRAWINGS BY

ALAN C. REILEY

*REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION*

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VOLUME V—TAPURIANS TO ZYP

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**TAPURIANS, The.**—"To the west of the Hyrcanians, between Elburz and the Caspian, lay the Tapurians, whose name has survived in the modern Taberistan, and further yet, on the sea-coast, and at the mouth of the Mardus (now Safidrud), were the Mardians."—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 8, ch. 1 (v. 5).

**TARA, The Hill, the Feis, and the Psalter of.**—The Feis Teavrach, or Feis of Tara, in Irish history, was a triennial assembly on the royal hill of Tara, in Meath, which is claimed to have been instituted by a certain King Ollamh Fodhla, at so remote a period as 1,300 years before Christ. "All the chieftains or heads of septs, bards, historians, and military leaders throughout the country were regularly summoned, and were required to attend under the penalty of being treated as the king's enemies. The meeting was held in a large oblong hall, and the first three days were spent in enjoying the hospitality of the king, who entertained the entire assembly during its sittings. The bards give long and glowing accounts of the magnificence displayed on these occasions, of the formalities employed, and of the business transacted. Tables were arranged along the centre of the hall, and on the walls at either side were suspended the banners or arms of the chiefs, so that each chief on entering might take his seat under his own escutcheon. Orders were issued by sound of trumpet, and all the forms were characterized by great solemnity. What may have been the authority of this assembly, or whether it had any power to enact laws, is not clear; but it would appear that one of its principal functions was the inspection of the national records, the writers of which were obliged to the strictest accuracy under the weightiest penalties."—M. Haverty, *Hist. of Ireland*, p. 24.—The result of the examination and correction of the historical records of the kingdom were "entered in the great national register called the Psalter of Tara, which is supposed to have been destroyed at the period of the Norman invasion. . . . It is supposed that part of the contents of the Psalter of Cashel, which contains much of the fabulous history of the Irish, was copied from it."—T. Wright, *Hist. of Ireland*, bk. 1, ch. 2 (v. 1).

**TARANTEENS, OR TARENTINES, OR TARRANTINES.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ABNAKIS, and ALGONQUIAN FAMILY; also, NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1675 (JULY—SEPTEMBER).

**TARAS.** See TARENTUM.

**TARASCANS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TARASCANS.

**TARBELLI, The.** See AQUITAINE: THE ANCIENT TRIBES.

**TARENTINE WAR, The.** See ROME: B. C. 282-275.

**TARENTUM.**—Tarentum (or Taras), the most important of the ancient Greek cities in Italy, "lay at the northern corner of the great gulf which still bears its name. It had an excellent harbour, almost land-locked. On its eastern horn stood the city. Its form was triangular; one side being washed by the open sea, the other by the waters of the harbour, while the base or land side was protected by a line of strong fortifications. Thus advantageously posted for commerce the city grew apace. She possessed an opulent middle class; and the poorer citizens found an easy subsistence in the abundant supply of fish which the gulf afforded. These native fishermen were always ready to man the navy of the state. But they made indifferent soldiers. Therefore when any peril of war threatened the state, it was the practice of the government to hire foreign captains, soldiers of fortune, who were often kings or princes, to bring an army for their defence. . . . The origin of Lacedæmonian Tarentum is veiled in fable. The warriors of Sparta (so runs the well-known legend) went forth to the second Messenian war under a vow not to see their homes till they had conquered the enemy. They were long absent, and their wives sought paramours among the slaves and others who had not gone out to war. When the warriors returned, they found a large body of youth grown up from this adulterous intercourse. These youths (the Parthenii as they were called), disdaining subjection, quitted their native land under the command of Phalantus, one of their own body, and founded the colony of Tarentum."—H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 3, ch. 25 (v. 1).—See, also, SIRIS.

**B. C. 282-275.**—Alliance with Pyrrhus and war with Rome. See ROME: B. C. 282-275.

**B. C. 212.**—Betrayed to Hannibal. See PUNIC WARS: THE SECOND.

**TARENTUM, Treaty of.**—The treaty in which Octavius and Antony extended their triumvirate to a second term of five years; negotiated at Tarentum, B. C. 37.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 27.

**TARGOWITZ, Confederates of.** See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792.

**TARIFA: A. D. 1291.**—Taken by the Christians from the Moors. See SPAIN: A. D. 1273-1460.

## TARIFF LEGISLATION AND CONVENTIONS.

(The Netherlands): 15th Century.—Early Free Trade and Reciprocity.—In the Netherlands, at the close of a short war with the English, in 1437, "the import of raw wool was entirely relieved from the payment of even the ordinary customs. . . . And this was then their notion of protection,—to be allowed to buy what they liked where they liked, to live at peace with their neighbours, and to be let alone. Four hundred years have passed and gone since the Netherlands persuaded their rulers to take off all duty on raw wool, and to permit half-finished clothes to

be brought into their country in order that they might be dyed and taken out again duty free; yet we live in the midst of tariffs whose aim it is to hinder the importation of the raw material by prohibitory duties and to prevent competition in every kind of fabric by so-called protecting ones! And in England, also, at the period in question, the suicidal spirit of commercial envy had seized hold of the government, and in every parliament some fresh evidence was afforded of the jealousy with which foreign skill and competition were viewed. But the Dutch held on



the tenour of their discerning and sagacious way without waiting for reciprocity or resenting its reverse. If the English would not admit their cloths, that was no reason why they should cheat themselves of the advantage of English and Irish wool. If not cloths, there was doubtless something else that they would buy from them. Among other articles, there was salt, which they had acquired a peculiar skill in refining; and there was an extensive carrying trade in the produce of the Northern countries, and in various costly luxuries, which the English obtained from remoter regions generally through them. In 1496, when Philip (father of the Emperor Charles V.) assumed the government of the Netherlands, as Duke of Brabant, he "presented to the senates of the leading cities the draught of a commercial treaty with England, conceived in a wise and liberal spirit, and eminently fitted to advance the real welfare of both countries. Their assent was gladly given. . . . Nor did they over-estimate the value of the new compact, which long went by the name of 'The Grand Treaty of Commerce.' Its provisions were, in all respects, reciprocal, and enabled every kind of merchandise to be freely imported from either country by the citizens of the other. The entire liberty of fishing on each other's coast was confirmed; measures were prescribed for the suppression of piracy; and property saved from wrecks, when none of the crew survived, was vested in the local authorities in trust for the proper owners, should they appear to claim it within a year and a day. . . . The industrial policy of the Dutch was founded on ideas wholly and essentially different from that of the kingdoms around them. 'The freedom of traffic had ever been greater with them than amongst any of their neighbours;' and its different results began to appear. Not only were strangers of every race and creed sure of an asylum in Holland, but of a welcome; and singular pains were taken to induce those whose skill enabled them to contribute to the wealth of the state to settle permanently in the great towns."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial History of Free Nations*, v. 2, pp. 110-111, 150-151, 266-267.

(Venice): 15-17th Centuries.—Beginning of systematic exclusion and monopoly. See VENICE: 15-17TH CENTURIES.

(England): A. D. 1651-1672.—The Navigation Laws and their effect on the American colonies. See NAVIGATION LAWS: A. D. 1651; and UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1651-1672.

(France): A. D. 1664-1667.—The System of Colbert.—Colbert, the great minister of Louis XIV., was the first among statesmen who had an economic system, "settled, complete and consistent in all its parts; and it is to the eternal honor of his name that he made it triumph in spite of obstacles of every kind. Although this system was far from being irreproachable in all its parts, it was an immense progress at the time of its appearance; and we have had nothing since then which can be compared with it, for breadth and penetration. . . . It was . . . the need of restoring order in the finances which gave rise to the attempts at amelioration made by Colbert. This illustrious minister soon comprehended that the surest way to increase public fortune was to favor private fortune, and to open to production the broadest and freest ways. . . . One of the first acts of his ministry, the

reestablishment of the taxes on a uniform basis, is an homage rendered to true principles; and one cannot doubt that all the others would have been in conformity with this glorious precedent, if the science of wealth had been, at that time, as advanced as it is to-day. Colbert would certainly have carried out in France what Mr. Huskisson had begun in England at the time of his sudden death. . . . The edict of September, 1664, reduced the import and export duties on merchandise to suitable limits, and suppressed the most onerous. 'It is our intention,' said the king, 'to make known to all our governors and intendants in what consideration we hold at present everything that may concern commerce. . . . As the most solid and most essential means for the reestablishment of commerce are the diminution and the regulation of the duties which are levied on all commodities, we have arranged to reduce all these duties to one single import and one export duty, and also to diminish these considerably, in order to encourage navigation, reestablish the ancient manufactures, banish idleness.' . . . At the same time Colbert prohibited the seizure for the *tailles* (*villein-tax*) [see *TAILLE AND GABELLE*] of beds, clothes, bread, horses and cattle serving for labor; or the tools by which artisans and manual laborers gained their livelihood. The register of the survey of lands was revised, so that property should be taxed only in proportion to its value and the actual extent of the land. The great highways of the kingdom and all the rivers were then guarded by armies of receivers of tolls, who stopped merchandise on its passage and burdened its transportation with a multitude of abusive charges, to say nothing of the delays and exactions of every kind. An edict was issued ordering the investigation of these degrading charges; and most of them were abolished or reduced to just limits. . . . The lease of Customs duties being about to expire, Colbert improved this occasion to revise the tariff; and although this fatal measure has since been considered as the finest monument of his administration, we think we should present it in its true aspect, which seems to us to have been invariably misapprehended. Colbert's aim in revising the customs was to make them a means of protection for national manufactures, in the place of a simple financial resource, as they formerly were. Most articles of foreign manufacture had duties imposed upon them, so as to secure to similar French merchandise the home market. At the same time, Colbert spared neither sacrifices nor encouragement to give activity to the manufacturing spirit in our country. He caused the most skilful workmen of every kind to come from abroad; and he subjected manufactures to a severe discipline, that they should not lose their vigilance, relying on the tariffs. Heavy fines were inflicted on the manufacturers of an article recognized as inferior in quality to what it should be. For the first offence, the products of the delinquents were attached to a stake, with a carcan and the name of the manufacturer; in case of a second offence, the manufacturer himself was fastened to it. These draconian rigors would have led to results entirely contrary to those Colbert expected, if his enlightened solicitude had not tempered by other measures what was cruel in them. Thus, he appointed inspectors of the manufactures, who often directed the

workmen into the best way, and brought them information of the newest processes, purchased from foreign manufacturers, or secretly obtained at great expense. Colbert was far from attaching to the customs the idea of exclusive and blind protection that has ever been attributed to them since his ministry. He knew very well that these tariffs would engender reprisals, and that, while encouraging manufactures, they would seriously hinder commerce. Moreover, all his efforts tended to weaken their evil effects. His instructions to consuls and ambassadors testify strongly to his prepossessions in this regard. . . . The more one studies the administrative acts of this great minister, the more one is convinced of his lofty sense of justice, and of the liberal tendencies of his system, which has hitherto been generally extolled as hostile to the principle of commercial liberty. In vain the Italians have hailed it by the name of 'Colbertism,' to designate the exclusive system invented by themselves and honored by the Spaniards: Colbert never approved the sacrifice of the greater part of his fellow citizens to a few privileged ones, nor the creation of endless monopolies for the profit of certain branches of industry. We may reproach him with having been excessively inclined to make regulations, but not with having enfeoffed France to a few spinners of wool and cotton. He had himself summed up in a few words his system in the memorial he presented to the king: 'To reduce export duties on provisions and manufactures of the kingdom; to diminish import duties on everything which is of use in manufactures; and to repel the products of foreign manufactures, by raising the duties.' Such was the spirit of his first tariff, published in September, 1664. He had especially aimed at facilitating the supply of raw materials in France, and promoting the interests of her home trade by the abolition of provincial barriers, and by the establishment of lines of customs-houses at the extreme frontiers. . . . The only reproach that can be justly made against him is the abuse of the protective instrument he had just created, by increasing in the tariff of 1667 the exclusive measures directed against foreign manufactures in that of 1664. It was no longer then a question of manufactures, but of war, namely, with Holland; and this war broke out in 1672. . . . From the same epoch date the first wars of commercial reprisals between France and England, hostilities which were to cost both nations so much blood and so many tears. Manufactures were then seen to prosper and agriculture to languish in France under the influence of this system."—J. A. Blanqui, *Hist. of Pol. Economy in Europe*, ch. 26.

ALSO IN: H. Martin, *Hist. of France: The Age of Louis XIV.*, v. 1, ch. 2.—J. B. Perkins, *France under the Regency*, ch. 4.—See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 1661-1683.

(Pennsylvania): A. D. 1785.—Beginning of "Protection" in Pennsylvania.—"Before the Revolution Pennsylvania had always been slow to impose burdens on trade. While Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina were raising considerable sums from imposts, Pennsylvania commerce was free from restrictions. In 1780, however, the need of revenue overcame the predilection of the Quakers for free trade and they decided 'that considerable sums can be raised by a small impost on goods and merchandise im-

ported into this state without burdening commerce.' Accordingly, low duties were laid on wines, liquors, molasses, sugar, cocoa and tea, with 1 per cent. on all other imports. In 1782 the duties were doubled and the revenue was appropriated to the defence of commerce on the Delaware river and bay. This was done at the request of the merchants who wished to have their interests protected and 'signified their willingness to submit to a further impost on the importation of goods for that purpose.' When peace came, however, the merchants at once represented it as detrimental to the interests of the state to continue the duties, and they were repealed. In 1784 low duties were again imposed, and later in the same year increased. Early in 1785 more careful provisions were made for their collection. September 20, came the important act 'to encourage and protect the manufactures of this state by laying additional duties on certain manufactures which interfere with them.' . . . More than forty of the articles which Pennsylvania had begun to make were taxed at high specific rates. Coaches and carriages, paid £10 to £20; clocks, 30s.; scythes, 15s. per dozen; beer, ale and porter, 6d. per gallon; soap or candles, 1d. per pound; shoes and boots, 1s. to 6s. per pair; cordage and ropes, 8s. 4d. per hundred weight; and so on. The ten per cent. schedule included manufactures of iron and steel, hats, clothing, books and papers, whips, canes, musical instruments and jewelry. . . . The Pennsylvania act is of importance because it shows the nature of commodities which the country was then producing, as well as because it formed the basis of the tariff of 1789."—W. Hill, *First Stages of the Tariff Policy of the United States*, pp. 53-54.—The preamble of the Pennsylvania act of 1785 set forth its reasons as follows: "Whereas, divers useful and beneficial arts and manufactures have been gradually introduced into Pennsylvania, and the same have at length risen to a very considerable extent and perfection, inasmuch that in the late war between the United States of America and Great Britain, when the importation of European goods was much interrupted, and often very difficult and uncertain, the artisans and mechanics of this state were able to supply in the hours of need, not only large quantities of weapons and other implements, but also ammunition and clothing, without which the war could not have been carried on, whereby their oppressed country was greatly assisted and relieved. And whereas, although the fabrics and manufactures of Europe, and other foreign parts, imported into this country in times of peace, may be afforded at cheaper rates than they can be made here, yet good policy and a regard to the wellbeing of divers useful and industrious citizens, who are employed in the making of like goods, in this state, demand of us that moderate duties be laid on certain fabrics and manufactures imported, which do most interfere with, and which (if no relief be given) will undermine and destroy the useful manufactures of the like kind in this country, for this purpose. Be it enacted" &c.—*Pennsylvania Laws*, 1785.—The duties enacted, which were additional to the then existing impost of 2½ per cent., were generally specific, but ad valorem on some commodities as on British steel, 10 per cent.; earthen ware, the same; glass and glass-ware, 2½ per cent.; linens the same. Looked



at in the light of recent American tariffs, they would hardly be recognized as "protective" in their character; but the protective purpose was plainly enough declared.

(United States): A. D. 1789-1791.—The first tariff enactment.—Hamilton's Report on Manufactures.—The "American System" proposed.—"The immediate necessity of raising some ready money led to the passage of a tariff bill at the first session of Congress. It was prepared and carried through the House chiefly by Madison; and its contents, no less than the general tone of the debate in which it was discussed, showed a decided leaning towards the protective system. But this legislation was temporary, and was at the time known to be so. The permanent system of the country was left for subsequent and more leisurely development. When at last Congress felt able to give the subject due attention, it applied as usual to Hamilton to furnish information and opinions. A topic so important and so congenial to his tastes called forth his best exertions. A series of extensive investigations conducted by every feasible kind of inquiry and research, both in foreign parts and in the United States, furnished the material for his reflections. He took abundant time to digest as well as to collect the great mass of information thus acquired, and it was not until nearly two years had elapsed since the order for the report was passed that he sent in the document to the House of Representatives. . . . The inferences and arguments constituted as able a presentation of the protectionist theory as has ever been made. . . . It is, however, an incorrect construction of that report to regard it as a vindication of the general or abstract doctrine of protection. Hamilton was very far from assuming any such position; protection always and everywhere was not his theory; protection was not his ideal principle of commercial regulation. . . . So far from entertaining any predilection for protection in the abstract, it would seem that in a perfect commercial world he would have expected to find free trade the prevalent custom. . . . If free trade were the rule of the whole commercial world, Hamilton was not prepared to say that the United States would find it for her interest to be singular. But such were not the premises from which he had to draw a conclusion. . . . The report of Hamilton determined the policy of the country. For good or for evil protection was resorted to, with the avowed purpose of encouraging domestic manufacturing as well as of raising a revenue. . . . The principles upon which Hamilton based his tariff were not quite those of pure protection, but constituted what was known as the 'American System'; a system which has been believed in by former generations with a warmth of conviction not easy to withstand."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Life of Alex. Hamilton*, ch. 11.—Hamilton's celebrated report opens with an elaborate argument to prove the desirability of manufacturing industries in the country, and then proceeds: "A full view having now been taken of the inducements to the promotion of manufactures in the United States, accompanied with an examination of the principal objections which are commonly urged in opposition, it is proper, in the next place, to consider the means by which it may be effected, as introductory to a specification of the objects which in the present state of things appear the

most fit to be encouraged, and of the particular measures which it may be advisable to adopt in respect to each. In order to a better judgment of the means proper to be resorted to by the United States, it will be of use to advert to those which have been employed with success in other countries. The principle of these are:—I. Protecting duties, or duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged. Duties of this nature evidently amount to a virtual bounty on the domestic fabrics, since by enhancing the charges on foreign articles they enable the national manufacturers to undersell all their foreign competitors. The propriety of this species of encouragement need not be dwelt upon, as it is not only a clear result from the numerous topics which have been suggested, but is sanctioned by the laws of the United States in a variety of instances; it has the additional recommendation of being a resource of revenue. Indeed, all the duties imposed on imported articles, though with an exclusive view to revenue, have the effect in contemplation; and, except where they fall on raw materials, wear a beneficent aspect towards the manufacturers of the country. II. Prohibitions of rival articles, or duties equivalent to prohibitions. This is another and an efficacious mean of encouraging manufactures; but in general it is only fit to be employed when a manufacture has made such a progress, and is in so many hands, as to insure a due competition and an adequate supply on reasonable terms. Of duties equivalent to prohibitions there are examples in the laws of the United States; and there are other cases to which the principle may be advantageously extended, but they are not numerous. Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing nations, a similar policy on the part of the United States, in every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of endeavoring to secure to their own citizens a reciprocity of advantages. III. Prohibitions of the exportation of materials of manufactures. The desire of securing a cheap and plentiful supply for the national workmen; and, where the article is either peculiar to the country, or of peculiar quality there, the jealousy of enabling foreign workmen to rival those of the nation with its own materials, are the leading motives to this species of regulation. It ought not to be affirmed that it is in no instance proper, but it is certainly one which ought to be adopted with great circumspection and only in very plain cases. IV. Pecuniary bounties. This has been found one of the most efficacious means of encouraging manufactures, and it is, in some views, the best, though it has not yet been practiced upon the government of the United States,—unless the allowance on the exportation of dried and pickled fish and salted meat could be considered as a bounty—and though it is less favored by public opinion than some other modes. Its advantages are these:—1. It is a species of encouragement more positive and direct than any other, and for that very reason has a more immediate tendency to stimulate and uphold new enterprises, increasing the chances of profit, and diminishing the risks of loss in the first attempts. 2. It avoids the inconvenience of a temporary augmentation

of price, which is incident to some other modes, or it produces it to a less degree, either by making no addition to the charges on the rival foreign article, as in the case of protecting duties, or by making a smaller addition. The first happens when the fund for the bounty is derived from a different object (which may or may not increase the price of some other article according to the nature of that object); the second when the fund is derived from the same or a similar object of foreign manufacture. One per cent. duty on the foreign article, converted into a bounty on the domestic, will have an equal effect with a duty of 2% exclusive of such bounty; and the price of the foreign commodity is liable to be raised in the one case in the proportion of 1%, in the other in that of 2%. Indeed, the bounty when drawn from another source, is calculated to promote a reduction of price, because, without laying any new charge on the foreign article, it serves to introduce a competition with it, and to increase the total quantity of the article in the market. 3. Bounties have not, like high protecting duties, a tendency to produce scarcity. An increase of price is not always the immediate, though where the progress of a domestic manufacture does not counteract a rise, it is commonly the ultimate effect of an additional duty. In the interval between the laying of the duty and a proportional increase of price, it may discourage importation by interfering with the profits to be expected from the sale of the article. 4. Bounties are sometimes not only the best, but the only proper expedient for uniting the encouragement of a new object of agriculture with that of a new object of manufacture. It is the interest of the farmer to have the production of the raw material promoted by counteracting the interference of the foreign material of the same kind. It is the interest of the manufacturer to have the material abundant and cheap. If prior to the domestic production of the material in sufficient quantity to supply the manufacturer on good terms, a duty be laid upon the importation of it from abroad, with a view to promote the raising of it at home, the interest both of the farmer and manufacturer will be disserved. By either destroying the requisite supply, or raising the price of the article beyond what can be afforded to be given for it by the conductor of an infant manufacture, it is abandoned or fails; and there being no domestic manufactories to create a demand for the raw material which is raised by the farmer, it is in vain that the competition of the like foreign article may have been destroyed. It cannot escape notice that a duty upon the importation of an article can no otherwise aid the domestic production of it than by giving the latter greater advantages in the home market. It can have no influence upon the advantageous sale of the article produced in foreign markets, no tendency, therefore, to promote its exportation. The true way to conciliate these two interests is to lay a duty on foreign manufactures of the material, the growth of which is desired to be encouraged, and to apply the produce of that duty by way of bounty either upon the production of the material itself, or upon its manufacture at home, or upon both. In this disposition of the thing the manufacturer commences his enterprise under every advantage which is attainable as to quantity or price of the raw material. And the farmer, if the bounty

be immediately to him, is enabled by it to enter into a successful competition with the foreign material. . . . There is a degree of prejudice against bounties, from an appearance of giving away the public money without an immediate consideration, and from a supposition that they serve to enrich particular classes at the expense of the community. But neither of these sources of dislike will bear a serious examination. There is no purpose to which public money can be more beneficially applied than to the acquisition of a new and useful branch of industry, no consideration more valuable than a permanent addition to the general stock of productive labor. As to the second source of objection, it equally lies against other modes of encouragement, which are admitted to be eligible. As often as a duty upon a foreign article makes an addition to its price, it causes an extra expense to the community for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A bounty does no more. But it is the interest of the society in each case to submit to a temporary expense, which is more than compensated by an increase of industry and wealth, by an augmentation of resources and independence, and by the circumstance of eventual cheapness, which has been noticed in another place. It would deserve attention, however, in the employment of this species of encouragement in the United States, as a reason for moderating the degree of it in the instances in which it might be deemed eligible, that the great distance of this country from Europe imposes very heavy charges on all the fabrics which are brought from thence, amounting from 15% to 30% on their value according to their bulk. . . . V. Premiums. These are of a nature allied to bounties, though distinguishable from them in some important features. Bounties are applicable to the whole quantity of an article produced or manufactured or exported, and involve a correspondent expense. Premiums serve to reward some particular excellence or superiority, some extraordinary exertion or skill, and are dispensed only in a small number of cases. But their effect is to stimulate general effort. . . . VI. The exemption of the materials of manufactures from duty. The policy of that exemption, as a general rule, particularly in reference to new establishments, is obvious. . . . VII. Drawbacks of the duties which are imposed on the materials of manufactures. It has already been observed as a general rule, that duties on those materials ought, with certain exceptions, to be forborne. Of these exceptions, three cases occur which may serve as examples. One where the material is itself an object of general or extensive consumption, and a fit and productive source of revenue. Another where a manufacture of a simpler kind, the competition of which with a like domestic article is desired to be restrained, partakes of the nature of a raw material from being capable by a further process to be converted into a manufacture of a different kind, the introduction or growth of which is desired to be encouraged. A third where the material itself is the production of the country, and in sufficient abundance to furnish a cheap and plentiful supply to the national manufacturers. . . . Where duties on the materials of manufactures are not laid for the purpose of preventing a competition with some domestic production, the same reasons which recommend, as a general rule, the exemption of those materials from



duties, would recommend, as a like general rule, the allowance of drawbacks in favor of the manufacturer. . . . VIII. The encouragement of new inventions and discoveries at home, and of the introduction into the United States of such as may have been made in other countries; particularly those which relate to machinery. This is among the most useful and unexceptionable of the aids which can be given to manufactures. The usual means of that encouragement are pecuniary rewards, and, for a time, exclusive privileges. . . . IX. Judicious regulations for the inspection of manufactured commodities. This is not among the least important of the means by which the prosperity of manufactures may be promoted. It is indeed in many cases one of the most essential. Contributing to prevent frauds upon consumers at home and exporters to foreign countries, to improve the quality and preserve the character of the national manufactures; it cannot fail to aid the expeditious and advantageous sale of them, and to serve as a guard against successful competition from other quarters. . . . X. The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to place—is a point of considerable moment to trade in general and to manufactures in particular, by rendering more easy the purchase of raw materials and provisions, and the payment for manufactured supplies. A general circulation of bank paper, which is to be expected from the institution lately established, will be a most valuable mean to this end. . . . XI. The facilitating of the transportation of commodities. Improvements favoring this object intimately concern all the domestic interests of a community; but they may, without impropriety, be mentioned as having an important relation to manufactures. . . . The foregoing are the principal of the means by which the growth of manufactures is ordinarily promoted. It is, however, not merely necessary that the measures of government which have a direct view to manufactures should be calculated to assist and protect them; but that those which only collaterally affect them, in the general course of the administration, should be guarded from any peculiar tendency to injure them. There are certain species of taxes which are apt to be oppressive to different parts of the community, and, among other ill effects, have a very unfriendly aspect towards manufactures. All poll or capitation taxes are of this nature. They either proceed according to a fixed rate, which operates unequally and injuriously to the industrious poor; or they vest a discretion in certain officers to make estimates and assessments, which are necessarily vague, conjectural, and liable to abuse. . . . All such taxes (including all taxes on occupations) which proceed according to the amount of capital supposed to be employed in a business, or of profits supposed to be made in it, are unavoidably hurtful to industry.”—A. Hamilton, *Report on Manufactures* (Works, v. 3).

Also in: *State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff*.—R. W. Thompson, *Hist. of Protective Tariff Laws*, ch. 6-7.

(England): A. D. 1815-1828.—The Corn Laws and Provision Laws.—The sliding-scale.—During the Napoleonic wars in Europe there was a prolonged period of scarcity, approaching to famine, in Great Britain. There were scant harvests at home and supplies from

abroad were cut off by the “Continental system” of Napoleon. “In 1801 wheat was 115 shillings and 11 pence per quarter; from 1801 to 1818 the price averaged 84s.; whilst in the 20 years ending 1874, it averaged only 52s. per quarter. . . . The cry of starvation was everywhere heard amongst the working classes, and tradesmen of all kinds suffered severely; whilst the only well-to-do people were the Farmers and the Landlords. As soon as the war was over, and our ports were opened for the reception of foreign grain, prices came down rapidly. Then the Landlords took alarm, and appealed to Parliament to resist the importation of foreign grain, which they asserted, would be the ruin of the English Farmers. They insisted that in this country, the costs of cultivation were extremely heavy, as compared with those of foreign producers of grain, and that therefore the British Farmer must receive protection in order to prevent his ruin. Hence a Parliament, composed mostly of Landlords, proceeded, in 1815, to enact the Corn Law, which excluded foreign wheat, except at high rates of duty, until the market price should reach 80s. per quarter; and other kinds of grain, until there was a proportionate elevation in prices. The discussions in Parliament on this question made a great impression, and led to a wide-spread sympathy, and to the belief that there was need of a measure, which, according to its advocates, would preserve our Agriculture from ruin, and be at the same time a provision against famine. But by many thoughtful and patriotic people this law was viewed with intense dislike, and was characterised as an atrocious fraud. The fact was, that . . . when rents ought either to have been lowered, or the methods of cultivation improved, the Corn Law was passed by the Landlords in order to keep out foreign corn and to maintain high rents; and many of the common people saw, or thought they saw, what would be the effect; for whilst the legislature was engaged in the discussion of the question, the people of London became riotous, and the walls were chalked with invectives such as ‘Bread or Blood,’ ‘Guy Fawkes for ever,’ etc. A loaf, steeped in blood, was placed on Carlton House, (now the Tory Club House.) The houses of some of the most unpopular of the promoters of the measure were attacked by the mob. At Lord Eldon’s house the iron railings were torn up, whilst every pane of glass and many articles of furniture were broken and destroyed, and it was facetiously remarked that at last his lordship kept open house. The military were called out, and two persons were killed; the Houses of Parliament were guarded by soldiers, and, indeed, the whole of London appeared to be in possession of the Army. In various parts of the country similar disturbances prevailed. . . . Large popular meetings were held at Spa Fields, in London, public meetings were also held at Birmingham, and in many other parts of the kingdom. . . . In some of the towns and populous localities, the operatives having in view a large aggregate meeting to be held on St. Peter’s field in Manchester, submitted themselves to marching discipline. . . . Regardless, however, of the public demonstrations of dislike to the Corn and Provision Laws, the Legislature persisted in upholding the most stringent provisions thereof until the year 1828, when the duties on the importation of

grain were adjusted by a sliding scale, in accordance with the average prices in the English market. The following abstract may serve to denote the provisions of the amended Law:—When the average price of wheat was 36 shillings the duty was 50 shillings 8 pence per qr.; when 46s. the duty was 40s. 8d. per qr.; when 56s. it was 30s. 8d. per qr.; when 62s. it was 24s. 8d. per qr.; when 72s. it was 2s. 8d. per qr.; and when 73s. it was 1s. per qr. It was soon found that as a means of protection to the British Farmer, the operation of the sliding scale of duties was scarcely less effective, by deterring imports of grain, than the previous law, which absolutely excluded wheat until it reached 80s. per quarter. The Act certainly provided that foreign grain might at any time be imported, and be held in bond till the duty was paid; a provision under which it was expected to be stored until the price should be high, and the duty low; but the expenses attendant upon warehousing and preserving it from injury by keeping, were usually looked upon as an undesirable or even dangerous investment of a merchant's capital. . . . Agricultural protection, as exhibited by the Corn Law, would, however, have been very incomplete without the addition of the Provision Laws. By these Laws the importation of Foreign Cattle and foreign meat were strictly prohibited. Butter and Lard were indeed allowed to be imported, but they were not to be used as food, and in order to provide against any infraction of the law, the officers at the Custom Houses were employed to 'spoil' these articles on their arrival, by smearing them with a tarred stick. They could then be used only as grease for wheels, or for the smearing of sheep. With bread purposely made dear, with the import of cattle and of flesh meat prohibited, and with lard and butter wilfully reduced from articles of food to grease for wheels, there is no difficulty in accounting for the frequent murmurs of discontent, and for the starvation among the poorer classes in every part of the Kingdom. Soup kitchens were opened almost every winter, and coals and clothing gratuitously distributed in many places; but such palliatives were regarded with derision by all who understood the true causes of the evil. Such help was scorned, and a cry for justice was raised; scarcity was said to be created by Act of Parliament, in order to be mitigated by philanthropy."—H. Ashworth, *Recollections of Richard Cobden*, ch. 1.

Also in D. Ricardo, *On Protection to Agriculture* (Works, pp. 459-498).—J. E. T. Rogers, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, ch. 17-18.

(United States): A. D. 1816-1824.—The beginning of the protective policy (the "American System").—"The return of peace at the beginning of 1815 brought the manufacturers face to face with a serious danger. War had been their harvest time. Favored by double duties and abnormal conditions their industry had attained a marvelous though not always safe development. . . . By limitation, the double duties were to expire one year after the conclusion of peace, and unless Congress intervened promptly and effectually their individual ruin was certain. . . . As new industries sprang up, petitions were promptly laid before Congress praying for new duties, for the permanence of the war duties, and for certain prohibitions. . . . In laying before Congress the treaty of

peace, February, 1815, Madison called attention to the 'unparalleled maturity' attained by manufactures, and 'anxiously recommended this source of national independence and wealth to the prompt and constant guardianship of Congress.' . . . To Dallas, Secretary of the Treasury, the manufacturers had already turned. Six days after the treaty of peace was ratified, the House, February 23, 1815, called upon Dallas to report a general tariff bill at the next session of Congress. . . . In his annual report in December, 1815, Dallas had proposed the extension of the double duties until June 30, 1816, in order to give time for the elaboration of a new tariff bill; and after some discussion Congress agreed to this plan. February 13 he transmitted his reply to the resolutions of the previous February, closing with a carefully prepared schedule of new tariff rates. This, after being worked over in the Ways and Means Committee, was embodied in a bill and introduced into the House March 12, by Lowndes of South Carolina. Debate began March 20, and continued till April 8, when the bill was finally passed by a vote of 88 to 54. April 20 it passed the Senate with some amendments, and April 27 received the approval of Madison. . . . The features of Dallas' proposed tariff were the enlarging of the ad valorem list from three groups at 12½, 15, and 20 per cent to eight groups at 7½, 15, 20, 22, 28, 30, and 33½ per cent; the increase of specific duties by about 42 per cent; and, most important of all, in the article of coarse cottons, the insertion of a minimum, by which, as far as the custom-house was concerned, no quality was to be regarded as costing less than 25 cents per square yard. Except in the case of coarse cottons the new rates on articles which it was desired to protect fell slightly below the double rates of the war. Three positions were brought out in debate—two extremes, seeking the formulation of economic reasons for and against the policy of protection, and a middle party, composed mainly of men indifferent to manufacturing as such, but accepting the establishment of manufactures as one of the chief results of the war. . . . The two extremes, however, were far from taking the positions assumed later by extreme protectionism and extreme laissez-faire. . . . Only a few articles occasioned any discussion, and these were items like sugar, cottons, and woollens, which had been reduced in the Ways and Means Committee from the rates proposed by Dallas. Dallas had fixed the duty on cottons at 33½ per cent, which was reduced to 30 per cent in Lowndes' bill. Clay moved to restore the original rate. . . . Later Webster proposed a sliding scale on cottons, the rate to be 30 per cent for two years, then 25 per cent for two more, and then 20 per cent. Clay moved to amend by making the first period three years and the second one year. . . . Lowndes assented to the motion. . . . Dallas proposed 28 per cent on woollens. The committee reduced this to 25 per cent, and following the example set in the case of cottons, Lowndes moved that after two years the rate be fixed at 20 per cent. . . . After some debate the first period was made three years, and Lowndes' amendment agreed to. The tariff of 1816 was a substantial victory for the manufacturers. . . . But . . . in its working out the tariff of 1816 proved a bitter disappointment to the manufacturing in-



terest. The causes, however, were widely varied. . . . Yet it would be easy to exaggerate the distresses of the country. The years from 1816 to 1820 especially, were years of depression and hard times, but the steady growth of the country was hardly interrupted. In the main the tariff did not fail of its legitimate object. For the most part the new manufactures were conserved. . . . More and more there was a growing impatience with the tariff of 1816, and a tendency to lay the bad times upon its shoulders. . . . March 22, 1820, Baldwin of Pennsylvania, chairman of the newly created Committee on Manufactures, introduced a tariff bill embodying the general demand of the protected interests. . . . The bill passed the House by a vote of 90 to 69; it was defeated in the Senate by one vote."—O. L. Elliott, *The Tariff Controversy, 1789-1833* (Leland Stanford Junior University Monographs No. 1), pp. 163-211.—"The revision of the Tariff, with a view to the protection of home industry, and to the establishment of what was then called, 'The American System,' was one of the large subjects before Congress at the session of 1823-24, and was the regular commencement of the heated debates on that question which afterwards ripened into a serious difficulty between the federal government and some of the southern States. . . . Revenue the object, protection the incident, had been the rule in the earlier tariffs: now that rule was sought to be reversed, and to make protection the object of the law, and revenue the incident. . . . Mr. Clay, the leader in the proposed revision, and the champion of the American System, expressly placed the proposed augmentation of duties on this ground. . . . Mr. Webster was the leading speaker on the other side, and disputed the universality of the distress which had been described; claiming exemption from it in New England; denied the assumed cause for it where it did exist, and attributed it to over expansion and collapse of the paper system, as in Great Britain, after the long suspension of the Bank of England; denied the necessity for increased protection to manufactures, and its inadequacy, if granted, to the relief of the country where distress prevailed. . . . The bill was carried in the House, after a protracted contest of ten weeks, by the lean majority of five—107 to 102—only two members absent, and the voting so zealous that several members were brought in upon their sick couches. In the Senate the bill encountered a strenuous resistance. . . . The bill . . . was carried by the small majority of four votes—25 to 21. . . . An increased protection to the products of several States, as lead in Missouri and Illinois, hemp in Kentucky, iron in Pennsylvania, wool in Ohio and New York, commanded many votes for the bill; and the impending presidential election had its influence in its favor. Two of the candidates, Messrs. Adams and Clay, were avowedly for it; General Jackson, who voted for the bill, was for it, as tending to give a home supply of the articles necessary in time of war, and as raising revenue to pay the public debt."—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 13.

ALSO IN A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union*, sects. 122 and 132 (ch. 11-12).—A. Walker, *Science of Wealth*, p. 116.—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff Hist. of the U. S.*, pp. 68-76.—A. S. Bolles, *Financial Hist. of the U. S.*, 1789-1860, bk. 3, ch. 3.

(United States): A. D. 1828.—The "Bill of Abominations."—New England changes front.—"In 1828 came another tariff bill, so bad and so extreme in many respects that it was called the 'bill of abominations.' It originated in the agitation of the woollen manufacturers which had started the year before, and for this bill Mr. Webster spoke and voted. He changed his ground on this important question absolutely and entirely, and made no pretence of doing anything else. The speech which he made on this occasion is a celebrated one, but it is so solely on account of the startling change of position which it announced. . . . A few lines from the speech give the marrow of the whole matter. Mr. Webster said: 'New England, sir, has not been a leader in this policy. . . . The opinion of New England up to 1824 was founded in the conviction that, on the whole, it was wisest and best, both for herself and others, that manufactures should make haste slowly. . . . When, at the commencement of the late war, duties were doubled, we were told that we should find a mitigation of the weight of taxation in the new aid and succor which would be thus afforded to our own manufacturing labor. Like arguments were urged, and prevailed, but not by the aid of New England votes, when the tariff was afterwards arranged at the close of the war in 1816. Finally, after a winter's deliberation, the act of 1824 received the sanction of both Houses of Congress and settled the policy of the country. . . . What, then, was New England to do? Was she to hold out forever against the course of the government, and see herself losing on one side and yet make no effort to sustain herself on the other? No, sir. Nothing was left to New England but to conform herself to the will of others. Nothing was left to her but to consider that the government had fixed and determined its own policy, and that policy was protection.' . . . Opinion in New England changed for good and sufficient business reasons, and Mr. Webster changed with it. Free trade had commended itself to him as an abstract principle, and he had sustained and defended it as in the interest of commercial New England. But when the weight of interest in New England shifted from free trade to protection Mr. Webster followed it."—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, ch. 6.—"There was force in Webster's assertion, in reply to Hayne, that New England, after protesting against the tariff as long as she could, had conformed to a policy forced upon the country by others, and had embarked her capital in manufacturing. October 23, 1826, the Boston woollen manufacturers petitioned Congress for more protection. . . . This appeal of the woollen manufacturers brought out new demands from other quarters. Especially the wool-growers came forward. . . . May 14, 1827, the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts called a convention of wool growers and manufacturers. The convention met at Harrisburg, July 30, 1827. It was found necessary to enlarge the scope of the convention in order to make allies of interests which would otherwise become hostile. The convention went on the plan of favoring protection on everything which asked for it. The result was that iron, steel, glass, wool, woollens, hemp, and flax were recommended for protection. Louisiana was not represented, and so sugar was left

out. It was voted to discourage the importation of foreign spirits and the distillation of spirits from foreign products, by way of protection to Western whiskey. . . . When the 20th Congress met, the tariff was the absorbing question. Popular interest had become engaged in it, and parties were to form on it, but it perplexed the politicians greatly. . . . The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish special interests was an economic monstrosity. . . . May 19, 1828, the bill became a law. The duty on wool costing less than 10 cents per pound was 15 per cent., on other wool 20 per cent. and 30 per cent. That on woollens was 40 per cent. for a year, then 45 per cent., there being four minima, 50 cents, \$1.00, \$2.50, \$4.00. All which cost over \$4.00 were to be taxed 45 per cent. for a year, then 50 per cent. . . . The process of rolling iron had not yet been introduced into this country. It was argued that rolled iron was not as good as forged, and this was made the ground for raising the tax on rolled iron from \$30.00 to \$37.00 per ton, while the tax on forged iron was raised from \$18.00 to \$22.40. Rolled iron was cheaper and was available for a great number of uses. The tax, in this case, 'countervailed' an improvement in the arts, and robbed the American people of their share in the advantage of a new industrial achievement. The tax on steel was raised from \$20.00 to \$30.00 per ton; that on hemp from \$35.00 to \$45.00 per ton; that on molasses from 5 cents to 10 cents per gallon; that on flax from nothing to \$35.00 per ton. The tax on sugar, salt, and glass remained unchanged, and that on tea also, save by a differential tonnage duty. Coffee was classified and the tax reduced. The tax on wine, by a separate act, was reduced one half or more. This was the 'tariff of abominations,' so called on account of the number of especially monstrous provisions which it contained."—W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man*, ch. 9.—"The tariff of 1828. . . was the work of politicians and manufacturers; and was commenced for the benefit of the woollen interest, and upon a bill chiefly designed to favor that branch of manufacturing industry. But, like all other bills of the kind, it required help from other interests to get itself along."—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 34.—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 12, sect. 2 (v. 3).

(United States): A. D. 1832.—Clay's delusive act to diminish revenue.—President Jackson, in his message of December, 1831, "invited attention to the fact that the public debt would be extinguished before the expiration of his term, and that, therefore, 'a modification of the tariff, which shall produce a reduction of the revenue to the wants of the government,' was very advisable. He added that, in justice to the interests of the merchant as well as the manufacturer, the reduction should be prospective, and that the duties should be adjusted with a view 'to the counteraction of foreign policy, so far as it may be injurious to our national interests.' This meant a revenue tariff with incidental retaliation. He had thus arrived at a sensible plan to avoid the accumulation of a surplus. Clay took the matter in hand in the Senate, or rather in Congress. . . . He recognized the necessity of reducing the revenue, but he would reduce the revenue without reducing protective duties. The 'American System'

should not suffer. It must, therefore, not be done in the manner proposed by Jackson. He insisted upon confining the reduction to duties on articles not coming into competition with American products. . . . Instead of abolishing protective duties he would rather reduce the revenue by making some of them prohibitory. . . . When objection was made that this would be a defiance of the South, of the President, and of the whole administration party, he replied, as Adams reports, that 'to preserve, maintain and strengthen the American System, he would defy the South, the President and the devil.' He introduced a resolution in the Senate, 'that the existing duties upon articles imported from foreign countries, and not coming into competition with similar articles made or produced within the United States, ought to be forthwith abolished, except the duties upon wines and silks, and that those ought to be reduced; and that the Committee on Finance be instructed to report a bill accordingly.'" After long debate Clay's "tariff resolution was adopted, and in June, 1832, a bill substantially in accord with it passed both houses, known as the tariff act of 1832. It reduced or abolished the duties on many of the unprotected articles, but left the protective system without material change. As a reduction of the revenue it effected very little. . . . The reduction proposed by Clay, according to his own estimate, was not over seven millions; the reduction really effected by the new tariff law scarcely exceeded three millions. Clay had saved the American System at the expense of the very object contemplated by the measure. It was extremely short-sighted statesmanship. The surplus was as threatening as ever, and the dissatisfaction in the South grew from day to day."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 13 (v. 1).

ALSO IN H. Clay, *Life, Cor. and Speeches* (Colton ed.), v. 5, pp. 416-428.

(United States): A. D. 1833.—The Southern opposition to protection.—Nullification in S. Carolina.—The compromise tariff. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1828-1833.

(Germany): A. D. 1833.—The Zollverein.—"The German Customs Union (Deutsche Zollverein) is an association of states, having for its declared object to secure freedom of trade and commerce between the contracting states, and a common interest in the customs revenue. The terms of the union are expressed in the treaty between Prussia and the other states, dated 22d March, 1833, which may be regarded as the basis of the association. The states now [1844] forming the union are Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Nassau, the Thuringian states, Frankfort, Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Luxemburg. The population of these, with the exception of the three last mentioned states, was, in 1839, 26,858,886. Including these three states, which have since joined the union, the present population cannot be less than twenty-seven millions and a half. The German powers which have not joined the union are Austria, with twelve millions of German subjects, and Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein, the two Mecklenburgs, and the Hanse Towns, whose united population is about three millions more. The inhabitants of Germany are, therefore, divided



in the proportions of twenty-seven and a half within, to fifteen without, the sphere of the Zollverein. The treaty provides in the thirty-eighth article, for the admission of other German states, and the thirty-ninth article for the making of treaties with foreign states, but these latter are not admissible into the union. . . . The declared principle of the league—namely, the commercial and financial union of the German states—is not only one to which no foreign power has any right to object, but is excellent in itself; and is, in fact, the establishment of free trade among the associated states. . . . But it is not merely to its avowed principle that the league owes its successful accomplishment. There are other motives which have entered largely into the causes of its existence. In the first place, it has given practical effect to that vehement desire for national unity which so generally pervades the German mind. . . . Then, it so happened that this general desire for union fell in exactly with the policy of Prussia—a power which has not failed to seize so favourable an opportunity of extending her political influence, and occupying a position which, though of nominal equality, has in reality secured her predominance among the German states. To these inducements we regret to be obliged to add another—namely, the prevalent opinion in Germany that their manufacturing industry ought to be protected against foreign competition, and that the tariff of the Zollverein ought to be used as an instrument for the exclusion of foreign manufactures from the German market. . . . Although the Congress of Vienna had established a new Germanic confederation, (*Deutsche Bund*) and a federative diet charged with the maintenance of peace at home and abroad, yet it was soon perceived and felt that the kind of union obtained by means of this confederation was more formal than real. . . . The late King of Prussia was one of the first to perceive, that, in order to unite Germany in reality, something more cogent than the federative diet was indispensable. He found his own power rather weakened than strengthened by the addition of the Rhenish provinces, so long as they remained separated, not only by distance, but by the customs-barriers of intervening states, from his ancient territories. He accordingly effected, in 1829, a convention with those states, by which he became the farmer of their customs-revenues, and so removed the barriers between Eastern and Western Prussia. Some years, however, previous to this, the Prussian Government had deemed it expedient to comply with the demands of the manufacturers (especially those in the Rhenish provinces) for protection against foreign goods, which, since the peace, had begun to make their appearance; and on the 26th May, 1818, a new Prussian Tariff had been issued, which was designed to afford a moderate protection to the home industry, and which may be regarded as the groundwork of the present Tariff of the Zollverein. . . . But the proceedings of Prussia were considered in a hostile light by the manufacturers of the South. They formed a counteracting association in 1819 which numbered from five to six thousand members, had its headquarters in Nuremberg, and agents in all the principal towns, and published a weekly newspaper devoted to the cause. They addressed the Diet, the German courts, and the

Congress at Vienna in 1820, in favor of a general customs-union. They so far succeeded that, in 1826, the small Thuringian States, occupying the central portion of Germany, with one or two others, formed themselves into a customs-union, under the name of the *Mittel-Verein*; and within the two succeeding years a more important union was accomplished, consisting of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, with their small enclosed states; the Tariff of which union is stated to have been as high, or very nearly so, as that of Prussia. Thus Germany contained three separate customs-associations, with separate Tariffs, and it became obviously desirable to unite these conflicting interests. Prussia made overtures to the other unions, but was for a long time unsuccessful; they objecting principally to the high scale of Prussian duties on colonial produce. At last, however, all obstacles were removed, (principally, as Dr. List states, through the exertions of Baron von Cotta, the eminent publisher, and proprietor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*,) and on the 22d of March, 1833, the treaty was signed by which, for the first time, Germany was knit together in anything like a binding national confederation. Between that date and the present, the league has been enlarged by the accession of other states; but, as we have already mentioned, Hanover and some other northern states have hitherto refused to join it. Hanover formed a distinct union with three neighbouring states, viz.: Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Oldenburg, which assumed the title of the *North-western League*; but the two former having subsequently seceded from it and joined the Zollverein, the *North-western League* has been reduced to Hanover and Oldenburg only. The Hanse towns, Mecklenburg, and Holstein, are not yet members of any customs-union. The revenues of the Zollverein are divided among the contracting states according to the population of each state respectively.”—*Edinburgh Review*, Jan., 1844 (v. 79, p. 108).

ALSO IN G. Krause, *The Growth of German Unity*, ch. 10.—See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 1817-1840; and 1819-1847.

(England): A. D. 1836-1839.—**Beginning of the Anti-Corn-Law agitation.**—“Cobden was in no sense the original projector of an organized body for throwing off the burden of the corn duties. In 1836 an Anti-Corn-Law Association had been formed in London; its principal members were the parliamentary radicals, Grote, Molesworth, Joseph Hume, and Mr. Roebuck. But this group, notwithstanding their acuteness, their logical penetration, and the soundness of their ideas, were in that, as in so many other matters, stricken with impotence. Their gifts of reasoning were admirable, but they had no gifts for popular organization. . . . It was not until a body of men in Manchester were moved to take the matter in hand, that any serious attempt was made to inform and arouse the country. The price of wheat had risen to seventy-seven shillings in the August of 1838; there was every prospect of a wet harvesting; the revenue was declining; deficit was becoming a familiar word; pauperism was increasing; and the manufacturing population of Lancashire were finding it impossible to support themselves, because the landlords, and the legislation of a generation of landlords before them, insisted on keeping the first necessity of life at an artificially high rate.

. . . In October, 1838, a band of seven men met at a hotel in Manchester, and formed a new Anti-Corn Law Association. They were speedily joined by others, including Cobden, who from this moment began to take a prominent part in all counsel and action. That critical moment had arrived, which comes in the history of every successful movement, when a section arises within the party, which refuses from that day forward either to postpone or to compromise. The feeling among the older men was to stop short in their demands at some modification of the existing duty. . . . The more energetic members protested against these faltering voices. . . . The meeting was adjourned, to the great chagrin of the President, and when the members assembled a week later, Cobden drew from his pocket a draft petition which he and his allies had prepared in the interval, and which after a discussion of many hours was adopted by an almost unanimous vote. The preamble laid all the stress on the alleged facts of foreign competition, in words which never fail to be heard in times of bad trade. It recited how the existing laws prevented the British manufacturer from exchanging the produce of his labour for the corn of other countries, and so enabled his foreign rivals to purchase their food at one half of the price at which it was sold in the English market; and finally the prayer of the petition called for the repeal of all laws relating to the importation of foreign corn and other foreign articles of subsistence, and implored the House to carry out to the fullest extent, both as affects manufactures and agriculture, the true and peaceful principles of free-trade. In the following month, January, 1839, the Anti-Corn-Law Association showed that it was in earnest in the intention to agitate, by proceeding to raise a subscription of an effective sum of money. Cobden threw out one of those expressions which catch men's minds in moments when they are already ripe for action. 'Let us,' he said, 'invest part of our property, in order to save the rest from confiscation.' Within a month £6,000 had been raised, the first instalment of many scores of thousands still to come. A great banquet was given to some of the parliamentary supporters of Free Trade; more money was subscribed, convictions became clearer and purpose waxed more resolute. On the day after the banquet, at a meeting of delegates from other towns, Cobden brought forward a scheme for united action among the various associations throughout the country. This was the germ of what ultimately became the League."—J. Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, ch. 6 (v. 1).

ALSO IN W. Robertson, *Life and Times of John Bright*, ch. 8 and 11-14.

(England): A. D. 1842.—Peel's modification of the Corn Laws.—His sliding-scale.—His Tariff reductions.—The first great step towards Free-Trade.—The Whig administration under Lord Melbourne gave way in August, in 1841, to one formed by Sir Robert Peel. On the opening of the session in February, 1842, "The Queen's Speech recommended Parliament to consider the state of the laws affecting the importation of corn and other commodities. It announced the beginning of a revolution which few persons in England thought possible, although it was to be completed in little more than ten years. On the 9th of February Peel

moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Corn Laws. His speech, which lasted nearly three hours, was necessarily dull, and his proposal was equally offensive to the country gentlemen and to the Anti-Corn Law League. It amounted merely to an improvement of the sliding-scale which had been devised by the Duke of Wellington's Cabinet [See above: A. D. 1815-1828], and was based on the axiom that the British farmer, taking one year with another, could not make a profit by growing corn if foreign corn were admitted at a price of less than 70s. a quarter. By a calculation of prices extending over a long term of years, Peel had satisfied himself that a price of 56s. a quarter would remunerate the British farmer. He proposed to modify the sliding-scale accordingly. . . . Peel retained the minimum duty of 1s. when corn was selling at 73s. the quarter; he fixed a maximum duty of 20s. when corn was selling at from 50s. to 51s. the quarter, and he so altered the graduation in the increase of duty as to diminish the inducement to hold grain back when it became dear. . . . So general was the dissatisfaction with Peel's Corn Law that Russell ventured once more to place before the House his alternative of a fixed 8s. duty. He was defeated by a majority of upwards of 120 votes. Two days later Mr. Villiers made his annual motion for the total repeal of the Corn Laws, and was beaten by more than four votes to one. The murmurs of Peel's own supporters were easily overborne, and the Bill was carried through the House of Commons after a month spent in debates. As soon as it had passed, and the estimates for the army and navy had been voted, Peel produced what was really his Budget, nominally Mr. Goulburn's. . . . In every one of the last five years there had been a deficit. . . . Peel therefore resolved to impose an income tax." He also raised the duty on Irish spirits and on exports of coal, besides making some changes in the stamp duties. "With these and with the income tax he calculated that he would have a surplus of £1,900,000. Peel was thus able to propose a reduction of the tariff upon uniform and comprehensive principles. He proposed to limit import duties to a maximum of 5 per cent. upon the value of raw materials, of 12 per cent. upon the value of goods partly manufactured, and of 20 per cent. upon the value of goods wholly manufactured. Out of the 1,200 articles then comprised in the tariff, 750 were more or less affected by the application of these rules, yet so trivial was the revenue raised from most of them that the total loss was computed at only £270,000 a year. Peel reduced the duty on coffee; he reduced the duty on foreign and almost entirely abolished the duty on Canadian timber. Cattle and pigs, meat of all descriptions, cheese and butter, which had hitherto been subject to a prohibitory duty, he proposed to admit at a comparatively low rate. He also diminished the duty upon stage coaches. So extensive a change in our system of national finance had never before been effected at one stroke. . . . Immense was the excitement caused by the statement of the Budget. . . . Every part of Peel's scheme was debated with the utmost energy. . . . He procured the ratification of all his measures subject to some slight amendments, and at the cost of a whole session spent



in discussing them. Little or nothing else was accomplished by Parliament in this year. Peel had returned to power as the Champion of protection. His first great achievement was the extension of the freedom of trade."—F. G. Montague, *Life of Sir Robert Peel*, ch. 8.—"Notwithstanding the objections which free traders might raise, the Budget of 1842 proved the first great advance in the direction of free trade. It did not remove the shackles under which trade was struggling, but it relaxed the fastenings and lightened the load."—S. Walpole, *Hist. of Eng. from 1815*, ch. 18 (v. 4).

ALSO IN: S. Walpole, *Life of Sir Robert Peel*, v. 3, ch. 5.—J. Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, v. 1, ch. 11.

(United States): A. D. 1842.—An Act to provide a necessary increase of revenue, with incidental protection.—"There had been a lull in tariff legislation for ten years. The free-trade party had been ascendant; and amendment of the law, save in the slight ways mentioned, had been impossible. During the decade, a financial tornado had swept over the country; the United-States bank had ceased to be; the experiment of keeping the government deposits with the State banks had been tried, and had failed; the government had kept them several years without authority, but finally a bill had been passed which authorized keeping them in that manner. The time had now nearly come for reducing the duties [by the gradual scaling down provided for in the Compromise tariff act of 1833] to their lowest point. Manufactures were drying up at the root. A material augmentation of the national revenue from some source had become necessary. . . . Whatever difference of opinion existed respecting the necessity of additional protection to manufacturers, some expedient, it was universally conceded, must be adopted to increase the public revenue. As no one favored direct taxation, a revision of the tariff was the only mode of enriching the treasury. . . . The committee on manufactures did not report to the House until the last of March, 1842. . . . The leading provisions of the bill reported by the committee were the following: 1. A general ad valorem duty of 30 per cent, with few exceptions, where the duty was on that principle. 2. A discrimination was made for the security of certain interests requiring it by specific duties, in some instances below, in others above, the rate of the general ad valorem duty. 3. As a general principle, the duty on the articles subject to discrimination was made at the rate at which it was in 1840, after the deduction of four-tenths of the excess on 20 per cent by the Act of 1833. . . . The subject was discussed at great length by the House, although the time was drawing near for making the last reduction under the compromise law of [1833]. Something must be done. Accordingly, Fillmore, chairman of the committee of ways and means, reported a bill to extend the existing tariff laws until the 1st day of August, 1842, which was immediately passed by the House; but the Senate amended the bill by adding a proviso that nothing therein contained should suspend the operation of the Distribution law,—a law passed at the extra session of the preceding year, distributing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the States. . . . In the debate on this bill the proviso became a prominent topic of discussion. The distribution

Act contained a proviso, that, if at any time the duties under the compromise tariff should be raised, the distribution should cease, and be suspended until the cause of the suspension were removed. . . . Those who were in favor of high protective duties desired the removal of the proviso of the distribution Act in order that the tariff might be raised without interfering with distribution. The House having rejected an amendment proposing to strike out the proviso which prohibited the suspension of the distribution law, the bill was passed by the House, and afterward by the Senate, but vetoed by the President. Another tariff bill was introduced by Mr. Fillmore, drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury,—to which, however, the committee added a proviso that the . . . proceeds of the public lands should be distributed, notwithstanding the increase of duties,—which passed both Houses after a short debate. This contained a revision of a considerable number of duties, and was also vetoed by the President. Impelled by the necessity of providing additional revenue, a bill was rapidly pushed through Congress, similar to that previously passed, with the omission of the proviso requiring distribution, and further modified by admitting free of duty tea and coffee growing east of the Cape of Good Hope, imported in American vessels. This bill was approved by the President. A separate bill was then passed, repealing the proviso of the distribution Act, and allowing the distribution to take place, notwithstanding the increase of duties; but the bill was retained by the President and defeated. Thus ended a long and bitter controversy, in which public sentiment expanded, and hardened against the chief Executive of the nation. . . . That tariff remained without change during the next four years."—A. S. Bolles, *Financial Hist. of the U. S.*, 1789-1860, bk. 3, ch. 6.

(England): A. D. 1845-1846.—The Repeal of the Corn Laws.—Dissolution of the League.—"The Anti-Corn-Law agitation was one of those movements which, being founded on right principles, and in harmony with the interest of the masses, was sure to gather fresh strength by any event affecting the supply of food. It was popular to attempt to reverse a policy which aimed almost exclusively to benefit one class of society. . . . The economic theorists had the mass of the people with them. Their gatherings were becoming more and more enthusiastic. And even amidst Conservative landowners there were not a few enlightened and liberal minds who had already, silently at least, espoused the new ideas. No change certainly could be expected to be made so long as bread was cheap and labour abundant. But when a deficient harvest and a blight in the potato crop crippled the resources of the people and raised grain to famine prices, the voice of the League acquired greater power and influence. Hitherto they had received hundreds of pounds. Now, thousands were sent in to support the agitation. A quarter of a million was readily contributed. Nor were the contributors Lancashire mill-owners exclusively. Among them were merchants and bankers, men of heart and men of mind, the poor labourer and the peer of the realm. The fervid oratory of Bright, the demonstrative and argumentative reasoning of Cobden, the more popular appeals of Fox, Rawlins, and other platform speakers, filled the newspaper press, and were eagerly read. And when

Parliament dissolved in August 1845, even Sir Robert Peel showed some slight symptoms of a conviction that the days of the corn laws were numbered. Every day, in truth, brought home to his mind a stronger need for action, and as the ravages of the potato disease progressed, he saw that all further resistance would be absolutely dangerous. A cabinet council was held on October 31 of that year to consult as to what was to be done, and at an adjourned meeting on November 5 Sir Robert Peel intimated his intention to issue an order in council remitting the duty on grain in bond to one shilling, and opening the ports for the admission of all species of grain at a smaller rate of duty until a day to be named in the order; to call Parliament together on the 27th inst., in order to ask for an indemnity, and a sanction of the order by law; and to submit to Parliament immediately after the recess a modification of the existing law, including the admission at a nominal duty of Indian corn and of British colonial corn. A serious difference of opinion, however, was found to exist in the cabinet on the question brought before them, the only ministers supporting such measures being the Earl of Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Nor was it easy to induce the other members to listen to reason. And though at a subsequent meeting, held on November 28, Sir Robert Peel so far secured a majority in his favour, it was evident that the cabinet was too divided to justify him in bringing forward his measures, and he decided upon resigning office. His resolution to that effect having been communicated to the Queen, her Majesty summoned Lord John Russell to form a cabinet, and, to smooth his path, Sir Robert Peel, with characteristic frankness, sent a memorandum to her Majesty embodying a promise to give him his support. But Lord John Russell failed in his efforts, and the Queen had no alternative but to recall Sir Robert Peel, and give him full power to carry out his measures. It was under such circumstances that Parliament was called for January 22, 1846, and on January 27 the Government plan was propounded before a crowded House. It was not an immediate repeal of the corn laws that Sir Robert Peel recommended. He proposed a temporary protection for three years, till February 1, 1849, imposing a scale during that time ranging from 4s. when the price of wheat should be 50s. per quarter and upward, and 10s. when the price should be under 48s. per quarter, providing, however, that after that period all grain should be admitted at the uniform duty of 1s. per quarter. The measure, as might have been expected, was received in a very different manner by the political parties in both Houses of Parliament. There was treason in the Conservative camp, it was said, and keen and bitter was the opposition offered to the chief of the party. For twelve nights speaker after speaker indulged in personal recriminations. They recalled to Sir Robert Peel's memory the speeches he had made in defence of the corn laws. And as to his assertion that he had changed his mind, they denied his right to do so. . . . The passing of the measure was, however, more than certain, and after a debate of twelve nights' duration on Mr. Miles's amendment, the Government obtained a majority of 97, 337 having voted for the motion and 240 against it. And from that evening the corn law may be

said to have expired. Not a day too soon, certainly, when we consider the straitened resources of the country as regards the first article of food, caused not only by the bad crop of grain, but by the serious loss of the potato crop, especially in Ireland."—L. Levi, *Hist. of British Commerce*, pt. 4, ch. 4.—"On the 2nd of July the League was 'conditionally dissolved,' by the unanimous vote of a great meeting of the leaders at Manchester. . . . Mr. Cobden here joyfully closed his seven years' task, which he had prosecuted at the expense of health, fortune, domestic comfort, and the sacrifice of his own tastes in every way. . . . Mr. Cobden had sacrificed at least £20,000 in the cause. The country now, at the call of the other chief Leaguers, presented him with above £80,000—not only for the purpose of acknowledging his sacrifices, but also to set him free for life for the political service of his country."—H. Martineau, *Hist. of the Thirty Years' Peace*, bk. 6, ch. 15 (p. 4).

ALSO IN: W. C. Taylor, *Life and Times of Sir Robert Peel*, v. 3, ch. 8-10.—J. Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, v. 1, ch. 15-16.—M. M. Trumbull, *The Free Trade Struggle in England*.—A. Bisset, *Notes on the Anti-Corn Law Struggle*.—*Debate upon the Corn Laws in Session 1846*.

(United States): A. D. 1846-1861.—Lowered duties and the disputed effects.—"In 1846 was passed what we will call the 'Walker tariff,' from Robert J. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury. It reduced the duties on imports down to about the standard of the 'Compromise' of 1833. It discriminated, however, as the Compromise did not, between goods that could be produced at home and those that could not. It approached, in short, more nearly than any other, in its principles and details, to the Hamilton tariff, although the general rate of duties was higher. From that time up to 1857 there was a regular and large increase in the amount of dutiable goods imported, bringing in a larger revenue to the government. The surplus in the treasury accumulated, and large sums were expended by the government in buying up its own bonds at a high premium, for the sake of emptying the treasury. Under these circumstances the 'tariff of 1857' was passed, decidedly lowering the rates of duties and largely increasing the free list. The financial crisis of that year diminished the imports, and the revenue fell off \$22,000,000. It rallied, however, the next two years, but owing to the large increase of the free list, not quite up to the old point."—A. L. Perry, *Elements of Pol. Economy*, p. 464.—"The free-traders consider the tariff of 1846 to be a conclusive proof of the beneficial effect of low duties. They challenge a comparison of the years of its operation, between 1846 and 1857, with any other equal period in the history of the country. Manufacturing, they say, was not forced by a hot-house process to produce high-priced goods for popular consumption, but was gradually encouraged and developed on a healthful and self-sustaining basis, not to be shaken as a reed in the wind by every change in the financial world. Commerce, as they point out, made great advances, and our carrying trade grew so rapidly that in ten years from the day the tariff of 1846 was passed our tonnage exceeded the tonnage of England. The free-traders refer with especial emphasis to what they term the symmetrical development of all the great interests of the country under this



liberal tariff. Manufactures were not stimulated at the expense of the commercial interest. Both were developed in harmony, while agriculture, the indispensable basis of all, was never more flourishing. The farmers and planters at no other period of our history were in receipt of such good prices, steadily paid to them in gold coin, for their surplus product, which they could send to the domestic market over our own railways and to the foreign market in our own ships. Assertions as to the progress of manufactures in the period under discussion are denied by the protectionists. While admitting the general correctness of the free-trader's statements as to the prosperous condition of the country, they call attention to the fact that directly after the enactment of the tariff of 1846 the great famine occurred in Ireland, followed in the ensuing years by short crops in Europe. The prosperity which came to the American agriculturist was therefore from causes beyond the sea and not at home,—causes which were transient, indeed almost accidental. Moreover an exceptional condition of affairs existed in the United States in consequence of our large acquisition of territory from Mexico at the close of the war and the subsequent and almost immediate discovery of gold in California. A new and extended field of trade was thus opened in which we had the monopoly, and an enormous surplus of money was speedily created from the products of the rich mines on the Pacific coast. At the same time Europe was in convulsion from the revolutions of 1848, and production was materially hindered over a large part of the Continent. This disturbance had scarcely subsided when three leading nations of Europe, England, France, and Russia, engaged in the wasteful and expensive war of the Crimea. The struggle began in 1853 and ended in 1856, and during those years it increased consumption and decreased production abroad, and totally closed the grain-fields of Russia from any competition with the United States. The protectionists therefore hold that the boasted prosperity of the country under the tariff of 1846 was abnormal in origin and in character. . . . The protectionists maintain that from 1846 to 1857 the United States would have enjoyed prosperity under any form of tariff, but that the moment the exceptional conditions in Europe and in America came to an end, the country was plunged headlong into a disaster [the financial crisis of 1857] from which the conservative force of a protective tariff would in large part have saved it. . . . The free-traders, as an answer to this arraignment of their tariff policy, seek to charge responsibility for the financial disasters to the hasty and inconsiderate changes made in the tariff in 1857, for which both parties were in large degree if not indeed equally answerable."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 9.

(England): A. D. 1846-1879.—Total abandonment of Protection and Navigation Laws.—The perfected tariff of Free Trade.—“With the fall of the principle of the protection in corn may be said to have practically fallen the principle of protection in this country altogether. That principle was a little complicated in regard to the sugar duties and to the navigation laws. The sugar produced in the West Indian colonies was allowed to enter this country at rates of duty

much lower than those imposed upon the sugar grown in foreign lands. The abolition of slavery in our colonies had made labour there somewhat costly and difficult to obtain continuously, and the impression was that if the duties on foreign sugar were reduced, it would tend to enable those countries which still maintained the slave trade to compete at great advantage with the sugar grown in our colonies by that free labour to establish which England had but just paid so large a pecuniary fine. Therefore, the question of Free Trade became involved with that of free labour; at least, so it seemed to the eyes of many a man who was not inclined to support the protective principle in itself. When it was put to him, whether he was willing to push the Free Trade principle so far as to allow countries growing sugar by slave labour to drive our free grown sugar out of the market, he was often inclined to give way before this mode of putting the question, and to imagine that there really was a collision between Free Trade and free labour. Therefore a certain sentimental plea came in to aid the Protectionists in regard to the sugar duties. Many of the old anti-slavery party found themselves deceived by this fallacy, and inclined to join the agitation against the reduction of the duty on foreign sugar. On the other hand, it was made tolerably clear that the labour was not so scarce or so dear in the colonies as had been represented, and that colonial sugar grown by free labour really suffered from no inconvenience except the fact that it was still manufactured on the most crude, old fashioned, and uneconomical methods. Besides, the time had gone by when the majority of the English people could be convinced that a lesson on the beauty of freedom was to be conveyed to foreign sugar-growers and slave-owners by the means of a tax upon the products of their plantations. Therefore, after a long and somewhat eager struggle, the principle of Free Trade was allowed to prevail in regard to sugar. The duties on sugar were made equal. The growth of the sugar plantations was admitted on the same terms into this country, without any reference either to the soil from which it had sprung or to the conditions under which it was grown.”—J. McCarthy, *The Epoch of Reform*, ch. 12.—“The contest on the Navigation Laws [finally repealed in 1849—see NAVIGATION LAWS: A. D. 1849] was the last pitched battle fought by the Protectionist party. Their resistance grew fainter and fainter, and a few occasional skirmishes just reminded the world that such a party still existed. Three years afterwards their leaders came into power. In February, 1852, the Earl of Derby became Prime Minister, and Mr. Disraeli Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. The Free-traders, alarmed at the possibility of some attempt to reverse the policy of commercial freedom which had been adopted, took the earliest opportunity of questioning those Ministers in Parliament on the subject. The discreet reply was that the Government did not intend to propose any return to the policy of protection during the present Session, nor at any future time, unless a great majority of members favourable to that policy should be returned to Parliament. But far from this proving to be the case, the general election which immediately ensued reinstated a Liberal Government, and the work of stripping off the few rags of protection that still

hung on went rapidly forward. On the 18th of April, 1853, Mr. Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, made his financial statement in an able and luminous speech. Such was the admirable order in which he marshalled his topics, and the transparent lucidity with which he treated them, that although his address occupied five hours in the delivery, and although it bristled with figures and statistics, he never for a moment lost the attention or fatigued the minds of his hearers. Mr. Gladstone's financial scheme included, among other reforms, the reduction or total remission of imposts on 133 articles. In this way, our tariff underwent rapid simplification. Each subsequent year was marked by a similar elimination of protective impediments to free commercial intercourse with other countries. In 1860, butter, cheese, &c., were admitted duty free; in 1869, the small nominal duty that had been left on corn was abolished; in 1874, sugar was relieved from the remnant of duty that had survived from previous reductions. It would be superfluous, as well as tedious, to enter upon a detailed reference to the various minor reforms through which we advanced towards, and finally reached, our present free-trade tariff. In fact, all the great battles had been fought and won by the close of the year 1849, and the struggle was then virtually over. . . . Is our present tariff one from which every shred and vestige of protection have been discarded? Is it truly and thoroughly a free-trade tariff? That these questions must be answered in the affirmative it is easy to prove in the most conclusive manner. We raise about £20,000,000 of our annual revenue by means of customs' duties on the foreign commodities which we import, and this fact is sometimes adduced by the advocates for protection, without any explanation, leaving their readers to infer that ours is not, as it really is, a free-trade tariff. That such an inference is totally erroneous will presently be made manifest beyond all question. We now levy import duties on only fifteen articles. Subjoined is a list of them, and to each is appended the amount of duty levied on it during the financial year ending 1st of April, 1879. Not produced in England: Tobacco, £8,589,681; Tea, 4,169,233; Wine, 1,469,710; Dried Fruit, 509,234; Coffee, 212,002; Chicory, 66,739; Chocolate and Cocoa, 44,671; Total, £15,061,270. Produced also in England: Spirits, £5,336,058; Plate (Silver and Gold), 5,853; Beer, 3,814; Vinegar, 671; Playing Cards, 522; Pickles, 17; Malt, 6; Spruce, 3; Total, £5,246,944. Total of both £20,408,214. It will be seen by the above figures that £15,000,000, or three-fourths of the total sum levied, is levied on articles which we do not and cannot produce in England. It is clear, therefore, that this portion of the import duties cannot by any possibility be said to afford the blightest 'protection to native industry.' Every shilling's worth which we consume of those articles comes from abroad, and every shilling extra that the consumer pays for them in consequence of the duty goes to the revenue. So much for that portion of the £20,400,000 import duties. As to the £5,336,000 levied on foreign spirits, it consists of import duties which are only the exact counterpart of the excise duties, levied internally on the produce of the British distillers. The foreign article is placed on precisely the same footing as the native article. Both have to pay the same

duty of about 10s. per gallon on spirits of the same strength. It would of course be an absurd stultification to admit foreign spirits duty-free while the English producer was burdened with a tax of 10s. per gallon; but by making the excise duty and the customs' duty precisely the same, equality is established, and no protection or preference whatever is enjoyed by the native distiller. The excise duty levied in the aforesaid year ending April, 1879, on spirits the produce of British distilleries, was no less than £14,855,000. The trifling amounts raised on plate, beer, vinegar, &c., are explained in the same way. They also act as a mere counterpoise to the excise duties levied on the British producers of the same articles, and thus afford to the latter no protection whatever against foreign competition. It is evident, therefore, that our tariff does not retain within it one solitary shred of protection."—A. Mongredien, *Hist. of the Free Trade Movement in Eng.*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: H. Hall, *Hist. of the Customs Revenue of Eng.*—S. Dowell, *Hist. of Taxation and Taxes in Eng.*

(France): A. D. 1853-1860.—**Moderation of Protective duties.—The Cobden-Chevalier Commercial Treaty.**—After the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons in France, the protective system was pushed to so great an extreme that it became in some instances avowedly prohibitive. "The first serious attempt to alter this very severe restrictive system was reserved for the Second Empire. The English reforms of Peel proved the possibility of removing most of the barriers to commerce that legislation had set up, and consequently Napoleon III. entered with moderation on the work of revision. Between 1853 and 1855 the duties on coal, iron, steel, and wool were lowered, as also those on cattle, corn, and various raw materials, the requirements for ship-building being allowed in free. The legislative body was, however, with difficulty brought to consent to these measures. A more extensive proposal—made in 1856—to remove all prohibitions on imports, while retaining protective duties of 30% on woollen and 35% on cotton goods, had to be withdrawn, in consequence of the strong opposition that it excited. The interest of the consumers was in the popular opinion entirely subordinate to that of the iron-masters, cotton-spinners, and agriculturists—one of the many instances which shows that the long continuance of high duties does not facilitate the introduction of free competition. It was under such discouraging circumstances that the famous Commercial Treaty of 1860 with England was negotiated. This important measure (the work of Chevalier and Cobden, but owing a good deal of its success to the efforts of the Emperor and M. Rouher), though only a finishing step in English tariff reform, inaugurated a new era in France."—C. F. Bastable, *The Commerce of Nations*, ch. 8.—"By the treaty of commerce of 1860, France engaged to abolish all prohibitions, and to admit certain articles of British produce and manufacture at duties not exceeding 30 per cent. ad valorem, to be further reduced to duties not exceeding 25 per cent. from the 1st October, 1864. Britain, on the other hand, bound herself to abolish the duties on French silks and other manufactured goods, and to reduce the duties on French wines and brandies. As regards coals, France engaged to



reduce the import duty, and both contracting parties engaged not to prohibit exportation of coal, and to levy no duty upon such exports. Whilst both contracting parties engaged to confer on the other any favour, privilege, or reduction in the tariff of duties on imports on the articles mentioned in the treaty which the said power might concede to any third power; and also not to enforce, one against another, any prohibition of importation or exportation which should not at the same time be applicable to all other nations. The sum and substance of the treaty was, that France engaged to act more liberally for the future than she had done for the past, and England made another step in the way of liberalising her tariff, and placing all her manufactures under the wholesome and invigorating influence of free competition. Nor was the treaty allowed to remain limited to France and England, for forthwith after its conclusion both France and England entered into similar treaties with other nations. And inasmuch as under existing treaties other nations were bound to give to England as good treatment as they gave to the most favoured nations, the restrictions theretofore in existence in countries not originally parties to the French treaty were everywhere greatly reduced, and thereby its benefits extended rapidly over the greater part of Europe."—L. Levi, *Statistical Results of the Recent Treaties of Commerce* (*Journal of the Statistical Soc.*, v. 40, 1877), p. 3.

(Germany): A. D. 1853-1892.—Progress towards Free Trade arrested by Prince Bismarck.—Protection measures of 1878-1887.—"Up to the revolutionary period of 1848-50, the policy of the German Zollverein or Custom's Union was a pronounced protectionism. The general liberalization, so to speak, of political life in Western Europe through the events of the years mentioned and the larger sympathy they engendered between nations produced, however, a strong movement in Germany and German-Austria in favor of greater freedom of commercial exchange between these two countries. It resulted in the conclusion, for the term of twelve years, of the treaty of 1853 between the Zollverein and Austria, as the first of the international compacts for the promotion of commercial intercourse that formed so prominent a feature of European history during the following twenty years. The treaty was a first, but long step towards free exchange, providing, as it did, for uniform duties on imports from other countries, for a considerable free list and for largely reduced duties between the contracting countries. It also contained stipulations for its renewal on the basis of entire free trade. . . . A very influential association was formed, with free trade as the avowed ulterior object. Its leaders, who were also the champions of political liberalism, represented intellects of the highest order. They included the well-known economists Prince Smith, Mittermaier, Rau, Faucher, Michaelis, Wirth, Schulze and Braun. An 'Economic Congress' was held annually, the proceedings of which attracted the greatest attention, and exercised a growing influence upon the policy of the governments composing the Zollverein. . . . The beneficial results of the treaty of 1853 were so obvious and instantaneous that the Zollverein and Austria would have no doubt sought to bring about improved commercial relations with other nations by the same means, but for the disturb-

ance of the peace of Europe by the Crimean war, and the conflict of 1859 between France, Italy and Austria. The bitter feelings, caused by the latter war against the two first named countries wherever the German tongue was spoken, rendered the negotiation of commercial treaties with them out of the question for a time. The great achievement of Richard Cobden and Michel Chevalier, the famous treaty of 1860 between Great Britain and France, changed this reluctance at once into eagerness to secure the same advantages that those two countries had insured to each other. The enlightened and far-seeing despot occupying the throne of France, being once won over to the cause of free exchange by Cobden's ardor and persistence and clear and convincing arguments, against the views of the majority of his ministers and with probably 90 per cent. of his subjects strongly opposed to the abandonment of protectionism, determined, with the zeal of a new convert, to make the most of his new departure. He was very willing, therefore, to meet the advances of the Zollverein, so that in the spring of 1862, after a whole year's negotiation, a formal treaty was consummated between it and the French Empire. It was a very broad measure. . . . It comprised a copyright and trade-mark convention, provisions for liberal modifications of the respective navigation laws and a commercial treaty proper. The latter provided for the free admission of raw materials, for the abolition of transit and export duties and for equalizing import duties as nearly as possible, and also contained a 'most favored nation' clause. . . . In pursuance of the terms of the treaty of 1853 with Austria, negotiations had been commenced early in the sixties with reference to its renewal upon the basis of the removal of all custom-barriers between the two countries. Austria was naturally against the conclusion of a treaty between the Zollverein and France with herself left out, and opposed its consummation with all the means at her command. . . . After long negotiations, accompanied by much excitement in Germany, a compromise was reached in 1864, under which the Zollverein was renewed for twelve years, that is till 1877, and the French treaty ratified on condition that a new treaty should be made with Austria. This was done in 1865, but the new convention did not provide for the complete commercial union, contemplated under that of 1853. It was only a compact between two independent nations, but on more liberal lines than the old treaty, and certainly constituting a yet nearer approach to free trade. . . . In other directions the Zollverein lost no time in following the example of Napoleon by entering successively in 1865 and 1866 into commercial treaties with Belgium, Italy, Great Britain and Switzerland, which were simple conventions, by which the contracting parties granted to each other the position of the most favored nation, or formal tariff regulating treaties after the model of that between the Zollverein and France. These additional treaties were no more than the latter the work of Bismarck. . . . The general upheaval in Germany arising from the war between Prussia and Austria and her North and South-German Allies, while temporarily delaying the farther progress of tariff reform, subsequently accelerated its forward march. . . . A special treaty for the reform of the constitution, so to

speak, of the Zollverein was concluded in July, 1867, between the North-German Federation, the new political constellation Prussia had formed out of all Germany north of the Main, after destroying the old Diet, and Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and Hesse, under the provisions of which the tariff and revenue policy of all Germany was to be managed by the 'Zollparlament,' consisting of an upper house, made up of representatives of the governments, and of a lower house of representatives of the people elected by universal suffrage on a population basis. Thus tariff reform was actually the chain that bound up, as it were, the material interests of all Germans outside of Austria for the first time, as those of one nation. Negotiations for a new commercial treaty with the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary—into which Austria had changed in consequence of the events of 1866—commenced immediately after the restoration of peace, and were brought to a satisfactory conclusion in March, 1868. The treaty was to run nine years, and provided for still lower duties than under the old treaty, the principal reductions being on all agricultural products, wines and iron. . . . The Franco-German war put an end to the treaty of 1862 between France and the Zollverein. As a substitute for the commercial part of it, article II of the treaty of peace of 1871 provided simply that France and Germany should be bound for an indefinite period to allow each other the most favorable tariff rates either of them had granted or might grant to Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary and Russia. . . . A large majority of the members of the first Reichstag [under the newly created Empire] favored further legislation in the direction of free trade, and the work of tariff reform was vigorously taken in hand, as soon as the constitution and the essential organic laws of the Empire had been framed. . . . In the session of 1873 the National Liberals brought in a motion asking the Government to present measures for the abolition of all duties on raw and manufactured iron, salt and other articles. The Government responded very readily. . . . Prince Bismarck was no less pronounced for a strict revenue tariff than any of the other government speakers. Up to the end of 1875, there was not the slightest indication of a change of views on his part upon this general subject. . . . The climax of the free trade movement in Germany can be said to have been reached about the time last stated. But a few months later, suspicious signs of a new inspiration on the part of the Prince became manifest. Rumors of dissensions between him and Minister Delbrück began to circulate, and gradually gained strength. In May, 1876, all Germany was startled by the announcement that the latter and his principal co-workers had resigned. Soon it was known that their retirement was due to a disagreement with the Prince over tariff reform matters. A crisis had evidently set in that was a great puzzle at first to everybody. Gradually it became clear that the cause of it was really a sudden abandonment of the past policy by the Prince. The new course, upon which the mighty helmsman was starting the ship of state, was signalized in various ways, but the full extent of his change of front was disclosed only in a communication addressed by him to the Federal Council, under date of December 15, 1878. It was a most ex-

traordinary document. It condemned boldly all that had been done by the government under his own eyes and with his full consent in relation to tariff reform ever since the Franco-German treaty of 1862. . . . As the principal reason for the new departure, he assigned the necessity of reforming the public finances in order to increase the revenues of the Government. The will of the Chancellor had become the law for the federal council, and, accordingly, the tariff-committee began the work of devising a general protective tariff in hot haste. It was submitted to the Reichstag by the Prince in May, 1879. . . . Thus Germany was started on the downward plain of protectionism, on which it continued for twelve years. Beyond all question, the Chancellor was solely responsible for it. . . . The tariff bill of 1879 met with vigorous opposition under the lead of ex-Minister Delbrück, but was passed by the large majority of 217 to 117—showing the readiness with which the 'bon plaisir' of the master had made converts to his new faith. It was a sweeping measure, establishing large duties on cereals, iron, lumber and petroleum, increasing existing duties on textile goods, coffee, wines, rice, tea, and a great number of other minor articles and also on cattle. The protectionist current came to a temporary stop from 1880-'83, inasmuch as in the new Reichstag, elected in 1881, the protection and anti-protection parties were so evenly balanced that the Government failed to carry its proposals for still higher duties. The elections of 1884, in which the Government brought every influence to bear against the opposition, resulted, however, in the return of a protectionist majority. Accordingly, there followed in 1885 a new screwing up of duties, tripling those on grain, doubling those on lumber, and raising most others. In 1887 the duties on grain were even again increased. But now the insatiable protection and especially the duties put on the necessities of life produced a strong reaction, as evidenced by the largely increased membership of the opposition parties in the present Reichstag. . . . The Imperial Government, shortly after the retirement of Prince Bismarck had untied its hands, entered upon negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium, which resulted in . . . reciprocity treaties."—H. Villard, *German Tariff Policy* (*Yale Rev.*, May, 1892).

ALSO IN: W. H. Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism*.

(United States and Canada): A. D. 1854-1866.—The Reciprocity Treaty.—The Treaty commonly known in America as the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, between the governments of Great Britain and the United States, was concluded on the 5th of June, 1854, and ratifications were exchanged on the 9th of September following. The negotiators were the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, on the part of the British Government, and William L. Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States, acting for the latter. By the first article of the treaty it was agreed that, "in addition to the liberty secured to the United States fishermen by the . . . convention of October 20, 1818, of taking, curing, and drying fish on certain coasts of the British North American Colonies therein defined, the inhabitants of the United States shall have, in common with the subjects of Her Britannic



Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbors, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and of the several islands thereunto adjacent, without being restricted to any distance from the shore, with permission to land upon the coasts and shores of those colonies and the islands thereof, and also upon the Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish; provided that, in so doing, they do not interfere with the rights of private property, or with British fishermen, in the peaceable use of any part of the said coast in their occupancy for the same purpose. It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies solely to the sea-fishery, and that the salmon and shad fisheries, and all fisheries in rivers and the mouths of rivers, are hereby reserved exclusively for British fishermen." The same article provided for the appointment of commissioners and an arbitrator or umpire to settle any disputes that might arise "as to the places to which the reservation of exclusive right to British fishermen contained in this article, and that of fishermen of the United States contained in the next succeeding article, apply." By the second article of the treaty British subjects received privileges on the eastern sea-coasts and shores of the United States north of the 36th parallel of north latitude, identical with those given by the first article to citizens of the United States on the coasts and shores mentioned above. Article 3 was as follows: "It is agreed that the articles enumerated in the schedule hereunto annexed, being the growth and produce of the aforesaid British colonies or of the United States, shall be admitted into each country respectively free of duty: Schedule: Grain, flour, and breadstuffs, of all kinds. Animals of all kinds. Fresh, smoked, and salted meats. Cotton-wool, seeds, and vegetables. Undried fruits, dried fruits. Fish of all kinds. Products of fish, and of all other creatures living in the water. Poultry, eggs. Hides, furs, skins, or tails, undressed. Stone or marble, in its crude or unwrought state. Slate. Butter, cheese, tallow. Lard, horns, manures. Ores of metals, of all kinds. Coal. Pitch, tar, turpentine, ashes. Timber and lumber of all kinds, round, hewed, and sawed, unmanufactured in whole or in part. Firewood. Plants, shrubs, and trees. Pelts, wool. Fish-oil. Rice, broom-corn, and bark. Gypsum, ground or unground. Hewn, or wrought, or unwrought burr or grindstones. Dye-stuffs. Flax, hemp, and tow, unmanufactured. Unmanufactured tobacco. Rags." Article 4 secured to the citizens and inhabitants of the United States the right to navigate the River St. Lawrence and the canals in Canada between the ocean and the great lakes, subject to the same tolls and charges that might be exacted from Her Majesty's subjects, but the British Government retained the right to suspend this privilege, on due notice given, in which case the Government of the United States might suspend the operations of Article 3. Reciprocally, British subjects were given the right to navigate Lake Michigan, and the Government of the United States engaged itself to urge the State governments to open the several State canals to British subjects on terms of equality. It was further agreed that no export or other duty should be levied on lumber or

timber floated down the river St. John to the sea, "when the same is shipped to the United States from the province of New Brunswick." Article 5 provided that the treaty should take effect whenever the necessary laws were passed by the Imperial Parliament, the Provincial Parliaments, and the Congress of the United States, and that it should "remain in force for ten years from the date at which it may come into operation, and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same." Article 6 extended the provisions of the treaty to the island of Newfoundland, so far as applicable, provided the Imperial Parliament, the Parliament of Newfoundland and the Congress of the United States should embrace the island in their laws for carrying the treaty into effect; but not otherwise. — *Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers, ed. of 1889, pp. 448-452.* — The Treaty was abrogated in 1866, the United States having given the required notice in 1865. — F. E. Haynes, *The Reciprocity Treaty with Canada of 1854* (Am. Economic Assn. Pubs., v. 7, no. 6).

(United States): A. D. 1861-1864. — The Morrill Tariff and the War Tariffs. — "In 1861 the Morrill tariff act began a change toward a higher range of duties and a stronger application of protection. The Morrill act is often spoken of as if it were the basis of the present protective system. But this is by no means the case. The tariff act of 1861 was passed by the House of Representatives in the session of 1859-60, the session preceding the election of President Lincoln. It was passed, undoubtedly, with the intention of attracting to the Republican party, at the approaching Presidential election, votes in Pennsylvania and other States that had protectionist leanings. In the Senate the tariff bill was not taken up in the same session in which it was passed in the House. Its consideration was postponed, and it was not until the next session—that of 1860-61—that it received the assent of the Senate and became law. It is clear that the Morrill tariff was carried in the House before any serious expectation of war was entertained; and it was accepted by the Senate in the session of 1861 without material change. It therefore forms no part of the financial legislation of the war, which gave rise in time to a series of measures that entirely superseded the Morrill tariff. Indeed, Mr. Morrill and the other supporters of the act of 1861 declared that their intention was simply to restore the rates of 1846. The important change which they proposed to make from the provisions of the tariff of 1846 was to substitute specific for ad-valorem duties. . . . The specific duties . . . established were in many cases considerably above the ad-valorem duties of 1846. The most important direct changes made by the act of 1861 were in the increased duties on iron and on wool, by which it was hoped to attach to the Republican party Pennsylvania and some of the Western States. Most of the manufacturing States at this time still stood aloof from the movement toward higher rates. . . . Mr. Rice, of Massachusetts, said in 1860: 'The manufacturer asks no additional protection. He has learned, among other things, that the greatest evil, next to a ruinous competition from foreign sources, is an excessive protec-

tion, which stimulates a like ruinous and irresponsible competition at home' (Congress. Globe, 1859-60, p. 1867). Mr. Sherman said: . . . 'The manufacturers have asked over and over again to be let alone. The tariff of 1857 is the manufacturers' bill; but the present bill is more beneficial to the agricultural interest than the tariff of 1857.' (Ibid., p. 2053. C. F. Hunter's speech, Ibid., p. 3010.) In later years Mr. Morrill himself said that the tariff of 1861 'was not asked for, and but coldly welcomed, by manufacturers, who always and justly fear instability.' (Congr. Globe, 1869-70, p. 3295.) . . . Hardly had the Morrill tariff been passed when Fort Sumter was fired on. The Civil War began. The need of additional revenue for carrying on the great struggle was immediately felt; and as early as the extra session of the summer of 1861, additional customs duties were imposed. In the next regular session, in December, 1861, a still further increase of duties was made. From that time till 1865 no session, indeed hardly a month of any session, passed in which some increase of duties on imports was not made. . . . The great acts of 1862 and 1864 are typical of the whole course of the war measures; and the latter is of particular importance, because it became the foundation of the existing tariff system. . . . The three revenue acts of June 30, 1864, practically form one measure, and that probably the greatest measure of taxation which the world has seen. The first of the acts provided for an enormous extension of the internal-tax system; the second for a corresponding increase of the duties on imports; the third authorized a loan of \$400,000,000. . . . Like the tariff act of 1862, that of 1864 was introduced, explained, amended, and passed under the management of Mr. Morrill, who was chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. That gentleman again stated, as he had done in 1862, that the passage of the tariff act was rendered necessary in order to put domestic producers in the same situation, so far as foreign competition was concerned, as if the internal taxes had not been raised. This was one great object of the new tariff. . . . But it explains only in part the measure which in fact was proposed and passed. The tariff of 1864 was a characteristic result of that veritable furor of taxation which had become fixed in the minds of the men who were then managing the national finances. Mr. Morrill, and those who with him made our revenue laws, seem to have had but one principle: to tax every possible article indiscriminately, and to tax it at the highest rates that any one had the courage to suggest. They carried this method out to its fullest extent in the tariff act of 1864, as well as in the tax act of that year. At the same time these statesmen were protectionists. . . . Every domestic producer who came before Congress got what he wanted in the way of duties. Protection ran riot; and this, moreover, not merely for the time being. The whole tone of the public mind toward the question of import duties became distorted. . . . The average rate on dutiable commodities, which had been 37.2 per cent. under the act of 1862, became 47.06 per cent. under that of 1864. . . . In regard to the duties as they stood before 1863, it is literally true, in regard to almost all protected articles, that the tariff act of 1864 remained in force for twenty years without reductions."—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff History of the U. S.*, pp.

158-169, with foot-note.—Under the Morrill Tariff, which went into effect April 1, 1861, the imposts which had averaged about 19 per cent. on dutiable articles were raised to 36 per cent.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, p. 400.

(Australia): A. D. 1862-1892.—Contrasted policy of Victoria and New South Wales.—Both New South Wales and Victoria "are young countries, and are inhabited by men of the same race, speech, and training: capital and labour oscillate freely between them: both use substantially the same methods and forms of government: while against the larger territory of New South Wales may be set the superior climate and easier development of its southern neighbour. Whatever may be the balance of the natural advantages, whether of climate or population, is on the side of Victoria, whose compact, fertile, and well watered territory gained for it, on its first discovery, the well-deserved title of Australia Felix. The striking and ultimate point of difference between the two countries is their fiscal policy. Since 1866 Victoria has lived under a system of gradually increasing Protection, while the policy of New South Wales has been, in the main, one of Free Trade. According to all Protectionist theory Victoria should be prosperous and New South Wales distressed; there should be variety and growth in the one country, stagnation in the other. At least the progress of Victoria ought to have been more rapid than that of New South Wales, because she has added to the natural advantages which she already enjoyed, the artificial benefits which are claimed for a Protective tariff. If, in fact, neither of these conclusions is correct, and, while both countries have been phenomenally prosperous, New South Wales has prospered the most, one of two conclusions is inevitable—namely, either that certain special influences have caused the more rapid progress of New South Wales which were not felt in Victoria, or that Protection has retarded instead of assisted the development of Victoria's natural superiority. Writers of all schools admit that activity in certain departments of national life is a fair indication of prosperity and progress. It is, for instance, generally allowed that an increase in population, a development of agricultural and manufacturing industry, a growth of foreign commerce, an increase in shipping, or an improvement in the public revenue, are all signs of health and well-being; and that a concurrence of such symptoms over a lengthened period indicates an increase in material wealth. Accepting these tests of progress, our comparison proceeds thus: first, we examine the position of the two Colonies as regards population, foreign commerce, shipping, agriculture, manufactures, and revenue, at the time when both of them adhered to Free Trade; from which we find that, according to all these indications of prosperity, Victoria was then very much the better off: In 1866 she outnumbered New South Wales in population by 200,000 souls: her foreign commerce was larger by £8,300,000: she had a greater area of land under cultivation: her manufactures were well established, while those of New South Wales were few and insignificant: she was ahead in shipping, and her revenue was greater by one-third. Passing next to the years which follow 1866, we observe that New South Wales gradually bettered her position in every province of national activity, and



that, as the fetters of Protection became tighter, Victoria receded in the race. She gave way first in the department of foreign commerce, next in population, shipping, and revenue, until, in 1887, she maintained her old superiority in agriculture alone. From this accumulation of facts—and not from any one of them we infer that the rate of progress in New South Wales under Free Trade has been greater than that of Victoria under Protection.”—B. R. Wise, *Industrial Freedom*, app. 3.

(Europe): A. D. 1871-1892.—**Protectionist reaction on the Continent.—High Tariff in France.**—“The Franco-German War (1870-1) and the overthrow of Napoleon III. at once arrested the free-trade policy, which had little support in the national mind, and was hardly understood outside the small circle of French economists. The need of fresh revenue was imperative, and M. Thiers, the most prominent of French statesmen, was notoriously protectionist in his leanings. Pure revenue duties on colonial and Eastern commodities were first tried; the sugar duty was increased 30%; that on coffee was trebled; tea, cocoa, wines and spirits, were all subjected to greatly increased charges. As the yield thus obtained did not suffice, proposals for the taxation of raw materials were brought forward but rejected by the legislature in 1871, when M. Thiers tendered his resignation. To avoid this result the measure was passed, not however to come into operation until compensating productive duties had been placed on imported manufactures. The existing commercial treaties were a further obstacle to changes in policy, and accordingly negotiations were opened with England and Belgium, in order that the new duties might be applied to their products. As was justifiable under the circumstances, the former country required that if imported raw products were to be taxed, the like articles produced in France should pay an equivalent tax, and therefore, as the shortest way of escape, the French Government gave notice for the termination of the treaties (in the technical language of international law ‘denounced’ them), and new conventions were agreed on; but as this arrangement was just as unsatisfactory in the opinion of the French Chambers, the old treaties were in 1873 restored to force until 1877, and thus the larger part of the raw materials escaped the new taxation. The protectionist tendency was, too, manifested in the departure from the open system introduced in 1866 in respect to shipping. A law of 1872 imposed differential duties on goods imported in foreign vessels. . . . The advance of the sentiment in favour of a return to the restrictive system was even more decidedly indicated in 1881. Bounties were then granted for the encouragement of French shipping, and extra taxes imposed on indirect imports of non-European and some European goods. In 1889 the carrying trade between France and Algiers was reserved for native ships. The revision of the general tariff was a more serious task, undertaken with a view to influencing the new treaties that the termination of the old engagements made necessary. The tariff of 1881 (to come into force in 1882) made several increases and substituted many specific for ad valorem duties. Raw materials escaped taxation; half-manufactured articles were placed under moderate duties. The nominal corn duties were diminished by a frac-

tion, but the duties on live stock and fresh meat were considerably increased. . . . A new ‘conventional tariff’ speedily followed in a series of fresh treaties with European countries. . . . The duties on whole or partially-manufactured goods remained substantially unchanged by the new treaties, which do not, in fact, vary so much from the general tariff as was previously the case. The number of articles included in the conventions had been reduced, and all countries outside Europe came under the general code. The reaction against the liberal policy of 1860 was thus as yet very slight, and did not seriously affect manufactures. The agricultural depression was the primary cause of the legislation of 1885, which placed a duty of 3 francs per quintal on wheat, 7 francs on flour, 2 francs on rye and barley, and one franc on oats, with additional duties on indirect importation. Cattle, sheep, and pigs came under increases of from 50% to 100%. . . . Not satisfied with their partial success, the advocates of high duties have made further efforts. Maize, hitherto free, as being chiefly used by farmers for feeding purposes, is now liable to duty, and the tariff proposed in the present year (1891) raises the rates on most articles from an average of 10% to 15% to one of 30% and 40%. . . . Germany did not quite as speedily come under the influence of the economic reaction as France. . . . Italian commercial policy also altered for the worse. From the formation of the kingdom till 1875, as the various commercial treaties and the general tariff of 1861 show, it was liberal and tending towards freedom. About the latter date the forces that we have indicated above as operating generally throughout Europe, commenced to affect Italy. The public expenditure had largely increased, and additional revenue was urgently required. Agriculture was so depressed that, though the country is pre-eminently agricultural, alarm was excited by the supposed danger of foreign competition. The result was that on the general revision of duties in 1877 much higher rates were imposed on the principal imports. . . . Depression both in agriculture and elaborative industries continued and strengthened the protectionist party, who succeeded in securing the abandonment of all the commercial treaties, and the enactment of a new tariff in 1887. . . . The first effect of the new system of high taxation with no conventional privileges was to lead to a war of tariffs between France and Italy. . . . Austria may be added to the list of countries in which the protectionist reaction has been effectively shown. . . . In Russia the revival (or perhaps it would be more correct to say continued existence), of protection is decisively marked. . . . Spain and Portugal had long been strongholds of protectionist ideas. . . . Holland and Belgium have as yet [1891] adhered to the system of moderate duties.”—C. F. Bastable, *The Commerce of Nations*, ch. 9.—A new tariff system was elaborated by the French Chambers, with infinite labor and discussion, during the year 1891, and adopted early in the following year, being known as the “Loi du 11 Janvier, 1892.” This tariff makes a great advance in duties on most imports, with a concession of lower rates to nations according reciprocal favors to French productions. Raw materials in general are admitted free of duties. The commercial treaties of France are undergoing modification.

(United States): A. D. 1883.—Revision of the Tariff.—In 1882, "Congress appointed a Tariff Commission 'to take into consideration, and to thoroughly investigate, all the various questions relating to the agricultural, commercial, mercantile, manufacturing, mining, and industrial interests of the United States, so far as the same may be necessary to the establishment of a judicious tariff, or a revision of the existing tariff upon a scale of justice to all interests.' Several things it was expected would be accomplished by revising the tariff, and the measure received the assent of nearly all the members of Congress. The free-traders expected to get lower duties, the protectionists expected to concede them in some cases, and in others to get such modifications as would remove existing ambiguities and strengthen themselves against foreign competition. The protective force of the existing tariff had been weakened in several important manufactures by rulings of the treasury department. . . . The composition of the commission was as satisfactory to the manufacturing class as displeasing to free-traders. . . . Early in their deliberations, the commission became convinced that a substantial reduction of the tariff duties was demanded, not by a mere indiscriminate popular clamor, but by the best conservative opinion of the country, including that which had in former times been most strenuous for the preservation of the national industrial defences. Such a reduction of the existing tariff the commission regarded not only as a due recognition of public sentiment, and a measure of justice to consumers, but one conducive to the general industrial prosperity, and which, though it might be temporarily inconvenient, would be ultimately beneficial to the special interests affected by such reduction. No rates of defensive duties, except for establishing new industries, which more than equalized the conditions of labor and capital with those of foreign competitors, could be justified. Excessive duties, or those above such standard of equalization, were positively injurious to the interest which they were supposed to benefit. They encouraged the investment of capital in manufacturing enterprise by rash and unskilled speculators, to be followed by disaster to the adventurers and their employees, and a plethora of commodities which deranged the operations of skilled and prudent enterprise. . . . 'It would seem that the rates of duties under the existing tariff—fixed, for the most part, during the war under the evident necessity at that time of stimulating to its utmost extent all domestic production—might be adapted, through reduction, to the present condition of peace requiring no such extraordinary stimulus. And in the mechanical and manufacturing industries, especially those which have been long established, it would seem that the improvements in machinery and processes made within the last twenty years, and the high scale of productiveness which had become a characteristic of their establishments, would permit our manufacturers to compete with their foreign rivals under a substantial reduction of existing duties.' Entertaining these views, the commission sought to present a scheme of tariff duties in which substantial reduction was the distinguishing feature. . . . The attempt to modify the tariff brought into bold relief the numerous conflicting interests, and the difficulty and delicacy of the undertaking.

As our industries become more heterogeneous, the tariff also grows more complex, and the difficulty of doing justice to all is increased. For example, the wool manufacturers to succeed best must have free wool and dye-stuffs; on the other hand, both these interests desired protection. The manufacturers of the higher forms of iron must have free materials to succeed best; on the other hand, the ore producers, the pig-iron manufacturers, and every succeeding class desired a tariff on their products. It was not easy for these interests to agree, and some of them did not. The iron-ore producers desired a tariff of 85 cents a ton on ore; the steel-rail makers were opposed to the granting of more than 50; the manufacturers of fence wire were opposed to an increase of duty on wire rods used for making wire, and favored a reduction; the manufacturers of rods in this country were desirous of getting an increase; the manufacturers of floor oil-cloths desired a reduction or abolition of the duty on the articles used by them; the soap manufacturers desired the putting of caustic soda on the free list, which the American manufacturers of it opposed; some of the woolen manufacturers were desirous that protection should be granted to the manufacturers of dye-stuffs, and some were not; the manufacturers of tanned foreign goat and sheep skins desired the removal of the tariff on such skins; those who tanned them, and who were much less numerous, were equally tenacious in maintaining the tariff on the raw skins, and the same conflict arose between other interests. The method of determining how much protection their several interests needed, and of adjusting differences between them, has always been of the crudest kind. . . . Although not all of the recommendations of the commission were adopted, most of them were. Those which pertained to the simplification of the law were adopted with only slight changes. The bill reported by the commission contained, not including the free list, 631 articles and classifications. . . . Less than 25 articles, mainly in the cotton, woolen goods, and the iron and steel schedules, were matters of contention. The rates on 409 of the 631 articles mentioned in the tariff recommended by the commission were adopted, and between 50 and 60 more articles have substantially the same rates, though levied under different clauses. Of the 170 changes, 98 were fixed at lower rates than those proposed by the commission, 46 at higher, and 26 have been classed as doubtful."—A. S. Bolles, *Financial History of the United States, 1861-1885, bk. 2, ch. 7.*

(United States): A. D. 1884-1888.—Attempts at Tariff Reform.—The Morrison Bills and the Hewett Bill.—President Cleveland's Message.—The Mills Bill and its defeat.—The slight concessions made in the protectionist tariff-revision of 1883 did not at all satisfy the opinion in the country demanding greater industrial freedom, and the question of tariff-reform became more important than before in American politics. The Democratic Party, identified by all its early traditions, with the opposition to a policy of "protection," won the election of 1884, placing Mr. Cleveland in the Presidency and gaining control of the House of Representatives in the 49th Congress. But it had drifted from its old anchorage on the tariff question, and was slow in pulling back. A large minority in the party had accepted and become supporters of



the doctrine which was hateful to their fathers as an economic heresy. The majority of the Democrats in the House, however, made strenuous efforts to accomplish something in the way of reducing duties most complained of. Their first undertaking was led by Mr. Morrison of Illinois, who introduced a bill which "proposed an average reduction of 20 per cent., but with so many exceptions that it was estimated the average reduction on dutiable articles would be about 17 per cent. The rates under the Morrill Act of 1861 were to form the minimum limit. An extensive addition to the free list was proposed, including the following articles: ores of iron, copper, lead, and nickel, coal, lumber, wood, hay, bristles, lime, sponges, indigo, coal tar and dyewoods." In the Committee of Ways and Means the bill underwent considerable changes, the articles in the free list being reduced to salt, coal, lumber and wood. It was reported to the House March 11, and remained under debate until May 6, when it was killed by a motion to strike out the enacting clause, on which 118 Republicans and 41 Democrats voted aye, against 4 Republicans and 151 Democrats voting nay. The 4 Republicans supporting the bill were all from Minnesota; of the 41 Democrats opposing it 12 were from Pennsylvania, 10 from Ohio, 6 from New York, 4 from California and 3 from New Jersey. "The Morrison 'horizontal bill' having been thus killed, Mr. Hewett, a New York Democrat, and a member of the Ways and Means Committee, on May 12 introduced a new tariff bill, providing for a reduction of 10 to 20 per cent. on a considerable number of articles and placing several others on the free list." The bill was reported favorably to the House, but action upon it was not reached before the adjournment. During the same session, a bill to restore the duties of 1867 on raw wool was defeated in the House; an amendment to the shipping bill, permitting a free importation of iron and steel steamships for employment in the foreign trade, passed the House and was defeated in the Senate; and a bill reducing the duty on works of art from 20 to 10 per cent. was defeated in the House. In the next Congress, the Forty-ninth, Mr. Morrison led a new undertaking to diminish the protective duties which were producing an enormous surplus of revenue. The bill which he introduced (February 15, 1886) received radical changes in the Ways and Means Committee, "inasmuch as it was clearly seen that the opposition from the metal and coal interests was sufficiently strong to destroy all chance of consideration in the House. Accordingly, it was found preferable to make the duties on wool and woollens the special point for assault." But the bill modified on this new line,—lowering duties on woollens to 35 per cent. ad valorem, and placing wool in the free list, with lumber, wood, fish, salt, flax, hemp and jute,—was refused consideration by a vote of 157 to 140 in the House, on the 17th of June. Again there were 35 members of his own party arrayed against Mr. Morrison. At the second session of the same Congress, December 18, 1886, Mr. Morrison repeated his attempt with no better success.—O. H. Perry, *Proposed Tariff Legislation since 1883* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, October, 1887).—The assembling of the 50th Congress, on the 6th of December, 1887, was signalized by a message from President Cleveland which pro-

duced an extraordinary effect, decisively lifting the tariff question into precedence over all other issues in national politics, and compelling the Democratic Party to array its lines distinctly and unequivocally against the upholders of "protection" as an economic policy. He emphasized the "paramount importance of the subject" impressively by passing by every other matter of public concern, and devoting his message exclusively to a consideration of the "'state of the Union' as shown in the present condition of our Treasury and our general fiscal situation." The condition of the Treasury to which the President called attention was one of unexampled plethora. "On the 30th day of June, 1885, the excess of revenues over public expenditures, after complying with the annual requirement of the Sinking-Fund Act, was \$17,859,735.84; during the year ended June 30, 1886, such excess amounted to \$49,405,545.20; and during the year ended June 30, 1887, it reached the sum of \$55,567,849.54." "Our scheme of taxation," said the President, "by means of which this needless surplus is taken from the people and put into the public treasury, consists of a tariff or duty levied upon importations from abroad, and internal-revenue taxes levied upon the consumption of tobacco and spirituous and malt liquors. It must be conceded that none of the things subjected to internal-revenue taxation are, strictly speaking, necessities; there appears to be no just complaint of this taxation by the consumers of these articles, and there seems to be nothing so well able to bear the burden without hardship to any portion of the people. But our present tariff laws, the vicious, inequitable, and illogical source of unnecessary taxation, ought to be at once revised and amended. These laws, as their primary and plain effect, raise the price to consumers of all articles imported and subject to duty, by precisely the sum paid for such duties. Thus the amount of the duty measures the tax paid by those who purchase for use these imported articles. Many of these things, however, are raised or manufactured in our own country, and the duties now levied upon foreign goods and products are called protection to these home manufactures, because they render it possible for those of our people who are manufacturers to make these taxed articles and sell them for a price equal to that demanded for the imported goods that have paid customs duty. So it happens that while comparatively a few use the imported articles, millions of our people, who never use and never saw any of the foreign products, purchase and use things of the same kind made in this country, and pay therefor nearly or quite the same enhanced price which the duty adds to the imported articles. Those who buy imports pay the duty charged thereon into the public treasury, but the majority of our citizens, who buy domestic articles of the same class, pay a sum at least approximately equal to this duty to the home manufacturer. . . . The difficulty attending a wise and fair revision of our tariff-laws is not underestimated. It will require on the part of Congress great labor and care, and especially a broad and national contemplation of the subject, and a patriotic disregard of such local and selfish claims as are unreasonable and reckless of the welfare of the entire country. Under our present laws more than 4,000 articles are subject to duty. Many of these do not in

any way compete with our own manufactures, and many are hardly worth attention as subjects of revenue. A considerable reduction can be made in the aggregate by adding them to the free list. The taxation of luxuries presents no features of hardship; but the necessities of life used and consumed by all the people, the duty upon which adds to the cost of living in every home, should be greatly cheapened. The radical reduction of the duties imposed upon raw material used in manufactures, or its free importation, is of course an important factor in any effort to reduce the price of these necessities. . . . It is not apparent how such a change can have any injurious effect upon our manufacturers. On the contrary, it would appear to give them a better chance in foreign markets with the manufacturers of other countries, who cheapen their wares by free material. Thus our people might have an opportunity of extending their sales beyond the limits of home consumption—saving them from the depression, interruption in business, and loss caused by a glutted domestic market, and affording their employes more certain and steady labor, with its resulting quiet and contentment. The question thus imperatively presented for solution should be approached in a spirit higher than partisanship. . . . But the obligation to declared party policy and principle is not wanting to urge prompt and effective action. Both of the great political parties now represented in the Government have, by repeated and authoritative declarations, condemned the condition of our laws which permits the collection from the people of unnecessary revenue, and have, in the most solemn manner, promised its correction. . . . Our progress toward a wise conclusion will not be improved by dwelling upon the theories of protection and free trade. This savors too much of bandying epithets. It is a condition which confronts us—not a theory. Relief from this condition may involve a slight reduction of the advantages which we award our home productions, but the entire withdrawal of such advantages should not be contemplated. The question of free trade is absolutely irrelevant.”—The President’s emphatic utterance rallied his party and inspired a more united effort in the House to modify and simplify the tariff. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Mills, of Texas, a bill was framed by the Committee of Ways and Means and reported to the House on the 2d of April, 1888. “We have gone as far as we could,” said the Committee in reporting the bill, “and done what we could, in the present condition of things, to place our manufactures upon a firm and unshaken foundation, where they would have advantages over all the manufacturers of the world. Our manufacturers, having the advantage of all others in the intelligence, skill, and productive capacity of their labor, need only to be placed on the same footing with their rivals in having their materials at the same cost in the open markets of the world. In starting on this policy, we have transferred many articles from the dutiable to the free list. The revenues now received on these articles amount to \$22,189,595.48. Three-fourths of this amount is collected on articles that enter into manufactures, of which wool and tin-plates are the most important. . . . The repeal of all duties on wool enables us to reduce the duties on the manufactures of wool \$12,332,211.65. The largest reduction we

have made is in the woolen schedule, and this reduction was only made possible by placing wool on the free list. There is no greater reason for a duty on wool than there is for a duty on any other raw material. A duty on wool makes it necessary to impose a higher duty on the goods made from wool, and the consumer has to pay a double tax. If we leave wool untaxed the consumer has to pay a tax only on the manufactured goods. . . . In the woolen schedule we have substituted ad valorem for specific duties. The specific duty is the favorite of those who are to be benefited by high rates, who are protected against competition, and protected in combinations against the consumer of their products. There is a persistent pressure by manufacturers for the specific duty, because it conceals from the people the amount of taxes they are compelled to pay to the manufacturer. The specific duty always discriminates in favor of the costly article and against the cheaper one. . . . This discrimination is peculiarly oppressive in woolen and cotton goods, which are necessities of life to all classes of people.” The ad valorem duty on woolen goods proposed by the committee in accordance with these views, ranged from 30 to 45 per cent., existing rates being reckoned as equivalent to about from 40 to 90 per cent. ad valorem. Duties on cottons were fixed at 35 to 40 per cent. On steel rails the bill proposed a reduction from \$17 per ton to \$11. It lowered the duty on pig-iron to \$6 per ton. It diminished the tariff on common earthenware from 60 to 35 per cent.; on china and decorated earthenware from 60 to 45 per cent.; on window-glass from 93 and 106 to 62 and 68 per cent. It put tin plates on the free list, along with hemp, flax, lumber, timber, salt, and other materials of manufacture and articles in common use. These were the more important modifications contemplated in what became known as “the Mills Bill.” After vigorous debate, it was passed by the Democrats of the House with a nearness to unanimity which showed a remarkable change in the sentiment of their party on the subject. Only four Democratic representatives were found voting in opposition to the measure. In the Senate, where the Republicans were in the majority, the measure was wrecked, as a matter of course. The protectionists of that body substituted a bill which revised the tariff in the contrary direction, generally raising duties instead of lowering them. Thus the issue was made in the elections of 1888.

(United States): A. D. 1890.—The McKinley Act.—“In the campaign of 1888 the tariff question was the issue squarely presented. . . . The victory of the Republicans . . . and the election of President Harrison were the results. . . . The election was won by a narrow margin, and was affected by certain factors which stood apart from the main issue. The independent voters had been disappointed with some phases of President Cleveland’s administration of the civil service, and many who had voted for him in 1884 did not do so in 1888. . . . On the whole, however, the Republicans held their own, and even made gains, throughout the country, on the tariff issue; and they might fairly consider the result a popular verdict in favor of the system of protection. But their opposition to the policy of lower duties, emphasized by President Cleveland, had led them not only to champion the existing system, but to advocate its



further extension, by an increase of duties in various directions. . . . Accordingly when the Congress then elected met for the session of 1889-90, the Republican majority in the House proceeded to pass a measure which finally became the tariff act of 1890. This measure may fairly be said to be the direct result of Mr. Cleveland's tariff message of 1887. The Republicans, in resisting the doctrine of that message, were led by logical necessity to the opposite doctrine of higher duties. . . . Notwithstanding grave misgivings on the part of some of their leaders, especially those from the northwest, the act known popularly as the McKinley bill was pushed through."—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff History of the U. S.*, ch. 5.—The bill was reported to the House of Representatives by the Chairman of its Committee on Ways and Means, Mr. McKinley, on the 16th of April, 1890. "We have not been so much concerned," said the majority of the Committee in their report, "about the prices of the articles we consume as we have been to encourage a system of home production which shall give fair remuneration to domestic producers and fair wages to American workmen, and by increased production and home competition insure fair prices to consumers. . . . The aim has been to impose duties upon such foreign products as compete with our own, whether of the soil or the shop, and to enlarge the free list wherever this can be done without injury to any American industry, or wherever an existing home industry can be helped without detriment to another industry which is equally worthy of the protecting care of the Government. . . . We have recommended no duty above the point of difference between the normal cost of production here, including labor, and the cost of like production in the countries which seek our markets, nor have we hesitated to give this quantum of duty even though it involved an increase over present rates and showed an advance of percentages and ad valorem equivalents." On the changes proposed to be made in the rates of duty on wool and on the manufactures of wool—the subject of most debate in the whole measure—the majority reported as follows: "By the census of 1880, in every county in the United States except 34, sheep were raised. In 1883 the number of sheep in the United States was over 50,000,000, and the number of persons owning flocks was in excess of a million. This large number of flock-masters was, to a considerable extent, withdrawn from the business of raising grain and other farm products, to which they must return if wool-growing cannot be profitably pursued. The enormous growth of this industry was stimulated by the wool tariff of 1867, and was in a prosperous condition prior to the act of 1883. Since then the industry has diminished in alarming proportions, and the business has neither been satisfactory nor profitable. . . . By the proposed bill the duties on first and second class wools are made at 11 and 12 cents a pound, as against 10 and 12 under existing law. On third-class wool, costing 12 cents or less, the duty is raised from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cents a pound to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  cents, and upon wool of the third class, costing above 12 cents, the duty recommended is an advance from 5 to 8 cents per pound. . . . There seems to be no doubt that with the protection afforded by the increased duties recommended in the bill the farmers of the United States will be able at

an early day to supply substantially all of the home demand, and the great benefit such production will be to the agricultural interests of the country cannot be estimated. The production of 600,000,000 pounds of wool would require about 100,000,000 sheep, or an addition of more than 100 per cent to the present number. . . . The increase in the duty on clothing wool and substitutes for wool to protect the wool growers of this country, and the well-understood fact that the tariff of 1883, and the construction given to the worsted clause, reduced the duties on many grades of woollen goods to a point that invited increasing importations, to the serious injury of our woollen manufacturers and wool growers, necessitate raising the duties on woollen yarn, cloth and dress goods to a point which will insure the holding of our home market for these manufactures to a much greater extent than is now possible. The necessity of this increase is apparent in view of the fact already stated that during the last fiscal year there were imports of manufactures of wool of the foreign value of \$52,681,482, as shown by the undervalued invoices, and the real value in our market of nearly \$90,000,000—fully one-fourth of our entire home consumption—equivalent to an import of at least 160,000,000 pounds of wool in the form of manufactured goods. In revising the woollen-goods schedule so as to afford adequate protection to our woollen manufacturers and wool growers we have continued the system of compound duties which have proved to be so essential in any tariff which protects wool, providing first for a specific compensatory pound or square yard duty, equivalent to the duty which would be paid on the wool if imported, for the benefit of the wool grower, and an ad valorem duty of from 30 to 50 per cent, according to the proportion of labor required in the manufacture of the several classes of goods, as a protection to the manufacturer against foreign competition, and 10 per cent additional upon ready made clothing for the protection of the clothing manufacturers. . . . In computing the equivalent ad valorem duty on manufactures of woollens, the combinations of both the specific duty, which is simply compensatory for the duty on the wool used, of which the wool grower receives the benefit, and the duty which protects the manufacturers, makes the average resultant rate of the woollen-goods schedule proposed 91.78 per cent."—*Report of the Committee on Ways and Means*.—"Substantially as reported from the Committee on Ways and Means, it [the McKinley Bill] passed the House, after two weeks' debate, May 21 [1890]. The vote was a strictly party one, except that two Republicans voted in the negative. June 19 the bill was reported from the Senate Committee on Finance with a very large number of amendments, mainly in the way of a lessening of rates. After debating the project during nearly the whole of August and a week in September, the Senate passed it by a strict party vote, September 10. The differences between the houses then went to a conference committee. The bill as reported by this committee, September 26, was adopted by the House and Senate on the 27th and 30th respectively and approved by the President October 1. On the final vote three Republicans in each house declined to follow their party. The law went into effect October 6. Prominent features of the new

schedules are as follows: steel rails reduced one-tenth of a cent per lb.; tin plates increased from one cent to two and two-tenths cents per lb., with the proviso that they shall be put on the free list at the end of six years if by that time the domestic product shall not have reached an aggregate equal to one-third of the importations; unmanufactured copper substantially reduced; bar, block and pig tin, hitherto on the free list, receives a duty of four cents per lb. to take effect July 1, 1893, provided that it be restored to the free list if by July 1, 1895, the mines of the United States shall not have produced in one year 5,000 tons; a bounty of one and three-fourths and two cents per lb. upon beet, sorghum, cane or maple sugar produced in the United States between 1891 and 1905; all imports of sugar free up to number 16, Dutch standard, in color and all above that one-half cent per lb. (formerly from three to three and a half cents), with one-tenth cent additional if imported from a country that pays an export bounty; a heavy increase on cigar wrappers and cigars; a general and heavy increase on agricultural products, e. g. on beans, eggs, hay, hops, vegetables and straw; a heavy increase on woollen goods, with a new classification of raw wool designed to give more protection; paintings and statuary reduced from 30 to 15 per cent. The following (among other) additions are made to the free list: beeswax, books and pamphlets printed exclusively in languages other than English, blue clay, coal tar, currants and dates, jute butts and various textile and fibrous grasses, needles, nickel ore, flower and grass seeds and crude sulphur. . . . Among the 464 points of difference between the two houses which the conference committee had to adjust, some of the more important were as follows: paintings and statuary, made free by the House and kept at the old rate by the Senate, were fixed at half the old rate; binding twine, made free by the Senate in favor of Western grain-raisers but taxed by the House to protect Eastern manufacturers, fixed at half the House rate; the limit of free sugar fixed at number 16, as voted by the House, instead of number 13, as passed by the Senate, thus including in the free list the lower grades of refined as well as all raw sugar. The question of reciprocity with American nations was injected into the tariff discussion by Secretary Blaine in June. In transmitting to Congress the recommendation of the International American Conference for improved commercial relations, the secretary dilated upon the importance of securing the markets of central and South America for our products, and suggested as a more speedy way than treaties of reciprocity an amendment to the pending tariff bill authorizing the President to open our ports to the free entry of the products of any American nation which should in turn admit free of taxation our leading agricultural and manufactured products. In July Mr. Blaine took up the idea again in a public correspondence with Senator Frye, criticizing severely the removal of the tariff on sugar, as that on coffee had been removed before, without exacting trade concessions in return. He complained that there was not a section or a line in the bill as it came from the House that would open the market for another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork. The Senate Finance Committee acted upon the suggestion of the secretary by intro-

ducing an amendment to the bill authorizing and directing the President to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides from any country which should impose on products of the United States exactions which in view of the free introduction of sugar etc. he should deem reciprocally unequal and unreasonable. The rates at which the President is to demand duties upon the commodities named are duly fixed. This reciprocity provision passed the Senate and the conference committee and became part of the law."—*Political Science Quarterly: Record of Events, Dec., 1890.*

(United States): A. D. 1894.—**The Wilson Act.—Protected interests and the Senate.**—Two years after the embodiment of the extremest doctrines of protection in the McKinley Act, the tariff question was submitted again to the people, as the dominant issue between the Republican and Democratic parties, in the presidential and congressional elections of 1892. The verdict of 1888 was then reversed, and tariff reform carried the day. Mr. Cleveland was again elected President, with a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress apparently placed there to sustain his policy. A serious financial situation was manifesting itself in the country at the time he resumed the presidential office, produced by the operation of the silver-purchase law of 1890 (see MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1848-1893), and by the extravagance of congressional appropriations, depleting the treasury. It became necessary, therefore, to give attention, first, to the repeal of the mischievous silver law, which was accomplished, November 1, 1893, at a special session of Congress called by the President. That cleared the way for the more serious work of tariff-revision, which was taken up under discouraging circumstances of general depression and extensive collapse in business, throughout the country. "The Democratic members of the House committee on ways and means began during the special session the preparation of a tariff bill. The outcome of their labors was the Wilson Bill, which was laid before the whole committee and made public November 27. On the previous day the sugar schedule was given out, in order to terminate the manipulation of the stock market through false reports as to the committee's conclusions. The characteristic features of the bill, as described in the statement of Chairman Wilson which accompanied it, were as follows: First, the adoption, wherever practicable, of *ad valorem* instead of specific duties; second, 'the freeing from taxes of those great materials of industry that lie at the basis of production.' Specific duties were held to be objectionable, first, as concealing the true weight of taxation, and second, as bearing unjustly on consumers of commoner articles. Free raw materials were held necessary to the stimulation of industry and the extension of foreign trade. The schedules, as reported, showed in addition to a very extensive increase in the free list, reductions in rates, as compared with the McKinley Bill, on all but a small number of items. The important additions to the free list included iron ore, lumber, coal and wool. Raw sugar was left free, as in the existing law, but the rate on refined sugar was reduced from one-half to one-fourth of a cent per pound, and the bounty was repealed one-eighth per annum until extin-



guished. Some amendments were made in the administrative provisions of the tariff law, designed to soften, as the committee said, features of the McKinley Bill 'that would treat the business of importing as an outlawry, not entitled to the protection of the government.' It was estimated that the reduction of revenue effected would be about \$50,000,000, and the committee set to work on an internal revenue bill to make good this deficiency. On January 8 Mr. Wilson brought up the bill in the House, and debate began under a rule calling for a vote on the 29th. During the consideration in committee a number of changes were made in the schedules, the most important being in respect to sugar, where the duty was taken off refined sugars, and the repeal of the bounty was made immediate instead of gradual. A clause was inserted, also, specifically repealing the reciprocity provision of the McKinley Act. The greatest general interest was excited, however, by the progress of the internal revenue bill, the chief feature of which was a proposition for an income tax. The bill, after formulation by the Democratic members of the ways and means committee, was brought before the full committee January 22. Besides the income tax, the measure provided for a stamp duty on playing cards, and raised the excise on distilled spirits to one dollar per gallon. As to incomes, the committee's bill . . . imposed a tax of two per cent on all incomes so far as they were in excess of \$4,000, after allowing deductions for taxes, losses not covered by insurance and bad debts. Declarations of income were required from all persons having over \$3,500, under heavy penalties for neglect, refusal or fraud in the matter. As to corporations, the same rate was levied on all interest on bonds and on all dividends and all surplus income above dividends, excepting premiums returned to policy holders by mutual life insurance companies, interest to depositors in savings banks, and dividends of building loan associations. . . . The income-tax measure was immediately and very vigorously antagonized by a considerable number of Eastern Democrats, headed by the New York Congressmen. It was adopted by the ways and means committee mainly through Southern and Western votes. On the 24th of January it was reported to the House. A Democratic caucus on the following day resolved by a small majority, against the wish of Mr. Wilson, to attach the measure to the Tariff Bill. Accordingly, the rule regulating the debate was modified to allow discussion of the amendment. The final votes were then taken on February 1. The internal revenue bill was added to the Wilson Bill by 182 to 50, 44 Democrats voting in the minority and most of the Republicans not voting. The measure as amended was then adopted by 204 to 140, 16 Democrats and one Populist going with the Republicans in the negative. In the hands of the Senate finance committee the bill underwent a thorough revision, differences of opinion in the Democratic majority leading to a careful discussion of the measure in a party caucus. The measure as amended was laid before the full committee March 8, and was introduced in the Senate on the 20th. Changes in details were very numerous. The most important consisted in taking sugar, iron ore and coal off the free list and subjecting each to a small duty.

Debate on the bill was opened April 2. It was soon discovered, however, that many Democratic senators were seriously dissatisfied with the schedules affecting the industries of their respective states, and at the end of April there was a lull in the debate while the factions of the majority adjusted their differences. A scheme of changes was finally agreed to in caucus on May 3, and laid before the Senate by the finance committee on the 8th. The most important features were a new sugar schedule which had given great trouble, and very numerous changes from ad valorem to specific duties, with a net increase in rates.—*Political Science Quarterly: Record of Political Events, June, 1894.*—Very soon after the tariff bill appeared in the Senate, it became apparent that the more powerful protected "interests," and conspicuously the "sugar trust" had acquired control, by some means, of several Democratic senators, who were acting obviously in agreement to prevent an honest fulfillment of the pledges of their party, and especially as concerned the free opening of the country to raw materials. Public opinion of the conduct of the senators in question may be judged from the expressions of so dignified an organ of the business world as the "Banker's Magazine," which said in its issue of July, 1894: "Indifference has largely supplanted the hopes of the friends of tariff reform, as well as the fears of the honest advocates of high protection; and disgust, on the part of the people, has taken the place of trust in our Government, at the exposures of the corruption of the Senate by the most unconscionable and greedy Trusts in existence. Hence the indifference of everybody but the Trusts, and their Senatorial attorneys and dummies with 'retainers' or Trust stocks in their pockets; as it is taken for granted that no interests, but those rich and characterless enough to buy 'protection' will be looked after. . . . Nothing will be regarded as finally settled . . . if the Tariff Bill, as emasculated by the Senate, becomes a law; and it may as well be killed by the House, if the Senate refuse to recede; or, vetoed by the President, if it goes to him in its present shape; and let the existing status continue, until the country can get rid of its purchasable Senators and fill their disgraced seats with honest men who cannot be bought up like cattle at so much per head. This is the growing sentiment of business men generally."—H. A. Pierce, *A Review of Finance and Business (Banker's Magazine, July, 1894).*—First in committee, and still more in the Senate after the committee had reported, the bill was radically changed in character from that which the House sent up. The profits of the sugar trust were still protected, and coal and iron ore were dropped back from the free list into the schedules of dutiable commodities. According to estimates made, the average rate of duty in the Wilson Bill as it passed the House was 35.52 per cent., and in the bill which passed the Senate it was 37 per cent., as against 49.58 per cent. in the McKinley law. Hence, the general effect of the revision in the Senate, even as manipulated by the senators suspected of corrupt motives, was an extensive lowering of duties. Some very important additions to the free list made by the Wilson Bill were left untouched by the senators—such as wool, lumber and salt. In view of the extent

of the gains acquired, the supporters of tariff-reform in the House, after prolonged attempts in conference committee to break the strength of the combination against free sugar, free coal and free iron ore, were reluctantly prevailed upon to accept the Senate bill. It had passed the Senate on the 3d of July. The struggle in conference committee lasted until the 13th of

August, when the House passed the Senate bill unchanged. The President declined to give his signature to the act, but allowed it to become a law. Immediately after the passage of the bill, the House adopted special enactments admitting raw sugar, coal, iron ore, and barbed wire, free of duty; but these bills were not acted on in the Senate.

**TARLETON, Colonel, in the War of the American Revolution.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1780 (FEBRUARY—AUGUST); and 1780-1781.

**TARPEIAN ROCK, The.** See CAPITOLINE HILL.

**TARQUIN THE PROUD, The expulsion of.** See ROME: B. C. 510.

**TARRACONENSIS.** See SPAIN: B. C. 218-25.

**TARRAGONA: A. D. 1641.—Occupation by the French.—Surrender to the Spaniards.** See SPAIN: A. D. 1640-1642.

**A. D. 1644.—Siege by the French.** See SPAIN: A. D. 1644-1646.

**TARSUS.** See CILICIA.

**TARTAN.**—The title of the chief commander—under the king—of the Assyrian armies.

**TARTAR DYNASTY OF CHINA, The.** See CHINA: A. D. 1294-1882.

**TARTARS, OR TATARS.**—"The Chinese used the name in a general sense, to include the greater part of their northern neighbours, and it was in imitation of them, probably, that the Europeans applied the name to the various nomade hordes who controlled Central Asia after the Mongol invasion. But the name properly belonged, and is applied by Raschid and other Mongol historians, to certain tribes living in the north-eastern corner of Mongolia, who, as I believe, were partially, at least, of the Tungusic race, and whose descendants are probably to be found among the Solons of Northern Manchuria."—H. H. Howorth, *Hist. of the Mongols*, pt. 1, p. 25.—"The name of Tartars, or Tatars, has been variously applied. It was long customary among geographical writers to give this title to the Kalmucs and Mongoles, and even to use it as a distinguishing name for those races of men who resemble the Kalmucs in features, and who have been supposed, whether correctly or not, to be allied to them in descent. Later authors, more accurate in the application of terms, have declared this to be an improper use of the name of Tartar, and by them the appellation has been given exclusively to the tribes of the Great Turkish race, and chiefly to the northern division of it, viz. to the hordes spread through the Russian empire and independent Tartary. . . . Whatever may be the true origin of the name of Tartar, custom has appropriated it to the race of men extensively spread through northern Asia, of whom the Ottoman Turks are a branch. It would, perhaps, be more strictly correct to call all these nations Turks, but the customary appellation may be retained when its meaning is determined."—J. C. Prichard, *Researches into the Physical History of the Races of Mankind*, ch. 5, sect. 1 (v. 2).—"The populations in question [the remnants, in southern Russia and Siberia, of the great Mongol empire of the Kiptchak], belong to one of three great groups,

stocks, or families—the Turk, the Mongol, or the Tungus. When we speak of a Tartar, he belongs to the first, whenever we speak of a Kalmuk, he belongs to the second, of these divisions. It is necessary to insist upon this; because, whatever may be the laxity with which the term Tartar is used, it is, in Russian ethnology at least, a misnomer when applied to a Mongol. It is still worse to call a Turk a Kalmuk."—R. G. Latham, *The Nationalities of Europe*, v. 1, ch. 23.—"Tartars (more correctly Tatars, but Tartars is the form generally current), a name given to nearly three million inhabitants of the Russian empire, chiefly Moslem and of Turkish origin. The majority—in European Russia—are remnants of the Mongol invasion of the 13th century, while those who inhabit Siberia are survivals of the once much more numerous Turkish population of the Ural-Altaic region, mixed to some extent with Finnish and Samoyedic stems, as also with Mongols. . . . The ethnographical features of the present Tartar inhabitants of European Russia, as well as their language, show that they contain no admixture (or very little) of Mongolian blood, but belong to the Turkish branch of the Ural-Altaic stock, necessitating the conclusion that only Batu, his warriors, and a limited number of his followers were Mongolians, while the great bulk of the 13th-century invaders were Turks."—P. A. Kropotkin, *Art. "Tartars" Encyclopædia Brit.*

ALSO IN: H. H. Howorth, *Hist. of the Mongols*, pt. 2, div. 1, p. 37.—See TURKS; and MONGOLS.

**TARTESSUS.**—"The territory round Gades, Carteia, and the other Phœnician settlements in this district [southwestern Spain] was known to the Greeks in the sixth century B. C. by the name of Tartessus, and regarded by them somewhat in the same light as Mexico and Peru appeared to the Spaniards of the sixteenth century."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 18.—This was the rich region known afterwards to the Romans as Bætica, as Turdetania, and in modern times as Andalusia.—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geog.*, ch. 21, sect. 2.

ALSO IN: J. Kenrick, *Phœnicia*, ch. 4, sect. 3.

**TARUMI, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIBS AND THEIR KINDRED.

**TARUSATES, The.** See AQUITAINE: THE ANCIENT TRIBES.

**TASHKEND, OR TASHKENT, Russian capture of (1865).** See RUSSIA: A. D. 1859-1876.

**TASMANIA, formerly Van Diemen's Land.**—"The first occupation of Van Diemen's Land as a British settlement dates from the 13th of June, 1802, when Lieutenant John Bowen, of H. M. S. Glatton, was instructed by the Governor of New South Wales to proceed thither from Sydney in order 'to establish His Majesty's right' to the Island. . . . A mere handful of convicts, guarded by a few soldiers, constituted the vanguard of the great army of criminals



which was to follow. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the colony in 1824. . . . About 18 months after his arrival in Van Diemen's Land it was proclaimed an independent colony [see *NEW SOUTH WALES: A. D. 1821-1831*], and the Imperial Government instituted Executive and Legislative Councils, with advisory and legislative functions. . . . For the better administration of justice, Governor Arthur divided the Island into police districts, with a stipendiary magistrate for each; but he caused the laws to be executed with a Draconic severity, which transformed wretched convicts—many of whom had been transported for trivial offences—into sullen madmen, or ferocious and revengeful devils. Men fled from the horrors of the penal settlement into the solitude of the bush, preferring to face a lingering death by starvation rather than undergo the tortures of the oft-repeated lash at the convict station. . . . In the year 1825, as many as 100 escaped convicts with arms in their hands had re-established a reign of terror in the country districts. . . . At length it became a question whether law or lawlessness should triumph. Governor Arthur placed himself at the head of a strong body of soldiers and civilians, and hunted the daring outlaws down. As many as 103 persons underwent capital punishment in the years 1825 and 1826, and once more the plague of brigandage was stamped out. . . . The Government of the Island remained in the hands of Colonel Arthur for twelve years; and the Crown acknowledged the value of his services by creating him a baronet on his return to England, and by conferring on him the Governorship of Canada. Captain Sir John Franklin . . . was the next Governor of Van Diemen's Land, where he arrived in January, 1837. . . . To numbers of even well-informed persons in the Old World the very name of this remote island was unfamiliar until it became associated with that of the illustrious navigator; and men of high scientific attainments began from that time to exhibit a lively interest in a part of the world of which so little was actually known. . . . Sir John Franklin was replaced in the Government of the colony by Sir John Eardley Wilmot, on the 21st of August, 1843. . . . Shortly after his appointment to the Governorship of Van Diemen's Land, the penal settlement in Norfolk Island had been constituted a dependency of the former; and the most depraved, desperate and irreclaimable of the convicts had been herded together on that beautiful spot. It would be difficult to exaggerate the horrors perpetrated by such a 'pestilent congregation' of criminals of the deepest dye. . . . There were 2,000 prisoners concentrated in Norfolk Island in the year 1845, under the nominal rule of a superintendent who is alleged to have been stern, merciless and cruel in the exercise of the authority entrusted to him. . . . He used the lash and various forms of torture with a frequency and severity which failed to break the spirit of the criminals he endeavoured to tame, while it aggravated the ferocity of their natures. . . . The result was the prevalence of a state of things upon the Island, which, in its unexampled misery and horror, it would be impossible to find adequate words to describe. The Imperial Government happening to learn what a pandemonium Norfolk Island had become, determined upon putting an end to it, and Gov-

ernor Wilmot received instructions for the immediate transfer of the establishment to Port Arthur. . . . A turning point had now arrived in the history of Van Diemen's Land; and its free population found itself confronted by two alternatives. Either it must consent to succumb to, and to be overwhelmed by, the criminal and servile element, . . . or it must resolve, as it soon afterwards did, that transportation should cease. . . . In . . . 1846 Sir Eardley Wilmot was recalled. . . . The darker chapters of Tasmanian story were by this time rapidly turning their last pages. . . . The vice-regal term of Governor Denison, who followed, marks the dawn of the new day which was to see the picturesque Island assume a new name and turn a brighter chapter in its hitherto gloomy story. . . . In the year 1850 the Imperial Parliament passed an Act for the better Government of the Australian Colonies, and among its provisions was one for the establishment of a Legislative Council in Van Diemen's Land, to consist of eight Members nominated by the Governor for the time being, and sixteen to be elected by as many districts. . . . The new Legislative Council did not meet for the dispatch of business until the 1st of January, 1852, and one of its earliest proceedings was to pass a resolution condemnatory of the continuance of the system of transportation. . . . Sir William Denison pertinaciously advised the Secretary of State for the Colonies to uphold transportation to Van Diemen's Land, and stigmatized its opponents as 'a few itinerant agitators.' Happily, wiser counsels prevailed in Downing Street, and when the Earl of Aberdeen came into office, the Duke of Newcastle was enabled to convey to the people of Van Diemen's Land the gratifying assurance that . . . transportation to that Island had been put an end to for ever. The welcome dispatch . . . was published in . . . May, 1853. . . . To break the more effectually with such of the associations of the past as were painful in the present, there was a general understanding that the old name of Van Diemen's Land should be allowed to fall into disuse, and that that of the Dutch navigator who had discovered the Island [in 1642] should be bestowed upon it. . . . Henceforth it was to be known as Tasmania, and the judicious change was formally sanctioned by Legislative Enactment a short time afterwards. . . . By an Act of the Imperial Parliament which received the Royal Assent upon the 1st of May, 1855, a Constitution was bestowed upon Tasmania. Two Houses, both of them elective, the Council consisting of 15, and the Assembly of 30 Members, were created and invested with all the Legislative and Administrative powers and functions enjoyed by the august body which had called them into existence."—*Historical Review of Tasmania*, by James Smith, in *Australasia Illustrated*, v. 2, pp. 925-941.—Since its constitutional organization, the history of Tasmania has been one of moderate progress. By census in 1891, its population was 146,667. The aborigines are extinct.

**TATARS.** See **TARTARS.**

**TAUBERBISCHOFESHEIM, Battle of.** See **GERMANY: A. D. 1866.**

**TAUNTON: A. D. 1685.**—The Welcome to Monmouth.—The Maids of Taunton and their flag.—"When Monmouth marched into Taunton [A. D. 1685] it was an eminently prosperous place. . . . The townsmen had long

leaned towards Presbyterian divinity and Whig politics. In the great civil war, Taunton had, through all vicissitudes, adhered to the Parliament, had been twice closely besieged by Goring, and had been twice defended with heroic valour by Robert Blake, afterwards the renowned Admiral of the Commonwealth. Whole streets had been burned down by the mortars and grenades of the Cavaliers. . . . The children of the men who, forty years before, had manned the ramparts of Taunton against the Royalists, now welcomed Monmouth with transports of joy and affection. Every door and window was adorned with wreaths of flowers. No man appeared in the streets without wearing in his hat a green bough, the badge of the popular cause. Damsels of the best families in the town wore colours for the insurgents. One flag in particular was embroidered gorgeously with emblems of royal dignity, and was offered to Monmouth by a train of young girls." After the suppression of Monmouth's rebellion, and while the "bloody Assizes" of Jeffreys were in progress, these little girls were hunted out and imprisoned, and the queen's maids of honor were permitted to extort money from their parents for the buying of their pardon and release.—Lord Macaulay, *Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 5.—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1685 (MAY—JULY).

**TAURICA, TAURIC CHERSONESE.**—The ancient Greek name of the Crimea, derived from the Tauri, a savage people who once inhabited it; "perhaps," says Grote, "a remnant of the expelled Cimmerians." See BOSPHORUS, THE CITY, &c.; and CIMMERIANS.

**TAURIS, Naval battle near.**—In the Roman civil war between Cæsar and his antagonists an important naval battle was fought, B. C. 47, near the little island of Tauris, on the Illyrian coast. Vatinius, who commanded on the Cæsarian side, defeated Octavius, and drove him out of the Adriatic.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 21.

**TAVORA PLOT, The.** See JESUITS: A. D. 1757–1773.

**TAWACONIES, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAWNEE (CADDON) FAMILY.

**TAXIARCH.—PHYLARCH.**—"The tribe appears to have been the only military classification known to Athens, and the taxiarch the only tribe officer for infantry, as the phylarch was for cavalry, under the general-in-chief."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 8.

Also in: G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece: The State*, pt. 3, ch. 3.

**TAYLOR, General Zachary, The Mexican campaign of.** See MEXICO: A. D. 1846–1847. . . . Presidential election and administration.—Death. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1848.

**TCHERNAYA, Battle of the (1855).** See RUSSIA: A. D. 1854–1856.

**TCHINOVNIKS.**—To keep the vast and complex bureaucratic machine of Russia in motion "it is necessary to have a large and well-drilled army of officials. These are drawn chiefly from the ranks of the noblesse and the clergy, and form a peculiar social class called Tchinovniks, or men with 'Tchins.' As the Tchin plays an important part in Russia, not only in the official world, but also to some extent in social life, it may be well to explain its significance. All officers, civil and military, are, ac-

cording to a scheme invented by Peter the Great, arranged in fourteen classes or ranks, and to each class or rank a particular name is attached. . . . As a general rule a man must begin at or near the bottom of the official ladder, and he must remain on each step a certain specified time. The step on which he is for the moment standing, or, in other words, the official rank or Tchin which he possesses, determines what offices he is competent to hold. Thus rank or Tchin is a necessary condition for receiving an appointment, but it does not designate any actual office, and the names of the different ranks are extremely apt to mislead a foreigner."—D. M. Wallace, *Russia*, ch. 13.

**TCHOUPRIA, Battle of (1804).** See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14–19TH CENTURIES (SERVIA).

**TEA: Introduction into Europe.**—"The Dutch East India Company were the first to introduce it into Europe, and a small quantity came to England from Holland in 1666. The East India Company thereafter ordered their agent at Bantam to send home small quantities, which they wished to introduce as presents, but its price was 60s. per lb., and it was little thought of. Twenty years elapsed before the Company first decided on importing tea, but by degrees it came into general use. In 1712 the imports of tea were only 156,000 lbs.; in 1750 they reached 2,300,000 lbs.; in 1800, 24,000,000 lbs.; in 1880, 30,500,000 lbs., and in 1870, 141,000,000 lbs."—L. Levi, *Hist. of British Commerce*, p. 239.

**TEA-PARTY, The Boston.** See BOSTON: A. D. 1773.

**TEA-ROOM PARTY, The.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1865–1868.

**TEARLESS BATTLE, The (B. C. 368).** See GREECE: B. C. 371–362.

**TECPANECAS, The.** See MEXICO: A. D. 1325–1502.

**TECTOSAGES.** See VOLCÆ.

**TECUMSEH, and his Indian League.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1811; and 1812–1813 HARRISON'S NORTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN.

**TECUNA, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: GUCK OR COCO GROUP.

**TEGYRA, Battle of.**—The first important victory won by the Thebans (B. C. 375), in the war which broke the power of Sparta. It was fought in Lokrian territory.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 38.

**TEHUEL-CHE, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PATAGONIANS.

**TEKKE TURCOMANS, Russian subjugation of.** See RUSSIA: A. D. 1869–1881.

**TEL EL AMARNA TABLETS, The.** See EGYPT: ABOUT B. C. 1500–1400.

**TEL EL KEBIR, Battle of (1882).** See EGYPT: A. D. 1882–1883.

**TELAMON, Battle of (B. C. 225).** See ROME: B. C. 295–191.

**TELEGRAPH, Invention of the.** See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY.

**TELINGAS, The.** See TURANIAN RACES.

**TELL, William, The Legend of.** See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.

**TEMENIDÆ, The.**—"The history of the Macedonian kingdom is the history of its royal race. The members of this royal house called themselves Temenidæ; i. e. they venerated as their original ancestor the same Temenus who was accounted the founder of the Heracleide dy-



nasty in Peloponnesian Argos."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 7, ch. 1 (c. 5).

**TEMENITES.**—One of the suburbs of the ancient city of Syracuse was so-called from the ground sacred to Apollo Temenites which it contained. It afterwards became a part of the city called Neapolis.

**TEMESVAR, Battle of (1849).** See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

**Siege and capture of (1716).** See HUNGARY: A. D. 1699-1718.

**TEMPE, Vale of.** See THESSALY.

**TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTS.**—Organized movements of temperance reform appear to have had their origin in America. The first known Temperance Society is said to have been formed among the farmers of Litchfield county, Connecticut, in 1789; the next appeared in Saratoga county, New York, in 1808 and 1809. In 1813 a Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance was formed. In 1829 the movement was nationalized by the organization of the American Temperance Society. In that year, too, it was taken up in Ireland and Scotland, by societies formed at New Ross, in the former, and at Glasgow, in the latter. The first English society of like kind is reported to have taken form at Bradford, in 1830; but a British and Foreign Temperance Society was organized for general agitation of the subject as early as 1831. In America, the first national temperance convention was held at Philadelphia in 1833. A movement for the absolute suppression of the traffic in ardent spirits was begun in Maine, with Neal Dow among its leaders, as early as 1837. It succeeded after fourteen years in accomplishing its purpose, by the passage of the famous Maine Law, in June, 1851. Stringent legislation to restrain the traffic had already been secured in several other states; but really effective prohibition may be said to have been brought to trial first by the Maine Law. Meantime, many widespread temperance organizations had arisen—the Order of Rechabites in England, in 1835; the Societies of the Washingtonians, for the reclamation of drunkards, at Baltimore, in 1840; the Band of Hope among children, instituted at Leeds, England, in 1847; the Order of Sons of Temperance, formed in New York, in 1842; the Good Templars, in 1851. In 1838, Father Mathew entered on his great temperance mission in Ireland. In 1842, John B. Gough began his career as a temperance lecturer. In 1853, the United Kingdom Alliance, for the suppression of the liquor traffic, was formed in Great Britain. In December, 1873, the Women's Temperance Crusade, by meetings for prayer in saloons, was started in Ohio, and spread through many states. In the same year, the Blue Ribbon temperance mission of Francis Murphy was begun. In 1874, the Woman's National Christian Temperance Union was organized, at a convention held in Cleveland, Ohio.—*Centennial Temperance Volume*.

ALSO IN: D. Burns, *Temperance History*, 2 v.

**TEMPLARS: A. D. 1118.**—The Founding of the Order.—In 1118, nine knights, of whom Hugh de Payens was the principal, took a vow, in the presence of Baldwin I., King of Jerusalem,

to be both monks and soldiers, devoting themselves to the protection of the pilgrims who visited the Holy Land. They were given part of the king's palace for residence, and the open space between the palace and the Temple—whence they took the name of Templars. In 1128 Hugh de Payens and others visited Europe and awakened great interest in the Order. "The Templars appeared before the council of Troyes, and gave an account of their order and its objects, which were highly approved of by the fathers. The celebrated Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, took a lively interest in its welfare, and made some improvements in its rule. A white mantle was assigned as their habit, to which Pope Eugenius some years afterwards added a plain red cross on the left breast; their banner was formed of the black and white striped cloth named Bauséant, which word became their battle-cry, and it bore the humble inscription, 'Not unto us, O Lord, but unto thy name be glory!' Hugh de Payens returned to Syria at the head of three hundred knights of the noblest houses of the West, who had become members of the order."—T. Keightley, *The Crusaders*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: J. A. Froude, *The Spanish Story of the Armada and other Essays*, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1185-1313.**—The Order in England and elsewhere.—"The Knights Templars first established the chief house of their order in England, without Holborn Bars [London] on the south side of the street, where Southampton House formerly stood; . . . but when the order had greatly increased in numbers, power, and wealth, and had somewhat departed from its original purity and simplicity, we find that the superior and the knights resident in London began to look abroad for a more extensive and commodious place of habitation. They purchased a large space of ground, extending from the White Friars westward to Essex House without Temple Bar, and commenced the erection of a convent on a scale of grandeur commensurate with the dignity and importance of the chief house of the great religio-military society of the Temple in Britain. It was called the New Temple, to distinguish it from the original establishment at Holborn, which came thenceforth to be known by the name of the Old Temple. . . . [In 1185] Geoffrey, the superior of the order in England, caused an inquisition to be made of the lands of the Templars, . . . and the amount of all kinds of property possessed by the Templars in England at that period is astonishing. . . . The annual income of the order in Europe has been roughly estimated at six millions sterling! According to Matthew Paris, the Templars possessed nine thousand manors or lordships in Christendom, besides a large revenue and immense riches arising from the constant charitable bequests and donations of sums of money from pious persons. . . . The Templars, in addition to their amazing wealth, enjoyed vast privileges and immunities."—C. G. Addison, *The Knights Templars*, ch. 3.—When the order of the Templars was suppressed and its property confiscated, the convent and church of the Temple in London were granted by the king, first, in 1313, to Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke; afterwards, successively, to the Duke of Lancaster and to Hugh le Despenser. "The Temple then came for a short time into the hands of the Knights Hospitallers, and during the reign of

Edward III. It seems to have been occupied by the lawyers, as tenants under the Hospitallers. When that order was dissolved by Henry VIII., the property passed into the hands of the Crown, the lawyers still holding possession as tenants. This continued till the reign of James I., when a petition was drawn up and presented to the king asking him to assign the property to the legal body in permanence. This was accordingly done by letters patent, in A. D. 1609, and the Benchers of the Inner and Middle Temple received possession of the buildings, on consideration of a small annual payment to the Crown."—F. C. Woodhouse, *Military Religious Orders*, pt. 2, ch. 7.—"Many of the old retainers of the Temple became servants of the new lawyers, who had ousted their masters. . . . The dining in pairs, the expulsion from hall for misconduct, and the locking out of chambers were old customs also kept up. The judges of Common Pleas retained the title of knight, and the *Fratres Servientes* of the Templars arose again in the character of learned serjeants-at-law, the coif of the modern serjeant being the linen coif of the old *Feres Serjens* of the Temple."—W. Thornbury, *Old and New London*, v. 1, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: C. G. Addison, *The Knights Templars*, ch. 7.

A. D. 1299.—Their last campaign in Palestine. See CRUSADES: A. D. 1299.

A. D. 1307-1314.—The prosecution and destruction of the order.—"When the Holy Land fell completely into Mahomedan hands on the loss of Acre in 1291 [see JERUSALEM: A. D. 1291] they [the Templars] abandoned the hopeless task and settled in Cyprus. By the end of the thirteenth century they had almost all returned to Europe. They were peculiarly strong and wealthy in France—the strength and wealth were alike dangerous to them. In Paris they built their fortress, the Temple, over against the King's palace of the Louvre; and in that stronghold the King himself had once to take refuge from the angry Parisian mob, exasperated by his heavy extortions. During the life and death struggle with the Papacy, the order had not taken the side of the Church against the sovereign; for their wealth had held them down. Philip [Philip IV], however, knew no gratitude, and they were doomed. A powerful and secret society endangered the safety of the state: their wealth was a sore temptation: there was no lack of rumours. Dark tales came out respecting the habits of the order; tales exaggerated and blackened by the diseased imagination of the age. Popular proverbs, those ominous straws of public opinion, were heard in different lands, hinting at dark vices and crimes. Doubtless the vows of the order, imposed on unruly natures, led to grievous sins against the first laws of moral life. And there was more than this: there were strange rumours of horrible infidelity and blasphemy; and men were prepared to believe everything. So no one seemed to be amazed when, in October, 1307, the King made a sudden coup d'état, arrested all the Templars in France on the same day, and seized their goods. The Temple at Paris with the Grand Master fell into his hands. Their property was presently placed in the custody of the Pope's nuncios in France; the knights were kept in dark and dismal prisons. Their trial was long and tedious. Two hundred and thirty-one knights were examined, with all the

brutality that examination then meant; the Pope also took the depositions of more than seventy. From these examinations what can we learn? All means were used: some were tortured, others threatened, others tempted with promises of immunity. They made confession accordingly; and the ghastly catalogue of their professed ill-doings may be read in the history of the trial. Who shall say what truth there was in it all? Probably little or none. Many confessed and then recanted their confession. The golden image with eyes of glowing carbuncle which they worshipped; the trampling and spitting on the crucifix; the names of Galla and Baphomet; the hideous practices of the initiation;—all these things pass before us, in the dim uncertainty, like some horrible procession of the vices in hell. What the truth was will never be known. . . . The knights made a dignified defence in these last moments of their history; they did not flinch either at the terrible prospect before them, or through memory of the tortures which they had undergone. Public opinion, in and out of France, began to stir against the barbarous treatment they had received; they were no longer proud and wealthy princes, but suffering martyrs, showing bravery and a firm front against the cruelties of the King and his lawyers. Marigni, Philip's minister and friend, and the King himself, were embarrassed by the number and firmness of their victims, by the sight of Europe looking aghast, by the murmurs of the people. Marigni suggested that men who had confessed and recanted might be treated as relapsed heretics, such being the law of the Inquisition, (what irony was here!) and accordingly in 1310 an enclosure was made at Paris, within which fifty-nine Templars perished miserably by fire. Others were burnt later at Senlis. . . . The King and Pope worked on the feeble Council, until in March 1312 the abolition of the order was formally decreed; and its chief property, its lands and buildings, were given over to the Knights of St. John, to be used for the recovery of the Holy Land; 'which thing,' says the Supplementor to William of Nangis, 'came not to pass, but rather the endowment did but make them worse than before.' The chief part of the spoil, as might be well believed, never left the King's hands. One more tragedy, and then all was over. The four heads of the order were still at Paris, prisoners—Jacques de Molai, Grand Master; Guy of Auvergne, the Master of Normandy, and two more. The Pope had reserved their fate in his own hands, and sent a commission to Paris, who were enjoined once more to hear the confession of these dignitaries, and then to condemn them to perpetual captivity. But at the last moment the Grand Master and Guy publicly retracted their forced confessions, and declared themselves and the order guiltless of all the abominable charges laid against them. Philip was filled with devouring rage. Without further trial or judgment he ordered them to be led that night to the island in the Seine; there they were fastened to the stake and burnt."—G. W. Kitchin, *Hist. of France*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 10, sect. 3.—In England, a similar prosecution of the Templars, instigated by the pope, was commenced in January, 1308, when the chiefs of the order were seized and imprisoned and subjected to examination with torture. The result was the dissolution of the order and the confiscation of its property:



but none of the knights were executed, though some died in prison from the effects of their barbarous treatment. "The property of the Templars in England was placed under the charge of a commission at the time that proceedings were commenced against them, and the king very soon treated it as if it were his own, giving away manors and convents at his pleasure. A great part of the possessions of the Order was subsequently made over to the Hospitallers. . . . Some of the surviving Templars retired to monasteries, others returned to the world, and assumed secular habits, for which they incurred the censures of the Pope. . . . In Spain, Portugal, and Germany, proceedings were taken against the Order; their property was confiscated, and in some cases torture was used; but it is remarkable that it was only in France, and those places where Philip's influence was powerful, that any Templar was actually put to death."—F. C. Woodhouse, *Military Religious Orders*, pt. 2, ch. 6-7 and 5.

ALSO IN: C. G. Addison, *The Knights Templars*, ch. 7.—J. Michelet, *Hist. of France*, bk. 5, ch. 3.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 12, ch. 1-2 (v. 5).

TEMPLE, The (London). See TEMPLARS: A. D. 1185-1313.

TEMPLE OF CONCORD AT ROME, The.—After the long contest in Rome over the Licinian Laws, which were adopted B. C. 367, M. Furius Camillus—the great Camillus—being made Dictator for the fifth time, in his eightieth year, brought about peace between the patricians and plebeians, in commemoration of which he vowed a temple to Concord. "Before he could dedicate it, the old hero died. The temple, however, was built according to his design; its site, now one of the best known among those of ancient Rome, can still be traced with great certainty at the north-western angle of the Forum, immediately under the Capitoline. The building was restored with great magnificence by the Emperor Tiberius; and it deserved to be so, for it commemorated one of the greatest events of Roman history."—H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 2, ch. 15 (v. 1).

TEMPLE OF DIANA. See EPHEBUS.

TEMPLE OF JANUS, The.—"The Temple of Janus was one of the earliest buildings of Rome, founded, according to Livy (i. 19.) by Numa. It stood near the Curia, on the north-east side of the Forum, at the verge of a district called the Argiletum. . . . [It was] a small 'ædícula' or shrine, which towards the end of the Republic, or perhaps earlier, was of bronze. It is shown with much minuteness on a First Brass of Nero as a small cella, without columns, but with richly ornamented frieze and cornice. Its doors were closed on those rare occasions when Rome was at peace with all the world. From the time of its traditional founder, Numa, to that of Livy, it was only twice shut—once after the first Punic War, and secondly after the victory of Augustus at Actium. . . . It contained a very ancient statue, probably by an Etruscan artist, of the doublefaced Janus Bifrons, or Geminus. . . . The Temple of Janus gave its name to this part of the edge of the Forum, and from the numerous shops of the argentarii or bankers and money-lenders which were there, the word Janus came to mean the

usurers' quarter."—J. H. Middleton, *Ancient Rome in 1885*, ch. 5.—The Temple of Janus was closed, once more, by Vespasian, after the destruction of Jerusalem and the ending of the war in Judea, A. D. 71. "It had stood open since the German wars of the first princes [Augustus]; or, according to the computation of the Christian Orosius, from the birth of Christ to the overthrow of the Jewish people: for the senate had refused to sanction Nero's caprice in closing it on his precarious accommodation with Parthia. Never before had this solemn act addressed the feelings of the citizens so directly. . . . The Peace of Vespasian was celebrated by a new bevy of poets and historians not less loudly than the Peace of Augustus. A new era of happiness and prosperity was not less passionately predicted."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 60.

TEMPLE OF SOLOMON, The.—"As soon as David had given to his people the boon of a unique capital, nothing could be more natural than the wish to add sacredness to the glory of the capital by making it the centre of the national worship. According to the Chronicles, David . . . had made unheard-of preparations to build a house for God. But it had been decreed unfit that the sanctuary should be built by a man whose hands were red with the blood of many wars, and he had received the promise that the great work should be accomplished by his son. Into that work Solomon threw himself with hearty zeal in the month Zif of the fourth year of his reign, when his kingdom was consolidated. . . . He inherited the friendship which David had enjoyed, with Hiram, King of Tyre. . . . The friendliest overtures passed between the two kings in letters, to which Josephus appeals as still extant. A commercial treaty was made by which Solomon engaged to furnish the Tyrian king with annual revenues of wheat, barley, and oil, and Hiram put at Solomon's disposal the skilled labour of an army of Sidonian wood-cutters and artisans. . . . Some writers have tried to minimise Solomon's work as a builder, and have spoken of the Temple as an exceedingly insignificant structure which would not stand a moment's comparison with the smallest and humblest of our own cathedrals. Insignificant in size it certainly was, but we must not forget its costly splendour, the remote age in which the work was achieved, and the truly stupendous constructions which the design required. Mount Moriah was selected as a site hallowed by the tradition of Abraham's sacrifice, and more recently by David's vision of the Angel of the Pestilence with his drawn sword on the threshing-floor of the Jebusite Prince Araunah. But to utilise this doubly consecrated area involved almost superhuman difficulties, which would have been avoided if the loftier but less suitable height of the Mount of Olives could have been chosen. The rugged summit had to be enlarged to a space of 500 yards square, and this level was supported by Cyclopean walls, which have long been the wonder of the world. . . . The caverns, quarries, water storages, and subterranean conduits hewn out of the solid rock, over which Jerusalem is built, could only have been constructed at the cost of immeasurable toil. . . . It was perhaps from his Egyptian father-in-law that Solomon, to his own cost, learnt the secret of forced labour which alone rendered such undertakings possible. . . . Four classes were

subject to it. 1. The lightest labour was required from the native freeborn Israelites (ezrach). They were not regarded as bondsmen, . . . yet 30,000 of these were required in relays of 10,000 to work, one month in every three, in the forest of Lebanon. 2. There were the strangers, or resident aliens (Gerim), such as the Phoenicians and Gibrilites, who were Hiram's subjects and worked for pay. 3. There were three classes of slaves—those taken in war, or sold for debt, or home-born. 4. Lowest and most wretched of all, there were the vassal Canaanites (Toshabim), from whom were drawn those 70,000 burden-bearers, and 80,000 quarry-men, the Helots of Palestine, who were placed under the charge of 3,600 Israelite officers. The blotches of smoke are still visible on the walls and roofs of the subterranean quarries where these poor serfs, in the dim torchlight and suffocating air, 'laboured without reward, perished without pity, and suffered without redress.' The sad narrative reveals to us, and modern research confirms, that the purple of Solomon had a very seamy side, and that an abyss of misery heaved and moaned under the glittering surface of his splendour. . . . Apart from the lavish costliness of its materials the actual Temple was architecturally a poor and commonplace structure. It was quite small—only 90 feet long, 35 feet broad, and 45 feet high. It was meant for the symbolic habitation of God, not for the worship of great congregations. . . . Of the external aspect of the building in Solomon's day we know nothing. We cannot even tell whether it had one level roof, or whether the Holy of Holies was like a lower chancel at the end of it; nor whether the roof was flat or, as the Rabbis say, ridged; nor whether the outer surface of the three-storied chambers which surrounded it was of stone, or planked with cedar, or overlaid with plinths of gold and silver; nor whether, in any case, it was ornamented with carvings or left blank; nor whether the cornices only were decorated with open flowers like the Assyrian rosettes. Nor do we know with certainty whether it was supported within by pillars or not. . . . It required the toil of 300,000 men for twenty years to build one of the pyramids. It took two hundred years to build and four hundred to embellish the great Temple of Artemis of the Ephesians. It took more than five centuries to give to Westminster Abbey its present form. Solomon's Temple only took seven and a half years to build; but . . . its objects were wholly different from those of the great shrines which we have mentioned. . . . Needing but little repair, it stood for more than four centuries. Succeeded as it was by the Temples of Zerubbabel and of Herod, it carried down till seventy years after the Christian era the memory of the Tabernacle in the wilderness, of which it preserved the general outline, though it exactly doubled all the proportions and admitted many innovations."—F. W. Farrar, *The First Book of Kings*, ch. 14 (*Expositor's Bible*).

**TEN, The Council of.** See VENICE: A. D. 1032-1319.

**TEN THOUSAND, The Retreat of the.** See PERSIA: B. C. 401-400.

**TEN TRIBES OF ISRAEL, The.** See JEWS: THE KINGDOMS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH.

**TEN YEARS WAR, The.**—The long conflict between Athens and her confederated ene-

mies, Sparta at the head, which is usually called the Peloponnesian War, was divided into two periods by the Peace of Nicias. The war in the first period, covering a decade, was known as the Ten Years War; though the Peloponnesians called it the Attic War.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 2.—See ATHENS: B. C. 421.

**TENANT RIGHT, The Ulster.—The Tenant League.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1848-1852.

**TENCHEBRAY, Battle of (1106).** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1087-1135.

**TENCTHERI, The.** See USIPETES.

**TENEDOS.** See TROJA; and ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES.

**TENEZ, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ZAPOTECOS, ETC.

**TENNESSEE: The aboriginal inhabitants.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SHAWANESE, and CHEROKEES.

**A. D. 1629.**—Embraced in the Carolina grant to Sir Robert Heath. See AMERICA: A. D. 1629.

**A. D. 1663.**—Embraced in the Carolina grant to Monk, Shaftesbury and others. See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1663-1670.

**A. D. 1748.**—First English exploration from Virginia. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1751.

**A. D. 1768.**—The Treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix.—Pretended cession of country south of the Ohio. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1765-1768.

**A. D. 1769-1772.**—The first settlers in the eastern valley.—The Watauga commonwealth and its constitution.—"Soon after the successful ending of the last colonial struggle with France, and the conquest of Canada, the British king issued a proclamation forbidding the English colonists from trespassing on Indian grounds, or moving west of the mountains [see NORTH-WEST TERRITORY OF THE U. S.: A. D. 1763]. But in 1768, at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, the Six Nations agreed to surrender to the English all the lands lying between the Ohio and the Tennessee [see UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1765-1768]; and this treaty was at once seized upon by the backwoodsmen as offering an excuse for settling beyond the mountains. However, the Iroquois had ceded lands to which they had no more right than a score or more other Indian tribes. . . . The great hunting-grounds between the Ohio and the Tennessee formed a debatable land, claimed by every tribe that could hold its own against its rivals. The eastern part of what is now Tennessee consists of a great hill-strewn, forest-clad valley, running from northeast to southwest, bounded on one side by the Cumberland, and on the other by the Great Smoky and Unaka Mountains; the latter separating it from North Carolina. In this valley arise and end the Clinch, the Holston, the Watauga, the Nolichucky, the French Broad, and the other streams, whose combined volume makes the Tennessee River. The upper end of the valley lies in southwestern Virginia, the headwaters of some of the rivers being well within that State; and though the province was really part of North Carolina, it was separated therefrom by high mountain chains, while from Virginia it was easy to follow the watercourses down the valley. Thus, as elsewhere among the mountains forming the western frontier, the first



movements of population went parallel with, rather than across, the ranges. As in western Virginia the first settlers came, for the most part, from Pennsylvania, so, in turn, in what was then western North Carolina, and is now eastern Tennessee, the first settlers came mainly from Virginia, and, indeed, in great part, from this same Pennsylvanian stock. Of course, in each case there was also a very considerable movement directly westward. They were a sturdy race, enterprising and intelligent, fond of the strong excitement inherent in the adventurous frontier life. Their untamed and turbulent passions, and the lawless freedom of their lives, made them a population very productive of wild, headstrong characters; yet, as a whole, they were a God-fearing race, as was but natural in those who sprang from the loins of the Irish Calvinists. Their preachers, all Presbyterians, followed close behind the first settlers and shared their toil and dangers. . . . In 1769, the year that Boon first went to Kentucky, the first permanent settlers came to the banks of the Watauga, the settlement being merely an enlargement of the Virginia settlement, which had for a short time existed on the head-waters of the Holston, especially near Wolf Hills. At first the settlers thought they were still in the domain of Virginia, for at that time the line marking her southern boundary had not been run so far west. . . . But in 1771, one of the new-comers, who was a practical surveyor, ran out the Virginia boundary line some distance to the westward, and discovered that the Watauga settlement came within the limits of North Carolina. Hitherto the settlers had supposed that they themselves were governed by the Virginian law, and that their rights as against the Indians were guaranteed by the Virginian government; but this discovery threw them back upon their own resources. They suddenly found themselves obliged to organize a civil government. . . . About the time that the Watauga commonwealth was founded, the troubles in North Carolina came to a head. Open war ensued between the adherents of the royal governor, Tryon, on the one hand, and the Regulators, as the insurgents styled themselves, on the other, the struggle ending with the overthrow of the Regulators at the battle of Alamance [see NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1766-1771]. As a consequence of these troubles, many people from the back counties of North Carolina crossed the mountains, and took up their abode among the pioneers on the Watauga and upper Holston; the beautiful valley of the Nolichucky soon receiving its share of this stream of immigration. Among the first comers were many members of the class of desperate adventurers always to be found hanging round the outskirts of frontier civilization. . . . But the bulk of the settlers were men of sterling worth; fit to be the pioneer fathers of a mighty and beautiful state. . . . Such were the settlers of the Watauga, the founders of the commonwealth that grew into the State of Tennessee, who early in 1772 decided that they must form some kind of government that would put down wrong-doing and work equity between man and man. Two of their number already towered head and shoulders above the rest in importance and merit especial mention; for they were destined for the next thirty years to play the chief parts in the history of that portion of

the Southwest which largely through their own efforts became the State of Tennessee. These two men, neither of them yet thirty years of age, were John Sevier and James Robertson. . . . With their characteristic capacity for combination, so striking as existing together with the equally characteristic capacity for individual self-help, the settlers determined to organize a government of their own. They promptly put their resolution into effect early in the spring of 1772, Robertson being apparently the leader in the movement. They decided to adopt written articles of agreement, by which their conduct should be governed; and these were known as the Articles of the Watauga Association. They formed a written constitution, the first ever adopted west of the mountains, or by a community composed of American-born freemen. It is this fact of the early independence and self-government of the settlers along the head-waters of the Tennessee that gives to their history its peculiar importance. They were the first men of American birth to establish a free and independent community on the continent. . . . The first step taken by the Watauga settlers, when they had determined to organize, was to meet in general convention, holding a kind of folk-thing, akin to the New England town-meeting. They then elected a representative assembly, a small parliament or 'witanagemot,' which met at Robertson's station. Apparently the freemen of each little fort or palisaded village, each block-house that was the centre of a group of detached cabins and clearings, sent a member to this first frontier legislature. It consisted of thirteen representatives, who proceeded to elect from their number five—among them Sevier and Robertson—to form a committee or court, which should carry on the actual business of government, and should exercise both judicial and executive functions. This court had a clerk and a sheriff, or executive officer, who respectively recorded and enforced their decrees. . . . In fact, the dwellers, in this little outlying frontier commonwealth, exercised the rights of full statehood for a number of years; establishing in true American style a purely democratic government with representative institutions."—T. Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, v. 1, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: E. Kirke (pseud. J. R. Gilmore), *The Rear-Guard of the Revolution*, ch. 2-6.—J. Phelan, *Hist. of Tennessee*, ch. 1-3.

**A. D. 1776-1784.—Annexation to North Carolina.—Cession by that state to the Congress of the Confederation.—Consequent revolt.—Repeal of the act of cession.**—"The Watauga people had hopes, when the articles of association were adopted, of being able eventually to form an independent government, governed as the older colonies were governed, by royal governors. When the disagreements between the colonies and the mother country arose, they modified their views to the new order of things, and regarded themselves as a distinct though as yet inchoate state. But their weakness . . . rendered the protection of some more powerful state necessary for their welfare. . . . They petitioned North Carolina for annexation in 1776. Their petition was granted. . . . The provincial congress of North Carolina met at Halifax in November, 1776, and [Robertson, Sevier and two others] were delegates from Washington District, Watauga settlement. . . . After

the annexation of the Washington District the old form of government was allowed to stand until the spring of 1777. . . . In November of this year, 1777, the District of Washington became Washington County. . . . From 1777 until the disturbances of eight years later, the history of Tennessee was a part of the history of North Carolina. . . . The part played by the inhabitants of Tennessee in the war for independence was active, and in one instance [at King's Mountain] decisive. Their operations were chiefly of a desultory, guerrilla kind, under the leadership of Sevier . . . and Shelby." Sevier was also the leader in wars with the Indians, which were carried on with unsparing fierceness on both sides. "In the April session of 1784, the General Assembly of North Carolina, in accordance with the recommendation of Congress itself, as well as with the dictates of a far-seeing and enlightened statesmanship, imitated the example of Virginia and New York [see UNITED STATES OF AM. : A. D. 1781-1786], and ceded to the United States all the territory which is now the State of Tennessee. This of course included all the settlements. The condition of the cession was its acceptance by Congress within two years. Until Congress should have accepted the ceded territory, the jurisdiction of North Carolina over it was to remain in every respect the same as heretofore. . . . When the question of cession was first broached, it was accepted by the four representatives of the western counties at Hillsboro, as well as by those who proposed it, as the natural and legitimate solution of a complex problem. No one apparently dreamed of opposition on the part of the settlers themselves. . . . There is no reason to think that the Watauga people had any objection to the cession. . . . The objection was against the manner of the cession and its conditions. . . . The main cause of complaint was that North Carolina had left them without any form of government for two years. . . . A storm of indignation swept through the entire settlement. . . . The people regarded themselves without government, and, true to the traditions of their race, they sought the solution of the difficulty in their own resources. . . . It is one of the noteworthy facts in the history of institutions that the possessors of English tradition always begin with the first primal germ of local self-government at hand, be it court leet, court of quarter sessions, township, county, school district, or military company, and build upward. The Watauga people had nothing so convenient as the militia companies, and they began with them as representing a more minutely varied constituency than the county court. Each company elected two representatives, and the representatives so elected in each county formed themselves into a committee, and the three committees of Washington, Sullivan, and Greene counties met as a kind of impromptu or temporary legislature, and decided to call a general convention to be elected by the people of the different counties. This convention met on the 23d of August, 1784, at Jonesboro. John Sevier was elected president, and Landon Carter secretary. . . . It is supposed that the convention which met at Jonesboro adopted the resolution to form a 'separate and distinct State, independent of the State of North Carolina.' . . . Provision was made for the calling of a future convention in which representation was to be

according to companies. . . . The meeting adjourned, having fairly inaugurated the contest with North Carolina, which still claimed jurisdiction." Soon afterward the legislature of North Carolina repealed the act of cession, and "for a time it was supposed that this would terminate the agitation in favor of a new State."

—J. Phelan, *Hist. of Tennessee*, ch. 5-10.

ALSO IN: J. R. Gilmore, *John Sevier as a Commonwealth Builder*, ch. 2.—J. G. M. Ramsey, *Annals of Tennessee*, ch. 3.

**A. D. 1780.—The Battle of King's Mountain.** See UNITED STATES OF AM. : A. D. 1780-1781.

**A. D. 1785.—The organization of the State of Franklin.**—"Toward the close of May [1785] the western lands being again under discussion [in Congress], a resolution was carried urging North Carolina to reconsider her act of the previous November, and once more cede to Congress her possessions beyond the mountains. Had the request been granted, there can be no doubt the measure would have speedily brought peace and quiet to that distracted region. But North Carolina was too intent on bringing her rebellious subjects to terms to think for a moment of bestowing them with their lands and goods on Congress. Indeed, when the news of the request was carried into the district some months later, the malcontents expressed much surprise. They could not, they said, understand why Congress should apply to North Carolina; North Carolina had nothing to do with them. The parent State had, by her act of 1784, given them away. Congress did not take them under its protection. They belonged, therefore, to nobody, and while in this condition had called a convention, had framed a constitution, had formed a new State, had chosen for it a name, and elected a Legislature which was actually in session at the time the act of the 23d of May was passed. . . . Much of what they stated was strictly true. The delegates to the second convention had assembled early in 1785. These had given the State the name of Franklin, and had drawn up a constitution which they submitted to the people. It was expected that the men of the district would consider it carefully, and select delegates to a third convention, which should have full power to ratify or reject. The place fixed upon for the meeting of the convention was Greenville. But as there was then no printing-press nearer than Charleston or Richmond, and as much time must elapse before the constitution could become known to all, the delegates were not to convene till the 14th of November. Meanwhile the Legislature was to organize. Elections were held without delay; members were chosen after the manner in which the settlers had long been accustomed to elect representatives to the Assembly of the parent State, and these, meeting at Jonesboro, conducted their business with so much dispatch that on the last day of March they adjourned. Many acts were passed by them. But one alone excited general comment, and was the cause of unbounded merriment across the mountains. A list of articles at that time scarce to be met with in the State of Franklin would be a long one. But there would be no article in the list less plentiful than money. . . . When, therefore, the Legislature came to determine what should be the legal currency of the State, it most wisely contented itself with fixing the value of



such articles as had, from time immemorial, been used as money. One pound of sugar, the law said, should pass for a shilling-piece; the skin of a raccoon or a fox for a shilling and threepence. A gallon of rye whiskey, it was thought, was worth twice that sum, while a gallon of peach-brandy or a yard of good nine hundred flax linen was each to pass for a three-shilling piece. Some difficulty was met with in selecting articles that could be easily carried from place to place and expressive of large values. It was, however, finally determined that a clean beaver-skin, an otter- or a deer-skin, should each of them be the representative of six shillings. In this kind of money, the law further prescribed, the salary of every officer of the State, from the Governor down to the hangman, was to be paid. When this act became known in the East the wits were greatly amused. . . . In the belief that the new money could not be counterfeited they were much mistaken. Many bundles of what seemed to be otter-skins were soon passing about, which, on being opened, were found to be skins of raccoons with tails of otters sewed to them. . . . The name of the State has often been asserted to be Frankland, the land of the Franks, or Freemen. . . . But letters are extant from high officials of the State to Benjamin Franklin declaring that it was named after him."—J. B. McMaster, *Hist. of the People of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 3, with foot-note.

ALSO IN: J. G. M. Ramsey, *Annals of Tennessee*, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1785-1796.**—The troubled history and the fall of the state of Franklin.—The rise of the state of Tennessee.—On receiving news of the organization of the independent state of Franklin, Governor Martin, of North Carolina, issued a proclamation which was skilfully addressed to the cooler judgment of the mountaineers and which "was not without its effect." But, although the adherents of North Carolina "gradually gained ground in the new commonwealth, a majority still clung to Sevier, and refused to recognize any government but the one they themselves had organized. In this opposition of parties, disorders sprang up which presently degenerated into lawlessness. Both governments claimed jurisdiction, and both sought to exercise it. The consequence was that both became inefficient. Party quarrels ensued; old friends became enemies; Tipton and his followers openly supported the claims of North Carolina; Sevier sought to maintain his authority as the executive officer of Franklin. This antagonistic spirit led to the commission of various outrages. . . . But in the midst of these inglorious quarrels, Governor Sevier did not neglect to defend from Indian aggressions the state over which he had been called to preside. . . . He was far less successful, however, in giving peace to the distracted state of Franklin. The continuance of intestine dissensions, and the nice balance of parties which took place in 1787, induced the people to refuse to pay taxes either to North Carolina or to the local government, until the supremacy of one or the other should be more generally acknowledged. In this state of affairs, with his government tottering to its downfall, Sevier earnestly appealed to North Carolina for a ratification of the independence of the state of Franklin, and to Franklin himself, and the governors of Georgia and Virginia, for

counsel and assistance. Disappointed on all sides, he finally rested for support upon his immediate friends, conscious of the rectitude of his own intentions. . . . But the people were already weary of a feud which threatened, at every fresh outbreak, to end in bloodshed. In 1787 the last legislature of the state of Franklin held its session at Greenville. . . . The conciliatory measures of North Carolina presently disarmed the malecontents of all further arguments for opposing the reunion; and in February, 1788, the state of Franklin ceased to exist." Fierce conflicts between Sevier and Tipton and their hotter partisans still continued for some time; until, in October, Sevier was arrested for high treason and imprisoned at Morgantown. He escaped soon after, through the aid of his sons, was elected to the North Carolina senate, and was permitted to qualify for the seat on renewing his oath of allegiance. "His services were remembered and his faults forgotten." Meantime, settlements on the Cumberland, founded in 1779 by James Robertson, had prospered and grown strong, and Nashville, the chief among them, assumed its name in 1784, "in commemoration of the patriotic services of Colonel Francis Nash," of North Carolina, who fell in the battle of Germantown. In 1790, after ratifying the Federal Constitution, North Carolina, re-enacted the cession of her western territory, coinciding with the present state of Tennessee, to the United States, stipulating "that no regulation made or to be made by Congress shall tend to the emancipation of slaves." The "Territory southwest of the Ohio" was then organized, with William Blount for governor. Six years later (January, 1796), the population of the Territory having been ascertained by a census to be 67,000 free white inhabitants and 10,000 slaves, a constitution was adopted, the State of Tennessee was formed, with John Sevier for Governor, and, after some opposition in Congress, it was formally admitted to its place and rank as one of the United States of America. Its first Representative in the House was Andrew Jackson.—W. H. Carpenter, *Hist. of Tennessee*, ch. 13-17.

ALSO IN: J. R. Gilmore, *John Sevier as a Commonwealth-Builder*, ch. 4-12.

**A. D. 1785-1800.**—The question of the Free Navigation of the Mississippi.—Discontent of the settlers and intrigues among them. See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1785-1800.

**A. D. 1813-1814.**—The Creek War. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1813-1814 (AUGUST—APRIL).

**A. D. 1861 (January—May).**—The mode in which the state was dragged into Rebellion.—"The Legislature of Tennessee met on the 6th of January. On the 12th, a bill for the calling of a state convention [with the object of following the lead, in secession, which South Carolina had taken on the 20th of December—See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1860 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER)] was passed. It was passed subject to the approval of the voters. The election took place on the 8th day of February. The people voted against holding a convention by 67,360, to 54,156. In disregard of this vote of the people, however, the legislature, on May 1st, passed a joint resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a military league with the Confederate States. The league was formed. The Governor,

Isham G. Harris, sent a message to the legislature, announcing the fact. He stated its terms. . . . It stipulated that until the state should become a member of the Confederacy, 'the whole military force and military operations, offensive and defensive, of said state, in the impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief control and direction of the President of the Confederate States.' It was also agreed that the state would, as soon as it should join the Confederacy, turn over all public property it might acquire from the United States. The legislature ratified the league by decided majorities of both branches. These final proceedings took place on the 7th day of May. On the preceding day, the legislature put forth a declaration of independence. It was submitted to the votes of the people for ratification. This document waives the right of secession, as follows: 'We, the people of the State of Tennessee, waiving an expression of opinion as to the abstract doctrine of secession, but asserting the right, as a free and independent people,' declare that all the laws and ordinances by which Tennessee became a member of the Federal Union, 'are hereby abrogated.' The vote for separation was declared by the governor to be 104,019 for, and 47,238 against that measure. It thus appears that the Legislature of Tennessee, in declaring the separation of the state from the Federal Union, placed its action upon the ground of a revolutionary right, which all admit to be inalienable, if the cause be just."—S. S. Cox, *Three Decades of Federal Legislation*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record*, v. 1, doc. 201–205.—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, div. 4, ch. 11 (v. 2).

A. D. 1861 (April).—Governor Harris' reply to President Lincoln's call for troops. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL).

A. D. 1861 (June).—The loyalty of East Tennessee and its resistance to Secession.—"For separation and representation at Richmond, East Tennessee gave [at the election, June 8, when the question of secession was nominally submitted to the people, the state having been already delivered by its governor and legislature to the Confederacy] 14,700 votes; and half of that number were Rebel troops, having no authority under the Constitution to vote at any election. For 'no separation' and 'no representation,'—the straight-out Union vote,—East Tennessee gave 33,000, or 18,300 of a majority, with at least 5,000 quiet citizens deterred from coming out by threats of violence, and by the presence of drunken troops at the polls to insult them. . . . By . . . fraud and villainy, . . . the great State of Tennessee was carried out of the Union. The loyal people of East Tennessee, to their great honor, had no lot or part in the work."—W. G. Brownlow, *Sketches of the Rise, Progress and Decline of Secession*, pp. 222–223.—"Finding themselves powerless before the tyranny inaugurated, the Unionists of East Tennessee resolved, as a last resort, to hold a Convention at Greenville, to consult as to the best course to pursue. This Convention met June 17th. The attendance was very large—thirty-one counties having delegates present on the first day. Judge Nelson presided. After a four days' session it adopted a Declaration of Grievances and Resolutions," declaring that "we prefer to remain attached to the Government of our

fathers. The Constitution of the United States has done us no wrong. The Congress of the United States has passed no law to oppress us. . . . The secession cause has thus far been sustained by deception and falsehood." The Convention protested on behalf of East Tennessee against being dragged into rebellion, and appointed commissioners to pursue measures looking to the formation of a separate state. "Vain protest! It was not long before those Unionists and protestants against wrong were flying for their lives, and were hunted down like wild beasts."—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, div. 5, ch. 5 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: T. W. Humes, *The Loyal Mountaineers of Tennessee*, ch. 6–11.—W. Rule, *Loyalists of Tenn. in the late War (Sketches of War Hist., Ohio Commandery, L. L. v. 2)*.

A. D. 1862 (February).—The breaking of the Rebel line of defense at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JANUARY—FEBRUARY: KENTUCKY—TENNESSEE).

A. D. 1862 (March).—Andrew Johnson appointed military governor. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MARCH—JUNE).

A. D. 1862 (April).—The continued advance of the Union armies.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: TENNESSEE).

A. D. 1862 (April—May).—The Union advance upon Corinth, Mississippi. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (APRIL—MAY: TENNESSEE—MISSISSIPPI).

A. D. 1862 (June).—Evacuation of Fort Pillow and surrender of Memphis by the Confederates. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

A. D. 1862 (June—October).—The Buell-Bragg campaign.—Chattanooga secured by the Confederates. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE—OCTOBER: TENNESSEE—KENTUCKY).

A. D. 1862–1863 (December—January).—Bragg and Rosecrans.—The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862–1863 (DECEMBER—JANUARY: TENNESSEE).

A. D. 1863 (February—April).—Engagements at Dover and Franklin. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: TENNESSEE).

A. D. 1863 (June—July).—The Tullahoma campaign of Rosecrans. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (JUNE—JULY: TENNESSEE).

A. D. 1863 (August—September).—Burnside in east Tennessee. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER: TENNESSEE) BURNSIDE'S DELIVERANCE.

A. D. 1863 (August—September).—The Chickamauga campaign and battle.—The Union army at Chattanooga. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER: TENNESSEE) ROSECRANS' ADVANCE.

A. D. 1863 (October—November).—The Siege and the Battles of Chattanooga.—Lookout Mountain.—Missionary Ridge. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (OCTOBER—NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE).

A. D. 1863 (October—December).—Siege of Knoxville. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER: TENNESSEE).



**A. D. 1863-1864 (December—April).—Winter operations.**—Withdrawal of Longstreet from east Tennessee. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863-1864 (DECEMBER—APRIL: TENNESSEE—MISSISSIPPI).

**A. D. 1864 (April).—The Fort Pillow Massacre.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (APRIL: TENNESSEE).

**A. D. 1864 (September—October).—Forest's raid.**—The capture of Athens. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER: GEORGIA).

**A. D. 1864 (November).—Hood's invasion and destruction.**—The Battles of Franklin and Nashville. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE), and (DECEMBER: TENNESSEE).

**A. D. 1865.—President Johnson's recognition of the reconstructed State Government.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (MAY—JULY).

**A. D. 1865-1866.—Reconstruction.—Abolition of Slavery.—Restoration of the State to its "former, proper, practical relation to the Union."**—In the early part of 1865, Andrew Johnson, though Vice-President-elect, was "still discharging the functions of military governor of Tennessee. A popular convention originating from his recommendation and assembling under his auspices, was organized at Nashville on the 9th day of January, 1865. Membership of the body was limited to those who 'give an active support to the Union cause, who have never voluntarily borne arms against the Government, who have never voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy.' . . . Tennessee, as Johnson bluntly maintained, could only be organized and controlled as a State in the Union by that portion of her citizens who acknowledged their allegiance to the Government of the Union. Under this theory of procedure the popular convention proposed an amendment to the State constitution, 'forever abolishing and prohibiting slavery in the State,' and further declaring that 'the Legislature shall make no law recognizing the right of property in man.' The convention took several other important steps, annulling in whole and in detail all the legislation which under Confederate rule had made the State a guilty participant in the rebellion. Thus was swept away the ordinance of Secession, and the State debt created in aid of the war against the Union. All these proceedings were submitted to popular vote on the 22d of February, and were ratified by an affirmative vote of 25,293 against a negative vote of 48. The total vote of the State at the Presidential election of 1860 was 145,333. Mr. Lincoln's requirement of one-tenth of that number was abundantly complied with by the vote on the questions submitted to the popular decision. . . . Under this new order of things, William G. Brownlow, better known to the world by his soubriquet of 'Parson' Brownlow, was chosen governor without opposition on the 4th day of March, 1865, the day of Mr. Lincoln's second inauguration. The new Legislature met at Nashville a month later, on the 3d of April, and on the 5th ratified the Thirteenth Amendment; thus adding the abolition of slavery by National authority to that already decreed by the State. The Legislature completed its work by electing two consistent Union men, David T. Patterson and Joseph S. Fowler, to the United

States Senate. The framework of the new Government was thus completed and in operation before the death of Mr. Lincoln."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 3.—After the organization of a loyal government in Tennessee, more than a year passed before the restoration of the State to its constitutional relations with the United States, by the admission of its Senators and Representatives to Congress. Tennessee was the first, however, among the seceded States to obtain that recognition, by being the first to ratify the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment. "Immediately on the reception of the circular of the Secretary of State containing the proposed amendment, Governor Brownlow issued a proclamation summoning the Legislature of Tennessee to assemble at Nashville on the 4th of July [1866]. . . . Every effort was made to prevent the assembling of the required number [to constitute a quorum]. The powerful influence of the President himself was thrown in opposition to ratification." By arresting recalcitrant members, and by "the expedient of considering the members who were under arrest and confined in a committee room as present in their places," the quorum was assumed to have been made up and the amendment was ratified. "Immediately after the news was received in Washington, Mr. Bingham, in the House of Representatives, moved to reconsider a motion by which a joint resolution relating to the restoration of Tennessee had been referred to the Committee on Reconstruction," and this motion being adopted, he introduced a substitute which declared, "That the State of Tennessee is hereby restored to her former, proper, practical relation to the Union, and again entitled to be represented by Senators and Representatives in Congress, duly elected and qualified, upon their taking the oaths of office required by existing laws." On the following day this joint resolution passed the House, and a day later (July 21st), it was adopted by the Senate.—W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, ch. 20.

Also in: Ira P. Jones, *Reconstruction in Tennessee (Why the Solid South? ch. 7).*

**A. D. 1866-1871.—The Ku Klux Klan.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1866-1871.

**TENNIS-COURT OATH, The.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1789 (JUNE).

**TENOCHTITLAN.**—The native name of the city of Mexico. See MEXICO: A. D. 1325-1502.

**TENPET, The.** See MAGIANS.

**TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT: Its passage and repeal.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1866-1867 (DEC.—MAR.); and 1866-1867.

**TEOTIHUACAN, Pyramids at.** See MEXICO, ANCIENT: THE TOLTEC EMPIRE, &c.

**TEQUESTA, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TIMUQUANAN FAMILY.

**TERENTILIAN LAW, The.** See ROME: B. C. 451-449.

**TERNATE.** See MOLUCCAS.

**TEROUENNE: Siege and capture by the English (1513).** See FRANCE: A. D. 1513-1515.

**TERRA FIRMA.** See TIERRA FIRME.

**TERROR, The Reign of.**—As commonly used, this phrase describes the fearful state of things that prevailed in France during a period of the French Revolution which ended with

the fall of Robespierre, July 27 (Ninth Thermidor), 1794. The beginning of the period so called is usually placed at the date of the coup d'état, May 31—June 2, 1793, which overthrew the Girondists and gave unrestrained power into the hands of the Terrorists of the Mountain. The Reign of Terror was not however fully organized as a deliberately merciless system, and made, according to the demand of the Paris Commune, "the order of the day," until the following September. In another view, the Reign of Terror may be said to have begun with the creation of the terrible Revolutionary Tribunal, March, 1793. See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (FEBRUARY—APRIL), to 1794 (JULY).

**TERTIARI, The.** See BEGUINES, ETC.

**TESCHEN, Treaty of (1779).** See BAVARIA: A. D. 1777-1779.

**TESHER.**—The name which the Egyptians gave to the Arabian desert, signifying red earth. See EGYPT: ITS NAMES.

**TESSERA HOSPITALIS.** See HOSPES.

**TEST ACT, and its Repeal.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1672-1673, and 1827-1828 REMOVAL OF DISABILITIES.

**TESTRI, Battle of (A. D. 687).** See FRANKS: A. D. 511-752.

**TESTS, Religious, in the English Universities: Abolished.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1871.

**TETONS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

**TETRARCH.**—As originally used, this official title, from the Greek, signified the governor of one fourth part of a country or province. Later, the Romans applied it to many tributary princes, in Syria and elsewhere, to whom they wished to give a rank inferior to that of the tributary kings.

**TETZEL, and the sale of Indulgences.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1517 TETZEL.

**TEUKRIANS, The.**—"The elegiac poet Kallinus, in the middle of the seventh century B. C., was the first who mentioned the Teukrians; he treated them as immigrants from Krête, though other authors represented them as indigenous, or as having come from Attica. However the fact may stand as to their origin, we may gather that, in the time of Kallinus, they were still the great occupants of the Troad [northwestern Asia Minor]. Gradually the south and west coasts, as well as the interior of this region, became penetrated by successive colonies of Æolic Greeks. . . . The name Teukrians gradually vanished out of present use and came to belong only to the legends of the past."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 14.

**TEUTECAS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ZAPOTECAS, ETC.

**TEUTONES.—TEUTONIC.**—"In the way of evidence of there being Teutones amongst the Germans, over and above the associate mention of their names with that of the Cimbri [see CIMBRI], there is but little. They are not so mentioned either by Tacitus or Strabo. . . . Arguments have been taken from . . . the supposed connection of the present word 'Deut-sch' = 'German,' with the classical word 'Teut-ones.' . . . The reasoning . . . runs thus: The syllable in question is common to the word 'Teut-ones,' 'Teut-onicus,' 'Theod-iscas,' 'teud-uisus,' 'teut-iscus,' 'tūt-iske,' 'dūt-iske,' 'tiut-sche,' 'deut-sch'; whilst the word Deut-sch means German. As the 'Teut-ones' were Germans, so were the

Cimbri also. Now this line of argument is set aside by the circumstance that the syllable 'Teut-' in Teut-ones and Teut-onicus as the names of the confederates of the Cimbri, is wholly unconnected with the 'Teut-' in 'theod-iscus' and Deut-sch. This is fully shown by Grimm in his dissertation on the words German and Dutch. In its oldest form the latter word meant 'popular,' 'national,' 'vernacular'; it was an adjective applied to the 'vulgar tongue,' or the vernacular German, in opposition to the Latin. In the tenth century the secondary form 'Teut-onicus' came in vogue even with German writers. Whether this arose out of imitation of the Latin form 'Romanice,' or out of the idea of an historical connection with the Teutones of the classics, is immaterial. It is clear that the present word 'Deut-sch' proves nothing respecting the Teutones. Perhaps, however, as early as the time of Martial the word 'Teutonicus' was used in a general sense, denoting the Germans in general. Certain it is that, before his time, it meant the particular people conquered by Marius, irrespective of origin or locality."—R. G. Latham, *The Germany of Tacitus*, app. 3.

**TEUTONIC KNIGHTS OF THE HOSPITAL: The founding of the order.**—"It is not possible to find the exact date of the foundation of the Teutonic Order, but it was probably about A. D. 1190 that it received its full organization as one of the recognized Religious Military Orders. Its actual commencement, like that of the other Orders, was obscure and humble. About 1128 or 1129, a wealthy German, who had taken part in the siege and capture of Jerusalem, settled there with his wife, intending to spend the remainder of his life in the practice of religion and in visiting the holy places. His attention and interest were soon excited by the misfortunes of his poorer countrymen, who came in great numbers as pilgrims to Jerusalem. Many fell sick, and endured great miseries and hardships. Moved with compassion, he received some of the more distressing cases into his own house. But he soon found that the work grew beyond this, and he built a hospital, with a chapel dedicated to the Blessed Virgin. In this institution he passed the whole of his time, nursing the sick pilgrims; and to their maintenance he devoted the whole of his means." One by one, others of his countrymen joined the pious German in his benevolent work, and "banded themselves together after the pattern of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and united the care of the sick and poor with the profession of arms in their defence, under the title of Hospitalers of the Blessed Virgin. This little band put themselves under the direction of the Grand Prior of the Hospitalers of St. John of Jerusalem, although they did not actually join this Order, whose operations they so closely imitated. . . . It was, however, during the siege of Acre [A. D. 1189-1191] that the Teutonic Order received its final and complete organization as one of the great Military Religious Orders of Europe." At Acre, the Hospitalers of the Blessed Virgin, then driven from Jerusalem by Saladin's conquest, joined certain citizens of Bremen and Lubeck in providing a field-hospital for the wounded and sick, and in their new sphere of labor they acquired the designation of the Teutonic Knights of the Hospital of the Blessed Virgin at Jerusa-



lem. "It is said that the Order owed its constitution to Frederick, Duke of Suabia; but there is much obscurity, and little authentic record to determine this or to furnish particulars of the transaction. The Order seems, however, to have been confirmed by Pope Celestine III."—F. C. Woodhouse, *Military Religious Orders*, pt. 3, ch. 1.

**Conquest of Prussia.** See PRUSSIA: 13TH CENTURY; and LIVONIA.

**Subjection to Poland, secularization of the Order and surrender of its territories.** See POLAND: A. D. 1333-1572.

**A. D. 1809.—Suppression by Napoleon.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY—DECEMBER).

**TEWFIK, Khedive of Egypt, The reign of.** See EGYPT: A. D. 1875-1882; and 1882-1883.

**TEWKESBURY, Battle of (1471).**—The final battle of the "Wars of the Roses," in which Edward IV. of England overthrew the last Lancastrian army, collected by Queen Margaret of Anjou and her adherents; fought May 4, 1471. Three weeks previously, at Barnet, he had defeated and slain the Earl of Warwick. At Tewkesbury Queen Margaret was taken prisoner, her young son disappeared, how or when is uncertain, and her husband, the deposed King Henry VI., died mysteriously a few days afterwards in his prison in the tower. It was the end of the Lancastrian struggle. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

**TEXAS: The aboriginal inhabitants and the name.**—Amongst the small tribes found early in the 19th century existing west of the Mississippi on Red River and south of it, and believed to be natives of that region, were the Caddoes, "the Nandakoes, the Inues or Tachies, who have given their name to the province of Texas, and the Nabadaches, . . . [who] speak dialects of the Caddo language." Also, the Natchitoches, the Yataseees, the Adaize, the Appelousas, etc.—A. Gallatin, *Synopsis of the Indian Tribes* (*Archæologia Americana*, v. 2), introd., sect. 3.

ALSO IN: *President's Message*, Feb. 19, 1806, with accompanying doc's.—See, also, AMERICAN ABORIGINES: APACHE GROUP.

**A. D. 1685-1687.—La Salle's shipwrecked colony.** See CANADA: A. D. 1669-1687.

**A. D. 1819-1835.—Relinquishment of American claims to Spain.**—Condition as a Mexican province.—Encouragement of immigration from the United States and Europe.—"By the treaty of 1819 with Spain for the cession of the Floridas, the United States relinquished all claim to the western portion of Louisiana lying south of Red River and west of the Sabine [see FLORIDA: A. D. 1819-1821; and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1798-1803]. After the final ratification of that treaty by both governments, and the cession and delivery of the Floridas to the United States, the Spaniards took formal possession of the country west of the Sabine, and erected it into the 'Province of Texas,' under the authority and jurisdiction of the Viceroy of Mexico. From that time the Sabine River was the western boundary of the United States, near the Gulf of Mexico. The province of Texas at this time was occupied by the native tribes of savages, interrupted only by a few Spanish settlements. . . .

The whole population, including some settlements in the vicinity of the sea-coast, scarcely exceeded 5,000 souls, of whom the greater portion were the remains of old colonies formed during the Spanish dominion over the province of Louisiana. Each principal settlement, from San Antonio de Bexar to Nacogdoches, was placed under the government of a military commandant, who exercised civil and military authority within the limits of his presidio. . . . Such was the province of Texas under the Spanish monarchy until the year 1821, when Mexico became an independent nation. . . . On the 24th of October, 1824, the Mexican States adopted a Republican form of government, embracing 'a confederation of independent states,' known and designated as the 'United States of Mexico.' In this confederation the departments of Texas and Coahuila were admitted as one state, and were jointly represented in the Congress of Mexico. Soon after the establishment of independence in the United States of Mexico, the colonization and settlement of Texas became a favorite subject of national policy with the new government. To attract population for the settlement of the country, colonization laws were enacted, to encourage enterprising individuals from foreign countries to establish large colonies of emigrants within the limits of Texas. Under the provisions of these laws enterprise was awakened in the United States and in some portions of Europe. Founders of colonies, or 'Empresarios,' were induced to enter into engagements for the occupancy and settlement of large tracts of country, designated in their respective 'grants'; the extent of the grant being proportionate to the number of colonists to be introduced. The first grant was made to Moses Austin, a native of Durham, Connecticut, in 1821, and under its provisions he was required by the Mexican authorities to introduce 300 families from the United States. This enterprising man, having departed from Bexar for the introduction of his colony, died on his journey through the wilderness, leaving his plans of colonization to be prosecuted by his son, Colonel Stephen F. Austin, who possessed the talents, energy, and judgment requisite for the arduous undertaking. Having succeeded to his father's enterprise, he subsequently acquired more influence with the Mexican government than any other 'empresario' in the province. . . . But a few years had elapsed when nearly the whole area of the department of Texas had been parceled out into extensive grants for settlement by the different 'empresarios' with their colonies. . . . Emigration from the United States, as well as from Great Britain and Ireland, continued to augment the population in all the departments until the year 1834, when political troubles began to convulse the Mexican Republic." In 1835 "the whole Anglo-American population of Texas was about 20,000; of this number General Austin's colony comprised no less than 13,000, or more than half the entire population. These were chiefly emigrants from the United States. . . . The Mexicans within the limits of Texas at this period scarcely exceeded 3,000, most of whom resided in the vicinity of Bexar."—J. W. Monette, *Discovery and Settlement of the Mississippi Valley*, v. 2, pp. 569-572.

ALSO IN: H. Yoakum, *Hist. of Texas*, v. 1, ch. 15-21.

**A. D. 1824-1836.**—The introduction of Slavery.—Schemes of the Slave Power in the United States.—Revolutionary movement under Houston.—Independence of Mexico declared, and practically won at San Jacinto.—The American settlers in Texas “brought their slaves with them, and continued to do so notwithstanding a decree of the Mexican Congress, issued in July, 1824, which forbade the importation into Mexican territory of slaves from foreign countries, and notwithstanding the Constitution adopted the same year, which declared free all children thereafter born of slaves. About that time the slave-holders in the United States began to see in Texas an object of peculiar interest to them. The Missouri Compromise, admitting Missouri as a Slave State and opening to slavery all that part of the Louisiana purchase south of 36° 30', seemed at first to give a great advantage to the slave power. But gradually it became apparent that the territory thus opened to slavery was, after all, too limited for the formation of many new Slave States, while the area for the building up of Free States was much larger. More territory for slavery was therefore needed to maintain the balance of power between the two sections. At the same time the Mexican government, growing alarmed at the unruly spirit of the American colony in Texas, attached Texas to Coahuila, the two to form one state. The constitution of Coahuila forbade the importation of slaves; and in 1829 the Republic of Mexico, by the decree of September 15, emancipated all the slaves within its boundaries. Then the American Slave States found themselves flanked in the southwest by a power not only not in sympathy with slavery, but threatening to become dangerous to its safety. The maintenance of slavery in Texas, and eventually the acquisition of that country, were thenceforth looked upon by the slaveholding interest in this Republic as matters of very great importance, and the annexation project was pushed forward systematically. First the American settlers in Texas refused to obey the Mexican decree of emancipation, and, in order to avoid an insurrection, the Mexican authorities permitted it to be understood that the decree did not embrace Texas. Thus one point was gained. Then the Southern press vigorously agitated the necessity of enlarging the area of slavery, while an interest in the North was created by organizing three land companies in New York, which used pretended Mexican land grants in Texas as the basis of issues of stock, promising to make people rich over-night, and thus drawing Texas within the circle of American business speculation. In 1830 President Jackson made another attempt to purchase Texas [Henry Clay, in 1827, when Secretary of State under John Quincy Adams, had already made a proposal to the Mexican government for the purchase], offering five millions, but without success. The Mexican government, scenting the coming danger, prohibited the immigration of Americans into Texas. This, however, had no effect. The American colony now received a capable and daring leader in Sam Houston of Tennessee, who had served with General Jackson in the Indian wars. He went to Texas for the distinct object of wresting that country from Mexico. There is reason for believing that President Jackson was not ignorant of his intentions. Revolutionary convulsions in

Mexico gave the American colonists welcome opportunities for complaints, which led to collisions with the Mexican authorities. General Santa Anna, who by a successful revolutionary stroke had put himself at the head of the Mexican government, attempted to reduce the unruly Americans to obedience. In 1835 armed conflicts took place, in which the Americans frequently had the advantage. The Texans declared their independence from Mexico on March 2, 1836. The declaration was signed by about 60 men, among whom there were only two of Mexican nationality. The constitution of the new republic confirmed the existence of slavery under its jurisdiction, and surrounded it with all possible guaranties. Meanwhile Santa Anna advanced at the head of a Mexican army to subdue the revolutionists. Atrocious butcheries marked the progress of his soldiery. On March 6 the American garrison [250 men] of the Alamo [a mission church at San Antonio de Bexar] was massacred, and on the 27th a large number [500] of American prisoners at Goliad met a like fate. These atrocities created a great excitement in the United States. But on April 21 the Texans under Houston, about 800 strong, inflicted a crushing defeat upon Santa Anna's army of 1,500 men, at San Jacinto, taking Santa Anna himself prisoner. The captive Mexican President concluded an armistice with the victorious Texans, promising the evacuation of the country, and to procure the recognition of its independence; but this the Mexican Congress refused to ratify. The government of the United States maintained, in appearance, a neutral position. President Jackson had indeed instructed General Gaines to march his troops into Texas, if he should see reason to apprehend Indian incursions. Gaines actually crossed the boundary line, and was recalled only after the Mexican Minister at Washington had taken his passports. The organization of reinforcements for Houston, however, had been suffered to proceed on American soil without interference.”—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 17 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 2, ch. 7.—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, v. 8 (*Mexico*, v. 5), ch. 7.—A. M. Williams, *Sam Houston and the War of Independence in Texas*.

**A. D. 1836-1845.**—Eight years of independence.—Annexation to the United States.—The question in Congress and the country.—“Santa Anna, . . . constrained in his extremity to acknowledge the independence of Texas, . . . was liberated, and the new republic established in October, 1836, with a Constitution modeled on that of the United States, and with General Houston inaugurated as its first President. The United States forthwith acknowledged its independence. In less than a year application was made to the United States government to receive the new republic into the Union, and, though this was at the time declined, it was obvious that the question was destined to play a most important part in American civil policy. The North saw in the whole movement a predetermined attempt at the extension of slavery, and in the invasive emigration, the revolt, the proclamation of independence, the temporary organization of a republic, and the application to be admitted into the Union as a state, successive steps of a conspiracy which would, through the creation of



half a dozen or more new states, give a preponderance to the slave power in the republic. Mr. Van Buren, who had declined the overtures for the annexation of Texas, was succeeded in the Presidency by General Harrison, who, dying almost immediately after his inauguration, was followed by the Vice President, Mr. Tyler, a Virginian, and a supporter of extreme Southern principles. The annexation project was now steadily pressed forward, but, owing to the difficult circumstances under which Mr. Tyler was placed, and dissensions arising in the party that had elected him, nothing decisive could be done until 1844, when Mr. Upshur, the Secretary of State, being accidentally killed by the bursting of a cannon, Mr. Calhoun succeeded him. A treaty of annexation was at once arranged, but, on being submitted to the Senate, was rejected. Undiscouraged by this result, the South at once determined to make annexation the touchstone in the coming Presidential election. . . . Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Clay, the prominent candidates of the two opposing parties for the Presidency, were compelled to make known their views previously to the meeting of the nominating Conventions," and both discountenanced annexation. Van Buren was accordingly defeated in the Democratic Convention and James K. Polk received the nomination. Clay was nominated by the Whigs, and made an attempt, in the succeeding canvass, to change his ground on the Texas question; but "his attempt only served to make the matter worse, and cost him the support of the anti-slavery party, whose votes would have elected him." Polk was chosen President; but the annexation of Texas did not wait for his inauguration. "On December 19th a joint resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives providing for annexation. Attempts were made to secure half the country for free labor, the other half being resigned to slavery. . . . This proposition was, however, defeated. . . . As the measure eventually stood, it made suitable provision for the mode in which the 'State of Texas' should be admitted into the Union, the disposal of its munitions of war, public property, unappropriated lands, debts. On the main point it was arranged that new states, not exceeding four in number, in addition to Texas proper, should subsequently be made out of its territory, those lying south of latitude 36° 30' to be admitted with or without slavery, as their people might desire; in those north of that line, slavery to be prohibited. Mr. Tyler, on the last day of his term of office, unwilling to leave to his successor, Mr. Polk, the honor of completing this great Southern measure, dispatched a swift messenger to Texas; her assent was duly secured, and the Mexican province became a state of the Union. But the circumstances and conditions under which this had been done left a profound dissatisfaction in the North. The portion of territory ceded to freedom did not belong to Texas; her boundary did not approach within 200 miles of the Missouri Compromise line. The South had therefore secured the whole of the new acquisition; she had seized the substance, and had deluded the North with a shadow."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 2, ch. 135, 138-142, 148.—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, v. 8, ch. 13.—H. Greeley, *Hist. of the Struggle for Slavery Extension*, ch. 10.

A. D. 1846-1848.—The Mexican War. See MEXICO: A. D. 1846; 1846-1847; and 1847.

A. D. 1848.—Territory extorted from Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. See MEXICO: A. D. 1848.

A. D. 1850.—Sale of territory to the United States. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1850.

A. D. 1861 (February).—Secession from the Union. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1861 (February).—Twiggs' surrender of the Federal army, posts and stores. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1860-1861 (DECEMBER—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1862.—Farragut's occupation of coast towns. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—JULY: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

A. D. 1865 (June).—Provisional government set up under President Johnson's Plan of Reconstruction. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (MAY—JULY).

A. D. 1865-1870.—Reconstruction. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (MAY—JULY), and after, to 1868-1870.

TEZCUCO. See MEXICO: A. D. 1325-1502.

THABORITES, The. See MYSTICISM.

THAI RACE, The. See SIAM.

THAMANÆANS, The.—An ancient people who occupied the region in western Afghanistan which lies south and southeast of Herat, from the Haroot-rud to the Helمند.—G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies, Persia*, ch. 1.

THAMES, Battle of the. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812-1813 HARRISON'S NORTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN.

THANAGE.—An old Celtic tenure by which certain thanes' estates were held in Scotland, and which feudalism displaced.—W. F. Skene, *Celtic Scotland*, v. 3, p. 246.

THANE, OR THEGN. See COMITATUS; and ETHEL; and ENGLAND: A. D. 958.

THANET, The Jute Landing on. See ENGLAND: A. D. 449-473.

THANKSGIVING DAY, The American.—In 1621 the Pilgrims, at Plymouth, "determined to have a period of recreation, combined with thanksgiving for their many mercies. The Governor thereupon sent out four huntsmen, who in one day secured enough game to supply the Colony for nearly a week. Hospitality was extended to Massasoit, who accepted and brought ninety people with him. The guests remained three days, during which they captured five deer to add to the larder of their hosts. . . . Without doubt, religious services opened each day; for the Pilgrims were cheerful Christians, who carried religion into all their affairs. Thus heartily and royally was inaugurated the great New England festival of Thanksgiving. . . . I do not doubt that such a religious festival was held after every harvest."—J. A. Goodwin, *The Pilgrim Republic*, pp. 179-180, and foot-note.—The first Thanksgiving Day observed in all the States of the American Union was recommended by a proclamation from the Continental Congress, after Burgoyne's surrender, in 1777, and fixed for Thursday, December 18. Each year thereafter, until 1784, the Continental Congress continued to recommend a day for thanksgiving services which the several States accepted and appointed. Then came an interval during which the observance was left

wholly to the States. The first Congress under the federal constitution, in 1789, adopted a resolution which requested President Washington to recommend a day for national thanksgiving and prayer, and the President's proclamation named Thursday, November 26, of that year. This proceeding, however, was much opposed by the anti-federalists, and it was not repeated until 1795, when President Washington, without action of Congress, recommended a day of thanksgiving, on February 19th. Until 1815 there was no other national appointment. In that year, by resolution of Congress and proclamation of the President, the 13th of April was set apart as a day of national thanksgiving for the restoration of peace. Then, for almost half a century, the national observance ceased. It was revived by President Lincoln in 1863, when he appointed a special day of thanksgiving for the victory at Gettysburg, on the 6th of August, and nationalized, by his proclamation, the autumnal Thanksgiving Day of November, which had become a fixed festival in most of the States. From that time the day has been appointed for the whole nation each year by presidential proclamation. — W. De L. Love, Jr., *Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England*, ch. 27. — See, also, HOLIDAYS.

**THANN, OR THAUN, Battle of (1638).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639. . . . **Battle of (1809).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JANUARY—JUNE).

**THAPSACUS.**—An important fording place on the Euphrates, where many armies crossed the river in ancient times. See APAMEA.

**THAPSUS, The Battle of (B. C. 46).** See ROME: B. C. 47-46.

**THAPSUS: The Tyrian colony.** See CAR-THAGE, THE DOMINION OF.

**THASOS.—THASIAN MINES.**—Thasos, an island off the coast of Thrace, in the northern part of the Ægean Sea, celebrated in antiquity for its gold mines. — See ATHENS: B. C. 466-454.

**THAUR, The Cave of Mount.** See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST: A. D. 609-632.

**THAUSS, Battle of (1431).** See BOHEMIA: A. D. 1419-1434.

**THEATINES, The.**—The founders of the Order of the Theatines (1524) were "Gaetano of Thiene, a native of Vicenza, and Gian Pietro Caraffa [afterwards Pope Paul IV.]. The former had quitted a lucrative post at the Roman court in order to transplant the ideas of the Oratory of the Divine Love to his native city, Venice, and Verona, and had gradually come to concentrate his pious thoughts upon the reformation of the secular clergy of the Church. On his return to Rome, Bonifacio da Colle, a Lombard lawyer, became interested in his design, and then it was enthusiastically taken up by Caraffa, whose bishopric of Chieti, or, according to the older form, Theate, gave its name to the new order of the Theatines."—A. W. Ward, *The Counter-Reformation*, p. 28.—"To the vow of poverty they made the special addition that not only would they possess nothing, but would even abstain from begging, and await the alms that might be brought to their dwellings. . . . They did not call themselves monks, but regular clergy—they were priests with the vows of monks. . . . The order of the Theatines did not indeed become a seminary for priests precisely, its numbers were never sufficient for that; but it grew to be a seminary for bishops, coming at

length to be considered the order of priests peculiar to the nobility."—L. Ranke, *Hist. of the Popes*, bk. 2, sect. 3 (v. 1).

**THEBAIS, The.**—The southern district of Upper Egypt, taking its name from Thebes.

**THEBES, Egypt.**—"No city of the old world can still show so much of her former splendour as Egyptian Thebes. . . . Not one of the many temples of Thebes has wholly disappeared; some are almost complete; many of the royal and private tombs were, until the tourist came, fresh with colours as of yesterday. . . . The origin of the great city is obscure. Unlike Memphis, Thebes, her southern rival, rose to the headship by slow degrees. It was towards the close of the dark age marked by the rule of Hanes, that a new line of kings arose in the upper country, with Thebes for their capital. At first they were merely nobles; then one became a local king, and his successors won the whole dominion of Egypt. These were the sovereigns of the Eleventh Dynasty. Their date must be before Abraham, probably some centuries earlier. . . . Thebes, like the other cities of Egypt, had a civil and a religious name. The civil name was Apiu, 'the city of thrones,' which, with the article 't' or 'ta,' became Ta-Apiu, and was identified by the Greeks with the name of their own famous city, by us corruptly called Thebes. The sacred name was Nu-Amen, 'the city of Amen,' the god of Thebes; or simply Nu, 'the city,' and Nu-ā, 'the great city.' In these names we recognize the No-Amon and No of Scripture."—R. S. Poole, *Cities of Egypt*, ch. 4.—See, also, EGYPT: THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE MIDDLE EMPIRE.

**THEBES, Greece: The founding of the city.**—"In the fruitful plain, only traversed by low hills, which stretches from the northern declivity of Mount Cithæron to the Bœotian lakes opposite the narrowest part of the sound which separates Eubœa from the mainland, in the 'well-watered, pasture-bearing region of the Aones,' as Euripides says, lay the citadel and town of Thebes. According to Greek tradition, it was built by Cadmus the Phœnician. The Aones, who inhabited the country, are said to have amalgamated with the Phœnicians whom Cadmus brought with him, into one people. The citadel lay on a hill of moderate height between the streams Ismenus and Dirce; it bore even in historical times the name Cadmea; the ridge to the north of the town was called Phœnicium, i. e. mountain of the Phœnicians. In the story of Cadmus and Europa, Greek legend relates the Phœnician mythus of Melkarth and Astarte. In order to seek the lost goddess of the moon, Astarte, Cadmus-Melkarth, the wandering sun-god, sets forth. He finds her in the far west, in Bœotia, and here in Thebes, on the Cadmea, celebrates the holy marriage. . . . There are a few relics of the wall of the citadel of Cadmea, principally on the north side; they are great blocks, not quite regularly hewn. Of the city wall and the famous seven gates in it nothing remains; even this number seven points to the Phœnicians as well as the designations which were retained by these gates even in historical times. The Electric gate belonged to the sun-god Baal, called by the Greeks Elector; the Neitic gate, it would seem, to the god of war. . . . The gate Hypsistia was that of



Zeus Hypsistos, whose shrine stood on the Cadmea; . . . the Prætidic gate belonged to Astarte, whose domain was the moon; the Onœic gate in the north-west belonged to Athena Onca, who is expressly called a Phœnician goddess. . . . It is probable that the two remaining gates, the Homoloic and the Crenaic, were also dedicated to gods of this circle—to the spirits of planets. According to Greek legend, Cadmus invented the building of walls, mining, armour, and letters. Herodotus contents himself with saying that the Phœnicians who came with Cadmus taught much to the Greeks, even writing: from the Phœnicians the Ionians, in whose midst they lived, had learned letters. If even this early borrowing of writing on the part of the Greeks is incorrect, all the other particulars,—the legend of Cadmus, which extends to the Homeric poems, where the inhabitants of Thebes are called Cadmeans; the rites of the Thebans; the walls and gates,—taken together, give evidence that the Phœnicians went over from Eubœa to the continent, and here fixed one of their most important and lasting colonies upon and around the hill of Cadmea.”—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 1, ch. 4.—See, also, *BEOTIA*.

**B. C. 509-506.**—Unsuccessful war with Athens. See *ATHENS*: B. C. 509-506.

**B. C. 480.**—Traitorous alliance with the Persians. See *GREECE*: B. C. 480 (*SALAMIS*).

**B. C. 479.**—Siege and reduction by the confederate Greeks.—Punishment for the Persian alliance. See *GREECE*: B. C. 479 (*PLATÆA*).

**B. C. 457-456.**—War with Athens.—Defeat at *Ænophyta*.—Overthrow of the oligarchies. See *GREECE*: B. C. 458-456.

**B. C. 447-445.**—Bœotian revolution.—Overthrow of Athenian influence.—Defeat of Athens at *Coronea*. See *GREECE*: B. C. 449-445.

**B. C. 431.**—Disastrous attack on *Platæa*.—Opening hostilities of the Peloponnesian War. See *GREECE*: B. C. 432-431.

**B. C. 404-403.**—Shelter and aid to Athenian patriots. See *ATHENS*: B. C. 404-403.

**B. C. 395-387.**—Confederacy against Sparta and alliance with Persia.—The Corinthian War.—Battle of *Coronea*.—Peace of *Antalcidas*. See *GREECE*: B. C. 399-387.

**B. C. 383.**—The betrayal of the city to the Spartans. See *GREECE*: B. C. 383.

**B. C. 379-371.**—The liberation of the city.—Rise of *Epaminondas*.—Overthrow of Spartan supremacy at *Leuctra*. See *GREECE*: B. C. 379-371.

**B. C. 378.**—The Sacred Band.—“This was an institution connecting itself with earlier usages of the land. For already in the battle of *Delium* a band of the Three Hundred is mentioned, who fought, like the heroes of the Homeric age, associated in pairs, from their chariots in front of the main body of the soldiery. This doubtless very ancient institution was now [B. C. 378] revived and carried out in a new spirit under the guidance of *Epaminondas* and *Gorgidas*. They had quietly assembled around them a circle of youths, with whom they had presented themselves before the community on the day of the Liberation, so that they were regarded as the founders of the Sacred Band of Thebes. It was now no longer a privilege of the nobility to belong to the Three Hundred; but those among the youth of the land who were in

feeling the noblest and most high-minded, and who already under the oppression of the Tyrants had been preparing themselves for the struggle for freedom, were henceforth the elect and the champions. It was their duty to stimulate the rest eagerly to follow their example of bravery and discipline; they were associated with one another by the bonds of friendship and by identity of feelings. . . . A soldier-like spirit was happily blended with ethical and political points of view, and ancient national usage with the ideas of the present and with Pythagorean principles; and it constitutes an honorable monument of the wisdom of *Epaminondas*.”—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 6, ch. 1.

**B. C. 370-362.**—Intervention in Peloponnesus.—Successive expeditions of *Epaminondas*.—Invasions of Sparta.—Formation of the Arcadian Union.—Battle of *Mantineia* and death of *Epaminondas*. See *GREECE*: B. C. 371-362.

**B. C. 357-338.**—The Ten Years Sacred War with the Phocians.—Intervention of Philip of Macedon.—Loss of independence and liberty. See *GREECE*: B. C. 357-336.

**B. C. 335.**—Revolt.—Destruction by Alexander the Great. See *GREECE*: B. C. 336-335.

**B. C. 316.**—Restoration by Cassander of Macedonia. See *GREECE*: B. C. 321-312.

**B. C. 291-290.**—Siege of by *Demetrius*.—Thebes, with other Bœotian towns, united in a revolt against *Demetrius Poliorcetes*, while the latter held the throne of Macedonia, and was reduced to submission, B. C. 290, after a siege which lasted nearly a year.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 60.

**A. D. 1146.**—Sack by the Normans of Sicily.—Abduction of silk-weavers. See *BYZANTINE EMPIRE*: A. D. 1146.

**A. D. 1205.**—Included in the Latin duchy of Athens. See *ATHENS*: A. D. 1205.

**A. D. 1311.**—Conquest by the Catalans. See *CATALAN GRAND COMPANY*.

**THEGN, OR THANE.** See *COMITATUS*; *ETHEL*; and *ENGLAND*: A. D. 958.

**THEIPHALI.—THEIPHALIA.** See *TAIFALE*.

**THEMES.**—Administrative divisions of the Byzantine Empire. “The term *thema* was first applied to the Roman legion. The military districts, garrisoned by legions, were then called *themata*, and ultimately the word was used merely to indicate geographical administrative divisions.”—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine Empire*, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 1, foot-note.—See, also, *BYZANTINE EMPIRE*: A. D. 717.

**THEMISTOCLES, Ascendancy and fall of.** See *ATHENS*: B. C. 489-480, to 477-462.

**THEODORA, Empress in the East (Byzantine, or Greek), A. D. 1042, and 1054-1056.**

**THEODORE, King of Corsica.** See *CORSICA*: A. D. 1729-1769. . . . *Theodore I.*, Pope, A. D. 642-649. . . . *Theodore II.*, Pope, 898. . . . *Theodore* or *Feodore*, II., Czar of Russia, 1584-1598. . . . *Theodore III.*, Czar of Russia, 1676-1682. . . . *Theodore Lascaris I.*, Greek Emperor of *Nicæa*, 1206-1222. . . . *Theodore Lascaris II.*, Greek Emperor of *Nicæa*, 1255-1259.

**THEODORIC, Ostrogothic kingdom of.** See *GOTHS*: A. D. 473-488; and *ROME*: A. D. 488-526.

**THEODOSIAN CODE, The.** See **CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS**.

**THEODOSIUS I., Roman Emperor (Eastern),** A. D. 378-395; (Western), 392-395; in Britain, see **BRITAIN**: A. D. 367-370. . . . **Theodosius II., Roman Emperor (Eastern),** 408-450; (Western), 423-425. . . . **Theodosius III., Roman Emperor (Eastern),** 716-717.

**THEOPHILUS, Emperor in the East, (Byzantine, or Greek),** A. D. 829-842.

**THEORI.**—The name of Theori, among the ancient Greeks, "in addition to its familiar signification of spectators at the theatre and public ambassadors to foreign sanctuaries and festivals, was specially applied to certain public magistrates, whose function it was to superintend and take charge of religious affairs in general, though they often possessed along with this some more extensive political power."—G. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece: The State*, pt. 2, ch. 5.

**THEORICON, The.**—"By means of the Theoricon . . . , the most pernicious issue of the age of Pericles, there arose in a small free state [Athens] a lavish expenditure, which was relatively not less than in the most voluptuous courts, and which consumed large sums, while the wars were unsuccessful for the want of money. By it is understood the money which was distributed among the people for the celebration of the festivals and games, partly to restore to the citizens the sum required for their admission into the theatre, partly to enable them to procure a better meal. In part it was expended for sacrifices, with which a public feast was connected. . . . The superintendents of the theoricon were not called treasurers; but they evidently had a treasury. Their office was one of the administrative offices of the government, and indeed of the most eminent. They were elected by the assembly of the people through cheirotonia. Their office seems to have been annual. Their number is nowhere given. Probably there were ten of them, one from each tribe. . . . The Athenian people was a tyrant, and the treasury of the theorica its private treasury."—A. Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens* (tr. by Lamb), bk. 2, ch. 7; also ch. 13.

**THEOW.**—"In the earliest English laws . . . slaves are found; the 'theow' [from the same root as 'dienen,' to serve] or slave simple, whether 'wealh'—that is, of British extraction, captured or purchased—or of the common German stock descended from the slaves of the first colonists; the 'esne' or slave who works for hire; the 'wite-theow' who is reduced to slavery because he cannot pay his debts."—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 5, sect. 37.

**THERA.**—The ancient name of the Greek island of Santorin, one of the Sporades, whose inhabitants were enterprising navigators, and weavers and dyers of purple stuffs. They are said to have founded Cyrene, on the north African coast.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 3.—See **CYRENAICA**.

**THERMÆ.**—"The Roman thermæ were a combination on a huge scale of the common balneæ with the Greek gymnasia. Their usual form was that of a large quadrangular space, the sides of which were formed by various porticos, exedrae, and even theatres for gymnastic and literary exercises, and in the centre of which stood a block of buildings containing the bath rooms and spacious halls for undergoing the compli-

cated process of the Roman warm bath. The area covered by the whole group of buildings was, in many cases, very large. The court of the Baths of Caracalla enclosed a space of 1,150 feet on each side, with curvilinear projections on two sides. The central mass of building was a rectangle, 730 feet by 380. . . . The other great Imperial thermæ of Rome, those of Nero, Titus, Domitian, Diocletian, and Constantine, were probably upon the same plan as the Thermæ Caracallæ. All were built of brick, and the interior was decorated with stucco, mosaics, or slabs of marble, and other ornamental stones. . . . The public balneæ, as distinct from thermæ, . . . were used simply as baths, and had none of the luxurious accessories attached to them which were found in the courts of the great thermæ."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, introd.

**THERMIDOR, The month.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1793 (OCTOBER) **THE NEW REPUBLICAN CALENDAR**.

**THERMIDORIANS.**—The Ninth of Thermidor. See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1794 (JULY), and 1794-1795 (JULY—APRIL).

**THERMOPYLÆ, The Pass of.** See **THESSALY**.

**B. C. 480.**—The defense by Leonidas against the Persians. See **GREECE**: B. C. 480 (**THERMOPYLÆ**).

**B. C. 352.**—Repulse of Philip of Macedon. See **GREECE**: B. C. 357-336.

**B. C. 279.**—Defense against the Gauls. See **GAULS**: B. C. 280-279.

**B. C. 191.**—Defeat of Antiochus by the Romans. See **SELEUCIDÆ**: B. C. 224-187.

**A. D. 1822.**—Greek victory over the Turks. See **GREECE**: A. D. 1821-1829.

**THERVINGI, The.** See **GOTHS (VISIGOTHS)**: A. D. 376.

**THESES OF LUTHER, The Ninety-five.** See **PAPACY**: A. D. 1517.

**THESMOPHORIA, The.** See **GREECE**: B. C. 383.

**THESMOTHETES.** See **ATHENS**: FROM THE DORIAN MIGRATION TO B. C. 683.

**THESPROTIANS.** See **EPHROS**; and **HEL-LAS**.

**THESSALONICA.**—Therma, an unimportant ancient city of Macedonia, received the name of Thessalonica, about 315 B. C., in honor of the sister of Alexander the Great, who married Cassander. Cassander gave an impetus to the city which proved lasting. It rose to a high commercial rank, acquired wealth, and became, under the Romans, the capital of the Illyrian provinces.

**A. D. 390.**—Massacre ordered by Theodosius. — A riotous outbreak at Thessalonica, A. D. 390, caused by the imprisonment of one of the popular favorites of the circus, was punished by the Emperor Theodosius in a manner so fiendish that it seems wellnigh incredible. He caused the greatest possible number of the inhabitants to be invited, in his name, to witness certain games in the circus. "As soon as the assembly was complete, the soldiers, who had secretly been posted round the circus, received the signal, not of the races, but of a general massacre. The promiscuous carnage continued three hours,



without discrimination of strangers or natives, of age or sex, of innocence or guilt; the most moderate accounts state the number of the slain at 7,000; and it is affirmed by some writers that more than 15,000 victims were sacrificed. . . . The guilt of the emperor is aggravated by his long and frequent residence at Thessalonica."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 27.

**A. D. 904.—Capture and pillage by the Saracens.**—The capture of Thessalonica by a piratical expedition from Tarsus, A. D. 904, was one of the most terrible experiences of its kind in that age of blood and rapine, and one of which the fullest account, by an eye-witness and sufferer, has come down to posterity. The wretched inhabitants who escaped the sword were mostly sold into slavery, and the splendid city—then the second in the Byzantine Empire—was stripped of all its wealth. The defense of the place had been neglected, with implicit dependence on the good will and the power of St. Demetrius.—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine Empire*, from 716 to 1057, bk. 2, ch. 1, sect. 2.

**A. D. 1204-1222.—Capital of the kingdom of Saloniki.** See SALONIKI.

**A. D. 1222-1234.—The Greek empire.** See EPIRUS: A. D. 1204-1350.

**A. D. 1430.—Capture by the Turks.**—Thessalonica, feebly defended by Venetians and Greeks, was taken by the Turks, under Amurath II., in February, 1430. "The pillage and the carnage," relates the Greek Anagnosta, an eye-witness of this disastrous night, "transcended the hopes of the Turks and the terror of the Greeks. No family escaped the swords, the chains, the flames, the outrages of the Asiatics fierce for their prey. At the close of the day, each soldier drove like a herd before him, through the streets of Salonica, troops of women, of young girls, of children, of caloyers and anchorites, of monks of all the monasteries. Priests were chained with virgins, children with old men, mothers with their sons, in derision of age, of profession, of sex, which added a barbarous irony to nudity and death itself."—A. Lamartine, *Hist. of Turkey*, bk. 10, sect. 27.

**THESSALY.**—"The northern part of Greece is traversed in its whole length by a range of mountains, the Greek Apennines, which issue from the same mighty root, the Thracian Scomius, in which Hæmus, and Rhodopé and the Illyrian Alps likewise meet. This ridge first takes the name of Pindus, where it intersects the northern boundary of Greece, at a point where an ancient route still affords the least difficult passage from Epirus into Thessaly. From Pindus two huge arms stretch towards the eastern sea and enclose the vale of Thessaly, the largest and richest plain in Greece: on the north the Cambunian Hills, after making a bend towards the south, terminate in the loftier heights of Olympus, which are scarcely ever entirely free from snow; the opposite and lower chain of Othrys parting, with its eastern extremity, the Malian from the Pagasæan Gulf, sinks gently towards the coast. A fourth rampart, which runs parallel to Pindus, is formed by the range which includes the celebrated heights of Pelion and Ossa; the first a broad and nearly even ridge, the other towering into a steep and conical peak, the neighbour and rival of Olympus,

with which, in the songs of the country, it is said to dispute the pre-eminence in the depth and duration of its snows. The mountain barrier with which Thessaly is thus encompassed is broken only at the northeast corner by a deep and narrow cleft, which parts Ossa from Olympus; the defile so renowned in poetry as the vale, in history as the pass, of Tempe. The imagination of the ancient poets and declaimers delighted to dwell on the natural beauties of this romantic glen and on the sanctity of the site, from which Apollo had transplanted his laurel to Delphi. . . . South of this gulf [the Gulf of Pagasæ], the coast is again deeply indented by that of Malia, into which the Spercheius, rising from Mount Tymphrestus, a continuation of Pindus, winds through a long, narrow vale, which, though considered as a part of Thessaly, forms a separate region, widely distinguished from the rest by its physical features. It is intercepted between Othrys and Ceta, a huge, rugged pile, which stretching from Pindus to the sea at Thermopylæ, forms the inner barrier of Greece, as the Cambunian range is the outer, to which it corresponds in direction and is nearly equal in height. From Mount Callidromus, a southern limb of Ceta, the same range is continued without interruption, though under various names and different degrees of elevation, along the coast of the Eubœan Sea. . . . Another branch, issuing from the same part of Pindus, connects it with the loftier summits of Parnassus, and afterward skirting the Corinthian Gulf under the names of Cirphis and Helicon, proceeds to form the northern boundary of Attica under those of Cithæron and Parnes."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 1 (v. 1).—In the mythical legends of Greece, Thessaly was the kingdom of Hellen, transmitted to his son Æolus and occupied originally by the Æolic branch of the Hellenic family. The Æolians, however, appear to have receded from the rich Thessalian plain, into Bœotia and elsewhere, before various invading tribes. The people who fixed their name, at last, upon the country, the Thessalians, came into it from Epirus, crossing the Pindus mountain-range.—See, also, GREECE: THE MIGRATIONS; and DORIANS and IONIANS.

**THETES, The.** See DEBT, ANCIENT LEGISLATION CONCERNING: GREEK; also, ATHENS: B. C. 594.

**THEUDEBERT, King of the Franks (Austria).** A. D. 596-612.

**THIASI.**—"The name denotes associations [in ancient Athens] which had chosen as their special protector and patron some deity in whose honour at certain times they held sacrifices and festal banquets, whilst they pursued in addition objects of a very varied nature, sometimes joint-stock businesses, sometimes only social enjoyments."—G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece*, pt. 3, ch. 3, sect. 2.

**THIBAUT I., King of Navarre.** A. D. 1236-1253. . . . Thibault II., King of Navarre, 1253-1270.

**THIBET.** See TIBET.

**THIERRY I., King of the Franks, at Metz.** A. D. 511-534. . . . Thierry II., King of the Franks (Austria), 612-613; King of Burgundy, 596-613. . . . Thierry III., King of the Franks (Neustria and Burgundy), 670-691. . . . Thierry IV., King of the Franks (Neustria, Austrasia, and Burgundy), 720-737.

**THIERS, Adolphe, and the founding of the third French Republic.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1871-1876.

**THIN.—THINÆ.** See CHINA: The NAMES OF THE COUNTRY.

**THING.—THINGVALLA.—ALTHING.**—"The judicial and legislative assembly of the Northmen represented by the word 'thing' (from 'tinga'—to speak, and allied to our English word 'think') can be traced in many local names throughout England, and more especially in the extreme North, where the Scandinavian race prevailed, and where the 'thing' was primitively held upon the site of, or as an appanage to, a 'hof' or temple. It is plainly seen in the Tynwald Court or general legislative assembly for the Isle of Man, where the distinctive feature of the primitive open-air assembly still survives in the custom of the whole assembly going once a year in solemn procession, attended by the governor of the island and a military escort, to a hill known as the Tynwald Hill, whence all the laws that have been passed in the course of the past year are proclaimed in English and Manx. . . . In Norway there is an 'Al-thing' or general assembly, and four district 'things' for the several provinces, as well as a Norwegian Parliament familiar to us as 'Stor-thing' or great council."—R. R. Sharpe, *Introd. to Calendar of Wills, Court of Husting, London, v. 1.*—"By the end of the period of the first occupation of Iceland, a number of little kingdoms had been formed all round the coast, ruled by the priests, who, at stated times, convened their adherents and retainers to meetings for the settlement of matters which concerned any or all of them. These were called 'Things'—meetings, i. e. Mot-things. Each was independent of the other, and quarrels between the members of two separate Things could only be settled as the quarrels of nations are settled, by treaty or war. But the time soon arrived when the progress of political thought began to work upon this disjointed constitution; and then amalgamation of local Things into an Althing, of local jurisdiction into a commonwealth jurisdiction, was the historical result. . . . The Thingvalla, or Thing-field itself, was a vast sunken plain of lava, about four miles broad and rather more than four miles deep, lying with a dip or slope from north-east to south-west, between two great lips or furrows. A stream called Öxará, (Axewater) cuts off a rocky portion of the plain, so as almost to form an island. This is the famous Hill of Laws, or Lögberg, which was the heart of the Icelandic body politic. . . . This example of the Icelandic Thing is the most perfect that is known to history."—G. L. Gomme, *Primitive Folk-Moots, ch. 2.*

Also IN: G. W. Dasent, *introd. to "The Story of Burnt Njal."*—See, also, NORMANS.—NORTHMEN: A. D. 860-1100; and SCANDINAVIAN STATES (DENMARK—ICELAND): A. D. 1849-1874.

**THINGMEN.** See HOUSECARLS.

**THINIS.** See MEMPHIS, EGYPT; also EGYPT: THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE MIDDLE EMPIRE.

**THIONVILLE:** A. D. 1643.—Siege and capture by the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1643.

**A. D. 1659.—Ceded to France.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1659-1661.

**THIRD ESTATE, The.** See ESTATES, THE THREE.

**THIRTEEN COLONIES, The.** See MASSACHUSETTS; RHODE ISLAND; CONNECTICUT; NEW HAMPSHIRE; NEW YORK; NEW JERSEY; PENNSYLVANIA; DELAWARE; MARYLAND; VIRGINIA; NORTH CAROLINA; SOUTH CAROLINA; GEORGIA; also, NEW ENGLAND.

**THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (JANUARY).

**THIRTY TYRANTS OF ATHENS, The.** See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

**THIRTY TYRANTS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, The.** See ROME: A. D. 192-284.

**THIRTY YEARS TRUCE, The.** See GREECE: B. C. 449-445.

**THIRTY YEARS WAR, The.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1608-1618, to 1648; and BOHEMIA: A. D. 1611-1618, and 1621-1648.

**THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES, The.**—"In 1563 the Articles of the English Church, forty-two in number, originally drawn up in 1551 under Edward VI., were revised in Convocation, and reduced to their present number, thirty-nine; but it was not until 1571 that they were made binding upon the clergy by Act of Parliament."—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *English Const. Hist., ch. 12.*

**THIS, OR THINIS.** See EGYPT: THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE MIDDLE EMPIRE; also, MEMPHIS, EGYPT.

**THISTLE:** Its adoption as the national emblem of Scotland. See SAINT ANDREW: THE SCOTTISH ORDER.

**THISTLE, Order of the.**—A Scottish order of knighthood instituted by James V. in 1530.

**THOMAS, General George H.: Campaign against Zollicoffer.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JANUARY—FEBRUARY: KENTUCKY—TENNESSEE). . . . Refusal of the command of the Army of the Ohio. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE—OCTOBER: TENNESSEE—KENTUCKY). . . . At Chickamauga, and in the Chattanooga Campaign. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER) ROSECRANS' ADVANCE; and (OCTOBER—NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE). . . . The Atlanta campaign. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MAY: GEORGIA), to (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER: GEORGIA). . . . Campaign against Hood. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE), and (DECEMBER: TENNESSEE).

**THOMAS À BECKET, Saint, and King Henry II.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1162-1170.

**THOMPSON'S STATION, Battle at.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: TENNESSEE).

**THORN, Peace of (1466).** See POLAND: A. D. 1333-1572.

**"THOROUGH," Wentworth and Laud's government system.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1633-1639.

**THRACE:** B. C. 323-281.—The kingdom of Lysimachus and its overthrow. See MACEDONIA, &c.: B. C. 323-316 to 297-280.

**THRACIANS, The.**—"That vast space comprised between the rivers Strymon and Danube, and bounded to the west by the easternmost Illyrian tribes, northward of the Strymon, was occupied by the innumerable subdivisions of the race called Thracians, or Threicians. They were the



most numerous and most terrible race known to Herodotus: could they by possibility act in unison or under one dominion (he says) they would be irresistible. . . . Numerous as the tribes of Thracians were, their customs and character (according to Herodotus) were marked by great uniformity: of the Getæ, the Trausi, and others, he tells us a few particularities. . . . The general character of the race presents an aggregate of repulsive features unredeemed by the presence of even the commonest domestic affections. . . . It appears that the Thynians and Bithynians, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, perhaps also the Mysians, were members of this great Thracian race, which was more remotely connected, also, with the Phrygians. And the whole race may be said to present a character more Asiatic than European; especially in those ecstatic and maddening religious rites, which prevailed not less among the Edonian Thracians than in the mountains of Ida and Dindymon of Asia, though with some important differences. The Thracians served to furnish the Greeks with mercenary troops and slaves."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 26.—"Under Seuthes [B. C. 424—] Thrace stood at the height of its prosperity. It formed a connected empire from Abdera to the Danube, from Byzantium to the Strymon. . . . The land abounded in resources, in corn and flocks and herds, in gold and silver. . . . No such state had as yet existed in the whole circuit of the Ægean. . . . But their kingdom failed to endure. After Seuthes it broke up into several principalities."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 7, ch. 1.—"Herodotus is not wrong in calling the Thracians the greatest of the peoples known to him after the Indians. Like the Illyrian, the Thracian stock attained to no full development, and appears more as hard-pressed and dispossessed than as having any historically memorable course of its own. . . . The Thracian [language] disappeared amidst the fluctuations of peoples in the region of the Danube and the overpowerful influence of Constantinople, and we cannot even determine the place which belongs to it in the pedigree of nations. . . . Their wild but grand mode of worshipping the gods may perhaps be conceived as a trait peculiar to this stock—the mighty outburst of the joy of spring and youth, the nocturnal mountain-festivals of torch-swinging maidens, the intoxicating sense-confusing music, the flowing of wine and the flowing of blood, the giddy festal whirl, frantic with the simultaneous excitement of all sensuous passions. Dionysos, the glorious and the terrible, was a Thracian god." Under the supremacy of the Romans, the Thracians were governed by a native line of vassal kings, reigning at Bizye (Wiza), between Adrianople and the coast of the Black Sea, until the Emperor Claudius, A. D. 46, suppressed the nominal kingdom and made Thrace a Roman province.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 6.—In the 8th and 9th centuries, "the great Thracian race, which had once been inferior in number only to the Indian, and which, in the first century of our era, had excited the attention of Vespasian by the extent of the territory it occupied, had . . . almost disappeared. The country it had formerly inhabited was peopled by Vallachian and Slavonian tribes."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine Empire*, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 1.

**THREE CHAPTERS, The dispute of the.**—A famous church dispute raised in the sixth century by the Emperor Justinian, who discovered an heretical taint in certain passages, called the Three Chapters, culled out of the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia and two other doctors of the church who had been teachers and friends of Nestorius. A solemn Church Council called (A. D. 553) at Constantinople—the fifth general Council—condemned the Three Chapters and anathematized their adherents. But this touched by implication the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon, which were especially cherished in the Latin Church, and Rome became rebellious. In the end, the Roman opposition prevailed, and, "in the period of a century, the schism of the three chapters expired in an obscure angle of the Venetian province."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 47.

ALSO IN: H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 1, ch. 4.

**THREE F'S, The.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1873-1879.

**THREE HENRYS, War of the.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1584-1589.

**THREE HUNDRED AT THERMOPYLÆ, The.** See GREECE: B. C. 480 (THERMOPYLÆ).

**THREE HUNDRED OF THEBES, The.** See THEBES: B. C. 378.

**THREE KINGS, Battle of the.** See MAROCCO: THE ARAB CONQUEST, AND SINCE.

**THREE LEGS OF MAN, The.** See TRI-SKELION.

**THREE PRESIDENCIES OF INDIA, The.** See INDIA: A. D. 1600-1702.

**THUCYDIDES: The origin of his history.** See AMPHIPOLIS.

**THUGS.—THUGGEE.** See INDIA: A. D. 1823-1833.

**THULE.**—Pytheas, a Greek traveller and writer of the time (as supposed) of Alexander the Great, was the first to introduce the name of Thule into ancient geography. He described it vaguely as an island, lying six days' voyage to the north of Britain, in a region where the sea became like neither land nor water, but was of a thick and sluggish substance, resembling that of the jelly fish. "It appears to me impossible to identify the Thule of Pytheas with any approach to certainty; but he had probably heard vaguely of the existence of some considerable island, or group of islands, to the north of Britain, whether the Orkneys or the Shetlands it is impossible to say."—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geog.*, ch. 15, sect. 2, foot-note.—Some modern writers identify Thule with Iceland; some with the coast of Norway, mistakenly regarded as an island. But, whichever land it may have been, Thule to the Greeks and Romans, was Ultima Thule,—the end of the known world,—the most northerly point of Europe to which their knowledge reached.—R. F. Burton, *Ultima Thule*, introd., sect. 1 (v. 1).

**THUNDERING LEGION, The.**—During the summer of the year 174, in a campaign which the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus conducted against the Quadi, on the Danube, the Roman army was once placed in a perilous position. It was hemmed in by the enemy, cut off from all access to water, and was reduced to despair. At the last extremity, it is said, the army was saved by a miraculous storm, which

poured rain on the thirsty Romans, while lightning and hail fell destructively in the ranks of the barbarians. According to the Pagan historians, Aurelius owed this "miraculous victory," as it was called, to the arts of one Arnuphis, an Egyptian magician. But later Christian writers told a different story. They relate that the distressed army contained one legion composed entirely of Christians, from Melitene, and that these soldiers, being called upon by the emperor to invoke their God, united in a prayer which received the answer described. Hence, the legion was known thereafter, by imperial command, as the Thundering Legion.—P. B. Watson, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, bk. 5, ch. 5.

THURII.—THURIUM. See SIRIS.

THURINGIA.—THURINGIANS, The.—"To the eastward of the Saxons and of the Franks, the Thuringians had just formed a new monarchy. That people had united to the Varni and the Heruli, they had spread from the borders of the Elbe and of the Undstrut to those of the Necker. They had invaded Hesse or the country of the Catti, one of the Frankish people, and Franconia, where they had distinguished their conquests by frightful cruelties. . . . It is not known at what period these atrocities were committed, but Thierry [or Theoderic, one of the four Frank kings, sons of Clovis] towards the year 528, reminds his soldiers of them to excite their revenge; it is probable that they were the motives which induced the Franks of Germany and those of Gaul to unite, in order to provide more powerfully for their defence." Thierry, the Frank king at Metz, and Clotaire, his brother, who reigned at Soissons, united in 528 against the Thuringians and completely crushed them. "This great province was then united to the monarchy of the Franks, and its dukes, during two centuries, marched under the standards of the Merovingians."—J. C. L. S. de Sismondi, *The French under the Merovingians*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. C. Perry, *The Franks*, ch. 3.—See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 481-768.

Absorbed in Saxony. See SAXONY: THE OLD DUCHY.

THURM AND TAXIS, Prince, and the German postal system. See POST.

THYMBRÆAN ORACLE. See ORACLES OF THE GREEKS.

THYNIANS, The. See BITHYNIANS.

TIBARENIANS, The.—A people who anciently inhabited the southern coast of the Euxine, toward its eastern extremity.—G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies: Persia*, ch. 1.

TIBBOOS, The. See LIBYANS.

TIBERIAS, Battle of (1187). See JERUSALEM: A. D. 1149-1187.

TIBERIAS, The Patriarch of. See JEWS: A. D. 200-400.

TIBERIUS, Roman Emperor, A. D. 14-37; German campaigns, see GERMANY: B. C. 8—A. D. 11.... Tiberius II, Roman Emperor (Eastern), 578-582.... Tiberius Absimar, Roman Emperor (Eastern), 698-704.

TIBET.—"The name of Tibet is applied not only to the south-west portion of the Chinese Empire, but also to more than half of Kashmir

occupied by peoples of Tibetan origin. These regions of 'Little Tibet' and of 'Apricot Tibet'—so called from the orchards surrounding its villages—consist of deep valleys opening like troughs between the snowy Himalayan and Karakorum ranges. Draining towards India, these uplands have gradually been brought under Hindu influences, whereas Tibet proper has pursued a totally different career. It is variously known as 'Great,' the 'Third,' or 'East Tibet'; but such is the confusion of nomenclature that the expression 'Great Tibet' is also applied to Ladak, which forms part of Kashmir. At the same time, the term Tibet itself, employed by Europeans to designate two countries widely differing in their physical and political conditions, is unknown to the people themselves. Hermann Schlagintweit regards it as an old Tibetan word meaning 'strength,' or 'empire' in a pre-eminent sense and this is the interpretation supplied by the missionaries of the seventeenth century, who give the country the Italian name of Potente, or 'Powerful.' But however this be, the present inhabitants use the term Bod-yul alone; that is, 'land of the Bod,' itself probably identical with Bhutan, a Hindu name restricted by Europeans to a single state on the southern slope of the Himalayas. The Chinese call Tibet either Si-Tsang—that is, West Tsang, from its principal province—or Wei-Tsang, a word applied to the two provinces of Wei and Tsang, which jointly constitute Tibet proper. To the inhabitants they give the name of Tu-Fan, or 'Aboriginal Fans,' in opposition to the Si-Fan, or 'Western Fans,' of Sechuen and Kansu. . . . Suspended like a vast terrace some 14,000 or 16,000 feet above the surrounding plains, the Tibetan plateau is more than half filled with closed basins dotted with a few lakes or marshes, the probable remains of inland seas whose overflow discharged through the breaks in the frontier ranges. . . . During the present century the Tibetan Government has succeeded better than any other Asiatic state in preserving the political isolation of the people, thanks chiefly to the relief and physical conditions of the land. Tibet rises like a citadel in the heart of Asia; hence its defenders have guarded its approaches more easily than those of India, China, and Japan. The greater part of Tibet remains still unexplored. . . . The great bulk of the inhabitants, apart from the Mongolo-Tartar Horsoks of Khachi and the various independent tribes of the province of Kham, belong to a distinct branch of the Mongolian family. They are of low size, with broad shoulders and chests, and present a striking contrast to the Hindus in the size of their arms and calves, while resembling them in their small and delicate hands and feet. . . . The Tibetans are one of the most highly endowed people in the world. Nearly all travellers are unanimous in praise of their gentleness, frank and kindly bearing, unaffected dignity. Strong, courageous, naturally cheerful, fond of music, the dance and song, they would be a model race but for their lack of enterprise. They are as easily governed as a flock of sheep, and for them the word of a lama has force of law. Even the mandates of the Chinese authorities are scrupulously obeyed, and thus it happens that against their own friendly feelings they jealously guard the frontiers against all strangers. The more or less mixed races of East Tibet on the Chinese



frontier, on the route of the troops that plunder them and of the mandarins who oppress them, seem to be less favourably constituted, and are described as thievish and treacherous. . . . The Tibetans have long been a civilised people. . . . In some respects they are even more civilised than those of many European countries, for reading and writing are general accomplishments in many places, and books are here so cheap that they are found in the humblest dwellings, though several of these works are kept simply on account of their magical properties. In the free evolution of their speech, which has been studied chiefly by Foucaux, Csoma de Körös, Schiefner, and Jäschke, the Tibetans have outlived the period in which the Chinese are still found. The monosyllabic character of the language, which differs from all other Asiatic tongues, has nearly been effaced. . . . The Tibetan Government is in theory a pure theocracy. The Dalia-lama, called also the Gyalba-remboché, 'Jewel of Majesty,' or 'Sovereign Treasure,' is at once god and king, master of the life and fortunes of his subjects, with no limit to his power except his own pleasure. [On Lamaism in Tibet, see LAMAS.] Nevertheless he consents to be guided in ordinary matters by the old usages, while his very greatness prevents him from directly oppressing his people. His sphere of action being restricted to spiritual matters, he is represented in the administration by a viceroy chosen by the Emperor in a supreme council of three high priests. . . . Everything connected with general politics and war must be referred to Peking, while local matters are left to the Tibetan authorities. . . . Pope, viceroy, ministers, all receive a yearly subvention from Peking and all the Tibetan mandarins wear on their hats the button, or distinctive sign of the dignities conferred by the empire. Every third or fifth year a solemn embassy is sent to Peking with rich presents, receiving others in exchange from the 'Son of Heaven.' . . . The whole land belongs to the Dalai-lama, the people being merely temporary occupants, tolerated by the real owner. The very houses and furniture and all movable property are held in trust for the supreme master, whose subjects must be grateful if he takes a portion only for the requirements of the administration. One of the most ordinary sentences, in fact, is wholesale confiscation, when the condemned must leave house and lands, betaking themselves to a camp life, and living by begging in the districts assigned to them. So numerous are these chong long, or official mendicants, that they form a distinct class in the State. . . . Since the cession of Ladak to Kashmir, and the annexation of Batang, Litang, Aten-tze, and other districts to Sechuen and Yunnan, Si-tsang, or Tibet proper, comprises only the four provinces of Nari, Tsang, Wei, or U, and Kham. Certain principalities enclosed in these provinces are completely independent of Lassa, and either enjoy self-government or are directly administered from Peking. . . . Even in the four provinces the Chinese authorities interfere in many ways, and their power is especially felt in that of Nari, where, owing to its dangerous proximity to Kashmir and India, the old spirit of independence might be awakened. Nor is any money allowed to be coined in Tibet, which in the eyes of the Imperial Government is merely a dependency of Sechuen, whence all

orders are received in Lassa."—É. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants: Asia*, v. 2, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: H. Bower, *Diary of a Journey across Tibet*, ch. 16.

**TIBISCUS, The.**—The ancient name of the river Theiss.

**TIBUR.**—An important Latin city, more ancient than Rome, from which it was only 20 miles distant, on the Anio. Tibur, after many wars, was reduced by the Romans to subjection in the 4th century, B. C., and the delightful country in its neighborhood became a favorite place of residence for wealthy Romans in later times. The ruins of the villa of Hadrian have been identified in the vicinity, and many others have been named, but without historical authority. Hadrian's villa is said to have been like a town in its vast extent. The modern town of Tivoli occupies the site of Tibur.—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 14.

**TIBURTINE SIBYL.** See SIBYLS.

**TICINUS, Battle on the.** See PUNIC WARS: THE SECOND.

**TICKET-OF-LEAVE SYSTEM, The.** See LAW, CRIMINAL: A. D. 1825.

**TICONDEROGA, Fort: A. D. 1731.**—Built by the French. See CANADA: A. D. 1700-1735.

**A. D. 1756.**—Reconstructed by the French. See CANADA: A. D. 1756.

**A. D. 1758.**—The bloody repulse of Abercrombie. See CANADA: A. D. 1758.

**A. D. 1759.**—Taken by General Amherst. See CANADA: A. D. 1759 (JULY—AUGUST).

**A. D. 1775.**—Surprised and taken by the Green Mountain Boys. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (MAY).

**A. D. 1777.**—Recapture by Burgoyne. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1777 (JULY—OCTOBER).

**TIEN-TSIN, Treaty of (1858).** See CHINA: A. D. 1856-1860.

**TIERRA FIRME.**—"The world was at a loss at first [after Columbus' discovery] what to call the newly found region to the westward. It was easy enough to name the islands, one after another, as they were discovered, but when the Spaniards reached the continent they were backward about giving it a general name. . . . As the coast line of the continent extended itself and became known as such, it was very naturally called by navigators 'tierra firme,' firm land, in contradistinction to the islands which were supposed to be less firm. . . . The name Tierra Firme, thus general at first, in time became particular. As a designation for an unknown shore it at first implied only the Continent. As discovery unfolded, and the magnitude of this Firm Land became better known, new parts of it were designated by new names, and Tierra Firme became a local appellation in place of a general term. Paria being first discovered, it fastened itself there; also along the shore to Darien, Veragua, and on to Costa Rica, where at no well defined point it stopped, so far as the northern seaboard was concerned, and in due time struck across to the South Sea, where the name marked off an equivalent coast line. . . . As a political division Tierra Firme had existence for a long time. It comprised the provinces of Darien, Veragua, and Panamá, which last bore

also the name of Tierra Firme as a province. The extent of the kingdom was 65 leagues in length by 18 at its greatest breadth, and 9 leagues at its smallest width. It was bounded on the east by Cartagena, and the gulf of Urabá and its river; on the west by Costa Rica, including a portion of what is now Costa Rica; and on the north and south by the two seas. . . . Neither Guatemala, Mexico, nor any of the lands to the north were ever included in Tierra Firme. English authors often apply the Latin form, Terra Firma, to this division, which is misleading."—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, v. 1, p. 290, foot-note.—See, also, SPANISH MAIN.

**TIERS ETAT.** See ESTATES, THE THREE.

**TIGORINI, OR TIGURINI, in Gaul, The.**—After the Cimbrî had defeated two Roman armies, in 113 and 109 B. C., "the Helvetii, who had suffered much in the constant conflicts with their north-eastern neighbours, felt themselves stimulated by the example of the Cimbrî to seek in their turn for more quiet and fertile settlements in western Gaul, and had, perhaps, even when the Cimbrian hosts marched through their land, formed an alliance with them for that purpose. Now, under the leadership of Divico, the forces of the Tougeni (position unknown) and of the Tigorini (on the lake of Murten) crossed the Jura and reached the territory of the Nitobroges (about Agen on the Garonne). The Roman army under the consul Lucius Cassius Longinus, which they here encountered, allowed itself to be decoyed by the Helvetii into an ambush, in which the general himself and his legate, the consular Gaius Piso, along with the greater portion of the soldiers, met their death."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 5.—Subsequently the Tigorini and the Tougeni joined the Cimbrî, but were not present at the decisive battle on the Raudine Plain and escaped the destroying swords of the legions of Marius, by flying back to their native Helvetia.

**TIGRANOCERTA, Battle of (B. C. 69).**—See ROME: B. C. 78-68.

**TIGRANOCERTA, The building of.** See GORDYENE.

**TILDEN, Samuel J.**—In the Free Soil Movement. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1848. . . . The overthrow of the Tweed Ring. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1863-1871. . . . Defeat in Presidential Election. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1876-1877.

**TILLEMONT: A. D. 1635.**—Stormed and sacked by the Dutch and French. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1635-1638.

**TILLY, Count von: Campaigns.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1620, to 1631-1632.

**TILSIT, Treaty of.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY).

**TIMAR.—TIMARLI.—SAIM.—SPAHI.**—"It was Alaeddin who first instituted a division of all conquered lands among the 'Sipahis,' or Spahis (horsemen), on conditions which, like the feudal tenures of Christian Europe, obliged the holders to service in the field. Here, however, ends the likeness between the Turkish 'Timar' and the European fief. The 'Timarli' were not, like the Christian knighthood, a proud and hereditary aristocracy almost independent of the sovereign and having a voice in his councils, but the mere creatures of the Sultan's breath. The Ottoman constitution recognised no order of no-

bility. . . . The institution of military tenures was modified by Amurath I., who divided them into the larger and smaller ('Siamet' and 'Timar'), the holders of which were called 'Saim' and 'Timarli.' . . . The symbols of . . . investment were a sword and colours ('Kilidsch' and 'Sandjak')."—T. H. Dyer, *The History of Modern Europe*, v. 1, introd.—See, also, SPAHIS.

**TIMOCRACY.** See GEOMORI.

**TIMOLEON, and the deliverance of Sicily.** See SYRACUSE: B. C. 344.

**TIMOR.**—A large island which sometimes gives its name to the group, east of Java, to which it belongs. The group is also called the Lesser Sunda Islands. See MALAY ARCHIPELAGO.

**TIMOUR, The Conquests of.**—"Timour the Tartar, as he is usually termed in history, was called by his countrymen Timourlenk, that is, Timour the Lame, from the effects of an early wound; a name which some European writers have converted into Tamerlane, or Tamberlaine. He was of Mongol origin [see below], and a direct descendant, by the mother's side, of Zenghis Khan. He was born at Sebzar, a town near Samarcand, in Transoxiana, in 1336. . . . Timour's early youth was passed in struggles for ascendancy with the petty chiefs of rival tribes, but at the age of thirty-five he had fought his way to undisputed pre-eminence, and was proclaimed Khan of Zagatai by the 'couroultai,' or general assembly of the warriors of his race. He chose Samarcand as the capital of his dominion, and openly announced that he would make that dominion comprise the whole habitable earth. . . . In the thirty-six years of his reign he raged over the world from the great wall of China to the centre of Russia on the north; and the Mediterranean and the Nile were the western limits of his career, which was pressed eastward as far as the sources of the Ganges. He united in his own person the sovereignties of twenty-seven countries, and he stood in the place of nine several dynasties of kings. . . . The career of Timour as a conqueror is unparalleled in history; for neither Cyrus, nor Alexander, nor Cæsar, nor Attila, nor Zenghis Khan, nor Charlemagne, nor Napoleon, ever won by the sword so large a portion of the globe, or ruled over so many myriads of subjugated fellow-creatures."—E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 3.—"Born of the same family as Jenghiz, though not one of his direct descendants, he bore throughout life the humble title of Emir, and led about with him a nominal Grand Khan [a descendant of Chagatai, one of the sons of Jenghiz Khan], of whom he professed himself a dutiful subject. His pedigree may in strictness entitle him to be called a Mogul; but, for all practical purposes, himself and his hordes must be regarded as Turks. Like all the eastern Turks, such civilization as they had was of Persian origin; and it was of the Persian form of Islam that Timour was so zealous an assertor."—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. and Conquests of the Saracens*, lect. 6.—In 1378 Timour overran Khuarezm. Between 1380 and 1386 he subjugated Khorassan, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Sistan. He then passed into southern Persia and forced the submission of the Mozafferides who reigned over Fars, punishing the city of Isfahan for a rebellious rising by the massacre of 70,000 of its inhabitants. This done, he returned to Samarkand for a period of rest and prolonged carousal. Taking the field again in



1389, he turned his arms northward and shattered the famous "Golden Horde," of the Khanate of Kiptchak, which dominated a large part of Russia. In 1392-93 the Tartar conqueror completed the subjugation of Persia and Mesopotamia, extinguishing the decayed Mongol Empire of the Ilkhans, and piling up a pyramid of 90,000 human heads on the ruins of Bagdad, the old capital of Islam. Thence he pursued his career of slaughter through Armenia and Georgia, and finished his campaign of five years by a last destroying blow struck at the Kiptchak Khan whom he is said to have pursued as far as Moscow. Once more, at Samarkand, the red-handed, invincible savage then gave himself up to orgies of pleasure-making; but it was not for many months. His eyes were now on India, and the years 1398-1399 were spent by him in carrying death and desolation through the Punjab, and to the city of Delhi, which was made a scene of awful massacre and pillage. No permanent conquest was achieved; the plunder and the pleasure of slaughter were the ends of the expedition. A more serious purpose directed the next movement of Timour's arms, which were turned against the rival Turk of Asia Minor, or Rûm—the Ottoman, Bajazet, or Bayezid, who boasted of the conquest of the Roman Empire of the East. In 1402, Bajazet was summoned from the siege of Constantinople to defend his realm. On the 20th of July in that year, on the plain of Angora, he met the enormous hosts of Timour-lenk and was overwhelmed by them—his kingdom lost, himself a captive. The merciless Tartar hordes swept hapless Anatolia with a besom of destruction and death. Nicæa, Prusa and other cities were sacked. Smyrna provoked the Tartar savage by an obstinate defense and was doomed to the sword, without mercy for age or sex. Even then, the customary pyramid of heads which he built on the site was not large enough to satisfy his eye and he increased its height by alternate layers of mud. Aleppo, Damascus, and other cities of Syria had been dealt with in like manner the year before. When satiated with blood, he returned to Samarkand in 1404, rested there until January 1405, and then set out upon an expedition to China; but he died on the way. His empire was soon broken in pieces.—A. Vambery, *Hist. of Bokhara*, ch. 10, 11, 12.

ALSO IN: J. Hutton, *Central Asia*, ch. 5-6.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 65.—A. Lamartine, *Hist. of Turkey*, bk. 7.—H. G. Smith, *Romance of Hist.*, ch. 4.

**TIMUCHI.**—This was the name given to the members of the senate or council of six hundred of Massilia—ancient Marseilles.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 1, ch. 21.

**TIMUCUA, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TIMUQUANAN FAMILY.

**TINNEH.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ATHAPASCAN FAMILY.

**TIPPECANOE, The Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1811.

**"TIPPECANOE AND TYLER TOO."** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1840.

**TIPPERMUIR, Battle of (1644).** See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1644-1645.

**TIPPOO (OR TIPU) SAIB, English wars with.** See INDIA: A. D. 1785-1793, and 1798-1805.

**TIROL.** See TYROL.

**TIRSHATHA.**—An ancient Persian title, borne by an officer whose functions corresponded

with those of High Sheriff.—H. Ewald, *Hist. of Israel*, bk. 5, sect. 1.

**TIRYNS.** See ARGOS; and HERACLEIDÆ.

**TITHE.**—"To consecrate to the Sanctuary in pure thankfulness towards God the tenth of all annual profits, was a primitive tradition among the Canaanites, Phoenicians and Carthaginians. The custom, accordingly, very early passed over to Israel."—H. Ewald, *Antiquities of Israel*, introd., 3d sect., II., 3.—Modern "recognition of the legal obligation of tithe dates from the eighth century, both on the continent and in England. In A. D. 779 Charles the Great ordained that every one should pay tithe, and that the proceeds should be disposed of by the bishop; and in A. D. 787 it was made imperative by the legatine councils held in England."—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 8, sect. 86 (n. 1).

**TITHE OF SALADIN.** See SALADIN, THE TITHE OF.

**TITHES, Irish.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1832-1833.

**TITIES, The.** See ROME: THE BEGINNINGS.

**TITUS, Roman Emperor,** A. D. 79-81.

**TIVITIVAS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIBS AND THEIR KINDRED.

**TIVOLI.** See TIBUR.

**TLACOPAN.** See MEXICO: A. D. 1325-1502.

**TLASCALA.** See MEXICO: A. D. 1519 (JUNE—OCTOBER).

**T'LINKETS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ATHAPASCAN FAMILY.

**TOBACCO:** Its introduction into the Old World from the New. See AMERICA: A. D. 1584-1586.

The systematic culture introduced in Virginia. See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1609-1616.

**TOBACCO NATION, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: HURONS; and IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: THEIR NAME.

**TOBAGO.** See TRINIDAD.

**TOBAS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.

**TOGA, The Roman.**—"The toga, the specifically national dress of the Romans, was originally put on the naked body, fitting much more tightly than the rich folds of the togas of later times. About the shape of this toga, which is described as a semicircular cloak . . . , many different opinions prevail. Some scholars consider it to have been an oblong piece of woven cloth . . . ; others construct it of one or even two pieces cut into segments of a circle. Here again we shall adopt in the main the results arrived at through practical trials by Weiss ('Costümkunde,' p. 956 et seq.). The Roman toga therefore was not . . . a quadrangular oblong, but 'had the shape of an oblong edged off into the form of an oval, the middle length being equal to about three times the height of a grown-up man (exclusive of the head), and its middle breadth equal to twice the same length. In putting it on, the toga was at first folded lengthwise, and the double dress thus originated was laid in folds on the straight edge and thrown over the left shoulder in the simple manner of the Greek or Tuscan cloak; the toga, however, covered the whole left side and even dragged on the ground to a considerable extent. The cloak was then pulled across the back and through the

right arm, the ends being again thrown over the left shoulder backwards. The part of the drapery covering the back was once more pulled towards the right shoulder, so as to add to the richness of the folds.' . . . The simpler, that is narrower, toga of earlier times naturally clung more tightly to the body."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 95.—"No tacks or fastenings of any sort indeed are visible in the toga, but their existence may be inferred from the great formality and little variation displayed in its divisions and folds. In general, the toga seems not only to have formed, as it were, a short sleeve to the right arm, which was left unconfined, but to have covered the left arm down to the wrist. . . . The material of the toga was wool; the colour, in early ages, its own natural yellowish hue. In later periods this seems, however, only to have been retained in the togas of the higher orders; inferior persons wearing theirs dyed, and candidates for public offices bleached by an artificial process. In times of mourning the toga was worn black, or was left off altogether. Priests and magistrates wore the 'toga pretexta,' or toga edged with a purple border, called pretexta. This . . . was . . . worn by all youths of noble birth to the age of fifteen. . . . The knights wore the 'trabea,' or toga striped with purple throughout."—T. Hope, *Costume of the Ancients*, v. 1.

**TOGATI**, The. See **ROME**: B. C. 275.

**TOGGENBURG WAR**, The. See **SWITZERLAND**: A. D. 1652-1789.

**TOGOLAND**.—This piece of western Africa, on the Slave Coast, in Upper Guinea, was declared a German protectorate in 1884.

**TOGRUL BEG**, Seljuk Turkish Sultan. A. D. 1037-1063.

**TOHOMES**, The. See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES**: MUSKHOGEAN FAMILY.

**TOHOPEKA**, Battle of (1814). See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1813-1814 (AUGUST—APRIL).

**TOISECH**. See **RI**.

**TOISON D'OR**.—The French name of the "Order of the Golden Fleece." See **GOLDEN FLEECE**.

**TOKELAU ISLANDS**. See **POLYNESIA**.

**TOLBIAC**, Battle of. See **ALEMANNI**: A. D. 496-504; also, **FRANKS**: A. D. 481-511.

**TOLEDO**, Ohio: A. D. 1805-1835.—Site in dispute between Ohio and Michigan. See **MICHIGAN**: A. D. 1837.

**TOLEDO**, Spain: A. D. 531-712.—The capital of the Gothic kingdom in Spain. See **GOTHS (VISIGOTHS)**: A. D. 507-711.

A. D. 712.—Surrender to the Arab-Moors. See **SPAIN**: A. D. 711-713.

A. D. 1083-1085.—Recovery from the Moors.—On the crumbling of the dominions of the Spanish caliphate of Cordova, Toledo became the seat of one of the most vigorous of the petty kingdoms which arose in Moorish Spain. But on the death of its founder, Aben Dylun, and under his incapable son Yahia, the kingdom of Toledo soon sank to such weakness as invited the attacks of the Christian king of Leon, Alfonso VI. After a siege of three years, on the 25th of May, A. D. 1085, the old capital of the Goths was restored to their descendants and successors.—S. A. Dunham, *Hist. of Spain and Portugal*, bk. 3, sect. 1, ch. 1.

A. D. 1520-1522.—Revolt against the government of Charles, the emperor.—Siege and surrender. See **SPAIN**: A. D. 1518-1522.

**TOLEDO**, Councils of. See **GOTHS (VISIGOTHS)**: A. D. 507-711.

**TOLENTINO**, Treaty of (1797). See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1796-1797 (OCTOBER—APRIL).

**TOLERATION**, Religious: A. D. 1631-1661.—Denied in Massachusetts. See **MASSACHUSETTS**: A. D. 1631-1636, to 1656-1661.

A. D. 1636.—Established by Roger Williams in Rhode Island. See **RHODE ISLAND**: A. D. 1638-1647.

A. D. 1648-1665. Practiced in Holland. See **NETHERLANDS**: A. D. 1648-1665.

A. D. 1649.—Enacted in Maryland. See **MARYLAND**: A. D. 1649.

A. D. 1689.—Partial enactment in England. See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1689.

A. D. 1778.—Repeal of Catholic penal laws in England. See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1778-1780.

A. D. 1827-1829.—Removal of disabilities from Dissenters and Emancipation of Catholics in England and Ireland. See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1827-1828; and **IRELAND**: A. D. 1811-1829.

A. D. 1869.—Disestablishment of the Irish Church. See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1868-1870.

A. D. 1871.—Abolition of religious tests in English Universities. See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1871.

**TOLERATION ACT**, The. See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1689 (APRIL—AUGUST).

**TOLOSA**, Battle of Las Navas de (1211 or 1212). See **SPAIN**: A. D. 1146-1232; also, **AL-MOHADES**.

**TOLTECS**, The. See **MEXICO**, ANCIENT.

**TOMI**.—An ancient Greek city on the Euxine, which was Ovid's place of banishment. Its site is occupied by the modern town of Kustendje.

**TONE**, Theobald Wolf, and the United Irishmen. See **IRELAND**: A. D. 1793-1798.

**TONGA**, or Friendly Islands, The.—"According to Mariner, the Tongans did not deserve the name Cook gave them, that of the Friendly Islanders. He says that the chiefs intended to treacherously massacre Cook and his company, but the scheme came to nothing on account of differences among themselves as to how their amiable designs should be carried out. . . . The Tongan Archipelago is composed of at least a hundred islands and islets, comprised between 18° and 20° S. lat., and 174° and 179° W. long. The three principal islands of Tongatabu, Vavau and Eoa, are alone of any extent, which is in their cases from 15 to 20 miles in length. Six others, namely, Late, Tofua, Kao, Namuka, Lefuga, and Haano are from five to seven miles in extent. The rest are much smaller. Many of them are in fact only banks of sand and coral, covered with some tufts of trees. . . . Late Island has a peak about 1800 feet high in the centre of the island, which at one time was a volcano. . . . The Tongans, like the Fijians and Samoans, have had, from time immemorial, a civilisation of their own. They have more moral stamina, energy, and self-reliance than any other existing race in the Pacific. Had they been acquainted formerly with the use of metals, there can be no doubt that they would have subdued all Polynesia. When Captain Cook was in the islands, the



habits of war were little known to the natives; the only quarrels in which they had at that time engaged had been among the inhabitants of the Fijis. They visited that group for the purpose of getting sandalwood, and to join the fighting Fijians for their own ends. From the latter they gained a knowledge of improved spears, and bows, and arrows."—H. Stonehewer Cooper, *Coral Lands*, v. 2, ch. 12.—"In 1835 some Methodist missionaries arrived in New Zealand, whence they sailed to the Friendly or Tonga Islands. There they effected the conversion of the supreme chief of that archipelago. King George of Tonga, following the principle of 'cujus regio, ejus religio,' had his subjects baptised. The British Government recognised his title of king, concluded a treaty of friendship with him in 1879, and established a consulate in his capital. At the instance and under the direction of the missionaries, George I. granted his people a free constitution and parliament, and he was fortunate enough to find a man capable of governing his kingdom, in the Rev. Mr. Baker, one of the missionaries. King George, now [1884] 92 years of age, is still reigning, while Mr. Baker, the missionary and prime minister, is still governing at Tonga; and the archipelago has attained a degree of comparative prosperity and civilisation such as is not found in any other independent group of Oceania."—Baron von Hübnér, *Through the British Empire*, v. 2, pt. 5, ch. 2.—In 1880 the condition of Tonga was described by the English visitor already quoted as being "a very satisfactory one; the soil, it is almost needless to add, is inexhaustibly fertile, and it is also industriously cultivated, and intersected by good roads. Tonga is a succession of gardens, and want, beggary, or squalor are unknown. All the people are clothed, all read and write, all are professed Christians. They still retain a good deal of their old Tongan pride, but are courteous to strangers. . . . On each of the great islands there resides a governor. These are men of intelligence who speak English, dress well, and live in imported houses of the European fashion. The Governor of Vavau in 1874 was named David—all the Tongans take great delight in scriptural, or English names. He was a man of huge stature and majestic presence, and looked very well in a handsome uniform he had made for him in Sydney, at a cost of about £200. A friend of mine told me the following curious account of this personage with whom he stayed. David's house would be regarded in the Australian colonies as a fitting residence for any high official below the rank of a Viceroy. It is constructed of imported materials, all the interior panelled and polished; the furniture of every room being elegant and costly, and imported from New South Wales. In the centre of the building is a large dining hall with stained glass doors at either end, which is only used on state occasions. Here the table is laid with every requisite, fine linen, plate, and cut glass. The cook is a Chinaman, the butler a negro. A better, or more elegantly served dinner one would scarcely expect in Sydney: everything was in profusion, even to champagne and soda-water. This David, like all his colleagues, apes the manners of a British officer. . . . The established religion is Protestant; but toleration of all other creeds is the rule in Tonga, and no oppression of minorities is permitted. . . . The Ton-

gan laws are generally just, and are very strictly enforced. The statutes are printed, and distinctly understood by all the people. There is a strong flavour of Sabbatarianism about some of the edicts, which of course indicates their origin; but it seems to me that it is far better for the Tongans to hold curiously strict notions as to how to conduct themselves on the first day of the week—or, as they would call it, in Jewish parlance, the Sabbath—than to strangle children in sacrifice to heathen deities. The laws of Tonga forbid the sale of land to foreigners, but it is permitted to be leased on such liberal conditions and for so long a term as to be tantamount to an actual sale. All traders, planters, or permanent foreign residents not in the service of the Government, are obliged to take out a license. Spirits and some other articles pay a heavy duty. All the people contribute to the support of the state, the tax being on an adult male about six dollars per annum. All the great islands are traversed by broad roads laid out by a European engineer. They are formed and kept in repair by the labour of convicted criminals."—H. S. Cooper, *Coral Lands*, v. 2. See, also, POLYNESIA.

**TONGALAND.** See AMATONGALAND.

**TONIKAN FAMILY, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TONIKAN FAMILY.

**TONKAWAN FAMILY, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TONKAWAN FAMILY.

**TONKIN.—COCHIN-CHINA.—ANNAM.—CAMBOJA.**—"The whole region which recent events have practically converted into French territory comprises four distinct political divisions: Tonkin in the north; Cochin-China in the centre; Lower Cochin-China and Cambaja in the south. The first two, formerly separate States, have since 1802 constituted a single kingdom, commonly spoken of as the empire of Annam. This term Annam (properly An-nan) appears to be a modified form of Ngannan, that is, 'Southern Peace,' first applied to the frontier river between China and Tonkin, and afterwards extended not only to Tonkin, but to the whole region south of that river after its conquest and pacification by China in the third century of the new era. Hence its convenient application to the same region since the union of Tonkin and Cochin-China under one dynasty and since the transfer of the administration to France in 1883 is but a survival of the Chinese usage, and fully justified on historic grounds. Tonkin (Tongking, Tungking), that is, 'Eastern Capital,' a term originally applied to Ha-noi when that city was the royal residence, has in quite recent times been extended to the whole of the northern kingdom, whose true historic name is Yüeh-nan. Under the native rulers Tonkin was divided into provinces and subdivisions bearing Chinese names, and corresponding to the administrative divisions of the Chinese empire. . . . Since its conquest by Cochin-China the country has been administered in much the same way as the southern kingdom. From this State Tonkin is separated partly by a spur of the coast range projecting seawards, partly by a wall built in the sixteenth century and running in the same direction. After the erection of this artificial barrier, which lies about 18° N. lat., between Hatinh and Dong-koi, the northern and southern kingdoms came to be respectively distinguished by the titles of Dang-ngoai and Dang-trong, that is, 'Outer' and 'Inner Route.' The term Cochin-

China, by which the Inner Route is best known, has no more to do with China than it has with the Indian city of Cochin. It appears to be a modified form of Kwe-Chen-Ching, that is, the 'Kingdom of Chen-Ching,' the name by which this region was first known in the 9th century of the new era, from its capital Chen-Ching. Another although less probable derivation is from the Chinese Co-Chen-Ching, meaning 'Old Champa,' a reminiscence of the time when the Cham (Tsiam) nation was the most powerful in the peninsula. . . . Before the arrival of the French, Cochin-China comprised the whole of the coast lands from Tonkin nearly to the foot of the Pursat hills in South Camboja. . . . From the remotest times China claimed, and intermittently exercised, suzerain authority over Annam, whose energies have for ages been wasted partly in vain efforts to resist this claim, partly in still more disastrous warfare between the two rival States. Almost the first distinctly historic event was the reduction of Lu-liang, as Tonkin was then called, by the Chinese in 218 B. C., when the country was divided into prefectures, and a civil and military organisation established on the Chinese model. . . . Early in the ninth century of the new era the term Kwe-Chen-Ching (Cochin-China) began to be applied to the southern, which had already asserted its independence of the northern, kingdom. In 1428 the two States freed themselves temporarily from the Chinese protectorate, and 200 years later the Annamese reduced all that remained of the Champa territory, driving the natives to the uplands, and settling in the plains. This conquest was followed about 1750 by that of the southern or maritime provinces of Camboja since known as Lower (now French) Cochin-China. In 1775 the King of Cochin-China, who had usurped the throne in 1774, reduced Tonkin, and was acknowledged sovereign of Annam by the Chinese emperor. But in 1798 Gia-long, son of the deposed monarch, recovers the throne with the aid of some French auxiliaries, and in 1802 reconstitutes the Annamese empire under the Cochinchinese sceptre. From this time the relations with France become more frequent. . . . After his death in 1820 the anti-European national party acquires the ascendant, the French officers are dismissed, and the Roman Catholic religion, which had made rapid progress during the reign of Gia-long, is subjected to cruel and systematic persecution. Notwithstanding the protests and occasional intervention of France, this policy is persevered in, until the execution of Bishop Diaz in 1857 by order of Tu-Duc, third in succession from Gia-long, calls for more active interference. Admiral Rigault de Genouilly captures Tourane in 1858, followed next year by the rout of the Annamese army at the same place, and the occupation of the forts at the entrance of the Donnai and of Gia-diñh (Saigon), capital of Lower Cochin-China. This virtually established French supremacy, which was sealed by the treaty of 1862, ceding the three best, and that of 1867 the three remaining, provinces of Lower Cochin-China. It was further strengthened and extended by the treaty of 1863, securing the protectorate of Camboja and the important strategical position of 'Quatre-Bras' on the Mekhong. Then came the scientific expedition of Mekhong (1866-68), which dissipated the hopes entertained of that river giving access to the trade of South-

ern China. Attention was accordingly now attracted to the Song-koi basin, and the establishment of French interests in Tonkin secured by the treaties of peace and commerce concluded with the Annamese Government in 1874. This prepared the way for the recent diplomatic complications with Annam and China, followed by the military operations in Cochin-China and Tonkin [see FRANCE: A. D. 1875-1889], which led up to the treaties of 1883 and 1884, extending the French protectorate to the whole of Annam, and forbidding the Annamese Government all diplomatic relations with foreign powers, China included, except through the intermediary of France. Lastly, the appointment in 1886 of a French Resident General, with full administrative powers, effaced the last vestige of national autonomy, and virtually reduced the ancient kingdoms of Tonkin and Cochin-China to the position of an outlying French possession."—A. H. Keane, *Eastern Geography*, pp. 98-104.—“In the south-eastern extremity of Cochin-China, and in Camboja, still survive the scattered fragments of the historical Tsiam (Cham, Khiam) race, who appear to have been at one time the most powerful nation in Farther India. According to Gagelin, they ruled over the whole region between the Menam and the Gulf of Tongking. . . . Like the Tsiams, the Cambojans, or Khmers, are a race sprung from illustrious ancestry, but at present reduced to about 1,500,000, partly in the south-eastern provinces of Siam, partly forming a petty state under French protection, which is limited east and west by the Mekong and Gulf of Siam, north and south by the Great Lake and French Cochin-China. During the period of its prosperity the Cambojan empire overshadowed a great part of Indo-China, and maintained regular intercourse with Cis-gangetic India on the one hand, and on the other with the Island of Java. The centre of its power lay on the northern shores of the Great Lake, where the names of its great cities, the architecture and sculptures of its ruined temples, attest the successive influences of Brahmanism and Buddhism on the local culture. A native legend, based possibly on historic data, relates how a Hindu prince migrated with ten millions of his subjects, some twenty-three centuries ago, from Indraspathi (Delhi) to Camboja, while the present dynasty claims descent from a Benares family. But still more active relations seem to have been maintained with Lanka (Ceylon), which island has acquired almost a sacred character in the eyes of the Cambojans. The term Camboja itself (Kampushea, Kamp'osha) has by some writers been wrongly identified with the Camboja of Sanskrit geography. It simply means the 'land of the Kammen,' or 'Khmer.' Although some years under the French protectorate, the political institutions of the Cambojan state have undergone little change. The king, who still enjoys absolute power over the life and property of his subjects, chooses his own mandarins, and these magistrates dispense justice in favour of the highest bidders. Trade is a royal monopoly, sold mostly to energetic Chinese contractors; and slavery has not yet been abolished, although the severity of the system has been somewhat mitigated since 1877. Ordinary slaves now receive a daily pittance, which may help to purchase their freedom. . . . On the eastern slopes, and in the lower Mekong basin,



the dominant race are the Giao-shi (Giao-kii) or Annamese, who are of doubtful origin, but resemble the Chinese more than any other people of Farther India. Affiliated by some to the Malays, by others to the Chinese, Otto Kunze regards them as akin to the Japanese. According to the local traditions and records they have gradually spread along the coast from Tongking southwards to the extremity of the Peninsula. After driving the Tsiamis into the interior, they penetrated about 1650 to the Lower Mekong, which region formerly belonged to Camboja, but is now properly called French Cochinchina. Here the Annamese, having driven out or exterminated most of the Cambojans, have long formed the great majority of the population."—E. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants: Asia*, v. 3, ch. 22.

**TONNAGE AND POUNDAGE.** See TUNNAGE AND POUNDAGE; also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1629.

**TONQUIN.** See TONKIN.

**TONTONTÉAC.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PUEBLOS.

**TONTOS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: APACHE GROUP.

**TOPASSES, The.** See INDIA: A. D. 1600–1702.

**TOPEKA CONSTITUTION, The.** See KANSAS: A. D. 1854–1859.

**TOQUIS.** See CHILE: THE ARAUCANIANS.

**TORBAY, Landing of William of Orange at.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1688 (JULY—NOVEMBER).

**TORDESILLAS, Treaty of.** See AMERICA: A. D. 1494.

**TORGAU: A. D. 1525.—Protestant League.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1525–1529.

**A. D. 1645.—Yielded to the Swedes.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1640–1645.

**A. D. 1760.—Victory of Frederick the Great.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1760.

**A. D. 1813.—Siege and capture by the Allies.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

**TORIES, English: Origin of the Party and the Name.** See RAPPAREES; ENGLAND: A. D. 1680; and CONSERVATIVE PARTY.

Of the American Revolution, and their exile.—“Before the Revolution the parties in the colonies were practically identical with the Whigs and Tories of the mother country, the Whigs or anti-prerogative men supporting ever the cause of the people against arbitrary or illegal acts of the governor or the council. In the early days of the Revolution the ultra Tories were gradually driven into the ranks of the enemy, until for a time it might be said that all revolutionary America had become Whig; the name Tory, however, was still applied to those who, though opposed to the usurpations of George III., were averse to a final separation from England.”—G. Pellet, *John Jay*, p. 269.—“The terms Tories, Loyalists, Refugees, are burdened with a piteous record of wrongs and sufferings. It has not been found easy or satisfactory for even the most candid historian to leave the facts and arguments of the conflict impartially adjusted. Insult, confiscation of property, and exile were the penalties of those who bore these titles. . . . Remembering that the most bitter

words of Washington that have come to us are those which express his scorn of Tories, we must at least look to find some plausible, if not justifying, ground for the patriot party. Among those most frank and fearless in the avowal of loyalty, and who suffered the severest penalties, were men of the noblest character and of the highest position. So, also, bearing the same odious title, were men of the most despicable nature, self-seeking and unprincipled, ready for any act of evil. And between these were men of every grade of respectability and of every shade of moral meanness. . . . As a general rule, the Tories were content with an unarmed resistance, where they were not reinforced by the resources or forces of the enemy. But in successive places in possession of the British armies, in Boston, Long Island, New York, the Jerseys, Philadelphia, and in the Southern provinces, there rallied around them Tories both seeking protection, and ready to perform all kinds of military duty as allies. By all the estimates, probably below the mark, there were during the war at least 25,000 organized loyalist forces. . . . When the day of reckoning came at the close of the war, it needed no spirit of prophecy to tell how these Tories, armed or unarmed, would fare, and we have not to go outside the familiar field of human nature for an explanation. That it was not till six months after the ratification of the treaty by Congress that Sir Guy Carleton removed the British army from New York—the delay being caused by his embarrassment from the crowds of loyalists seeking his protection—is a reminder to us of their forlorn condition. . . . From all over the seaboard of the continent refugees made their way to New York in crowds. . . . They threw themselves in despair upon the protection of the British commander. . . . He pleaded his encumbrances of this character in answer to the censures upon him for delaying his departure, and he vainly hoped that Congress would devise some measures of leniency to relieve him. It is difficult to estimate with any approach to exactness the number of these hounded victims. Many hundreds of them had been seeking refuge in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick since the autumn of 1782, and additional parties, in increasing number, followed to the same provinces. An historian [Murdoch, “Hist. of Nova Scotia”] sets the whole number at the close of 1783 at 25,000. Large numbers of the loyalists of the Southern provinces were shipped to the Bahamas and to the West India Islands. At one time Carleton had upon his hands over 12,000 Tories clamorous for transportation. . . . A celebration of the centennial of the settlement of Upper Canada by these exiles took place in 1884. At a meeting of the royal governor, Lord Dorchester, and the council, in Quebec, in November, 1789, in connection with the disposal of still unappropriated crown lands in the province, order was taken for the making and preserving of a registry of the names of all persons, with those of their sons and daughters, ‘who had adhered to the unity of the empire, and joined the royal standard in America before the treaty of separation in the year 1783.’ The official list contains the names of several thousands. It was by their descendants and representatives that the centennial occasion referred to was observed. . . . Some bands passed to Canada by Whitehall, Lake Champlain, Ticonderoga, and Plattsburg, then south-

ward to Cornwall, ascending the St. Lawrence, and settling on the north bank. Others went from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia up the St. Lawrence to Sorel, where they wintered, going afterwards to Kingston. Most of the exiles ascended the Hudson to Albany, then by the Mohawk and Wood Creek to Oneida and Ontario lakes. . . . As these exiles had stood for the unity of the empire, they took the name of the 'United Empire Loyalists'" (a name which is often abbreviated in common use to U. E. Loyalists).—G. E. Ellis, *The Loyalists and their Fortunes* (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., v. 7, pp. 185-214).—"Some 10,000 refugees had, in 1784, and the few years following, found homes in Western Canada, just as it is estimated . . . that 20,000 had settled in the provinces by the sea. Assuming full responsibility for the care and present support of her devoted adherents, Great Britain opened her hand cheerfully to assist them. . . . The sum paid by the British Government to the suffering refugees was about \$15,000,000."—G. Bryce, *Short Hist. of the Canadian People*, ch. 7, sect. 2.

Also in: E. Ryerson, *The Loyalists of Am. and their Times*.—L. Sabine, *Biog. Sketches of the Loyalists of Am.*

**TORNOSA, Battle of.** See SPAIN: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER).

**TORO, Battle of (1476).** See SPAIN: A. D. 1368-1479.

**TOROMONOS, The.** See BOLIVIA: ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.

**TORONTO: A. D. 1749.**—The hospitable origin of the city.—"The Northern Indians were flocking with their beaver-skins to the English of Oswego; and in April, 1749, an officer named Portneuf had been sent with soldiers and workmen to build a stockaded trading-house at Toronto, in order to intercept them,—not by force, which would have been ruinous to French interests, but by a tempting supply of goods and brandy. Thus the fort was kept well stocked, and with excellent effect."—F. Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, ch. 3 (v. 1).

**A. D. 1813.**—Taken and burned by the Americans. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1813 (APRIL—JULY).

**A. D. 1837.**—The Mackenzie rising.—Defeat of the rebels. See CANADA: A. D. 1837-1838.

**TORQUEMADA.** See INQUISITION.

**TORQUES.**—"The Latin word torques has been applied in a very extended sense to the various necklaces or collars for the neck, found in Britain, and other countries inhabited by the Celtic tribes. This word has been supposed to be derived from the Welsh or Irish 'torc,' which has the same signification, but the converse is equally plausible, that this was derived from the Latin."—S. Birch, *Archaeological Journal*, v. 2.

**TORRES VEDRAS, The Lines of.** See SPAIN: A. D. 1809-1810 (OCTOBER—SEPTEMBER), and 1810-1812.

**TORTONA: A. D. 1155.**—Destruction by Frederick Barbarossa. See ITALY: A. D. 1154-1162.

**TORTOSA: A. D. 1640.**—Spanish capture and sack. See SPAIN: A. D. 1640-1642.

**TORTUGAS: The Rendezvous of the Buccaneers.** See AMERICA: A. D. 1639-1700.

**TORTURE.** See LAW, CRIMINAL: A. D. 1708.

**TORY.** See TORIES.

**TOTEMS.**—"A peculiar social institution exists among the [North American] Indians, very curious in its character; and though I am not prepared to say that it may be traced through all the tribes east of the Mississippi, yet its prevalence is so general, and its influence on political relations so important, as to claim especial attention. Indian communities, independent of their local distribution into tribes, bands, and villages, are composed of several distinct clans. Each clan has its emblem, consisting of the figure of some bird, beast, or reptile; and each is distinguished by the name of the animal which it thus bears as its device; as, for example, the clan of the Wolf, the Deer, the Otter, or the Hawk. In the language of the Algonquins, these emblems are known by the name of 'Totems.' The members of the same clan, being connected, or supposed to be so, by ties of kindred more or less remote, are prohibited from intermarriage. Thus Wolf cannot marry Wolf; but he may, if he chooses, take a wife from the clan of Hawks, or any other clan but his own. It follows that when this prohibition is rigidly observed, no single clan can live apart from the rest; but the whole must be mingled together, and in every family the husband and wife must be of different clans. To different totems attach different degrees of rank and dignity; and those of the Bear, the Tortoise, and the Wolf are among the first in honor. Each man is proud of his badge, jealously asserting its claims to respect; and the members of the same clan, though they may, perhaps, speak different dialects, and dwell far asunder, are yet bound together by the closest ties of fraternity. If a man is killed, every member of the clan feels called upon to avenge him; and the wayfarer, the hunter, or the warrior is sure of a cordial welcome in the distant lodge of the clansman whose face perhaps he has never seen. It may be added that certain privileges, highly prized as hereditary rights, sometimes reside in particular clans; such as that of furnishing a sachem to the tribe, or of performing certain religious ceremonies or magic rites."—F. Parkman, *Conspiracy of Pontiac*, ch. 1.—"A totem is a class of material objects which a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that there exists between him and every member of the class an intimate and altogether special relation. The name is derived from an Ojibway (Chippeway) word 'totem,' the correct spelling of which is somewhat uncertain. It was first introduced into literature, so far as appears, by J. Long, an Indian interpreter of last century, who spelt it 'totam.' . . . The connexion between a man and his totem is mutually beneficent; the totem protects the man, and the man shows his respect for the totem in various ways, by not killing it if it be an animal, and not cutting or gathering it if it be a plant. As distinguished from a fetish, a totem is never an isolated individual, but always a class of objects, generally a species of animals or of plants, more rarely a class of inanimate natural objects, very rarely a class of artificial objects. Considered in relation to men, totems are of at least three kinds:—(1) the clan totem, common to a whole clan, and passing by inheritance from generation to generation; (2) the sex totem, common either to all the males or to all



the females of a tribe, to the exclusion in either case of the other sex; (3) the individual totem, belonging to a single individual and not passing to his descendants."—J. G. Frazer, *Totemism*, pp. 1-2.

ALSO IN: L. H. Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, ch. 4.—The same, *Ancient Society*, pt. 2.—L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, app. B.—W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, ch. 7.

**TOTILA, King of the Ostrogoths.** See **ROME**: A. D. 535-553.

**TOTONACOS, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES**: **TOTONACOS**.

**TOUL**: A. D. 1552-1559.—**Possession acquired by France.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1547-1559.

A. D. 1648.—**Ceded to France in the Peace of Westphalia.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1648.

**TOULON**: A. D. 1793-1794.—**Revolt against the Revolutionary Government at Paris.**—English aid called in.—**Siege, capture and frightful vengeance by the Terrorists.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1793 (JULY—DECEMBER); and 1793-1794 (OCTOBER—APRIL).

**TOULOUSE**: B. C. 106.—**Acquisition by the Romans.**—Tolosa, modern Toulouse, was the chief town of the Volcæ Tectosages (see **VOLCÆ, THE**), a Gallic tribe which occupied the upper basin of the Garonne, between the western prolongation of the Cévennes and the eastern Pyrenees. Some time before 106 B. C. the Romans had formed an alliance with the Tectosages which enabled them to place a garrison in Tolosa; but the people had tired of the arrangement, had risen against the garrison and had put the soldiers in chains. On that provocation, Q. Servilius Cæpio, one of the consuls of the year 106, advanced upon the town, found traitors to admit him within its gates, and sacked it as a Roman general knew how to do. He found a great treasure of gold in Tolosa, the origin of which has been the subject of much dispute. The treasure was sent off under escort to Massilia, but disappeared on the way, its escort being attacked and slain. Consul Cæpio was accused of the robbery; there was a great scandal and prosecution at Rome, and "Aurum Tolosanum"—"the gold of Toulouse"—became a proverbial expression, applied to ill-gotten wealth.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 2, ch. 1.

A. D. 410-509.—**The Gothic kingdom.** See **GOTHS (VISIGOTHS)**: A. D. 410-419, and after.

A. D. 721.—**Repulse of the Moslems.** See **MAHOMETAN CONQUEST**: A. D. 715-732.

A. D. 781.—**Made a county of Aquitaine.** See **AQUITAINE**: A. D. 781.

10-11th Centuries.—**The rise of the Counts.**—The counts of Toulouse "represented an earlier line of dukes of Aquitaine, successors of the dukes of Gothia or Septimania, under whom the capital of southern Gaul had been not Poitiers but Toulouse, Poitou itself counting as a mere underfief. In the latter half of the tenth century these dukes of Gothia or Aquitania Prima, as the Latin chroniclers sometimes called them from the Old Roman name of their country, had seen their ducal title transferred to the Poitevin lords of Aquitania Secunda—the dukes of Aquitaine with whom we have had to deal.

But the Poitevin overlordship was never fully acknowledged by the house of Toulouse; and this latter in the course of the following century again rose to great importance and distinction, which reached its height in the person of Count Raymond IV., better known as Raymond of St. Gilles, from the name of the little county which had been his earliest possession. From that small centre his rule gradually spread over the whole territory of the ancient dukes of Septimania. In the year of the Norman conquest of England [1066] Rouergue, which was held by a younger branch of the house of Toulouse, lapsed to the elder line; in [1088] the year after the Conqueror's death Raymond came into possession of Toulouse itself; in 1094 he became, in right of his wife, owner of half the Burgundian county of Provence. His territorial influence was doubled by that of his personal fame; he was one of the chief heroes of the first Crusade; and when he died in 1105 he left to his son Bertrand, over and above his Aquitanian heritage, the Syrian county of Tripoli. On Bertrand's death in 1112 these possessions were divided, his son Pontius succeeding him as count of Tripoli, and surrendering his claims upon Toulouse to his uncle Alfonso Jordan, a younger son of Raymond of St. Gilles. Those claims, however, were disputed. Raymond's elder brother, Count William IV., had left an only daughter who, after a childless marriage with King Sancho Ramirez of Aragon, became the wife of Count William VIII. of Poitou. From that time forth it became a moot point whether the lord of St. Gilles or the lord of Poitiers was the rightful count of Toulouse. . . . With all these shiftings and changes of ownership the kings of France had never tried to interfere. Southern Gaul—'Aquitaine' in the wider sense—was a land whose internal concerns they found it wise to leave as far as possible untouched."—K. Norgate, *England under the Angevin Kings*, v. 1, ch. 10.—See, also, **BURGUNDY**: A. D. 1032.

12th Century.—**The joyous court.** See **PROVENCE**: A. D. 1179-1207.

A. D. 1209.—**The beginning of the Albigensian Crusades.** See **ALBIGENSES**: A. D. 1209.

A. D. 1213.—**Conquest by Simon de Montfort and his crusaders.** See **ALBIGENSES**: A. D. 1210-1213.

A. D. 1229-1271.—**End of the reign of the Counts.** See **ALBIGENSES**: A. D. 1217-1229.

A. D. 1814.—**The last battle of the Peninsular War.**—**Occupation of the city by the English.** See **SPAIN**: A. D. 1812-1814.

**TOURCOIGN, Battle of.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1794 (MARCH—JULY).

**TOURNAY**: A. D. 1513.—**Capture by the English.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1513-1515.

A. D. 1581.—**Siege and capture by the Spaniards.** See **NETHERLANDS**: A. D. 1581-1584.

A. D. 1583.—**Submission to Spain.** See **NETHERLANDS**: A. D. 1584-1585.

A. D. 1667.—**Taken by the French.** See **NETHERLANDS (THE SPANISH PROVINCES)**: A. D. 1667.

A. D. 1668.—**Ceded to France.** See **NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND)**: A. D. 1668.

A. D. 1709.—**Siege and reduction by Marlborough and Prince Eugene.** See **NETHERLANDS**: A. D. 1708-1709.

**A. D. 1713.**—Ceded to Holland. See **UTRECHT**: A. D. 1712-1714; and **NETHERLANDS** (**HOLLAND**): A. D. 1713-1715.

**A. D. 1745-1748.**—Siege. — **Battle of Fontenoy** and surrender to the French.—**Restoration at the Peace.** See **NETHERLANDS** (**AUSTRIAN PROVINCES**): A. D. 1745; and **AIX-LA-CHAPELLE**, **THE CONGRESS**.

**A. D. 1794.**—**Battles near the city.**—**Surrender to the French.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1794 (**MARCH—JULY**).

#### TOURNEY.—TOURNAMENT.—JOUST.

—"The word tourney, sometimes tournament, and in Latin 'torneamentum,' clearly indicates both the French origin of these games and the principal end of that exercise, the art of manœuvring, of turning ('tournoyer') his horse skillfully, to strike his adversary and shield himself at the same time from his blows. The combats, especially those of the nobility, were always fought on horseback, with the lance and sharp sword; the knight presented himself, clothed in armour which covered his whole body, and which, while it preserved him from wounds, bent to every movement and retarded those of his war horse. It was important, therefore, that constant exercise should accustom the knight's limbs to the enormous weight which he must carry, and the horse to the agility which was expected of him. In a 'passage' or 'pass of arms' ('passage' or 'pas d'armes') the generic name of all those games, this exercise was composed of two parts: the joust, which was a single combat of knight against knight, both clothed in all their arms, and the tourney, which was the image of a general battle, or the encounter and evolutions of two troops of cavalry equal in number."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *France under the Feudal System* (*Tr. by W. Bellingham*), ch. 8.

**TOURS**: A. D. 732.—**Defeat of the Moors** by **Charles Martel**. See **MAHOMETAN CONQUEST**: A. D. 715-732; also, **FRANKS**: A. D. 511-752.

**A. D. 1870.**—**Seat of a part of the provisional Government of National Defense.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1870 (**SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER**).

**TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE**, **The career of.** See **HAYTI**: A. D. 1832-1803.

**TOWER AND SWORD**, **The Order of the.**—This was an order of knighthood founded in Portugal by **Alfonso V.**, who reigned from 1438 to 1481. "The institution of the order related to a sword reputed to be carefully guarded in a tower of the city of Fez: respecting it there was a prophecy that it must one day come into the possession of a Christian king; in other words, that the Mohammedan empire of north-western Africa would be subverted by the Christians. Alfonso seemed to believe that he was the destined conqueror."—S. A. Dunham, *Hist. of Spain and Portugal*, v. 3, p. 225 (*Am. ed.*).

**TOWER OF LONDON**, **The.**—"Built originally by the Conqueror to curb London, afterwards the fortress-palace of his descendants, and in the end the State prison, from which a long procession of the ill-starred great went forth to lay their heads on the block on Tower Hill; while State murders, like those of Henry VI. and the two young sons of Edward IV., were done in the dark chambers of the Tower itself."—Gold-

win Smith, *A Trip to England*, p. 56.—"Even as to length of days, the Tower has no rival among palaces and prisons. . . . Old writers date it from the days of Caesar; a legend taken up by Shakspeare and the poets in favour of which the name of Caesar's Tower remains in popular use to this very day. A Roman wall can even yet be traced near some parts of the ditch. The Tower is mentioned in the Saxon Chronicle, in a way not incompatible with the fact of a Saxon stronghold having stood upon the spot. The buildings as we have them now in block and plan were commenced by William the Conqueror; and the series of apartments in Caesar's Tower [the great Norman keep now called the White Tower]—hall, gallery, council chamber, chapel—were built in the early Norman reigns and used as a royal residence by all our Norman kings."—W. H. Dixon, *Her Majesty's Tower*, ch. 1.—"We are informed by the 'Textus Roffensis' that the present Great or White Tower was constructed by Gundulph, Bishop of Rochester, under the direction of King William I., who was suspicious of the fidelity of the citizens. The date assigned by Stow is 1078."—J. Britton and E. W. Brayley, *Memoirs of the Tower of London*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: Lord de Ros, *Memorials of the Tower*.

**TOWN.**—"Burh, burgh, borough, in its various spellings and various shades of meaning, is our native word for urbes of every kind from Rome downward. It is curious that this word should in ordinary speech have been so largely displaced by the vaguer word tun, town, which means an enclosure of any kind, and in some English dialects is still applied to a single house and its surroundings."—E. A. Freeman, *City and Borough* (*Macmillan's Mag.*, May, 1889).—See, also, **TOWNSHIP**; **BOROUGH**; **GUILDS**; and **COMMUNE**.

**TOWNSHEND MEASURES**, **The.** See **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**: A. D. 1766-1767.

**TOWNSHIP.**—"In recent historical writing dealing with Anglo-Saxon conditions, a great place has been occupied by the 'township.' The example was set sixty years ago by Palgrave; but it does not seem to have been generally followed until in 1874 Dr. Stubbs gave the word a prominent place in his 'Constitutional History.' With Dr. Stubbs the 'township' was 'the unit of the constitutional machinery or local administration'; and since then most writers on constitutional and legal history have followed in the same direction. . . . The language commonly used in this connection need not, perhaps, necessarily be understood as meaning that the phenomenon which the writers have in mind was actually known to the Saxons themselves as a 'township' ('tunscepe'). It may be said that 'township' is merely a modern name which it is convenient to apply to it. Yet, certainly, that language usually suggests that it was under that name that the Saxons knew it. . . . It is therefore of some interest, at least for historical terminology,—and possibly for other and more important reasons,—to point out that there is no good foundation in Anglo-Saxon sources for such a use of the term; that 'tunscepe' in the few places where it does appear does not mean an area of land, an extent of territory, or even the material houses and crofts of a village; that it is probably nothing more than a loose general term



for 'the villagers.' . . . Only three passages in Anglo-Saxon literature have as yet been found in which the word 'tunscepe' appears,—the Saxon translation of Bede's 'Ecclesiastical History,' v. 10, the laws of Edgar, iv. 8, and the 'Saxon Chronicle,' s. a. 1137. . . . The later history of the word 'township' would probably repay investigation. It is certainly not a common word in literature until comparatively recent times; and, where it does appear, its old meaning seems often to cling to it. . . . There is a good deal to make one believe that 'town' [see, above, *Town*] continued to be the common popular term for what we may describe in general language as a rural centre of population even into the 18th century. . . . The far more general use of the word 'town' than of 'township' in early New England is most naturally explained by supposing that it was the word ordinarily employed in England at the time of the migration,—at any rate, in East Anglia. . . . It might very naturally be said that the effect of the foregoing argument is no more than to replace 'township' by town, and that such a change is immaterial,—that it is a difference between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee. I cannot help thinking, however, that the adoption of a more correct terminology will be of scientific advantage; and for this reason. So long as we speak of the Anglo-Saxon 'township' we can hardly help attaching to the word somewhat of the meaning which it has borne since the sixteenth century. We think of it as an area inhabited by freemen with an administrative machinery in the hands of an assembly of those inhabitants and of officers chosen by them. We start, therefore, with a sort of unconscious presumption that the 'township' was what we call 'free.' . . . Now, it is this question as to the position of the body of the population in the earliest Anglo-Saxon times that is just now at issue; and no student would say that at present the question is settled."—W. J. Ashley, *The Anglo-Saxon "Township"* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, April, 1894).

**TOWNSHIP AND TOWN-MEETING, The New England.**—"When people from England first came to dwell in the wilderness of Massachusetts Bay, they settled in groups upon small irregular-shaped patches of land, which soon came to be known as townships. . . . This migration . . . was a movement, not of individuals or of separate families, but of church-congregations, and it continued to be so as the settlers made their way inland and westward. . . . A township would consist of about as many farms as could be disposed within convenient distance from the meeting-house, where all the inhabitants, young and old, gathered every Sunday, coming on horseback or afoot. The meeting-house was thus centrally situated, and near it was the town pasture or 'common,' with the school-house and the block-house, or rude fortress for defence against the Indians. . . . Around the meeting-house and common the dwellings gradually clustered into a village, and after a while the tavern, store, and town-house made their appearance. . . . Under these circumstances they developed a kind of government which we may describe in the present tense, for its methods are pretty much the same to-day that they were two centuries ago. In a New England township the people directly govern themselves; the government is the people, or, to

speak with entire precision, it is all the male inhabitants of one-and-twenty years of age and upwards. The people tax themselves. Once each year, usually in March but sometimes as early as February or as late as April, a 'town-meeting' is held, at which all the grown men of the township are expected to be present and to vote, while any one may introduce motions or take part in the discussion. . . . The town-meeting is held in the town-house, but at first it used to be held in the church, which was thus a 'meeting-house' for civil as well as ecclesiastical purposes. At the town-meeting measures relating to the administration of town affairs are discussed and adopted or rejected; appropriations are made for the public expenses of the town, or in other words the amount of the town taxes for the year is determined; and town officers are elected for the year. . . . The principal executive magistrates of the town are the selectmen. They are three, five, seven, or nine in number. . . . It [the town] was simply the English parish government brought into a new country and adapted to the new situation. Part of this new situation consisted in the fact that the lords of the manor were left behind. There was no longer any occasion to distinguish between the township as a manor and the township as a parish; and so, as the three names had all lived on together, side by side, in England, it was now the oldest and most generally descriptive name, 'township,' that survived, and has come into use throughout a great part of the United States. . . . New York had from the very beginning the rudiments of an excellent system of local self-government. The Dutch villages had their assemblies, which under the English rule were developed into town-meetings, though with less ample powers than those of New England. . . . The New York system is of especial interest, because it has powerfully influenced the development of local institutions throughout the Northwest."—J. Fiske, *Civil Government in the U. S.*, ch. 2 and 4.—"The name town first occurs in the record of the second colonial meeting of the Court of Assistants [Massachusetts Bay, Sept. 7, 1630], in connection with the naming of Boston, Charlestown and Watertown. . . . A rude pattern of a frame of town government was shaped by Dorchester, when, in place of the earlier practice of transacting business at meetings of the whole body of its freemen (the grants of land being certified by a committee consisting of the clergymen and deacons), it designated certain inhabitants, twelve in number, to meet weekly, and consult and determine upon public affairs,—without any authority, however, beyond other inhabitants who should choose to come and take part in their consultations and votes. About the same time, at Watertown, it was 'agreed by the consent of the freemen, that there should be three persons chosen for the ordering of the civil affairs.' In the fourth year from the settlement of Boston, at which time the earliest extant records were made, three persons were chosen 'to make up the ten to manage the affairs of the town.' The system of delegated town action was there perhaps the same which was defined in an 'Order made by the inhabitants of Charlestown, at a full meeting [Feb. 10, 1635], for the government of the town by Selectmen,'—the name presently extended throughout New England to the municipal governors. . . . The towns have

been, on the one hand, separate governments, and, on the other, the separate constituents of a common government. In Massachusetts, for two centuries and a quarter, the Deputies in the General Court—or Representatives, as they have been named under the State Constitution—continued to represent the municipal corporations. In New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut and Rhode Island, that basis of representation still subsists.”—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New Eng.*, v. 1, ch. 9.—“Boston . . . is the largest community that ever maintained the town organization, probably the most generally able and intelligent. No other town ever played so conspicuous a part in connection with important events. It led Massachusetts, New England, the thirteen colonies, in the struggle for independence. Probably in the whole history of the Anglo-Saxon race, there has been no other so interesting manifestation of the activity of the Folk-mote. Of this town of towns, Samuel Adams was the son of sons. . . . One may almost call him the creature of the town-meeting.”—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams, the Man of the Town-Meeting* (Johns Hopkins University Studies, series 2, no. 4).

ALSO IN: E. Channing, *Town and County Gov't in the Eng. Colonies* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, series 2, no. 10).—See, also, NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1640-1644; and SELECTMEN.

**TOWTON, Battle of** (A. D. 1461).—On Palm Sunday, March 29, 1461, two armies of Englishmen met on a “goodly plain,” ten miles from the city of York, between the villages of Towton and Saxton, to fight out the contention of the parties of the “two roses,”—of Lancaster and York. The battle they fought is called the

bloodiest that ever dyed English soil. It raged through an afternoon and a night until the following day, and the slain of the two sides has been variously reckoned by different historians at 20,000 to 38,000. No quarter was given by the victorious partisans of Edward IV. and the Lancastrians were utterly crushed. Henry VI. fled to Scotland and Queen Margaret repaired to France.—See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.—C. Ransome, *Battle of Towton* (*English Historical Rev.*, July, 1889).

**TOXANDRIA.**—After Julian's successful campaigns against the Franks, A. D. 358, the latter were permitted to remain, as subjects of the Roman Empire, in “an extensive district of Brabant, which was then known by the appellation of Toxandria, and may deserve to be considered as the original seat of their Gallic monarchy. . . . This name seems to be derived from the ‘Toxandri’ of Pliny, and very frequently occurs in the histories of the middle age. Toxandria was a country of woods and morasses, which extended from the neighbourhood of Tongres to the conflux of the Vahal and the Rhine.”—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 19, with foot-note.—See, also, GAUL: A. D. 355-361.

**TOXARCHI, The.**—The commanders of the Athenian archers and of the city-watch (known as Scythians) were so called.—A. Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, bk. 2, ch. 11.

**TRACHIS.—TRACHINIA.** See GREECE: B. C. 480 (THERMOPYLÆ).

**TRACTARIAN MOVEMENT.—TRACTS FOR THE TIMES.—TRACT NINETY.** See OXFORD OR TRACTARIAN MOVEMENT.

## TRADE.

### Ancient.

**The Earliest Records of Trade.**—Probably the oldest commercial record that exists was found sculptured on the rocks in the valley of Hammamat, east from Koptos on the Nile. It relates to an expedition sent out by the Pharaoh Sankh-ka-ra, to trade in the “land of Punt.” Dr. Brugsch fixes the reign of Sankh-ka-ra at about 2500 B. C. The “land of Punt” he considers to have been the Somali coast of Africa, south of the extremity of the Red Sea, on the Gulf of Aden. Other writers maintain that it was southern Arabia. It was the “Holy Land” of the Egyptians, from which their gods were supposed to have anciently come. The trading expedition of Sankh-ka-ra was commanded by one Hannu (a name which has a Phœnician sound). Some seven or eight centuries after Hannu's voyage to Punt was made, we obtain in the Bible a most interesting glimpse of the trade then going on between Egypt and surrounding countries. It is found in the story of Joseph. When Joseph's brethren threw him into a pit, intending that he should be left there to die, their plans were changed by seeing a “Company of Ishmaelites from Gilead with their camels bearing spicery and balm and myrrh, going to carry it down to Egypt.” Then Judah said, “let us sell him to the Ishmaelites.” Now this story is found to agree well with other facts which go to show that some, at least, among the ancient tribes in northern Arabia—the Ishmaelites of the Bible—were great traders between the richer countries

that surrounded them. By the poverty of their country, by their wandering disposition, by their possession of the camel, and by their geographical situation, these Arabs of the olden time must have naturally been made a trading people. With their caravans of camels they traveled back and forth, very busily, no doubt, through the desert, which needed no building of bridges or making of roads. In one direction they carried the barley, wheat, millet, flax and woven goods of Egypt; in another, the honey, wine, wax, wool, skins, gums, resins and asphalt of Canaan and Syria; in still another the more costly freight of gold ornaments, precious stones, pearls, ivory, ebony, spices and fragrant gums from the south. In all directions, it is probable, they dragged poor unfortunates like Joseph, whom they bought or kidnapped to sell as slaves.

**Babylonia.**—“The industry of the Babylonians quickly attained great skill and wide development. They were famous for their weaving in wool and linen. . . . Their pottery was excellent and the manufacture active; the preparation of glass was not unknown; the ointments prepared in Babylon were famous and much sought after, and the stones cut there were highly valued. The products of Babylonian skill and industry were first brought to their kinsmen in Syria, who could offer oil and wine in exchange. In the Hebrew scriptures we find Babylonian cloaks in use in Syria before the immigration of the Hebrews into Canaan. . . . The rough material required by Babylonian industry was supplied in the first



place by the Arabs, who exchanged their animals, skins, and wool for corn and weapons. Wine, and more especially wood, of which there was none in Babylonia, were brought by the Armenians from their valleys in the north down the Euphrates to Babylon. Before 1500 B. C. the commerce of the Arabs brought the products of South Arabia, the spices of Yemen, and even the products and manufactures of India, especially their silks, which reached the coasts of Southern Arabia, to Babylon. The Babylonians required the perfumes of Arabia and India to prepare their ointments. . . . When the cities of Phenicia became great centres of trade which carried the wares of Babylonia by sea to the West in order to obtain copper in exchange, the trade between Babylonia and Syria must have become more lively still. It was the ships of the Phenicians which brought the cubic measure, and the weights, and the cubit of Babylonia to the shores of Greece, and caused them to be adopted there."—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 2, ch. 3 (v. 1).—See, also, MONEY AND BANKING.

**Egypt.**—"In ancient Egypt agriculture counted for more than manufactures, and manufactures were of more importance than commerce. The trade which existed was brisk enough as far as it went, but it aimed at little more than the satisfaction of local wants by the more or less direct exchange of commodities between producers. The limited development of internal traffic was due to two principal causes: the natural products of different parts of the country were too much alike for much intercourse to be necessary for purposes of exchange, and the conformation of the country, in itself scarcely larger than Belgium, was such as to give the longest possible distance from north to south. . . . The Nile was the only known highway, so much so that the language scarcely possessed a general word for travelling; going southward was called 'going up stream,' and a journey to the north, even by land into the desert, was described by a term meaning to sail with the current. . . . While internal traffic was thus brought to a minimum by natural causes, foreign commerce can scarcely be said to have existed, before the establishment of peaceable intercourse with Syria under the new empire. The importation of merchandise from foreign countries was a political rather than a commercial affair. Such foreign wares as entered the country came as tribute, as the spoil of war, or as memorials of peaceful embassies. . . . The list of the spoil taken by Thothmes III. gives a tolerably exhaustive account of the treasures of the time. It includes, of course, bulls, cows, kids, white goats, mares, foals, oxen, geese, and corn; then follow strange birds, negroes, men and maid-servants, noble prisoners and the children of defeated kings, chariots of copper, plated with gold and silver, iron armour, bows, swords and other accoutrements, leather collars ornamented with brass, gold and silver rings, cups, dishes and other utensils, vessels of iron and copper, statues with heads of gold, ell-measures with heads of ivory, ebony, and cedar inlaid with gold, chairs, tables and footstools of cedar wood and ivory, a plough inlaid with gold, blocks of bluestone, greenstone and lead, 'a golden storm-cap inlaid with bluestone,' jars of balsam, oil, wine and honey, various kinds

of precious woods, incense, alabaster, precious stones and colours, iron columns for a tent with precious stones in them, bricks of pure brass, elephants' tusks, natron, and, finally, by way of curiosity, from the land of the kings of Ruthen, three battle-axes of flint."—E. J. Simcox, *Primitive Civilizations*, bk. 1, ch. 3, sect. 1 (v. 1).—See, also, MONEY AND BANKING.

**India.**—"It is said in the Rig-Veda that 'merchants desirous of gain crowd the great waters with their ships.' And the activity in trade, thus early noted, has continued ever since to be characteristic of the country. Professor Lassen considers it remarkable that Hindus themselves discovered the rich, luxurious character of India's products. Many of the same beasts, birds, and fragrant oils are produced in other countries, but remain unnoticed until sought for by foreigners; whereas the most ancient of the Hindus had a keen enjoyment in articles of taste or luxury. Rajas and other rich people delighted in sagacious elephants, swift horses, splendid peacocks, golden decorations, exquisite perfumes, pungent peppers, ivory, pearls, gems, &c.; and, consequently, caravans were in constant requisition to carry these, and innumerable other matters, between the north and the south, and the east and the west, of their vast and varied country. These caravans, it is conjectured, were met at border stations, and at out-ports, by western caravans or ships bound to or from Tyre and Egypt, or to or from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. To the appearance of India goods in Greece, Professor Lassen attributes the Greek invasion of India. . . . The indirect evidence afforded by the presence of India's products in other ancient countries, coincides with the direct testimony of Sanskrit literature, to establish the fact that ancient Hindus were a commercial people. The code of Manu requires the king to determine the prices of commodities, and also the trustworthiness of the weights and measures used. And that the transactions contemplated were not restricted to local products is evident from reference to the charges for freight for articles in river boats, and the undetermined and larger charges to which sea-borne goods were liable. The account of King Yudhishtira's coronation in the Mahābhārata affords an instance of precious articles from distant lands brought into India. So also in the Rāmāyana, we read that when Rāma and his brothers were married, the brides were clad in silk from China. . . . Merchants are constantly being introduced into Sanskrit fiction, and equally often into Buddhist legend. They seem to have been always at hand to give variety and movement to the monotony of daily life."—Mrs. Manning, *Ancient and Medieval India*, ch. 40 (v. 2).

**Phenicians and Carthagians.**—"The Phenicians for some centuries confined their navigation within the limits of the Mediterranean, the Propontis, and the Euxine, land-locked seas, which are tideless and far less rough than the open ocean. But before the time of Solomon they had passed the pillars of Hercules, and affronted the dangers of the Atlantic. Their frail and small vessels, scarcely bigger than modern fishing-smacks, proceeded southwards along the West African coast, as far as the tract watered by the Gambia and Senegal, while northwards they coasted along Spain, braved the heavy seas of the Bay of Biscay, and passing Cape Finis-

terre, ventured across the mouth of the English Channel to the Cassiterides. Similarly, from the West African shore, they boldly steered for the Fortunate Islands (the Canaries), visible from certain elevated points of the coast, though at 170 miles distance. Whether they proceeded further, in the south to the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape de Verde Islands, in the north to the coast of Holland, and across the German Ocean to the Baltic, we regard as uncertain. It is possible that from time to time some of the more adventurous of their traders may have reached thus far; but their regular, settled and established navigation did not, we believe, extend beyond the Scilly Islands and coast of Cornwall to the north-west, and to the south-west Cape Non and the Canaries. The commerce of the Phœnicians was carried on, to a large extent, by land, though principally by sea. It appears from the famous chapter [xxvii] of Ezekiel which describes the riches and greatness of Tyre in the 6th century B. C., that almost the whole of Western Asia was penetrated by the Phœnician caravans, and laid under contribution to increase the wealth of the Phœnician traders. . . . Translating this glorious burst of poetry into prose, we find the following countries mentioned as carrying on an active trade with the Phœnician metropolis:—Northern Syria, Syria of Damascus, Judah and the land of Israel, Egypt, Arabia, Babylonia, Assyria, Upper Mesopotamia, Armenia, Central Asia Minor, Ionia, Cyprus, Hellas or Greece, and Spain."—G. Rawlinson, *Hist. of Phœnicia*, ch. 9.—"Though the invincible industry and enterprise of the Phœnicians maintained them as a people of importance down to the period of the Roman empire, yet the period of their widest range and greatest efficiency is to be sought much earlier— anterior to 700 B. C. In these remote times they and their colonists [the Carthaginians especially] were the exclusive navigators of the Mediterranean: the rise of the Greek maritime settlements banished their commerce to a great degree from the Ægean Sea, and embarrassed it even in the more westerly waters. Their colonial establishments were formed in Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic Isles, and Spain. The greatness as well as the antiquity of Carthage, Utica, and Gades, attest the long-sighted plans of Phœnician traders, even in days anterior to the first Olympiad. We trace the wealth and industry of Tyre, and the distant navigation of her vessels through the Red Sea and along the coast of Arabia, back to the days of David and Solomon. And as neither Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, or Indians, addressed themselves to a sea-faring life, so it seems that both the importation and the distribution of the products of India and Arabia into Western Asia and Europe were performed by the Idumæan Arabs between Petra and the Red Sea— by the Arabs of Gerrha on the Persian Gulf, joined as they were in later times by a body of Chaldean exiles from Babylonia—and by the more enterprising Phœnicians of Tyre and Sidon in these two seas as well as in the Mediterranean."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 18.—"The Commerce of Carthage may be conveniently considered under its two great branches—the trade with Africa, and the trade with Europe. The trade with Africa . . . was carried on with the barbarous tribes of the inland country that could be reached by caravans, and of the sea-coast.

Of both we hear something from Herodotus, the writer who furnishes us with most of our knowledge about these parts of the ancient world. . . . The goods with which the Carthaginian merchants traded with the African tribes were doubtless such as those which civilized nations have always used in their dealings with savages. Cheap finery, gaudily coloured cloths, and arms of inferior quality, would probably be their staple. Salt, too, would be an important article. . . . The articles which they would receive in exchange for their goods are easily enumerated. In the first place comes . . . gold. Carthage seems to have had always at hand an abundant supply of the precious metal for use, whether as money or as plate. Next to gold would come slaves. . . . Ivory must have been another article of Carthaginian trade, though we hear little about it. The Greeks used it extensively in art. . . . Precious stones seem to have been another article which the savages gave in exchange for the goods they coveted. . . . Perhaps we may add dates to the list of articles obtained from the interior. The European trade dealt, of course, partly with the things already mentioned, and partly with other articles for which the Carthaginian merchants acted as carriers, so to speak, from one part of the Mediterranean to another. Lipara, and the other volcanic islands near the southern extremity of Italy, produced resin; Agrigentum, and possibly other cities of Sicily, traded in sulphur brought down from the region of Etna; wine was produced in many of the Mediterranean countries. Wax and honey were the staple goods of Corsica. Corsican slaves, too, were highly valued. The iron of Elba, the fruit and the cattle of the Balearic islands, and, to go further, the tin and copper of Britain, and even amber from the Baltic, were articles of Carthaginian commerce. Trade was carried on not only with the dwellers on the coast, but with inland tribes. Thus goods were transported across Spain to the interior of Gaul, the jealousy of Massilia (Marseilles) not permitting the Carthaginians to have any trading stations on the southern coast of that country."—A. J. Church and A. Gilman, *The Story of Carthage*, pt. 3, ch. 3.—A high authority on questions of intercourse in ancient times throws doubt on the supposed African caravan trade of the Carthaginians—as follows: "There seems no doubt that the existing system of caravan trade dates only from the introduction of Islamism into Africa. It was the Arabs who first introduced the camel into Northern Africa, and without camels any extensive intercourse with the interior was impossible. The Negro races have never shown any disposition to avail themselves of this mode of transport, and at the present day the commerce of the interior is carried on almost entirely by Moorish, that is, by Mohammedan, traders. The spread of Islamism has doubtless led to increased communication from another cause, the necessity for the Mohammedan inhabitants of the outlying and detached regions of the continent to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Even in the most flourishing times of the Carthaginians they do not appear to have made any use of camels; and as late as the days of Strabo the communications with the tribes of Western Africa who dwelt beyond the Sahara were scanty and irregular. In the time of Herodotus there is certainly no indication that either the Carthaginians or the Greeks



of the Cyrenaica had any commercial intercourse with the regions beyond the Great Desert."—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geog.*, ch. 8, note I (v. 1).—See, also, PHENICIANS; and CARTHAGE.

**Jews.**—Beginning early in his reign, Solomon made great and enlightened efforts to promote the commerce and industries of the people of Israel. "To increase the land traffic, he had small cities built in advantageous localities, in which goods of all sorts in large quantities were kept in suitable storehouses; a practice similar to that which had from ancient times prevailed in Egypt. . . . They were established chiefly in the most northern districts of Israel, towards the Phœnician boundaries, as well as in the territories of the kingdom of Hamath, which was first conquered by Solomon himself.—The main road for the land traffic between Egypt and the interior of Asia must have been the great highway leading past Gaza and further west of Jerusalem to the Northern Jordan and Damascus. Here it was joined by the road from the Phœnician cities, and continued as far as Thapsacus, on the Euphrates. This was entirely in the dominions of the king; and here, under the peaceful banner of a great and powerful monarchy, commerce could flourish as it had never flourished before. It was clearly for the improvement of this route, which had to traverse the Syrian desert on the north, that Solomon built, in a happily chosen oasis of this wilderness, the city of Thammar, or Tadmor, of which the Greek version is Palmyra. There is not a single indication that this city was of importance before Solomon's time, but from that era it flourished for more than a thousand years. . . . For any distant navigation, however, Solomon was obliged to rely on the aid of the Phœnicians, inasmuch as they were in that age the only nation which possessed the necessary ability and inclination for it. It is true that the idea of competing with the Phœnicians upon the Mediterranean could hardly have occurred to him, since they had long before that time attracted all the commerce upon it to themselves, and would scarcely have desired or even tolerated such a rival. . . . But the Red Sea, which had been thrown open to the kings of Israel by the conquest of the Idumeans, offered the finest opportunity for the most distant and lucrative undertakings, the profit of which might perfectly satisfy a nation in the position of Israel in the dawn of maritime activity; and on their part, the Phœnicians could not fail to be most willing helpers in the promotion of undertakings which it lay in the hands of the powerful king of Israel entirely to cut off from them, or at any rate to encumber with great difficulties. In this way the mutual desires and needs of two nations coincided without any injury to the one or the other. . . . Phœnician sailors were at first, it is true, the teachers of the Israelite. It was they who aided them in constructing and manning the tall ships, which, destined to distant voyages upon uncertain seas, needed to be strongly built; but yet how many new ideas and what varied knowledge the nation would in this way acquire! The ships were built in Ezion-geber, the harbour of the town of Elath (or Eloth), probably on the very spot where Akaba now stands. The cargo brought back each time from the three years' voyage consisted of 420 talents of gold, besides silver, ivory, red sandal-wood, apes, and pea-

cocks, probably also nard and aloë."—H. Ewald, *Hist. of Israel*, v. 3, pp. 261-264.

**Greeks.**—"When the Greeks had established themselves, not only on the peninsula, but also on the islands and on the east coast of the Ægean Sea, their navigation was greatly extended. That this, even in the first half of the 8th century, was profitable in its results, we see from the instance of Dius of Cyme, the father of Hesiod, who maintained himself in this manner. The works of art in which Lydia and Caria excelled, together with the products and manufactures of the east, which reached the western coasts of Asia, the products of these coasts, and wine and oil from Lesbos and Samos—all these could be shipped from the Greek maritime cities of Asia Minor, and carried to the peninsula. It was through this commerce . . . that Chalcis and Eretria laid the foundation of their greatness. To what proportions it had attained, even in the course of the 8th century, we find from the mint marks of Phocæa and Cyme, the standards of Chalcis and Eretria, the coins and weights and measures of Phidon of Argos. . . . From the middle of the 8th century, the Greeks no longer merely practised navigation; they became, in an eminent sense, a maritime nation. At the time when Sinope and Trapezus were founded in the east, Naxos, Catana, and Syracuse in Sicily, and Cyme in Campania, a nautical discovery had already been made, by means of which the Greeks surpassed the Phœnicians, the ancient voyagers of Syria; this was the building of triremes. To what an extent and proficiency must seamanship have attained, what importance naval battles must have assumed, to give rise to the attempt to replace the ancient war vessels by others of a far more powerful kind! When the first triremes were built at Corinth and Samos, about the year 700 B. C., Greek cities already existed on the southern shore of the Black Sea, on the coasts of Thrace, in Coreyra and Sicily; the southern coast of Italy had also been colonised. The products of Greek industry, pottery, implements, and weapons, were advantageously bartered on the coasts of the Thracians, Scythians, Illyrians, Sicilians, and Oscans, for the fruits of the soil, and for the cattle of those regions. The need of the means of exchange must have given great encouragement and impetus to manufactures in the Greek cities of the peninsula, on the coasts of Asia, and in the newly-founded Asiatic settlements themselves. . . . Navigation and commerce must have become permanent occupations. And the great increase of manufactures must also have given employment to numbers of the country people. Thus there grew up under the very rule of the aristocracy a powerful rival to itself; a nautical, artisan, commercial class, side by side with the land population. If the protecting walls of the chief place of the canton had previously been sought only in time of need, in case of surprises or hostile landings, the new industrial classes were now settled together in the harbours and centres of trade. Handicrafts, navigation, and commerce, could not exist without one another. In the maritime cantons on the east of the peninsula, and in the cantons on the coasts of the Peloponnesus, there sprang up simultaneously with the burgher class a town population."—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 2 (v. 2).—"Between 700 B. C. and 530 B. C.,

we observe . . . an immense extension of Grecian maritime activity and commerce—but we at the same time notice the decline of Tyre and Sidon, both in power and traffic. The arms of Nebuchadnezzar reduced the Phœnician cities to the same state of dependence as that which the Ionian cities underwent half a century later from Cræsus and Cyrus; while the ships of Miletus, Phokæa and Samos gradually spread over all those waters of the Levant which had once been exclusively Phœnician. In the year 704 B. C., the Samians did not yet possess a single trireme: down to the year 630 B. C. not a single Greek vessel had yet visited Libya. But when we reach 550 B. C. we find the Ionic ships predominant in the Ægean, and those of Corinth and Korkyra in force to the west of Peloponnesus—we see the flourishing cities of Kyrene and Barka already rooted in Libya, and the port of Naukratis a busy emporium of Grecian commerce with Egypt. The trade by land—which is all that Egypt had enjoyed prior to Psammetichus, and which was exclusively conducted by Phœnicians—is exchanged for a trade by sea, of which the Phœnicians have only a share, and seemingly a smaller share than the Greeks. Moreover the conquest by Amasis of the island of Cyprus, half-filled with Phœnician settlements and once the tributary dependency of Tyre—affords an additional mark of the comparative decline of that great city. In her commerce with the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf she still remained without a competitor, the schemes of the Egyptian king Nekos having proved abortive. Even in the time of Herodotus, the spices and frankincense of Arabia were still brought and distributed only by the Phœnician merchant. But on the whole, both political and industrial development of Tyre are now cramped by impediments, and kept down by rivals, not before in operation. . . . The 6th century B. C., though a period of decline for Tyre and Sidon, was a period of growth for their African colony Carthage, which appears during this century in considerable traffic with the Tyrrhenian towns on the southern coast of Italy, and as thrusting out the Phokæan settlers from Alalia in Corsica.”—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 21.—“It is a remarkable fact in the history of Greek colonies that the exploration of the extreme west of the Mediterranean was not undertaken either by the adventurers who settled at Cyne, or by the powerful cities of Sicily. A century or more elapsed from the foundation of Syracuse before any Greek vessel was seen on the coast of Spain or Liguria, and when the new beginning was made, it was not made by any of the colonies, Chalcidian, Dorian, or Rhodian, which had taken part in the discovery of the West. It was the Phocæans of Ionia, Herodotus tells us, who first made the Greeks acquainted with the Hadriatic, with Tyrrhenia, Iberia (Spain), and Tartessus (the region round Cadiz). The first impulse to these distant voyages arose from a mere accident. At the time of the foundation of Cyrene, about the year 630 B. C., a Greek of Samos, by name Colæus, when on his way to Egypt, was carried by contrary winds beyond the pillars of Heracles to Tartessus. There he found a virgin market, from which he returned to realise a profit of 60 talents (£12,000), an amount only surpassed by the gains of Sostratus of Aegina, who was the pre-

mier of Greek merchants. But this was the beginning and the end of Samian trade to the West; why they left it to the Phocæans to enter into the riches which they had discovered, we cannot say, but within thirty years of this date, the enterprising Ionian town sent out a colony to Massilia near the mouth of the Rhone, in the district known as Liguria. . . . The mouth of the Rhone was the point where all the routes met which traversed France from the English Channel to the Gulf of Genoa. Of these Strabo specifies three. Merchandise was carried by boats up the Rhone and Saône, from which it was transferred to the Seine, and so passed down the river; or it was taken by land from Marseilles (or Narbo) to the Loire; or again carried up the Aude and transported thence to the Garonne. By one or other of these routes, the wares collected by the Gaulish merchants—more especially the tin, which they imported from Britain—was brought into the Greek market, if indeed it was not carried on pack-horses straight across the narrowest part of the country. The importance of these lines of transit at a time when the western Mediterranean was held by the Carthaginians, and the northern Hadriatic by the Tyrrhenians, can hardly be over-estimated. The colonists extended their borders by degrees, though not without severe contests with the Ligurians and Tyrrhenians by sea and land. New cities were founded to serve as outposts against the enemy: Agatha in the direction of the barbarians of the Rhone; Olbia, Antipolis, and Nicaea in the direction of the Salyans and Ligurians of the Alps. They also spread themselves down the coast of Spain.”—E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 13.

Rome.—“Rome, placed like a mightier Mexico in the centre of her mighty lake, was furnished with every luxury and with many of her chief necessities from beyond the waters; and cities on every coast, nearly similar in latitude and climate, vied in intense rivalry with each other in ministering to her appetite. First in the ranks of commerce was the traffic in corn, which was conducted by large fleets of galleys, sailing from certain havens once a year at stated periods, and pouring their stores into her granaries in their appointed order. Gaul and Spain, Sardinia and Sicily, Africa and Egypt were all wheat-growing countries, and all contributed of their produce, partly as a tax, partly also as an article of commerce, to the sustentation of Rome and Italy. The convoy from Alexandria was looked for with the greatest anxiety, both as the heaviest laden, and as from the length of the voyage the most liable to disaster or detention. The vessels which bore the corn of Egypt were required to hoist their topsails on sighting the promontory of Surrentum, both to distinguish them from others, and to expedite their arrival. These vessels moreover, according to the institution of Augustus, were of more than ordinary size, and they were attended by an escort of war galleys. The importance attached to this convoy was marked by the phrases, ‘auspicious’ and ‘sacred,’ applied to it. . . . A deputation of senators from Rome was directed to await its arrival at the port where it was about to cast anchor, which, from the bad condition of the haven at Ostia, was generally at this period Puteoli in Campania. As soon as the well-known topsails were seen above the horizon a general



holiday was proclaimed, and the population of the country, far and near, streamed with joyous acclamations to the pier, and gazed upon the rich flotilla expanding gaily before them. The vessels engaged in this trade, however numerous, were after all of small burden. The corn-fleets did not indeed form the chief maritime venture of the Alexandrians. The products of India, which had formerly reached Egypt from Arabia, and were supposed indeed in Europe to have come only from the shores of the Erythræan Sea, were now conveyed direct to Cleopatra or Berenice from the mouths of the Indus and the coast of Malabar, and employed an increasing number of vessels, which took advantage of the periodical trade winds both in going and returning. The articles of which they went in quest were for the most part objects of luxury; such as ivory and tortoiseshell, fabrics of cotton and silk, both then rare and costly, pearls and diamonds, and more especially gums and spices. The consumption of these latter substances in dress, in cookery, in the service of the temples, and above all at funerals, advanced with the progress of wealth and refinement. The consignments which reached Alexandria from the East were directed to every port on the Mediterranean; but there was no corresponding demand for the produce of the West in India, and these precious freights were for the most part exchanged for gold and silver, of which the drain from Europe to Asia was uninterrupted. The amount of the precious metals thus abstracted from the currency or bullion of the empire, was estimated at 100,000,000 sesterces, or about £800,000 yearly. The reed called papyrus, the growth of which seems to have been almost confined to the banks of the Nile, was in general use as the cheapest and most convenient writing material, and the consumption of it throughout the world, though it never entirely superseded the use of parchment and waxen tablets, must have been immense. It was converted into paper in Egypt, and thence exported in its manufactured state; but this practice was not universal, for we read of a house at Rome which improved on the native process, and produced what Pliny calls an imperial or noble out of a mere plebeian texture. With respect to other articles of general use, it may be remarked that the most important, such as corn, wine, oil, and wool, were the common produce of all the coasts of the Mediterranean, and there was accordingly much less interchange of these staple commodities among the nations of antiquity than with ourselves, whose relations extend through so many zones of temperature. Hence, probably, we hear of none of their great cities becoming the workshops or emporiums of the world for any special article of commerce. The woollens indeed of Miletus and Laodicea, together with other places of Asia Minor, were renowned for their excellence, and may have been transported as articles of luxury to distant parts; but Africa and Spain, Italy and parts of Greece, were also breeders of sheep, and none of these countries depended for this prime necessary on the industry or cupidity of foreigners. The finest qualities of Greek and Asiatic wines were bespoke at Rome, and at every other great seat of luxury. The Chian and Lesbian vintages were among the most celebrated. . . . Again, while the clothing of the mass of the population was

made perhaps mainly from the skins of animals, leather of course could be obtained abundantly in almost every locality. When we remember that the ancients had neither tea, coffee, tobacco, sugar, nor for the most part spirits; that they made little use of glass, and at this period had hardly acquired a taste for fabrics of silk, cotton, or even flax, we shall perceive at a glance how large a portion of the chief articles of our commerce was entirely wanting to theirs. Against this deficiency, however, many objects of great importance are to be set. Though the ruder classes were content with wooden cups and platters fashioned at their own doors, the transport of earthenware of the finer and more precious kinds, and from certain localities, was very considerable. Though the Greeks and Romans generally were without some of our commonest implements of gold and silver, such for instance as watches and forks, it is probable that they indulged even more than we do in personal decoration with rings, seals, and trinkets of a thousand descriptions. . . . The conveyance of wild animals, chiefly from Africa, for the sports of the amphitheatres of some hundreds of cities throughout the empire, must alone have given occupation to a large fleet of ships and many thousand mariners. Nor were the convoys smaller which were employed to transport marble from the choicest quarries of Greece and Asia to many flourishing cities besides the metropolis. . . . After due deduction for the more contracted sphere of ancient commerce, and the lesser number of articles, for the extent also to which the necessities and conveniences of life were manufactured at home in the establishments of wealthy slaveowners, we shall still readily believe that the inter-communication of the cities of the Mediterranean, such as Corinth, Rhodes, Ephesus, Cyzicus, Antioch, Tyrus, Alexandria, Cyrene, Athens, Carthage, Tarraco, Narbo and Massilia, Neapolis and Tarentum, Syracuse and Agrigentum, and of all with Rome, must have been a potent instrument in fusing into one family the manifold nations of the empire. . . . In the eyes of the Orientals and the Greeks, the mistress of lands and continents, the leader of armies, and the builder of roads was regarded as the greatest of all maritime emporiums, and represented in their figurative style as a woman sitting enthroned upon the waves of the Mediterranean. The maritime aspect thus assumed by Rome in the eyes of her subjects beyond the sea, is the more remarkable when we consider how directly her ancient policy and habits were opposed to commercial development. . . . The landowners of Rome, in the highday of her insolent adolescence, had denounced both commerce and the arts as the business of slaves or freedmen. So late as the year 535 a law had been passed which forbade a senator to possess a vessel of burden, and the traffic which was prohibited to the higher class was degraded in the eyes of the lower. . . . It was . . . by following the natural train of circumstances, and by no settled policy of her own, that Rome secured her march across the sea, and joined coast to coast with the indissoluble chain of her dominion. On land, on the contrary, she constructed her military causeways with a fixed and definite purpose. . . . The population of Gaul crept, we know, slowly up the channel of the rivers, and the native tracks which conveyed

their traffic from station to station were guided by these main arteries of their vital system. But the conquerors struck out at once a complete system of communication for their own purposes, by means of roads cut or built as occasion required, with a settled policy rigidly pursued. These high roads, as we may well call them, for they were raised above the level of the plains and the banks of the rivers, and climbed the loftiest hills, were driven in direct lines from point to point, and were stopped by neither forest nor marsh nor mountain."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 39.

**Gaul under the Romans and after the fall of the Empire.**—"In the second century of our era, in the time of Trajan and the Antonines, Gaul with its fertile fields, its beautiful meadows, its magnificent forests, was one of the best cultivated countries of the Roman world. It exported into Italy grain from Aquitaine, Celtique and from the country of the Allobroges (Dauphiné), flax from Cadurques (Quercy) and Bituriges (Berry), hemp from Auvergne and the valley of the Rhône, spikenard from Provence (*valeriana celtica* according to M. Littré) renowned in the Roman pharmacopœia, oak and pine from the immense forests which still covered the Pyrenees, the Cévennes, the Alps, the Jura, the Vosges and nearly all the north of Gaul (forest of Ardennes), horses from Belgium, wool from the Narbonnaise, cheese from the Alps and from Nîmes, hams and salt provisions from Séquanaise (Franche-Comté), and the Pyrenees. The wines of the Narbonnaise and the valley of the Rhône, often adulterated and little relished by the Italians, were notwithstanding one of the principal objects of commerce in the interior of Gaul, in Great Britain and Germany. The oysters of the Mediterranean and even those of the Atlantic and the Channel which the ancients had perhaps found means of keeping in fresh water, figured upon the tables of the gourmets of Rome. We know that long before the conquest, the Gauls took gold from the sands of their rivers and that in certain regions (Upper Pyrenees), territory of the Tarbelles, and Val d'Aoste, territory of the Salasses, they extracted gold from the auriferous rocks by processes quite analogous to those which are now employed by the great Californian companies. These mines which were yet in existence under Augustus were not long in being exhausted, but the iron of Berry, Sénonais, Périgord, Rouergue, the valley of the Rhône and of the Saône, the copper of the Pyrenees (Saint-Etienne-de-Baïgorry), of the Alps (country of the Centrons, now Upper Savoy), of the Cévennes (Cabrières in Hérault and Chessy in Rhône), the tin of Limousin, the argentiferous lead of the territory of the Rutènes (Rouergue), of the Gabales (Gévaudan), of the Centrons, etc., were mined and wrought with a skill which placed the metallurgy of Gaul in the first rank of the industries of the empire. These mining operations, superintended by the State, although they belonged to the proprietors of the soil, were often directed by companies which combined the working of the metal with its extraction from the ore. One which had its seat at Lyons is known to us by many inscriptions. Textile industries were not less flourishing than metallurgy, the manufacture of sail-cloth was carried on all over Gaul; the bleached linens of Cahors, the carpets of the Narbonnaise, the sags of

mingled bright colors were renowned even in Italy. The progress of commerce had followed that of agriculture and manufacture. The network of Roman roads planned by Agrippa was completed and four roads accessible to carriages or beasts of burden, crossed the Alps by the passes of the Little (Graius Mons) and of the Great Saint-Bernard (Summus Penninus), of Mount Genève (Mons Matrona) and of the Argentière: the Corniche road stretched along the Mediterranean from Genoa to Marseilles: those of the pass of Pertus (Summo Pyrenoeco), of the valley of Aran, of the Somport, of Roncevaux, and from Lapurdum (Bayonne) to Pampeluna connected Gaul to Spain. . . . Notwithstanding the competition of new roads, river navigation had retained all its activity. . . . We know from inscriptions of a certain number of associations for water transportation which appear to have played a great rôle in the interior commerce of Gaul from the first century of our era. The boatmen of the Rhône, the Saône, the Durance, the Seine, the Loire, the Aar, an affluent of the Rhine, formed corporations recognized by the State, organized on the model of cities, having their regulations, property, elective chiefs, and patronized by great personages who charged themselves with defending their interests against the Roman authorities. The most celebrated, if not the most important of these associations, is that of the *Nautæ Parisiaci*, the memory of which has been preserved to us by the remains of an altar raised, under Tiberius, at the point of the Isle of the City (the ancient *Lutetia*) and found in 1711 under the choir of Notre-Dame. . . . The two great commercial ports of the Mediterranean were Narbonne and Arles, after Marseilles had lost her maritime preponderance and was only a city of science, luxury and pleasure. . . . Immense labor upon embankments and canalization which had thrown within Narbonne the mass of the river and deepened the maritime channel made of the metropolis of the Narbonnaise one of the safest ports upon the coast of Gaul. It communicated with the Rhône by the navigation of the lakes (*étangs*) which at that time extended without interruption to the western mouth of the river, with the ocean by the course of the Garonne, navigable from Toulouse (*Tolosa*). The port of the Garonne was then as now Bordeaux (*Burdigala*) which already had intercourse with Great Britain and Spain. Arles, connected with the sea by the canal of Marius and perhaps also by the small arm of the Rhône and the navigation of the lakes (*étangs*), was a maritime port and at the same time the outlet for the navigation of the Rhône which was prolonged by the Saône as far as Chalon (*Cabillonum*). Upon the banks of the river rose the wealthy cities of Tarascon, Avignon (*Avenio*), Orange (*Arausio*), Vienne. Lyons is the commercial and also the political metropolis of Gaul, the seat of the most powerful manufacturing and commercial companies; the boatmen of the Saône and the Rhône, the wine merchants, the mining and smelting company of the valley of the Rhône. Above Chalon, four great commercial routes start from the valley of the Saône. The first ascends the Doubs as far as Besançon (*Vesuntio*) and terminates at the Rhine near Augst (*Augusta Rauracorum*), where the river is already navigable. The second follows the valley of the Saône and



descends by the Moselle, navigable above Trèves (Augusta Trevirorum), and by the Meuse, toward the middle and lower valley of the Rhine. . . . The third route, that from the Saône to the Loire, set out from Chalon, crossed Autun (Augustodunum), and reached the Loire above Orléans (Genabum, later Aurelianum). Goods embarked upon the river arrived, after a voyage of 370 kilometers (2,000 stades), at Nantes (Portus Namnetum) which appears to have been substituted, about the beginning of the first century, for the ancient port of Corbilo and which was also in intercourse with Great Britain. The fourth route, that from the Saône to the Seine, crossed Autun, was there divided into two branches which went by way of Avallon and Alise to meet at Sens (Agedincum) on the Yonne, and descended the Seine to its mouth by Melun (Melodunum), Paris (Lutetia) and Rouen (Rotomagus). This was the shortest route between the new province of Britani and the Mediterranean; but the ancients, notwithstanding the progress in navigation, always distrusted long passages by sea; so the principal emporium of commerce with Britani was not Caracotinum (Harfleur), the port of the Seine, but Gesoriacum, later Bononia (Boulogne), which is distant only 50 kilometers from the English coast. It was there that Caligula erected that gigantic pharos known to the middle-ages under the name of the tower of Odre and which existed until 1645. . . . When one thinks of Gaul in the second half of the 5th century, after those great streams of invasion which swept it for fifty years, one easily fancies that the flood has carried everything away, that the Roman institutions have disappeared, that private fortunes are swallowed up in a frightful catastrophe, that the barbarians have enslaved the Gallo-Romans, that social life is suspended, manufactures ruined, commerce interrupted. This picture which responds to the idea we form of a barbarian conquest, is necessarily exaggerated, because the Germanic invasion was not a conquest. The Germans who established themselves upon the Roman territory, those even who had employed force to make a place for themselves within it, did not consider themselves conquerors, but subjects and soldiers of the Empire: they dreamed so little of destroying it that they aspired to serve it whether it would or no. . . . Notwithstanding the decadence of manufactures and the inevitable disorders which weakness of the central power brings in its train, commerce appears to have preserved a certain amount of activity. In the 6th century, post stages still existed. Upon the Roman roads, maintained and repaired by the Mérovingians, heavy wagons which served for the transportation of goods and travelers circulated with their teams of oxen or horses. Royal decrees commanded the preservation of towing-paths along navigable rivers; the rivers had remained the high-ways of interior commerce, and the boatmen's companies of Roman Gaul had perhaps survived the fall of the imperial domination. The ports of the Atlantic, Bordeaux and Nantes, those of the Channel, Alet (between Saint-Malo and Saint-Servan), Rouen, Quantovic (Etaples or Saint-Josse-sur-Mer) on the bay of the Canche, Boulogne, were in relations with the Visigoths and the Suevi of Spain, the Irish, the Frisians, and received in exchange for the wines, honey, madder, grains

and linens of Gaul, oils and lead from Spain, metals and slaves from Great Britain, coarse cloths from Ireland and finer fabrics which they were beginning to make in Frisia. Marseilles, Arles, Narbonne, the great ports of the Mediterranean, were always the depots for the trade of the Orient, where their vessels went for spices, silks, papyrus from Alexandria, cloths and carpets from Antioch and Laodicea, which their merchants exchanged in part for money, in part for metals, honey, saffron, almonds and linens from southern Gaul, coral brought from Italy, and amber brought overland from the borders of the Baltic. The conquests of the Franks, masters of central and southern Germany, had opened to commerce two new roads: one, by the Danube, stretched away to the frontiers of the Eastern Empire and to Constantinople through the countries occupied by the fierce tribes of the Avars and the Bulgarians; the other arrived by Thuringia in the regions where the Slav tribes, Sorbs (Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, Pomerania) and Wends (Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, Carinthia) dominated. In these uncultivated countries, covered with forests and marshes, in the midst of these warlike peoples, the merchants could risk themselves only in large caravans, sword at the side and lance in hand. These distant and perilous expeditions were attractive to the adventurous spirit of the Frank race. . . . Faith, as well as ambition, found its account in these journeys to the countries of the pagan. On the way, they distributed religious images to the heathen, they tried to convert them while profiting by them. . . . This mingling of commerce and religion is one of the characteristic traits of the middle ages, as it is of antiquity. The most ancient fairs of Gaul, that of Troyes which was in existence as early as the 5th century, that of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, that of Saint-Denis, which goes back to the time of Dagobert (629), were at the same time pilgrimages. This latter the most celebrated of all, under the Mérovingians, was held outside the walls of Paris, between the churches of Saint-Martin and Saint-Laurent, upon the lands watered by the brook Menilmontant; it was opened on the festival of Saint-Denis and continued four weeks, in order to permit, says its charter, merchants from Spain, Provence and Lombardy and even those from beyond the sea, to take part in it. . . . The fair of Saint-Denis was the rendezvous of merchants from all parts of Gaul and Europe. Beside the wines and oils of the South might be seen the honey and wax of Armorica, the linens and madder of Neustria, the metals of Spain and England, the furs of the North, the products of the royal manufactories; but the choicest goods were the spices, pepper, tissues of silk and of cotton, jewels, enamels, goldsmiths' work, which came from the Orient by the Mediterranean ports, more rarely by way of the Danube, and whose guardians were the Syrians or Jews destined to hold so great a place in the commerce of the middle ages. The Syrians,—and under this name the Franks comprehended, without doubt, all merchants native to Egypt or Roman Asia,—formed powerful communities at Marseilles, Narbonne, Bordeaux; at Paris they had sufficient influence to enable one of them, Eusebius, to succeed in purchasing the episcopate, in 591. . . . As to the Jews, a great number were already established in Gaul before

the fall of the Roman Empire, but their prosperity dates only from the epoch of disorganization which followed the barbarian invasion."—H. Pigeonneau, *Histoire du Commerce de la France* (trans. from the French), tome 1, livre 1.

#### Mediæval.

**Early trade with China.**—"During the Tang Dynasty the intercourse between China and other considerable powers was not only closer but conducted on more nearly equal terms than at any other time. . . . The neighbouring kingdom of Tibet is first mentioned in the annals for 634 A. D. as sending ambassadors with tribute and being able to raise a large and formidable army. . . . Appeals from Persia and India for help against the Saracens were addressed to China more than once in the 7th and 8th centuries; and the heir apparent to the Persian throne resided for a time as hostage at the court of China. . . . But for the physical structure of the continent, which isolates India and China, while freezing Tibet and nomadizing Tartary, the spread of Arab conquest round or across the desert would have reached a point near enough to bring about a collision with China. As it was, a general impetus was given to foreign travel and foreign commerce; and . . . colonies of traders established themselves in the southern ports, as well as along the continental trade routes. . . . About the year 700 A. D. a market for strangers was opened at Canton, and an imperial commission appointed to levy duties. In 714 A. D. we hear of a petition of foreign merchants, arriving by way of the southern sea, which is forwarded from the coast in quite modern fashion for the emperor's consideration. It set forth all the precious things which the merchants could bring from the countries of the West, and represented them as only desirous of collecting medicinal drugs and simples. Unfortunately for the traders, they arrived at the beginning of a new reign, when a vigorous attempt had been made to put down the luxury of the court. . . . It was concluded to take no further notice of the petition. Foreign trade continued to exist on sufferance, but so far as the Chinese were concerned, it was limited by the attitude of the Government to a moderate exportation of staple commodities, paid for in foreign coin or precious metals. What China had to sell was much more important to the Western nations than anything she or her rulers could be prevailed upon to buy; and so long as the trade dealt with surplus manufactures, like silk, or natural products, like musk or rhubarb, and did not endanger the local food supply, it was not interfered with. In 794 A. D. complaints were made that trade was leaving Canton for Cochin China, but the traders' schemes for recovering or pursuing it were discouraged by the Government, which opined that there must have been intolerable extortions used to drive it away, or a want of natural inducements to bring it, and quoted the Shoo: 'Do not prize strange commodities too much, and persons will come from remote parts.' Arab geographers and travellers of the 9th century show what a development had been reached by foreign commerce under this modified freedom. The Jewish merchants described by Ibn Khordadbeh as speaking Persian, Latin, Greek, Arab, Spanish, Slavonic, and Lingua franca, and trading by sea

and land to the remotest regions, had their representatives at Canton; and the four trade routes, enumerated by Sir Henry Yule, enabled all the great commercial communities to try their hand at the China trade. The first of these routes led from the Mediterranean over the Isthmus of Suez, and onwards by sea; another reached the Indian sea via Antioch, Bagdad and Bussora and the Persian Gulf; a third followed the coast of Africa by land from Tangiers to Egypt and thence by Damascus to Bagdad, while the fourth led south of the Caspian Sea and north of the central Asian desert to the gates of the Great Wall. The Chinese traders either met the Western merchants at Ceylon, or themselves came as far as the mouth of the Euphrates."—E. J. Simcox, *Primitive Civilizations*, bk. 4, ch. 12, sect. 2 (v. 2).

**The Arabs.**—The earliest date to which any positive statement of intercourse between the Arabs and the Chinese "appears to refer is the first half of the 5th century of our era. At this time, according to Hamza of Ispahan and Masudi, the Euphrates was navigable as high as Hira, a city lying south-west of ancient Babylon, near Kufa, (now at a long distance from the actual channel of the river), and the ships of India and China were constantly to be seen moored before the houses of the town. Hira was then abounding in wealth, and the country round, now a howling wilderness, was full of that life and prosperity which water bestows in such a climate. A gradual recession took place in the position of the headquarters of Indian and Chinese trade. From Hira it descended to Obolla, the ancient Apologos, from Obolla it was transferred to the neighbouring city of Basra, built by the Khalif Omar on the first conquest of Irak (636), from Basra to Siraf on the northern shore of the gulf, and from Siraf successively to Kish and Hormuz. Chinese Annals of the Thang dynasty of the 7th and 8th centuries, describe the course followed by their junks in voyaging to the Euphrates from Kwangcheu (Canton). . . . The ships of China, according to some authorities, used to visit Aden as well as the mouths of Indus and Euphrates. I do not think that either Polo or any traveller of his age speaks of them as going further than Malabar, the ports of which appear to have become the entrepôts for commercial exchange between China and the west, nor does it appear what led to this change. Some time in the 15th century again they seem to have ceased to come to Malabar. . . . The Arabs at an early date of Islam, if not before, had established a factory at Canton, and their numbers at that port were so great by the middle of the 8th century that in 758 they were strong enough to attack and pillage the city, to which they set fire and then fled to their ships. Nor were they confined to this port. . . . In the 8th century also the Arabs began to know the Chinese not only as Sinae, but as Seres, i. e. by the northern land route. . . . Besides . . . communication by land and sea with Arabia, and with the various states of India, . . . there existed from an old date other and obscurer streams of intercourse between China and Western Asia, of which we have but fragmentary notices, but which seem to indicate a somewhat fuller mutual knowledge and freer communication than most persons probably have been prepared to recognise. Thus, China



appears to have been well known from an early period to the Armenians."—H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way thither, prelim. essay* (v. 1), pp. lxxvii–lxxviii. —After the Arabs began their career as a conquering people, under Mahomet and his successors, and took possession of the great ancient fields of Asiatic and African commerce, with its highways and its capital seats, from Ispahan to Palmyra, Damascus, Baalbec, Tyre, Alexandria, and the old Carthaginian ports, they quickly caught the large ideas of trade that were then opened up to them. They improved the early caravan routes and established new ones in many directions. They dug wells, made cisterns and built caravansaries, or public places of shelter for travelers and traders, along the important desert roads. The pilgrimages which their religion encouraged had a lively traffic connected with them, and by spreading one language and one set of customs and laws over the wide region which they ruled, they helped commerce as the Romans had done. From Bagdad, the new capital city which they built on the Tigris, nearly opposite the deserted ruins of Babylon, on the other side of the Chaldean plain, they carried on direct trade with India, through Afghanistan; with China by three routes through Bokhara, or Tartary; with Siberia and with Russia, to the very center of it, through the agency of the Turkish and Tartar races. This city of Bagdad became a marvel of magnificence under the early Arabian caliphs. Other cities of Asia that acquired importance in manufactures or trade, or both, during the period of Arabian power, were Ispahan, in Persia, the woollens and linens from which were equally noted for their fineness; Damascus, in Syria, which produced cutlery of steel, and especially sword blades, that have never been surpassed, and which gave the name of "damasks" to certain raised patterns in linen that are well known by that term to this day; Herat, in Afghanistan, which was famous for its carpet looms and for its cultivation of saffron and assafœtida; Balkh and Khotan, in Bokhara, the former of which, on the banks of the Oxus, was a populous seat of trade between China, India and the West. From its great antiquity, Balkh was called "the mother of cities." In their native country, the Arabs, during this brilliant period of their history, increased the ancient trade which they had carried on by sea, with India, on one hand, and with the eastern coasts of Africa, on the other. They extended the latter far south of the limits of ancient Ethiopia, and even to the island of Madagascar. There are few settlements now existing on the east African coast, below the straits of Babel-Mandeb, which were not of Arabian origin. The pilgrimages to Mecca, their holy city, where the remains of Mahomet were interred, made that a great market and both industry and commerce were enlivened throughout the Arabian peninsula. As masters of Egypt, the Arabians reorganized with fresh vigor the ancient caravan traffic with central Africa and with the countries on the Upper Nile. Alexandria, it is true, lost much of its former importance. This was owing, in part, to the bitter hostility that existed between the Mahometans and the European Christians, which broke up, for a long period, nearly all open commerce between the two. But Alexandria was also hurt by the rise of new Arabian cities, in Egypt and on the Barbary coast, which

drew away some of the trade that had centered almost wholly at Alexandria before. Cairo, the modern capital of Egypt, stood first among these and became a wealthy seat of many manufactures and of much commercial exchange. The interior caravan traffic of Egypt centered principally at Syene, while Temnis and Damietta were busy productive towns. Within the old Carthaginian dominions, west of Egypt, on the Mediterranean, the Arab conquerors revived a traffic quite as extensive, perhaps, as the greatest that ancient Carthage had controlled. Not far from the site of that ancient emporium, and twelve miles from the modern city of Tunis, they built the now forgotten city of Kirwan, which was one of the largest and most magnificent of its time. It was a point from which numerous caravan routes led southward into the heart of the African continent, even beyond the great desert, as well as eastward to Egypt and westward to the Atlantic coasts and Spain. Many flourishing towns surrounded this African metropolis and were the centers of many different activities, such as the cultivation of grain, the making of salt, the rearing of silk-worms and the production of silk. In Mauritania, which embraced the modern empire of Morocco and part of Algiers, the Arabs introduced the same spirit of enterprise. In their hands, the barren country—which has since become almost a desert again—was made fertile, through wide regions, by extensive irrigation, and produced wheat, olives, grapes, dates and other fruits in great abundance, besides feeding flocks and herds of sheep, goats, horses, asses and camels in rich pastures. The people became skilful in several manufactures, including weaving and dyeing, the making of silk and gold thread, the mining and smelting of copper and iron, the preparation of soap and the tanning of leather. From the Atlantic coast of their Mauritanian dominion, the Arabs pushed their traffic far down the western shores of the continent, while they opened caravan routes to the interior quite as widely, perhaps, as they did from Kirwan and from Egypt. The chief city that they founded in Mauritania was Fez, which still bears witness to its former glory in a lingering university, or collection of Mahometan schools; in the remains of many mosques, and in a vast number of caravansaries. The native inhabitants whom the Arabs found in Mauritania derived from their country the name of Moors. They embraced the Mahometan religion and joined their Saracen conquerors in invading Spain, A. D. 712. This led, in Europe, to the applying of the name "Moors" to the whole of the mixed races which took possession of southern Spain, and finally gave that name to all the Mahometans on the western Mediterranean coasts. But the Moors and the Arabs were distinct races of people. The conquest of southern Spain gave the Arabs the finest field in which their energy and genius were shown. They made the most of its mineral treasures, its delightful climate and its fertile soil. On the remains of Roman civilization, which Vandals and Visigoths had not wholly destroyed, they built up, with wonderful quickness, a new culture—of industry, of manners and of taste, of art, of literature, of government and of social life—that was splendidly in contrast with the rude state of Europe at large. The trade of the Spanish Moors was considerably extended among

the Christians of Europe, notwithstanding the religious enmities that opposed it. The products of their skilful workmanship were so eagerly desired, and they controlled so many of the coveted luxuries found in Africa and the East that their Christian neighbors could not be restrained, by war nor by the commands of the church nor by the hatred which both stirred up, from dealings with them. With other parts of the Mahometan dominion, and with the countries in commercial connection with it, the trade of Moorish Spain was active and large. In exchange for the varied products which they received, they gave the fine fabrics of their looms; exquisite work of their goldsmiths and silversmiths; famous leather; iron, quicksilver and silver from the old Spanish mines, which they worked with new knowledge and skill; sugar, the production of which they had learned and introduced from India; olive oil, raw silk, dye-stuffs, sulphur and many commodities of less worth. The career of the Arabs, in the large region of the world which they conquered, was brilliant but not lasting. The energy which carried them for a time far ahead of their slower neighbors in Europe showed signs of decay before two centuries of their career had been run.

**Byzantine Trade.**—"The commerce of Europe centred at Constantinople in the 8th and 9th centuries more completely than it has ever since done in any one city. The principles of the government, which reprobated monopoly, and the moderation of its duties, which repudiated privileges, were favourable to the extension of trade. While Charlemagne ruined the internal trade of his dominions by fixing a maximum of prices, and destroyed foreign commerce under the persuasion that, by discouraging luxury, he could enable his subjects to accumulate treasures which he might afterwards extort or filch into his own treasury, Theophilus prohibited the persons about his court from engaging in mercantile speculations, lest by so doing they should injure the regular channels of commercial intercourse, by diminishing the profits of the individual dealer. . . . During this period the western nations of Europe drew their supplies of Indian commodities from Constantinople, and the Byzantine empire supplied them with all the gold coin in circulation for several centuries. The Greek navy, both mercantile and warlike, was the most numerous then in existence. Against the merchant-ships of the Greeks, the piratical enterprises of the Egyptian, African, and Spanish Arabs were principally directed. Unfortunately we possess no authentic details of the commercial state of the Byzantine empire, nor of the Greek population during the Iconoclast period, yet we may safely transfer to this time the records that exist proving the extent of Greek commerce under the Basilian dynasty. Indeed, we must remember that, as the ignorance and poverty of western Europe was much greater in the 11th and 12th centuries than in the 8th and 9th, we may conclude that Byzantine commerce was also greater during the earlier period. The influence of the trade of the Arabians with the East Indies on the supply of the markets of western Europe has been overrated, and that of the Greeks generally lost sight of. . . . The Byzantine markets drew their supplies of Indian and Chinese productions from Central Asia, the trade passing

north of the caliph's dominions through the territory of the Khazars to the Black Sea. This route was long frequented by the Christians, to avoid the countries in the possession of the Mohammedans, and was the highway of European commerce for several centuries. Though it appears at present a far more difficult and expensive route than that by the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, it was really safer, more rapid, and more economical, in the 8th, 9th, and 10th centuries. This requires no proof to those who are acquainted with caravan life in the East, and who reflect on the imperfections of ancient navigation, and the dangers and delays to which sailing vessels of any burden are exposed in the Red Sea. When the Venetians and Genoese began to surpass the Greeks in commercial enterprise, they endeavoured to occupy this route; and we have some account of the line it followed, and the manner in which it was carried on, after the East had been thrown into confusion by the conquests of the Crusaders and Tartars, in the travels of Marco Polo. For several centuries the numerous cities of the Byzantine empire supplied the majority of the European consumers with Indian wares, and it was in them alone that the necessary security of property existed to preserve large stores of merchandise. Constantinople was as much superior to every city in the civilised world, in wealth and commerce, as London now is to the other European capitals. And it must also be borne in mind, that the countries of central Asia were not then in the rude and barbarous condition into which they have now sunk, since nomade nations have subdued them. On many parts of the road traversed by the caravans, the merchants found a numerous and wealthy population ready to traffic in many articles sought after both in the East and West; and the single commodity of furs supplied the traders with the means of adding greatly to their profits. Several circumstances contributed to turn the great highway of trade from the dominions of the caliphs to Constantinople. The Mohammedan law, which prohibited all loans at interest, and the arbitrary nature of the administration of justice, rendered all property, and particularly commercial property, insecure. Again, the commercial route of the Eastern trade, by the way of Egypt and the Red Sea, was suddenly rendered both difficult and expensive, about the year 767, by the Caliph Al Mansur, who closed the canal connecting the Nile with the Red Sea. The harvests of Egypt, which had previously filled the coast of Arabia with plenty, could no longer be transported in quantity to the ports of the Red Sea; living became expensive; the population of Arabia declined; and the carrying trade was ruined by the additional expenditure required. The caliph certainly by this measure impoverished and depopulated the rebellious cities of Medina and Mecca to such a degree as to render their military and political power less dangerous to the central authority at Bagdat, but at the same time he ruined the commerce of Egypt with India and the eastern coast of Southern Africa. Since that period, this most important line of communication has never been restored, and the coarser articles of food, of which Egypt can produce inexhaustible stores, are deprived of their natural market in the arid regions of Arabia. The hostile relations be-



tween the caliphs of Bagdat and Spain likewise induced a considerable portion of the Mohammedan population on the shores of the Mediterranean to maintain close commercial relations with Constantinople. A remarkable proof of the great wealth of society at this period is to be found in the immense amount of specie in circulation. . . . The poverty of Europe at a later period, when the isolation caused by the feudal system had annihilated commerce and prevented the circulation of the precious metals, cannot be used as an argument against the probability of this wealth having existed at the earlier period of which we are treating."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine Empire*, 716–1057, bk. 1, ch. 4, sect. 1.

**Venice and Genoa.**—In the slow revival of commerce which took place in Christian Europe, during the later half of the middle ages, no one city or people can be said to have taken a lead from the beginning. At various points, north and south, on the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, on the Baltic, on the Rhine and other rivers which flow into the North Sea, and on the Danube, the Dnieper and the Don, centers of trade were growing up in a gradual way, out of which it would be hard to name one that ranked much above the rest for many generations. But the 11th century brought a great commercial leader to the front. This was Venice. The circumstances of the founding of Venice, in the 5th century, and the history of the rise of the singular republic, are given elsewhere—see *VENICE*: A. D. 452. The condition of the unfortunate refugees, who sought shelter from invading savages on a few small mud banks, barely separated from the shore of their Adriatic coast, did not seem to be a promising one. Nor was it so. While the neighboring parts of Italy were being overrun by Huns, Goths and Lombards in succession, and while the settlement of the barbarous new races was going on over all Southern Europe, in the midst of great disorder and constant war, these islanders and their descendants, for generations, were protected as much by their poverty as by the shallow waters that surrounded them. They had nothing to tempt either plunder or conquest. They lived by salt-making, fishing and fish-salting. They began trade in a small way by exchanging their salt and salted fish for other articles. It grew in their hands from year to year, for they were enterprising, industrious and courageous. Procuring timber on the opposite Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, they became expert ship builders and sailors. The safety of their situation caused increasing numbers of their Italian fellow countrymen to join them. The islands of the Venetian lagune were, in time, all occupied, and bridges between several of them were built. From the selling of salt and fish to their neighbors, the Venetians went on to more extensive commercial business. By slow degrees, they took the occupation of general merchants, buying goods here and there to sell again. They became friendly with the Greeks on the eastern side of the Adriatic, in Dalmatia and Albania, and this led them into important relations, both commercial and political, with the Byzantine Empire and its capital city, Constantinople. By the time they had gained wealth and consequence enough to attract the notice of their rough neighbors and invite attack, they had also gained

strength enough to defend themselves. They took part then in the wars of the Byzantines, rendering valuable services in Italy and elsewhere, and they joined the Greeks in destroying the pirates who infested the Adriatic Sea. The early important trade of the Venetians was with Constantinople, where they enjoyed, for a long period, the peculiar favor of the Byzantine rulers. After the Saracens had mastered Syria and Persia, and taken possession of Alexandria (A. D. 640), Constantinople became the emporium of Eastern trade, adding it to a great traffic which the Byzantine capital had always carried on with the Tartar and Russian territories in Asia and Europe. When the Venetians gained a footing there, as political friends and favored merchants, their fortunes were made. While the Greeks were busy in desperate wars with their Mahometan neighbors, these enterprising Italians took into their own hands more and more of the profitable trade which the Greeks had opened to them. They soon had the handling of Byzantine commerce in western Europe almost wholly. From partners they became rivals, and especially in the Russian traffic, which they drew away from Constantinople, to a large extent, by opening direct dealings with the Russian traders, at a market place established on the Dnieper. From the beginning of the Crusades, in the 11th century, the rise of Venetian commerce and Venetian power was very rapid. The Venetians were prepared, as no other people were, at the time, to furnish fleets, both for transportation and for naval war. They enlisted in the crusading enterprises with a zeal which was not, perhaps, purely pious. Their carrying ships were busy conveying men and supplies; their war galleys were in the front of some sea fighting with the Moslems, and more with Christian rivals; their shrewd politicians were alert, at all points and among all parties, looking after the interests of the republic; their merchants were everywhere ready to improve the new opportunities of trade which these times of excitement opened up. In all directions, and throughout the whole of Europe, new activities were awakened, and especially such as led to a busier trade. The crusaders who lived to return, into France, Flanders, Italy, Germany, and England, brought home with them many ideas which they had picked up in the East, and much new knowledge of oriental products and arts, all of which became widely diffused and produced great effects. The result was to stimulate and improve the industries and to increase the commerce which the Europeans carried on among themselves, as well as to greatly enlarge their demand for the products of the Asiatic world. A new era in European commerce was opened, therefore, by the Crusades, and the Venetians, by their enterprise, their energy and their early experience, took the lead in its activities. They organized the traffic between the East and the West, the North and the South, upon a great scale, and centered the larger part of it in their island city. By sea and by land they managed it with equal vigor. Their merchant fleets were under the protection of the state and made voyages, at regular and appointed times, under the convoy of vessels of war. On the landward side, they arranged an extensive trade with the interior of Germany, Hungary and Bohemia, through the Tyrol and Carinthia. As the first bitterness of

hatred between Christians and Mahometans wore away, they grew willing to trade with one another, though the Popes still forbade it. The Venetians were among the first in such willingness. Having many quarrels with the Byzantine Greeks, they were eager to reopen the old eastern market at Alexandria, and did so at the earliest opportunity. From that beginning they spread their trade with Arabs, Moors and Turks, along the whole Mahometan line, in Asia and Africa. But, though Venice took the lead in the reviving commerce of the middle ages and held it substantially to the end of that period of history, she had powerful rivals to contend with, and the strongest were among her near neighbors in Italy. The same commercial spirit was alive in several other Italian cities, which had grown up in the midst of those disorderly times and had contrived to acquire more or less of independence and more or less of power to defend themselves. Amalfi, Genoa and Pisa were the earliest of these in growing to importance, and Florence at a somewhat later day rose to high rank. Florence, which did not become a free city until near the end of the 12th century, gained its subsequent wealth more by manufactures and by banking than by trade. Its chief products were woollens, silk and jewelry, and its money-lenders were everywhere in Europe. See FLORENCE: 12TH CENTURY, and after. The commercial career of Amalfi was cut short in the 12th century by events connected with the Norman conquest of Southern Italy. Pisa, an ancient city, whose history goes back to Etruscan times, was a considerable seat of trade while Venice was little known; but she fell behind both Venice and Genoa, soon after those vigorous republics were fairly entered in the race. The Pisans prospered highly for some time, by going into partnership or alliance with the Venetians, first, and afterwards with the Genoese; but they quarreled with the latter and were ruined in the wars that ensued. After the thirteenth century Pisa had no commercial importance. See PISA. The most formidable rival of Venice was Genoa, a city which claims to be, like Pisa, of more than Roman antiquity. In the trade of the Levant—that is, the eastern ports of the Mediterranean Sea—the Genoese pushed themselves into competition with the Venetians at an early day, and they seemed for some time to hold an equal chance of controlling the prize. During the later part of the 12th century, such unfriendly feelings had grown up between the Venetians and the Byzantine court that the latter transferred its commercial favors to the merchants of Genoa, Pisa and Amalfi, and gave them many privileges at Constantinople. The Venetians were thus placed at a disadvantage in the Bosphorus and the Black Sea; but they did not long submit. In 1204 they persuaded one of the crusading expeditions to join them in attacking Constantinople, which was taken, and the dominions of the ancient Empire of the East were divided among the captors, Venice receiving a goodly share. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE. This was a golden era for Venice and she improved it to the utmost. For almost sixty years she triumphed over her rivals completely. But in 1261 her merchants were again expelled from Constantinople and the Black Sea. The Greeks had continued to hold a large part of the ancient domain of the Byzantine Empire

in Asia Minor, and now, with the help of the Genoese, they succeeded in retaking their old capital city. The Frank Empire, or Latin Empire as it was differently called, which the Crusaders and the Venetians had set up, was extinguished and the Genoese again took the place of the Venetians as masters of the Byzantine trade, including that of the Black Sea and the Asiatic traffic which was carried on from its ports. But by this time the better disposition to deal commercially with one another had grown up between the Christians and the Mahometans. So the Venetians, when they lost their footing at Constantinople, very promptly went over to Alexandria and made excellent arrangements with the Saracens there, for supplying Europe once more with the commodities of the East, by those easier and shorter ancient routes which Christian commerce had not used for several hundred years. This opening of trade with the Mahometan races, at Alexandria, and elsewhere soon afterwards, may easily have repaid the Venetians for what they lost in the Byzantine direction; but they did not give up the latter. A long series of desperate wars between the competitors ensued, with such shiftings of victory that Venice seemed sometimes to be almost in a hopeless strait; but, in the end, she broke the power of her rival completely. The final peace, which was concluded in 1381, left her quite undisputedly, for a time, the mistress of the Mediterranean and its trade. See GENOA: A. D. 1261–1299; VENICE: A. D. 1378–1379, and 1379–1381; and CONSTANTINOPLE. Both the northward and the southward lines of traffic between Asia and Europe, through Alexandria and through Constantinople, were now chiefly in the hands of the Venetians. Between those great courses were important minor currents of commerce, along caravan routes through Asia Minor and Syria, which they mainly controlled. The trade of the rich islands of the Levant and of Moorish Africa was under their management for the most part, and they found on the northern shores of the Black Sea a commerce with the Russian region which the Genoese had increased while they ruled in those waters. For three quarters of a century the Venetians enjoyed this large extent of commerce with the East. Then the Turks came, besieged and captured Constantinople (A. D. 1453) and spread over the country which they now occupy. For the next two centuries the Venetians were at war with the Turks—defending Christendom in the Mediterranean with little help. At the same time they had to encounter an almost fatal attack from Christian princes who had become jealous of their formidable wealth and power and who united against the republic in the shameful League of Cambrai—see VENICE: A. D. 1508–1509. They might have recovered from this attack, for they still held the Mediterranean trade; but a great event had occurred, just ten years before the League of Cambrai, which was more fatal than war, not to Venice alone, but to most of her rivals in trade as well. This was the discovery, by Vasco da Gama, of the ocean passage to the Eastern world around the Cape of Good Hope. The toiling traffic of desert caravans, to Alexandria, to Constantinople, to Tyre, Antioch, Ephesus and Erzeroum, was soon reduced to insignificance. The rich trade of the Indies and of all the farther East—the trade of the silk countries and the



cotton countries, of the spice islands, of the pearl fisheries, of the lands of ivory, of ebony, of gold, of precious stones, of fragrant gums, of curious things and curious arts—was quickly swept into a different course—into broader seas than the Mediterranean and into new hands.

**Northern Europe.—The Baltic Cities.—The Hansa.**—The earliest commercial seaports of northwestern Europe had their rise, not on the North Sea, but on the Baltic and the straits which enter it. The Northmen of that region were not alone in the traffic which grew up there, for the Wends (a Slavonic people), who occupied most of the southern shores of the Baltic, east of the Elbe, appear to have stoutly rivalled them from the first. Björko, on an island in Lake Maelar, Sweden (the inlet upon which Stockholm is situated), was one of the first of the seats of commerce at the North. It is supposed to have been destroyed about 1008. But the most famous was the city of Vinet, or Vineta, on the island of Usedom, at the mouth of the river Oder. It may not have been quite as rich and magnificent a town as some would infer from accounts given in early chronicles; but no doubt it was remarkable for the age, in that part of the world, and carried on a large trade. The Swedes and Danes were the destroyers of Vineta, before the middle of the 9th century, and the former people are said to have carried away from it great quantities of marble, brass and iron work, with which they gave splendor to their own newer city of Wisby, then just rising on the island of Gothland. The career of Wisby lasted several centuries and it was prominent in commerce throughout the Middle Ages. All that can be said of that most ancient commerce in northern Europe is gathered from sources which are uncertain and obscure. It is not until the 12th century that much of the real history of trade in the Baltic region opens. In 1140 the modern city of Lubeck was founded, on the site of a more ancient town, known as Old Lubeck, which is supposed to have been a thriving port of trade in its day but which had been utterly destroyed by its rivals or enemies. The new Lubeck established close relations with the Genoese and soon took the lead in the commerce of the north, among a large number of enterprising towns which, about that time, came into prominence on the northern coast and on the rivers which run to it. The city of Hamburg, on the Elbe, lying inland and not very distant from Lubeck, was one of the earliest of these. Like Lubeck, it had suffered destruction, in the constant warfare of the earlier time, and had made a new beginning of existence about 1013. Hamburg had access to the North Sea by the Elbe and Lubeck to the Baltic by the Trave. Trading in different directions, therefore, by sea, they carried on an active traffic with one another, across the narrow stretch of land which divides them,—as they still do to this day. But this inland commerce was greatly disturbed by robbers who infested the country, until the two cities, Lubeck and Hamburg, in 1241, agreed to establish and support in common a body of soldiers for the protection of their merchants. That agreement is believed to have been the beginning of a wide-spread union which afterwards took shape among the commercial cities of northern Europe, and which became powerful and famous in the later

history of the Middle Ages, under the name of the Hanseatic League.—For an account of that remarkable commercial league of German free cities, see HANSA TOWNS.

**Frisians and Flemings.—The early Netherlands.**—The two peoples who inhabit the region called the Netherlands—a purely Germanic stock in the north (modern Holland) and a mixed but largely Celtic population in the south (modern Belgium)—have had a history so much in common that it cannot well be divided, though they have differed in experiences as widely as in character. The struggle with nature for a foothold in the lowland itself was harder in the north than in the south, and no doubt that is why the Teutonic Frisians led the way in industrial training. It was among them that the arts of weaving and dyeing were cultivated first to a notable excellence. As early as the age of Charlemagne (8–9th centuries), Frisian robes, of white and purple woolen stuffs, are mentioned among the choice gifts which the Emperor sometimes sent to foreign princes, and even to the great caliph, Haroun al Raschid. In the 9th century, Frisian weavers are said to have been persuaded by an enterprising count of Flanders to settle in his dominions, at Ghent, and introduce there a better knowledge of their art. But if the Flemish people borrowed from the Frisians in this matter, they soon outran their teachers and made the loom their own peculiar property. The shuttle, ere long, was in the hands of a very large part of the whole south Netherland or Belgian population, and they became almost a nation of weavers. The same Count Baldwin of Flanders who brought the Frisian weavers into Ghent established annual markets, or fairs, in various towns, which drew merchants from abroad, promoted trade and stimulated manufacturing industries throughout the country. Woolen, linen, and finally silk looms multiplied to a prodigious extent, and the weavers in all these branches acquired remarkable skill. The working of metals was also learned with great aptness, and Flemish cutlery, weapons and armor became very nearly as renowned as those of Milan and Damascus. Tanning was another valuable art which the Flemings and their Netherland neighbors cultivated, and the tilling of the soil was so industriously pursued that flax, hemp, grain and other farm products were raised quite abundantly for sale abroad. In the north Netherlands—the Hollow-land of the sturdy “Free Frisians” and Batavians, who were afterwards called the Dutch—the hard working energy of the people had been pushed in some different directions. The old trade of weaving was still vigorously carried on, in nearly every important town, and Dutch woollens, damask linens, carpets, velvets, etc., were largely produced and widely sought after; but this industry was never so prominent as it became in the Belgian provinces. The fortunes of the Hollanders were founded to a large extent upon their fisheries, and especially the herring fishery, which assumed great importance in their hands after the middle of the 12th century. Before that time, they appear to have been obliged to seek the herring in other waters than their own—along the shores of England, Scotland and Norway. But some change in the movements of those curiously swarming fish, about the time above mentioned, brought great shoals

of them to the Dutch coast, and the herring harvest thereafter was a rich source of gain to the Hollanders. They discovered some secrets of salting or curing the fish which were very much valued, and the Dutch herring were eagerly bought for all parts of Europe. The making of pottery was another industry to which the Dutch applied themselves with success, and particularly at the town of Delft, which gave its name for many centuries to the common earthenware used in western Europe. In dairy farming and skilful horticulture, or gardening, the Hollanders were superior to all other people at an early time. Wherever sea-fisheries are extensive, sailors and ship builders are trained and ocean navigation and commerce are sure, in time, to be prosperously pursued. It was so with the Dutch. Their Frisian ancestors had suffered so much on their coasts from the harassing raids of the Norse pirates, or Vikings, that they did not figure very early in seafaring enterprise. But they fought the freebooters in their stubborn and stout-hearted way and were able at last to make the harbors of their coast tolerably safe. From that time the seaport towns of Holland grew rapidly, and Dutch merchants and merchant ships, trading with the cities of the Baltic, with England and with Flanders and France increased in number. The Hollanders had an advantage in this matter over their Flemish neighbors of the South Netherlands. They were provided with better harbors and they held the outlets of the great rivers in their hands. This latter was the cause of incessant quarrels between the two peoples. The 15th century found the whole Netherlands, both north and south, in a thriving state, so far as industry and trade were concerned, notwithstanding bad government and disorderly times. The people were counted among the richest in Europe. Many great and wealthy cities had grown up, containing large populations and very busy ones. In the north, there were Dordrecht or Dort, Hoorn, Zierikzee, Haarlem, Delft, Leyden, Deventer, Enkhuizen, Middelburg, Nimeguen, Utrecht, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam, which last named city eclipsed them all in the end, though it was one of the latest to rise. In the south there was Ghent, with forty thousand weavers inside its strong walls, who were always as ready to string the bow as to throw the shuttle, and whose hot-tempered revolts against tyranny and wrong are among the most exciting incidents of history. There was Bruges, which became for a time the great emporium of the commerce of northern and southern Europe, but which lost its importance before the 15th century closed. There was Antwerp, which succeeded to the trade of Bruges and rose to unrivalled rank; and there were Lille, Mechlin (or Malines), Courtrai, Ypres, Louvain, and other towns, all centers of flourishing manufactures, chiefly those of the loom.

**Trade Routes, west and north from the Mediterranean.**—"The connection between the two great divisions of European commerce, the northern including the Hansa and the Flemish towns, and the southern the Italian republics and Mediterranean ports, was effected by two chief routes. One was by sea from the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar, up the coasts of Spain and France to Flanders. This route was used more by the southern, and especially

by Venetian, merchants than by the northern traders, for . . . Venice sent every year a large fleet to Flanders and the English Channel, which fleet would meet at Bruges, the great Hansa depot, the most important merchants of North Europe and the Hansa traders. Bruges was indeed for a long time the central mart in the north for the commercial world, till 1482, when the canal connecting it with the port of Sluys was blocked up. But at Bruges also the maritime trade just mentioned met the overland trade through central Europe, a trade that was very important, and which enriched many a city upon the Rhine and farther south, from Augsburg to Cologne. We must consider this overland route more carefully. The great centre from which it started, or to which it tended, was Venice, where as we know were collected most of the products of the East, coming both via Egypt and via the lands round the Black Sea. . . . Starting . . . from Venice, the merchants used to cross the Alps by the Brenner or Julier Passes, and then would make for the Upper Danube or one of its tributaries, and thence get on to the stream of the Rhine. Their object was generally to utilise a natural waterway wherever possible, rather in contrast to the old Roman traders, who preferred the roads. But the roads of the Middle Ages were far inferior to the old Roman highways. One of the first great cities which the mediæval trader passed on this route, coming from Venice, was Augsburg. . . . Thence he might go down the stream to Regensburg (Ratisbon) and Vienna; or he might go up to Ulm and then make a short land journey till he reached the Rhine, and so right away down that convenient stream. This was perhaps the main route from north to south. But many others converged from central Europe to Italy, and many important cities owed their wealth to the stream of trade. In Karl the Great's time the cities on the great waterway to the East along the Danube became very flourishing; Regensburg, Passau, and Vienna being the most important. From Regensburg there ran north and west two great commercial highways into the interior of Germany, one by way of Nürnberg and Erfurt and the other past Nürnberg to the Rhine. Another route from Regensburg, by river, to Trentschin on the river Waag took its merchants through Galicia into Russia, whither they went as far as Kief, the centre of Russian trade. Along this great waterway of the Danube and its tributaries came the products of the East from Constantinople and the Black Sea. . . . Another important route was that from the cities of the Rhine, such as Coblenz and Basle, up that river and on to Chur and then by the Julier Pass and the Engadine and the Etschthal to Venice; or again, after passing Chur, through the Septimer Pass and the Bergeller Thal to Genoa. These Rhine cities were very flourishing, from Basle to Cologne. . . . Like most trading towns in the Middle Ages, the Rhine cities were compelled to form themselves into a confederacy to resist the robbery and extortions of feudal nobles, whose only idea of trade seems to have been that it providentially existed as a source of plunder to themselves. But besides this Confederacy of the Rhine there was another great Confederacy of the Swabian cities, arising from the same causes. . . . That of the Rhine included ninety cities, and existed



in a fully organised form in 1255. The Swabian Confederacy was formed a little later, about 1300 or 1350, under the leadership of Augsburg, Ulm, and Nürnberg, and was in close political and commercial relations both with Venice and Genoa. . . . If now we turn from trade routes in Europe itself to those which led to Europe from the East, we find that at the time of which we are now speaking there were three main streams of commerce. In the 12th century the caravan trade in Central Asia had passed along several different paths; but after the Crusades, and the decline of the Eastern empire by the capture of Constantinople (1204), the various tribes of Central Asia, rendered more fanatical and warlike than ever by these military and religious events, caused caravan trading to become very unsafe. The first of the three routes which now remained in the 13th century was from India and the western coasts of Asia, past Basra on the Persian Gulf to Bagdad by water. From Bagdad merchants went, still by water, along the Tigris to the point on that river nearest to Seleucia and Antioch, and so to Orontes, and then to the coast of the Levant. The second route followed the same course as the first till the point of leaving the Tigris, and then proceeded over the Highlands of Asia Minor and Armenia to the port of Trebizond on the Black Sea, where Venetian vessels used to meet Asiatic traders. For both these routes Bagdad formed a very important centre. . . . The third route from the far East was from India by sea to Aden, then by land across the desert to Chus on the Nile, which took nine days, and then again by water down the Nile to Cairo, a journey of thirteen days. From Cairo there was a canal, 200 miles long, to Alexandria, where again Venetian and Genoese merchants were ready to receive the rich spices, sugar, perfumes, precious stones, gum, oil, cotton, and silk brought from the East."—H. de B. Gibbins, *History of Commerce in Europe*, bk. 2, ch. 5.

**The English.**—"Whilst the Italians were vigorously pursuing their trade in India and Europe, and Spain was renowned for her manufactures; whilst the Hanse merchants were extending their factories, and Portuguese navigators were bent upon maritime discoveries; whilst the Dutch were struggling for independence, and France was planting the seeds of her industries; England was only known as possessing a few articles of commerce of great value. Her wools and her metals were eagerly sought by foreign traders, but she had no ships of her own to carry them abroad. She had many raw materials, but she produced no manufactures for exportation. Nor was her policy respecting foreign trade the most wise. The chief concern of the legislature in those days seemed to be to prevent foreign nations doing with English produce what, after all, the English could not do themselves. Again and again the export of wool was prohibited, or was hindered by prohibitory duties. . . . The people regarded the introduction of foreigners with the utmost jealousy. They resented their competition, they grudged their profits and their advantages. The guilds would not admit them as members, and it was hard for the poor strangers to establish a footing in England, even although Magna Charta had long before declared that all merchants shall have safety in coming to or going

out of England, and in remaining and travelling through it, by land or water, for buying or selling, free from any grievous imposition. Anyhow, whatever the opposition of cities and corporations, the nation was benefited by the foreign merchants. Thankful, indeed, might England have been for the Lombards, who brought hither money and merchandise, banking and insurance; for the Flemings, who, driven by intestine dissension, found refuge on British soil, and became the founders of the woollen manufacture; and for the Huguenots, who brought with them the silk manufacture. . . . But a new era advanced. The discovery of the American continent by Columbus, and of a maritime route to India by Vasco da Gama, altered the course and character of commerce. Till then trade was essentially inland, thenceforth its most conspicuous triumphs were to be on the ocean. Till then, the Mediterranean was the centre of international trading. From thenceforth the tendency of trade was towards the countries bordering on the Atlantic. . . . It was not long . . . before England followed the lead of Spain and Portugal. John Cabot and his sons went in quest of land to North America; Drake went to circumnavigate the globe; Chancellor sailed up the White Sea to Russia; Willoughby went on his ill-fated voyage in search of a north-eastern passage to India; Sir Walter Raleigh explored Virginia; the Merchant Adventurers pushed their adventures to Spain and Portugal; and English ships began to be seen in the Levant. Meanwhile, English trade enlarged its sphere, English bravery at sea became most conspicuous, and English industry advanced apace."—L. Levi, *Hist. of British Commerce*, 2d ed., introd.—"In the 14th century the whole of the external, and much of the internal, trade of the country had been in the hands of foreigners; in the 15th our merchants began to push their way from point to point in the Mediterranean and the Baltic; in the 16th they followed slowly in the wake of other adventurers, or tried to establish themselves in unkindly regions which had attracted no one else. When Elizabeth ascended the throne England appears to have been behind other nations of Western Europe in the very industrial arts and commercial enterprise on which her present reputation is chiefly based."—W. Cunningham, *Growth of Eng. Industry and Commerce*, v. 2, p. 2.

**Trade and Piracy.**—"It would be wrong to infer from the prevalence of piracy at this period [the 15th century] that commerce must have declined. On the contrary, it was probably the increase of commerce, unaccompanied by the growth of adequate means for its defence, which made the pirate's calling so profitable. Nor was the evil confined to the professional pirate class, if we may use the expression. Even recognised associations of merchants frequently indulged in practices which can only be characterised as piracy. Commerce, in fact, was deeply imbued with the spirit of lawlessness, and in these circumstances it is probable that the depredations of pirates did not excite the same alarm nor discourage trade in the same degree as would be the case in more law-abiding times. In the 15th century the profession of Christianity and extreme respectability were not incompatible with a life of violence and outrage, and it is to be feared that in some cases the Govern-

ments which should have repressed pirates by the severest measures, encouraged their depredations. Certainly they have never enjoyed such immunity from the strong arm of the law as in the 15th century. Outrage and robbery went on unchecked along the coasts and in the track of merchant vessels. No trader was safe even in the rivers and ports of his own country. The pirates burnt and sacked towns as important as Sandwich and Southampton; they carried off not only the goods they could lay their hands on, but men and women, and even children, whom they held to ransom. Unable to look to the Government for protection of life and property while they were engaged in trade, the merchants were thrown upon their own resources to provide security. The best method of grappling with the pirates, and that which was most frequently adopted, was for merchant vessels to sail together in such numbers that they could repel attack; and these voluntary efforts were sometimes aided by the Government. In 1406 Henry IV. granted the merchants 3s. on every cask of wine imported, and certain payments on Staple exports for purposes of defence. Two Admirals were appointed, one for the north and the other for the south, with full jurisdiction in maritime affairs and power to organise naval forces. But this scheme was unsuccessful. A similar expedient was tried in 1453, but abandoned two years afterwards. The only satisfactory remedy would have been a strong navy, but the conditions necessary for this had not yet been realised. The country could not have supported the charge of maintaining a strong naval force. . . . That merchants were beginning to realise the importance of the subject, and were becoming wealthy enough to build vessels of a considerable size, is evident from the operations of John Taverner, of Kingston-upon-Hull, and the famous William Cannynges of Bristol, the latter of whom is said to have possessed 2,470 tons of shipping and some vessels of 900 tons burthen." —W. A. S. Hewins, *Industry and Commerce (in "Social England," ed. by H. D. Traill, ch. 7, v. 2).*

**The Portuguese, and the finding of the Ocean Way to the Indies.**—It was not by accident that the Portuguese rose all at once, in the closing years of the 15th century and the early years of the 16th, to a position in which they controlled and directed the main current of trade between Europe and the Eastern world. The discovery by Vasco da Gama of an ocean route to the Indies, and all the results (hereafter described), which it yielded to his countrymen for the time, were a reward of enterprise which the Portuguese had fully earned. They had worked for it, patiently and resolutely, through almost a hundred years. The undertaking was begun, at about the commencement of the 15th century, by a Portuguese prince who ought to enjoy greater fame than if he had conquered an empire; because his ambition was nobler and the fruits were of higher worth to the world. He was known as "Prince Henry the Navigator," and he was the third son of the Portuguese King John I. who was called the Great, on account of his success in wars with the Castilians and the Moors. But this young son, Prince Henry, was much the greater man of the two. He could not endure the ignorance of his time with regard

to the mysterious ocean that stretched westward and southward from the shores of the little country which his father ruled. He was bent on knowing more about it; and he was specially bent on having the Portuguese sailors make their way down the shores of the African continent, to learn where it ended and what track to the farther side might be found. Beyond Cape Nun, at the southern extremity of the modern empire of Morocco, nothing was known of the western coast of Africa when Prince Henry began his work. The Phœnicians and Carthaginians, two thousand years earlier, had probably known more about it; but their knowledge was lost. Prince Henry studied everything that could give him light and became well convinced that round the continent of Africa there was a way to the Indies for bold sailors to find. Then he applied himself, with a zeal which never flagged, to the working out of that achievement. He was a young man when he began, and during more than forty years of his life he devoted his time and his means almost wholly to the fitting out and directing of exploring ships and he fixed his residence upon the most southerly promontory of Portugal, to watch their going and coming. But the art of navigation was so little understood and the navigators were so timid, that slow progress was made. Each explorer only ventured a little farther than the one before him; and so they went feeling their way, league by league, down the African coast. The forty-three years of Prince Henry's endeavors were consumed in reaching what is now the settlement of Sierra Leone, near the head of the gulf of Guinea. But even this added more than a thousand miles of the western coast of Africa to the maps of the 15th century and was a greater advance in geographical knowledge than had been made since Carthage fell. Before he died (A. D. 1460), Prince Henry secured from the Pope (who was supposed to have the giving of all heathen countries) a grant to Portugal of all these discoveries, both island and mainland, and of all which the Portuguese explorers might make in the future, between Europe and India. So he died well content, let us hope, with the work which he had done for his country and for mankind. The enthusiasm for exploration which Prince Henry had awakened in Portugal did not die with him, though his efforts had met with unending opposition and excited very much discontent. Repeated expeditions were still sent down the African coast, and they crept farther and farther toward the goal of desire. At last, in 1486, Bartholomew Diaz, with three ships, actually rounded the Cape of Good Hope without knowing it, and only learned the fact when he turned backward from his voyage, discouraged by storms. Eleven years later, Vasco da Gama set out, fired with fresh determination, by the great discovery of a new world which Columbus had so lately made for Spain, and this time there was no failure. He passed the Cape, sailed up the eastern shores of the African continent to Melinda, in Zanguebar, and thence across the Indian Ocean to Calicut in Hindostan. The ocean route to India was now fully proved; the new era was opened and its grand prize plucked by the Portuguese—thanks to Prince Henry the Navigator. —See, also, PORTUGAL: A. D. 1415-1460 and 1463-1498.



## Modern.

**New Routes and New Marts.**—There is nothing at all imaginary in the line which is drawn in history across the later years of the 15th and the early years of the 16th century, to mark the beginning of a new era in human affairs. It is a line very real and very distinct, dividing one state of things, known as the mediæval, from another state of things, known as the modern. It was fixed by the occurrence of a series of extraordinary events, which came quickly, one after the other, and which brought about, either singly or together, the most tremendous changes, in many ways, that ever happened to the world in the same space of time. The first of these was the invention of printing, which dates as a practical art from about 1454. The second was the discovery of the new world by Columbus, A. D. 1492. The third was the passage around the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, A. D. 1497. The fourth was the religious reformation set in motion by Martin Luther, at Wittenberg, A. D. 1517. The combined effect of these great events was to make really a new starting point in almost every particular of human history, and to do so very quickly. The commercial changes which resulted are among the most remarkable. No sooner had the route by sea to southern and eastern Asia and the islands of the Indian ocean been found, than almost the whole traffic of Europe with that rich eastern world abandoned its ancient channels and ran into the new one. There were several strong reasons for this. In the first place, it cost less to bring goods by ship from India, Ceylon or China direct to European ports, than to carry them over long distances by land to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and there ship them to the West. In the second place, by taking its new route, this commerce escaped the Moorish pirates in the Mediterranean, who had long been very troublesome. And, lastly, but not least in importance, the European merchants gained a great advantage in becoming able to deal directly with the East Indians and the Chinese, instead of trading at second hand with them, through Arabs and Mahometan Turks, who controlled the Asiatic and African routes. So the commerce of the Indies, as it was generally called, fled suddenly away from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic; fled away from the Venetians, the Genoese, the Marseillaise, and the Barcelonians; from Constantinople, lately conquered by the Turks; from Antioch and Alexandria; and from many cities of the Hansa League in the north, which had learned the old ways of traffic and were slow to learn anything new. Soon many of the great marts which had been busiest, grew silent and deserted and fell into slow decay. The most enriching commerce of the world was passing to different hands and bringing younger races into the front of history.

**The Portuguese in the lead.**—Having found the way to India by sea, the Portuguese were prompt in taking measures to make themselves strong in that part of the world and to control the trade with it. They were helped in this effort by the grant of imagined rights which Prince Henry had obtained from the Pope, long before. But they strengthened the rights which the Pope gave them, by the older fashioned

methods of conquest and possession. They began at once to plant themselves firmly at important points in the eastern seas and on the Indian coast. They sent out one of their ablest military men, Francesco d'Almeida, with a strong force of ships and volunteers, and appointed him Viceroy of India. He took possession of several parts of the Malabar coast (the western coast of the southern extremity of Hindostan) and built forts in which garrisons were placed. He similarly established the Portuguese power in Ceylon, took possession of the Maldive Islands and founded trading settlements in Sumatra. The Venetians, who saw that their ancient trade with the East was doomed unless this new rivalry could be crushed, now joined their Mahometan allies of Egypt in a great effort to drive the Portuguese back. A formidable fleet was fitted out on the Red Sea and sent against Almeida. He was unfortunate in his first encounter with these allied enemies and lost the squadron that opposed them. But the resolute viceroy was undaunted. Recalled from his command, he refused to give it up until he had equipped and led another fleet against the navy of the Egyptians and completely destroyed it. The successor of Almeida, as viceroy of India, was a remarkable personage who is known in the annals of his time as "the great Afonso D'Albuquerque." The chronicle of his exploits in Africa and India, compiled by his son from his own letters and records, and entitled "The commentaries of the great Afonso D'Albuquerque," has been translated into English and published by the Hakluyt Society. He was a remarkably energetic commander, and very honest in his way, according to the notions of his time; but he did the work of subjugation and conquest which he was sent to do in a cruel and rapacious style. He was not rapacious on his own account; but he saw no wrong in anything done for the profit of his country. In the course of seven years he spread the Portuguese power so widely and fixed it so firmly on the East Indian coasts and in the neighboring seas that there was hardly an attempt for many years to disturb it. None but Portuguese ships dared enter the Indian ocean without special permits, and the few which received admission were forbidden to trade in spices—the most precious merchandise of the region. From the Indies the Portuguese made their way to the coasts of China and put themselves on friendly terms with its people. They were permitted to occupy the port of Macao and have possessed it ever since. Some years later they discovered the islands of Japan and opened the earliest European commerce with that singular country. So they held for a time the complete mastery of eastern trade and enlarged it to greater bounds than it had ever reached before. But they were satisfied with keeping the sources of the supply of eastern goods to Europe in their own hands. The first handling of the commodities was all that they tried to control. They brought to Lisbon the spices, silks, cotton, pearls, ivory, sugar, aromatic drugs and the like, which their ships and merchants gathered up, and there sold them to other traders, Dutch, English and German for the most part, who found the final markets for them and who enjoyed a good half of the profits of the trade. These latter derived great advantages from the arrangements—much more than they had gained in their trading with

Genoa and Venice—and the commerce of Holland and England grew rapidly as the result. But the glory and prosperity of the Portuguese, as masters of the rich traffic of the eastern world, were not of long duration. Before the 16th century closed, they had lost the footholds of their power and were slipping into the background very fast. By misfortunes and by folly combined, all the fruits of the patient wisdom of Prince Henry, the persevering courage of Vasco da Gama, the bold energy of Almeida, and the restless enterprise of Albuquerque, were torn out of their hands. Almost from the first, a greedy and jealous court had done all that could be done to destroy the grand opportunities in trade which the country had gained. Private enterprise was discouraged; the crown claimed exclusive rights over large parts of the commerce opened up, and these rights were sold, given to favorites and dealt with in many ways that are ruinous to successful trade. Royal jealousy sent three viceroys to divide among them the government of the Portuguese possessions in the East, when there should have been but one, and the same jealousy kept these viceroys ever changing. Of course, there was nowhere good government nor thrifty management of trade. In the midst of this bad state of things, the royal family of Portugal died out, in 1580, and Philip II. of Spain set up claims to the crown which he was strong enough to make good. Portugal thus became joined to Spain, for the next sixty years, and was dragged into Philip's wicked war with the Netherlands. Her Spanish masters did what they could to draw her trade away from Lisbon to Cadiz and Seville. The Dutch and English, her former customers and friends, made enemies now by Philip of Spain, pushed their way into the eastern seas, defying the mandates of the Pope, and broke down her supremacy there. When the Portuguese, in 1640, threw off the Spanish yoke and asserted their independence again, calling a prince of the house of Braganza to the throne, there was not much left of their former power or their former trade. They still held Goa, on the western coast of Hindostan, and the Chinese port of Macao—as they do to the present day; and they retained, as they still do, considerable possessions in Africa. But their brief importance in navigation, in colonization and trade, was quite gone and they dropped back to a humble position in the history of the world. Even the management of their home trade with other countries fell mostly, after a time, into the hands of the English, who became their special allies and friends.

**The Spaniards.**—While the Portuguese were pursuing glory and gain in the track of Vasco da Gama, which led them south and east, the Spaniards were doing the same in the wake of the three little ships which Columbus, with a bolder hand, had steered westward, to strange shores which he never dreamed of finding. These newly opened regions of the globe, in the Atlantic and on both sides of it, were divided between the two nations by the Pope, and it was a bold matter in those days to dispute his right. He gave to the Spaniards all islands and countries found west of a meridian line drawn  $27\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$  west of the island of Ferro, in the Canary group. This nearly corresponds with the meridian  $45\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  west of Greenwich. To the Portuguese

he assigned all discoveries east of it. So they both went on their appointed ways, with pious hearts and untroubled consciences, busily hunting for heathen lands to seize and despoil. But the eastern field, in which the Portuguese did most of their work, was one where commerce was old and where something of Europe and its people was already known. They were forced to look upon trade as the chief object of their pursuit. With the Spaniards the case was different. They found their way to a quarter of the world which Europe had never heard of and came upon people who never saw the faces of white men until then. These strange races of the new world were some of them quite as civilized, in certain respects, as the Spaniards who invaded them, and even more so, it would seem, in their notions of truth and in the refinement of their manners and modes of life. But they were simple and unsuspecting; they were not warlike in disposition and they were rudely and poorly armed. So the mail-clad cavaliers of Spain crushed them into helpless slavery with perfect ease. From the islands of the West Indies, which they discovered and occupied first, the Spaniards had soon made their way to the shores of the two continents of America, North and South. They found cities and nations which astonished them by their splendor and wealth and set them wild with greedy desires. Europe looked poor in comparison with the shining wealth of Mexico and Peru. The Spaniards went mad with the lust of gold. They lost human feeling and common sense in their greediness to grasp the metal treasures of the new world. They were indifferent to the more precious and abounding products that it offered, and neglected to build up the great commerce which might have filled their hands with lasting riches. They made the old fable of the goose which laid golden eggs a piece of real history. They killed the goose; they destroyed their source of wealth in Peru and Mexico by their eager extortions. Of true commerce between the old world and the new there was little while the Spaniards controlled it. They did, in the course of time, ship considerable quantities of sugar, tobacco, hides, logwood, indigo, cochineal, cocoa, cinchona, or Peruvian bark (from which quinine is extracted) and other American products, from their various colonies; but to no such extent as a wise and enterprising people would have done, having the same opportunities. Once a year, or once in two years, a fleet of ships was sent from Seville, at first, and afterwards from Cadiz, to Vera Cruz, for freights from Mexico, and another to Porto Bello, on the Isthmus of Panama, for the South American freights. The ships which made the latter voyage were distinguished from the Mexican fleet by being called the galleons. For a long time, twelve galleons in the one squadron and fifteen ships in the other, making their voyage once a year, and sometimes only every other year, conveyed all the trade that passed between Spain and America; which shows how little the Spaniards drew from their great possessions, except the enormous treasure of silver and gold which a few ships could transport. This glittering treasure formed, in fact, the main cargo of the Peruvian galleons and the Mexican fleet. Before the close of the reign of Philip II. the number of galleons was increased to about forty and that of the fleet to



fifty or sixty. It is quite certain that no country had ever before received such a quantity of gold and silver as came into Spain during the 16th century. Instead of enriching, it ruined the nation. Neither rulers nor people had sense enough to see what a treacherous and delusive kind of wealth it formed, if trusted to alone. They vainly fancied that, with such a store of precious metals to draw upon, they could afford to despise the homely labors by which other people lived. With such mad notions as these, the honest industries of Spain were treated with neglect or worse. Her trade with neighboring countries was looked upon as a business too insignificant for Spaniards to care for or trouble themselves about. It was mostly given over to the Dutch and Flemings, while they remained under Spanish rule, and it was afterwards kept up in great part by smugglers, Dutch and English. Agriculture decayed, and its destruction was helped by the formation of a great aristocratic company of sheep-farmers, called the Mesta, to which such tyrannical rights and privileges were given by the crown that the most fertile parts of Spain were finally turned into sheep-pasture, under its control. The best artisans and the most enterprising merchants of the kingdom were driven out, because they were Moors and Jews, or they were burned for Christian beliefs which the Church did not approve. The Inquisition was so busy, with its racks and its fires, that no other business could thrive. Every kind of production dwindled, and for the supplying of all descriptions of wants the Spaniards were soon driven to look to other countries. The few who laid hands upon the riches coming in from the plunder of America spent it recklessly, in extravagant ways, while costly foreign wars which had no success, and plots in France and England which came to nothing, drained the coffers of the king. And thus the great stream of gold and silver which flowed into Spain from the new world ran out of it quite as fast, until nearly every other country in Europe held more of it than Spain herself. The strong hand with which the Spaniards were able at first, and for some time, to hold the vast domain of sea and land which the Pope had given them and which their own sailors and soldiers had explored and seized, grew weak before the end of a hundred years after the memorable voyage of Columbus was made. The hardy Dutch, driven to revolt and enmity by tyrannical government and by cruel religious persecutions, attacked them everywhere, in the eastern and western world. The English, just beginning to grow ambitious and bold on the ocean, and constantly threatened by the armadas of Spain, did the same. But these were not the only enemies who harassed the Spanish colonies and fleets. In a general way, the whole world went to war with the insolent nation which claimed the lordship of the earth. There came into existence, in the 17th century, a powerful organization of pirates or freebooters, made up of daring men of all nations, who carried on for many years a villainous warfare of their own against the Spaniards at sea and against their American settlements. These Buccaneers, as they were called, gained strongholds in several islands of the West Indies, from which the Spaniards were not able to dislodge them. Under the attacks of all these enemies, combined with her own misgovernment

and her contempt and abuse of thrifty industries and fair trade—which no people can neglect without ruin—Spain steadily and rapidly sank.

**The Flemings and the Dutch.**—In the first half of the 16th century, the people of the Netherlands were the tolerably contented subjects of that famous monarch, the Emperor Charles V., who ruled in Spain, in Naples, in Germany (the old Empire), and in Burgundy, as well as in the Lowland principalities, Flanders, Holland, and the rest. They were already very prosperous, working hard at many callings, trading shrewdly and busily with the rest of the world, and diligently picking up all kinds of knowledge everywhere. In the southern provinces (which we may call the Belgian, because they are mostly now embraced in the modern kingdom of Belgium) the chief industries were those of the loom, in all branches of weaving; and in skilful workmanship of every kind the people were tasteful and apt. These provinces were the seat of a much greater and more general activity in manufactures than appeared in the states to the north of them (which we will call the Dutch states, without distinction, because they are now included in the kingdom of Holland). The latter were more extensively employed in fisheries, in navigation and in ship-building, although most kinds of industry, manufacturing and agricultural, were thriftily and successfully carried on. At the time when Charles V. ruled the Netherlands, the city of Antwerp, in the Belgian circle of provinces, was the great metropolis of Netherland trade. It was much more than that. It was the foremost commercial capital of the world. The traffic which slipped away from Venice and Genoa, had fixed its central seat in this younger town on the Scheldt. It was sure to plant its new emporium somewhere in the Netherlands, because there was nowhere else in Europe so much energy, so much enterprise, so much industry, so much commercial wisdom, so much activity of domestic trade. Spain and Portugal held the wealth of the Indies and the Americas in their hands, but we have seen how incapable they were of using the commercial advantage it gave them. Lisbon, Cadiz and Seville were only depots for the transfer of merchandise; it was impossible to make them real capitals of trade, because they could not and would not furnish either the spirit, or the genius, or the organized agencies that it demands. The Netherlands, with their long schooling in commerce upon a smaller scale, were ready to meet every requirement when the new era opened and gave them their greater chance. There was no other mercantile organization so well prepared. The league of the Hansa Towns was breaking and failing; the English were just beginning to show their aptitude for manufactures and trade. Some one of the Netherland cities was sure to win the sovereignty in commercial affairs which Venice gave up, and Antwerp proved the winner, for a time. During most of the 16th century, it was the business center of Europe. It was the gathering-place of the merchants and the seat of the money-changers and bankers. Two and three thousand ships were often crowded in its harbor, at one time. It distributed the merchandise of the East and West Indies, which it took from Portugal and Spain, and the manifold

wares of the many manufacturing towns of Flanders, Brabant, southern Germany, to a great extent, and northern France. At the same time, its own looms, anvils, tanneries, glass-works, dyeing-vats and mechanic shops of various kinds were numerous and busy. Its thriving population was rapidly increased, for it welcomed all who came with skill or knowledge or money or strong hands to take part in its work. Such was Antwerp during the reign of Charles V., and at the time (A. D. 1555-1556) when that weary monarch gave up his many crowns to his evil son, Philip II. of Spain, and went away to a Spanish monastery to seek for rest. The government of Charles in the Netherlands had been hard and heavy, but the people were left free enough to prosper and to grow intelligent and strong. Under Philip the prospect changed. The story of his malignant persecutions and oppressions, of the revolt to which they drove the Netherland provinces, of the long, merciless war in which he strove to ruin or subdue them, of the independence which the Dutch provinces achieved and the prosperous career on which they entered, is told in another place—see NETHERLANDS. Antwerp, the great capital of trade, stood foremost in the struggle, as became its greatness, and it suffered correspondingly. The death-blow to its fortunes was given in 1585, when, after a siege that is almost unexampled, it was taken by the Spaniards under Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, and given up to pillage and slaughter. Its surviving inhabitants fled in large numbers, the greater part of them to Holland, some to England, and some to other countries. Commerce abandoned the port. The chief merchants who had made it the center of their undertakings chose Amsterdam for their future seat of business, and that city rose at once to the commercial rank of which Antwerp had been stripped by the stupid malice of its Spanish sovereign. While the Belgian Netherlands fell hopelessly under the fatal despotism of Spain, the Dutch Netherlands fought their way slowly to independence, which Spain was forced to acknowledge in 1648. But long before that time the Dutch Republic had become a power in Europe—much greater in every way than Spain. Its foundations had been laid by the union of the seven provinces of Holland, Zealand, Friesland, Utrecht, Groningen, Overijssel and Gelderland. It had grown firmer and stronger year by year, and the people, after a time, had not only found themselves able to thrive generally in the midst of their desperate war with Spain, but the war itself opened their way to wealth and power. They learned, early, as we have seen, that they could attack their enemy to the best advantage at sea. In pursuing this ocean warfare they were led on to the East and West Indies, and soon broke, in both regions, the exclusive power which the Spanish and Portuguese had held. When Portugal was dragged into a fatal union with Spain, under Philip II., it had to suffer the consequences of Philip's wars, and it bore more than its share of the suffering. The Dutch and the English forced their way pretty nearly together into the eastern seas, and, between them, the Portuguese were mostly driven out. They divided the rich commerce of that great Asiatic and Oceanic region, and, for a time, the most lucrative part of it was gained by the Dutch.

While the English got their footing on the coasts of Hindostan and were laying the foundations of their future empire in India, the Dutch gained control of the spice-growing islands, which, in that day, were the richer commercial prize. The first Dutch fleet that rounded the Cape of Good Hope and made its way into East Indian waters, sailed under the command of one Cornelius Houtmann, who had been in the service of the Portuguese and learned the route. He started in 1595 with four ships and returned, after a voyage of eighteen months, with only two. He had lost more than half his men, and he brought back very little cargo to pay for the adventurous undertaking. But the Dutch were well satisfied with the experiment; they knew that more experience would lead to better success. Another fleet of eight ships was sent out in 1598 and when four of them returned the next year with a precious cargo of spices and other merchandise from Java, which they had procured very cheaply in exchange for the cloths, the metal wares and the trinkets that they took out, the delight of the nation can hardly be described. Part of the fleet had remained in the East to hold and strengthen the position they had gained, and other ships were sent speedily to join them. Very soon the armed merchantmen of the Dutch were thickly swarming in that part of the world, ready for fight or for trade, as the case might be. So many companies of merchants became engaged in the business that too lively competition between them occurred and they threatened to ruin one another. But that danger was overcome in 1602 by joining the rival interests together in one strong association, to which the government gave exclusive rights of trade in the East. Thus the Dutch East India Company was formed, in which the merchants of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and other cities of the republic put their capital together. By its charter, this great company held powers of war as well as of commerce and it used them both with prodigious energy. At first, the chief trading stations of the Dutch in the East were at Bantam, in Java, and Amboyna, one of the group of the Moluccas or Spice Islands; but the city of Batavia, which they founded in Java in 1619, became afterwards their principal seat of trade and the capital of their surrounding possessions. The chief aim of the Dutch was to gather into their hands the profitable commerce of the island world of the Eastern Archipelago, but they did not fail to pursue their Spanish and Portuguese enemies in other quarters, where the chances of traffic looked inviting. They seized positions on the Guinea coast of western Africa and took their full share of the trade with its savage natives, who gave gold dust, ivory, ebony, gums, wax, ginger, pepper, palm oil, various choice kinds of wood, and slaves (for the West Indies and America, when the plantations there began to want labor), in exchange for trinkets and cheap goods. They also occupied and colonized the Cape of Good Hope, which the Portuguese had neglected, and made it, in time, a very prosperous and valuable possession. That they should carry their war with Spain into the West Indies and to the American coasts, was a matter of course. In 1623 a Dutch West India Company was chartered, to organize these operations in the western world, as the East India Company had organized undertakings in



the East. But the West India Company was much less commercial and much more warlike in its aims than the corporation of the orient. Its first object was to take spoils from the enemy, and it found the prizes of war so rich that not much else was thought of. On the North American continent, a most important lodgment was made, as early as 1614, at the mouth of the Hudson River, where the colony of New Netherland was founded. In this quarter, as everywhere, the Dutch and English were rivals, and before many years they came to open war. In the series of wars which followed (1652, 1665, 1672), and in the long contest with Louis XIV. of France which they shared with England, the Dutch expended more of their energies than they could afford. The English, with their well protected island, rich in soil and in minerals, had heavy advantages on their side, when once they had acquired the knowledge of commerce and the ability in labor which enabled them to compete with the Dutch. To the latter nature had always been wholly unfriendly. They had fought against circumstances at every step in their history, and had won their wealth, their knowledge, their high importance and influence in the world, by sheer hard work, tireless patience and indomitable will. But the natural advantages against which they struggled were sure to overcome them in the end. It must be said, too, that they did not grow in character as their fortunes rose. It is not difficult, therefore, to account for the fact that the Dutch nation slowly slipped back, during the 18th century, from the high and leading position in civilization to which it had climbed, and lost by degrees its commercial supremacy, while the English nation came to the front.

**The English: 16-17th Centuries.—Commercial progress.—The East India Company.**—As English commerce slowly freed itself from foreign hands, it fell under the control of monopolies at home. The merchants of the Middle Ages, in England and elsewhere, had formed themselves into societies, or guilds, just as the artisans and mechanics in different trades had done. Such associations had originally grown out of the disorderly state of the times, when government and law were weak, and when men who had common interests were forced to unite to protect themselves, and to establish customs and rules for regulating their business affairs. But the guilds almost always became, in time, oppressive monopolies, each acquiring, in its own department of business, such exclusive rights and privileges as practically shut out from that business all persons not admitted to its membership. This occurred among the merchants, as it did elsewhere, and English commerce grew up under the control of various societies of "Merchant Adventurers," as they were called—see, elsewhere, MERCHANT ADVENTURERS. The disputes and contests of these companies, at home and abroad, and their suppression of individual enterprise, appear to have hindered the growth of English commerce for a long period. But it did grow steadily, notwithstanding, and through the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, the number of English ships set afloat and of English merchants trading abroad, was rapidly multiplied. Meantime the English people gained skill in weaving, dyeing and other arts, and were fast extending the manufacture at

home of their own famous wool. This, in turn, made the sheep farming more profitable, and so much land was taken for that purpose that other products were diminished and most articles of food rose in price. That occurrence caused grave anxiety, and the meddling statesmen of the time, who thought that nothing could go well if their wisdom did not regulate it by law (as too many meddling statesmen think yet) began to frame acts of Parliament which directed how farming lands should be managed and how many sheep a single farmer should be permitted to own. The same kind of statesmanship took alarm at the spread of weaving, in a small way, among industrious villagers and country people, who set up looms and made and sold cloth, outside of the guilds of the town weavers. So the complaints of the latter were listened to, and Parliament forbade weaving to be done outside of certain towns, except for home use in the family of the weaver. There was much of that sort of legislation during Tudor times, and the industry and enterprise of the country had to struggle long and hard for freedom to fairly exercise themselves. But in spite of meddling statesmen and tyrannical monopolies, the people went on from year to year, learning more, doing more, producing more, wanting more, buying and selling more, and living in a better way. After about 1511, there appears to have been a considerable direct trade growing up between England and the countries of the eastern Mediterranean (the Levant), and consuls, to look after the rights and interests of English merchants, began to be appointed, at Candia, and elsewhere, as early as 1530. The voyage from London to the Levant and return then occupied from eleven months to a year. About 1535 the English made their appearance as traders on the Guinea coast of West Africa, disputing the exclusive rights which the Portuguese claimed there, and in 1537 they opened trade with the Moors of the Barbary coast, in northern Africa. In 1553 a chartered company of London merchants was formed with the object of exploring for a northeastern passage to China, around Europe, through the Arctic seas, as a means of dividing the trade of the East with the Portuguese, who controlled the southern route, around Africa. This is believed to have been the first joint stock corporation of shareholders that was organized in England. Sebastian Cabot, then "Grand Pilot of England," was at the head of it. The northwestern passage was not found, but the company opened a trade with Russia which proved to be exceedingly valuable. Accepting this, in lieu of the China trade which it could not reach, it became, as the Russia Company, a rich and powerful corporation. The success of the Russia Company stimulated the adventurous disposition of the English people and set other enterprises in motion. But still more energy was roused by the hostility of national feeling toward Spain. The destruction of the Armada broke the Spanish naval power and made the English bold. They began to navigate the sea from that time with intent to become its masters, though the Dutch were still superior to them in maritime strength and experience. During the reign of Elizabeth there rose a new race of Vikings, very much like the old Norse heroes of the sea, and pursuing a very similar career. The most daring and most famous among them, such as Grenville, Drake and Hawkins, were

more than half pirates, and their voyages were chiefly expeditions for plunder, directed against the Spaniards and Portuguese. The trade which they first gave attention to was the trade in negro slaves. But those piratical adventurers of the 16th century made England the "mistress of the seas." They trained for her a body of sailors who were able in time to more than cope with the Dutch, and they opened the newly known regions of the world for her merchants and colonists to spread over them. Before the end of the 17th century, the English had become the foremost power in the western world and were making the most of its opportunities for production and trade. Meantime they were pushing their way with equal energy in the East. On the last day of the year 1600 the "Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies," which became afterwards so great and famous as the "East India Company" of England, was chartered by the Queen. The Company sent out its first fleet of five vessels in 1601. The expedition returned, after an absence of two years and seven months, richly laden, in part with pepper from Sumatra and in part with the spoils of a Portuguese ship which it had captured in the straits of Malacca. It had settled a trading agency, or factory, at Bantam—and that was the beginning of the vast empire which England now rules in the East.—See INDIA: A. D. 1600-1702.

**The English: 17-18th Centuries.—The Colonial or Sole Market Commercial System.**—"The doctrine that the commercial prosperity of a country depends on the creation, maintenance, and extension of a sole market for its products and for its supplies, was prevalent from the discovery of the New World and the Cape Passage down to the war of American Independence. This was the principal object of Borgia's Bulls. This was what animated the Dutch, in their successful, in the end too successful, struggle, after a monopoly of the Spice Islands. This was the motive which led to the charters of the Russian Company, the Levant Company, the East India Company, the Turkey Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, in England. The theory was organized in the colonial system, which Adam Smith examined, attacked, and as far as argument could go, demolished in his great work. But the dream of a sole market is still possessing the Germans and the French. . . . The early wars of Europe were wars of conquest. . . . After them came the wars of religion, from the outbreak of the Insurrection in the Low Countries, and the civil wars in France, down to the Peace of Westphalia in the middle of the 17th century. From that day to our own, European wars have been waged on behalf of the balance of power, the principal mischief-maker in the contest being France. The English, the French, and the Dutch were the competitors in the wars for a sole market. But Holland was practically ruined at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and France was stripped . . . of her colonies at the peace of Paris, and England became not only the principal maritime, but the principal manufacturing and mercantile country in the world. As regards English trade, however, though India was an outlet to some extent for English goods, its trade was in the hands of a chartered company, whom the Seven Years' War had left

in serious straits. The most important sole market which Great Britain had acquired by her wars was the sea-board of North America. To support the finances of the chartered company, the British Parliament determined on taxing the inhabitants of her sole market, and the result as you know was the war of American Independence. . . . The colonial or sole-market system was based on a strict reciprocity. The English Government admitted colonial produce into the English markets at differential duties, or prohibited the produce of foreign nations and foreign colonies altogether. The Colonies were not only the customers of English manufacturers only, to the absolute exclusion of foreign manufactures, but were prohibited from undertaking those manufactures themselves. The English Government adopted with their colonies the policy which they adopted with Irish manufactures, which they also prohibited, but with this difference, that they disabled the Irish from having any trade whatever with England, with the Colonies, and with foreign countries. They wished to extinguish, with one exception, every Irish product, and to constitute themselves the sole manufacturers and shopkeepers for the Irish. They allowed only the linen manufacture of Ulster. The Irish were to be, with this exception, agriculturists only, but they were to be disabled from selling their agricultural produce in England, or elsewhere. They were practically denied the right of trade. . . . It was the doctrine of the sole market in its most exaggerated form. . . . The colonial system, under which advantages were secured to the colonial producer by giving him a preferred market in Great Britain, while the colonist was debarred from engaging in manufactures, was a selfish one on the part of the English merchants and manufacturers. It gave the colonist a sole market, it is true. But it does not follow that a sole market is a high market. On the contrary, it is probable that the offer of a sole market is intended to secure a low market. The Virginian planter sent the whole of his tobacco to England. The English trader re-exported it to other countries, say Holland or Germany. It may be presumed that he made a profit on the original consignment, and on the re-exportation, or he would not have undertaken the business. . . . The colonial system did not preclude the plantations from sending, under the strict conditions of the Navigation Act, certain kinds of produce to other countries than England. These were called non-enumerated commodities, the principal being corn, timber, salted provisions, fish, sugar, and rum. There was a reason for this, which was to be found in the fiscal system of England. We did not want colonial corn, for there were duties on corn, levied in the interest of the landlords, nor colonial timber, salted meat and salted fish, for the home produce of these articles were similarly assisted. Sugar and rum were allowed to be exported, for the owners of the plantations in the Leeward isles were chiefly absentee English proprietors, who had already a monopoly of English supply, and were powerful enough in Parliament to get an extended market elsewhere. But in 1769, just before the troubles broke out with the American plantations, an Act was passed, disabling the colonists from sending even the non-enumerated commodities to any country north of Cape Finisterre,



in Northern Spain. . . . The enumerated goods, and there was a long list of them, could be exported to Great Britain only. They consisted, as Adam Smith says, of what could not be produced in this country, and what could be produced in great quantity in the Colonies."—J. E. T. Rogers, *The Economic Interpretation of Hist.*, lect. 15.

**The Americans: Colonial Trade.**—"We are a nation of land-traffickers, but our ancestors in the colonies traded and traveled almost entirely by water. There were but twelve miles of land-carriage in all the province of New York; beyond Albany the Indian trade was carried on by 'three-' or 'four-handed batteaus,' sharp at both ends, like the Adirondack boat of to-day. Yachts, with bottoms of black oak and sides of red cedar, brought wheat in bulk and peltries down the Hudson; other craft carried on the domestic trade of New York town with the shores of Long Island, Staten Island, and the little ports beyond the Kill von Kull. . . . The first regular wagon-carriage from the Connecticut River to Boston did not begin until 1697; Massachusetts had then been settled seventy years. The flat-bottomed boat, which has since played so important a part in the trade of the Ohio and the Mississippi, and whose form was probably suggested by that of the 'west country barges' of England, appears to have been used for floating produce down the Delaware before 1685. In the Chesapeake colonies, until late in the provincial period, there were almost no roads but the numerous bays and water-courses, and almost no vehicles but canoes, row-boats, pinnaces and barks. Places of resort for worship or business were usually near the water-side. . . . But of all means of travel or trade the Indian canoe was the chief. . . . Roads in the colonies were hardly ever laid out, but were left where Indian trail or chance cart-track in the woods had marked them. . . . From England, along with bad roads, the colonists brought the pack-horse which, in Devon and Cornwall, at the close of the last century, still did the carrying, even of building-stones and cord-wood. Most of the inland traffic of the colonial period was done by packing. . . . The Germans, whose ancestors had four-wheeled vehicles in the days of Julius Cæsar, made good roads wherever they planted themselves. While their English neighbors were content to travel on horseback and to ford and swim streams, the Salzburgers in Georgia began by opening a wagon-road twelve miles long, with seven bridges, 'which surprised the English mightily.' Pennsylvania, the home of the Germans, alone of the colonies built good straight roads; and the facility which these afforded to ten thousand freight-wagons was the main advantage that gave Philadelphia the final preëminence among the colonial sea-ports, and made Lancaster the only considerable inland mart in North America. . . . Proximity to the wampum-making savages at one end of Hudson River navigation and to the beaver-catchers at the other made New York the chief seat of the fur trade. Wagon-roads, soil, climate, and an industrious people made Philadelphia the principal center of the traffic in bread and meat. The never-ending line of convenient shore that bordered the peninsulas of Maryland and Virginia, and gave a good landing-place at every man's door, with a tobacco currency, rendered it

difficult to build towns or develop trade among the easy-going planters of the Chesapeake and Albemarle regions. A different coast-line, and rivers less convenient, made Charleston the rich and urbane commercial and social center of southern Carolina. Until about 1750 Boston was the leading sea-port, and its long wharf, 2,000 feet in length with warehouses on one side of it, was the New World wonder of travelers. Five or six hundred vessels annually cleared out of Boston in the middle of the 18th century for the foreign trade alone, and the city contained between twenty and thirty thousand people at the outbreak of the Revolution. But Newport, with its thirty distilleries to make rum of the molasses brought from the islands, and its seventeen sperm-oil and candle factories to work up the results of the whaling industry, had nearly half as many ships in foreign trade as Boston, and three or four hundred craft of all sorts in the coast-wise carrying trade. He was thought a bold prophet who said then that 'New York might one day equal Newport'; for about 1750 New York sent forth fewer ships than Newport, and not half so many as Boston. . . . But Philadelphia—planted late in the 17th century—outstripped all rivals, and for the last twenty years of the colonial period was the chief port of North America. . . . The imports and exports of the two tobacco colonies together were far larger than those of Philadelphia, but their profits were far less."—E. Eggleston, *Commerce in the Colonies* (Century, June, 1884).

**The English: 18-19th Centuries.**—**Rising prosperity and commercial supremacy.**—**Successful War, Free Trade and Steam Power.**—"If we look at the state of the European powers after the conclusion of the Seven Years' War in 1763, we shall see how favourable our position then was. In the first place, England had seriously crippled her commercial rival, France, both in her Indian and American possessions, and thereby had gained extensive colonial territories which afforded a ready market for British goods. Spain, which had been allied with France, had lost at the same time her position as the commercial rival of England in trade with the New World. Germany had for some time ceased to be a formidable competitor, and was now being ravaged by internal conflicts between the reigning houses of Austria and Prussia. Holland, which had once been England's most serious rival—especially in foreign commerce—was at this time in a similar condition, and had greatly declined from the prosperity of the 16th and 17th centuries. Hence England alone had the chance of 'the universal empire of the sole market.' The supply of this market was in the hands of English manufacturers and English workmen, so that the great inventions which came into operation after 1763 were thus at once called into active employment, and our mills and mines were able to produce wealth as fast as they could work, without fear of foreign competition. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in the ten years, from 1782 to 1792, our entire foreign trade was nearly doubled, the exact figures being:—1782, imports £10,341,628, exports £13,009,458; 1792, imports £19,659,358, exports £24,905,200. And this remarkable progress was still kept up even during the great continental wars which were caused by the French Revolution, and which lasted for almost

a quarter of a century. . . . In spite of the almost entire loss of our trade in some directions, English commerce improved in others; and, in fact, any loss was more than counterbalanced by an increase in regard to the (now independent) United States, Russia, Venice, Germany, and Northern Europe, as well as with the West and East Indian colonies, both British and foreign. In fact, many of the countries whom France had compelled to become our enemies found themselves unable to do without British manufactures, especially as their own industries were suffering from the warfare that was going on on the Continent, and therefore had to find means to procure our goods. . . . The close of the 25 years of continental war (1815) is sometimes taken as being the date when the modern system of commerce may be said to have had its beginning. Up to that time, although great changes and advances had been made, the spirit of monopoly and the general restrictive policy which characterised previous centuries, were still, to some extent, in force. But not very long after the peace that was won by the battle of Waterloo, a remarkable change was made in the commercial policy of England. . . . We now come to the beginnings of freedom of trade."—H. de B. Gibbins, *British Commerce and Colonies*, pp. 91-102.—"When the wars of the French Revolution began, the foundations of a great empire had already been broadly laid; and when it ended, England stood out as a power which had grown greater in the struggle. . . . Dutchman, Dane, and Spaniard, Frenchman and Venetian, all ancient competitors of England, fell before her; and, when the sword was sheathed in 1815, it was no exaggerated boast to call her mistress of the seas. These facts should never be lost sight of in any consideration of the causes which have led us to where we now are. Without these preparatory steps, both in domestic industries and in foreign wars and conquests, England would not, with all her material advantages, have been so entirely the gainer by the progress of the last fifty years as she has so far proved to be. . . . There is the more need to remember this because the time immediately following the war was one of severe domestic suffering, and of much retrograde legislation, conceived with a view to, if possible, lessen that suffering. . . . The worst of all the laws which then restricted trade were those relating to the exports and imports of corn, which the younger men of to-day have well-nigh forgotten. . . . It was not till after long years of agitation by John Bright, Richard Cobden, and other leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League, that the landed party gave way sullenly, and assented, amid the most gloomy predictions of impending ruin, to the repeal of the sliding scale altogether, and the virtual abolition of all corn laws by the substitution of a fixed duty of 1s. per quarter. Thus recently was one of the most oppressive pieces of fiscal legislation that man could have conceived withdrawn; and not until 1849, when that law came into force, could the industries of the country be said to be anything like unfettered. Yet twenty years more passed before this shilling duty—the last rag of protection—was itself flung aside, and the import of corn became perfectly free. . . . But many other changes had in the meantime taken place, all tending more and more to throw off the shackles

of trade. . . . As late as 1840 our customs tariff was described in the report of a committee of the House of Commons as 'presenting neither congruity nor unity of purpose;' as 'often aiming at incompatible ends,' seeking both to produce revenue and to protect interests in ways incompatible with each other.\* There were no fewer than 1,150 different rates of duty chargeable on imported articles, . . . and the committee gave a list of 862 of such articles which were subject to duty, seventeen of which then produced 94 per cent. of a revenue amounting to £23,000,000. . . . The present customs tariff contains less than two dozen articles all told, and including those on which duty is imposed to countervail the excise charges on internal products. The ordinary import articles on which duty is charged number only seven. . . . But there is yet another hindrance the removal of which has to be noticed, and which, till removed, cramped England very seriously, viz. the navigation laws and the great trade monopoly of the East India Company. . . . It took longer time . . . to accomplish the complete deliverance of our mercantile marine from the baneful influence of 'protective' jealousy than to accomplish any other great free-trade reform. A tentative effort to lessen the consequences of confining the carrying trade of England to English ships was made in 1825 by Mr. Huskisson; but it was not till 1854 that complete free trade on the sea was granted by the abolition of any restriction as to the nationality of vessels engaged in the coasting trade of the kingdom. . . . Here, then, we have noted briefly the various steps and leading characteristics of the commercial reforms which, in this country, either paved the way for or secured the benefit of the great outburst of enterprise and influx of wealth which began in the second quarter of the present century. These various reforms constitute, so to say, the negative side of the modern commercial prosperity which this country built upon the foundations of her world-wide empire; and, in order to get a complete outline of the position which we at present occupy, we must now revert briefly to the positive side of the subject; we must find out where the great modern wealth has come from, and on what it has been based. Freedom of trade no doubt did much to call wealth and enterprise into being; but in what did this wealth consist? Happily the leading features are not difficult to trace. Although the foundations of the great manufacturing industries of this country lie far back in the past, their development, like the growth of free-trade principles, is quite modern, and dates in reality from the day when George Stephenson won the competition at Liverpool with his locomotive 'the Rocket,' settling thereby the question of railroad travelling by steam beyond dispute. The mere stimulus to all kinds of mining and manufacturing industries which this victory and the subsequent railway operations gave, was itself enough to cause the trade of this country to press forward by 'leaps and bounds.' Since November 1830, it may be said to have done so; and the mere fact that England was the originator of the railway systems of the world, and that she contained within herself almost boundless materials wherewith to supply those systems, would itself suffice to explain the pre-eminence which from that day to this has



been unquestionably hers. The great natural resources of the country were first employed in supplying the materials for home development, and then gradually the wealth thus acquired by digging in the bowels of the earth was utilised in tempting or leading other nations into a career of 'progress' similar to our own. In spite of the many losses which individuals suffered in the early days of this progress, the nation grew steadily richer and its stores of realised wealth increased with every new enterprise almost that it took up. . . . Each year the realised wealth of the one before told, as it were, in swelling the working power of the nation, and in enlarging the business capacities and scope of its credit. . . . Side by side with the increased produce of the country, the increased manufactures, and the increasing wealth, there were growing up facilities for intercommunication with all parts of the world, and with that an increasing tendency to emigration. The home hives were constantly throwing off young swarms, which, settling now in America, now in Australia, now in Africa, became so many new centres of demand, so many links in the trade chain that we had bound round the world."—A. J. Wilson, *British Trade* (*Fraser's Mag.*, Sept., 1876), pp. 271-277.—"The almost unlimited expansion which becomes marked about 1850 and culminates in 1873, has been pointed to by many different people as proof of the great effect of different measures or inventions; as a matter of fact, it was due to no one cause, but was rather the result of multitudinous discoveries and events, acting and reacting on each other. Perhaps the following list of dates shows this most clearly:—Opening of first English railway, 1830; Wheatstone's telegraph, 1837; first ocean steamer, 1838; settlement in New Zealand, 1840; reduction of duties on raw materials, 1842; repeal of Corn Laws, 1846; commercial treaty with France, 1860. Here are seven events of widely different natures, each of which must have had its effect in the period under consideration, and it would be useless, even if it were possible, to weigh the separate result of each. We cannot estimate, we can obtain no criterion of the vast effects of the adoption of Free Trade. Three things, however, are clear:—First, that till the suffocating restrictions were removed, trade could not expand; when exports were prohibited, imports could not be plentiful; when imports were taxed, the demand at enhanced prices could not be great. Secondly, if every restriction was removed from every branch of trade, there would be no increase without natural causes of manufacture and demand, no increased demand without a cheapening or improvement of supply; that, in fact, Free Trade is the method, not the source, of commerce, and that the claim of this increase as the direct result of freedom and a proof of its expediency is an inaccurate exaggeration. Thirdly, that the date of the marked commencement of the expansion coincides exactly with the reductions and abolitions of duties, pointing to the fact, borne out by all concurrent events, that the adoption of Free Trade was the opening of the valve which allowed the forces of commerce full play. . . . It was in the trades of comparatively recent establishment, in England especially, that there were immense outputs (of cotton goods and machinery, for instance), in great excess of the

home demand; and this could only pay if the foreign demand grew in proportion to the growing efficiency; that is to say, our newer industries became the most important, and were marked as our division of international labour. The foreign demand, indeed, for our manufactures and our machines was extraordinary. Now, every country is trying to rival our goods, and each to produce for herself the manufactures she requires; then, rivalry was out of the question. . . . On every side new markets were opened; old trades were increased, new developed. The railways built with our materials opened up districts hitherto inaccessible; this acted as a fresh stimulus to our manufacturers—more capital was forthcoming, and more railways were built. Not only were countries, with which we had already established some trade, brought nearer and in closer relation, but new countries were discovered. Australia and New Zealand were ready to take our surplus population, and were not behindhand in the new system of development. Our older colonies also increased. With each emigration the number of our customers abroad was multiplied. In 1850 and 1852 this process was accelerated by the news of the gold discoveries in California and Australia. So great was the emigration and the consequent demand for ships that all freights were increased, and, with a short lull, this continued till 1856. . . . The last great impetus was given by the Suez Canal, by which the journey to India and the East was quickened by one-half, and, at the same time, rendered more secure."—A. L. Bowley, *England's Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, ch. 4.—See, also, *TARIFF LEGISLATION (ENGLAND)*: A. D. 1842, and after.

**The Americans: A. D. 1856-1895.—Decay of American shipping interests.**—"Down to the year 1856, the United States had rapidly advanced in commercial greatness, and had overcome all the obstacles which had clustered about their path. At that time we were close upon the heels of England, and everything pointed to our speedily passing her in the race for commercial supremacy. Since then our commerce has steadily declined,—a misfortune usually attributed to the civil war, and subsequently to the competition of more profitable forms of investment. These circumstances no doubt hastened the loss of our commerce; but, as Lieutenant Kelley points out, they are not the true causes of its decline, inasmuch as that began before the civil war. The origin of our difficulties lay in the abandonment of our old policy, which, from the beginning of the century, consisted in surpassing all the world in the quality and speed of our ships and in our naval architecture. With the substitution of iron for wood we began to drop behind, until, with a population of 55,000,000, we have a tonnage but little greater than we had when half as numerous. Moreover, our percentage of wrecks is larger than that of any other seafaring people, and our ships and steamers are shorter-lived."—*The Question of Ships* (*Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1884, pp. 859-861).—"The first symptoms of the decadence appeared in 1856, in the falling-off in the sales of American tonnage to foreigners; the reduction being from 65,000 in 1855 to 42,000 in 1856, to 26,000 in 1858, and to 17,000 in 1860. During the war, however, the transfers of

American tonnage to foreign flags again increased very largely, and, for the years 1862 to 1865 inclusive, amounted to the large aggregate of 824,652 tons, or to more than one-fourth of all the registered tonnage (the tonnage engaged in foreign trade) of the United States in 1860. But these transfers, it is well understood, were not in the nature of ordinary business, but for the sake of obtaining a more complete immunity from destruction upon the high seas than the United States at that time was able to afford. The year 1856 also marks the time when the growth of our foreign steam-shipping was arrested, and a retrograde movement inaugurated; so that . . . our aggregate tonnage in this department was 1,000 tons less in 1862 than it was in 1855. The total tonnage of every description built in the United States also declined from 583,450 tons in 1855 (the largest amount ever built in any one year) to 469,393 in 1856, 378,804 in 1857, and 212,892 in 1860, a reduction of 68 per cent in five years. During the year 1855, American vessels carried 75.6 per cent of the value of the exports and imports of the United States. After 1855 this proportion steadily declined to 75.2 per cent in 1856, 70.5 in 1857, 66.9 in 1859, and 65.2 in 1861, the year of the outbreak of the war. . . . Of the enormous increase in the foreign commerce of the United States since 1860, as above noted, every maritime nation of any note, with the exception of the United States, has taken a share. American tonnage alone exhibits a decrease. Thus, comparing 1880 with 1856, the foreign tonnage entering the seaports of the United States increased nearly 11,000,000 of tons; whereas the American tonnage entered during the same period exhibits a decrease of over 65,000 tons. British tonnage increased its proportion from 935,000 tons in 1856 to 7,903,000 in 1880; Germany, during the same time, from 166,000 to 1,089,000; and Sweden and Norway from 20,662 to 1,234,000. Austria, limited to almost a single seaport, jumped up from 1,477 tons in 1856 to 206,000 tons in 1880, and had, in 1879, 179 large-class sailing-vessels engaged in the American trade. Sleepy Portugal increased during the same period from 4,727 tons to 24,449 tons. . . . How is it, that the United States, formerly a maritime power of the first class, has now no ships or steamers that can profitably compete for the carrying of even its own exports; not merely with the ships of our great commercial rival, England, but also with those of Italy, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Holland, Austria, and Portugal? . . . The facts already presented fully demonstrate that the war was not the cause, and did not mark the commencement, of the decadence of American shipping; although the contrary is often and perhaps generally assumed by those who have undertaken to discuss this subject. The war simply hastened a decay which had already commenced. . . . The primary cause was what may be termed a natural one, the result of the progress of the age and a higher degree of civilization; namely, the substitution of steam in place of wind as an agent for ship-propulsion, and the substitution of iron in the place of wood as a material for ship-construction. . . . The means and appliances for the construction of iron vessels did not then [in 1855] exist in the United States; while Great Britain, commencing even as far back as 1837 (when John

Laird constructed his first iron steamers of any magnitude for steam navigation), and with eighteen years of experience, had become thoroughly equipped in 1855 for the prosecution of this great industry. The facilities for the construction of steam machinery adapted to the most economical propulsion of ocean vessels, furthermore, were also inferior in the United States to those existing in Great Britain; and, by reason of statute provisions, citizens of the United States interested in ocean commerce were absolutely prevented and forbidden from availing themselves of the results of British skill and superiority in the construction of vessels when such a recourse was the only policy which could have enabled them at the time to hold their position in the ocean carrying trade in competition with their foreign rivals. . . . The inability of the ships of the United States to do the work which trade and commerce required that they should do as well and cheaply as the ships of other nations having been demonstrated by experience, the decadence of American shipping commenced and was inevitable from the very hour when this fact was first recognized, which was about the year 1856. Here, then, we have the primary cause of the decay of the business of ship-building in the United States and of our commercial marine. . . . The question which next naturally presents itself in the order of this inquiry and discussion is, Why is it that the people of the United States have not been permitted to enjoy the privileges accorded to other maritime nations, of adjusting their shipping interests to the spirit and wants of the age? Why have they alone been debarred from using the best tools in an important department of commerce, when the using meant business retained, labor employed, and capital rewarded, and the non-using equally meant decay, paralysis, and impoverishment? The answer is, Because of our so-called navigation laws."—D. A. Wells, *Our Merchant Marine*, ch. 2-3. — "Somewhat curtailed, the navigation laws may be summarized as follows: No American is allowed to import a foreign-built vessel in the sense of purchasing, acquiring a registry, or using her as his property; the only other imports, equally and forcibly prohibited, being counterfeit money and obscene goods. An American vessel ceases to be such if owned in the smallest degree by a naturalized citizen, who may, after acquiring the purchase, reside for more than one year in his native country, or for more than two years in any other foreign state. An American ship owned in part or in full by an American citizen who, without the expectation of relinquishing his citizenship, resides in any foreign country except as United States Consul, or as agent or partner in an exclusively American mercantile house, loses its register and its right to protection. A citizen obtaining a register for an American vessel must make oath that no foreigner is directly or indirectly interested in the profits thereof, whether as commander, officer, or owner. Foreign capital may build our railroads, work our mines, insure our property, and buy our bonds, but a single dollar invested in American ships so taints as to render it unworthy of the benefit of our laws. No foreign-built vessel can, under penalty of confiscation, enter our ports and then sail to another domestic port with any new cargo, or with



any part of an original cargo, which has once been unladen previously, without touching at some port of some foreign country. This law is construed to include all direct traffic between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States via Cape Horn, the Cape of Good Hope, or the Isthmus of Panama; and being a coasting trade, foreigners cannot compete. An American vessel once sold or transferred to a foreigner, can never again become American property, even if the transaction has been the result of capture and condemnation by a foreign power in time of war. Vessels under 30 tons cannot be used to import anything at any seaboard town. Cargoes from the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope are subject to a duty of 10 per cent. in addition to the direct importation duties. American vessels repaired in foreign ports must pay a duty on the repairs equal to one-half the cost of the foreign work or material, or pay 50 per cent. ad valorem, the master or owner making entry of such repairs as imports. This liberal provision, which dates from 1866, is made to include boats obtained at sea, from a passing foreign vessel, in order to assure the safety of our own seamen.

. . . All other nations have the power of buying ships for foreign trade in the cheapest market, and the effort to protect our shipbuilders by the denial of this right forbids the return of commercial prosperity."—J. D. J. Kelley, *The Question of Ships*, ch. 4-5.

**The recent revolution in Commerce.**—"All economists who have specially studied this matter are substantially agreed that, within the period named [1860-1885], man in general has attained to such a greater control over the forces of Nature, and has so compassed their use, that he has been able to do far more work in a given time, produce far more product, measured by quantity in ratio to a given amount of labor, and reduce the effort necessary to insure a comfortable subsistence in a far greater measure than it was possible for him to accomplish 20 or 30 years anterior to the time of the present writing (1889). In the absence of sufficiently complete data, it is not easy, and perhaps not possible, to estimate accurately, and specifically state the average saving in time and labor in the world's work of production and distribution that has been thus achieved. In a few departments of industrial effort the saving in both of these factors has certainly amounted to 70 or 80 per cent; in not a few to more than 50 per cent. . . . Out of such results as are definitely known and accepted have come tremendous industrial and social disturbances, the extent and effect of which—and more especially of the disturbances which have culminated, as it were, in later years—it is not easy to appreciate without the presentation and consideration of certain typical and specific examples. . . . Let us go back, in the first instance, to the year 1869, when an event occurred which was probably productive of more immediate and serious economic changes—industrial, commercial, and financial—than any other event of this century, a period of extensive war excepted. That was the opening of the Suez Canal. . . . The old transportation had been performed by ships, mainly sailing-vessels, fitted to go round the Cape, and as such ships were not adapted to the Suez Canal, an amount of tonnage, estimated by some authorities as high as two million tons, and representing an immense

amount of wealth, was virtually destroyed. The voyage, in place of occupying from six to eight months, has been so greatly reduced that steamers adapted to the canal now make the voyage from London to Calcutta, or vice versa, in less than 30 days. The notable destruction or great impairment in the value of ships consequent upon the construction of the canal did not, furthermore, terminate with its immediate opening and use; for improvements in marine engines, diminishing the consumption of coal, and so enabling vessels to be not only sailed at less cost, but to carry also more cargo, were, in consequence of demand for quick and cheap service so rapidly effected, that the numerous and expensive steamer constructions of 1870-'73, being unable to compete with the constructions of the next two years, were nearly all displaced in 1875-'76, and sold for half, or less than half, of their original cost. And within another decade these same improved steamers of 1875-'76 have, in turn, been discarded and sold at small prices. . . . Again, with telegraphic communication between India and China, and the markets of the Western world, permitting the dealers and consumers of the latter to adjust to a nicety their supplies of commodities to varying demands, and with the reduction of the time of the voyage to 30 days or less, there was no longer any necessity of laying up great stores of Eastern commodities in Europe; and with the termination of this necessity, the India warehouse and distribution system of England, with all the labor and all the capital and banking incident to it, substantially passed away. Europe, and to some extent the United States, ceased to go to England for its supplies. . . . Importations of East Indian produce are also no longer confined in England and other countries to a special class of merchants; and so generally has this former large and special department of trade been broken up and dispersed, that extensive retail grocers in the larger cities of Europe and the United States are now reported as drawing their supplies direct from native dealers in both China and India. . . . In short, the construction of the Suez Canal completely revolutionized one of the greatest departments of the world's commerce and business; absolutely destroying an immense amount of what had previously been wealth, and displacing or changing the employment of millions of capital and thousands of men. . . . The deductions from the most recent tonnage statistics of Great Britain come properly next in order for consideration. During the ten years from 1870 to 1880, inclusive, the British mercantile marine increased its movement, in the matter of foreign entries and clearances alone, to the extent of 22,000,000 tons; or, to put it more simply, the British mercantile marine exclusively engaged in foreign trade did so much more work within the period named; and yet the number of men who were employed in effecting this great movement had decreased in 1880, as compared with 1870, to the extent of about 3,000 (2,990 exactly). What did it? The introduction of steam hoisting-machines and grain-elevators upon the wharves and docks, and the employment of steam-power upon the vessels for steering, raising the sails and anchors, pumping, and discharging the cargo; or, in other words, the ability, through the increased use of steam and improved machinery, to carry larger

cargoes in a shorter time, with no increase—or, rather, an actual decrease—of the number of men employed in sailing or managing the vessels. . . . Prior to about the year 1875 ocean-steamships had not been formidable as freight-carriers. The marine engine was too heavy, occupied too much space, consumed too much coal. . . . The result of the construction and use of compound engines in economizing coal has been illustrated by Sir Lyon Playfair, by the statement that 'a small cake of coal, which would pass through a ring the size of a shilling, when burned in the compound engine of a modern steamboat would drive a ton of food and its proportion of the ship two miles on its way from a foreign port.' . . . Is it, therefore, to be wondered at, that the sailing-vessel is fast disappearing from the ocean? . . . Great, however, as has been the revolution in respect to economy and efficiency in the carrying-trade upon the ocean, the revolution in the carrying-trade upon land during the same period has been even greater and more remarkable. Taking the American railroads in general as representative of the railroad system of the world, the average charge for moving one ton of freight per mile has been reduced from about 2.5 cents in 1869 to 1.06 in 1887; or, taking the results on one of the standard roads of the United States the (New York Central), from 1.95 in 1869 to 0.68 in 1885. . . . One marked effect of the present railroad and steamship system of transportation has been to compel a uniformity of prices for all commodities that are essential to life. . . . For grain henceforth, therefore, the railroad and the steamship have decided that there shall be but one market—the world."—D. A. Wells, *Recent Economic Changes*, pp. 27-47.—A recent English writer says: "Formerly we [the English] were the great manufacturers of the world; the great distributors and the great warehousemen of the world. Our country was the point on which the great passenger traffic impinged from America and from our Colonies, and from which passengers distributed themselves over the continent of Europe. The products of the world as a general rule came to English ports, and from English ports were distributed to their various markets. All this has much changed. Probably the alteration is more marked in our distributing trade than in that of our manufacturing trade or in any other direction. About twenty years ago all the silk that was manufactured or consumed in Europe was brought to England from the East, mostly in a raw state, and was thence distributed to continental mills. Notwithstanding the increased consumption in Europe, silk now coming to England for distribution is only about one-eighth of the quantity that came here some twelve years ago. This is one single example of an Oriental product. The same diversion of our distributing trade can be traced in almost every other commodity. Many people believe that the opening of the Suez Canal has caused this diminution of our distributing trade, and it cannot be denied that the Suez Canal has done much to divert Oriental trade from this country, and to send goods direct through the Canal to the continental ports, where they are consumed, or where they can be placed on railways and be forwarded without break of bulk to their destinations. But whatever the Suez Canal may have

done to divert trade in Oriental goods such as tea or silk, it cannot account for the diversion of the trade coming from America. Yet we find the same diversion of American products which formerly came to England for distribution. With cotton the same result is found, and with coffee from the Brazil. Nor does the diversion of these articles merely demonstrate that our distributing trade is being lost to us: it also shows that the manufacturers of England now permit the raw material of their industries to be sent straight to the factories of their competitors on the Continent. It shows that the great manufactures of the world are being transferred from England to Belgium, France, Germany, and even to Portugal and Spain. In the train of these manufactures are rapidly following all the complex and complicated businesses which are the hand-maidens of commerce. For instance, the financial business which used to centre in London is being transferred to Paris, Antwerp, and Germany, mainly because the goods to which this business relates are now consigned to continental countries instead of as formerly being brought to England to be distributed therefrom. . . . The loss of our distributing trade is to my mind in a great measure due to the fact that goods consigned to continental ports can be there put upon railways and sent straight to their destination; while goods sent to English ports must be put upon a railway, taken to our coast, there taken out of the railway, put on board a vessel, taken across to the Continent, there unloaded, then put on the railway and sent off to their ultimate destination. These transshipments from railway to vessel and from vessel to railway are always costly, always involve time, and in the case of some perishable articles render the transaction almost prohibitive. To get over this difficulty and to retain our distributing trade, there appears to me to be only one course open, and that is in some way to obtain direct railway-communication from Liverpool, from London, from Bristol, from Hull, from Glasgow, and from Dundee, to the continental markets where the goods landed at those ports are consumed."—H. M. Hozier, *England's Real Peril* (*Macmillan's Mag.*, July, 1888).

**Waterways and Railways in modern inland commerce.**—"There are three great epochs in the modern history of canal navigation, each marked by characteristics peculiar to itself, and sufficiently unlike those of either of the others to enable it to be readily differentiated. They may be thus described:—1. The era of waterways, designed at once to facilitate the transport of heavy traffic from inland centres to the seaboard, and to supersede the then existing systems of locomotion—the wagon and the pack-horse. This era commenced with the construction of the Bridgewater Canal between 1766 and 1770, and terminated with the installation of the railway system in 1830. 2. The era of interoceanic canals, which was inaugurated by the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, and is still in progress. 3. The era of ship-canals intended to afford to cities and towns remote from the sea, all the advantages of a seaboard, and especially that of removing and dispatching merchandise without the necessity of breaking bulk. The second great stage in the development of canal transport is of comparatively recent origin. It may, in fact, be



said to date only from the time when the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez was proved to be not only practicable as an engineering project, but likewise highly successful as a commercial enterprise. Not that this was by any means the first canal of its kind. On the contrary, . . . the ancients had many schemes of a similar kind in view across the same isthmus. The canal of Languedoc, constructed in the reign of Louis XIV., was for that day as considerable an undertaking. It was designed for the purpose of affording a safe and speedy means of communication between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean; it has a total length of 148 miles, is in its highest part 600 ft. above the level of the sea, and has in all 114 locks and sluices. In Russia, canals had been constructed in the time of Peter the Great, for the purpose of affording a means of communication between the different inland seas that are characteristic of that country. The junction of the North and Caspian Seas, of the Baltic and the Caspian, and the union of the Black and the Caspian Seas, had all been assisted by the construction of a series of canals which were perhaps without parallel for their completeness a century ago. In Prussia a vast system of inland navigation had been completed during the last century, whereby Hamburg was connected with Dantzic, and the products of the country could be exported either by the Black Sea or by the Baltic. In Scotland the Forth and Clyde Canal, and the Caledonian Canal, were notable examples of artificial navigation designed to connect two seas, or two firths that had all the characteristics of independent oceans; and the Erie Canal, in the United States, completed a chain of communication between inland seas of much the same order. But, although a great deal had been done in the direction of facilitating navigation between different waters by getting rid of the 'hyphen' by which they were separated anterior to the date of the Suez Canal, this grand enterprise undoubtedly marked a notable advance in the progress of the world from this point of view. The work was at once more original and more gigantic than any that had preceded it. . . . The Suez Canal once completed and successful, other ship canal schemes came 'thick as autumnal leaves in Vallombrosa.' Several of these were eminently practical, as well as practicable. The Hellenic Parliament determined on cutting through the tongue of land which is situated between the Gulfs of Athens and Lepantus, known as the Isthmus of Corinth. This isthmus divides the Adriatic and the Archipelago, and compels all vessels passing from the one sea to the other to round Cape Matapan, thus materially lengthening the voyages of vessels bound from the western parts of Europe to the Levant, Asia Minor and Smyrna. The canal is now an accomplished fact. Another proposal was that of cutting a canal from Bordeaux to Marseilles, across the South of France, a distance of some 120 miles, whereby these two great ports would be brought 1,678 miles nearer to each other, and a further reduction, estimated at 800 miles, effected in the distance between England and India. The Panama Canal (projected in 1871, and actually commenced in 1880) is, however, the greatest enterprise of all, and in many respects the most gigantic and

difficult undertaking of which there is any record. The proposed national canal from sea to sea, proposed by Mr. Samuel Lloyd and others for Great Britain, the proposed Sheffield Ship Canal, the proposed Irish Sea and Birkenhead Ship Canal, and the proposed ship canal to connect the Forth and the Clyde, are but a few of many notable examples of the restlessness of our times in this direction. . . . There are not a few people who regard the canal system almost as they might regard the Dodo and the Megatherium. It is to them an effete relic of a time when civilisation was as yet but imperfectly developed. . . . Canals do, indeed, belong to the past. . . . That canals also belong to the present, Egypt, the American isthmus, Manchester, Corinth, and other places, fully prove; and, unless we greatly err, they are no less the heritage of the future."—J. S. Jeans, *Waterways and Water Transport*, sect. 1, ch. 1.—"The sea girt British Isles have upwards of 2,500 miles of canals, in addition to the Manchester Ship Canal, which is thirty-five and one-half miles, and is said to be one of the most remarkable undertakings of modern times.' . . . In 1878, Germany had in operation 1,289 miles of canals, and had ordered the construction of 1,045 miles of new canals. Belgium has forty-five canals. Italy, Hungary, Sweden, Holland and Russia have their respective systems of canals. France has expended a larger amount of money than any other European nation, to provide for canal navigation, and in 1887 the total length of its canals was 2,998 miles. About forty-eight per cent of the tonnage of that Republic was transported on its waterways. The average capacity of boats used therefor was 300 tons. The total length of the canals in operation in the United States in 1890 was upwards of 2,926 miles."—H. W. Hill, *Speech on Canals in N. Y. Const. Conv. of 1894*.—"In most of the leading countries of the world, a time arrived when the canal system and the railway system came into strong competition, and when it seemed doubtful on which side the victory would lie. This contest was necessarily more marked in England than in any other country. England had not, indeed, been the first in the field with canals, as she had been with railways. . . . But England having once started on a career of canal development, followed it up with greater energy and on a more comprehensive scale than any other country. For more than half a century canals had had it all their own way. . . . But the railway system, first put forward as a tentative experiment, and without the slightest knowledge on the part of its promoters of the results that were before long to be realised, was making encroachments, and proving its capabilities. This was a slow process, as the way had to be felt. The first railway Acts did not contemplate the use of locomotives, nor the transport of passenger traffic. The Stockton and Darlington Railway, constructed in 1825, was the first on which locomotives were employed [see *Steam Locomotion* (page 3029)]. Even at this date, there were many who doubted the expediency of having a railroad instead of a canal, and in the county of Durham . . . there was a fierce fight, carried on for more than twenty years. In the United States, the supremacy of waterways was maintained until a much later date. . . . A keen and embittered struggle was kept up between

the canal and the railroad companies until 1857. . . . In the annals of transportation, there is no more interesting chapter than that which deals with the contest that has been carried on for nearly half a century between the railways and the lakes and canals for the grain traffic between Chicago and New York."—J. S. Jeans, *Waterways and Water Transport*, ch. 26-27.—"The early railroad engineers overestimated the speed which could be readily attained. Fifty years ago it was generally expected that passenger trains would soon run at rates of from seventy-five to one hundred miles an hour—a prediction which has as yet remained unfulfilled. On the other hand, they underestimated the railroad's capacity for doing work cheaply. It was not supposed that railroads would ever be able to compete with water-routes in the carriage of freight, except where speedy delivery was of the first importance. Nor was it at that time desired that they should do so. The first English railroad charter contained provisions expressly intended to prevent such competition. A generation later, in the State of New York itself, there was a loud popular cry that the New York Central must be prohibited from carrying freight in competition with the Erie Canal. The main field of usefulness of railroads, and the means by which that field was to be developed, were not merely ignored, they were positively shunned. This period of railroad infancy ended about the year 1850. . . . The changes were: first, the con-

solidation of old roads; second, the construction of new ones in a great variety of conditions; third, and most important, the development of traffic by cheap rates and new methods. . . . Between 1850 and 1880 rates were reduced on an average to about one half their former figures, in spite of the advance in price of labor and of many articles of consumption. A variety of means were made to contribute to this result. The inventions of Bessemer and others, by which it became possible to substitute steel rails for iron, made it profitable for the railroads to carry larger loads at a reduction in rates. Improvements in management increased the effective use of the rolling stock, while the consumption of fuel and the cost of handling were diminished. By other changes in railroad economy it became possible to compete for business of every kind, with the best canals or with natural water-courses. The railroad rates of to-day are but a small fraction of the canal charges of two generations ago; while in volume of business, speed, and variety of use there is an inestimable advance."—A. T. Hadley, *Railroad Transportation*, ch. 1.—"The railway mileage in the United States on June 30, 1893, was 176,461.07 miles. . . . The total number [of men] in the service of railways in the United States on June 30, 1893, was 873,602, being an increase of 52,187 over the number employed the previous year."—Interstate Commerce Commission, *Statistics of Railways*, 1893, pp. 11 and 31.

**TRADE MARKS, Protection of.** See **LAW, EQUITY**: A. D. 1875.

**TRADES UNIONS.** See **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**: A. D. 1720-1800, and after.

**TRAFALGAR, Naval Battle of.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1805 (MARCH-DECEMBER).

**TRAJAN, Roman Emperor,** A. D. 98-117.

**TRAJAN'S WALL.**—The Emperor Trajan "began a fortified line, afterwards completed, from the Rhine to the Danube. This great work was carried from Ratisbon to Mayence. It was known as Trajan's Wall. It may still be traced to some extent by the marks of a mound and a ditch."—Church and Brodribb, *Notes to The Germany of Tacitus*, ch. 29.

**TRAMELI, The.** See **LYCIANS**.

**TRANSALPINE.**—Beyond the Alps, looking from the Roman standpoint.

**TRANSLEITHANIA.** See **AUSTRIA**: A. D. 1866-1867.

**TRANSOXANIA.** See **BOKHARA**.

**TRANSPADANE GAUL.**—Cisalpine Gaul north of the Padus, or Po. See **PADUS**.

**TRANSRHENANE.**—Beyond the Rhine,—looking from the Roman standpoint; that is, on the eastern and northern side of the Rhine.

**TRANSSVAAL REPUBLIC, The.** See **SOUTH AFRICA**: A. D. 1806-1881.

**TRANSYLVANIA: Early history.** See **DACIA**.

**The Huns in possession.** See **HUNS**: A. D. 433-453.

**12th Century.**—Conquest by Hungary.—Settlement of Germans. See **HUNGARY**: A. D. 1114-1301.

**A. D. 1526-1567.**—John Zapolya, the waivod, elected King of Hungary.—His contest with Ferdinand of Austria.—His appeal to the

**Turks.**—The Sultan assumes suzerainty of the country. See **HUNGARY**: A. D. 1526-1567.

**A. D. 1567-1660.**—Struggles between the Austrian and the Turk. See **HUNGARY**: A. D. 1567-1604; and 1606-1660.

**A. D. 1575.**—Stephen Batory, the Duke, elected King of Poland. See **POLAND**: A. D. 1574-1590.

**A. D. 1599-1601.**—Wallachian conquest. See **BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES, 14-18TH CENTURIES (ROUMANIA, &C.)**.

**A. D. 1606.**—Yoke of the Ottomans partly broken. See **HUNGARY**: A. D. 1595-1606.

**A. D. 1660-1664.**—Recovery of independence from the Turks. See **HUNGARY**: A. D. 1660-1664.

**A. D. 1699.**—Ceded to the House of Austria by the Turks, in the Treaty of Carlowitz. See **HUNGARY**: A. D. 1683-1699.

**TRANSYLVANIA, The Kentucky colony of.**—For several years after the settlement of the region of Kentucky began it was known as the "colony of Transylvania," and seemed likely to bear that name permanently. See **KENTUCKY**: A. D. 1765-1778.

**TRAPPISTS.**—The monks of La Trappe are often referred to as Trappists. "This celebrated abbey was one of the most ancient belonging to the Order of Cisteraux [the Cistercians]. It was established [A. D. 1140] by Rotrou, the second count of Perche, and undertaken to accomplish a vow made whilst in peril of shipwreck." In the 17th century the monks had become scandalously degenerate and dissolute. Their institution was reformed by M. de Rancé, who assumed the direction as abbot in 1662, and who introduced the severe discipline for which the monastery was afterwards famous.



Among its rules was one of absolute silence.—C. Lancelot, *A Tour to Alet and La Grande Chartreuse*, v. 1, pp. 113–186.

**TRASIMENE, Lake, Battle of (B. C. 217).** See PUNIC WARS: THE SECOND.

**TRASTEVERE.**—Trastevere was a suburb of Rome “as early as the time of Augustus; it now contains the oldest houses in Rome, which belong to the 11th and 12th centuries.”—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lect's on ancient Ethnog. and Geog.*, v. 2, p. 103.

**TRAUSI, The.** See THRACIANS.

**TRAVENDAHL, Treaty of (1700).** See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1697–1700.

**TRAVENSTADT, Battle of (1706).** See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1701–1707.

**TREASON.** See MAJESTAS.

**TREATIES.**—The Treaties of which account is given in this work are so numerous that no convenience would be served by collecting references to them under this general heading. They are severally indexed under the names by which they are historically known.

**TREATY PORTS, The.** See CHINA: A. D. 1839–1842.

**TREBIA, OR TREBBIA, Battle of the.** See PUNIC WARS: THE SECOND....Battle. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER).

**TREBIZOND: Origin of the city.**—“Trebizond, celebrated in the retreat of the Ten Thousand as an ancient colony of Greeks, derived its wealth and splendour from the munificence of the Emperor Hadrian, who had constructed an artificial port on a coast left destitute by nature of secure harbours. The city was large and populous.”—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 10.

**A. D. 258.—Capture by the Goths.** See GOTHs: A. D. 258–267.

**A. D. 1204–1461.—The Greek empire.**—“The empire of Trebizond was the creation of accident. . . . The destruction of a distant central government, when Constantinople was conquered by the Frank Crusaders, left [the] provincial administration without the pivot on which it had revolved. The conjuncture was seized by a young man, of whom nothing was known but that he bore a great name, and was descended from the worst tyrant in the Byzantine annals. This youth grasped the vacant sovereignty, and, merely by assuming the imperial title, and placing himself at the head of the local administration, founded a new empire. Power changed its name and its dwelling, but the history of the people was hardly modified. The grandeur of the empire of Trebizond exists only in romance. Its government owed its permanence to its being nothing more than a continuation of a long-established order of civil polity, and to its making no attempt to effect any social revolution.” The young man who grasped the sovereignty of this Asiatic fragment of the shattered Byzantine empire was Alexius, a grandson of Andronicus I., the last emperor at Constantinople of the family of Comnenos. This Alexius and his brother David, who had been raised in obscurity at Constantinople, escaped from the city before it was taken by the Crusaders, and fled to the coast of Colchis, “where their paternal aunt, Tamar, possessed wealth and influence. Assisted by her power, and by the memory of their tyrannical

grandfather, who had been popular in the east of Asia Minor, they were enabled to collect an army of Iberian mercenaries. At the head of this force Alexius entered Trebizond in the month of April 1204, about the time Constantinople fell into the hands of the Crusaders. He had been proclaimed emperor by his army on crossing the frontier. To mark that he was the legitimate representative of the imperial family of Komnenos, and to prevent his being confounded with the numerous descendants of females, or with the family of the emperor Alexius III. (Angelos), who had arrogated to themselves his name, he assumed the designation of Grand-Komnenos. Wherever he appeared, he was acknowledged as the lawful sovereign of the Roman empire.” For a time Alexius of Trebizond, with the help of his brother David, extended his dominions in Asia Minor with rapidity and ease, and he was brought very soon into collision with the other Greek emperor, Theodore Lascaris, who had established himself at Nicæa. It seemed likely, at first, that Trebizond would become the dominant power; but the movement of events which favored that one of the rival empires was presently stayed, and then reversed, even though Alexius took aid from the Latin emperor at Constantinople. Not many years later, in fact, the empire of Trebizond evaded extinction at the hands of the Turkish Sultan of Iconium, or Roum, only by paying tribute and acknowledging vassalage to that sovereign. For sixty years the so-called empire continued in a tributary relationship to the Seljuk sultans and to the grand khan of the Mongols who overthrew them in 1244. But, if not a very substantial empire during that period, it seems to have formed an exceedingly prosperous and wealthy commercial power, controlling not only a considerable coast territory on its own side of the Euxine, but also Cherson, Gothia, and all the Byzantine possessions in the Tauric Chersonesos; and “so close was the alliance of interest that these districts remained dependent on the government of Trebizond until the period of its fall.” On the decline of the Mongol power, the empire of Trebizond regained its independence in 1280, and maintained it for nearly a century, when it was once more compelled to pay tribute to the later Mongol conqueror, Timur. At the end of the 14th century the little “empire” was reduced to a strip of coast, barely forty miles wide, extending from Batoun to Kerasunt, and the separated city of Oinaon, with some territory adjoining it. But, within this small compass, “few countries in Europe enjoyed as much internal tranquility, or so great security for private property.” The commerce of Trebizond had continued to flourish, notwithstanding frequent quarrels and hostilities with the Genoese, who were the chief managers of its trade with the west. But the decay of the empire, politically, commercially, and morally, was rapid in its later years. First becoming tributary to the Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople, it finally shared the fate of the Byzantine capital. The city of Trebizond was surrendered to Mohammed II. in 1461. Its last emperor, David, was permitted to live for a time, with his family, in the European dominions of the Turk; but after a few years, on some suspicion of a plot, he was put to death with his seven sons, and their bodies were cast unburied to the dogs. The wife and mother

of the dead—the fallen empress Helena—guarded them and dug a grave for them with her own hands. The Christian population of Trebizond was expelled from the city and mostly enslaved. Its place was taken by a Moslem colony.—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Empire of Trebizond* (*History of Greece and of the Empire of Trebizond*).

**TREBONIAN LAW, The.** See **ROME**: B. C. 57–52.

**TREK, The Great.** See **SOUTH AFRICA**: A. D. 1806–1881.

**TREMECEN, The Kingdom of.** See **BARBARY STATES**: A. D. 1516–1535.

**TREMONT, The Name.** See **MASSACHUSETTS**: A. D. 1630.

**TRENT, The Council of.** See **PAPACY**: A. D. 1537–1563.

**TRENT AFFAIR, The.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1861 (NOVEMBER).

**TRENTON: A. D. 1776.**—The surprise of the Hessians. See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1776–1777 WASHINGTON'S RETREAT.

**TRÈVES: Origin.**—Trèves was originally the chief town of the Treveri, from whom it derived its name. When the Romans established a colony there they called it Augusta Trevirorum. In time, the Augusta was dropped and Trevirorum became Trèves, or Trier. See **TREVIRI**.

**Under the Romans.**—"The town of the Treveri, named Augusta probably from the first emperor, soon gained the first place in the Belgic province; if, still, in the time of Tiberius, Durocorum of the Remi (Rheims) is named the most populous place of the province and the seat of the governors, an author from the time of Claudius already assigns the primacy there to the chief place of the Treveri. But Treves became the capital of Gaul—we may even say of the West—only through the remodelling of the imperial administration under Diocletian. After Gaul, Britain and Spain were placed under one supreme administration, the latter had its seat in Treves; and thenceforth Treves was also, when the emperors stayed in Gaul, their regular residence, and, as a Greek of the fifth century says, the greatest city beyond the Alps."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 3.

**A. D. 306.**—The Ludi Francici at. See **FRANKS**: A. D. 306.

**A. D. 364–376.**—Capital of Valentinian and the Western Empire. See **ROME**: A. D. 363–379.

**A. D. 402.**—Abandoned by the Roman præfecture. See **BRITAIN**: A. D. 407.

**A. D. 1125–1152.**—Origin of the Electorate. See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1125–1152.

**A. D. 1675.**—Taken from the French by the Imperialists. See **NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND)**: A. D. 1674–1678.

**A. D. 1689.**—Threatened destruction by the French. See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1689–1690.

**A. D. 1697.**—Restored to the Empire. See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1697.

**A. D. 1704.**—Taken by Marlborough. See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1704.

**A. D. 1801–1803.**—Extinction of the Electorate. See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1801–1803.

**TREVILLIAN'S STATION, Battle of.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1864 (MAY–JUNE: VIRGINIA) CAMPAIGNING IN THE SHENANDOAH.

**TREVIRI, The.**—The Treviri were one of the peoples of Gaul, in Cæsar's time, "whose territory lay on the left bank of the Rhine and on both sides of the Mosella (Mosel). Trier [ancient Treves] on the Mosel was the head-quarters of the Treviri."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 8.

**TREVISAN MARCHES, Tyranny of Ecelino di Romano in the.** See **VERONA**: A. D. 1236–1259.

**TRIAD SOCIETY, OR WATER-LILY SECT, The.**—The most extensive of the many secret societies among the Chinese is "the Tien-ti hwui, or San-hoh hwui, i. e. the Triad Society. It was formerly known by the title of the Pih-lien kiau, or Water-lily Sect, but having been proscribed by the government, it sought by this alteration of name, and some other slight changes, to evade the operation of the laws. In fact, it still subsists in some of the remoter provinces under its old name and organization. The known and indeed almost openly avowed object of this society has been, for many years, the overturn of the Mant-chou dynasty."—*The Chinese Rebellion* (*North Am. Rev.*, July, 1854).

ALSO IN: Abbé Huc, *Christianity in China*, &c., v. 2, pp. 274–277.—H. A. Giles, *Historic China*, pp. 395–399.

**TRIAL BY COMBAT.** See **WAGER OF BATTLE**.

**TRIANON TARIFF, The.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1806–1810.

**TRIARI.** See **LEGION, ROMAN**.

**TRIBE.—TRIBUS.** See **ROME, THE BEGINNING**.

**TRIBES, Greek.** See **PHYLÆ**.

**TRIBOCES, The.**—A people who, in Cæsar's time, were established on both banks of the Rhine, occupying the central part of the modern Grand Duchy of Baden and the opposite region of Gaul.—Napoleon III., *Hist. of Cæsar*, bk. 3, ch. 2, foot-note.—See, also, **VANGIONES**.

**TRIBON, The.**—A garment of thick cloth and small size worn by Spartan youths, and sometimes by old men.—C. C. Felton, *Greece, Ancient and Modern*, course 2, lect. 7.

**TRIBUNAL, The Revolutionary.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1793 (FEBRUARY–APRIL).

**TRIBUNES, Consular, or Military.** See **CONSULAR TRIBUNES**.

**TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS.** See **ROME**: B. C. 494–492.

**TRIBUNITIA, Potestas.** See **POTESTAS TRIBUNITIA**.

**TRIBUTUM, The.**—The tributum, a war-tax, collected from the Roman people in the earlier periods of the Republic, was "looked upon as a loan, and was returned on the termination of a successful war out of the captured booty. . . . The principle that Rome was justified in living at the expense of her subjects was formally acknowledged when, in the year 167 B. C., the tributum—the only direct tax which the Roman citizens paid—was abolished, because the government could dispense with it after the conquest of Macedonia. The entire burden and expense of the administration were now put off upon the subjects."—W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 6, ch. 7 (v. 4).

**TRICAMARON, Battle of (A. D. 533).** See **VANDALS**: A. D. 533–534.

**TRICASSES.**—The earlier name of the city of Troyes, France.



**TRICHINOPOLY: Siege and relief (1751).** See INDIA: A. D. 1743-1752.

**TRICOTEUSES.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (OCTOBER).

**TRIDENTINE COUNCIL.**—The Council of Trent (see PAPACY: A. D. 1537-1563); from the Latin name of the town.

**TRIENNIAL ACTS.** See PARLIAMENT, THE ENGLISH: A. D. 1641-1664, and 1693.

**TRIERARCHY.** See LITURGIES.

**TRINACRIA.**—The ancient Greek name of the island of Sicily.

**TRINCOMALEE, Battle of (1767).** See INDIA: A. D. 1767-1769.

**TRINIDAD.**—The island of Trinidad, which lies close to the South American continent, off the delta of the Orinoco, was discovered by Columbus on his third voyage (1498); but the Spaniards made little use of it, except for slave hunting. Late in the 18th century a French settlement was established in the island, though under the government of Spain. In 1797 it was taken by the English, and it was ceded to England in 1802. United with the neighboring island of Tobago, it is one of the crown colonies of the British Empire. The area of Trinidad is 1754½ square miles. It is one of the most fertile of the West Indies islands. Its sole mineral wealth is in the extraordinary lake of half solid pitch or asphalt, of which a graphic description may be found in the eighth chapter of Charles Kingsley's account of his visit to Trinidad, in 1869, entitled "At Last."

**TRINITY HOUSE.**—"Perhaps there is throughout Britain no more interesting example of the innate power and varied developments of the old gild principle, certainly no more illustrious survival of it to modern times, than the Trinity House. It stands out now as an institution of high national importance, whose history is entwined with the early progress of the British navy and the welfare and increase of our sea craft and seamanship; in an age when the tendency is to assume state control over all matters of national interest the Trinity House, a voluntary corporation, still fulfils the public functions to which its faithful labours, through a long course of years, have established its right and title. Although its earliest records appear to be lost or burned, there seems to be no doubt that Henry VIII's charter of 1514 was granted to a brotherhood already existing. . . . In the charter itself we read that the shipmen or mariners of England 'may anew erect' a gild, and lands and tenements in Deptford Strond, already in possession, are referred to. Similar bodies were formed in other places. . . . The charitable side of the Trinity House functions has always been considerable; in 1815 they possessed no less than 144 almshouses, besides giving 7,012 pensions; but of late years their funds applicable to such purposes have been curtailed. . . . It is significant that in Edward VI's reign the name and style of Gild was abandoned by the brethren for the title of 'the Corporation of the Trinity House of Deptford Strond.' Gilds now had come into disrepute. The functions of the Trinity House have long been recognized of such value to the public service that their honourable origin, so consonant with other English institutions, is apt to be forgotten. . . . To cherish the 'science and art of mariners,' and to provide a supply of pilots, especially for the Thames up to London, were their prime duties.

The Admiralty and Navy boards were established as administrative bodies in 1520, and the ship-building yard at Deptford, with the store-houses there, 'was placed under the direct control of the gild.' The Sea Marks Act of 1566, which throws considerable light on the position of the company at that time, endowed them with the power of preserving old and setting up new sea marks or beacons round the coasts, among which trees came under their purview. How far their jurisdiction extended is not stated; it would be interesting to know whether their progress round the whole shores of Britain were gradual or not. It is, perhaps, for its work in connexion with light-houses, light-ships, buoys, and beacons, that the Trinity House is best known to the general public. . . . It was only in 1836 that parliament 'empowered the corporation to purchase of the crown, or from private proprietors, all lights then in existence,' which are therefore at present under their efficient central control. . . . The principal matters in their sphere of action—the important provision of pilots, the encouragement and supply of seamen, ballastage and ballast, lights and buoys, the suppression of piracy and privateers, tonnage measurement, the victualling of the navy, their intimate connexion with the gradual growth and armament of the navy, the curious right to appoint certain consuls abroad—all these receive illustration at first hand from the author's careful researches among state papers and the muniments of the corporation."—Lucy T. Smith, *Review of "The Trinity House of Deptford Strond"; by C. R. B. Barrett (English Historical Rev., April, 1894).*

**TRINOBANTES, The.**—The Trinobantes were the first of the tribes of Britain to submit to Cæsar. They inhabited the part of the country now embraced in the county of Essex and part of Middlesex. Their chief town, or stronghold ("oppidum") was Camulodunum, where the Romans afterwards founded a colony which became the modern city of Colchester. Cunobelin, the Cymbeline of Shakespeare, was a king of the Trinobantes who acquired extensive power. One of the sons of Cunobelin, Caractacus, became the most obstinate enemy of the Romans when they seriously began the conquest of Britain, in the reign of Claudius.—E. L. Cutts, *Colchester, ch. 2-3.*

ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans, ch. 51.*—See, also, BRITAIN: CELTIC TRIBES.

**TRIOBOLON.**—Three oboli,—the daily compensation paid in Athens to citizens who served as judges in the great popular courts; afterwards paid, likewise, to those who attended the assemblies of the people.—A. Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens, bk. 2, ch. 15.*

**TRIPLE ALLIANCE, The.**—There have been a number of Triple Alliances formed in European history; see, for example, NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1668, and SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725; but the one in recent times to which allusion is often made is that in which Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, are the three parties. It was formed by treaty in February, 1882, and renewed in 1887. Its purpose is mutual defense, especially, no doubt, against the apprehended combination of Russia with France.

**TRIPOLI, North Africa: Origin of the name of.** See LEFTIS MAGNA.

**History.** See BARBARY STATES.

**TRIPOLI, Syria: Capture by the Crusaders.—Destruction of the Library.—Formation of the Latin county.** See CRUSADES: A. D. 1104–1111; and JERUSALEM: A. D. 1099–1144.

**TRIPONTIUM.**—A town in Roman Britain, where one of the great roads crossed the Avon, near modern Lilburne.—T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon*, ch. 5.

**TRISAGION, The.** See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 511–512.

**TRI-SKELION.—GAMMADION.—FYL-FOT-CROSS.—SVASTIKA.**—"One of the most remarkable instances of the migration of a symbol is that afforded by the 'tri-skelion,' or, as we more familiarly know it, 'the three legs of Man.' It first appears on the coins of Lycia, circa B. C. 480; and then on those of Sicily, where it was adopted by Agathocles, B. C. 317–307, but not as a symbol of the morning, midday, and afternoon sun, but of the land of Trinacria, i. e., 'Three Capes,' the ancient name of Sicily; and finally on the coins of the Isle of Man, on which it seems to refer rather to the position of that island between England, Scotland, and Ireland, than to its triangular shape. The tri-skelion of Lycia is made up of three cocks' heads. . . . But on the coins of Sicily and of the Isle of Man the tri-skelion consists of three human legs of an identical pattern, excepting that those of the latter island are spurred. This form of tri-skelion is borne on the arms of several old English families, and it was in all probability first introduced into this country [England] by some Crusader returning from the East by way of Sicily. . . . The tri-skelion is but a modification of the 'gammadion' or 'fyl-fot-cross,' the 'svastika' of the Hindus. The latter was long ago suspected by Edward Thomas to be a sun-symbol; but this was not positively proved until Mr. Percy Gardner found a coin of the ancient city of Mesembria in Thrace stamped with a gammadion bearing within its open centre an image of the sun—Mesembria meaning the city of 'Mid-day,' and this name being figured on some of its coins by the decisive legend *MEΣΗ*. . . . The gammadion has travelled further afield than any other symbol of antiquity. . . . Count Goblet d'Alviella traces it back at last to the Troad as the cradle of its birth, some time anterior to the 13th century B. C."—*The Athenæum*, Aug. 13, 1892 (*Reviewing Comte Goblet d'Alviella's "La Migration des Symboles."*)

**TRITTYES.** See PHYLE.

**TRIUMPH AND OVATION, The Roman.**—"The highest reward of the commander was the triumphal entrance. At first it was awarded by senate and people to real merit in the field, and its arrangement was simple and dignified; but soon it became an opportunity of displaying the results of insatiable Roman rapacity and love of conquest. Only the dictators, consuls, prætors, and, in late republican times, occasionally legates, were permitted by the senate to enter Rome in triumph, the permission to the legate being granted only in case he had commanded independently ('suis auspiciis'), and conducted the army to Rome from a victorious campaign 'in sua provincia.' As in later times it was impossible to conduct the whole army from distant provinces to Rome, the last-men-

tioned condition was dispensed with, the claim of the commander to a triumph being acknowledged in case in one of the battles gained by him 5,000 enemies had been killed. The senate granted the expenses necessary for the procession after the quæstor urbanus had examined and confirmed the commander's claim. Streets and squares through which the procession had to pass were festively adorned. The temples were opened, and incense burnt on the altars. Improvised stands were erected in the street, filled with festive crowds shouting 'Io triumphe!' The commander, in the meantime, collected his troops near the temples of Bellona and Apollo, outside the gates of Rome. . . . The victor was met at the 'porta triumphalis' by the senate, the city magistrates, and numerous citizens, who took the lead of the procession, while lictors opened a way through the crowd. After the city dignitaries followed tibicines, after them the booty. . . . Fettered kings, princes, and nobles followed, doomed to detention in the Mamertine prison. Next came sacrificial oxen with gilt horns, accompanied by priests; and, finally, preceded by singers, musicians, and jesters, the triumphal chariot drawn by four horses. Clad in a toga picta and the tunica palmata, temporarily taken from the statue of the Capitoline Jupiter, the triumphator stood in his chariot holding the eagle-crowned ivory sceptre in his hand, while a servus publicus standing behind him held the corona triumphalis over his head. The army brought up the rear of the procession, which moved from the Campus Martius through the circus of Flaminius to the Porta Carmentalis, and thence, by way of the Velabrum and the Circus Maximus, the Via Sacra and the Forum, to the Capitol. Here the triumphator deposited his golden crown in the lap of the Capitoline Jupiter, and sacrificed the usual suovetaurilia. . . . The ovatio was granted for less important conquests, or to a general for victories not won 'suis auspiciis.' The victor, adorned with the toga prætexta and the myrtle crown, originally used to walk; in later times he rode on horseback."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 109.—See, also, VIA SACRA.

**TRIUMVIRATE, The First.** See ROME: B. C. 63–58. . . . **The Second.** See ROME: B. C. 44–42.

**TROIS ÉVÊCHÉS, Les, and their acquisition by France.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1547–1559, and 1679–1681; and GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

**TROISVILLE, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH—JULY).

**TROJA.—TROY.—TROAD.—ILIUM.**—"In the whole long extent of this Western coast [of Asia Minor] no region occupies a fairer situation than the northern projection, the peninsula jutting out between Archipelago, Hellespont, and Propontis, of which the mountain-range of Ida, abounding in springs, forms the centre. Its woody heights were the seat of the Phrygian Mother of the Gods; in its depths it concealed treasures of ore, which the dæmons of mining, the Dactyli of Ida, were here first said to have been taught by Cybele to win and employ. A hardy race of men dwelt on the mountains so rich in iron, divided into several tribes, the Cebrenes, the Gergithians, and above all the beautiful Dardani, among whom the story went, how their ancestor, Dardanus, had, under the protec-



tion of the Pelasgian Zeus, founded the city of Dardania. Some of these Dardani descended from the highlands into the tracts by the coast, which has no harbours, but an island lying in front of it called Tenedos. Here Phœnicians had settled and established purple-fisheries in the sea of Sigeum; at a later period Hellenic tribes arrived from Crete and introduced the worship of Apollo. In the secure waters between Tenedos and the mainland took place that contact which drew the Idæan peninsula into the intercourse subsisting between the coasts of the Archipelago. . . . In the midst of this intercourse on the coast arose, out of the tribe of the Dardani, which had deserted the hills, the branch of the Trojans. . . . Thus, in the midst of the full life of the nations of Asia Minor, on the soil of a peninsula (itself related to either side) on which Phrygians and Pelasgians, Assyrians, Phœnicians, and Hellenic mariners met, grows up the empire of the Dardanides. The springs of the Ida range collect into rivers, of which two flow to the Propontis, and one, the Scamander, into the Ægean. The latter first flows through his bed high in the mountains, through which he then breaks in a narrow rocky gorge, and quitting the latter enters the flat plain of his water-shed, surrounded on three sides by gentle declivities, and open on the West to the sea. . . . In the innermost corner of this plain projects a rocky height with precipitous sides, as if it would bar the passage of the river breaking forth from the ravine. Skirted in a wide curve by Scamander on the East, it sinks to the West in gentle declivities, where numerous veins of water spring from the earth; these unite into two rivulets, distinguished by the abundance and temperature of their water, which remain the same at all seasons of the year. This pair of rivulets is the immutable mark of nature, by which the height towering above is recognized as the citadel of Ilium. They are the same rivulets to which of old the Trojan women descended from the Scæan gate to fetch water or to wash linen, and to this day the same ancient walls close around the flowing water and render it more easily available. The source of these rivulets was the seat of power. On the gentler declivity lay Troja; over which towered the steep citadel of Pergamus, the view from whose turrets commanded the entire plain, . . . and beyond the plain the broad sea itself. . . . No royal seat of the ancient world could boast a grander site than this Trojan citadel."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 1, ch. 3.—The site contemplated by Dr. Curtius in the description quoted above is some five miles higher up the valley of the Scamander than Hissarlik, where Dr. Schliemann's excavations are believed by many scholars to have now established the location of ancient Troy.—H. Schliemann, *Ilios: the City and Country of the Trojans*.—"Dr. Schliemann described in his 'Troja' and 'Ilios' seven successive layers of city ruins found in his excavations at Hissarlik. This number was increased in 1890 to nine by the discovery of two layers intervening between the highest (or Roman) layer, formerly called the seventh, and the sixth, or so-called Lydian layer. These two layers were, from the character of the finds, attributed to the early and the later Greek period. Dr. Schliemann was baffled by the fact that he could discover no acropolis for the sixth, seventh, or eighth layers. Dr. Dörpfeld, who in May

[1893] resumed the excavations at the expense of Dr. Schliemann's widow, makes in the *Mittheilungen of the German Archaeological Society* (xviii, 2), which appeared November 7, a significant report clearly establishing the fact that the Romans, in building the great temple of Ilian Athene, cut down the highest part of the acropolis, and thus destroyed all traces of the acropolis belonging to those layers. The excavations of 1890 had brought to light two magnificent buildings in the sixth layer, besides 'Lydian' jars, much pottery, and one entire vase of the Mykenæan or Homeric period. The evidence favored the identification of this layer with the Homeric Troy or the period of Mykenæ and Tiryns. On the other hand, the fact that only two buildings and no city wall had been discovered for this layer seemed to indicate that the Troy of Priam must be referred to a lower level, namely, the second, where a magnificent wall of prehistoric style had been discovered, although its architecture and the character of the finds suggested a more primitive culture than that painted in Homeric song. The sixth layer has now in large part been exposed by Dr. Dörpfeld and reveals the most imposing wall of pre-Roman times. The remains of seven vast buildings have been brought to light which have in part the ground plan of the ancient Greek temples and of the halls of Tiryns and Mykenæ, though surpassing those in proportions and in the carefulness of their architecture. The remains of one admirable building contained a hall 37 feet by 30. . . . Further, Dr. Dörpfeld uncovered the fortifications of this city in many places, and found them some sixteen feet in thickness with a still greater height. On the outside the wall has a uniform slope. A strong-tower fifty-eight feet in diameter contains an inner staircase. In strength, proportions, and careful architecture this tower will compare favorably with any tower of Greek antiquity. The neat work of the corners and the nice dressing of the stones might refer it to a period later than Homer, to the historical Greek period, did we not know that in historical times Troy was too insignificant to need the erection of such walls. Moreover, the tower, built over in Greek times, and partly damaged by the addition of an outer stair, was finally in Roman times buried under massive foundations. The correspondences in stone-work of the wall and the houses place the tower and the buildings evidently in the same layer. In the houses were found both local pottery and also pottery of the Mykenæan style."—*The Nation*, Nov. 30, 1893.—"The latest news from the explorations at Hissarlik (*Levant Herald* July 7) comes to us from the owner of the site, Mr. Frank Calvert, United States consul, Dardanelles. It was readily seen that the second, or burned city which Dr. Schliemann enthusiastically assumed to be the city of Priam, instead of solving the question of the 'Iliad,' offered new problems to the archaeologist. The precious objects and the works of art there found were evidently ruder and more ancient by some centuries than those of Mycenæ, and therefore decidedly earlier than Homeric Troy. In the sixth city, however, pottery of a Mycenæan type was discovered, and this led Dr. Dörpfeld, assisted by Mrs. Schliemann, and later by the German Government, to extend excavations on this level, with results that are now proving fruitful, and

that may possibly be conclusive. Curiously enough, Dr. Schliemann's excavations obscured rather than aided this particular investigation. The area of the sixth city was twice as great as the space covered by the successive acropolises of the other five; and, in consequence, their debris was dumped on the very spot which Dr. Dörpfeld has just been clearing. The massive walls he has uncovered, from five to six metres broad, the lofty towers, and the street which has been traced, may provisionally be assumed to belong to the Homeric Troy."—*The Nation*, August 9, 1894.

ALSO IN: C. Schuchardt, *Schliemann's Excavations*.—See, also, ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES; and HOMER.

**TROPAION.**—The trophy erected by a victorious army, among the Greeks, on the spot from which the enemy had been driven. The trophy was constructed in some manner out of the booty taken.—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 54.

**TROPFAU**, Congress of. See VERONA, CONGRESS OF.

**TROUBADOURS.—TROUVÈRES.**

—**JOGLARS.—JONGLEURS.**—"The poets of the South of France during the Middle Age called themselves 'Trobadors,' that is to say, 'inventers' or 'finders'; and they adapted the 'langue d'oc,' also called the Romansh of the South, or the Provençal, to the expression of poetical sentiments. It is probable that poets of this description existed as early as the formation of the idiom in which they wrote. At any rate, we know that toward the year 1000 they already enjoyed considerable distinction, although there is scarcely anything now left us from the earliest period of their existence. . . . In regard to the time within which the poetry of the Troubadours was in vogue, M. Fauriel assumes only two periods. But it may perhaps be more conveniently divided into three, as follows: The first commences with its origin, as a popular poetry, and extends to the time when it became an art and a profession, the poetry of the nobles and the courts, that is to say, from about 1090 to 1140. The second is the period of its culmination, which extends from the year 1140 to 1250. The third is the period of its decadence, from 1250 to 1290."—G. J. Adler, *Introd. to Fauriel's "History of Provençal Poetry."*—"Sufficient has been said . . . to show the superiority of lyrical over epic poetry in Provence. This inequality of the two branches implied a commensurate difference of praise and social esteem awarded to those who excelled in either of them, and it is perhaps from this point of view that the two great divisions of poets in the 'langue d'oc,' respectively described as 'joglars' and 'trobadors,' or, in the French and generally adopted form of the word, 'troubadours,' may be most distinctly recognised. . . . It seems sufficiently established that the verb 'trobar' and its derivative noun first and foremost apply to lyrical poetry. To speak therefore of the Troubadour as the singer of songs, of cansos and sirventeses and albas and retroensas is a correct and tolerably comprehensive definition."—F. Hueffer, *The Troubadours*, ch. 6.—"In the twelfth century, the Romance-Wallon [or the 'langue d'oïl' of northern France] became a literary language, subsequent, by at least a hundred years, to the Romance-provençal. . . . The reciters of tales, and the poets, giving

the name of Troubadour a French termination, called themselves Trouvères. With the exception of the difference of language, it may be thought that the Troubadour and the Trouvère, whose merit was pretty nearly equal; who were equally ignorant or well-informed; who both of them spent their lives at courts, at which they composed their poems, and where they mingled with knights and ladies; and who were both accompanied by their jongleurs and minstrels, should have preserved the same resemblance in their productions. Nothing, however, can be more dissimilar than their poems. All that remains of the poetry of the Troubadours is of a lyrical character, while that of the Trouvères is decidedly epic. . . . The Trouvères have left us many romances of chivalry, and fabliaux."—J. C. L. S. de Sismondi, *Literature of the South of Europe*, ch. 7 (v. 1).—"We know nothing of the rise or origin of the two classes of Trouveurs and Jongleurs. The former (which it is needless to say is the same word as Troubadour, and Trobador, and Trovatore) is the term for the composing class, the latter for the performing one. But the separation was not sharp or absolute."—G. Saintsbury, *Short Hist. of French Literature*, bk. 1, ch. 1.

**TROY.** See TROJA.

**TROYES**, Treaty of (1420). See FRANCE: A. D. 1417-1422. . . . Treaty of (1564). See FRANCE: A. D. 1563-1564.

**TRUCE**, The Five Years. See FIVE YEARS TRUCE.

**TRUCE**, The Sacred. See OLYMPIC GAMES.

**TRUCE**, The Thirty Years. See GREECE: B. C. 449-445.

**TRUCE OF GOD**, The.—"This extraordinary institution is the most speaking witness, at once to the ferocity of the times [11th century], and also to the deep counter feeling which underlay men's minds. Clergy and laity alike felt that the state of things which they saw daily before their eyes was a standing sin against God and man, repugnant alike to natural humanity and to the precepts of the Christian religion. States were everywhere so subdivided, governments were everywhere so weak, that, in most parts of Europe, every man who had the needful force at his command simply did that which was right in his own eyes. . . . Every man claimed the right of private war against every other man who was not bound to him by some special tie as his lord or his vassal. And the distinction between private war and mere robbery and murder was not always very sharply drawn. . . . A movement on behalf of peace and good will towards men could not fail in those days to assume an ecclesiastical form. As of old the Amphiktyonic Council, the great religious synod of Greece, strove to put some bounds to the horrors of war as waged between Greek and Greek, so now, in the same spirit, a series of Christian synods strove, by means of ecclesiastical decrees and ecclesiastical censures, to put some bounds to the horrors of war as waged between Christian and Christian. . . . The movement began in Aquitaine [A. D. 1034], and the vague and rhetorical language of our authority would seem to imply that all war, at any rate all private war, was forbidden under pain of ecclesiastical censures. It must not be forgotten that, in that age, it must have been exceedingly difficult to draw the distinction between public and private



war. . . . But the doctrine, hard as it might be to carry out in practice, was rapturously received at its first announcement. As the first preaching of the Crusade was met with one universal cry of 'God wills it,' so the Bishops, Abbots, and other preachers of the Truce were met with a like universal cry of Peace, Peace, Peace. Men bound themselves to God and to one another to abstain from all wrong and violence, and they engaged solemnly to renew the obligation every five years. From Aquitaine the movement spread through Burgundy Royal and Ducal. But it seems to have been gradually found that the establishment of perfect peace on earth was hopeless. After seven years from the first preaching of peace, we find the requirements of its apostles greatly relaxed. It was found vain to forbid all war, even all private war. All that was now attempted was to forbid violence of every kind from the evening of Wednesday till the morning of Monday. It was in this shape that the Truce was first preached in northern and eastern Gaul. The days of Christ's supper, of His passion, of His rest in the grave and His resurrection, were all to be kept free from strife and bloodshed."—E. A. Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, ch. 8, sect. 2 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: P. Schaff, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, v. 4, ch. 6, sect. 78.

**TRUCELESS WAR, The.** See **CARTHAGE**: B. C. 241–238.

**TRUELLAS, Battle of.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1793 (JULY–DECEMBER).—**PROGRESS OF WAR.**

**TRYON, Governor, The flight of.** See **NEW YORK**: A. D. 1775 (APRIL–SEPTEMBER), and **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1776 (AUGUST).

**TSHEKHS, The.** See **BOHEMIA**: ITS PEOPLE, &C.

**TSIAM NATION, The.** See **TONKIN**.

**TSING, OR CH'ING, Dynasty, The.** See **CHINA**: A. D. 1294–1882.

**TUARIKS, The.** See **LIBYANS**.

**TUATH.**—"Among the people of Gaelic race [in Ireland and Scotland] the original social unit appears to have been the 'Tuath,' a name originally applied to the tribe, but which came to signify also the territory occupied by the tribe community. . . . Several of these Tuaths were grouped together to form a still larger tribe, termed a Mortuath or great tribe, over whom one of the kings presided as Ri Mortuath. . . . Then several of these Mortuath formed a province, called in Irish 'Cuicidh,' or a fifth. . . . Over each province was the Ri Cuicidh, or provincial king, and then over the whole was the Ardri, or sovereign of all Ireland. The succession to these several grades of Ri, or king, was the same as that of the Ri Tuath, and was regulated by the law of Tanistry, that is, hereditary in the family but elective in the individual, the senior of the family being usually preferred."—W. F. Skene, *Celtic Scotland*, v. 3, pp. 136–150.

**TUATHA-DE-DANAAN.**—One of the races named in Irish legend as original settlers of Ireland, represented to have come from Greece and to have been extraordinarily proficient in the arts of magic. They were conquered, after two centuries, as the legend runs, by the Milesians, or Scots.—T. Wright, *Hist. of Ireland*, bk. 1, ch. 2 (v. 1).—See **IRELAND**: THE PRIMITIVE INHABITANTS.

**TUBANTES, The.** See **FRANKS**: ORIGIN AND EARLIEST HISTORY.

**TUDELA, Battle of.** See **SPAIN**: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER).

**TUDORS, The.** See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1485–1603.

**TUFTS COLLEGE.** See **EDUCATION, MODERN**: AMERICA: A. D. 1769–1884.

**TUGENDBUND, The.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1808 (APRIL–DECEMBER).

**TUILERIES, The.**—The palace of the Tuileries is said to have taken its name from the tile-making which had been carried on formerly in the vicinity of the ground on which it was built. "The history of it begins in the year 1564, when Catherine de Medicis conceived the idea of having a palace to herself near the Louvre, yet independent, in which she might be near enough to her son Charles IX. to have influence over him. . . . The palace was never very long or very closely connected with the history of the monarchy. It is not at all comparable to Windsor in that respect. Henry IV. liked it, Louis XIV. preferred Versailles, Louis XV. lived at the Tuileries in his minority. The chosen association of the palace with the sovereigns of France is very recent. Louis XVI. lived in it, and so did Charles X. and Louis-Philippe. The two Napoleons were fond of it. . . . The last inhabitant was the Empress Eugénie, as Regent. . . . The parliamentary history of the Tuileries is important, as it has been not only a palace but a parliament house. . . . The destruction of the Tuileries by the Communards [1871] was a lamentable event from the point of view of the historian and the archaeologist, but artistically the loss is not great."—P. G. Hamerton, *Paris in Old and Present Times*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: *Hist. of Paris* (London: 1827), v. 2, ch. 2.

**A. D. 1792.—Mobbing of the King.—The attack of August 10.—Massacre of the Swiss.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1792 (JUNE–AUGUST).

**TULANE UNIVERSITY.** See **EDUCATION, MODERN**: AMERICA: A. D. 1845–1847.

**TULCHAN BISHOPS.** See **SCOTLAND**: A. D. 1572.

**TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN, The.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1863 (JUNE–JULY: TENNESSEE).

**TULLIANUM, The.** See **MAMERTINE PRISON**.

**TUMULT OF AMBOISE.** See **FRANCE**: A. D. 1559–1561.

**TUMULUS.**—A mound; usually a grave mound, or barrow.

**TUN.—TUNSCAPE.** See **TOWN**; **TOWNSHIP**; and **BOROUGH**.

**TUNIC, The Roman.**—"The tunica was put on in the same way as the Greek chiton. Its cut was the same for men and women, and its simple original type was never essentially modified by the additions of later fashion. It was light and comfortable, and was worn especially at home; out of doors the toga was arranged over it."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 95.

**TUNIS, Ancient.** See **CARTHAGE, THE DOMINION OF**; also, **AFRICA, THE ROMAN PROVINCE**. A. D. 1270–1271.—**Crusade of Saint Louis.** See **CRUSADES**: A. D. 1270–1271.

**Modern history.** See **BARBARY STATES**.

**TUNNAGE AND POUNDAGE.**—A tax or custom of two shillings on the tun of wine and sixpence on the pound of merchandise, which became, in England, from the fourteenth century, one of the regular parliamentary grants to the crown, for a long period. It grew out of an agreement with the merchants in the time of Edward II., to take the place of the former right of prisage; the right, that is, to take two tuns of wine from every ship importing twenty tuns or more,—one before and one behind the mast.—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 17, sect. 276-277 (v. 2).—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1629.

**TUPI, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TUPI.

**TUPUYAS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TUPI, ETC.

**TURAN.**—"The old Persians, who spoke an Aryan tongue, called their own land Iran, and the barbarous land to the north of it they called Turan. In their eyes, Iran was the land of light, and Turan was the land of darkness. From this Turan, the land of Central Asia, came the many Turkish settlements which made their way, first into Western Asia and then into Europe."—E. A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, ch. 2.

**TURANIAN RACES AND LANGUAGES.**—The name Turanian has been given to a large group of peoples, mostly Asiatic, whose languages are all in the agglutinative stage and bear evident marks of a family relationship. "This race, one of the largest, both numerically and with regard to the extent of territory which it occupies, is divided into two great branches, the Ugro-finnish and the Dravidian. The first must be again subdivided into the Turkish, including the populations of Turkestan and of the Steppes of Central Asia, as well as the Hungarians who have been for a long time settled in Europe; and the Uralo-finnish group, comprising the Finns, the Esthonians, the Tchoudes, and, in general, nearly all the tribes of the north of Europe and Asia. The country of the Dravidian branch is, on the contrary, to the south. This branch is in fact composed of the indigenous people of the Peninsula of Hindustan; Tamuls, Telingas, Carnates, who were subjugated by the Aryan race, and who appear to have originally driven before them the negroes of the Australian group, the original inhabitants of the soil, who are now represented by the almost savage tribe of the Khonds. The Turanian race is one of the oldest in the world. . . . The skulls discovered in France, England and Belgium, in caves of the close of the quaternary epoch, appear from their characteristics to belong to a Turanian race, to the Uralo-finnish group, and particularly resemble those of the Esthonians. Wherever the Japhetic or pure Indo-European race extended, it seems to have encountered a Turanian population which it conquered and finally amalgamated with itself."—F. Lenormant, *Manual of Ancient Hist. of the East*, bk. 1, ch. 4.—"From the 'Shah-nameh,' the great Persian epic, we learn that the Aryan Persians called their nearest non-Aryan neighbours—the Turkic or Turcoman tribes to the north of them—by the name Turan, a word from which we derive the familiar ethnologic term Turanian."—I. Taylor, *Etruscan Researches*, ch. 2.

**TURCOMANS, Russian subjugation of the.** See RUSSIA: A. D. 1869-1881.

**TURDETANI, The.**—"There is a tradition that the Turdetani (round Seville) possessed lays from very ancient times, a metrical book of laws, of 6,000 verses, and even historical records. At any rate, this tribe is described as the most civilized of all the Spanish tribes, and at the same time the least warlike."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 3, ch. 7.—"The most mixed portion of the Peninsular population . . . is that of the water-system of the Guadalquivir and the parts immediately south and east of it, . . . the country of the Turdetani and Bastitani, if we look to the ancient populations—Bætica, if we adopt the general name of the Romans, Andalusia in modern geography; . . . it was the Iberians of these parts who were the first to receive foreign intermixture, and the last to lose it."—R. G. Latham, *Ethnology of Europe*, ch. 2.

**TURDETANIA.**—The ancient name of modern Andalusia, in Spain; known still more anciently as Tartessus.

**TURENNE, Vicomte de: Campaigns in the Thirty Years War and the war with Spain.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645; 1643-1644; 1646-1648; and ITALY: A. D. 1635-1659. . . . The wars of the Fronde. See FRANCE: A. D. 1649; 1650-1651; 1651-1653. . . . Campaigns against the Spaniards under Condé. See FRANCE: A. D. 1653-1656; and 1655-1658. . . . Last campaigns. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1667; 1672-1674; and, 1674-1678.

**TURGOT, Ministry of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1774-1788.

**TURIERO, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CHIBCHAS.

**TURIN: A. D. 312.**—Defeat of Maxentius by Constantine. See ROME: A. D. 305-323.

**11-12th Centuries.**—Acquisition of Republican Independence. See ITALY: A. D. 1056-1152.

**12th Century, Included in the original Italian possessions of the House of Savoy.** See SAVOY: 11-15TH CENTURIES.

**A. D. 1536-1544.**—Occupation by the French and restoration to the Duke of Savoy. See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.

**A. D. 1559.**—Held by France while other territory of the Duke of Savoy was restored to him. See FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559.

**A. D. 1562-1580.**—Evacuation by the French.—Establishment of the seat of government by Duke Emanuel Philibert.—Increased importance. See SAVOY: A. D. 1559-1580.

**A. D. 1639-1657.**—Extraordinary siege within a siege.—The citadel, and its restoration by France to the Duke of Savoy. See ITALY: A. D. 1635-1659.

**A. D. 1706.**—Siege by the French and rout of the besiegers. See ITALY (SAVOY AND PIEDMONT): A. D. 1701-1713.

**TURIN PAPYRUS, The.**—An Egyptian papyrus preserved in the Turin Museum, for which it was purchased from M. Drovetti, consul-general of France. "If this papyrus were entire, the science of Egyptian antiquities could not possess a more valuable document. It contains a list of all the mythical or historical personages who were believed to have reigned in Egypt, from fabulous times down to a period we



cannot ascertain, because the end of the papyrus is wanting. Compiled under Ramses II. (19th dynasty), that is, in the most flourishing epoch of the history of Egypt, this list has all the characteristics of an official document, and gives us the more valuable assistance, as the name of each king is followed by the duration of his reign, and each dynasty by the total number of years during which it governed Egypt. Unfortunately this inestimable treasure exists only in very small pieces (164 in number), which it is often impossible to join correctly."—F. Lenormant, *Manual of Ancient Hist. of the East*, bk. 3, ch. 1, sect. 2.

**TURKESTAN.**—"Few even of the leading authorities are of accord as to the exact meaning of such common expressions as Turkestan or Central Asia. The Russians themselves often designate as Central Asia the second great administrative division of their Asiatic possessions, which is mainly comprised within the Aralo-Caspian depression. But this expression is misleading in a geographical sense. To the portion of this division directly administered by the Governor-General, whose headquarters are at Tashkent, they give the still more questionable name of Eastern Turkestan—the true Eastern Turkestan, if there be any, lying beyond his jurisdiction in the Chinese province of Kashgaria. . . . Russian Turkestan is bordered on the west by the Caspian, the Ural river and mountains, on the east by the Pamir plateau, the Tian-Shan and Ala-tau ranges separating it

from the Chinese Empire, northwards by the low ridge crossing the Kirghis steppes about the 51st parallel, and forming the water-parting between the Aralo-Caspian and Ob basins."—*Stanford's Compendium of Geog. and Travel: Asia*, pp. 391–392.—Of the region sometimes called Chinese Turkestan, the name "Kashgaria," "lately current in Europe, has no *raison d'être* since the collapse of the independent state founded by Yakub of Kashgar. In the same way the expression 'Kingdom of Khotan' fell into disuse after the city of Khotan had ceased to be the capital. The term 'Little Bokhara,' still in use some thirty years ago, pointed at the former religious ascendancy of Bokhara, but is now all the less appropriate that Bokhara itself has yielded the supremacy to Tashkent. Lastly, the expressions Eastern Turkestan and Chinese Turkestan are still applicable, because the inhabitants are of Turki speech, while the Chinese have again brought the country under subjection."—E. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants: Asia*, v. 2, ch. 3.—See, also, YAKOUB BEG.

**Ancient.** See SOGDIANA.

**6th Century.**—**Turkish conquest.** See **TURKS: 6TH CENTURY.**

**A. D. 710.**—**Mahometan conquest.** See **MAHOMETAN CONQUEST: A. D. 710.**

**A. D. 1859–1865.**—**Russian conquest.** See **RUSSIA: A. D. 1859–1876.**

**TURKEY.** See **TURKS (THE OTTOMANS): A. D. 1240–1326**, and after; also, **SUBLIME PORTE.**

## TURKS.

**6th Century.**—**Beginning of their career.**—"At the equal distance of 2,000 miles from the Caspian, the Icy, the Chinese, and the Bengal seas, a ridge of mountains is conspicuous, the centre, and perhaps the summit, of Asia, which, in the language of different nations has been styled Imaus, and Caf, and Altai, and the Golden Mountains, and the Girdle of the Earth. The sides of the hills were productive of minerals; and the iron-forges, for the purpose of war, were exercised by the Turks, the most despised portion of the slaves of the great khan of the Geougen. But their servitude could only last till a leader, bold and eloquent, should arise to persuade his countrymen that the same arms which they forged for their masters might become in their own hands the instruments of freedom and victory. They sallied from the mountain; a sceptre was the reward of his advice. . . . The decisive battle which almost extirpated the nation of the Geougen established in Tartary the new and more powerful empire of the Turks. . . . The royal encampment seldom lost sight of Mount Altai, from whence the river Irtish descends to water the rich pastures of the Calmucks, which nourish the largest sheep and oxen in the world. . . . As the subject nations marched under the standard of the Turks, their cavalry, both men and horses, were proudly computed by millions; one of their effective armies consisted of 400,000 soldiers, and in less than fifty years they were connected in peace and war with the Romans, the Persians, and the Chinese. . . . Among their southern conquests the most splendid was that

of the Nephthalites, or White Huns, a polite and warlike people, who possessed the commercial cities of Bochara and Samarcand, who had vanquished the Persian monarch, and carried their victorious arms along the banks and perhaps to the mouth of the Indus. On the side of the west the Turkish cavalry advanced to the lake Mæotis [Sea of Azov]. They passed that lake on the ice. The khan, who dwelt at the foot of Mount Altai, issued his commands for the siege of Bosphorus, a city the voluntary subject of Rome and whose princes had formerly been the friends of Athens."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 42.—"The name Turks is the collective appellation of a vast number of tribes extending from the neighbourhood of the Lake Baikal, 110° E. longitude, to the eastern boundaries of the Greek and Slavonic countries of Europe. . . . Although the name of the Turks first became known to the western nations in the sixth century, the people had appeared in the west a century earlier, for there is every reason to believe that the Huns belonged to the Turkish stock. The Turks of Mount Altai are called Thú-kiú by the Chinese writers and are regarded as the same people as the Hiong-nú of earlier times. . . . The Chinese name . . . appears to be a corruption of the Turkish word 'terk' . . . a 'helmet.' The Thú-kiú became very powerful under their leader Tumere, who conquered the Jéujen (the Geougen of Gibbon), united under his sway all the Turkish tribes . . . and assumed the title of Chagan or Khan, A. D. 546."—W. Smith, *Note to above.*

ALSO IN: J. H. Newman, *Lect's on the Hist. of the Turks (Hist. Sketches, v. 1), lect. 1-4.*—See, also, TARTARS; and MONGOLS: ORIGIN, &c.; and BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: RACES EXISTING.

**A. D. 710.**—Subjugation by the Saracens. See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST: A. D. 710.

**A. D. 815-945.**—Slaves and masters of the Caliphate. See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST AND EMPIRE: A. D. 815-945.

**A. D. 999-1183.**—The Gaznevide empire.—The decline of the Caliphate at Bagdad in the 9th century was signalized by the rise to practically independent power of several dynasties in its Persian and Central Asian dominions. Among these was the dynasty of the Samanides who ruled, for a hundred and twenty-five years, an extensive dominion in northern Persia and modern Afghanistan and in the Turkoman regions to the Oxus and beyond. In this dominion of the Samanides was included the Turkish tribes which had submitted to Islam and which were presently to become the master champions of the faith. Their first attainment of actual empire in the Moslem world was accomplished by the overthrow of the Samanide princes, and the chief instruments of that revolution were two Turks of humble origin—Sebectagi, or Sabektekkin, and his son Mahmud. Sebectagi had been a slave (in the service of a high official under the Samanides) who gained the favor of his masters and acquired command of the city and province of Gazna; whence his famous son Mahmud was called the Gaznevide, and the wide conquests which the latter made are sometimes distinguished as the Gaznevide empire. "For him the title of Sultan was first invented [see SULTAN]; and his kingdom was enlarged from Transoxiana to the neighbourhood of Ispahan, from the shores of the Caspian to the mouth of the Indus. But the principal source of his fame and riches was the holy war which he waged against the Gentoos of Hindostan. . . . The Sultan of Gazna surpassed the limits of the conquests of Alexander; after a march of three months, over the hills of Cashmir and Thibet, he reached the famous city of Kinoge, on the Upper Ganges, and, in a naval combat on one of the branches of the Indus, he fought and vanquished 4,000 boats of the natives. Delhi, Lahor, and Multan were compelled to open their gates; the fertile kingdom of Guzarat attracted his ambition and tempted his stay." The throne of Mahmud scarcely outlasted himself. In the reign of his son Massoud, it was nearly overturned by another Turkish horde—later comers into the region of Bokhara from the steppes beyond. In a great battle fought at Zendecan, in Khorassan, A. D. 1038, Massoud was defeated and driven from Persia to a narrowed kingdom in Cabul and the Punjab, which survived for more than a century longer and then disappeared.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 57.

ALSO IN: J. H. Newman, *Lect's on the Hist. of the Turks (Hist. Sketches, v. 1), lect. 4.*—See, also, INDIA: A. D. 977-1290.

(Seljuk), **A. D. 1004-1063.**—Conquests of Seldjuk and Togrul Beg.—"The history of the origin of the Seldjukides is obscured by numerous myths, but it appears from it that Seldjuk, or more correctly Seldjik, the son of Tokmak, and Subash, commander of the army of a prince

named Pigu or Bogu, were expelled from their native steppes for some crime, and forced to seek their fortunes in strange countries. Seldjuk, with 100 horsemen, 1,000 camels, and 50,000 sheep, migrated to a place on the southern confines of the desert, in the neighbourhood of Djend [described as distant twenty fersakhs from Bokhara]. He settled there and, with all his followers, embraced Islamism." Under Seldjuk and his two grandsons, Togrul and Tchakar, the Seldjukides grew formidable in numbers and power, on the border of the empire of Mahmud the Ghaznevide, then rising on the ruins of the principality of the Samanides. Thinking to control these turbulent kinsmen of his race, Mahmud unwisely proposed to them to quit the country they occupied, between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and to settle themselves in Khorasan. "In the year . . . (1030), that is, within a year of the death of Sultan Mahmud, we find the Seldjukides west of Merv, on the ground now occupied by the Tekke-Turkomans, in the neighbourhood of the southern cities of Nisa and Abivard, from which point they molested the rich province of Khorasan by constant raids, as grievously as is done by the Turkomans to this very day." When it was too late, the Ghaznevide Sultan attempted to expel the marauders. His armies were routed, and the grandsons of Seldjuk were soon (A. D. 1039) in undisputed possession of the whole of Khorasan, with the rich and flourishing cities of Merv, Balkh, and Nishabur. A few years later they had pushed forward "over the ruins of the former power of the Buyyides [or Boides, of Persia] to Azerbaidjan, and, in the year 446 (1054) the skirmishers of the Turkish army, led by Togrul Beg, penetrated into the interior of the eastern Roman Empire [that is, into Asia Minor]; and although the bold inhabitants of the desert in their raid on the land of the Cæsars were bent rather on plunder than on actual conquest, yet even their temporary success against the great name of Rome—so long one of awe to the ancient Asiatic—increased enormously the prestige and reputation of the Seldjukides. Togrul Beg was said to meditate a pilgrimage to Mecca, with the object at the same time of clearing the road thither, which the state of anarchy in Bagdad had long rendered unsafe."—A. Vámbéry, *Hist. of Bokhara*, ch. 6.—"Togrul Beg, under pretence of a pilgrimage to Mekka had entered Irak at the head of a strong army, and sought to obtain admission into Baghddad. The khalif, in opposition to the advice of his vizier and the officers of the Turkish militia, consented; on the 22nd Ramadan, 447 (December, 1050), the name of Togrul was inserted in the public prayer; and three days after he made his entry into the city. He had taken an oath, before entering, to be the faithful and obedient servant of the khalif; but it is needless to add that he broke this immediately afterwards, and occupied the city in force. A dispute broke out between the Seljuk soldiers and some shop-keepers. The Baghddad Turks took the side of the citizens, the foreigners were driven out, and several of them killed and wounded. This riot was followed by a general attack upon the ill-fated city by the army of Togrul Beg. It was useless for the khalif and his vizier to protest their innocence. The Turkish chief denounced them as the murderers of his soldiers, and summoned the vizier to his camp to



explain his conduct. On his arrival there he was arrested and flung into prison. With this occurrence the rule of the Bouides in Baghdad may be said to have terminated, and that of the Seljuks commenced. Togrul Beg remained for a year inactive in Baghdad, neither visiting the khalif nor heeding his entreaties to put an end to the ravages and outrages perpetrated by his fierce and lawless soldiery on the wretched towns-people." The khalif was forced, nevertheless, to crown Sultan Togrul with two crowns, one to represent the sovereignty of Persia and the other the sovereignty of Arabia, and to confer on him the title of "The Sultan of the Court, the Right Hand of the Chief of Believers, the King of the East and of the West." The Seljuk sultan was now master of the Asiatic Mahometan empire. But civil war was still protracted for a period, by struggles of the partisans of the Bouides, assisted by the Fatimite Kalif of Egypt, and the unfortunate city of Baghdad suffered terribly at the hands of each party in turn. Togrul Beg, in the end, destroyed the opposition to his rule, and was at the point of marrying one of the kalif's daughters, when a sudden illness ended his life, A. D. 1063. He was succeeded by his nephew, Alp Arslan, who extended the empire of the Seljukides in Asia Minor and Armenia.—R. D. Osborn, *Islam under the Khalifs of Baghdad*, pt. 3, ch. 2.

**A. D. 1063-1073. — Conquests of Alp Arslan.**—"Alp Arslan, the nephew and successor of Togrul Beg, carried on the havoc and devastation which had marked the career through life of his uncle. Togrul Beg had on two or three occasions invaded the Asiatic territories of the Byzantine Emperor; Alp Arslan carried these partial conquests to completion. He invaded in person the northern parts of Armenia and Iberia. He laid waste the country in the cruellest manner, for it was the notion of these barbarians that a country was not really conquered unless it was also depopulated. Iberia had been long celebrated for the industry of its inhabitants, the wealth of its numerous towns, and the valour of its people. There is no doubt they could have flung back the invaders had the Byzantine Empire come to their aid. But avarice was the dominant passion of the Emperor, Constantine X., and rather than disburse his loved hoards, he preferred to look idly on, while his fairest provinces were laid waste and overrun. The country was, in consequence, compelled to submit to the Seljuk Turks, and the invaders settling upon it, like a swarm of locusts, swiftly converted the happiest and most flourishing portion of Asia into a scene of poverty and desolation. From Iberia, Alp Arslan passed into Armenia. Ani, the capital, was stormed and taken, after a gallant defence, on the 6th June, 1064. . . . So great was the carnage that the streets were literally choked up with dead bodies; and the waters of the river were reddened from the quantity of bloody corpses."—R. D. Osborn, *Islam under the Khalifs of Baghdad*, pt. 3, ch. 2.—"So far as one can judge from the evidence of modern and mediæval travellers and of Byzantine historians, Asia Minor, at the time of the Seljuk invasion of Alparslan, was thickly occupied by races who were industrious, intelligent, and civilised—races with a certain mixture of Greek blood and mostly Greek as to language. The numerous provincial cities were the centres

of civilisation. Their walls and amphitheatres, their works of art, aqueducts, and other public buildings, give evidence of a long-continued sense of security, of peaceful and progressive peoples, and of a healthy municipal life. Wealth was widely diffused. . . . It was against this prosperous portion of the Empire, which had contributed largely to the wealth of the capital, that Alparslan turned his attention when the border states were no longer able to resist his progress. . . . The Strong Lion of the Seljuks devoured many cities and devastated the fairest provinces. Cappadocia was laid waste; the inhabitants of its capital, Cesarea, were massacred. . . . Mesopotamia, Mitylene, Syria, and Cilicia were plundered."—E. Pears, *The Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 2.—The career of Alp Arslan in Asia Minor was opposed by a courageous and vigorous emperor, Romanus Diogenes, or Romanus IV.; but Romanus exposed himself and his army rashly to the chances of a battle at Manzikert, A. D. 1071, on which all was staked. He lost; his army was routed, and he, himself, was taken prisoner. He was released on signing a treaty of peace and agreeing to pay a heavy ransom; but a revolution at Constantinople meantime had robbed him of the throne, deprived him of the means of fulfilling his engagements, and brought upon him, soon afterwards, a cruel end. Alp Arslan, provoked by the repudiation of the treaty, revenged himself on the ill-fated country which lay at his mercy. "Every calamity of this unfortunate period sinks into insignificance when compared with the destruction of the greater part of the Greek race, by the ravages of the Seljouk Turks in Asia Minor."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine and Greek Empires*, bk. 3, ch. 1, sect. 2.

**A. D. 1073-1092. — The empire of Malek Shah and its subordinate Sultans.**—Alp Arslan, assassinated in 1073, "was succeeded by his son, Malek Shah, in whose reign the power of the Seljukian Turks attained its greatest height. . . . Turkestan, the home of his race, including Bokhara and Samarcand, was annexed by Malek, and the rule of the shepherd Sultan was admitted at Cashgar. In addition to Persia and the countries just mentioned, his territory included at one time nearly the whole of what is now Turkey in Asia. . . . The Seljukian empire, however, broke up on the death of Malek, which took place in 1092, and, after a period of civil war, was divided into four parts. . . . The only one of the divisions . . . with which I am concerned is that which was carved out of the dominions of the Roman empire, and of which the capital was, for the most part, at Iconium, a city which to-day, under the name of Konieh, retains somewhat of a sacred character among the Turks, because of its connection with the first Sultans who obtained the right to be Caliphs. Sultan Malek, eighteen years before his death, had prevented a quarrel with Suliman, his cousin, by consenting to allow him to be Sultan of the Seljuks in the lands of the Christian empire. With Suliman there begins the famous line of robber chiefs who are known as Seljukian Sultans of Rome or Roum, or as Sultans of Iconium."—E. Pears, *The Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 2.—"The dominion of Suleiman over the greater part of Asia Minor was recognised by a treaty with the Byzantine empire in 1074, when Michael VII. purchased the assistance of a Turkish aux-

iliary force against the rebellion of Oursel and his own uncle John Dukas. Nicephorus III. ratified the treaty concluded with Michael VII., augmented the power of the Turks, and abandoned additional numbers of Christians to their domination, to gain their aid in dethroning his lawful prince; and Nicephorus Melissenos, when he rebelled against Nicephorus III., repeated a similar treason against the traitor, and, in hopes of gaining possession of Constantinople, yielded up the possession of Nicæa to Suleiman, which that chief immediately made the capital of his dominions. . . . When Alexius ascended the throne [Alexius I. A. D. 1081], the Seljouk conquests in Asia Minor were still considered as a portion of the dominions of the Grand Sultan Malekshah, the son of Alp Arslan, and Suleiman, the sultan of Nicæa, was only his lieutenant, though as a member of the house of Seljouk, and as cousin of Malekshah, he was honoured with the title of Sultan. The prominent position which his posterity occupied in the wars of the Crusaders, their long relations with the Byzantine empire, and the independent position they held as sultans of Iconium, have secured to them a far more lasting place in history than has been obtained by the superior but less durable dynasty of the grand sultans. . . . Toutoush, the brother of Malekshah, who acted as his governor at Damascus at the same time, became the founder of the Syrian dynasty of Seljouk sultans."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine and Greek Empires, from 716 to 1453, bk. 3, ch. 2, sect. 1.*—The empire of Malek Shah "was as vast as that of the Sassanian kings in the height of their glory. He encouraged the cultivation of science and literature, and his reign is famous for the reformation of the Calendar [in which work Omar el-Khayyam, the poet, was one of the astronomers employed]. An assembly of all the astronomers of Persia adopted a system of computing time which Gibbon says 'surpasses the Julian and approaches the accuracy of the Gregorian era.' It was called the Jalalean era, from Jalalu'd-Din, 'Glory of the Faith,' one of the titles of Malik-Shah, and commenced on March 15, 1079."—C. R. Markham, *Hist. of Persia, ch. 6.*

**A. D. 1092-1160.**—Dissolution of the empire of Malek Shah.—"Melikshah's reign was certainly the culminating point of the glory of the Seldjukides. . . . Mindful of the oriental adage, 'Perfection and decay go hand in hand,' he determined as far as possible to provide, during his own lifetime, against discord breaking out amongst those who should come after him, by dividing the empire between his different relations. Anatolia was given to Suleiman Shah, whose family had hitherto governed Gazan; Syria fell to his brother Tutush, the adversary of the Crusaders; Nushtekin Gartcha, who had raised himself from slavery to the rank of generalissimo, and who became later the founder of the dynasty of the Khahrezmides, was invested with Khahrezm; Aksonghar got Aleppo; Tchekermish Mosul, Kobulmish Damascus, Khomar-tekkin Fars, and his son Sandjar was entrusted with the administration of Khorasan and Transoxania. These precautions proved, however, ineffectual to preserve the dynasty of the Seldjukides from the common fate of oriental sovereign races, for after the death of Melikshah, which took place in 485 (1092), his son Berkiyaruk

(the Very Brilliant One) had scarcely ascended the throne before the flames of discord were kindled amongst the numerous members of the family, and they speedily fell a prey to the generals and the other relations of the deceased prince." Sandjar, who died in 1160, "was almost the only one of all his race who took to heart the decay of their power in their old hereditary dominions, or made any earnest endeavour to arrest it."—A. Vámbéry, *Hist. of Bokhara, ch. 6.*

**A. D. 1097-1099.**—First encounters with the Crusaders. See CRUSADES: A. D. 1096-1099.

**A. D. 1101-1102.**—Destruction of three hosts of Crusaders. See CRUSADES: A. D. 1101-1102.

**A. D. 1193.**—Overthrow by the Khwarezmians. See KHUAREZM.

(Ottoman): **A. D. 1240-1326.**—Origin and rise of the modern Turkish power.—On the final defeat and death, in Kurdistan, of the last Khwarezmian or Carizmian prince, who was pursued relentlessly by the Mongols of Jingis Khan and his successors, there was dissolved an army which included various Turkish hordes. The fragments of this Khwarezmian force were scattered and played several important parts in the history of the troubled time. "The bolder and more powerful chiefs invaded Syria, and violated the holy sepulchre of Jerusalem; the more humble engaged in the service of Aladin, Sultan of Iconium, and among these were the obscure fathers of the Ottoman line. They had formerly pitched their tents near the southern bank of the Oxus, in the plains of Mahan and Nesa; and it is somewhat remarkable that the same spot should have produced the first authors of the Parthian and Turkish empires. At the head or in rear of a Carizmian army, Soliman Shah was drowned in the passage of the Euphrates. His son Orthogrul became the soldier and subject of Aladin, and established at Surgut, on the banks of the Sangar, a camp of four hundred families or tents, whom he governed fifty-two years both in peace and war. He was the father of Thaman, or Athman, whose Turkish name has been melted into the appellation of the Caliph Othman; and if we describe that pastoral chief as a shepherd and a robber, we must separate from those characters all idea of ignominy and baseness. Othman possessed, and perhaps surpassed, the ordinary virtues of a soldier, and the circumstances of time and place were propitious to his independence and success. The Seldjukian dynasty was no more, and the distance and decline of the Mogul Khans soon enfranchised him from the control of a superior. He was situate on the verge of the Greek empire. The Koran sanctified his 'gazi,' or holy war, against the infidels; and their political errors unlocked the passes of Mount Olympus, and invited him to descend into the plains of Bithynia. . . . It was on the 27th of July, in the year 1299 of the Christian era, that Othman first invaded the territory of Nicomedia; and the singular accuracy of the date seems to disclose some foresight of the rapid and destructive growth of the monster. The annals of the twenty-seven years of his reign would exhibit a repetition of the same inroads; and his hereditary troops were multiplied in each campaign by the accession of captives and volunteers. Instead of retreating to the hills, he maintained the



most useful and defensible posts, fortified the towns and castles which he had first pillaged; and renounced the pastoral life for the baths and palaces of his infant capitals. But it was not till Othman was oppressed by age and infirmities that he received the welcome news of the conquest of Prusa, which had been surrendered by famine or treachery to the arms of his son Orchan. . . . From the conquest of Prusa we may date the true era of the Ottoman empire. The lives and possessions of the Christian subjects were redeemed by a tribute or ransom of thirty thousand crowns of gold; and the city, by the labors of Orchan, assumed the aspect of a Mahometan capital."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 64.—"Osman is the real Turkish name, which has been corrupted into Othman. The descendants of his subjects style themselves Osmanlis, which has in like manner been corrupted into Ottoman."—Dr. W. Smith, *Note to Gibbon*, as above.

**A. D. 1326-1359.—Progress of conquests in Asia Minor.—The Janissaries.**—"Orchan [the son and successor of Othman] had captured the city of Nicomedia in the first year of his reign (1326); and with the new resources for warfare which the administrative genius of his brother [Alaeddin] placed at his command, he speedily signalled his reign by conquests still more important. The great city of Nice [Nicæa] (second to Constantinople only in the Greek Empire) surrendered to him in 1330. . . . Numerous other advantages were gained over the Greeks: and the Turkish prince of Karasi (the ancient Mysia), who had taken up arms against the Ottomans, was defeated; and his capital city, Berghama (the ancient Pergamus), and his territory, annexed to Orchan's dominions. On the conquest of Karasi, in the year 1336 of our era, nearly the whole of the north-west of Asia Minor was included in the Ottoman Empire; and the four great cities of Brusa, Nicomedia, Nice, and Pergamus had become strongholds of its power. A period of twenty years, without further conquests, and without war, followed the acquisition of Karasi. During this time the Ottoman sovereign was actively occupied in perfecting the civil and military institutions which his brother had introduced; in securing internal order, in founding and endowing mosques and schools, and in the construction of vast public edifices. . . . Orchan died in the year 1359 of our era, at the age of seventy-five, after a reign of thirty-three years, during which the most important civil and military institutions of his nation were founded, and the Crescent was not only advanced over many of the fairest provinces of Asia, but was also planted on the European continent."—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 2.—"It is with Othman's son Orkhan that the Ottoman Empire really begins. He threw off his nominal allegiance to the Sultan [of Iconium], though he still bore only the title of Emir. And in his time the Ottomans first made good their footing in Europe. But while his dominion was still only Asiatic, Orkhan began one institution which did more than anything else firmly to establish the Ottoman power. This was the institution of the tribute children. By the law of Mahomet . . . the unbeliever is allowed to purchase life, property, and the exercise of his religion, by the payment of tribute. Earlier Mahometan rulers had been

satisfied with tribute in the ordinary sense. Orkhan first demanded a tribute of children. The deepest of wrongs, that which other tyrants did as an occasional outrage, thus became under the Ottomans a settled law. A fixed proportion of the strongest and most promising boys among the conquered Christian nations were carried off for the service of the Ottoman princes. They were brought up in the Mahometan faith, and were employed in civil or military functions, according to their capacity. Out of them was formed the famous force of the Janissaries, the new soldiers who, for three centuries, as long as they were levied in this way, formed the strength of the Ottoman armies. These children, torn from their homes and cut off from every domestic and national tie, knew only the religion and the service into which they were forced, and formed a body of troops such as no other power, Christian or Mahometan, could command. . . . While the force founded by Orkhan lasted in its first shape, the Ottoman armies were irresistible. But all this shews how far the Ottomans were from being a national power. Their victories were won by soldiers who were really of the blood of the Greeks, Slaves, and other conquered nations. In the same way, while the Ottoman power was strongest, the chief posts of the Empire, civil and military, were constantly held, not by native Turks, but by Christian renegades of all nations. The Ottoman power in short was the power, not of a nation, but simply of an army."—E. A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, ch. 4.—"The name of *Yeni Tscheri*, which means 'new troops,' and which European writers have turned into Janissaries, was given to Orchan's young corps by the Dervish Hadji Beytarch."—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 2.

**A. D. 1360-1389.—The conquests in Europe of Amurath I.**—"The dissensions of the elder and younger Andronicus [Emperors at Constantinople, the younger—a grandson—in revolt and the elder finally deposed, A. D. 1320-1328], and the mistaken policy of Cantacuzene [Great Domestic of the empire, regent, after the death of Andronicus the younger, A. D. 1341, and then usurper of the throne from 1341 until 1355], first led to the introduction of the Turks into Europe; and the subsequent marriage of Orchan with a Grecian princess was acceded to by the Byzantine court as a faint bond of peace between a dreaded conqueror and a crouching state. The expectation of tranquillity was, however, fatally blasted; and, in the last quarrel of Cantacuzene with his pupil [John Palæologus, the youthful son of Andronicus the younger, who was deprived of his crown for fourteen years by Cantacuzene], the disastrous ambition of the former opened the path of Solyman, the son of Orchan, across the Hellespont [A. D. 1356], and laid the northern provinces of the kingdom open to the temporary ravages of the barbarians, thus inflicting a lasting and irremediable injury on the liberties of Christendom. The exploits of Solyman, however, led to no other permanent results than the example which they left to the ambition of Amurath I., who, amongst his earliest achievements, led his victorious army across the Hellespont [A. D. 1360], ravaged the extended district from Mount Hæmus to the Straits, and, taking possession of Adrianople [A. D. 1361], made it the first seat of his royalty, and the first

shrine of Mahomedanism in Europe. His conquests had now drawn a circle round the enfeebled dominions of the Emperor; and the submission of John Palæologus, together with his political views in more distant quarters, alone prevented Amurath from contracting the circumference to the centre, and annihilating the empire of the East, by seating himself on the throne of Byzantium. For the present, he turned his back upon the city, and pursued his course towards the wilds of Bulgaria and Servia."—Sir J. E. Tennent, *Hist. of Modern Greece*, v. 1, ch. 4.—"Hitherto the Turkish victories in Europe had been won over the feeble Greeks; but the Ottomans now came in contact with the far more warlike Slavonic tribes, which had founded kingdoms and principalities in Servia and Bosnia. Amurath also menaced the frontiers of Wallachia and Hungary. The Roman See, once so energetic in exciting the early crusades, had disregarded the progress of the new Mahometan power, so long as the heretical Greeks were the only sufferers beneath its arms. But Hungary, a country that professed spiritual obedience to the Pope, a branch of Latin Christendom, was now in peril; and Pope Urban V. preached up a crusade against the infidel Turks. The King of Hungary, the princes of Servia, of Bosnia and Wallachia, leagued together to drive the Ottomans out of Europe; and their forces marched towards Adrianople until they crossed the river Marizza at a point not more than two days' journey from that city." A single battle, fought on the Marizza, in 1363, broke this first Slavonic league against the Turks, and Amurath proceeded in his acquisition of towns and territory from the Servians and Bulgarians until 1376, when both people purchased a short peace, the former by paying a heavy annual tribute of money and soldiers, the latter by giving their king's daughter to the Turk. The peace thus secured only gave an opportunity to the Slavic nations to organize one more great attempt to cast out their aggressive and dangerous neighbor. Servia led the movement, and was joined in it by the Bulgarians, the Bosnians, and the Skipetars of Albania, with aid likewise promised and rendered from Hungary, Wallachia, and Poland. But nothing prospered in the undertaking; it served the ambition of the Turks and quickened their conquest of southeastern Europe. Amurath fell upon Bulgaria first (A. D. 1389), broke down all resistance, dethroned the king and annexed his state to the Ottoman dominions. A few weeks later in the same year, on the 27th of August, 1389, the great and famous battle of Kossova was fought, which laid the heavy yoke of Turkish tyranny upon the necks of the Servian people, and the memory of which has been embalmed in their literature. Amurath was assassinated in the hour of victory by a despairing Servian nobleman, but lived long enough to command the execution of the captive Servian king.—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: L. Ranke, *Hist. of Servia*, ch. 2.—Madame E. L. Mijatovich, *Kossovo*.—See, also, BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 9-16TH CENTURIES.

A. D. 1389-1403.—The conquests of Bajazet.—The Emir becomes Sultan.—His overthrow and capture by Timour.—"The character of Bajazet, the son and successor of Amurath,

is strongly expressed in his surname of Ilderim, or the Lightning; and he might glory in an epithet which was drawn from the fiery energy of his soul and the rapidity of his destructive march. In the fourteen years of his reign he incessantly moved at the head of his armies, from Boursa to Adrianople, from the Danube to the Euphrates. . . . No sooner had he imposed a regular form of servitude on the Servians and Bulgarians than he passed the Danube to seek new enemies and new subjects in the heart of Moldavia. Whatever yet adhered to the Greek empire in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, acknowledged a Turkish master. . . . The humble title of emir was no longer suitable to the Ottoman greatness; and Bajazet condescended to accept a patent of sultan from the caliphs who served in Egypt under the yoke of the Mamelukes—a last and frivolous homage that was yielded by force to opinion, by the Turkish conquerors to the House of Abbas and the successors of the Arabian prophet. The ambition of the sultan was inflamed by the obligation of deserving this august title; and he turned his arms against the kingdom of Hungary, the perpetual theatre of the Turkish victories and defeats. Sigismund, the Hungarian king, was the son and brother of the emperors of the West; his cause was that of Europe and the Church; and on the report of his danger, the bravest knights of France and Germany were eager to march under his standard and that of the cross. In the battle of Nicopolis [September 28, A. D. 1396], Bajazet defeated a confederate army of 100,000 Christians, who had proudly boasted that if the sky should fall they could uphold it on their lances. The far greater part were slain or driven into the Danube; and Sigismund, escaping to Constantinople by the river and the Black Sea, returned, after a long circuit, to his exhausted kingdom. In the pride of victory, Bajazet threatened that he would besiege Buda; that he would subdue the adjacent countries of Germany and Italy; and that he would feed his horse with a bushel of oats on the altar of St. Peter at Rome. His progress was checked, not by the miraculous interposition of the apostle, not by a crusade of the Christian powers, but by a long and painful fit of the gout. . . . At length the ambition of the victorious sultan pointed to the conquest of Constantinople; but he listened to the advice of his vizir, who represented that such an enterprise might unite the powers of Christendom in a second and more formidable crusade. His epistle to the emperor was conceived in these words: 'By the divine clemency, our invincible scimitar has reduced to our obedience almost all Asia, with many and large countries in Europe, excepting only the city of Constantinople; for beyond the walls thou hast nothing left. Resign that city; stipulate thy reward; or tremble for thyself and thy unhappy people at the consequences of a rash refusal.' But his ambassadors were instructed to soften their tone, and to propose a treaty, which was subscribed with submission and gratitude. A truce of ten years was purchased by an annual tribute of thirty thousand crowns of gold." The truce was soon broken by Bajazet, who found a pretext for again demanding the surrender of Constantinople. He had established his blockade of the city and would surely have won it by famine or assault if Timour's invasion of Asia Minor (A. D.



1402) had not summarily interrupted his plans and ended his career. Defeated at the battle of Angora and taken prisoner by the Tartar conqueror, he died a few months later — whether caged like a beast or held in more honorable captivity is a question in some dispute. — E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 64-65. — See, also, TIMOUR.

A. D. 1393.—Wallachian capitulation. See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14-18TH CENTURIES (ROUMANIA, ETC.).

A. D. 1402-1451.—Prostration and recovery. —Conquests of Mahomet and Amurath II.—It is one of the marvels of history that the Ottoman empire, broken and dismembered by Timour, recovered its vigor and re-entered upon a long career. After the fall of Bajazet, three fragments of his dominions were held by three of his surviving sons, while other portions were transferred by Timour to princes of the old Seljuk house. Civil war broke out between the brothers of the Ottoman race; it resulted in the triumph of Mahomet, the youngest (A. D. 1413), who reunited a large part of the dominions of his father. He reigned but eight years, which were years of peace for the Greeks, with whom Mahomet maintained a friendly intercourse. His son, Amurath II., was provoked to renew the state of war, and a formidable attack upon Constantinople was made in August, 1432. The first assault failed, and disturbances at home recalled Amurath before he could repeat it. The Roman capital was reprieved for thirty years; but its trembling emperor paid tribute to the sultan and yielded most of the few cities that remained to him outside of his capital. The Ottoman power had become threatening again in Europe, and Servians, Bosnians, Albanians, Wallachians, Hungarians, and Poles now struck hands together in a combination, once more, to oppose it. "A severe struggle followed, which, after threatening the utter expulsion of the house of Othman from Europe, confirmed for centuries its dominion in that continent, and wrought the heavier subjugation of those who were then seeking to release themselves from its superiority. In 1442 Amurath was repulsed from Belgrade; and his generals, who were besieging Hermanstadt, in Transylvania, met with a still more disastrous reverse. It was at Hermanstadt that the renowned Hunyades first appeared in the wars between the Hungarians and the Turks. He was the illegitimate son of Sigismund, King of Hungary, and the fair Elizabeth Morsiney. In his early youth he gained distinction in the wars of Italy; and Comines, in his memoirs, celebrates him under the name of the White Knight of Wallachia. After some campaigns in Western Christendom, Hunyades returned to protect his native country against the Ottomans." At Hermanstadt, and again at Vassag, Hunyades defeated the Turks with great slaughter and rivalled them in the ferocity with which his prisoners were treated. His fame now gave a great impulse to the Crusade against the Turks which Pope Eugenius had preached, and drew volunteers to his standard from all the nations of the West. In 1443, Hunyades led a splendid and powerful army across the Danube near Semendra, drove the Turks beyond the Balkans, forced the passage of the mountains with a boldness and a skill that is compared with the exploits of Hannibal and Napoleon, and ex-

torted from the Sultan a treaty (of Szegeddin, July 12, 1444) which rescued a large Christian territory from the Moslem yoke. "The Sultan resigned all claims upon Servia and recognised George Brankovich as its independent sovereign. Wallachia was given up to Hungary." But the peace which this treaty secured was brief; Christian perfidy destroyed it, and the penalty was paid by whole centuries of suffering and shame for the Christians of the Danubian states. "Within a month from the signature of the treaty of Szegeddin the Pope and the Greek Emperor had persuaded the King of Hungary and his councillors to take an oath to break the oath which had been pledged to the Sultan. They represented that the confessed weakness of the Ottomans, and the retirement of Amurath [who had placed his son Mahomet on the throne and withdrawn from the cares of sovereignty] to Asia, gave an opportunity for eradicating the Turks from Europe which ought to be fully employed. The Cardinal Julian [legate of the Pope] pacified the conscientious misgivings which young King Ladislaus expressed, by his spiritual authority in giving dispensation and absolution in the Pope's name. . . . On the 1st of Sept., the King, the legate, and Hunyades, marched against the surprised and unprepared Turks with an army of 10,000 Poles and Hungarians. The temerity which made them expect to destroy the Turkish power in Europe with so slight a force was equal to the dishonesty of their enterprise." They advanced through Bulgaria to the Black Sea, and southward along its coast as far as Varna, which they took. There they were called to account. Amurath had resumed the sceptre, put himself at the head of 40,000 of the best warriors of Islam and on the 10th November he dashed them upon the Christian forces at Varna, with the broken treaty borne like a banner at their head. His victory was overwhelming. Cardinal Julian and the King of Hungary were both among the slain. Hunyades fled with a little remnant of followers and escaped to try fortune in other fields. "This overthrow did not bring immediate ruin upon Hungary, but it was fatal to the Slavonic neighbours of the Ottomans, who had joined the Hungarian King against them. Servia and Bosnia were thoroughly reconquered by the Mahometans; and the ruin of these Christian nations, which adhered to the Greek Church, was accelerated by the religious intolerance with which they were treated by their fellow Christians of Hungary and Poland, who obeyed the Pope and hated the Greek Church as heretical. . . . The bigotry of the Church of Rome in preaching up a crusade against the sect of the Patarenes, which was extensively spread in that country [Bosnia], caused the speedy and complete annexation of an important frontier province to the Ottoman Empire. Seventy Bosnian fortresses are said to have opened their gates to the Turks within eight days. The royal house of Bosnia was annihilated, and many of her chief nobles embraced Mahometanism to avoid a similar doom." After once more attempting to escape from the throne, and being recalled by domestic disturbances, Amurath reigned yet six years, extending his dominions in the Peloponnesus, defeating once more his old antagonist, Hunyades, who invaded Servia (1448), but being successfully defied in Albania by the heroic Scanderbeg. He died in

1451.—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: L. Ranke, *Hist. of Serbia*, ch. 2.—E. Szabad, *Hungary*, pt. 1, ch. 3-4.—A. Lamartine, *Hist. of Turkey*, bk. 10-11.

**A. D. 1451-1481.—Conquest of Constantinople.**—The Empire organized and perfected by Mahomet II.—Mahomet II., son of Amurath II., "finished the work of his predecessors; he made the Ottoman power in Europe what it has been ever since. He gave a systematic form to the customs of his house and to the dominion which he had won. His first act was the murder of his infant brother, and he made the murder of brothers a standing law of his Empire. He overthrew the last remnants of independent Roman rule, of independent Greek nationality, and he fixed the relations which the Greek part of his subjects were to bear both towards their Turkish masters and towards their Christian fellow-subjects. He made the northern and western frontiers of his Empire nearly what they still remain. The Ottoman Empire, in short, as our age has to deal with it, is, before all things, the work of Mahomet the Conqueror. The prince whose throne was fixed in the New Rome held altogether another place from even the mightiest of his predecessors. Mahomet had reigned two years, he had lived twenty-three, on the memorable day, May 29th 1453, when the Turks entered the city of the Cæsars and when the last Emperor, Constantine, died in the breach [see CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1453]. . . . And now that the Imperial city was at last taken, Mahomet seemed to make it his policy both to gather in whatever remained unconquered, and to bring most of the states which had hitherto been tributary under his direct rule. Greece itself, though it had been often ravaged by the Turks, had not been added to their dominions. The Emperors had, in the very last days of the Empire before the fall of Constantinople, recovered all Peloponnesos, except some points which were held by Venice. Frank Dukes also reigned at Athens, and another small duchy lingered on in the islands of Leukas and Kephallenia and on the coasts of Akarnania. The Turkish conquest of the mainland, again saving the Venetian points, was completed by the year 1460, but the two western islands were not taken until 1479. Eubœa was conquered in 1471. . . . The Empire of Trebizond was conquered in 1461, and the island of Lesbos or Mitylene in 1462. There was now no independent Greek state left. Crete, Corfu, and some smaller islands and points of coast, were held by Venice, and some of the islands of the Ægean were still ruled by Frank princes and by the Knights of Saint John. But, after the fall of Trebizond, there was no longer any independent Greek state anywhere, and the part of the Greek nation which was under Christian rulers of any kind was now far smaller than the part which was under the Turk. While the Greeks were thus wholly subdued, the Slaves fared no better. In 1459 Serbia was reduced from a tributary principality to an Ottoman province, and six years later Bosnia was annexed also. . . . One little fragment of the great Slavonic power in those lands alone remained. The little district of Zeta, a part of the Servian kingdom, was never fully conquered by the Turks. One part of it, the mountain district called Tsernagora or Montenegro, has kept its

independence to our times. Standing as an outpost of freedom and Christendom amid surrounding bondage, the Black Mountain has been often attacked, it has been several times overrun, but it has never been conquered. . . . To the south of them, the Christian Albanians held out for a long time under their famous chief George Castriot or Scanderbeg. After his death in 1459, they also came under the yoke. These conquests of Mahomet gave the Ottoman dominion in Europe nearly the same extent which it has now. His victories had been great, but they were balanced by some defeats. The conquest of Serbia and Bosnia opened the way to endless inroads into Hungary, South-eastern Germany and North-eastern Italy. But as yet these lands were merely ravaged, and the Turkish power met with some reverses. In 1456 Belgrade was saved by the last victory of Huniades [see HUNGARY: A. D. 1442-1458], and this time Mahomet the Conqueror had to flee. In another part of Europe, if in those days it is to be counted for Europe, Mahomet won the Genoese possessions in the peninsula of Crimea [A. D. 1475], and the Tartar Khans who ruled in that peninsula and the neighbouring lands became vassals of the Sultan. . . . The last years of Mahomet's reign were marked by a great failure and a great success. He failed to take Rhodes [A. D. 1480], which belonged to the Knights of Saint John; but his troops suddenly seized on Otranto in Southern Italy. Had this post been kept, Italy might have fallen as well as Greece; but the Conqueror died the next year, and Otranto was won back."—E. A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: A. Lamartine, *Hist. of Turkey*, bk. 12-13.—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 5-6.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 68.—See, also, ITALY: A. D. 1447-1480.

**A. D. 1454-1479.—Treaty with Venice, followed by war.** See GREECE: A. D. 1454-1479.

**A. D. 1479.—Defeat at Kenyer-Mesö by the Hungarians and Wallachians.** See HUNGARY: A. D. 1471-1487.

**A. D. 1481-1520.—The sad story of Prince Jem and the Christians.—Massacre of the Shiites.—Selim's conquests in Persia, Syria and Egypt.—The Sultan becomes the successor of the Khalifs, the chief of Islam.**—"The long reign of Bayezid [or Bajazet] II. (1481-1512) which surpassed that of his father and grandfather, so that the three together nearly completed a century, was marked by a general lethargy and incapacity on the part of the Turkish Government. . . . Family dissensions were indeed the leading incidents of Bayezid's reign, and for many years he was kept in a state of anxious uncertainty by the ingenious intrigues of the Christian Powers concerning the custody of his brother, the unfortunate Prince Jem. The adventures of Prince Jem (the name is short for Jemshid, but in Europe it has been written Zizim) cast a very unpleasant light upon the honour of the Christians of his time, and especially upon the Knights of Rhodes. Of the two sons of Mohammed II. Jem was undoubtedly the one who was by nature fitted to be his successor. . . . Jem however, was not the first to hear of his father's death, and a year's warfare against his brother ended in his own defeat. The younger prince then sought refuge with the Knights of



Rhodes, who promised to receive him hospitably, and to find him a way to Europe, where he intended to renew his opposition to his brother's authority. D'Aubusson, the Grand Master of Rhodes, was too astute a diplomatist to sacrifice the solid gains that he perceived would accrue to his Order for the sake of a few paltry twinges of conscience; and he had no sooner made sure of Prince Jem's person, and induced him to sign a treaty, by which, in the event of his coming to the throne, the Order was to reap many sterling advantages, than he ingeniously opened negotiations with Sultan Bayezid, with a view to ascertain how much gold that sovereign was willing to pay for the safe custody of his refractory brother. It is only fair to say that Bayezid, who had no particle of cruelty in his nature, did all he could to come to terms with Jem. . . . All negotiation and compromise having proved ineffectual, he listened to the proposals of the crafty Grand Master, and finally agreed to pay him 45,000 ducats a year, so long as he kept Jem under his surveillance. The Knights of St. John possessed many commanderies, and the one they now selected for Jem's entertainment was at Nice, in the south of France. In 1482 he arrived there, wholly unconscious of the plots that were being woven about him. . . . On one pretext or another the knights contrived to keep their prisoner at Nice for several months, and then transferred him to Rousillon, thence to Puy, and next to Sassenage, where the monotony of captivity were relieved by the delights of love, which he shared with the daughter of the commandant, the beautiful Philippine Hélène, his lawful spouse being fortunately away in Egypt. . . . Meanwhile Grand Master D'Aubusson was driving a handsome trade in his capacity of jailor. All the potentates of Europe were anxious to obtain possession of the claimant to the Ottoman throne, and were ready to pay large sums in hard cash to enjoy the privilege of using this specially dangerous instrument against the Sultan's peace. D'Aubusson was not averse to taking the money, but he did not wish to give up his captive; and his knightly honour felt no smirch in taking 20,000 ducats from Jem's desolate wife (who probably had not heard of the fair Hélène) as the price of her husband's release, while he held him all the tighter. Of such chivalrous stuff were made the famous knights of Rhodes; and of such men as D'Aubusson the Church made cardinals! A new influence now appeared upon the scene of Jem's captivity. Charles VIII. of France considered that the Grand Master had made enough profit out of the unlucky prince, and the king resolved to work the oracle himself. His plan was to restore Jem to a nominal sultanate by the aid of Matthias Corvinus, Ferdinand of Naples, and the Pope. He took Jem out of the hands of the knights, and transferred him to the custody of Innocent VIII., who kindly consented to take care of the prince for the sum of 40,000 ducats a year, to be paid by his grateful brother at Constantinople." Innocent's successor, the terrible Borgia, Alexander VI., unsatisfied with this liberal allowance, opened negotiations with Constantinople looking to the payment of some heavy lump sum for summary riddance of poor Jem. But the sinister bargain was interrupted by Charles VIII. of France, who invaded Italy at this juncture, passed through Rome, and took the captive

prince in his train when he went on to Naples. Jem died on the way, and few have doubted that Pope Alexander poisoned him, as he had poisoned many before. "The curious conclusion one draws from the whole melancholy tale is, that there was not apparently a single honest prince in Christendom to take compassion upon the captive." In 1512 Bayezid was deposed by his son Selim, and did not long survive the humiliation. To avoid troubles of the Prince Jem character, Selim slew all his brothers and nephews, eleven in number, making a family solitude around the throne. Then he prepared himself for foreign conquest by exterminating the sometimes troublesome sect of the Shias, or Shiites, in his dominions. "A carefully organized system of detectives, whom Selim distributed throughout his Asiatic provinces, revealed the fact that the number of the heretical sect reached the alarming total of 70,000. Selim . . . secretly massed his troops at spots where the heretics chiefly congregated, and at a given signal 40,000 of them were massacred or imprisoned. . . . Having got rid of the enemy within his gates, Selim now proceeded to attack the head of the Shias, the great Shah Ismail himself [the founder of the Sufi line of Persian sovereigns, who had lately established his authority over the provinces of Persia]. . . . Selim set forth with an army estimated at over 140,000 men, 80,000 of which were cavalry. . . . After weary and painful marching, the Ottomans forced Ismail to give battle at Chaldiran [or Tabreez—see PERSIA: A. D. 1499-1887], and defeated him. "The victory of Chaldiran (1514) might have been followed by the conquest of Persia, but the privations which the soldiery had undergone had rendered them unmanageable, and Selim was forced to content himself with the annexation of the important provinces of Kurdistan and Dyarbekr, which are still part of the Turkish Empire; and then turned homewards, to prosecute other schemes of conquest. No peace, however, was concluded between him and the Shah, and a frontier war continued to be waged for many years. During the campaign against Persia, the Turks had been kept in anxiety by the presence on their flanks of the forces of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria, whose frontiers now marched with the territory of the Ottomans." Turning his arms against the Mamluks, "Selim set out in 1516 for Syria, and meeting the Mamluk army on the field of Marj Dabik near Aleppo, administered a terrible defeat, in which the aged Sultan El-Ghuri was trampled to death. He found a brave successor in Tuman Bey, but in the interval the Turks had mastered Syria and were advancing to Gaza. Here the Mamluks made another stand, but the generalship of Sinan Pasha was not to be resisted any more than the preponderance of his forces. The final battle was fought at Reydaniya in the neighbourhood of Cairo, in January, 1517. . . . Twenty-five thousand Mamluks lay stark upon the field, and the enemy occupied Cairo. There a succession of street-fights took place." The perfidious Turkish Sultan finally cheated the Mamluks into submission by offering amnesty, and then put them to the sword, giving the city up to massacre. "Tuman Bey, after some further resistance, was captured and executed, and Egypt became a Turkish province. . . . Sultan Selim returned to Constantinople in 1518, a much more dignified personage than he had set out. By the

conquest of the Mamluk kingdom he had also succeeded to their authority over the sacred cities of Arabia, Mekka and Medina, and in recognition of this position, as well as of his undoubted supremacy among Mohammedan monarchs, he received from the last Abbaside Khalif, who kept a shadowy court at Cairo, the inheritance of the great pontiffs of Baghdad. The 'fainéant' Khalif was induced to make over to the real sovereign the spiritual authority which he still affected to exercise, and with it the symbols of his office, the standard and cloak of the Prophet Mohammed. Selim now became not only the visible chief of the Mohammedan State throughout the wide dominions subdued to his sway, but also the revered head of the religion of Islam, wheresoever it was practised in its orthodox form. The heretical Shias of Persia might reject his claim, but in India, in all parts of Asia and Africa, where the traditional Khalifate was recognized, the Ottoman Sultan henceforth was the supreme head of the church, the successor to the spiritual prestige of the long line of the Khalifs. How far this new title commands the homage of the orthodox Moslem world is a matter of dispute; but there can be no doubt that it has always added, and still adds, a real and important authority to the acts and proclamations of the Ottoman Sultan." Selim died in 1520, and was succeeded by his son Suleyman, or Solyman, who acquired the name of "the Magnificent."—S. Lane-Poole, *Story of Turkey*, ch. 8-9.

ALSO IN: A. de Lamartine, *Hist. of Turkey*, bk. 15-18 (v. 2).—A. A. Paton, *Hist. of the Egyptian Revolution*, ch. 5.

**A. D. 1498-1502.—War with the Venetians.**—"During the first 17 years of Bajazet's reign, the peace between the Venetians and the Porte, though occasionally menaced, remained on the whole undisturbed. The Venetians complained of the Turkish incursions, and the definitive occupation of Montenegro, while the Porte, on its side, was jealous because the Republic had reduced the Duke of Naxos to dependence, and obtained possession of Cyprus (1489). At last, in 1498, the Turks, after making great naval preparations, suddenly arrested all the Venetian residents at Constantinople, and in the following year seized Lepanto, which surrendered without striking a blow (August 1499). Soon after, a body of 10,000 Turks crossed the Isonzo, carrying fire and desolation almost to the lagoons of Venice. In August 1500, Modon was taken by assault. . . . Navarino and Koron surrendered soon after, but towards the close of the year the Venetians were more successful. They captured Ægina, devastated and partly occupied Mytilene, Tenedos, and Samothrace, and with the help of a Spanish squadron, and 7,000 troops, under Gonsalvo de Cordova, reduced the island of Cephalonia. For this service the grateful Venetians rewarded Gonsalvo with a present of 500 tuns of Cretan wine, 60,000 pounds of cheese, 266 pounds of wrought silver, and the honorary freedom of their Republic. In 1501 the Venetian fleet was joined by a French, a Papal, and a Spanish squadron, but, through a want of cordiality among the commanders, little was effected. The Turks, however, had not made a better figure; and the Porte, whose attention was at that time distracted by the affairs of Persia, was evidently inclined for peace. The disordered state of the Venetian finances, and the

decay of their commerce through the maritime discoveries of the Portuguese, also disposed them to negociation; although the sale of indulgences, granted to them by the Pope for this war, is said to have brought more than 700 pounds of gold into their exchequer. The war nevertheless continued through 1502, and the Venetians were tolerably successful, having captured many Turkish ships, and, with the assistance of the French, taken the island of Sta. Maura. But at length a treaty was signed, Dec. 14th, by which Venice was allowed to hold Cephalonia, but restored Sta. Maura, and permitted the Porte to retain its conquests, including the three important fortresses of Modon, Koron, and Navarino."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 1, ch. 6 (v. 1).

**A. D. 1519.—The Sultan acquires sovereignty of Algiers and Tunis.** See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1516-1535.

**A. D. 1520.—Accession of Solyman I.**

**A. D. 1521-1526.—Capture of Belgrade.—Great invasion of Hungary.—Overwhelming victory of Mohacs.** See HUNGARY: A. D. 1487-1526.

**A. D. 1522.—Conquest of the isle of Rhodes.—Expulsion of the Knights of St. John.** See HOSPITALLERS OF ST. JOHN: A. D. 1522.

**A. D. 1526-1567.—The Sultan suzerain of Transylvania and master of Hungary.—Invasion of Austria and siege of Vienna.—Death of Solyman the Magnificent.** See HUNGARY: A. D. 1526-1567.

**A. D. 1527.—Final subjugation of the Bosnians.** See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 9-16TH CENTURIES.

**A. D. 1532-1553.—Frightful depredations along the coast of Southern Italy.** See ITALY (SOUTHERN): A. D. 1528-1570.

**A. D. 1542.—Alliance with France.—Siege of Nice.—Ravages on the Italian coast.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.

**A. D. 1551-1560.—Unsuccessful attack on Malta.—Capture of Tripoli.—Disastrous attempt of the Christians to recover that city.** See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1543-1560.

**A. D. 1565.—Unsuccessful attack on the Knights of St. John in Malta.** See HOSPITALLERS OF ST. JOHN: A. D. 1530-1565.

**A. D. 1566-1571.—Reign of Selim II.—War with the Holy League of Spain, Venice and the Pope.—Conquest of Cyprus.—Great defeat at Lepanto.**—"In 1566, Solyman the Magnificent closed his long and prosperous reign. His son and successor, Selim II., possessed few of the qualities of his great father. Bred in the Seraglio, he showed the fruits of his education in his indolent way of life, and in the free indulgence of the most licentious appetites. With these effeminate tastes, he inherited the passion for conquest which belonged, not only to his father, but to the whole of his warlike dynasty. . . . The scheme which most occupied the thoughts of Selim was the conquest of Cyprus. . . . Selim, resolved on the acquisition of Cyprus, was not slow in devising a pretext for claiming it from Venice as a part of the Ottoman empire. The republic, though willing to make almost any concession rather than come to a rupture with the colossal power under whose shadow she lay, was not prepared to surrender without a struggle the richest gem in her colonial diadem. War was accordingly declared against her by the Porte, and vast preparations were made for fit-



ting out an armament against Cyprus. Venice, in her turn, showed her usual alacrity in providing for the encounter. She strained her resources to the utmost. In a very short time she equipped a powerful fleet, and took measures to place the fortifications of Cyprus in a proper state of defence. But Venice no longer boasted a navy such as in earlier days had enabled her to humble the pride of Genoa, and to ride the unquestioned mistress of the Mediterranean. The defences of her colonies, moreover, during her long repose had gradually fallen into decay. In her extremity, she turned to the Christian powers of Europe, and besought them to make common cause with her against the enemy of Christendom." The only responses to her appeal came, first, from Pope Pius V., and finally, through his urgency, from Philip II. of Spain. After much deliberation, Philip agreed, in the spring of 1570, to enter into an alliance with Venice and the Pope against the Ottoman Porte. "The ensuing summer, the royal admiral, the famous John Andrew Doria, who was lying with a strong squadron off Sicily, put to sea, by the king's orders. He was soon after reinforced by a few galleys which were furnished by his holiness, and placed under the command of Mark Antonio Colonna. . . . On the last of August, 1570, the combined fleet effected its junction with the Venetians at Candia, and a plan of operations was immediately arranged. It was not long before the startling intelligence arrived that Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, had been taken and sacked by the Turks, with all the circumstances of cruelty which distinguish wars in which the feeling of national hostility is embittered by religious hatred. The plan was now to be changed. A dispute arose among the commanders as to the course to be pursued. No one had authority enough to enforce compliance with his own opinion. The dispute ended in a rupture. The expedition was abandoned. . . . Still the stout-hearted pontiff was not discouraged;" nor did the king of Spain draw back. "Venice, on the other hand, soon showed that the Catholic king had good reason for distrusting her fidelity. Appalled by the loss of Nicosia, with her usual inconstancy, she despatched a secret agent to Constantinople, to see if some terms might not yet be made with the sultan." Her overtures, however, were coldly received by the sultan, and she was won back to the alliance. "Towards the close of 1570, the deputies from the three powers met in Rome to arrange the terms of the league." With much difficulty, a treaty was concluded, and ratified in May, 1571, to the effect that the operations of the league "should be directed against the Moors of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, as well as against the Turks; that the contracting parties should furnish 200 galleys, 100 transports and smaller vessels, 50,000 foot and 4,500 horse, with the requisite artillery and munitions; that by April, at farthest, of every succeeding year, a similar force should be held in readiness by the allies for expeditions to the Levant; and that any year in which there was no expedition in common, and either Spain or the republic should desire to engage in one on her own account against the infidel, the other confederates should furnish 50 galleys towards it; that if the enemy should invade the dominions of any of the three powers, the others should be bound to come to the aid of their ally;

that three-sixths of the expenses of the war should be borne by the Catholic king, two-sixths by the republic, the remaining sixth by the Holy See; . . . that each power should appoint a captain-general; that the united voices of the three commanders should regulate the plan of operations; that the execution of this plan should be intrusted to the captain-general of the league, and that this high office should be given to Don John of Austria [natural son of Charles V. and half-brother of Philip II.]. . . . Such were the principal provisions of the famous treaty of the Holy League." The sultan was not dismayed. "He soon got together a powerful fleet, partly drawn from his own dominions, and in part from those of the Moslem powers on the Mediterranean, who acknowledged allegiance to the Porte. The armada was placed under the command of Selim's brother-in-law, the Pacha Piali. . . . Early in the season [of 1571] the combined fleets sailed for the Adriatic, and Piali, after landing and laying waste the territory belonging to the republic, detached Uluch [dey of Algiers] with his squadron to penetrate higher up the gulf. The Algerine, in executing these orders, advanced so near to Venice as to throw the inhabitants of that capital into . . . consternation. . . . Meanwhile the Venetians were pushing forward their own preparations with their wonted alacrity,—indeed with more alacrity than thoroughness. . . . The fleet was placed under the command of Sebastian Veniero," and sailed before midsummer, "or as much of it as was then ready, for the port of Messina, appointed as the place of rendezvous for the allies. Here he was soon joined by Colonna, the papal commander, with the little squadron furnished by his holiness; and the two fleets lay at anchor . . . waiting the arrival of the rest of the confederates and of Don John of Austria." The latter reached Messina on the 25th of August. "The whole number of vessels in the armada, great and small, amounted to something more than 300. Of these full two thirds were 'royal galleys.' Venice alone contributed 106, besides six 'galeazzas.' These were ships of enormous bulk. . . . The number of persons on board of the fleet, soldiers and seamen, was estimated at 80,000. . . . The soldiers did not exceed 29,000. . . . On the 16th of September the magnificent armament . . . stood out to sea." Before encountering the Turkish fleet, the allies received tidings "that Famagosta, the second city of Cyprus, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and this under circumstances of unparalleled perfidy and cruelty. . . . The fall of Famagosta secured the fall of Cyprus, which thus became permanently incorporated in the Ottoman empire." On Sunday, October 7th, the armada of the Turks was found and attacked in the gulf of Lepanto. The terrific fight which ensued lasted only four hours, but those were hours of indescribable destruction and carnage. "It was indeed a sanguinary battle, surpassing in this particular any sea-fight of modern times. The loss fell much the most heavily on the Turks. There is the usual discrepancy about numbers; but it may be safe to estimate their loss at nearly 25,000 slain and 5,000 prisoners. What brought most pleasure to the hearts of the conquerors was the liberation of 12,000 Christian captives, who had been chained to the oar on board the Moslem galleys, and who now came forth, with tears of joy streaming down their

haggard cheeks, to bless their deliverers. The loss of the allies was comparatively small,—less than 8,000." As to the armada of the Turks, "it may almost be said to have been annihilated. Not more than 40 galleys escaped out of near 250 which entered into the action. . . . The news of the victory of Lepanto caused a profound sensation throughout Christendom. . . . In Venice, which might be said to have gained a new lease of existence from the result of the battle, . . . the 7th of October was set apart to be observed for ever as a national anniversary. . . . It is a great error to speak of the victory of Lepanto as a barren victory, which yielded no fruits to those who gained it. True, it did not strip the Turks of an inch of territory. . . . But the loss of reputation—that tower of strength to the conqueror—was not to be estimated."—W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of Philip II.*, bk. 5, ch. 9-11.

ALSO IN: Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, v. 1, ch. 13-15.

A. D. 1569-1570.—First collision with the Russians.—Vizir Sokolli's canal project and its frustration.—Peace with the Czar. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1569-1571.

A. D. 1572-1573.—Withdrawal of Venice from the Holy League.—Conquest of Tunis by Don John of Austria and its recovery, with Goletta.—"Uluciali, whom Selim . . . made commander-in-chief of all his naval forces, exerted himself with extraordinary vigour and activity in fitting out a new fleet, to supply the place of that which had been ruined in the battle of Lepanto; and such at this time were the resources of the Turkish empire, that he was ready by the month of April [1572] to leave Constantinople, with more than 200 galleys, besides a great number of other ships. With this fleet he coasted along Negropont, the Morea, and Epirus; put the maritime towns into a posture of defence; chastised with great severity many of those Christians who had been concerned in the invitation given to Don John [who had just been offered the sovereignty of Albania and Macedonia by the Christians of those countries]; and afterwards took his station at Modon in the Morea, with an intention to watch there the motions of the enemy. He had full leisure to finish all the preparations which he judged to be necessary. The allies disputed long with one another concerning the plan of their future operations," and were also held inactive by the Spanish king's fear of an attack from France. "It was the last day of August before the allies could effectuate a junction of their forces; and it was the middle of September before they came in sight of the enemy. . . . Uluciali drew out his fleet, as if he intended to offer battle; but no sooner had he made a single discharge of his artillery . . . than he retired under the fortifications of Modon." The allies thought first of besieging Modon, but gave up the project. They then sent Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma—afterwards so famous in the Netherlands—to reduce Navarino; but he had no success and abandoned the siege. The expedition then returned to Messina. The Venetians, dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, now faithfully negotiated a separate peace with the Turks; but Philip II. of Spain maintained his alliance with the Pope (now Gregory XIII.), and ordered his brother, Don John, to proceed the

next spring to Africa and undertake the reduction of Tunis. Don John obeyed the order, "carrying with him for this purpose a fleet of 2,000 sail, having 20,000 foot on board, besides 400 light horse, 700 pioneers, and a numerous train of heavy artillery. Tunis was at this time in the hands of the Turks, commanded by Heder Basha, whom Selim had lately sent to govern the town and kingdom. Heder, seized with consternation at the approach of the Spanish fleet, left Tunis with his troops and a great number of the inhabitants, and Don John took possession of the place without meeting with the smallest opposition. Philip had instructed his brother, when he sent him on this expedition, to destroy Tunis, and to strengthen the fortifications of the isle and fortress of Goletta. But instead of complying with these instructions, Don John resolved to fortify the town more strongly than ever; and having laid the foundations of a new fort, or citadel, he treated all the inhabitants who remained with lenity and indulgence; and engaged many of those who had fled to return and submit to the Spanish government; after which he carried back his fleet to Sicily." It is believed that Don John had conceived ambitious hopes of a kingdom on the African border of the Mediterranean. "In the summer following [1573], Selim sent Uluciali against Tunis, with a fleet consisting of 300 ships, having about 40,000 troops on board, under the command of his son-in-law, Sinan Basha. The new fort which Don John had begun to build was not yet complete. Nor was the garrison which he had left strong enough to hold out long against so great a force." Before Don John could reassemble a fleet with which to make his way to the protection of his African conquest, both Tunis and Goletta were carried by assault, and passed again into the possession of the Turks and their Moorish vassals.—R. Watson, *Hist. of Philip II.*, bk. 9.

ALSO IN: Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, v. 2, ch. 1-3.

A. D. 1572-1623.—Beginning of the decline of the Ottoman power.—"The conquest of Cyprus was the last great exploit which ever added materially to the dominions of the Porte; the battle of Lepanto was the final blow which destroyed its naval superiority. The days of greatness had gone by. The kingdoms of the West were developing their strength, and had learnt the policy of union and of peace among themselves. Their armies had acquired the discipline and had learnt the lessons in which the Ottomans had shown so formidable an example; and their navy rode triumphant on the seas. The Empire, no longer in the hands of Charles V., with foreign interests to absorb its power, could bestow an undivided strength upon its own affairs; and the Emperor Ferdinand was looking forward with some hope to an incorporation of Hungary, which should end the weakness, and ensure the safety, of his eastern frontier. As the pre-eminence of the Porte, however, and the dread of it declined, a wider intercourse for her with Europe began. . . . Slowly the Sultans were beginning to take part in the schemes and combinations of the Christian Powers, from which they had hitherto so contemptuously stood aloof. Five reigns succeeded to that of Selim [the Sot, son of Solyman the Magnificent], during which the progress of decline continued marked. The indolence of Amurath III. [1574-



1595], the incapacity of Mahomet III. [1595-1603], the inexperience of Achmet I. [1603-1617], the imprudence of Othman II. [1618-1622], and the imbecility of Mustapha [1617-1618, and 1622-1623], contributed to bring the Ottoman Empire into a condition of anarchy and weakness. During the reign of Amurath hostilities with Austria were renewed, and successive losses testified to the enfeebled state of the Ottoman arms."—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical Abstracts*, ch. 3.

A. D. 1591-1606.—Wars in Hungary and Croatia.—Great victory at Cereses.—Peace of Sitvatorok. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1567-1604; and 1595-1606.

A. D. 1621-1622.—War with Poland.—Victory at Cecora and defeat at Choczim. See POLAND: A. D. 1590-1648.

A. D. 1623-1640.—War with Persia.—Siege and capture of Bagdad.—Horrible massacre of the inhabitants.—"During the first twelve years of the reign of Amurath IV. [1623-1635], the Ottoman Empire had been occupied with active hostilities in different parts of Europe, and especially with Poland, Germany, and the maritime powers of the Mediterranean. . . . In the east, however, great losses had been sustained. Shah Abbas, a sovereign well entitled to the epithet 'Great,' had repossessed himself of Diarbekr, Baghddad [1623], the district of the Euphrates, with Kourdistan; and, on the north, he had regained Armenia, and a considerable part of Anatolia. The Sultan therefore resolved to undertake an expedition to recover the territories thus taken from him, and to this he was encouraged by the death of his formidable foe the Persian monarch. Amurath marched from his capital early in 1635, to superintend the operations of the campaign. . . . In passing through Asia, he took care personally to examine into the conduct of his various Pashas, and wherever it was requisite he subjected them to a severe punishment. One of them, the Pasha of Erzeroum, was put to death. Having at that city reviewed his army, he found them to amount to 200,000 men, and as his first object was the seizure of Armenia, the key of the Persian provinces, he besieged Erivan, and notwithstanding a vigorous defence, the fortress in a few days surrendered. Tauris and the surrounding provinces speedily fell into his hands, and Amurath returned in the winter to Constantinople, entering the city in great triumph. The affairs of Europe were in such a state of confusion, that it was several years ere he again appeared in the east, the scene of so many of his victories. The Khan of Tartary threw off his allegiance, the Polish serfs appeared suddenly on the Caspian shores, and, joining a body of Russians, attacked and carried the fortress of Azof. . . . The European war, which at this time occurred, rendered it unnecessary for the Sultan to entertain any serious apprehension from his enemies in the west, who were sufficiently occupied with their own affairs. He therefore directed his attention to Persia, resolved to subjugate that country, and to seize upon Baghddad. To this end his preparations were proportionally great. An immense army was collected on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. This mighty host numbered more than 300,000 armed men, and was accompanied by a numerous array of miners, as well as artillery. And after having consulted an astrologer, Amu-

rath embarked amid all the display which Asiatic pomp could furnish, and directed his progress toward Persia. After a successful march, this immense army arrived at Baghddad. The city was strongly fortified, and defended by a resolute army of 80,000 men. The Shah, however, was absent in the northern part of his dominions, which had been threatened by an invasion from India, under Shah Jehan, father of the celebrated Aurungzebe. Baghddad, therefore, was left to its own resources. The operations of the siege began in October 1638. . . . The besieged made repeated sallies, with a force of five or six thousand men at a time, who, on retiring, were succeeded by a similar number, and thus the losses of the Ottoman army were sometimes very great. The 200 great guns, however, which played upon the ramparts, at length made a wide opening in the walls, and after five days' fighting in the breach thus made, where 'the slain lay in immense multitudes, and the blood was stagnated like a pool to wade through,' the city was taken. Quarter was given to 24,000 of the defenders, who remained alive, on condition that they would lay down their arms. But as soon as they had done so, the Sultan perfidiously issued orders to the Janizaries, and the work of butchery commenced, and was carried on by torch-light during the night on which the city was taken, and an indiscriminate slaughter took place, neither youth, nor age, nor sex being spared by the ruthless conqueror and his merciless soldiers. . . . In the morning of the 23d of December the Sultan marched into the city, passing with his army over the innumerable bodies of the unfortunate Persians, whose gallant defence merited a better fate. Some 15,000 women, children and old men were all that remained of the inhabitants, who, but a day or two before, filled every part of the magnificent capital. . . . The capture of Baghddad closed the military career of the Sultan."—R. W. Fraser, *Turkey, Ancient and Modern*, ch. 17.—"A peace with Persia, on the basis of that which Solyman the Great had granted in 1555, was the speedy result of Amurath's victories (15th September, 1639). Erivan was restored by the Porte; but the possession of Bagdad and the adjacent territory by the Ottomans was solemnly sanctioned and confirmed. Eighty years passed away before Turkey was again obliged to struggle against her old and obstinate enemy on the line of the Euphrates. . . . Amurath died at the age of 28, on the 9th of February, 1640."—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 13.

A. D. 1625-1626.—War in Hungary. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1606-1660.

A. D. 1640.—Accession of Ibrahim.

A. D. 1645-1669.—The war of Candia.—Conquest of Crete.—"The Turks attacked the island [of Crete] in 1645, and the war went on till 1669, when Crete was lost. This is called the war of Candia, from the long siege of the town of Candia, which was most gallantly defended by the Venetians, with the help of many volunteers from Western Europe. It must be remembered that, though the island has sometimes got to be called Candia, from the town of Candia and its memorable siege, yet the island itself has never changed its name, but has always been called Crete both by Greeks and Turks."—E. A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, p. 145.

—"The war which cost the republic of Venice the island of Crete owed its origin to the incessant irritation caused by the Western corsairs in the Archipelago. Some strong measures adopted by the Venetians to suppress the piracies committed by Turkish and Barbary corsairs in the Adriatic, created much dissatisfaction on the part of the Othoman government, which looked chiefly to the Mohammedan corsairs as a protection against the Christian corsairs in the Levant, and considered it the duty of the Venetians to suppress the piracies of these Christians. The Porte at last resolved to seek a profitable revenge, and a pretext soon presented itself. In 1644 some Maltese galleys made a prize which offended the personal feelings of the reigning sultan, Ibrahim. . . . As he feared to attack Malta, he resolved to make the Venetians responsible for the shelter which Crete had afforded to the corsairs. The Porte affected to consider Venice as a tributary State, which was bound to keep the Archipelago free from Christian corsairs, in return for the great commercial privileges it enjoyed in the Othoman empire. Immediate preparations were made for attacking Crete, but the project was concealed from the Venetian senate, under the pretence of directing the expedition against Malta. . . . In the month of June 1645, the Othoman army landed before Canea, which capitulated on the 17th of August. This treacherous commencement of the war authorised the Christian powers to dispense with all the formalities of international law in lending assistance to the Venetians during the celebrated War of Candia, which lasted nearly 25 years. During this long struggle the Venetians generally maintained the superiority at sea, but they were unable to prevent the Othoman navy, whenever it exerted its full force, from throwing in supplies of fresh troops and ample stores, by which the Othoman army was enabled to command the whole island, and kept Candia, and the other fortresses in the hands of the republic, either blockaded or besieged. The Greeks generally favoured the Turks, who encouraged them to cultivate their lands by purchasing the produce at a liberal price, for the use of the army. . . . The squadrons of the republic often ravaged the coasts of the Othoman empire, and on one occasion they carried off about 5,000 slaves from the coast of the Morea, between Patras and Coron. In the year 1656, after Mocenigo's great victory at the Dardanelles, they took possession of the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos, but they were driven from these conquests by the Othoman fleet in the following year. At the end of the year 1666, the grand vizier, Achmet Kueprily, one of the greatest ministers of the Othoman empire, took the command of the siege of Candia. The whole naval force of Venice, and numerous bands of French and Italian volunteers, attempted to force the grand vizier to raise the siege; but the skill of the Italian engineers, the valour of the French nobles, and the determined perseverance of Morosini, were vain against the strict discipline and steady valour of the Othoman troops. The works of the besiegers were pushed forward by the labours of a numerous body of Greek pioneers, and the fire of the powerful batteries at last rendered the place untenable. At this crisis Morosini proved himself a daring statesman and a sincere patriot. When he found that he must surrender the city, he re-

solved to make his capitulation the means of purchasing peace for the republic. . . . On the 27th September 1669, Achmet Kueprily received the keys of Candia, and the republic of Venice resigned all right to the island of Crete, but retained possession of the three insular fortresses of Karabusa, Suda, and Spinalonga, with their valuable ports. No fortress is said to have cost so much blood and treasure, both to the besiegers and the defenders, as Candia; yet the Greeks, in whose territory it was situated, and who could have furnished an army from the inhabitants of Crete sufficiently numerous to have decided the issue of the contest, were the people on the shores of the Mediterranean who took least part in this memorable war. So utterly destitute of all national feeling was the Hellenic race at this period."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of Greece under Othoman and Venetian Domination*, ch. 2.

A. D. 1649.—Accession of Mohammed IV.

A. D. 1660-1664.—Renewed war with Austria.—Defeat at St. Gothard.—A twenty years truce. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1660-1664.

A. D. 1664-1665.—Alliance with France broken.—War of the French with Tunis and Algiers. See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1664-1684.

A. D. 1670-1676.—Wars with the Poles. See POLAND: A. D. 1668-1696.

A. D. 1681-1684.—Rupture with France.—French attack on Scio and war with the Barbary States. See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1664-1684.

A. D. 1683.—Great invasion of Austria.—Siege of Vienna.—Overwhelming defeat by Sobieski and the Imperialists. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1668-1683.

A. D. 1683-1699.—Expulsion from Hungary.—The Peace of Carlowitz. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.

A. D. 1684-1696.—War with the Holy League.—Expulsion from Hungary.—Venetian conquests in Greece.—Revolution at Constantinople.—Accession of Solyman II.—Czar Peter's capture of Azov.—The first Russian acquisition on the Black Sea.—In 1684, "a league against the Turks, under the protection of the Pope, and thence called the Holy League, was formed by the Emperor, the King of Poland, and the Republic of Venice; and it was resolved to procure, if possible, the accession to it of the Czar of Muscovy. The Venetians were induced to join the league by the hope of recovering their former possessions, and declared war against the Sultan, Mahomet IV., July 15th. The war which ensued, now called the Holy War, lasted till the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699. Venice in this war put forth a strength that was little expected from that declining state. Many thousand Germans were enrolled in her army, commanded by Morosini, and by Count Königs-mark, a Swede. The Austrians pursued the campaign in Hungary with success [steadily expelling the Turks—see HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699]. . . . While the war in Hungary had been conducted by the Emperor with such eminent success, the King of Poland had made only some fruitless attempts upon Moldavia. The Czar of Muscovy, Ivan Alexiowitsch, who, after settling some disputes about boundaries with the King of Poland, had joined the Holy League in 1686, did not fare much better. All the attempts of the Russians to penetrate into the Crimea were



frustrated by the Tartars. The Venetians, on the other hand, had made some splendid conquests. St Maura, Koron, the mountain tract of Maina, Navarino, Modon, Argos, Napoli di Romania, fell successively into their hands. The year 1687 especially was almost as fatal to the Turks in their war with Venice as in that with Hungary. In this year the Venetians took Patras, the castles at the entrance of the bay of Lepanto, Lepanto itself, all the northern coast of the Morea, Corinth, and Athens. Athens had been abandoned with the exception of the acropolis or citadel; and it was in this siege that one of the Venetian bombs fell into the Parthenon, which had been converted by the Turks into a powder magazine, and destroyed the greater part of those magnificent remains of classical antiquity. The acropolis surrendered September 29th. The fall of Athens, added to the disastrous news from Hungary, excited the greatest consternation and discontent at Constantinople," and brought about a revolution which deposed the sultan, raising his brother Solymán to the throne (1687) in his place. "By the capture of Malvasia in 1690, the Venetians completed the conquest of the Morea. The Isle of Chios, taken in 1694, was again lost the following year; but in Dalmatia and Albania the Venetian Republic made many permanent conquests, from the mountains of Montenegro to the borders of Croatia and the banks of the Unna. The operations of the Poles in the Turkish war were insignificant; but in July 1696, the Russians, under the Czar Peter, after many long and fruitless attempts, at length succeeded in taking Azov, at the mouth of the Don; a most important conquest as securing for them the entry into the Black Sea. It was the fall of this place, combined with the defeat at Zenta [in Hungary], that chiefly induced the Porte to enter into negotiation for a peace."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 5, ch. 4 (v. 3).

A. D. 1691.—Accession of Achmet II.

A. D. 1695.—Accession of Mustapha II.

A. D. 1703.—Accession of Achmet III.

A. D. 1709-1714.—Refuge given to Charles XII. of Sweden.—His intrigues.—Unlucky invasion of Moldavia by Peter the Great.—The Treaty of the Pruth. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1707-1718.

A. D. 1714-1718.—War with Venice and Austria.—Recovery of the Morea and disasters in Hungary.—The Peace of Passarowitz.—"By the treaty of the Pruth the Russian conquest of Azof had been recovered. This success encouraged the hope of repairing the other losses that had been incurred in the former war. There were two states which had aggrandised themselves at Turkish expense, Austria and Venice. Of these the republic was far the less formidable and was naturally chosen as the first object of attack. A pretext was found in the protection which Venice had given to some Montenegrin fugitives, and in December, 1714, the Porte declared war. Venice was entirely unprepared, and moreover had failed to acquire popularity amongst her Greek subjects. In 1715, the grand vizier, Ali Cumurgi, landed in the Morea, and by the end of the year was master of the whole peninsula. Sailing thence he captured Suda and Spinalonga, the two last fortresses that Venice had been allowed to retain in Crete. The republic naturally appealed to

her old ally, Austria, which had guaranteed her possessions by the treaty of Carlowitz. . . . As the Turk refused to give any satisfaction, war was inevitable. The intervention of Austria saved Venice from ruin. The grand vizier and the main body of the Turkish army had to be employed in Hungary. Still a considerable army and fleet was sent to attack Corfu. The Venetian troops were commanded by count Schulenburg, who had won a great reputation in the northern war, and whose services had been procured for the republic by Eugene. A heroic defence ended successfully, and in August, 1716, the Turks were compelled to raise the siege. 'It was the last glorious military exploit in the annals of the republic, and it was achieved by a German mercenary soldier.' Meanwhile the vizier, with an army of 150,000 men, had laid siege to Peterwardein, the most important of the Austrian border-fortresses in Hungary," and suffered death there, in a great defeat which prince Eugene inflicted upon his army, August 5, 1716. The same year, Eugene took Temesvar, and in August, 1717, he annihilated the Turkish army before Belgrad, capturing the town (see HUNGARY: A. D. 1699-1718). The result was the Treaty of Passarowitz, signed in July, 1718. "Austria retained all its conquests, thus completing its possession of Hungary by acquiring the Banat of Temesvar, and adding to it Belgrad and a strip of Servia. The Turks, on their side, kept the Morea, while Venice was confirmed in its possession of Corfu and Santa Maura, together with the conquests which it had made in 1717 in Albania and Dalmatia."—R. Lodge, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, ch. 16.

A. D. 1730.—Accession of Mahmoud I.

A. D. 1735-1739.—War with Russia and Austria.—Favourable Treaty of Belgrade.—Important acquisitions of Territory from Austria. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1725-1739.

A. D. 1754.—Accession of Othman III.

A. D. 1757.—Accession of Mustapha III.

A. D. 1768-1774.—War with Russia on behalf of Poland.—Concession of independence to the Crim Tartars.—The Poles, in their struggle with Catherine II. of Russia found a strange champion in the Turk (see POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773). "The Sultan, Mustafa III., was opposed to intervention in Poland; but his hand was forced by a rising in Constantinople, and he declared war against Russia in October, 1768. Hostilities were not commenced till the next year, and they never assumed considerable proportions. The Turkish army was in the last stage of inefficiency, and the Russians, who were wholly unprepared for war, were little better. Galitzin, an incompetent commander, defeated the grand vizier, and took Khoczim after his first attack had been repulsed. His successor, Romanzow, 'the Russian Turenne,' acted with greater energy. He drove the Turks from Moldavia, and in 1770 he occupied Wallachia, won a great victory over vastly superior numbers at Kaghul [August 1, 1770], and advanced into the Crimea. At the same time a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean with the avowed intention of restoring Greece to independence. But the admiral, Alexis Orloff, mismanaged the expedition. After encouraging the Greeks to rebel, he left them to the horrors of a Turkish revenge, and sailed towards Constantinople. A victory over the Turkish fleet gave

him possession of Chios and other islands of the Archipelago, but he refused, in spite of his English officers, to attempt the passage of the Dardanelles." In May, 1772, a truce was arranged and a congress assembled to settle the terms of peace. "But the Russian demands were too excessive for the Porte to accept, and the Turks resumed hostilities in 1773. They attempted to recover Moldavia and Wallachia, and for a time they succeeded in forcing the Russians to retreat. Mustafa III. died in December, and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Hamid. In the next year Romanzow won a complete victory, and compelled the grand vizier to accept the terms dictated to him at Kutschuk Kainardji [July 16, 1774]. The Russians restored the conquered provinces except Azof and Kinburn, only stipulating for toleration for the Christian population. The Tartars of the Crimea and Kuban were declared independent of the Porte, and authorised to elect their own Khan. Russian ships were allowed free passage through the Dardanelles, and the right of sailing in the Turkish seas and on the Danube. Poland, for which the Turks had undertaken the war, was not even mentioned in the treaty."—R. Lodge, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, ch. 20, sect. 11-12.

ALSO IN: F. C. Schlosser, *Hist. of the 18th Century*, v. 4, pp. 405-441.—See, also, RUSSIA: A. D. 1762-1796.

A. D. 1774.—Accession of Abdul Hamid.

A. D. 1776-1792.—Acquisition of the Crimea by the Russians.—War with Russia and Austria.—The Treaties of Sistova and Jassy.—Territorial concessions.—"A peace of some years followed the treaty of Kainarji, if, indeed, that can be called peace where the most solemn engagements are perpetually evaded. On that treaty Catherine put what interpretation she pleased. . . . She offered her protection to the voivods of Wallachia and Moldavia, who, in consequence, were her vassals rather than those of the Porte. The Christians on the opposite bank of the Danube were in correspondence with Russia; they were encouraged to revolt, to claim her protection, to oppose the Turkish government in every way. . . . Though the Crimea had been declared independent, she proved that the word had reference merely to the authority of the sultan, and not to hers. . . . More than once . . . the Russian troops appeared in that peninsula. In 1776 they deposed the reigning khan, and elected in his stead another, who was easily induced to solicit the protection of the empress. Turkey threatened to resume the war. . . . At length . . . a new treaty, or rather a modification of the former, was signed at Constantinople in 1779. In it Russia promised to desist from some of her obnoxious pretensions in regard both to the two principalities and the Crimea; but promises cost little. . . . Almost every year brought new complaints and evasions. The foundation of the city of Cherson, about ten leagues from Oztakof, gave peculiar umbrage to the Porte. This place had now a population of 40,000; and the number of warlike vessels constructed in its arsenal were evidently intended to overawe Constantinople. In 1783 another insulting message was sent to the Turkish ministers,—that, let the conduct of the empress in regard to the Crimea be whatever it might, they should not interfere. At the same time she prevailed on the khan whom she had supported,

Sahim Gherei, to make the most outrageous demands from the Porte. The khan's envoy was beheaded. Under the pretext of punishing the Turks for this insult to their 'good ally,' the Russians requested permission to march through his territory. It was immediately granted; but no sooner were they in the peninsula than, instead of proceeding against the Turkish fortifications on the island of Taman, they seized the towns, forced the Mahometan authorities, in the khan's presence, to take the oath of allegiance to the empress, and seized on the revenues of the country. . . . The khan was now forced to resign his authority, and transfer it to Catherine; in return, he received some estates in Russia. A manifesto declared that the Crimea, Kuban, and Taman, were for ever incorporated with the empire. In a document of some length, and of great force, the Turkish ministry exposed to the world the unprincipled encroachments of their neighbours." But Russia responded to it by marshalling three great armies on the frontiers, with an exhibition of formidable fleets in the Euxine and the Baltic. "The Porte, terrified at this menacing display, listened to the advice of France and Austria; and, by another treaty (signed at Constantinople early in 1784) recognised the sovereignty of the empress over the Crimea, Taman, and a great part of Kuban. To the first and last of these places she restored their ancient classical names, Taurida and Caucasus." The treaty of Constantinople did not put an end to Russian aggressions, and in August, 1787, the Sultan declared war. "The campaign was opened with ardour. Knowing that Oztakof would be the earliest object of hostility, the Sultan sent a considerable force to cover it. Another army marched to the Danube, and the vizier in person took the field. . . . On the other hand, Potemkin, the commander-in-chief, having under his orders some of the best generals in the service, hastened to the frontiers, which were soon covered by Russian troops. At the same time the emperor Joseph [according to a prior agreement with Catherine] sent 80,000 Austrians into Moldavia; while a powerful fleet in the Euxine prepared to co-operate with the allies, and another in the Baltic was ready to sail for the Mediterranean. It seemed, indeed, as if Catherine's favourite dream, the elevation of her grandson Constantine to the throne of the Greek empire, was about to be realised. Yet these mighty preparations had no commensurate effect. An attack on Kinburn by 5,000 Turks from the garrison of Oztakof was repulsed [by Suwarof] with heavy loss. But this advantage was counterbalanced by the dispersion of the Euxine fleet in a storm, with the loss of some vessels. These were the chief events of the first campaign. The second, of 1788, was more decisive. Oztakof was taken by assault, and the garrison [with nearly all the inhabitants] put to the sword. At the same time Joseph took Sobach; and his generals captured Soubitza [Dubitzka?]. On the deep, too, fortune was equally adverse to the Turks. Their fleet was defeated in the Euxine. . . . In the following campaigns the superiority of the Russians was maintained. It would have been still more signal but for the jealousy of Potemkin, who could not tolerate success in any of his generals. . . . The death of Abdul Hamet, and the accession of Selim III., made no difference in the character of the war; it was still



adverse to the Turks. Fortress after fortress [including Belgrade, taken by General Loudon for the Austrians] was reduced by the enemy; and, though no general engagement was risked, the loss of men was not the less felt. Suwarof saved the Austrians [in Moldavia, defeating the Turks, who had nearly overwhelmed them, at Fockshani, July 30, and again at Rimnik, September 16, 1789]; Repnin forced the Seraskier, Hussein Pasha, to seek refuge in Ismail; Komenski reduced Galatz; Ackerman fell into the power of the Christians; Bender was forced to capitulate. In the following campaign, the important fortress of Ismail was assailed: the siege was conducted by Suwarof, the most dreaded of all the Russian generals. . . . It was taken . . . though the loss was most severe; and, in revenge, the garrison, with the greater part of the population [nearly 40,000 in all], was put to the sword. Other successes followed, both on the banks of the Caspian, and on those of the Danube. Bohada was stormed; at Kotzim 100,000 Turks were defeated by Repnin; Varna was menaced; and the road to Adrianople lay open. The grand vizier now sued for peace, which Catherine was ready to grant, on conditions much less onerous than might have been expected." Austria had already made peace with the sultan and withdrawn from the war. By the treaty of Sistova, which the new emperor, Leopold, signed on the 4th of August, 1791, the Austrians relinquished all their conquests except the town of Old Orsova and a small district in Croatia along the left bank of the river Unna. With these slight variations the same boundary between Austria and Turkey was reconstituted in 1791 that had been defined by the treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The treaty of the Turks with Russia was signed at Jassy on the 9th of January 1792. "By that treaty, Catherine retained the whole country between the Bog and the Dniester, but restored all the other conquests which she had made since 1787. This was the last of the hostilities between Russia and the Porte during the reign of this empress; and the peace of Jassy enabled her to carry into effect her designs on Poland."—R. Bell, *Hist. of Russia*, v. 2, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 21.—F. C. Schlosser, *Hist. of the 18th Century*, period 5, div. 1, ch. 2 (v. 6).—G. B. Malleson, *London*, ch. 15.

**A. D. 1789-1812.—Attempted reforms of Sultan Selim III.—Their fate and his.—Palace revolutions.—Reign of Mahmud II.—War with Russia.**—"Abd-ul-Hamid died on the 7th April, 1789, and was succeeded by his nephew, Selim III (1789-1807). Although Selim had been confined in the Seraglio by his uncle, he had been in other respects well treated. His love of information and his natural talents had induced him to carry on an active correspondence with several servants of his father and his uncle. Their information had, however, in no way satisfied him, and he had commenced a correspondence with Choiseul, the French envoy at Constantinople in 1786, and had also sent his intimate friend Isaac Bey to France, to enquire into the state measures and administrative organization of that country. Selim had also entered into correspondence with Louis XVI, and this lasted till 1789, when the French Revolution broke out simultaneously with Selim's ascension of the throne. All this throws a clear light upon

Selim's eventual exertions to cause reforms, which at last cost him both his throne and his life. His thirst for knowledge leads us to presume that he was not deficient in natural and sound talent. . . . But it was a mistake, that in his pursuit of knowledge, and desire to improve the institutions of Turkey—and the habits and character of its inhabitants—Selim should have applied to France, and to Frenchmen. That country was then on the eve of her great revolution. Theories of all kinds were afloat. . . . Selim would certainly have acted more wisely had he sought help from his own sensible mind; he would have easily perceived the palpable fact, that things which were suited for Christian nations were utterly inapplicable to the rude, uncivilized Turks. . . . Unfortunately he set about the task with very different ideas, and listened to the suggestions of the sciolists who surrounded him. The first thing to which they drew his attention was the formation of a council of state, which not only restricted the power of the Grand Vizier, but that of the Sultan, very materially. The Reis Effendi, Raschid, was the soul of the council, and the boldest of these sciolists; and he had perfect liberty to carry on the work of reform. He set the printing presses again in activity which had been introduced in a preceding reign, sent for French officers, who founded an engineer academy, built arsenals and foundries, and openly stated that he took science under his protection. But his chief care was to form an army after the European fashion, in order by their assistance to gain the mastery over the Janissaries, in whom old customs and traditions found their most zealous guardians. He took several steps, therefore, to call into life the new military organization, called the Nizam Djedid; and as money was required for the purpose, he laid a tax on articles of consumption. This was quite sufficient to cause the popular discontent to burst into a flame. The Ulema declared themselves hostile to the Nizam Djedid, and Pashwan Oglu, Pacha of Widdin, who placed himself at the head of the Janissaries, openly rebelled against the Porte, which could not effect anything to check him, but acquiesced in all that was demanded. The extraordinary conquests of Napoleon diverted attention from Turkey, and instead of seeking to divide the dominions of a weak neighbour, the Great Powers of the Continent were trembling for their own safety. Egypt became the battle field between England and France [see FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (August—August), and 1801-1802], and its invasion by Napoleon obliged the Turks to unite with the Allied Powers against France. When the French were expelled from Egypt, that province was restored to Turkey, and peace concluded between the two Powers. Selim, under the influence of General Sebastiani who was then French ambassador at Constantinople, signed [seized?] what was considered by him a favourable opportunity for renewing the war with Russia [see below], in which, however, the Turks were defeated both by land and sea. These misfortunes the Janissaries attributed to the new troops or Seymens. . . . At the end of May, 1807, the chiefs of the Janissaries and the Ulema had already formed their plans for the overthrow of the Sultan, when Selim accelerated the outbreak by going to the mosque on Friday, accompanied by

a body of Seymens and the French ambassador, Sebastiani. The Janissaries, aroused by this, broke out in open revolt, which soon grew of such a menacing nature by the co-operation of the Mufti, that Selim was compelled to promise the abolition of the Nizam, and the heads of those of his advisers who had promoted the measure. But the insurgents were not satisfied with this: they demanded the abdication of the Sultan, whom the Mufti declared unworthy to be a successor of Muhammad, through his partiality for foreigners, and marched to the Seraglio, to carry their designs into effect. But when the Mufti and the Ulema entered it, they found a new Sultan. Selim, under the conviction that he could not resist the storm his attempts at reform had created, had retired to the Harem, where his nephew, Mustapha, was confined, and led him to the throne: he had then attempted to destroy his own life by a cup of poisoned sherbet, but had been prevented by Mustapha, and was led into the apartments of the Royal Princes, with a promise that he should ever be treated as a friend and an uncle. On the same afternoon, Sultan Mustapha III [IV] (who reigned from 31st May, 1807, to 28th July, 1808) rode in solemn procession for the first time to the great mosque, was invested in the traditional manner with the sabre of Muhammad, then immediately did away with the Nizam Djedid, and restored the old customs. But among the Pachas in the provinces, there were several devoted partisans of reform. The most influential of these was Mustapha Bairaktar, Pacha of Rustchuk, who set out in July 1808, at the head of 18,000 men, to restore Selim to the throne. He succeeded in taking possession of the capital, and keeping the Sultan so long in ignorance of his designs, until he sent him orders to resign the throne in favour of Selim. As the Sultan had only one hour allowed him for consideration, he was so helpless that he followed the advice of the Mufti and had Selim cruelly murdered. As the gates of the Seraglio were not opened at the appointed time, and Bairaktar hurried up to enforce his authority, Selim's lifeless body was thrown over the wall. Upon this the Pacha ordered the Seraglio to be stormed, seized the Sultan, destroyed all those who had advised the abolition of the plans of reform, and placed Mustapha's younger brother on the throne. Mahmud II, the second son of Abd-ul-Hamid, was born on the 2nd July, 1785, and was consequently twenty-three years of age when he ascended the throne. . . . Mahmud appointed Mustapha Bairaktar his Grand Vizier, and, regardless of the fate of his predecessor, restored all the measures of reform which Selim had undertaken. Within three months the Janissaries were again in open rebellion, and on the night of the 14th November, 1808, attacked the Seymens, destroyed a great number of them, and, after storming the new barracks, forced their way into the Grand Vizier's palace. He fled and appealed to the people for help, but the greater portion abused him as a renegade and joined the rebels. Bairaktar recognised his impending fate, but still ordered the execution of Mustapha, for fear he might reascend the throne. After this he retired with a body of Seymens into a stone tower, where he had before collected a quantity of gunpowder. He defended himself here for some time, but, at last, when the Janissaries rushed up in larger masses to the attack,

he blew up the tower. The Janissaries then attacked the Seraglio, and, but for the fact that Mahmud was the last legitimate descendant of the race of Osman, they would have taken his life. But even this, probably, would not have saved him, had he not sent a deputation to the insurgents and given an unconditional assent to their demands. . . . As an additional guarantee for his own safety on the throne, ensanguined with the blood of his uncle and his brother, Mahmud ordered his brother's son, a child of three months old, to be strangled, and four of the Sultan's to be thrown into the Bosphorus. The reign of Mahmud is one of the longest and most important in the whole of Turkish history. It commenced with war. The Emperor Alexander menaced him on the Danube: the Hospodar of Servia, Czerny George, had rebelled against him. The campaign of the Turks in 1809, was, consequently, not a prosperous one. The contest lasted till 1812, when it was ended by the treaty of Bucharest, which surrendered the whole of Bessarabia, as far as the Pruth, to Russia. At the same time the Russian protectorate of the Greek Christian subjects of the Porte, which had been stipulated in the treaty of Kudjuk Kainardji, was again confirmed."—Sir J. Porter, *Turkey*, v. 1, pp. 194-204.

ALSO IN: Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 21-24.

A. D. 1798.—In the Coalition against France.—War declared. See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST—APRIL).

A. D. 1806-1807.—Alliance with Napoleon, and hostilities with Russia and England.—British fleet before Constantinople.—Its humiliating retreat.—The English again in Egypt.—Disastrous failure of their expedition.—“Before the end of 1806, Russia had driven Selim into the arms of France; and war was declared at the Porte just after Napoleon's victories in Prussia had filled Alexander with alarm. His troops had overrun some Turkish territory before war was declared; but just at this juncture he wanted all his forces for the defence of his own frontier. He dreaded the effects of withdrawing them from the Turkish provinces, which would immediately fight for France; but he must do it. He besought the British to undertake another of those ‘diversions’ which began to sound so disagreeably to the ears of Englishmen. . . . The Grenville Cabinet . . . gave orders to Sir John Duckworth, then cruising off Ferrol, to join Admiral Louis at the mouth of the Dardanelles. . . . Neither the efforts of Sebastiani [French representative at Constantinople] . . . nor any other warning that the English were coming, had roused the Turks to make the slightest preparation. The ships sailed proudly up the strait [February, 1807], undelayed by the fire of the forts at the narrowest part of the channel, and belching out flames and cannonballs as they went. They took and burned some Turkish ships, and appeared before Constantinople, to the horror of the whole population, who were absolutely without means of defence. The Divan would have yielded at once; but Sebastiani prevented it, and instigated a negotiation which proved a fatal snare to Sir John Duckworth, notwithstanding express warnings and instructions, strong and clear, from Lord Collingwood. He was unwilling to destroy the city, and shoot down the defenceless inhabitants;



and he allowed himself to be drawn on, from day to day, exchanging notes and receiving promises. . . . Meantime, not a moment was lost by Sebastiani and the Turks, whom he was instructing in Napoleon's methods of warfare. Women and children, Christians and Mohammedans, worked day and night at the defences; and in a few days the whole coast was bristling with artillery, and the chance was over. . . . There was nothing to be done but to get away as safely as they yet might. . . . For thirty miles (reckoning the windings of the channel) the ships ran the gauntlet of an incessant fire—and such a fire as was never seen before. Stone balls, weighing 700 or 800 lbs., broke down the masts, crushed in the decks, snapped the rigging, and amazed the hearts of the sailors. The hills smoked from end to end, and the roar of the artillery rolled from side to side. In another week, Sir J. Duckworth declared in his dispatch, any return would have been impossible. The news of this singular affair spread fast over Europe. Every body thought the expedition gallantly conceived, and miserably weak in its failure. . . . So ended the second of the 'diversions' proposed under the Grenville Ministry. The third legacy of this kind that they left was a diversion on the side of Egypt. For some time, a notion had been gaining ground, in the minds of English politicians, that the Sultan would, some day soon, be giving Egypt to Napoleon, in return for the aid afforded to Constantinople, on the Danube, and elsewhere. Egypt was in an unhappy state. Mohammed Alee, the Viceroy, was at feud with the Memlooks; and the Arab inhabitants were made a prey of by both. The Grenville Ministry thought that a diversion in that direction would be of great service to Russia, and great injury to Napoleon; and they confidently reckoned on being enthusiastically received by the Arab inhabitants, and probably by the Memlooks also. In laying their plans, however, they strangely underrated the forces and the ability of Mohammed Alee; and they sent only between 4,000 and 5,000 men to the mouth of the Nile, instead of an army large enough to cope with the able and warlike Pasha of Egypt, and his Albanian troops. The small British force was drafted from the troops in Sicily. It landed without opposition on the 17th of March, supposing that Sir John Duckworth must by this time have conquered the Sultan, and that his province of Egypt would come very easily into our hands. No opposition was made to the landing of the troops, and Alexandria capitulated immediately. Only seven lives were lost on the British side. Within the city, however, no provisions were found." A detachment of 1,200 men sent to Rosetta for supplies were trapped in the city by Mohammed Alee's Albanians, and 400 of them, with their general, were shot down in the streets. Then Rosetta was besieged, with results of disastrous failure and the loss of 1,000 or 1,200 more men. General Fraser, the Commander, "was discouraged from home, and hourly harassed by the enemy. . . . More and more of the enemy came up as his little force dwindled away; and at last, on the appearance of a column which he was unable to encounter, he sent out a flag of truce, with an offer to evacuate Egypt on the restoration of the prisoners taken since the invasion. This was in August, 1807; and in September the last English soldier left the mouth of the Nile.

By this time, the Sultan had declared war against England, and had caused a seizure of all the British property in his dominions."—H. Martineau, *Hist. of Eng.*, 1800-1815, *bk. 2, ch. 1*.

A. D. 1807.—Accession of Mustapha IV.

A. D. 1807.—Schemes of Napoleon and Alexander I. at Tilsit for the partition of Turkey. See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY).

A. D. 1808.—Accession of Mahmud II.

A. D. 1821-1829.—Revolt and recovery of independence by the Greeks.—Battle of Navarino.—Treaty of Adrianople. See GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.

A. D. 1822-1823.—The Congress of Verona. See VERONA, CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1826.—Reforms of Mahmud II.—Insurrection of the Janissaries.—Their subjugation and destruction.—"While the struggle in Greece was proceeding, Mahmud had been busily engaged with his internal reforms, many of which were of a nature to offend the prejudices of his subjects. His great object was to give a European character to the institutions and the manners of his country. He introduced the western style of dress into Turkey; abandoned the use of the turban, which Mohammedans generally regard with much veneration; and gave musical and theatrical entertainments within the sacred enclosure of the Seraglio. He resolved also to recommence the military reforms of his uncle Selim, and again to establish the Nizam Jedid, or body of troops organized after European models. This last design roused once more the savage fanaticism of the Janizaries. On the 15th of June, 1826, when the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were in the country, the dissatisfied troops rose in insurrection, and committed great excesses. The Grand Vizier, hastily recalled to the metropolis, took measures for vindicating his master's authority, and at once found himself supported, not only by the new troops, but by the Ulemas and Students. Mahmud arrived shortly afterwards at the Seraglio, and by his orders the Mufti unfolded the standard of the Prophet, and summoned all faithful Mohammedans to rally round that holy symbol. The city was soon divided into two hostile factions. The Janizaries concentrated their forces in one of the great squares, and threw up entrenchments. The supporters of the Sultan gathered in their front, and an attack was made by ordnance, before which the Janizaries retired into their fortified barracks, where they continued to fight with the resolution of despair. . . . The building was presently on fire from one end to the other. The frightful struggle was continued in the midst of the flames; all who endeavoured to escape were at once shot down; and before the day was over 6,000 Janizaries had perished at the hands of their fellow-troops. Fifteen thousand who had not taken part in the movement were exiled to different places in Asia Minor, and on the following day a Hatti-Sherif pronounced the abolition of a corps which had contributed so much to the military predominance of Turkey, but which had at length become a source of internal danger too great to be suffered."—E. Ollier, *Cassell's Ill. Hist. of the Russo-Turkish War*, v. 1, *ch. 23*.

A. D. 1826-1829.—Convention of Ackerman.—War with Russia.—Surrender of Varna and Silistria.—Disastrous battle of Koulevscha.—Treaty of Hadrianople.—Cessions of territory.

—“It was not to be expected that an event so remarkable as the destruction of the Janizaries would fail to be taken advantage of by the court of St. Petersburg. The Emperor Nicholas had brought with him to the Russian throne a thorough determination to carry out that aggressive policy of the Empress Catherine, of which the terms of the celebrated treaty of Kutschouc-Kainardji [see above: A. D. 1768-1774] afforded so striking an illustration, and the annihilation of the Ottoman army, as well as the distracted condition of many of the provinces of that empire, afforded an opportunity too tempting to be neglected. The Czar, therefore, demanded that the Sultan should conclude with him a treaty, the provisions of which were made the subject of discussion at Ackerman, a town in Bessarabia; and Mahmoud, pressed by the necessity of his condition, . . . had found it requisite to conclude the arrangement, and the celebrated convention of Ackerman was ratified in October 1826. This treaty proved of great importance to Russia. In addition to other provisions, it recognised the whole stipulations of the two treaties of Bucharest and Kainardji, by which Russia claimed the right to interpose in behalf of the members of the Greek church in the Ottoman dominions. . . . During the year which succeeded the ratification of the convention of Ackerman, Russia was occupied with the Persian war, which was prosecuted with great vigour by General Paskewitch, by whom very considerable advantages were obtained; and in November 1827 the treaty of Tourkmanchai was concluded between Russia and Persia. . . . It left the Emperor . . . at leisure to carry out those hostile intentions which his ready interference in the affairs of Greece, and a variety of other considerations, clearly proved him to entertain. The approaching war was indicated by the mutual recriminations of the hostile powers. Russia accused the Porte of an endeavour to cause a revolution in the Caucasus, and of a violation of treaties by closing the Bosphorus against Russian ships, and by its conduct towards its Christian subjects. There was no inconsiderable foundation for such a complaint, and especially for the latter part of it. . . . Both sides immediately prepared for the struggle, which a variety of circumstances have proved that the Czar had long contemplated, and only waited for a suitable opportunity of entering upon. . . . In the month of May [1828] the [Russian] force began to assemble on the banks of the Pruth, and crossed that river at three different points. Being unopposed by the Ottomans, the Russian forces almost immediately entered Jassy and Bucharest, took possession of Galatz, and in a few weeks had occupied the whole of the left bank of the Danube. To accomplish as rapidly as possible the objects of the campaign, as well as to avoid having their very widely extended line exposed to the enemy, it was resolved by the leaders of the Russian forces to cross the Danube at Brahilow, and thence to advance with rapidity upon Silistria, Varna, and Schumla. This resolution they immediately proceeded to carry into effect. . . . About the middle of July, the Russian force under General Rudiger on the right, and Generals Woinoff and Diebitch on the left wing, accompanied by the Emperor Nicholas, moved toward Schumia; and the Ottoman army, whose instructions were to avoid general actions, and to

throw their whole energy upon the defence of their fortifications, having engaged in battle with the enemy, retired within the entrenched camp surrounding that fortress, which now contained a force of 40,000 men. . . . The Emperor . . . resolved . . . to leave a corps of observation of 30,000 men before Schumla, under General Wittgenstein, and to direct the principal efforts of his army, in the first instance, to the reduction of Varna. . . . On the 5th of September, after having been absent at Odessa for about a month, during which he was engaged making arrangements for obtaining levies from Russia, and in negotiating loans in Holland, the Emperor Nicholas arrived at Varna, to inspect the progress and encourage the operations of the besiegers. . . . The besieging force, towards the end of August, amounted to 40,000 men, which, on the arrival of the Emperor, were reinforced by more than 20,000, with a great addition to the artillery already possessed by the invading army. This large force was further supported by the Russian fleet. . . . The details of the siege exhibit a series of assaults repulsed with the utmost valour and spirit by the besieged, and entailing an immense loss upon the Russians, both in men and superior officers; but the circumstance that the reinforcement sent to relieve the garrison could not approach, so closely was the place invested, and the destruction of a part of the walls by the cannon of the Russians, led to a surrender, and Jussouf Pasha delivered up the fortress to the Emperor on the 10th of October, after a siege of more than two months. The utmost efforts were made to reduce Silistria, after Varna had been surrendered, but the advance of the season, and the difficulties of the attempt, as well as the disastrous circumstances of the Russian army before Schumla, soon proved that nothing more could be attempted till the following spring. The campaign, therefore, was brought to a conclusion, and orders were issued for the Russians to retire beyond the Danube, and take up their winter quarters in Wallachia. The fall of Brahilow and Varna were the only important events of the campaign of 1828 in Europe, and even these successes had been attained at a vast expense of human life. Out of nearly 160,000 men who had crossed the Danube at the beginning of the campaign, only about one-half remained. . . . In Asia operations were carried on by the Russians with equal vigour and much more success, in consequence, in a great measure, of the military genius and experience of General Paskewitch, who commanded the troops on the east of the Black Sea. . . . The first attack of the Russians in Asia was made upon the fortress of Anapa. . . . After a siege of about a month, the place was taken, with 85 guns and 3,000 prisoners, and the fleet sailed immediately to Varna. . . . After some other successes, General Paskewitch resolved upon attacking the town and fortress of Akhalzikh, a very important place in the pashalik of that name, and which was not only strongly fortified by nature and art, but had for its chief strength a resolute garrison of 10,000 Ottomans, besides the armed inhabitants of the place. The Sultan's troops defended this important fortress with the most undaunted resolution. . . . The surrender of Akhalzikh was followed by that of other important places of strength, which closed the campaign of 1828 in Asia. . . . The campaign of 1828 had rendered the most active



preparations requisite on the part of both belligerents for the commencement of hostilities in the following spring. The Ottoman soldiers, according to their usual custom, hastened from the garrisons to pass the winter in their homes, but the utmost efforts were made by the Porte to gather an adequate force to meet the exigencies of the struggle so soon to be renewed. Although only 10,000 men were left in Schumla during the winter, 40,000 assembled in that fortress early in spring. They were, however, for the most part new levies. . . . The Russians, on the other hand, were no less energetic in their arrangements. . . . It was impossible, however, before the month of May, from the condition of the Danube, to commence the campaign with the whole force, but by the tenth of that month the passage of the river was completed at Hirchova and Kalavatsch, below Silistria, the siege of which was immediately begun, while General Kouprianoff was stationed with a force at Pravadi, a fortress on the east of Schumla, and which, lying in the line of communication between Silistria and Varna, was important to the Russians as the means of keeping open a communication between the army of General Roth near Varna and the troops destined to act upon Silistria. Redschid Pasha, who on being recalled from Greece had been appointed Grand Vizier, had arrived at Schumla on the 21st of March, and on perceiving the position of the invading army, formed the well-conceived design of attacking Pravadi and the force under General Roth. . . . This movement of the Vizier became immediately known to General Roth, who by means of a courier conveyed information of it to Count Diebitch. That General was too acute not to perceive the purpose of his adversary, and too enterprising not to endeavour immediately to take advantage of it. The Count therefore adopted a movement of the highest importance, and which, indeed, had the effect of deciding the campaign. Instead of marching to attack Redschid Pasha at Pravadi, he resolved to intercept his communication with the fortress he had quitted, and thus compel the Ottoman general either to come to a general engagement, which could hardly fail to result to the advantage of the Russians, or to fight his way towards Schumla through the Russian army, or leave the fortress of Schumla to its fate, which, feebly garrisoned as it was, could not be long delayed. This skilful manœuvre was no sooner resolved upon than it was carried into execution. . . . While the Russian force were rapidly advancing towards Koulevscha, a village between Pravadi and Schumla, and scarcely three miles from the latter, the Grand Vizier remained wholly ignorant of the fact that Diebitch had quitted Silistria, and persisted in the belief that the only opponents of his retreat to Schumla were Generals Roth and Rudiger. . . . The mistake was fatal. The Ottoman cavalry attacked the infantry of the Russians, who were overwhelmed by their charge; and Diebitch, having waited in expectation that the Vizier would descend from the eminence on which he was posted to complete his supposed victory, and finding that he did not make this movement, broke from his concealment among the hills, and suddenly attacked the Ottoman troops with his whole force. The effect was instantaneous. A universal panic seized the Vizier's forces, his cavalry and infantry fled in

confusion, every attempt to bring them to a stand proved abortive, and he himself escaped with difficulty. The artillery and baggage all fell into the hands of the enemy. . . . The muster at Schumla on the return of the Vizier and his remaining troops exhibited the magnitude of their loss. Out of a fine army of 40,000 men, who a few days before had marched from the fortress full of confidence, only 12,000 foot and about 6,000 cavalry remained. After the fatal battle of Koulevscha, the siege of Silistria was carried on with redoubled vigour, and on the 30th of June the fortress surrendered, when the whole garrison were made prisoners of war, and to the number of 8,000, and the Russians found on the ramparts 238 cannon, in addition to those on board the vessels in the harbour. The fall of Silistria now determined the Russian commander-in-chief to push across the Balkans. . . . After defeating with great facility such troops as opposed their advance, the Russian army pressed on with the utmost activity towards Hadrianople, and entered the city not only unopposed, but amidst the rejoicings of a multitude of the Greek population. . . . The terror which this extraordinary event inspired at Constantinople may easily be imagined to have been extreme. The very heart of the empire had been assailed by the victorious invaders in Europe, while the tidings from the Asiatic provinces of the defeats sustained by the Sultan's forces opposed to General Paskewitch, greatly contributed to the public alarm. . . . In the midst of this tumult of public feeling, the ambassadors of England and Austria exerted themselves to the utmost to bring about a pacification; and . . . the Sultan reluctantly agreed to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. . . . The celebrated treaty of Hadrianople, which concluded the war of 1828-29, . . . contained sixteen distinct articles, by which, among other matters, the following conditions were agreed upon:— The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and all the conquered places in Bulgaria and Roumelia, were restored to the Porte, with the exception of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, which were to remain the possession of Russia. In Asia all the recent conquests were to revert to the Porte, with the exception of Anapa, on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea, several important fortresses, together with an extensive district situated to the north and east of a line of demarcation supposed to be drawn from the then existing boundary of the province of Gouriel, and thence by that of Imeritia direct to the point where the frontiers of Kars unite with those of Georgia. The conditions of the treaties of Kainardji, Bucharest, and Ackerman were confirmed; . . . the passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to all Russian merchant ships, as well as the undisputed navigation of the Black Sea; an indemnity for losses by Russian subjects was fixed at £750,000, to be paid in eighteen months; and the expenses of the war were to be paid to the Russian Government, amounting to 10,000,000 ducats, about £5,000,000. . . . To this treaty two separate acts were annexed, the provisions of which are of scarcely less importance than the treaty itself. By these acts it was arranged that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be elected for life instead of for seven years; that no interference in the affairs of these provinces by any of the officers of the Porte should take

place; that no fortified towns, nor any establishment of Muslims, should be retained by the Porte on the left bank of the Danube; that the Turkish towns on that bank of the river should belong to Wallachia; and that the Mussulmans who possessed property in such places should be required to sell it in the space of eighteen months. . . . The conclusion of these treaties, on the 14th September 1829, terminated the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire."—R. W. Fraser, *Turkey, Ancient and Modern*, ch. 30-31.

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, *Hist. of Europe, from 1815 to 1852*, ch. 15.

**A. D. 1830.—Recognition of the autonomy of Servia.** See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14-19TH CENTURIES (SERVIA).

**A. D. 1831-1840.—Rebellion of Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt.—Intervention of Russia and the Western Powers.—Egypt made an hereditary pashalik.**—"The peace of Adrianople (1829) had greatly discredited the authority of the Porte; insurrections multiplied, and Turkish armies had to enter Bosnia and Albania. In these and all other matters by which the embarrassment of the Porte was increased, the ambitious Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had a hand. As payment for his services against the Greeks, he had demanded the pashalik of Damascus. Sultan Mahmoud II. had refused the demand, and only given him the promised Candia. Hence, while the Western powers were occupied with the consequences of the July revolution [in France], and all Europe appeared to be on the verge of a new upheaval, he undertook to seize his booty for himself. In consequence of a quarrel with Abdallah, Pasha of Acre, Ibrahim Pasha [son of Mehemed Ali], notorious for his barbarous conduct of the war in Peloponnesus, crossed the Egyptian frontier, October 20th, 1831, with an army organized on the European system, took Gaza, Jaffa and Jerusalem without resistance, and besieged Acre, which was resolutely defended by Abdallah. Mehemed Ali now demanded both pashaliks—Damascus and Acre. The sultan commanded him to evacuate Syria. The demand was naturally refused; so Mehemed and his son Ibrahim were outlawed. But the latter proceeded with his operations, took Acre by storm May 25th, 1832, and entered Damascus. In the mean time, a Turkish army, under Hussein Pasha, had advanced into Syria. Mehemed Pasha, Hussein's lieutenant, was defeated at Homs, July 9th. Hussein himself, attempting to retrieve this loss, was defeated at Beylan July 27th, and his army scattered. The sultan sent a new army against Ibrahim, under Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had displayed great efficiency in the reduction of the Albanians and Bosnians. Reshid . . . was utterly defeated at Konieh December 20th, and was himself taken prisoner. The sultan was in a critical situation. He could not at the moment bring together another considerable army, while Ibrahim had 100,000 well-trained troops, and the road to Constantinople lay open before him." Russia, having no wish to see the energetic Pasha of Egypt in possession of that coveted capital, offered her help to the sultan and he was driven to accept it. "A Russian fleet appeared in the Bosphorus, and landed troops at Scutari, while a Russian army was on the march from the Danube to cover Constantinople. . . . At length England and France perceived how dangerous it was

to forget the East in their study of the Dutch-Belgian question. Their ambassadors had enough to do, by a hasty peace, to make Russia's help unnecessary. As their threats made no impression on the victorious Mehemed Ali, they filled the sultan with distrust of Russia, and by representing a cession of territory to his vassal as the lesser of the two evils, persuaded him into the peace of Kutayah (May 6th, 1833), by which Mehemed Ali received the whole of Syria and the territory of Adana, in south-eastern Asia Minor. Russia had to retire with her object unattained, but had no sooner been thrown out at the front door than she came in at the back. She called the sultan's attention to the favor shown to the insatiable pasha by England and France in the peace of Kutayah, and concluded with him, July 8th, 1833, the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, by which he entered into a defensive alliance with Russia for eight years, and pledged himself to permit no foreign vessel of war to pass through the Dardanelles. The Western powers took this outwitting very ill, and from that time on kept a sharp eye on Constantinople." Mehemed Ali was meantime giving another direction to his ambition. "The west coast of Arabia, as far as the English post at Aden, had been in his possession since 1829. He now sought to extend his sway over the eastern coast, and subdue the sultan of Muscat. . . . If this were to continue, the two most important roads to the East Indies, by Suez and by the Persian Gulf, would be in the hands of Mehemed Ali. . . . With Egypt, Syria, and Arabia in his hands, England's position in the East would receive a blow that must be felt. So it was a foregone conclusion which side England would take. In 1838 she concluded with the Porte a commercial treaty by which the abolition of all monopolies, as well as free exportation from all parts of the Turkish empire, including Egypt and Syria, was secured to her. Mehemed Ali hesitated about accepting this treaty; and Mahmoud, full of hate against a vassal who threatened ultimately to devour him, declared him a traitor, deprived him of all his dignities, and caused an army to advance into Syria under Hasiz Pasha. But again fortune was not favorable to the Turks. In their camp, as military adviser of the commander-in-chief, was a Prussian captain, Hellmuth von Moltke. For two years he had been assisting the sultan in planning and putting into execution military reforms. Recognizing the weakness and unreliable character of the Turkish army, he advised Hasiz Pasha to fall back on the strong camp at Birdshik, bring up the re-enforcements which were under way, and then risk a battle. But the Pasha would not listen to Moltke's advice, pronouncing retreat a disgrace. He was completely routed at Nisib, on the Euphrates, June 24th, 1839, and his army scattered. For the second time the road to Constantinople lay open to Ibrahim. Misfortunes fell thick and fast upon the Turks. Sultan Mahmoud died June 30th, and the empire fell to a sixteen-year old youth, his son Abdul Medshid. Five days later, Capudan Pasha, with the Turkish fleet, sailed out of the Dardanelles under orders to attack the Egyptians. Instead of this he went over to Mehemed Ali with his whole fleet—in consequence of French bribery, it was said. . . . In order to prevent Turkey from casting herself a second time into Russia's arms, four great



powers—England, France, Austria, and Prussia—declared, July 27th, 1839, that they would themselves take the Eastern question in hand. To save herself from being wholly left out, Russia had to give her consent, and become a party to the treaty. But there were very different views as to the way in which the question was to be settled. France, which was striving after the control of the Mediterranean, and which, since Napoleon's campaign, had turned its eyes toward Egypt, wished to leave its friend Mehemed Ali in full possession. England saw her interests endangered by the pasha, thought France's occupation of Algiers quite enough, and was afraid that if Turkey were too weak she might become the defenceless prey of Russia. The latter wished at no price to allow the energetic pasha to enter upon the inheritance of Turkey, or even of a part of it, and was pleased at seeing the cordial understanding between France and England destroyed. Austria and Prussia supported England and Russia, and so France was left alone. The Anglo-Russian view found expression in the quadruple alliance which the great powers, with the exception of France, concluded in London, July 15th, 1840. By this the hereditary possession of the pashalik of Egypt, and the possession for life of a part of Syria, were secured to Mehemed Ali, in case he submitted to the conclusions of the conference within ten days. . . . The allied powers began hostilities against Mehemed Ali, who, relying on French assistance, refused to submit. The Anglo-Austrian fleet sailed to the Syrian coast, and took Beirut and Acre; and Alexandria was bombarded by Commodore Napier. This and the fall of the Thiers ministry brought Mehemed Ali to a full realization of his mistake. He might consider himself lucky in being allowed to hold Egypt as hereditary pashalik upon evacuating Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and restoring the Turkish fleet. For this favor he had to thank England, which sought by this means to secure his friendship and the Suez road to India. The catastrophe of the 'sick man' [the Turk] was again put off for a few years."—W. Müller, *Political Hist. of Recent Times*, sect. 11.

ALSO IN: A. A. Paton, *Hist. of the Egyptian Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 1-20.—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, v. 2, ch. 6.—S. Walpole, *Hist. of England from 1815*, ch. 16 (v. 3).

A. D. 1839.—Accession of Abdul Medjid.

A. D. 1853-1856.—The Crimean War. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1853-1854, to 1854-1856.

A. D. 1861-1876.—The reign of Abd-ul-Aziz, and accession of Abd-ul-Hamid.—"Troubles broke out in the Lebanon in 1860, a French army was dispatched to restore order, and in the adjustment of rival claims an opportunity was afforded to Lord Dufferin for displaying those diplomatic talents for which he is renowned. In 1861 the Sultan Abd-ul-Mejid died, and with him passed away the hope of regenerating Turkey. His brother and successor Abd-ul-Aziz was an ignorant bigot, whose extravagance brought his country to avowed insolvency (1875), and thus deprived her of that sympathy which is seldom given to the impecunious. The only remarkable thing he did was to travel. No Ottoman Sultan had ever before left his own dominions, except on the war path, but Abd-ul-Aziz ventured even as far as London, without, however, awakening any enthusiasm on the part of his Allies. In 1876 he

was deposed, and—found dead. How he came by his death is a matter of doubt, but his end is said to have turned the brain of his successor, Murad V., a son of Abd-ul-Mejid, who after three months was removed as an imbecile, and succeeded by his brother, . . . Abd-ul-Hamid."

—S. Lane-Poole, *The Story of Turkey*, ch. 17.

A. D. 1861-1877.—Union of Wallachia and Moldavia.—Revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina.—Reforms demanded by the Great Powers.—War with Servia.—Conference at Constantinople.—Russian preparations for war.—"Before four years were over [after the termination of the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris], one of the chief stipulations of the treaty was set aside. Wallachia and Moldavia, which it had been the policy of the Powers to separate, displayed a constant desire to join. Two of the great Continental Powers—France and Russia—favoured the junction. England, Austria, and Turkey, thinking that the union would ultimately lead to their independence, opposed their fusion under one prince. At last, after discussions, which at one moment seemed likely to rekindle the flames of war, an administrative union was arranged, which resulted, in due course, in the formal union of the two provinces in 1861. [In 1858, the two provinces chose the same prince, or hospodar, in the person of Prince John Couza, who took the title of Prince of Roumania. The Porte protested, but was induced, in 1861, to recognize this union of the coronets. Prince Couza aspired to absolutism, and was forced to abdicate in 1866. Then a German, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, was chosen by the two provinces to be his successor.] Thus, five years after the Peace of Paris, one of the stipulations on which England had insisted was surrendered. In 1870 the Franco-German War led to the obliteration of another of them. In November, when the armies of France were either beaten or besieged, Russia repudiated the clause of the Treaty of Paris which had limited the forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. The declaration of the Russian Government came as a painful shock to the British people. The determination of a great European state to tear up the clause of a treaty excited indignation. It was recollected, moreover, that it was for the sake of this clause that the Crimean War had been prolonged after the Vienna negotiations; and that all the blood which had been shed, and all the money which had been spent, after the spring of 1855, were wasted in its abandonment. . . . All that diplomacy was able to do was to lessen the shock by persuading the Russian Government to submit its proposal for the abrogation of the clause to a conference. . . . The conference met. . . . It had practically nothing to do but to record its assent to the Russian proposal. . . . For five years more the Eastern Question remained undisturbed. In the spring of 1875 an insurrection broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two of the northern provinces of European Turkey. The Porte failed to quench the disturbance; and, its efforts to do so increasing its pecuniary embarrassments, was forced in the autumn to repudiate the claims of its many creditors. . . . In the meanwhile the insurrection continued to spread, and attracted the attention of the great European Powers. At the instigation of Austria a note was drawn up [by Count Andrassy, and

known, therefore, as the Andrassy Note], which was at once signed by all the European Powers except England, and which was ultimately accepted by England also, declaring that 'the promises of reform made by the Porte had not been carried into effect, and that some combined action by the Powers of Europe was necessary to insist on the fulfilment of the many engagements which Turkey had made and broken.' As the note failed to effect its object, the representatives of the Northern Powers—Germany, Austria, and Russia—met at Berlin, proposed a suspension of arms for two months, and intimated that if Turkey in the two months failed to fulfil her broken promises, 'force would be used to compel her' to do so. The British Government, unwilling to join in a threat, refused to sign this new note. The insurrection went on; Serbia, sympathising with the insurgents, declared war against Turkey; Russian officers and Russian troops fought in the Serbian battalions; and Russia herself, setting her legions in motion, evidently prepared for hostilities. When these events occurred, large numbers of the English people were prepared to support the Turk. Though they had been partially estranged from the cause of Turkey by the repudiation of the Ottoman debt in the previous autumn, they recollected the sacrifices of the Crimean War; they were irritated with the manner in which one part of the Treaty of Paris had been torn up in 1870; and they were consequently prepared to resist any further movement on the part of Russia. The Porte, however, dreading the extension of revolt, allowed its officers to anticipate disorder by massacre. The atrocious cruelty with which this policy was executed [especially in Bulgaria—see BALKAN and DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1875-1878] excited a general outburst of indignation in this country [England]; and the British Ministry, whose leader had hitherto displayed much sympathy with the Turks, found himself forced to observe a strict neutrality. In the short war which ensued in the autumn of 1876, the Serbian troops proved no match for the Turkish battalions. At the request or command of Russia the Porte was forced to grant an armistice to the belligerents; and, on the suggestion of the British Ministry, a Conference of the Great Powers was held at Constantinople to provide for the better government of the Turkish provinces. The Constantinople Conference, held at the beginning of 1877, formed in many respects an exact parallel to the Vienna Conference held in the summer of 1855. . . . The Porte rejected all the proposals on which the other Powers were agreed. . . . In each case the failure of the Conference was followed by war. But the parallel ends at this point. . . . In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, Turkey was left to fight her own battle alone."—S. Walpole, *Foreign Relations*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: E. Ollier, *Cassell's Ill. Hist. of the Russo-Turkish War*, v. 1, ch. 1-10.—Duke of Argyll, *The Eastern Question*, v. 1, ch. 3-9.—S. Menzies, *Turkey Old and New*, bk. 4, ch. 4 (v. 2).

A. D. 1877-1878.—War with Russia.—Heroic defense of Plevna.—Defeat and surrender.—"Russia had already massed large numbers of troops on her frontier, and Turkey was also engaged in the work of mobilization. On the 24th April the Emperor of Russia issued a manifesto to his subjects, in which he recited

the interest of the empire in the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula, and the general desire that their condition should be ameliorated. He declared that all efforts at peace had been exhausted. . . . He had given the orders for the army to cross the frontier, and the advance upon Turkey was begun without delay. . . . The Turks had not been idle, though their preparations were by no means as complete as those of Russia. They had massed heavy bodies of troops along the Danube, and were prepared to resist the movements of the Russians south of that stream. . . . The first crossing [of the Russians] was made at Galatz, on the 22d June, by General Zimmermann, who went over with two regiments in pontoons and drove out the Turks who were posted on the heights on the opposite shore. Having obtained a footing in the Dobrudja, as the peninsula between the Danube and Black Sea is called, the Russians were able to throw bridges over the great stream, by which the whole left wing of the army moved across. Meantime the right wing, on the 26th June, sent a pontoon force over the Danube from Simnitsa, under command of General Skobelev, who drove out the small force of Turks posted there, though not without hard fighting. More pontoons followed, and then a bridge was thrown across on which the army could march. . . . By the first week of July the whole Russian army was safely encamped on the southern bank of the Danube, and getting in readiness to assume the offensive. . . . The advance did not begin in force until after the middle of the month. But before that time General Gourko . . . had pushed forward on the road to the Balkans, heading first for Tirnova. . . . On the 5th July the cavalry occupied Biela, . . . and on the 7th Gourko was in possession of Tirnova. . . . The Emperor joined the army at Biela on the 8th or 9th. Gourko was soon reported past the Balkans. . . . The first check of the Russians was at Plevna. They had previously captured Nicopolis with its garrison of 7,000 men, having themselves lost about 1,300 officers and men killed and wounded. Orders had been given to occupy Plevna as soon as possible, and Baron Krudener sent forward General Schilder-Schuldner to carry out the orders. . . . Schilder-Schuldner had 6,500 men and 46 guns in the division with which he went to capture Plevna; he was attacked by a vastly superior force of Turks before he had reached his objective point, and the first battle of Plevna was disastrous to the Russians. . . . Nearly 3,000 men and 74 officers were killed or wounded. . . . The Russians retired to Nicopolis, and the Turks set to work to strengthen Plevna. . . . From the 20th to the 30th of July the Russians were engaged in bringing up reinforcements and getting ready for another attack. An order came for the assault of the Turkish position; Baron Krudener did not believe the assault advisable, but the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas left him no discretion." The assault was made on the 31st of July, and was repulsed, with a loss to the Russians of 170 officers and 7,136 men. "There was nothing for the Russians to do but send for reinforcements, and wait until they arrived. The advance into Turkey had received a severe check, from which recovery was not easy. From the offensive the Russians were thrown upon the defensive, and all as the result of a single battle of six or eight



hours' duration. Happily for Russia, the Turkish army had no competent leader, or the army of the Czar might have been captured or drowned in the Danube. The Turks had three armies in the field. . . . Mehemet Ali was at Shumla with 65,000 men; Osman Pasha at Plevna, with 50,000; and Suleiman Pasha at Yeni Zagra, with 40,000. . . . The order of the Czar for reinforcements was quickly issued, and resulted in the despatch of 120,000 regulars and 180,000 militia for the front. With these reinforcements went 460 pieces of artillery. . . . General Gourko took up his position in the Shipka Pass whence Suleiman Pasha sought in vain to dislodge him. . . . Towards the end of August the Russian reinforcements were assembled in such numbers that an advance could again be ventured. . . . The total Russian and Roumanian force for the attack of Plevna amounted to 90,000 men and 440 guns, while the Turks were estimated to have about 56,000 men—and Osman Pasha. . . . The attack began with a bombardment on the 6th September," which was kept up until the 11th, when the Russians again endeavored to carry the Turkish works by assault. Skobelev, conspicuous, as he always was, in daring and in success, took one of the redoubts and held it until the next day, waiting vainly for reinforcements which were not sent. Elsewhere the assault failed. "The Russian killed and wounded were estimated at 18,000 to 20,000, and the Turkish about 5,000 less than the Russian. The capture by assault having been given up, the Russians sat down to invoke the aid of that engine, more powerful than all their batteries, the engine of starvation. . . . One by one the roads leading into Plevna were occupied, but it was nearly two months from the terrible battle of the 11th September before the routes for supplies and reinforcements destined for Osman Pasha could be secured. The investment was completed on the 3d November; 120,000 Russians and Roumanians were around Plevna." On the morning of December 10 the beleaguered Turks made a desperate sortie, attempting to break the line of investment, having failed in which their stout-hearted commander surrendered unconditionally. "With the fall of Plevna and the surrender of its garrison of 40,000 men, the Turkish opposition practically ceased. Within a month from that event General Gourko had captured Sophia, and General Radetsky took the village of Shipka, in the Shipka Pass, and compelled the surrender of a Turkish army of 23,000 men. . . . Gourko and Skobelev advanced upon Philippopolis by different routes and narrowly missed capturing Suleiman Pasha with his entire force. Skobelev advanced upon Adrianople, which the Turks abandoned, and Slivno and Yeni-Zagra were occupied, all inside of thirty days. Plevna had made the Russians the masters of the situation, and they advanced upon Constantinople, the Turks retiring before them, and occasionally making a feeble resistance. Turkey asked the mediation of England, and finally, despairing of her aid, signed an armistice that became the basis of the treaty of San Stefano."—T. W. Knox, *Decisive Battles since Waterloo*, ch. 21.—The campaign of the Russians in Bulgaria was accompanied by another in Asiatic Turkey, where they, likewise, met with a temporary check, after pushing their first advance too confidently, and with an insufficient force. They invested Kars

and advanced against Erzeroum, in May, 1877; but were defeated at Sevin and withdrew from both undertakings. Having received reinforcements, they resumed the offensive in October, attacking the main Turkish army, under Mukhtar Pasha, in its strong position at Aladsha, or on the Little Yahni and Great Yahni hills. Their first attack, on the 2d, was repulsed; they repeated it on the 15th with success, driving one wing of the enemy into Kars and forcing the other to surrender. Kars was then besieged and taken by assault November 17. The Turks suffered another defeat at Deve-Boyun, near Erzeroum, November 4, and they evacuated Erzeroum itself in February, 1878.—E. Ollier, *Cassell's Illustrated Hist. of the Russo-Turkish War*.

ALSO IN: V. Baker, *The War in Bulgaria*.—F. V. Greene, *The Russian Army and its Campaign in Turkey*

A. D. 1878.—Excitement in England over the Russian advance.—The British fleet sent through the Dardanelles.—Arrangement of the Berlin Congress.—"At the opening of 1878 the Turks were completely prostrate. The road to Constantinople was clear. Before the English public had time to recover their breath and to observe what was taking place, the victorious armies of Russia were almost within sight of the minarets of Stamboul. Meanwhile the English Government were taking momentous action. . . . Parliament was called together at least a fortnight before the time usual during recent years. The Speech from the Throne announced that her Majesty could not conceal from herself that, should the hostilities between Russia and Turkey unfortunately be prolonged, 'some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on me to adopt measures of precaution.' This looked ominous to those who wished for peace, and it raised the spirits of the war party. There was a very large and a very noisy war party already in existence. It was particularly strong in London. It embraced some Liberals as well as nearly all Tories. It was popular in the music-halls and the public-houses of London. . . . The men of action got a nickname. They were dubbed the Jingo Party. . . . Some Tyrtæus of the tap-tub, some Körner of the music-halls, had composed a ballad which was sung at one of these caves of harmony every night amidst the tumultuous applause of excited patriots. The refrain of this war-song contained the spirit-stirring words: 'We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do, We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.' Some one whose pulses this lyrical outburst of national pride failed to stir called the party of its enthusiasts the Jingoists. . . . The name was caught up at once, and the party were universally known as the Jingoists. . . . The Government ordered the Mediterranean fleet to pass the Dardanelles and go up to Constantinople. The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that he would ask for a supplementary estimate of six millions for naval and military purposes. Thereupon Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, at once resigned. . . . Lord Derby was also anxious to resign, and indeed tendered his resignation, but he was prevailed upon to withdraw it. The fleet meanwhile was ordered back from the Dardanelles to Besika Bay. It had got as far as the opening of the Straits when it was recalled. The Liberal

Opposition in the House of Commons kept on protesting against the various war measures of the Government, but with little effect. . . . While all this agitation in and out of Parliament was going on . . . the news came that the Turks, utterly broken down, had been compelled to sign an armistice, and an agreement containing a basis of peace, at Adrianople. Then, following quickly on the heels of this announcement, came a report that the Russians, notwithstanding the armistice, were pushing on towards Constantinople with the intention of occupying the Turkish capital. A cry of alarm and indignation broke out in London. One memorable night a sudden report reached the House of Commons that the Russians were actually in the suburbs of Constantinople. The House for a time almost entirely lost its head. The lobbies, the corridors, St. Stephen's Hall, the great Westminster Hall itself, and Palace Yard beyond it, became filled with wildly excited and tumultuous crowds. If the clamour of the streets at that moment had been the voice of England, nothing could have prevented a declaration of war against Russia. Happily, however, it was proved that the rumour of Russian advance was unfounded. The fleet was now sent in good earnest through the Dardanelles, and anchored a few miles below Constantinople. Russia at first protested that if the English fleet passed the Straits Russian troops ought to occupy the city. Lord Derby was firm, and terms of arrangement were found—English troops were not to be disembarked, and the Russians were not to advance. Russia was still open to negotiation. Probably Russia had no idea of taking on herself the tremendous responsibility of an occupation of Constantinople. She had entered into a treaty with Turkey, the famous Treaty of San Stefano, by which she secured for the populations of the Christian provinces almost complete independence of Turkey, and was to create a great new Bulgarian State with a seaport on the Egean Sea. The English Government refused to recognise this Treaty. Lord Derby contended that it involved an entire readjustment of the Treaty of Paris, and that that could only be done with the sanction of the Great Powers assembled in Congress. Lord Beaconsfield openly declared that the Treaty of San Stefano would put the whole south-east of Europe directly under Russian influence. Russia offered to submit the Treaty to the perusal, if we may use the expression, of a Congress; but argued that the stipulations which merely concerned Turkey and herself were for Turkey and herself to settle between them. This was obviously an untenable position. . . . Turkey meanwhile kept feebly moaning that she had been coerced into signing the Treaty. The Government determined to call out the Reserves, to summon a contingent of Indian troops to Europe, to occupy Cyprus, and to make an armed landing on the coast of Syria. . . . The last hope of the Peace Party seemed to have vanished when Lord Derby left his office [which he did on the 28th of March]. Lord Salisbury was made Foreign Minister. . . . Lord Salisbury's first act in the office of Foreign Secretary was to issue a circular in which he declared that it would be impossible for England to enter a Congress which was not free to consider the whole of the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. . . . Prince Bismarck had often during these events

shown an inclination to exhibit himself in the new attitude of a peaceful mediator. He now interposed again and issued invitations for a congress to be held in Berlin to discuss the whole contents of the Treaty of San Stefano. After some delay, discussion, and altercation, Russia agreed to accept the invitation on the conditions proposed, and it was finally resolved that a Congress should assemble in Berlin on the approaching June 13. To this Congress it was supposed by most persons that Lord Salisbury would be sent to represent England. Much to the surprise of the public, Lord Beaconsfield announced that he himself would attend, accompanied by Lord Salisbury, and conduct the negotiations in Berlin. The event was, we believe, without precedent. . . . The Congress was held in the Radzivil Palace, a building with a plain unpretending exterior in one of the principal streets of Berlin, and then in the occupation of Prince Bismarck. The Prince himself presided. . . . The Congress discussed the whole or nearly the whole of the questions opened up by the recent war. . . . The great object of most of the statesmen who were concerned in the preparation of the Treaty which came of the Congress, was to open for the Christian populations of the south-east of Europe a way into gradual self-development and independence. But on the other hand it must be owned that the object of some of the Powers, and especially, we are afraid, of the English Government, was rather to maintain the Ottoman Government than to care for the future of the Christian races. These two influences, acting and counteracting on each other, produced the Treaty of Berlin."—J. McCarthy, *Hist. of Our Own Time*, ch. 65 (v. 4).

ALSO IN: J. A. Froude, *Lord Beaconsfield*, ch. 16.—H. D. Traill, *The Marquis of Salisbury*, ch. 11.—R. Wilson, *Life and Times of Queen Victoria*, v. 2, ch. 21.

A. D. 1878.—The Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.—"The First Article of the Treaty of San Stefano had reference to the new boundaries to be assigned to Montenegro. The accession of territory, which was not very large, was taken from the provinces of Bosnia and Albania, and lay to the north, east, and south of the original State. . . . It gave to the mountaineers their much-coveted admission to the sea. It was next provided that a European Commission, on which the Sublime Porte and the Government of Montenegro were to be represented, should be charged with fixing the definite limits of the Principality. . . . By Article II., the Sublime Porte recognized definitively the independence of the Principality of Montenegro. . . . Article III. dealt with Servia, which was recognized as independent. The new frontier of this Principality was to follow the course of the Drina, the Dezevo, the Raska, the Ibar, the Morava, and some other streams, and was drawn so as to give Little Zvornik, Zakar, Leskovatz, Ak Palanka, and Nisch, to the Servians. . . . In Article V., the Sublime Porte undertook to recognize the independence of Roumania, which would thus acquire a right to an indemnity, to be hereafter discussed between the two countries. The most important sections of the Treaty were of course those which had relation to Bulgaria. They commenced with Article VI., which set forth that Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous, tributary Principality, with a Christian Govern-



ment and a national militia. The definitive frontiers of the new Principality were to be traced by a special Russo-Turkish Commission before the evacuation of Roumelia by the Russian army. . . . The new Bulgaria was of very considerable dimensions. It extended from the Danube in the north to the Ægean in the south; and from the borders of Albania in the west to the Black Sea in the east. All that was left to Turkey in this part of her Empire was an irregular and somewhat narrow territory, running westward from Constantinople along the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Ægean until it touched the limits of the new Principality, and extending no farther north than was sufficient to include Adrianople and its immediate neighbourhood. By this arrangement, the territory so left to the Sultan was completely separated from Thessaly and Albania. . . . According to Article VII., the Prince of Bulgaria was to be freely elected by the people, and confirmed by the Sublime Porte with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the Great European Powers should be capable of being elected Prince of Bulgaria. . . . The introduction of the new system into Bulgaria, and the superintendence of its working, would be entrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian Commissioner. . . . By Article VIII., the Ottoman army would no longer remain in Bulgaria, and all the ancient fortresses would be razed at the expense of the local Government. . . . Until the complete formation of a native militia, the country would be occupied by Russian troops. . . . Article IX. declared that the amount of the annual tribute which Bulgaria was to pay the Suzerain Court would be determined by an agreement between Russia, the Ottoman Government, and the other Cabinets. . . . By Article X., the Sublime Porte was to have the right to make use of Bulgaria for the transport, by fixed routes, of its troops, munitions, and provisions, to the provinces beyond the Principality, and vice versa. . . . Article XII. provided that all the Danubian fortresses should be razed, and that in future there should be no strongholds on the banks of the Danube, nor any men-of-war in the waters of Roumania, Servia, or Bulgaria. . . . Article XIV. imposed on Turkey the obligation to introduce reforms into Bosnia and the Herzegovina." Articles XV. and XVI. stipulated reforms in government of Crete, Epirus, Thessaly, Armenia, and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. "The question of the war-indemnities was arranged in Article XIX., which set forth that the Emperor of Russia claimed, in all, 1,410,000,000 roubles for losses imposed on Russia during the contest. . . . The Emperor, however, did not desire to receive the whole of this indemnity in the form of money-payments, but, taking into consideration the financial embarrassments of Turkey, and acting in accordance with the wishes of the Sultan, was willing to substitute for the greater part of the sums enumerated certain territorial cessions, consisting of the Sandjak of Tultcha, on the Danube (including the Delta Islands and the Isle of Serpents), and, in Asia, Ardahan, Kars, Batoum, Bayazid, and the territory extending as far as the Soghanli Dag. With respect to the Sandjak of Tultcha and the Delta Islands, Russia, not wishing to annex that territory, reserved to herself the right of exchanging it for the part of Bessarabia detached from her by the Treaty of

1856. . . . The ceded territories in Europe and Asia were to be taken as an equivalent for the sum of 1,100,000,000 roubles." The remaining Articles of the Treaty of San Stefano related to details of minor importance. "The Treaty of Berlin, signed by the Plenipotentiaries on the 13th of July, 1878, and of which the ratifications were exchanged on the 3rd of August, was the Treaty of San Stefano, with additions, subtractions, and amendments. . . . Speaking generally, it may be said that the objects of the Treaty of Berlin, as distinguished from its predecessor, were to place the Turkish Empire in a position of independence, and to protect the jeopardised rights of Europe. These ends it accomplished, or partially accomplished, by several important provisions. It divided the so-called Bulgaria into two provinces, of which the one to the north of the Balkans was formed into a tributary Principality, while the one to the south, which was to be designated Eastern Roumelia, was to remain under the direct authority of the Sultan, with administrative autonomy and a Christian Governor-General. It left to the Sultan the passes of the mountains, and the right of sending troops into the interior of Eastern Roumelia whenever there might be occasion. It reduced the stay of the Russian army in European Turkey. . . . It secured to Roumania, as compensation for the loss of that portion of Bessarabia which had been annexed to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris (1856), a larger amount of territory, south of the Danube, than had been granted at San Stefano. It restored to Turkey the whole of the northern shores of the Ægean, a wide extent of country in Europe, and, in Asia, the valley of Alashgerd and the town of Bayazid. . . . It gave far ampler guarantees for religious liberty than had entered into the projects of the Czar."—E. Ollier, *Cassell's Illustrated Hist. of the Russo-Turkish War*, v. 2, ch. 9 and 21.—"In her private agreement with Russia, England had consented to the cession of Batoum, but she now sought to diminish the value of that post by stipulating that the fortifications should be demolished and the port declared free. The dispute, which at one time assumed a serious character, was finally settled by a declaration on the part of the Czar that Batoum should be a free port. Kars, Ardahan, and Batoum were ceded to Russia, the district of Khotur to Persia, and the Sultan pledged himself to carry out the requisite reforms in Armenia without loss of time, and to protect the inhabitants against the Kurds and Circassians. At the same time a secret treaty was made known which had been contracted between England and Turkey on the 4th of June. By this treaty the Porte pledged itself to carry out reforms in Asia Minor, and England, on her part, guaranteed the integrity of the Sultan's Asiatic possessions. To put England in a position to fulfil her part of the treaty, and as a pledge for the execution of the promised reforms, the Porte surrendered Cyprus to England as a naval and military station, the latter agreeing to regard the island as an integral part of the Turkish empire, and to make over the surplus revenue to the Sultan. This treaty, which had received the consent of Germany and Russia at the time of its execution, aroused great indignation in France and Italy. . . . To pacify the former state, Beaconsfield and Salisbury entered into a secret arrangement with Wadding-

ton, in accordance with which England was to put no obstacles in the way of a French occupation of Tunis—an arrangement of which the French government finally took advantage in the year 1881. The English representatives had also entered into an arrangement with Austria in reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the sitting of June 29th Andrassy read a memorandum in which he set forth that Austria had been disturbed for a whole year by the insurrection in those provinces, and had been compelled to receive and provide for over 150,000 Bosnian fugitives, who positively refused again to submit to the hardships of Turkish misrule; that Turkey was not in a position to restore order in the disturbed districts. . . . Thereupon the Marquis of Salisbury moved that Austria be charged with the occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and . . . the congress . . . decided to hand over those two provinces to Austro-Hungary. . . . The independence of Servia and Montenegro was recognized on condition that full freedom and political equality were accorded to the members of all religions. Servia received an addition to her population of 280,000 souls, her most important acquisition being the city and fortress of Nish. She also assumed a part of the Turkish debt. The recognition of Roumanian independence was conditioned on the cession of Bessarabia to Russia, and the admission to political equality of the members of all religions—a condition which had special refer-

ence to the Jews. In compensation for Bessarabia Roumania was to receive the Dobruddsha and the islands at the mouth of the Danube. . . . Austria took possession of her share of the booty at once, but not without the most obstinate resistance."—W. Müller, *Political Hist. of Recent Times*, sect. 30.

ALSO IN: Sir E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, v. 4, Nos. 518, 524–532.—Duke of Argyll, *The Eastern Question*, v. 2, ch. 13.—See, also, BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1878.

A. D. 1894.—Reported Atrocities in Armenia.—A disturbance of some nature—the causes and extent of which have not yet been ascertained—occurring in Turkish Armenia during the late weeks of summer or early part of autumn, gave occasion for what is claimed to have been more horrible atrocities on the part of the Turkish soldiery than were committed in Bulgaria during the year 1877. The scene of alleged massacres is in the mountainous district of Sassoun, near the western end of Lake Van, where 6,000 men, women and children are said to have been slain. The Christian world having been roused, though not very promptly, by the reports of this fresh outbreak of barbarism, the Porte has been forced by pressure from the Powers to consent to the formation of a commission to investigate the affair. England, France and Russia are to be represented on the commission.

TURLUPINS, The. See BEGUINES.

TURNER, Nat, The Insurrection of. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1828–1832.

TURONES, The.—A tribe in ancient Gaul who gave their name to Touraine, the district which they inhabited, and to Tours, the chief town of that district. See GAULS; also, VENETI OF WESTERN GAUL.

TUSCANY: A. D. 685–1115.—The founding of the duchy.—The reign of Countess Matilda.—The rise of the free cities.—“The first Lombard duke of whom any sure record remains is a certain ‘Alovisino’ who flourished about the year 685; and the last, though of more doubtful existence, is ‘Tachiputo,’ in the 8th century, when Lucca was the principal seat of government, with the privilege of coining, although her Counts were not always Dukes and Marquises of Tuscany. About the year 800, the title of Duke seems to have changed to that of Count, and although both are afterwards used the latter is most common: Muratori says, that this dignity was in 813 enjoyed by a certain Boniface whom Sismondi believes to be the ancestor of Countess Matilda; but her father, the son of Tedaldo, belonged to another race: he was the grandson to Attone, Azzo, or Adelberto, Count of Cannosa. . . . The line of Boniface I. finished in 1001 by the death of Hugo the Great. . . . After him, on account of the civil wars between Ardoino and Henry, there was no permanent Duke until 1014, when the latter appointed Ranieri, whom Conrad the Salique deposed in 1027, making room for Boniface the father of Countess Matilda. This heroine died in 1115 after a reign of active exertion for herself and the Church against the Emperors [in the ‘War of Investitures,’ see PAPACY: A. D. 1056–1122], which generated the infant and as yet nameless factions

of Guelph and Ghibeline. . . . The fearless assertion of her own independence by successful struggles with the Emperor was an example not overlooked by the young Italian communities under Matilda’s rule. . . . These seeds of liberty began first to germinate amongst the Lombard plains, but quickly spreading over the Apennines were welcomed throughout Tuscany [see ITALY: A. D. 1056–1152]. . . . It seems probable that in Tuscany, towards the commencement of the 12th century, the Count’s authority had passed entirely into the principal communities, leaving that of the Marquis as yet untouched; but there are reasons for believing that the Countess Matilda in some of her difficulties was induced to sell or cede a portion of her power, and probably all that of the Count’s. . . . Altogether, there appears little reason to doubt the internal freedom of most Tuscan cities very early in the 11th century.”—H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, bk. 1, ch. 4 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: P. Villari, *The Two First Centuries of Florentine History*, v. 1, ch. 2.

A. D. 925–1020.—The rise of Pisa. See PISA.

A. D. 1063–1200.—Cultivation of architecture at Pisa. See PISA: A. D. 1063–1293.

A. D. 1077–1115.—Countess Matilda and her Donation to the Holy See. See PAPACY: A. D. 1077–1102.

A. D. 1215.—Beginning of the wars of Guelphs and Ghibellines. See ITALY: A. D. 1215.

A. D. 1248–1278.—The Guelph and Ghibeline wars. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1248–1278.

A. D. 1250–1293.—Development of the popular constitution of the Florentine Commonwealth. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1250–1293.

A. D. 1282–1293.—War between Pisa and Genoa.—Battle of Meloria.—War of Florence and Lucca against Pisa. See PISA: A. D. 1063–1293.



A. D. 1300-1313. — The new factions of Florence.—Bianchi and Neri. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1295-1300; and 1301-1313.

A. D. 1310-1313. — The visitation of the Emperor, Henry VII.—His war with the Guelfic cities. See ITALY: A. D. 1310-1313.

A. D. 1313-1328. — The wars of Florence and Pisa.—The subjection of Lucca to Castruccio Castracani and his war with the Florentines.—The hostile visitation of the Emperor Louis of Bavaria. See ITALY: A. D. 1313-1330.

A. D. 1336-1338. — War of Florence with Mastino della Scala, of Verona. See VERONA: A. D. 1260-1338.

A. D. 1341-1343. — Defeat of the Florentines by the Pisans before Lucca.—Brief tyranny of the Duke of Athens at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1341-1343.

A. D. 1353-1359. — Sufferings and deliverance from "the Great Company." See ITALY: A. D. 1343-1393.

A. D. 1378-1427. — The democratizing of Florence.—The Tumult of the Ciompi.—First appearances of the Medici. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1378-1427.

A. D. 1390-1402. — Resistance of Florence to the conquests of the Duke of Milan. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1390-1402.

A. D. 1433-1464. — The ascendancy of Cosimo de' Medici at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1433-1464.

A. D. 1452-1454. — War of Florence and Milan against Venice, Naples, Siena and other states. See MILAN: A. D. 1447-1454.

A. D. 1469-1492. — The government of Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent, at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1469-1492.

A. D. 1494-1509. — The French deliverance of Pisa.—The long struggle and reconquest by Florence. See PISA: A. D. 1494-1509.

A. D. 1502-1569. — Restoration of the Medici in Florence and their creation of the grand duchy of Tuscany. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1502-1569.

A. D. 1725. — Reversion of the grand duchy pledged to the Infant of Spain. See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725; and ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

A. D. 1735. — Reversion of the duchy secured to the ex-Duke of Lorraine. See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735; and ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

A. D. 1796. — Seizure of Leghorn by the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1801. — The grand duchy transformed into the Kingdom of Etruria and given to the son of the Duke of Parma. See GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.

A. D. 1807. — End of the Kingdom of Etruria.—Cession and annexation to France. See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1807.

A. D. 1814-1815. — Restored to Ferdinand III. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF; and ITALY: A. D. 1814-1815.

A. D. 1848-1849. — Revolution.—Expulsion of the Grand Duke.—Proclamation of a Republic and union with Rome.—The old order restored. See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

A. D. 1859-1861. — Flight of the Grand Duke.—Formation of a provisional government.—Annexation to Sardinia.—Absorption in the new Kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: A. D. 1856-1859; and 1859-1861.

TUSCARORAS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY, and IROQUOIS TRIBES OF THE SOUTH.

TUSCULAN VILLAS.—"In Cicero's time the number of country-houses which a wealthy Roman considered it necessary to possess had evidently become considerable, and the amount spent upon them very great. The orator himself had villas at Tusculum, Antium, Formiæ, Baiæ, and Pompeii, besides his town-house on the Palatine, and his family seat at Arpinum. . . . The Tusculanum of Cicero had formerly been in the possession of Sylla. . . . Close to the Villa of Cicero, and so near that he could go across to fetch books from the library, was the Villa of Lucullus. . . . Many other Roman villas lay on the Tusculan hills."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 14, pt. 3.

TUSCULUM.—"In the times of the Latin League, from the fall of Alba to the battle of Lake Regillus, Tusculum was the most prominent town in Latium. It suffered, like the other towns in Latium, a complete eclipse during the later Republic and the Imperial times; but in the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, under the Counts of Tusculum, it became again a place of great importance and power." The ruins of Tusculum, about fifteen miles from Rome, on the Alban hills, have been considerably explored.—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 14, pt. 2.—See, also, ALBA.

TUSKEGEE INSTITUTE. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1865-1881.

TUTELOES, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: STOUAN FAMILY.

TUTTLLINGEN, OR DÜTLINGEN, Battle of (1643). See GERMANY: A. D. 1643-1644.

TWEED RING, The. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1863-1871.

TWELVE APOSTLES OF IRELAND. See CLONARD, MONASTERY OF.

TWELVE CÆSARS, The. See ROME: A. D. 68-96.

TWELVE PEERS OF FRANCE.—The Twelve Peers of France were the nobles and prelates "who held the great fiefs immediately from the Crown. . . . Their number had been fixed by Louis VII. at twelve; six lay and six ecclesiastical. They were the Dukes of Normandy, Burgundy, Guienne, the Counts of Champagne, Flanders, Toulouse; the Archbishop of Rheims, and the Bishops of Laon, Noyon, Châlons, Beauvais and Langres. . . . The immediate vassals of the Duchy of France, who held of the King as Duke, not as King, were not Peers of France."—G. W. Kitchen, *Hist. of France*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 6, with foot-note.

TWELVE TABLES OF THE LAW, The. See ROME: B. C. 451-449.

TWENTY-SECOND PRAIRIAL, Law of the. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (JUNE—JULY).

TWIGGS, General, Treacherous surrender of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1860-1861 (DECEMBER—FEBRUARY).

TWIGHTWEES, OR MIAMIS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY, also ILLINOIS and MIAMIS, and SACS, ETC.

TWILLER, Wouter Van, The governorship of. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1638-1647.

TWO SICILIES, The Kingdom of the.—The kingdom founded in Southern Italy and Sicily by the Norman conquest in the 11th century (see ITALY: A. D. 1000-1090, and 1081-

1194) maintained its existence until recent times, sometimes as a unit, and sometimes divided into the two dominions, insular and peninsular, of Sicily and Apulia, or Naples. The division occurred first after the rising against the French and the massacre known as "the Sicilian Vespers" (see ITALY: A. D. 1282-1300). The crown of Sicily was then acquired by Peter, king of Aragon, succeeded by his son Frederick. Charles of Anjou and his successors were left in possession of the kingdom of Naples, alone, although still claiming Sicily in union with it. "As the king who reigned at Naples would not give up his right to Sicily, . . . his kingdom is often called Sicily as well as the Island Kingdom; and so when at last the two kingdoms became one [again—see ITALY: A. D. 1412-1447], the strange name of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies arose."—W. Hunt, *Hist. of Italy*, p. 93.—See, also, NAPLES, and SICILY.

**TYCHE.**—One of the variously named parts of the ancient city of Syracuse, Sicily. Its position was northwest of Achradina.

**TYCOON, OR SHOGUN.** See JAPAN: SKETCH OF HISTORY.

**TYLER, John:** Vice-Presidential election. —Succession to the Presidency.—Administration. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1840, to 1845.

**TYLER, Wat,** The Rebellion of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1381.

**TYLIS, Celtic Empire of.**—"The empire of Tylic in the Haemus, which the Celts, not long after the death of Alexander [the Great], . . . had founded in the Moeso-Thracian territory, destroyed the seed of Greek civilisation within its sphere, and itself succumbed during the Hannibalic war to the assaults of the Thracians, who extirpated these intruders to the last man."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 7.

**TYNDARIS, Naval battle at** (B. C. 257). See PUNIC WARS: THE FIRST.

**TYNWALD, Court of.** See MANX KINGDOM; and, also, THING.

**TYPHOID FEVER, Appearance of.** See PLAGUE: 18TH CENTURY.

**TYRANTS, Greek.**—"A 'tyranny,' in the Greek sense of the word, was the irresponsible dominion of a single person, not founded on hereditary right, like the monarchies of the heroic ages and of many barbarian nations, nor on a free election, like that of a dictator or æsymnete, but on force. It did not change its character when transmitted through several generations, nor was any other name invented to describe it when power, which had been acquired by violence, was used for the public good; though Aristotle makes it an element in the definition of tyranny, that it is exercised for selfish ends. But, according to the ordinary Greek notions, and the usage of the Greek historians, a mild and beneficent tyranny is an expression which involves no contradiction."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 10.—"In spite of the worst which has been said against them, the tyrants hold a legitimate place in the progress of Greek constitutional history. They were the means of breaking down the oligarchies in the interests of the people. . . . It was at Sicyon that the first tyrannis arose. . . . About the year 670 B. C. a certain Orthagoras, who is said to have been a cook, succeeded in establishing himself as tyrant in Sicyon. Of his reign no incident is recorded.

He was succeeded by his son Myron."—E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 1, ch. 12.

ALSO IN: J. P. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, ch. 4.—See, also, DESPOTS.

**TYRAS, The.**—The ancient name of the river Dniester.

**TYRCONNEL'S DOMINATION IN IRELAND.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1685-1688.

**TYRE.**—"Justin represents Tyre as having been founded a year before the Capture of Troy, thus apparently reducing by about 1,500 years the date assigned to it by the priests of the temple of Hercules. . . . Josephus places the settlement of Tyre 240 years before the building of Solomon's Temple. He refers no doubt to the same event as Justin, the occupation of the island by the Sidonians, as he cannot have been ignorant of the mention of Tyre in the Old Testament more than 240 years before Solomon. The date of the building of Solomon's Temple is itself disputed, estimates varying from 1012 B. C. to 969 B. C. . . . Tyre consisted of two parts, an island about three-quarters of a mile in length, separated from the mainland by a strait four stadia, about half a mile, in width at its northern end, and a town on the shore. The latter was distinguished as Palæ-Tyros, or Ancient Tyre, and was the chief seat of the population, till the wars of the Assyrian monarchs against Phœnicia. It extended along the shore from the river Leontes in the north to the fountain of Ras-el-Ain in the south, a distance of seven miles, great part of which would be suburb rather than city. Pliny, who wrote when its boundaries could still be traced, computes the circuit of Palæ-Tyros and the island together at nineteen Roman miles, that of the island town being 22 stadia. . . . Though called Old Tyre, because it lay in ruins, when the younger city on the island was in the height of its prosperity, it was from the first connected with it; and the name of Tyre (Tsour), 'a rock,' would hardly be appropriate, except to the island. . . . It is probable that, from the first, the island, from the excellence of its natural harbour, was a naval station to the city on the mainland, and, as a place of security, the seat of the worship of the national deities, Astarte, Belus, Hercules. . . . The situation of Palæ-Tyros was one of the most fertile spots on the coast of Phœnicia. The plain is here about five miles wide, the soil is dark, and the variety of its productions excited the wonder of the Crusaders. Near the southern extremity of the city was a fountain, which, communicating with some natural receptacle in the mountains above, poured forth copious and perennial streams of pure and cool water. An aqueduct distributed them through the town. . . . Whatever may have been the relative importance of Palæ-Tyros and the island, previous to the great migration from Sidon, occasioned by the victory of the Ascalonites, there can be no doubt that from this time the population of the island greatly increased. The colonization of Gades took place about a century later. But we have no connected history of Tyre till near the age of Solomon."—J. Kenrick, *Phœnicia: Hist.*, ch. 1.—See PHœNICIANS, and TRADE.

The founding of the colony of Carthage. See CARTHAGE: THE FOUNDING OF.

B. C. 598-585.—Siege by Nebuchadnezzar. See PHœNICIANS: B. C. 850-538.



**B. C. 332.—Siege and capture by Alexander the Great.**—After defeating the Persians at Issus (see MACEDONIA: B. C. 334–330), Alexander turned his attention to the tributary Phœnician cities, whose fleets gave to the Great King a naval power more formidable than the hosts of the nations which marched at his command. Sidon, Byblus, and other towns submitted promptly to the conqueror. Tyre offered a qualified surrender, which did not satisfy the haughty Macedonian, and he instantly laid siege to the city. Having no adequate fleet with which to reach the island-town, he resolved to carry a causeway across the channel which separated the island from Old Tyre, on the mainland, and he demolished the buildings of the latter to provide materials for the work. It was an undertaking of immense magnitude and difficulty, and the ingenious Tyrians found many modes of interfering with it. They succeeded in destroying the mole when half of it had been built; but Alexander, with obstinate perseverance, began his work anew, on a larger scale than before. He also collected a strong fleet of war-galleys, from Cyprus and from the Phœnicians who had submitted to him, with which the opposition of the enemy was checked and his own operations advanced. After seven months of prodigious labor and incessant battle, the strong walls of Tyre were beaten down and the city taken. "It soon became a scene of unresisted carnage and plunder. The Macedonians, exasperated by the length and labours of the siege, which had lasted seven months, and by the execution of their comrades [Greek prisoners, whom the Tyrians had put to death on the walls, before the eyes of the besiegers, and cast into the sea], spared none that fell into their hands. The king—whom the Greeks call Azelmicus—with the principal inhabitants, and some Carthaginian envoys who had been sent with the usual offerings to Melkart, took refuge in his sanctuary: and these alone, according to Arrian, were exempted from the common lot of death or slavery. It was an act of clemency, by which the conqueror at the same time displayed his piety to the god. Of the rest, 8,000 perished in the first slaughter, and 30,000, including a number of foreign residents, were sold as slaves. But if we may believe Curtius, 15,000 were rescued by the Sidonians [of Alexander's navy], who first hid them in their galleys, and afterwards transported them to Sidon—not, it must be presumed, without Alexander's connivance or consent. It sounds incredible, that he should have ordered 2,000 of the prisoners to be crucified. . . . Tyre was still occupied as a fortress, and soon recovered some measure of her ancient prosperity."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 50.

ALSO IN: Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*, bk. 2, ch. 15–24.

**B. C. 332–A. D. 638.**—Under Greek and Roman domination.—"The Carians, with whom Alexander repeopled the city [of Tyre] fell into the habits of the former population, and both Tyre and Sidon recovered much of their commercial greatness. After a long struggle between the kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, Phœnicia was finally secured to the latter by Antiochus the Great (B. C. 198). But the commercial rivalry of Egypt proved more serious even than political subjection; and the foundation of Berenice on the Red Sea diverted to

Alexander much of the oriental commerce that had previously flowed through Tyre and Sidon. But still they did not succumb to their younger rival. Under the Romans, to whom Phœnicia was subjected with Syria [by Pompeius the Great, B. C. 64], Tyre was still the first commercial city of the world."—P. Smith, *Hist. of the World: Ancient*, ch. 24.

**A. D. 638.—Capture by the Moslems.**—After the taking of Jerusalem by the Caliph Omar, the Moslems made themselves masters of the remainder of Palestine very quickly. Tripoli was first won by treachery, and then the same traitor who had delivered it, making his way to Tyre, succeeded in bringing about the betrayal of that place. Many of the inhabitants were put to the sword; but many others are said to have saved their lives by accepting the religion of the victors. The fall of Tyre was followed by the flight from Cæsarea of Constantine, son of the Emperor Heraclius, who commanded in Syria, and the entire abandonment of that rich province to the Moslems.—S. Ockley, *Hist. of the Saracens*, pp. 251–253 (Bohn ed.).

**A. D. 1124.—Siege and Conquest by the Venetians and Crusaders.**—The Venetians took little or no part in the First Crusade, being largely engaged in commerce with the Saracens. But in 1124—a full quarter of a century after the taking of Jerusalem—they found it wise to obtain an interest in the Christian conquests that were spreading along the Levantine coasts. They accordingly sent their doge, with a formidable fleet, to offer aid to the Latin king of Jerusalem—then Baldwin II.—for the reduction of either Ascalon or Tyre, both of which cities were still held by the Moslems. Finding it difficult to make choice between the two places, a solemn drawing of lots took place, at the altar of the Holy Sepulchre, as a means of ascertaining the will of God. The lot decided that Tyre should be attacked, and operations were accordingly begun. But "the Venetians, more devoted to the interests of their commerce and of their nation than to those of a Christian kingdom, demanded, before beginning the siege of Tyre, that they should enjoy a church, a street, a common oven, and a national tribunal in every city in Palestine. They further demanded other privileges and the possession of a third of the conquered city." The demands of the Venetians were complied with, and Tyre, after a siege of over five months, beleaguered by land and sea, was taken. The capitulation was an honorable one and honorably respected. The Moslem inhabitants were permitted to leave the city; the Christians entered it triumphally, and the day on which the news reached Jerusalem was made a festival.—J. F. Michaud, *Hist. of the Crusades*, bk. 5.

**TYROL: Origin of the county and its name.**—"Tyrol freed herself from the suzerainty of Bavaria in very early times. She was divided among a number of princes, lay and ecclesiastical. The principal of these were the counts of the Adige or of the Tyrol, and the counts of Andechs, who obtained the title of duke from Frederick I. [1152–1190], and called themselves dukes of Meran. Their race came to an end in 1248, and their domains were united to those of the counts of Tyrol who thus became possessed of the larger part of the lands

between the Inn and the Adige. Tyrol takes its name from the castle of Tirol, which was built on the site of the Roman station Teriolis, not far from Meran, on the upper waters of the Adige."—L. Leger, *Hist. of Austro-Hungary*, p. 144, footnote.—"After the dissolution of the classic Roman Empire, the Province of Rætia split up into parcels. . . . It is impossible, in a sketch like this, to follow the various dynastic and other changes, most of them extremely perplexed and obscure, which ensued between the 5th and 10th centuries. At the end of this period, the main constituents of the old province had assumed something like the shape which they now bear. That is to say, Rætia Secunda was separated from Rætia Prima, which had also lost what formerly belonged to it south of the Alpine ridge. . . . Tirol again had been detached from Rætia Prima, and had begun to form a separate entity. Meanwhile a power of first rate importance in the future history of Graubünden [the Grisons] had arisen: namely the Bishopric of Chur. . . . The Bishops of Chur took rank as feudal lords of the first class. . . . Originally an insignificant house, exercising . . . the functions of Bailies to the See of Chur, the Counts of Tirol acquired influence and territory under the shadow of distant ecclesiastical superiors."—

J. A. Symonds, *Hist. of Graubünden (In Strickland's "The Engadine")*, pp. 23-27.

A. D. 1363.—Acquired by the House of Austria. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1330-1364.

A. D. 1805.—Taken from Austria and annexed to Bavaria. See GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806.

A. D. 1809.—Heroic rising under Hofer, against the Bavarians and the French.—The crushing of the revolt. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809-1810 (APRIL—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1814-1815.—Restored to Austria. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL—JUNE); and VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

TYRONE'S REBELLIONS.—The Wars of the O'Neils. See IRELAND: A. D. 1559-1603.

TYRRHENIANS.—TYRRHENIAN SEA.—The ancient race of people in western Italy whom the Romans called Etrusci, and who called themselves the Rasenna, were known to the Greeks as the Turrhenoi, or Tyrrhenians. They were an enterprising maritime people, and hence the Greeks called that part of the Mediterranean which washes the western Italian coast the Tyrrhenian Sea. See ETRUSCANS.

TZAR, OR CZAR. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1547.

TZOMBOR, Battle of (1849). See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

## U.

U. C., OR A. U. C., OR A. U.—Anno Urbis Conditæ: the "Year of Rome," reckoned from the founding of the city. See ROME: B. C. 753.

U. E. LOYALISTS. See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

UAUPE, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: GUCK OR COCO GROUP.

UBERTI FAMILY, The. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1248-1278.

UCHEES, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: UCHEAN FAMILY.

UCLES, Battle of (1108). See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1095-1325. . . . Battle of (1809). See SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (DECEMBER—MARCH).

UDAIPORE, OR OODEYPOOR. See RAJPOOTS.

UDHA-NALA, Battle of (1763). See INDIA: A. D. 1757-1772.

UGANDA.—"It was in 1858 that the travellers Burton and Speke, starting from Zanzibar, first made Europe acquainted with the existence of that vast inland sea, the Victoria Lake, of which Rebmann and Erhardt had already heard native reports. Four years later Speke and Grant, passing round the western shore, reached Uganda; and they found here, if I may employ the paradox, a singular, barbaric civilisation. Combined with the most barbarous usages and the grossest superstition were many of those advances in the scale of humanity which we are wont to accept as indications of civilisation. There was an appeal to law, and cases were decided after a formal hearing. The administration was vested in the king,—an absolute despot,—and from him downwards there existed a regular chain of delegated power and control. Well-made roads, kept constantly in repair, intersected the country in all directions. Rough bridges were constructed across river swamps. An army was maintained, and also a fleet of canoes on the waters of the lake. The arts of

building, smith-work, &c., were very far in advance of anything to be found between Uganda and the coast. The ideas of decency, the use of clothing, and the planting of trees, were indications of long years of development, of which the intricate customs and etiquettes surrounding the Court were an additional proof. Speke traces the earliest developments of this civilisation to Unyoro and its shepherd kings, descendants of a nomadic, pastoral race—the Wahuma—whom he supposes to be an offshoot from the Abyssinians or Gallas. Uganda and the countries lying along the lake shore, being the richest province of this Wahuma empire—called Kitara—had to bring large quantities of produce to Unyoro for the king's use, and their inhabitants were looked on as slaves. The legend relates that a hunter named Uganda headed a revolt, and was proclaimed king under the name of Kimera. Mtesa was the seventh of the dynasty, according to Speke, which shows it to be of some little antiquity. Speke was enthusiastic about the fertility of Uganda, and the development of its people as compared with the savage tribes of Africa. The next European to visit the country was Colonel Chaillé Long, who was sent by Gordon in the summer of 1874. Stanley followed in 1875, and simultaneously Linant arrived in the country. In 1876 Gordon sent Emin with a party of soldiers to Mtesa's capital. They were for some time quartered there, and Gordon had views of annexing Uganda to the Egyptian Sudan. . . . Stanley was even louder in his praises of Uganda than Speke had been, and described it as the 'Pearl of Africa.' In consequence of his appeal on behalf of the people, a fund was started, and missionaries were despatched to Uganda. These arrived in June 1877. . . . Some two years later—February 1879—the French (R. Catholic) Algerian Mission despatched a party of 'White Fathers' to



begin mission-work in Uganda. The religious differences between these two conflicting creeds, which marked the very inauguration of the R. Catholic mission, much puzzled and confused Mtesa, since both alike called themselves 'Christians.' The Arabs from the coast had already settled in Uganda, and brought with them the religion of Islam. . . . Mtesa showed great toleration to all creeds, though at one time he had leaned to Mohammedanism, and had ordered all Uganda to embrace that creed. Shortly after, however, as the followers of Islam refused to eat the king's meat because it was not killed in the orthodox way according to the Koran, he ordered the massacre of all Mohammedans. . . . Mtesa died in the autumn of 1884, and Mwanga, then about eighteen years old, succeeded him—being selected from among Mtesa's sons on account of his personal likeness to the late king, since in Uganda paternity is often difficult to prove. At this time the three religions had made great progress, and their disintegrating influences on the old customs began to be more and more apparent. This was especially the case with regard to the Christians, who no longer regarded the king as divine, nor his acts, however gross and cruel, as having a divine sanction. They owned a Higher allegiance, though they remained obedient subjects, and distinguished themselves by bravery in war. Such an attitude was, of course, intolerable to a cruel despot like Mwanga. . . . There was still a further reason for suspicion and fear of the white men. . . . The Egyptian flag had been hoisted at Mruli and Fauvera in Unyoro, only just beyond the borders of Uganda, and Gordon's envoys—Colonel Long and Emin—and his troops had penetrated to Mtesa's capital. The Arabs also told of the doings of the Belgians on the Congo. At a later period reports reached Mwanga of German annexations in Usagara on the East Coast. Last, and most disturbing of all, was the news of Mr. Thomson's arrival near Usoga in the East—the route from the coast by which native tradition said that the conquerors of Uganda would come. Mwanga had succeeded his father in November 1884. Early in 1885 he determined to stamp out those dangerous religions, Mohammedan and Christian alike, which were disintegrating his country. The missionaries Mackay and Ashe, were seized, and their followers persecuted. But the religion spread the more. A plot to depose Mwanga was discovered and crushed. With varying fortunes—sometimes treated leniently, sometimes the victims of violent persecution—the missionaries held their own till the autumn of 1885. Then came news of Bishop Hannington's approach." Unhappily the Bishop came by the forbidden Usoga route, and Mwanga ordered that he be killed, with all his men, which was done in October, 1885. "After this the position of the Europeans was very precarious, but not till the following May (1886) did the storm burst. Mwanga then threw aside all restraint, and butchered the Christian converts wholesale. . . . But in spite of the martyrdom by torture and burning, the religion grew. . . . The heroism inspired by religion in the early history of our own Church was repeated here in the heart of Africa." At length, in 1888, there was a revolt, in which Christians and Mohammedans seem to have combined, and Mwanga fled to an island at the south of the Lake. His brother Kiwewa was made

king, and for a time, the Christians were in control of affairs. But the Mohammedans grew jealous, and by a sudden rising drove the Christians out. Kiwewa refusing to accept the creed of Islam, was deposed, and another brother, Karema, was raised to the throne. The exiled Christians now made overtures to Mwanga, and an alliance was concluded, which resulted in the overthrow of the Mohammedan or Arab party, and the restoration of Mwanga to the throne, in October, 1889. The two Christian factions, Catholic and Protestant, or French and English, divided the country and all the offices of government between them, but were bitterly jealous of each other and perpetually quarreled, while the defeated Mohammedans were still strong and unsubdued. Affairs were in this state when Dr. Peters, the explorer in command of the German "Emin Relief Expedition," came to Uganda, having learned of the rescue of Emin Pasha by Stanley. Dr. Peters, with the aid of the French party, succeeded in arranging some kind of treaty with Mwanga, and this alarmed the Imperial British East Africa Company (see AFRICA: A. D. 1884-1891) when news of it had been received. That alarm was soon increased by intelligence that Emin Pasha had entered the German service and was about to conduct a strong expedition to the south of Lake Victoria Nyanza. These and other circumstances led to the despatching of Capt. Lugard with a small force to Uganda to represent the British East Africa Company and establish its influence there. Capt. Lugard arrived at Mengo, the capital of Uganda, on the 18th of December, 1890. Meantime Great Britain and Germany, by the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890 (see AFRICA: A. D. 1884-1891) had settled all questions between them as to their respective "spheres of influence," and Uganda had been definitely placed within the British "sphere." This enabled Captain Lugard to secure the signing of a treaty which recognized the suzerainty of the Company, established its protectorate over Uganda, and conceded to it many important commercial and political powers. He remained in the country until June, 1892, during which time he was driven to take part in a furious war that broke out between the Catholic and Protestant parties. The war ended in a partition of territory between the factions, and three small provinces were, at the same time, assigned to the Mohammedans. After maintaining Captain Lugard and his force in the country for eighteen months, the Company found the cost so heavy and the prospect of returns so distant, that it came to a resolution to withdraw; but was induced by a subscription of £16,000 from the Church Missionary Society to remain for another year in the exercise of the control which it had acquired. At the end of 1892 the Company renewed its resolution to evacuate the region west of Lake Victoria, and the British Government was urgently pressed to take upon itself the administration of the country. It was only persuaded, however, to assume the cost of a further occupation of Uganda for three months by the Company's officers, in order to give more time for ensuring the safety of missionaries and other Europeans. It consented, moreover, to despatch a Commissioner to investigate the situation and report upon it. The official selected for that duty was Sir Gerald Porter, Consul-General at

Zanzibar. Sir Gerald returned to England with his report in December, 1893, and died of typhoid fever in the month following. His report urged the maintenance of an effective control over the government of Uganda, to be exercised directly by the British Government, in the form of a Protectorate, keeping the king on his throne, with a Commissioner at his side to direct his action in all important particulars. After much discussion, the decision of the Government was announced at the beginning of June, 1894. It determined to establish the proposed Protectorate in Uganda, not extending to Unyoro, and to place a Sub-Commissioner on duty between Lake Victoria and the sea, for the purpose of watching over communications, and apparently without political powers. The Government declined to undertake the building of the railway from Mombassa on the coast to the Lake, for which the Imperial British East Africa Company had made surveys.—Capt. F. D. Lugard, *The Rise of our East African Empire*.

ALSO IN: Sir Gerald Porter, *The British Mission to Uganda in 1893*.—P. L. McDermott, *British East Africa, or Ibea*.—*The Spectator*, June 9, 1894.—See, also, AFRICA: A. D. 1874, and after.

UGRI. See HUNGARIANS.

UGRO-FINNISH RACES. See TURANIAN.

UHLCHES, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.

UIRINA, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: GUCK OR COCO GROUP.

UKASE.—An edict of the Russian government, deriving the force of law from the absolute authority of the Czar.

UKRAINE, The. See RUSSIA, GREAT, &c.; also COSSACKS.

ULADISLAUS I., King of Poland, A. D. 1083-1102....Uladislaus II., King of Bohemia, 1471-1516....Uladislaus II., Duke of Poland, 1138-1146....Uladislaus III., Duke of Poland, 1296-1333....Uladislaus IV. (Jagellon), King of Bohemia, 1471-1516; V. of Hungary, 1490-1516....Uladislaus V. (Jagellon), King of Poland and Duke of Lithuania, 1385-1434....Uladislaus VI., King of Poland, 1434-1444....Uladislaus VII., King of Poland, 1632-1648.

ULCA, Battle of the (A. D. 488). See ROME: A. D. 488-526.

ULEMA. See SUBLIME PORTE.

ULM: A. D. 1620.—Treaty of the Evangelical Union with the Catholic League. See GERMANY: A. D. 1618-1620.

A. D. 1702-1704.—Taken by the Bavarians and French, and recovered by Marlborough. See GERMANY: A. D. 1702; and 1704.

A. D. 1805.—Mack's capitulation. See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH—DECEMBER).

ULMENES. See CHILE: THE ARAUCANIANS.

ULSTER, The Plantation of. See IRELAND: A. D. 1607-1611.

ULSTER TENANT-RIGHT. See IRELAND: A. D. 1848-1852.

ULTIMA THULE. See THULE.

ULTRA VIRES. See LAW, COMMON: A. D. 1846.

ULTRAMONTANE.—ULTRAMONTANISM.—The term ultramontane (beyond the

mountain) has been used for so long a time in France and Germany to indicate the extreme doctrines of Papal supremacy maintained beyond the Alps—that is, in Italy, and especially at Rome—that it has come to have no other meaning. The ultramontanists in each country are those who make themselves partisans of these doctrines, in opposition to the more independent division of the Roman Catholic Church.

UMBRIANS, The.—“The Umbrians at one time possessed dominion over great part of central Italy. Inscriptions in their language also remain, and manifestly show that they spoke a tongue not alien to the Latin. The irruption of the Sabellian and of the Etruscan nations was probably the cause which broke the power of the Umbrians, and drove them back to a scanty territory between the Æsis, the Rubicon, and the Tiber.”—H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome, introd., sect. 2*.—See, also, ITALY: ANCIENT.

UNALACHTIGOS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: DELAWARES, and ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

UNAMIS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: DELAWARES, and ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

UNCIA, The. See AS; also, FOOT, THE ROMAN.

“UNCLE TOM'S CABIN,” The effect of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1852.

UNCTION. See CORONATION.

UNDERGROUND RAILROAD. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1840-1860.

UNELLI, The.—The Unelli were one of the Armorican tribes of ancient Gaul. Their country was the present department of Manche.

UNIFORMITY, Acts of.—Two Acts of Uniformity were passed by the English Parliament in the reign of Edward VI. (1548 and 1552), both of which were repealed under Mary. In 1559, the second year of Elizabeth, a more thorough-going law of the same nature was enacted, by the provisions of which, “(1) the revised Book of Common Prayer as established by Edward VI. in 1552, was, with a few alterations and additions, revised and confirmed. (2) Any parson, vicar, or other minister, whether benefited or not, wilfully using any but the established liturgy, was to suffer, for the first offence, six months' imprisonment, and, if benefited, forfeit the profits of his benefice for a year; for the second offence, a year's imprisonment; for the third, imprisonment for life. (3) All persons absenting themselves, without lawful or reasonable excuse, from the service at their parish church on Sundays and holydays, were to be punished by ecclesiastical censures and a fine of one shilling for the use of the poor.”—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *English Const. Hist., ch. 12*.—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1559.—In 1662, soon after the Restoration, another Act of Uniformity was passed, the immediate effect of which was to eject about 2,000 ministers from the Established Church. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1662-1665.

UNIGENITUS, The Bull. See PORT ROYAL AND THE JANSENISTS: A. D. 1702-1715.

UNION COLLEGE. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1795.

UNION JACK.—The national flag of Great Britain and Ireland, uniting the red cross of St. George and the diagonal crosses of St. Andrew and St. Patrick. See FLAG, THE BRITISH.

UNION LEAGUE, The.—A secret political society formed in the United States soon after the



outbreak of the American Civil War, having for its object a closer and more effective organization of the supporters of the national government. It was very large in numbers for a time, but declined as the need of such an organization disappeared.

**UNION OF BRUSSELS.** See **NETHERLANDS:** A. D. 1577-1581.

**UNION OF CALMAR, The.** See **SCANDINAVIAN STATES:** A. D. 1018-1397; and 1397-1527.

**UNION OF HEILBRONN, The.** See **GERMANY:** A. D. 1632-1634.

**UNION OF UTRECHT, The.** See **NETHERLANDS:** A. D. 1577-1581.

**UNITARIANISM.**—"In its restricted sense Unitarianism means belief in the personal unity of God instead of in a community of divine persons. . . . Among the articles of Unitarian faith so understood, besides the doctrine of one supreme divine person, may be enumerated belief in human nature, in moral freedom, in human reason, in character as of more worth than ritual or creed, in the equal justice not to say mercy of God, in the unreality of a devil, not to say of evil, and in the ultimate salvation, or evolution into something better, of all souls. Without being in any sense the first article of the faith, either in the historical order as having been the starting-point, or in the logical order as underlying the whole system, or in the order of importance as being with us the doctrine of doctrines, it has happened in spite of a thousand protests that belief in God's personal unity has given its name to the entire confession. The movement first called Socinian, then Arminian, and finally Unitarian, began as a protest of the 'natural man' against two particularly hateful doctrines of Calvinism, that of total depravity and that of predestination."—S. C. Beach, *Unitarianism and the Reformation (Unitarianism: its Origin and History)*.—"The establishment of distinct Unitarian churches in England dates back to 1774, when Theophilus Lindsey left the Church of England and went up to London to start the first avowedly Unitarian place of worship in the country. But that was not the beginning of Unitarianism. Centuries before this, Unitarianism began in England as an individual opinion, had first its martyr-age, then a period when it was a great ferment of controversy, and finally the distinct development of it which stands today in our English Unitarian body. The names of some of the Unitarian martyrs on the continent of Europe are comparatively well known,—Servetus, burned by Calvin; Valentine Gentilis the Italian; and other isolated students here and there, who had been stirred up by the Reformation spirit to read the Bible for themselves, and who could not stop where Luther and Calvin stopped. . . . What is called the 'era of toleration' began immediately after the overthrow of the Stuarts in 1688. The sects were now at liberty to go quietly on in their own way. On the one hand there was the great established Episcopal Church,—at a pretty low ebb in religious life, for its most earnest life had gone out of it on that 'black Bartholomew's Day, 1662,' when the two thousand Puritan clergy were ejected [see **ENGLAND:** A. D. 1662-1665]. On the other hand were these Puritans,—'Dissenters' they began now to be called,—divided into three great sects, Baptists, Independents, and English Presbyterians. Now,

these were all free. They could build churches, and they did. From 1693 to 1720 was the great 'chapel'-building time. . . . But now, in this great development of chapel-building by these three denominations, a curious thing took place, which unexpectedly affected their after history. That curious thing was, that while the Baptists and Independents (or Congregationalists) tied down all these new chapels to perpetual orthodox uses by rigid doctrinal trust-deeds, . . . the English Presbyterians left theirs free. It seems strange that they should do so; for the Presbyterians had begun by being the narrowest sect of the Puritans, and the Scotch Presbyterians always remained so. But the English Presbyterians had very little to do with the Scotch ones, and through all the changes and sufferings they had had to go through they had become broadened; and so it came to pass that now, when they were building their churches or chapels up and down the country, they left them free. . . . The English Presbyterians, thus left free, began to grow more liberal. . . . A general reverence for Christ took the place of the old distinct belief in his deity. . . . They opened the communion to all; they no longer insisted on the old professions of 'church-membership,' but counted all who worshipped with them 'the church.' Thus things were going on all through the middle of the last century. Of course it was not the same everywhere; some still held the old views. . . . One man among them, . . . Dr. Joseph Priestley, . . . was one of the leading scientists of his time,—a restless investigator, and at the same time an earnest religious thinker and student, just as eager to make out the truth about religion as to investigate the properties of oxygen or electricity. So he investigated Christianity, studied the creeds of the churches, came to the conclusion that they were a long way from the Christianity of Christ, and gradually came to be a thoroughgoing Unitarian. When he came to this conclusion he did not hide it; he proclaimed it and preached it. . . . The upshot of it was, that at length he aroused a large part of the body to the consciousness that they were really Unitarians. They still did not take the name; they disliked sect-names altogether. . . . And so, though they mostly continued to call themselves English Presbyterians, or simply Presbyterians, all the world began to call them Unitarians; and more and more the Baptists and Independents, or Congregationalists, who had formerly fellowshipped and worked with them, drew apart, and left them, as they are to-day, in the reluctant isolation of a separate Unitarian body. Two other movements of thought of a somewhat similar kind increased and strengthened this development of a separate Unitarian body,—one among the General Baptists, the other in the great Episcopal Church itself."—B. Herford, *Unitarianism in England (Unitarianism: its Origin and History)*.—"It is hard to trace the early history of Unitarianism in New England. The name was seldom used, yet not omitted with any view to concealment; for we have abundant proof that the ministers to whom it belonged preached what they believed clearly and fully. . . . But a marvellous change had taken place in the last century, at the beginning of which the denial of the Trinity would have seemed no better than blasphemy; while at its close nearly all the clergy of Boston

and its vicinity and many others in Massachusetts were known to dissent from the ancestral creed, to have ceased to use Trinitarian doxologies, and to preach what was then known as Arianism, regarding Jesus Christ as the greatest and oldest of created beings, but in no proper sense as God. At the same time, so little stress was laid on the Trinity by its professed believers that, with two or three exceptions, these Arians remained in full church fellowship with those of the orthodox faith. In the territory now within the limits of Boston there were, a century ago, but two professedly Trinitarian ministers, one of them being Dr. Thacher, of the liberal Brattle Square Church, while Dr. Eckley, of the Old South Church, was known to entertain doubts as to the deity of Christ."—A. P. Peabody, *Early New England Unitarians (Unitarianism: its Origin and History)*.

**UNITED BRETHREN** (*Unitas Fratrum*). See **BOHEMIA**: A. D. 1434-1457, and 1621-1648; also **MORAVIAN** or **BOHEMIAN BRETHREN**.

**UNITED EMPIRE LOYALISTS**. See **TORIES** OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

**UNITED IRISHMEN**, *The Society of*. See **IRELAND**: A. D. 1793-1798.

**UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN**, *Formation of the*. See **SCOTLAND**: A. D. 1707.

**UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND**, *Creation of the*. See **IRELAND**: A. D. 1798-1800.

**UNITED NETHERLANDS**, or *United Provinces, or United States of the Netherlands*. See **NETHERLANDS**: A. D. 1577-1581, 1581-1584, 1584-1585, and after.

**UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH**, *The*. See **SCOTLAND**: A. D. 1843.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A. D. 1492-1620.—*Discovery and exploration of the Atlantic coast*. See **AMERICA**.

A. D. 1607-1752.—*First settlement and organization of the thirteen original English colonies*.—The earliest attempts at European settlement (as distinct from exploration) within the present limits of the United States were made by French Huguenots, under the patronage of Admiral Coligny; first at Port Royal, on Beaufort River, Florida, where Jean Ribaut, in 1562, placed a few colonists who soon abandoned the spot, and, two years later, at Fort Caroline, on St. John's River, in the same peninsula. The second colony, commanded by René de Laudonnière, was considerable in numbers but unpromising in character, and not likely to gain a footing in the country, even if it had been left in peace. It was tragically extinguished, however, by the Spaniards in September, 1565. The Spaniards had then established themselves in a fortified settlement at St. Augustine. It was surprised and destroyed in 1567 by an avenging Huguenot, but was promptly restored, and has survived to the present day,—the oldest city in the United States. (See **FLORIDA**.)—The first undertakings at colonization from England were inspired and led by Sir Walter Raleigh. After unsuccessful attempts, in conjunction with his elder half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, to establish settlements in Newfoundland, Raleigh obtained a grant from Queen Elizabeth, in 1584, under which he planted a colony of 108 settlers, commanded by Ralph Lane, on Roanoke Island, within the boundaries of the present State of North Carolina. In honor of the virgin queen of England, the name Virginia was given to the region at large. Lane's colonists had expected to find gold, silver and pearls, and lost interest in the country when none could be discovered. In June, 1586, they persuaded Sir Francis Drake, who had touched at Roanoke with his fleet, to carry them home. Soon afterwards, several ships, sent out by Raleigh with reinforcements and supplies, arrived at the island, to find it deserted. They left fifteen men to hold the ground; but a year passed before another expedition reached the place. The fort was then found in ruins; the fifteen men had disappeared, and nothing of their fate could be learned. The new

colony perished in the same way—its fate an impenetrable secret of the savage land. This was Raleigh's last venture in colonization. His means were exhausted; England was absorbed in watching and preparing for the Spanish Armada; the time had not come to "plant an English nation in America." Sir Walter assigned his rights and interests in Virginia to a company of merchant adventurers, which accomplished nothing permanently. Twenty years passed before another vigorous effort of English colonization was made. In 1606 King James issued a royal charter to a company singularly formed in two branches or divisions, one having its headquarters at London, and known as the London Company, the other established at Plymouth and known as the Plymouth Company. Between them they were given authority to occupy territory in America from the 34th to the 45th degree of latitude; but the two grants overlapped in the middle, with the intention of giving the greater domain to the company which secured it by the earliest actual occupation. The London Company, holding the southward grant, despatched to Virginia a company of 105 emigrants, who established at Jamestown, on the northerly bank of James River (May 13, 1607), the first permanent English settlement in America, and founded there the colony and the subsequent State of Virginia. The colony survived many hardships and trials, owing its existence largely to the energy and courage of the famous Captain John Smith, who was one of its chief men from the beginning. Its prosperity was secured after a few years by the systematic cultivation of tobacco, for which the demand in England grew fast. In 1619, negro slavery was introduced; and by that time the white inhabitants of Virginia had increased to nearly 4,000 in number, divided between eleven settlements. (See **VIRGINIA**.)—Meantime, the Plymouth Company had done nothing effectively in the northward region assigned to it. Bartholomew Gosnold, in 1602, had examined the coast from Maine to Cape Cod, and built a lonely house on the island of Cuttyhunk; Martin Pring, in 1603, had loaded two ships with sassafras in Massachusetts Bay; a colony named in honor of the chief justice of England, Sir John Popham, had shivered through



the winter of 1607-8 near the mouth of Kennebec River and then gone home; Captain John Smith, in 1614, had made a voyage to the country, in the interest of London merchants, and had named it New England; but no lasting English settlement had been made anywhere within the bounds of King James' grant to the Plymouth Company, at the waning of the year 1620, when Virginia was well grown. It was then by chance, rather than by design, that the small ship Mayflower landed a little company of religious exiles on the Massachusetts coast, at Plymouth (December 21, 1620), instead of bearing them farther south. Driven from England into Holland by persecutions, twelve years before, this congregation of Independents, or Separatists, now sought liberty of conscience in the New World. They came with a patent from the London, or South Virginia Company, and expected to plant their settlement within that company's territorial bounds. But circumstances which seemed adverse at the time bent their course to the New England shore, and they accepted it for a home, not doubting that the proprietors of the land, who desired colonists, would permit them to stay. The next year they received a patent from the Council for New England, which had succeeded to the rights of the Plymouth Company. Of the hardships which these Pilgrim Fathers endured in the first years of their Plymouth Plantation, who does not know the story! Of the courage, the constancy and the prudence with which they overcame their difficulties, who has not admired the spectacle! For eight years they remained the only successful colony in New England. Then came the memorable movement of Puritans out of Old England into New England, beginning with the little settlement at Salem, under John Endicott; expanding next year into the "Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay"; founding Dorchester, Roxbury, Charlestown, Watertown, and Boston, in 1630, and rapidly possessing and putting the stamp of the stern, strong Puritan character on the whole section of America which it planted with towns. In the Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay a cleavage soon occurred, on lines between democratic and aristocratic or theocratic opinion, and democratic seceders pushed southwestwards into the Connecticut Valley, where Dutch and English were disputing possession of the country. There they settled the question decisively, in 1635 and 1636, by founding the towns of Hartford, Windsor, Wethersfield and Springfield. Three years later the three towns first named confederated themselves in a little republic, with a frame of government which is the first known written constitution, and so gave birth to the future State of Connecticut. In 1638 New Haven was founded by a company of wealthy nonconformists from England, under the lead of their minister, John Davenport, and was a distinct colony until 1662, when it was annexed to Connecticut by a royal charter. Another State, the smallest of the New England commonwealths, was taking form at this same time, in a little wedge of territory on Narragansett Bay, between Connecticut and Massachusetts. Roger Williams, the great apostle of a tolerant Christianity, driven from Salem by the intolerant Puritanism of the Bay, went forth with a few followers into the wilderness, bought land from the Narragansett Indians, and laid the foundations (1636) of the town of Providence. In that

same year another small company of people, banished from Boston for receiving the teachings of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson, bought the island of Aquidneck or Aquetnet from the Indians and settled at its northern end. This community was soon divided, and part of it removed to the southern end of the island, beginning a settlement which grew to be the town of Newport. The island as a whole received the name of the Isle of Rhodes, or Rhode Island; and in 1644 its two settlements were united with Providence, under a charter procured in England by Roger Williams, forming the colony of Providence Plantations. In 1643 the colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven, entered into a confederation, from which Rhode Island was excluded, calling themselves "The United Colonies of New England." The object of the confederation was common action in defence against the Indians and the Dutch on the Hudson. It was the beginning of the cementing of New England. Before this time, small settlements had been planted here and there in northern New England, within territory covered by grants made to Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason. The province claimed by Gorges was subsequently called Maine, and that of Mason, New Hampshire; but Maine never rose to an independent colonial existence. After years of dispute and litigation, between 1651, and 1677, the jurisdiction of Massachusetts was extended over the province, and it remained the "District of Maine" until 1820, when Massachusetts yielded the separation which made it a sovereign state in the American Union. The New Hampshire settlements were also annexed to Massachusetts, in 1641, after Captain Mason's death; were separated in 1679, to be organized as a royal province; were temporarily reclaimed without royal authority in 1685; but finally parted from Massachusetts in 1692, from which time until the Revolution they remained a distinct colony. (See NEW ENGLAND; also MASSACHUSETTS, CONNECTICUT, RHODE ISLAND, NEW HAMPSHIRE, and MAINE.)—While the English were thus colonizing New England at the north and Virginia at the south, the Dutch, not recognizing their claims to the country between, had taken possession of the important valley of the Hudson River and the region around its mouth, and had named the country "New Netherland." The river had been discovered in 1609 by Henry Hudson, an English sailor, but exploring in the service of the Dutch. Trading with the Indians for furs was begun the next year; the coast and the rivers of the region were actively explored; a New Netherland Company was chartered; a trading-house, called Fort Nassau, was built on the Hudson as far to the north, or nearly so, as Albany; but no real colonization was undertaken until 1623. The New Netherland Company had then been superseded by the Dutch West India Company, with rights and powers extending to Africa as well as the West Indies and the North American coasts. It bought Manhattan Island and large tracts of land from the Indians, but had little success for several years in settling them. In 1629 it introduced a strange experiment, creating a kind of feudal system in the New World, by conveying great estates to individuals, called Patroons, or Patrons, who would undertake to colonize them, and who received with their territorial grant much of the

powers and many of the characteristics of a feudal lord. Several Patroon colonies were established on a baronial scale; but, generally, the system did not produce satisfactory results, and in 1640 the Company tried the better experiment of making the trade of New Netherland free to all comers, offering small independent grants of land to settlers, and limiting the Patroons in their appropriation of territory. The Company government, however, as administered by the directors or governors whom it sent out, was too arbitrary to permit a colonial growth at all comparable with that of New England. Collisions with the English in Connecticut arose, over questions of boundary, but the latter held their ground. Southward, on the Delaware, the Swedes made a settlement where the city of Wilmington now stands, and refused to be warned off by the Dutch, who claimed the region. This Swedish colony prospered and enlarged itself during sixteen years, but was overcome by Director Stuyvesant of New Netherland in 1654. A little later than the appearance of the Swedes on the Delaware, certain colonists from New Haven bought lands from the Indians on both banks of the Delaware and made attempts at settlement, in what is now New Jersey and on the site of the future city of Philadelphia. The Dutch and Swedes combined against them and they failed. In 1664 the whole situation in this middle region was changed by the English conquest of New Netherland. The territory so acquired—or regained, if the original English claim had been good—passed then, by royal grant, to the Duke of York (afterwards King James II.), and became the proprietary province of New York. (See NEW YORK.)—The Duke of York, in turn, the same year, transferred to Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret the part of his domain which lay between the Hudson and the Delaware, and it received the name of New Cæsarea, or New Jersey. Under encouragement from Berkeley and Carteret the New Haven colonization was resumed. Ten years later Berkeley sold his rights to a party of Quakers who were seeking a refuge for their persecuted sect in the New World. A division of the province was made and the Quaker proprietors received West Jersey, while East Jersey remained to Carteret. (See NEW JERSEY.)—Before this time, William Penn had become the principal owner of the West Jersey interest. Not long afterwards (1681), by surrendering a claim which his father held against the British government, Penn procured from King Charles II. a much greater proprietary domain, on the western side of the Delaware, being no less than the vast tract, 40,000 square miles in extent, which received the name of Pennsylvania. To his title from the king he added a deed of purchase from the Indians. Penn's scheme of colonization was very liberally framed, and it was conducted with marked success. Philadelphia, first laid out in 1683, had 2,000 inhabitants in 1685, and Pennsylvania at large had 8,000. Penn himself did not find peace or happiness in his position as a princely proprietor; but he founded a great and prosperous commonwealth on noble lines. (See PENNSYLVANIA.)—In order to possess one bank of the Delaware River and Bay to the sea, William Penn, after securing his grant from the king, bought additionally from the Duke of York the

claims of the latter to that strip of territory which the Swedes had settled on and struggled for with the Dutch, and which took an independent political form in later days as the State of Delaware. The Delaware "territories," as they were called, never accepted their dependent relationship to Pennsylvania, and as early as 1702 it was found necessary to concede them a separate legislature, though they continued under Penn's proprietary government. (See DELAWARE.)—Adjoining Penn's province on the south was the domain of another great proprietor, Lord Baltimore, whose title deed, from the same royal source as that of Penn, but prior in time by half a century, gave rise to conflicts which troubled the whole life of the peaceful Friend. The first Lord Baltimore (George Calvert) received from James I. in 1632 a patent which gave him territory on the northerly side of the Potomac River, stretching to the Delaware Bay and River and to the 40th parallel of north latitude. By its terms it did undoubtedly take in Delaware and part of Pennsylvania; but the intervening occupation by the Swedes and Dutch, the English conquest, and the royal grant to the Duke of York, confused the title. The controversy was not settled until 1761-7, when "Mason and Dixon's line" was run as the accepted boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania. The lords proprietary of Maryland had been in conflict long before Penn's time with their neighbors at the south, in Virginia, and had many difficulties to encounter and many troubles in their undertaking to found a state. The powers they had received with their grant from the king were the largest that royalty could concede to a subject, and gave to their province the character of a palatine principality. But they exercised their substantial sovereignty with an admirable moderation. They were Catholics, and the early settlers in Maryland were largely though not wholly of that faith. But they introduced a policy of tolerance which was strange at the time to every other part of the New World except Rhode Island, and made their province free to all religions. Numerous Puritans entered it, especially from Virginia, where they were unwelcome; and these, it can hardly be denied, made ill returns for the tolerant hospitality they received. During the time of the Civil War, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate in England, the Maryland Puritans were hostile, not only to the proprietary government, but to its tolerant principles, and used the ascendancy which they frequently gained in a spirit that does not compare favorably with that of their adversaries. Subsequently the ascendancy of the Puritans gave way to that of the Anglican Church, without restoring the toleration which Catholicism in power had established—a rare instance in history—and which Protestantism in power had suppressed. (See MARYLAND.)—Beyond the Virginia plantations, in the South, the coasts to which Raleigh had sent his first colonists, and to which the virgin queen had intended to give her name, waited long for settlement. The first durable colony within that territory which took its name in time from a less worthy sovereign was planted in 1653, at Albemarle, on the Chowan River, by a small company of dissenters from Virginia. In 1665 a considerable party of emigrants from the Barbadoes, headed by a wealthy planter of that island,



Sir John Yeamans, established themselves on Cape Fear River, near its mouth, in the district which was afterwards called Clarendon. Two years before this time, in 1663, King Charles II. had discharged some part of his heavy obligations to his loyal supporters by granting that whole section of the American continent which lies between the 31st and 36th parallels of latitude to a company of courtiers, including Clarendon, Monk, Shaftesbury, and others, and the province was named Carolina. It was divided into two great counties, Albemarle and Clarendon, and these corresponded somewhat nearly to the North Carolina and South Carolina of the present day. In 1670 the lords proprietors sent out a colony under William Sayle, which settled first at Port Royal; but Sayle died soon after landing, and the colonists were induced to migrate northwards to the Ashley River, where Sir John Yeamans met them with a considerable part of his Clarendon colony, and became the head of the united settlements. There they founded "Old Charleston," and, after a few years, shifting the site to the confluence of the Ashley and the Cooper, they began the building of the present city of Charleston. This became the nucleus of the subsequently distinct colony of South Carolina, as Albemarle did of that of North Carolina. The division was made in 1729, when the rights of the Proprietors were bought by the Crown, and the Carolinas became crown colonies. Until that time, the southern colony had made far greater progress than its northern twin. It had received a considerable immigration of Huguenots from France and of Scotch-Irish from the north of Ireland, as well as of English, and Charleston was becoming an important port, especially frequented by buccaners. But after the displacement of the proprietary government, North Carolina began quickly to receive more than its share of the Scotch-Irish immigration and no small number of Highland Scotch. The colony was developed almost wholly in the agricultural direction, with few and small towns. Slavery was introduced at an early day, and rooted itself in the industrial system, as it did in that of all the southern settlements. (See NORTH CAROLINA and SOUTH CAROLINA.)—The last of the "Thirteen Colonies" to come into existence was the colony of Georgia, founded so late as 1733 by General James Oglethorpe. It occupied territory too close in neighborhood to the Spaniards of Florida to be attractive to settlers in the 17th century. Its colonization was undertaken by General Oglethorpe primarily as a philanthropic enterprise for the benefit of unfortunate English debtors, who were released from prison and permitted to emigrate under his care; but secondarily to strengthen the defence of the English colonies against the Spaniards. He obtained his grant from George II. "in trust for the poor," and the colony was governed by trustees until 1752, when it was surrendered to the crown. The first emigrants left England in the fall of 1732, and early in the next year Savannah was laid out by Oglethorpe in person. His scheme of colonization proved highly attractive, not only in England but on the continent, and numbers of Protestant Germans came over to become part of the original population of Georgia. At the outset, slavery was strictly prohibited; but the settlers thought themselves

grievously oppressed by the denial of slaves, and their discontent became so great that in 1749 the trustees rescinded the prohibition. (See GEORGIA.)

**A. D. 1620-1776.—Constitutional relations of the colonies to the English Crown and Parliament.—**The working of the leaven of independence in New England Puritanism.—The history of the development of the question between England and her colonies, as to their constitutional relations to one another, "falls naturally into two periods: first, from the beginning of English colonization in America to the Revolution of 1688; second, from 1688 to the Declaration of Independence. . . . Passing now to the history of the first period, it is to be observed that the leading institution in the English government at that time was the King in Council. . . . But in the 17th century, owing to a combination of very strong political and religious forces, the struggle between the King in Parliament and the King in Council was . . . opened and pushed with vigor. It continued with alternations of success, but on the whole with results favorable to Parliament, till 1688. Then the King in Parliament finally gained the ascendancy, and this result was so secured by statute as never afterwards to be seriously called in question. The supremacy of Parliament was established by a series of royal concessions. The parliamentary party viewed these as compromises between Parliament and king. This gave color to the theory of social contract, which was now given new impulse and form by the parliamentary writers of the 16th and 17th centuries. . . . It naturally follows from what has been said that the administration of colonial affairs previous to 1688 was in the hands of the King in Council. Such was the fact. The enterprises of discovery were fitted out under the patronage of the crown; the territories discovered or visited were taken possession of in its name; and grants of land, of rights of government and trade, were made to actual settlers by the kings. Every colonial charter is a proof of this. As the king was by the theory of English law feudal proprietor of England, so he became proprietor of colonial territory, though that territory was granted out in socage, one of the freest forms of English tenure. Certain superficial distinctions were introduced in the form of colonial governments, as royal, proprietary, and charter; but they all emanated from the crown. Its supremacy extended around and beneath them all. The fact that they were established by grant is proof of this, even though there had been no subsequent acts to enforce the control. They were colonies of the English crown; their inhabitants were its subjects. The true doctrine of sovereignty and allegiance necessitates this conclusion. . . . Parliament passed few statutes affecting the colonies. Yet, not to mention others, there were five such of very great importance which fall within this period: the Act of Supremacy (1 Eliz. cap. 1), and the four Navigation acts. In all these the colonies were expressly mentioned. But the relative position of crown and Parliament is illustrated by the fact that when in 1624 the Council was proceeding to annul the third Virginia charter, the House tried to interfere but was warned off—because the business concerned only the king and his advisers. Moreover there was no lack of precedents

for the extension not only of common law but of royal ordinances and statute law outside of the original realm of England. . . . Such in outline was the status of English colonial law previous to 1688. It was in the process of formation and adaptation to the new empire. There were ample precedents for the exercise of the rights of British sovereignty in America, but those rights had not yet been called into the fullest operation. Their legitimacy however was in general fully acknowledged by the colonists. They had been allowed great liberty in establishing their governments, erecting courts, levying taxes, organizing and calling out their militia for defence against the Indians. Colonial society had been allowed to develop freely in all lines and the product was far different from anything which existed in the mother country. It was democratic rather than aristocratic; it was also extremely particularistic, and too remote from England to feel much interest in the general concerns of the empire. In this divergence of social organization and interests, as between the colonies and the mother country, lay the germ which might develop into resistance on the part of the plantations, if at any time England should attempt to enforce her rightful supremacy over them. But as yet there was too little of the spirit of union among the colonists to make possible any combined action. Also those dynasties whose government had been most arbitrary in England, the Tudors and Stuarts, had, till the reign of James II, treated the colonies with great leniency. But the statements just made do not cover the whole ground. They describe the attitude of the colonies in general toward the mother country, but they do not describe the special conditions which prevailed in New England. If we wish to know how the theory of colonial independence originated, we must look in that direction. The American revolution cannot be explained without reference to the political character and tendencies of Puritanism. . . . Puritanism then was a political as well as a religious movement. On the one hand its doctrines contained a strong democratic leaven; on the other they contained principles which might lead to the separation of church and state. How the former tendency worked itself out in New England is familiar; how the latter failed of accomplishment there is equally well known. The Puritans of Massachusetts were not opposed to the union of church and state or to the employment of the secular power to enforce religious conformity. . . . What they were opposed to was every other form of state church except their own. . . . In order to maintain her peculiar system, Massachusetts had to be on her guard against all interference from outside. . . . The Massachusetts charter was brought over to this country. A few years later the Plymouth company was dissolved, and representation of the colony in England, except by such agents as she might send, ceased. The terms of the charter were very liberal; but like all the others it was a royal grant, and expressly stated that the inhabitants of the colony were to be subjects of England and were to enjoy all the liberties and immunities of such, as if they were in the realm of England. The oaths of supremacy and allegiance were to be administered to all who should go to the colony. The company was made a 'body corporate and politic' and was

given ample powers of government; but its laws, statutes, and ordinances were not to be contrary to the laws of England. The admission of freemen was left in the hands of the corporation. How did the Puritan oligarchy make use of this charter for serving the purposes of their government? In a word, they interpreted the expression 'body corporate and politic' to mean an independent state, and virtually abandoned all legal connection with England except an empty acknowledgment of allegiance. The oath of allegiance was not administered, but instead an oath of fidelity to the government of Massachusetts. An ecclesiastical system wholly different from that of England was established. Only those were admitted to political rights, made freemen, who were members of a Congregational church. . . . The colony also exercised full legislative and judicial powers, and denied the right of appeal both practically and theoretically. The proof of this is most direct and convincing. To illustrate: in 1646 the General Court refused to permit the appeal of Dr. Child and others who, as Presbyterians, desired to lay before Parliament the wrongs they suffered in Massachusetts. Not only was the right denied, but the petitioners were prevented by force from carrying their case to England. The same course was pursued in reference to appeals in ordinary judicial cases. During the discussion of the affair just mentioned it was boldly affirmed in the General Court that subjects were bound by English laws only so long as they lived in England; that neither statutes nor royal ordinances were in force beyond the seas. A little later than this both the magistrates and the elders were called upon to give their views on the legal relations between the colony and England. Both agreed that by their charter they 'had absolute power of government'; that their government was perfect and sufficient in all its parts, not needing the help of any superior to make it complete. They acknowledged that they had received the charter from England, and 'depended upon that state for protection and immunities as freeborn Englishmen'; but the duties which were correlative to those immunities, and which are necessary to a true conception of allegiance, were not mentioned. This position was consistently maintained by the Puritans of Massachusetts as long as they remained in power. In their correspondence with the home government and its officials between 1664 and 1684 the right of appeal was always denied. Its exercise was never allowed. If we add to this the further statements that Massachusetts coined money; strove to enlarge the bounds of her patent, not only without consulting the king, but in defiance of his absolute prohibition; taxed English imports; and, without the consent of the home government, entered the New England confederation, some notion can be formed of the degree of independence claimed and exercised by that colony. The exercise of this independence however did not make it legal. It only illustrates the fact that the roots of the American revolution extend back into the times of which we are speaking. . . . It was to be expected that England would interfere to bring Massachusetts within the bounds of constitutional dependence. Complaints against the colony, on the part of Gorges and of those who had been banished by the Puritans, began very early. These led to



'quo warranto' proceedings for the recall of the charter in 1635. But civil strife at home compelled the government of Charles I to abandon the project. Then came the period of the Commonwealth, when the views of the English government were so fully in harmony with those of the New England leaders that the practical independence of the colony was ignored. . . . From the restoration dates the beginning of a more comprehensive colonial policy." With the fall of the Massachusetts charter, in 1684, "closes the first stage in the development of the idea of colonial independence. The struggle between the Puritans of Massachusetts and the crown is the most significant fact in American history previous to 1760. The Puritans were defeated; the authority of England was reasserted. . . . But for our purpose the important result is that the Puritans left behind them an armory full of precedents and arguments in favor of colonial independence. They had constructed the American theory on that subject. That was the chief permanent result of their experiment. They had from first to last adhered to the theory which expediency taught them to adopt. They taught the colonists how to resist the exercise of the ecclesiastical and judicial supremacy of the crown. If now at any time in the future the Americans should consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the English government, the Puritan spirit and theory would be likely to appear. Such was the aspect of affairs at the close of the first period of colonial history. After the revolution of 1688, Parliament assumes more and more the control of American concerns. Statutes on those subjects multiply. The administration of the colonies becomes a branch of the ministerial government of Great Britain. The development of an imperial as distinguished from an insular policy is begun. The interference of England in colonial affairs became more frequent and the control asserted more extensive than heretofore. . . . The attitude of the colonists during this period was one of passive rather than active resistance. Parliamentary restrictions were so far evaded as not to be burdensome. . . . The records show that the burden of opinion in the colonies was jealousy of all government, so far as it operated as a restraint. The interference of government, whether colonial or imperial, was welcomed by the colonists, when it could be used for the advancement of their private or local interests; when larger objects were aimed at, it was if possible ignored or resisted. . . . The political condition of the colonies was for the first time clearly revealed during the French and Indian war. The history of Germany can furnish no more vivid spectacle of the evils of particularism than does that struggle. . . . The condition of anarchy and helplessness revealed by the war was such as to convince all the servants of the crown in America that active parliamentary interference was necessary, if the colonies were to be defended and retained as an integral part of the British empire. The fact that the British government, within a reasonable time after the close of the war, proceeded to put this suggestion into execution, implies nothing arbitrary or unreasonable. It had the undoubted constitutional right to do so; and so far as could be seen at the time, expediency prompted in the same direction. But during the century since the Puritan oligarchy of Massachusetts yielded

to the supremacy of the crown, the theory of social contract had been fully developed. It had formulated the needs of the opposition in all the European countries to the system of absolutism. It was the theory of government very generally held by the Puritans in both England and America. . . . This theory, as soon as it was understood, would naturally find general acceptance in the colonies. . . . The American revolution, as truly as the French, was the outgrowth of the doctrine of natural rights and social contract. By this I mean simply that the doctrine in question formed the theoretical basis of both movements. So far as the American revolution is concerned the proof of this statement is contained in the writings of the patriot leaders at the time, the various state papers that were issued, and the doctrine that was held respecting the right of imperial taxation. No man contributed so much to bringing about the revolution as Samuel Adams; and his mind was saturated with the theory of social contract. He made it the basis of all his reasonings. . . . The reason why New England became the leader of the movement clearly appears. The process of development through which the colonies passed was a natural, and therefore a necessary one. It was slow and obscure, and therefore could not be clearly recognized at the time. But that it was nevertheless revolutionary becomes evident when we compare the views and aims of the colonists with the constitution of the British empire. When the two systems came into collision the colonists adopted a theory which was 'in the air' at the time, but one under which no government can be successfully carried on. When they came to erect a government of their own, they had to abandon it. It is not claimed that the doctrine of natural rights ever found such general acceptance in America as in France. The character of the people and the absence of a despotic government prevented that. But that the American revolution cannot be explained without assigning it a prominent place is evident. It is not intended to convey the impression that the colonists had no grievances. There were causes for complaint, but they were doubtless greatly exaggerated. A mind filled with the democratic theories of the times, and with the loose notions concerning sovereignty and allegiance which then prevailed, could easily imagine that Parliament, unless resisted, would establish a despotic government in America."—Professor H. L. Osgood, *England and the Colonies* (*Pol. Sci. Quarterly*, Sept., 1887).

A. D. 1651-1672.—The Navigation Acts and the colonies.—Spirit and objects of the English restrictive commercial system.—To the Act of Navigation, passed in 1651 (see NAVIGATION LAWS) is due a change in the relations of the colonies to the mother-country. "Henceforth they were regarded mainly as feeders to its carrying-trade, as consumers of its manufactures, as factories for the distribution of its capital, and, in a word, as mere commercial appendages of what was now the great commercial power. Dominion became subordinate to trade. . . . Beginning . . . with the re-enactment of the Navigation Act after the Restoration, we find that the new system which is to regulate colonial trade and define the relations of the colonies to the parent, is contained in three Acts of Parliament. First, in the re-enactment itself of the Act of Naviga-

tion in 1660; secondly, in an act, passed in 1663, entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of trade'; and, thirdly, in an act, passed in 1672, and entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing the plantation trade.' . . . The three acts which created the system, were all passed in the reign of Charles II.; the others followed rapidly, and in great numbers, for a century, until the failure of the attempt to transform this system of trade into one of trade and revenue, by means of what is known as the Stamp Act. St. John's Navigation Act was re-enacted in 1660, under Charles II., as the first-fruits of the Restoration. This act forbade importation into or exportation out of the colonies, save what came and went in English ships, and its object was, to shut the doors of the colonies against foreign trade. In 1663 another step was taken, and an act was passed with the object, openly avowed in its fifth section, of keeping the colonies in 'a firmer dependence' upon England, and of making that kingdom the staple, or place of distribution, not only of colonial produce, 'but also of the commodities of other countries and places, for the supplying of them.' To effect this, the Act of 1663 went beyond that of 1660, and exacted, that no European products or manufactures should be imported into any colony, except what had been actually laden and shipped in an English port, and carried 'directly thence' to the importing colony. This act forced the colonists to get such supplies as they could not themselves furnish in England only, and thus not only could none but mariners of whom three fourths were English transport merchandise to and from the colonies, but the colonists themselves were not suffered to go anywhere but to England for that which they could not get at home. . . . This position of factor between the colonies and foreign markets was a lucrative one. But the spirit of trade is such, that it regards much as only a stepping-stone to more, and the next enactment concerning colonial trade, or that of 1672, betrays this characteristic. The existing factorage was maintained only between the colonial and foreign trade; it had no place in intercolonial traffic. . . . As this intercolonial trade developed, it attracted the observation of the English merchants, who at last demanded the control of it. In compliance with this demand, an act was passed in 1672, subjecting any enumerated commodity to a duty specified in the statute—and thus was destroyed the freedom, and, to a great extent, the incentive of intercolonial traffic. This act was well entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing of the plantation trade.' History is silent respecting the fisheries, but it has been very outspoken concerning its effect on the plantations. The effect was this: if Rhode Island wished to be supplied by Massachusetts with one of the enumerated commodities, and Massachusetts desired to furnish Rhode Island with that commodity, the delivery of the goods could not be made by the producer to the consumer, but the article would have to be sent to England first, and landed there, and then be sent back from England to Rhode Island before the consumer could touch it. A line drawn from Boston, in Massachusetts, to Bristol, in England, and thence back to Newport, in Rhode Island,

will show the course which such article must take, if sold by Massachusetts to Rhode Island, before the demands of English commerce were satisfied; it will in all probability likewise show the least angle with the longest sides ever subtended on the chart of trade. Should, however, the parties to the transaction desire to avoid the risk and delay incident to this phenomenal voyage, they could do so by paying the certain rates and duties prescribed by this statute."—E. G. Scott, *The Development of Const. Liberty in the English Colonies of Am.*, ch. 8 (*with corrections by the author*).—"Unfortunately there does not exist any history of the commerce of the American colonies, from the Commonwealth to 1774, as affected by navigation laws, acts of trade, and revenue measures. No one who has read the 29 acts which comprise this legislation will recommend their perusal to another; for, apart from their volume, the construction of these acts is difficult,—difficult even to trained lawyers like John Adams, whose business it was to advise clients in respect to them. Nor have special students, like Bancroft, stated their effect with exact precision."—M. Chamberlain, *The Revolution Impending: Critical Essay (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am.*, v. 6), p. 64.

ALSO IN: G. L. Beer, *The Commercial Policy of England toward the Am. Colonies (Columbia College Studies*, v. 3, no. 2).—W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social Hist. of N. Eng.*, ch. 7 (v. 1).—J. E. T. Rogers, *Economic Interpretation of History*, ch. 15.

A. D. 1690.—The First American Congress.—King William's War.—"After the accession [in England, A. D. 1689] of William and Mary, hostilities were declared between France and England, which extended to America; and thus began the first inter-colonial war [commonly known in American history as King William's War]. The French soon planned an invasion of Boston and New York. . . . On the 8th of February, 1690, a war-party, who had come stealthily from Canada, entered the open gates of the town of Schenectady, when it was snowing, and broke the stillness of midnight with the terrible yell and whoop of the savages. Men, women, and children, for two hours, were mercilessly butchered. Their dwellings were burned. The whole town was sacked. . . . The intelligence flew through the colonies. . . . Schenectady was the Fort Sumter of that day. The event had a political effect. It shamed the factions in New York at least into a truce. It roused a spirit of patriotism. The governor of Massachusetts urged, in letters to other colonies, the necessity for immediate action to provide for the common defence. . . . The General Court [of Massachusetts], in view of organizing a joint effort of the colonies, proposed to hold a congress. The call for a meeting is dated the 19th of March, 1690. It relates, that their majesties' subjects had been invaded by the French and Indians; that many of the colonists had been barbarously murdered, and were in danger of greater mischiefs; and it proposed, as a measure of prevention, that the neighboring colonies, and Virginia, Maryland, and the parts adjacent, should be invited to meet at New York, and conclude on suitable methods for assisting each other for the safety of the whole land. The governor of New York was desired to transmit this invitation to the southern colonies. Such was the first call for a general



congress in America. It is free from narrowness. It is liberal in its spirit, simple in its terms, and comprehensive in its object. . . . The call elicited from several colonies interesting replies. Governor Hinckley, of Plymouth, entered with zeal into the measure, and, though the General Court was not in session, appointed a commissioner. The Quaker-governor of Rhode Island, Henry Bull, replied in an excellent spirit. . . . Though the time was too short to convene the assembly for the appointment of commissioners, he promised the aid of that colony to the utmost of its ability to resist the French and Indians. The head of the convention of Maryland wrote, that it was the design of the assembly to send arms and men to aid in the general defence. . . . President Bacon, of Virginia, replied, that the proposition would require the action of the assembly, and that nothing would be done until the arrival of the daily expected governor. The replies to the invitation were cordial. The commissioners of four colonies [Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New York] met at New York. . . . The deliberations led to a unanimous result. On the 1st of May, an agreement was signed by the delegates, in behalf of the five colonies [including Maryland under its promise], to raise a force of 855 men for the strengthening of Albany, and, 'by the help of Almighty God, subduing the French and Indian enemies.' It was agreed, that the lieutenant-governor of New York should name the commander of this force; that it should not be employed on any other service without the consent of the five colonies; and that the officers should be required to preserve among their men good order, punish vice, keep the Sabbath, and maintain the worship of God. No proposition appears to have been entertained for a permanent organization. . . . Efforts were made to obtain additional aid from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. . . . I need only state, as the result of this congress, that it was resolved to attempt the reduction of Canada by two lines of attack, — one to conquer Acadia, and then to move on Quebec; and the other, by the route of Lake Champlain, to assault Montreal. The New England forces under Sir William Phips, assigned to the first route, captured Acadia and Port Royal, and sailed for Quebec, in the expectation of being aided by the other forces who marched by the Champlain route. But they, under Fitz-John Winthrop, with the title of major, were not successful. *Leisler* [see NEW YORK: A. D. 1689-1691], with characteristic rashness, accused the commander of treachery; while the officers charged the commissary, Jacob Milborne, of New York, with inefficiency in procuring supplies. The failure of Winthrop occasioned the retreat of Phips."—R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic of the U. S.*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: *Doc. Hist. of N. Y.*, v. 2 (*Leisler's administration*).—*Doc's relating to Col. Hist. of N. Y.*, v. 3.—See, also, CANADA: A. D. 1689-1690.

A. D. 1696-1697.—The Board of Trade for the Supervision of the Colonies.—Plans of Colonial Union by Penn and others.—"The king attempted a more efficient method of administering the colonies; and, in May 1696, a Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, consisting of the chancellor, the president of the privy council, the keeper of the privy seal,

the two secretaries of state, and eight special commissioners, was called into being. To William Blathwayte, who had drafted the new charter of Massachusetts, John Locke, and the rest of the commission, instructions were given by the crown 'to inquire into the means of making the colonies most useful and beneficial to England; into the staples and manufactures which may be encouraged there, and the means of diverting them from trades which may prove prejudicial to England; to examine into and weigh the acts of the assemblies; to set down the usefulness or mischief of them to the crown, the kingdom, or the plantations themselves; to require an account of all the moneys given for public uses by the assemblies of the plantations, and how the same are employed.' The administration of the several provinces had their unity in the person of the king, whose duties with regard to them were transacted through one of the secretaries of state; but the Board of Trade was the organ of inquiries and the centre of colonial information. Every law of a provincial legislature, except in some of the charter governments, if it escaped the veto of the royal governor, might be arrested by the unfavorable opinion of the law officer of the crown, or by the adverse report of the Board of Trade. Its rejection could come only from the king in council. . . . The Board of Trade was hardly constituted before it was summoned to plan unity in the military efforts of the provinces; and Locke with his associates despaired, on beholding them 'crumbled into little governments, disunited in interests, in an ill posture and much worse disposition to afford assistance to each other for the future.' The Board, in 1697, 'after considering with their utmost care,' could only recommend the appointment of 'a captain-general of all the forces and all the militia of all the provinces on the continent of North America, with power to levy and command them for their defence, under such limitations and instructions as to his majesty should seem best.' . . . With excellent sagacity — for true humanity perfects the judgment — William Penn matured a plan of a permanent union, by a national representation of the American States. On the 8th day of February 1697, he delivered his project for an annual 'congress,' as he termed it, of two delegates from each province. . . . But the ministry adopted neither the military dictatorship of Locke and his associates, nor the peaceful congress of William Penn."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (*Author's last revision*), pt. 3, ch. 4 (v. 2).—The following is the Plan of Union drafted by Penn: "A Briefe and Plaine Scheme how the English Colonists in the North parts of America, viz.: Boston, Connecticut, Road Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Carolina may be made more usefull to the Crowne, and one another's peace and safty with an universall concurrence. 1st. That the severall Colonies before mentioned do meet once a year, and oftener if need be, during the war, and at least once in two years in times of peace by their stated and appointed Deputies, to debate and resolve of such measures as are most adviseable for their better understanding, and the public tranquillity and safety. 2d. That in order to it two persons well qualified for sence, sobriety and substance be appointed by each Province, as their Representatives or Deputies, which in the

whole make the Congress to consist of twenty persons. 3d. That the King's Commissioner for that purpose specially appointed shall have the chaire and preside in the said Congress. 4th. That they shall meet as near as conveniently may be to the most centrall Colony for use of the Deputies. 5th. Since that may in all probability, be New York both because it is near the Center of the Colonies and for that it is a Frontier and in the King's nomination, the Govr. of that Colony may therefore also be the King's High Commissioner during the Session after the manner of Scotland. 6th. That their business shall be to hear and adjust all matters of Complaint or difference between Province and Province. As, 1st, where persons quit their own Province and goe to another, that they may avoid their just debts, tho they be able to pay them, 2nd, where offenders fly Justice, or Justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the Provinces that entertain them, 3dly, to prevent or cure injuries in point of Commerce, 4th, to consider of ways and means to support the union and safety of these Provinces against the public enemies. In which Congress the Quotas of men and charges will be much easier, and more equally sett, then it is possible for any establishment made here to do; for the Provinces, knowing their own condition and one another's, can debate that matter with more freedom and satisfaction and better adjust and ballance their affairs in all respects for their common safty. 7ly. That in times of war the King's High Commissioner shall be generally or chief Commander of the severall Quotas upon service against a common enemy as he shall be advised, for the good and benefit of the whole."—H. W. Preston, *Documents illustrative of Am. Hist.*, p. 146.

**A. D. 1696-1749.—Growing despotism of the English mercantile policy.—Systematic suppression of colonial manufactures.**—"By the erection, in 1696, of a new Standing Council, or Board of Trade, under the denomination of 'The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,' the interests of British commerce and the affairs of Colonial trade and government were confided to that body, which thenceforward became the repository of all official intelligence upon those subjects, and the medium of communication with the several governors and assemblies of the Colonies. Yearly reports of the state of the Provinces were required from the governors, in answer to queries addressed to them by the Board. An Act of Parliament of the same year still further restricted commercial intercourse, by limiting trade between England and her Colonies to English, Irish and Colonial built vessels, and by prohibiting Colonial produce from going to the ports of Ireland or Scotland. . . . The feeble attempts of the Colonists to make a portion of their own clothing from their abundant materials had not been unnoticed in England. Three years after—the Board of Trade having received complaints from English merchants and manufacturers, that the wool and woolen manufactures of Ireland and the North American plantations began to be exported to foreign markets formerly supplied by England—an Act passed the British Parliament, . . . dictated by that sleepless vigilance which guarded the staple manufacture of England. It prohibited the exportation of any wool or woolen manufacture from Ireland, except to certain ports in

England; but, by way of compensation, virtually surrendered to Ireland the linen manufacture, then little regarded in comparison with the woolen interests. In reference to the Colonies, it was enacted that 'After the first day of December, 1699, no wool, woollens, yarn, cloth, or woolen manufactures of the English plantations in America shall be shipped in any of the said English plantations, or otherwise loaden, in order to be transported thence to any place whatsoever, under the penalty of forfeiting ship and cargo, and £500 for each offence.' . . . A letter from New England to the Board of Trade [in 1715] . . . reiterates the necessity of employing the New England people in producing naval stores, to turn them from manufactures. . . . The discouragement of American manufactures, from this time, became the settled and avowed policy of the government, and, three years later, the Bill prohibiting the erection of forges and iron mills was introduced, and declared that the erecting of Manufactories in the Colonies 'tends to lessen their dependence upon Great Britain.' . . . The company of Feltmakers, in London, petitioned Parliament, in Feb., 1731, to prohibit the exportation of hats from the American Colonies, representing that foreign markets were almost altogether supplied from thence, and not a few sent to Great Britain. The petition was referred to a special committee, who reported that, in New York and New England, beaver hats were manufactured to the number, it was estimated, of 10,000 yearly. . . . The exports were to the Southern plantations, the West Indies, and Ireland. In consequence of this evidence, and that furnished by the Board of Trade in the same session, an act was passed (5 George II. c. 22) that 'no hats or felts, dyed or undyed, finished or unfinished, shall be put on board any vessel in any place within any of the British plantations; nor be laden upon any horse or other carriage to the intent to be exported from thence to any other plantation, or to any other place whatever, upon forfeiture thereof, and the offender shall likewise pay £500 for every such offence.' . . . This severe and stringent law continued in force in the Colonies until the Revolution. It aimed at the prostration of one of the oldest and, on account of the abundance and cheapness of beavers and other furs, one of the most profitable branches of industry."—J. L. Bishop, *Hist. of Am. Manufactures*, v. 1, ch. 14.—In 1749 an act of Parliament was passed "to encourage the importation of pig and bar iron from his majesty's colonies in America, and to prevent the erection of any mill or other engine for slitting or rolling of iron, or any plateing forge to work with a tilt hammer, or any furnace for making steel in any of the said colonies." "Pig iron was allowed to be imported free to all parts of the kingdom, so as to secure cheap bar iron. But bar iron could not be imported at any port but London, and carried no further than ten miles from that city. This clause was intended to aid the owners of woods. In order to protect the nail trade, all slitting-mills in the colonies were ordered to be destroyed."—J. B. Pearse, *Concise Hist. of the Iron Manufacture of the Am. Colonies*, p. 121.

ALSO IN: W. B. Weeden, *Economic and Social Hist. of New Eng.*, v. 2.—G. L. Beer, *Commercial Policy of Eng. toward the Colonies (Col. Col. Studies*, v. 3).—See, also, below: A. D. 1763 and 1764.



**A. D. 1704-1729.—The first colonial newspapers.** See PRINTING AND PRESS: A. D. 1704-1729.

**A. D. 1748-1754.—First collisions with the French in the Ohio Valley.**—"As the year 1750 approached, there came upon the colonies two changes, destined to lead to a new political life. In the first place, the colonies at last began to overrun the mountain barrier which had hemmed them in on the west, and thus to invite another and more desperate struggle with the French. The first settlement made west of the mountains was on a branch of the Kanawha (1748); in the same season several adventurous Virginians hunted and made land-claims in Kentucky and Tennessee. Before the close of the following year (1749) there had been formed the Ohio Company, composed of wealthy Virginians, among whom were two brothers of Washington. King George granted them 500,000 acres, on which they were to plant 100 families and build and maintain a fort. The first attempt to explore the region of the Ohio brought the English and the French traders into conflict; and troops were not long in following, on both sides [see OHIO VALLEY: A. D. 1748-1754]. At the same time the home government was awaking to the fact that the colonies were not under strict control. In 1750 the Administration began to consider means of stopping unlawful trade."—R. G. Thwaites, *The Colonies, 1492-1750 (Epochs of Am. Hist.)*, ch. 14, sect. 130.

**A. D. 1749-1755.—Unsettled boundary disputes of England and France.—Preludes of the last French War.** See NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755; CANADA: A. D. 1750-1753; 1755; and OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1754.

**A. D. 1750-1753.—The eve of the great French war.—Attitude of the colonies.**—"The quarrel in which the French and English now engaged was exclusively a colonial one. The possession and defence of the Americans had already cost, over and over again, a larger sum than the whole produce of their trade would have produced. The English had the mortification of observing that the colonists claimed all the security of Englishmen against attack, and repudiated their obligation to take a share of the burdens which their defence occasioned. Were they attacked by the French,—they were Englishmen, and had a right to the ægis which that name throws over all subjects of the crown; were they called upon for a subscription in aid of the war,—they were men who would not submit to be taxed without their own consent; were they taken at their word, and requested through their own assemblies to tax themselves,—they sometimes refused, and sometimes doled out a minute supply, taking care to mix up with their money bill some infringement on the royal prerogative, which rendered it impossible, except under severe exigency of the public service, for the governor to accept the terms offered. . . . The action of the colonies at this crisis was in accordance with their invariable policy. As soon as they perceived that the French meditated a war of aggression in America, a chorus of complaint and apprehension came at once from the colonists. Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, and Clinton, Governor of New York, had convened an assembly at Albany during the last year of the last war, to concert measures for uniting all the colonies for common defence;

Massachusetts and the other New England States were, of course, anxious that the union should be carried out. They were the barrier between the Canadas and the southern colonies, and if any attack was made they must bear the brunt of it. . . . The Congress of Albany, and especially the Legislature of Massachusetts, advocated the erection of a line of detached forts which might be so arranged as to overawe the French frontier, and defend the New England colonies from attack. . . . It was all in vain; every colony, with the exception of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and South Carolina, refused to contribute one farthing towards the expense. . . . Even in 1753, when the French were actually on the Ohio, and Washington had brought back certain intelligence of their intentions and views, the Virginians refused supplies to Dinwiddie because they declared themselves 'easy on account of the French.' When at last the French had actually established themselves in fortified posts at Niagara, at Le Bœuf, and at Venango, when Contrecoeur had driven a colonial officer out of a post which he held on the forks of the Monongahela, when Fort du Quesne had arisen on the ruins of an English stockade, they could no longer close their eyes to the danger which was actually within the boundaries of their State. They granted £10,000 of their currency; but Dinwiddie wrote home that the bill was so clogged with encroachments on the prerogative, that he would not have given his assent had not the public service rendered the supply imperatively necessary."—Viscount Bury, *Exodus of the Western Nations*, v. 2, ch. 7.—"The attitude of these various colonies towards each other is hardly conceivable to an American of the present time. They had no political tie except a common allegiance to the British Crown. Communication between them was difficult and slow, by rough roads traced often through primeval forests. Between some of them there was less of sympathy than of jealousy kindled by conflicting interests or perpetual disputes concerning boundaries. The patriotism of the colonist was bounded by the lines of his government, except in the compact and kindred colonies of New England, which were socially united, though politically distinct. The country of the New Yorker was New York, and the country of the Virginian was Virginia. The New England colonies had once confederated; but, kindred as they were, they had long ago dropped apart. . . . Nor was it this segregation only that unfitted them for war. They were all subject to popular legislatures, through whom alone money and men could be raised; and these elective bodies were sometimes factious and selfish, and not always either far-sighted or reasonable. Moreover, they were in a state of ceaseless friction with their governors, who represented the king, or, what was worse, the feudal proprietary. These disputes, though varying in intensity, were found everywhere except in the two small colonies which chose their own governors; and they were premonitions of the movement towards independence which ended in the war of Revolution. The occasion of difference mattered little. Active or latent, the quarrel was always present. . . . Divided in government; divided in origin, feelings, and principles; jealous of each other, jealous of the Crown; the people at war with the executive, and, by the fermentation of

internal politics, blinded to an outward danger that seemed remote and vague,—such were the conditions under which the British colonies drifted into a war that was to decide the fate of the continent.”—F. Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, ch. 1 (v. 1).

#### A. D. 1754.—The Congress at Albany and its Plans of Union.—Franklin's account.—

“In 1754, war with France being again apprehended, a congress of commissioners from the different colonies was, by an order of the Lords of Trade, to be assembled at Albany, there to confer with the chiefs of the Six Nations concerning the means of defending both their country and ours. Governor Hamilton [of Pennsylvania], having receiv'd this order, acquainted the House with it, requesting they would furnish proper presents for the Indians, to be given on this occasion; and naming the speaker (Mr. Norris) and myself to join Mr. Thomas Penn and Mr. Secretary Peters as commissioners to act for Pennsylvania. (The House approv'd the nomination, and provided the goods for the present, and tho' they did not much like treating out of the provinces;) and we met the other commissioners at Albany about the middle of June. In our way thither, I projected and drew a plan for the union of all the colonies under one government, so far as might be necessary for defense, and other important general purposes. As we pass'd thro' New York, I had there shown my project to Mr. James Alexander and Mr. Kennedy, two gentlemen of great knowledge in public affairs, and, being fortified by their approbation, I ventur'd to lay it before the Congress. It then appeared that several of the commissioners had form'd plans of the same kind. A previous question was first taken, whether a union should be established, which pass'd in the affirmative unanimously. A committee was then appointed, one member from each colony, to consider the several plans and report. Mine happen'd to be prefer'd, and, with a few amendments, was accordingly reported. . . . The debates upon it in Congress went on daily, hand in hand with the Indian business. Many objections and difficulties were started, but at length they were all overcome, and the plan was unanimously agreed to, and copies ordered to be transmitted to the Board of Trade and to the assemblies of the several provinces. Its fate was singular: the assemblies did not adopt it, as they all thought there was too much 'prerogative' in it, and in England it was judg'd to have too much of the 'democratic.' The Board of Trade therefore did not approve of it, nor recommend it for the approbation of his majesty; but another scheme was form'd, supposed to answer the same purpose better, whereby the governors of the provinces, with some members of their respective councils, were to meet and order the raising of troops, building of forts, etc., and to draw on the treasury of Great Britain for the expense, which was afterwards to be refunded by an act of Parliament laying a tax on America. . . . The different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan makes me suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides the water if it had been adopted. The colonies, so united, would have been sufficiently strong to have defended themselves; there would then have been no need of

troops from England; of course, the subsequent pretence for taxing America, and the bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided.”

—B. Franklin, *Autobiography* (ed. by John Bigelow), v. 1, pp. 308-310.—“When the members assembled at the Court House in Albany on the 19th of June, it was found that Pennsylvania was not alone in appointing a distinguished citizen to represent her. On the roll of the congress were the names of Lieutenant-governor De Lancey, of New York, who presided; and from the same province William Smith, the historian, and the future Sir William Johnson, not yet made a baronet. From the proprietary provinces of Pennsylvania and Maryland were the well known officials, John Penn, grandson of the founder; Richard Peters; and Benjamin Tasker. From the province of New Hampshire were her future governor, Meshech Weare, and Theodore Atkinson; and from the province of Massachusetts Bay, the late Lieutenant-governor, Thomas Hutchinson, Colonel John Chandler, of Worcester, and Oliver Partridge, a man of commanding influence in western Massachusetts. Lastly, the two colonies which had so tenaciously preserved their charter governments through the vicissitudes of more than a century,—Connecticut and Rhode Island,—had acceded to the repeated solicitations of the home government, and with unfeigned reluctance, we may be sure, had sent as representatives men of such wide experience in their colonial concerns as Roger Wolcott, Jr., and Stephen Hopkins. 'America,' says Mr. Bancroft, 'had never seen an assembly so venerable for the states that were represented, or for the great and able men who composed it.' They were detained in this hospitable old Dutch town for more than three weeks. . . . Franklin's plan . . . was not approved by a single one of the colonial assemblies before which it was brought; and . . . no action was ever taken on it in England. Yet there is no contribution to constructive statesmanship preceding the year 1776, which had a profounder effect on the subsequent growth and development of the idea of American nationality. Even in the amended form in which it was 'approved' by the congress, it was, says a recent writer, 'in advance of the Articles [of Confederation] in its national spirit, and served as the prototype of the constitution itself.'”—W. E. Foster, *Stephen Hopkins: a Rhode Island Statesman*, ch. 6 (pt. 1).

The Plan of Union, as adopted by the Congress at Albany, was accompanied by a “Representation of the Present State of the Colonies.” The following is the full text of the Representation, followed by that of the Plan of Union: “That His Majesty's Title to the Northern Continent of America, appears to be founded on the Discovery thereof first made, and the Possession thereof first taken in 1497, under a Commission from Henry the VIIth, of England, to Sebastian Cabot. That the French have possessed themselves of several Parts of this Continent, which by Treaties, have been ceded and confirmed to them: That the Rights of the English to the whole Sea Coast, from Georgia, on the South, to the River St. Lawrence, on the North, excepting the Island of Cape-Breton, in the Bay of St. Lawrence, remains plain and indisputable. That all the Lands or Countries Westward from the Atlantic Ocean to the South Sea, between 48 and 34 Degrees of North Latitude, were expressly



Included in the Grant of King James the First, to divers of his Subjects, so long since, as the Year 1606, and afterwards confirmed in 1620; and under this Grant, the Colony of Virginia claims an Extent as far West as to the South Sea; and the antient Colonies of the Massachusetts-Bay and Connecticut, were by their respective Charters, made to extend to the said South Sea; so that not only the Right to the Sea Coast, but to all the Inland Countries, from Sea to Sea, have at all Times been asserted by the Crown of England. That the Province of Nova Scotia or Accadia, hath known and determinate Bounds, by the original Grant from King James the First; and that there is abundant Evidence of the same, [and of the Knowledge] which the French had of these Bounds, while they were in Possession of it; and that these Bounds being thus known, the said Province by the Treaty of Utrecht, according to its antient Limits, was ceded to Great-Britain, and remained in Possession thereof, until the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, by which it was confirmed; but by said Treaty it is stipulated, That the Bounds of the said Province shall be determined by Commissioners, &c. That by the Treaty of Utrecht, the Country of the Five Cantons of the Iroquoise, is expressly acknowledged to be under the Dominion of the Crown of Great-Britain. That the Lake Champlain, formerly called Lake Iroquoise, and the Country Southward of it, as far as the Dutch or English Settlements, the Lake Ontario, Erie, and all the Countries adjacent, have by all antient Authors, French and English, been allowed to belong to the Five Cantons or Nations; and the whole of those Countries, long before the said Treaty of Utrecht, were by the said Nations, put under the Protection of the Crown of Great-Britain. That by the Treaty of Utrecht, there is a Reserve to the French, a Liberty of frequenting the Countries of the Five Nations, and other Indians in Friendship with Great-Britain, for the Sake of Commerce; as there is also to the English, a Liberty of frequenting the Countries of those in Friendship with France, for the same Purpose. That after the Treaty of Utrecht, the French built several Fortresses in the Country of the Five Nations, and a very strong one at a Place called Crown-Point, to the South of the Lake Champlain. That the French Court have evidently, since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, made this Northern Continent more than ever, the Object of its Attention. That the French have most unjustly taken Possession of a Part of the Province of Nova-Scotia; and in the River St. John's, and other Parts of said Province, they have built strong Fortresses; and from this River they will have, during the Winter and Spring Season, a much easier Communication between France and Canada, than they have heretofore had, and will be furnished with a Harbour more commodiously situated for the Annoying the British Colonies by Privateers and Men of War, than Louisbourg itself. That they have taken Possession of, and begun a Settlement at the Head of the River Kennebeck, within the Bounds of the Province of Main, the most convenient Situation for affording Support, and a safe Retreat, to the Eastern Indians, in any of their Attempts upon the Governments of New-England. That it appears by the Information of the Natives, the French have been making Preparations for another Settlement, at a

Place called Cohass, on Connecticut River, near the Head thereof, where 'tis but about ten Miles distant from a Branch of Merrimack River; and from whence, there is a very near and easy Communication with the Abnekais Indians, who are settled on the River St. Francois, about forty Miles from the River St. Lawrence; and it is certain, the Inhabitants of New-Hampshire, in which Province this Cohass is supposed to lie, have been interrupted and impeded by the French Indians, from making any Settlement there. That since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, the French have increased the Number of their Forts in the Country of the great Lakes, and on the Rivers which run into the Mississippi, and are securing a Communication between the two Colonies of Louisiana and Canada, and at the same Time, putting themselves into a Capacity of annoying the Southern British Colonies, and preventing any further Settlements of His Majesty's Dominions. That they have been gradually increasing their Troops in America, transporting them in their Ships of War, which return to France with a bare Complement of Men, leaving the rest in their Colonies; and by this Means, they are less observed by the Powers of Europe, than they would be, if Transports as usual heretofore, were provided for this Purpose. That they have taken Prisoners diverse of His Majesty's Subjects, trading in the Country of the Iroquoise, and other inland Parts, and plundered such Prisoners of several Thousand Pounds Sterling; and they are continually exciting the Indians to destroy or make Prisoners the Inhabitants of the Frontiers of the British Colonies; which Prisoners are carried to Canada, and a Price equal to what Slaves are sold in the Plantations, is demanded for their Redemption and Release. That they are continually drawing off the Indians from the British Interest, and have lately perswaded one Half of the Onondago Tribe, with many from the other Nations along with them, to remove to a Place called Oswegachie, on the River Cadaracqui, where they have built them a Church and Fort; and many of the Senecas, the most numerous Nation, appear to be wavering, and rather inclined to the French. And it is a melancholy Consideration, that not more than 150 Men of all the several Nations, have attended this Treaty, altho' they had Notice, that all the Governments would be here by their Commissioners, and that a large Present would be given. That it is the evident Design of the French to surround the British Colonies, to fortify themselves on the Back thereof, to take and keep Possession of the Heads of all the important Rivers, to draw over the Indians to their Interest, and with the Help of such Indians, added to such Forces as are already arrived, and may be hereafter sent from Europe, to be in a Capacity of making a general Attack upon the several Governments; and if at the same Time, a strong Naval Force be sent from France, there is the utmost Danger, that the whole Continent will be subjected to that Crown: And that the Danger of such a Naval Force is not merely imaginary, may be argued from past Experience. For had it not been by the most extraordinary Interposition of Heaven, every Sea Port Town on the Continent, in the Year 1746, might have been ravaged and destroyed, by the Squadron under the Command of the Duke D'Anville, notwithstanding the then declining State of the

French, and the very flourishing State of the British Navy, and the further Advantage accruing to the English, from the Possession of Cape-Breton. That the French find by Experience, they are able to make greater and more secure Advantages upon their Neighbours, in Peace than in War. What they unjustly possessed themselves of, after the Peace of Utrecht, they now pretend they have a Right to hold, by Virtue of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, until the true Boundary between the English and French be settled by Commissioners; but their Conquests made during War, they have been obliged to restore. That the French Affairs relative to this Continent, are under one Direction, and constantly regarded by the Crown and Ministry, who are not insensible how great a Stride they would make towards an Universal Monarchy, if the British Colonies were added to their Dominions, and consequently the whole Trade of North-America engrossed by them. That the said Colonies being in a divided, disunited State, there has never been any joint Exertion of their Force, or Council, to repel or defeat the Measures of the French; and particular Colonies are unable and unwilling to maintain the Cause of the whole. That there has been a very great Neglect of the Affairs of the Iroquois, as they are commonly called, the Indians of the Six Nations, and their Friendship and Alliance has been improved to private Purposes, for the Sake of the Trade with them, and the Purchase or Acquisition of their Lands, more than the Public Services. That they are supplied with Rum by the Traders, in vast and almost incredible Quantities; the Laws of the Colonies now in Force, being insufficient to restrain the Supply. And the Indians of every Nation, are frequently drunk, and abused in their Trade, and their Affections thereby alienated from the English; they often wound and murder one another in their Liquor, and to avoid Revenge, fly to the French; and perhaps more have been lost by these Means than by the French Artifice. That Purchases of Land from the Indians by private Persons, for small trifling Considerations, have been the Cause of great Uneasiness and Discontents; and if the Indians are not in fact imposed on and injured, yet they are apt to think they have been; and indeed, they appear not fit to be entrusted at Large, with the Sale of their own Lands: And the Laws of some of the Colonies, which make such Sales void, unless the Allowance of the Government be first obtained, seem to be well founded. That the Granting or Patenting vast Tracts of Land to private Persons or Companies, without Conditions of speedy Settlements, has tended to prevent the Strengthening the Frontiers of the particular Colony where such Tracts lie, and been Prejudicial to the rest. That it seems absolutely necessary, that speedy and effectual Measures be taken, to secure the Colonies from the Slavery they are threatened with: that any farther Advantages of the French should be prevented; and the Encroachments already made, removed. That the Indians in Alliance or Friendship with the English, be constantly regarded under some wise Direction or Superintendancy. That Endeavours be used for the Recovery of those Indians who are lately gone over to the French, and for securing those that remain. That some discreet Person or Persons be appointed to reside

constantly among each Nation of Indians; such Person to have no Concern in Trade, and duly to communicate all Advices to the Superintendants. That the Trade with the said Indians be well regulated, and made subservient to the Public Interest, more than to private Gain. That there be Forts built for the Security of each Nation, and the better carrying on the Trade with them. That warlike Vessels be provided, sufficient to maintain His Majesty's Right to a free Navigation on the several Lakes. That all future Purchases of Lands from the Indians be void, unless made by the Government where such Lands lie, and from the Indians in a Body, in their public Councils. That the Patentees or Possessors of large unsettled Territories, be enjoined to cause them to be settled in a reasonable Time, on Pain of Forfeiture. That the Complaints of the Indians, relative to any Grants or Possessions of their Lands, fraudulently obtained, be inquired into, and all Injuries redressed. That the Bounds of those Colonies which extend to the South Seas, be contracted and limited by the Alleghenny or Apalachian Mountains; and that Measures be taken, for settling from time to time, Colonies of His Majesty's Protestant Subjects, Westward of said Mountains, in convenient Cantons, to be assigned for that Purpose. And finally, that there be an Union of His Majesty's several Governments on the Continent, that so their Councils, Treasure, and Strength, may be employed in due Proportion, against their common Enemy."

The Plan of Union, adopted on the 10th of July, was as follows: "Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New-Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual Defence and Security, and for the Extending the British Settlements in North-America. That humble Application be made for an Act of the Parliament of Great-Britain, by Virtue of which One General Government may be formed in America, including all the said Colonies; within and under which Government, each Colony may retain its present Constitution, except in the Particulars wherein a Change may be directed by the said Act, as hereafter follows. That the said General Government be administered by a President General, to be appointed and supported by the Crown; and a Grand Council, to be chosen by the Representatives of the People of the several Colonies, met in their respective Assemblies. That within Months after the Passing of such Act, the House of Representatives in the several Assemblies, that happen to be sitting within that Time, or that shall be especially for that Purpose convened, may and shall chuse Members for the Grand Council, in the following Proportions; that is to say: Massachusetts-Bay, 7; New-Hampshire, 2; Connecticut, 5; Rhode-Island, 2; New-York, 4; New-Jersey, 3; Pennsylvania, 6; Maryland, 4; Virginia, 7; North-Carolina, 4; South Carolina, 4; = 48. Who shall meet for the first Time at the City of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, being called by the President General, as soon as conveniently may be, after his Appointment. That there shall be a new Election of Members for the Grand Council every three Years; and on the Death or Resignation of any Member, his Place shall be supplied by a new Choice, at the next



Sitting of the Assembly of the Colony he represented. That after the first three Years, when the Proportion of Money arising out of each Colony to the General Treasury, can be known, the Number of Members to be chosen for each Colony, shall from time to time, in all ensuing Elections, be regulated by that Proportion (yet so as that the Number to be chosen by any one Province, be not more than seven, nor less than two). That the Grand Council shall meet once in every Year, and oftener if Occasion require, at such Time and Place as they shall adjourn to at the last preceding Meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the President General on any Emergency; he having first obtained in writing, the Consent of seven of the Members to such Call, and sent due and timely Notice to the whole. That the Grand Council have Power to chuse their Speaker, and shall neither be dissolved, prorogued, nor continue sitting longer than six Weeks at one Time, without their own Consent, or the special Command of the Crown. That the Members of the Grand Council shall be allowed for their Service, Ten Shillings Sterling per Diem, during their Session and Journey to and from the Place of Meeting, twenty Miles to be reckoned a Day's Journey. That the Assent of the President General be requisite to all Acts of the Grand Council; and that it be his Office and Duty to cause them to be carried into Execution. That the President General, with the Advice of the Grand Council, hold or direct all Indian Treaties, in which the general Interest or Welfare of the Colonies may be concerned; and to make Peace or declare War with Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge necessary for regulating all Indian Trade. That they make all Purchases from Indians for the Crown, of the Lands now not within the Bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their Bounds, when some of them are reduced to more convenient Dimensions. That they make new Settlements on such Purchases, by granting Lands in the King's Name, reserving a Quit-Rent to the Crown for the Use of the General Treasury. That they make Laws for regulating and governing such new Settlements, 'till the Crown shall think fit to form them into particular Governments. That they may raise and pay Soldiers, and build Forts for the Defence of any of the Colonies, and equip Vessels of Force to guard the Coast, and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes, or great Rivers; but they shall not impress Men in any Colony, without the Consent of its Legislature. That for those Purposes, they have Power to make Laws, and lay and levy such general Duties, Imposts, or Taxes, as to themselves appear most equal and just, considering the Ability and other Circumstances of the Inhabitants in the several Colonies, and such as may be collected with the least Inconvenience to the People; rather discouraging Luxury, than loading Industry with unnecessary Burthens. That they may appoint a general Treasurer and a particular Treasurer in each Government, when necessary; and from time to time, may order the Sums in the Treasuries of each Government, into the General Treasury, or draw on them for special Payments, as they find most convenient; yet no Money to issue, but by joint Orders of the President General and Grand Council, except where Sums have been appro-

riated to particular Purposes, and the President General is previously empowered by an Act, to draw for such Sums. That the general Accounts shall be yearly settled, and reported to the several Assemblies. That a Quorum of the Grand Council, empowered to act with the President General, do consist of Twenty-five Members; among whom there shall be one or more from a Majority of the Colonies. That the Laws made by them for the Purposes aforesaid, shall not be repugnant, but as near as may be agreeable, to the Laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the King in Council, for Approbation, as soon as may be, after their passing; and if not disapproved within three Years after Presentation, to remain in Force. That in Case of the Death of the President General, the Speaker of the Grand Council for the Time being, shall succeed, and be vested with the same Power and Authorities, and continue 'till the King's Pleasure be known. That all Military Commission Officers, whether for Land or Sea Service, to act under this General Constitution, be nominated by the President General, but the Approbation of the Grand Council is to be obtained, before they receive their Commissions. And all Civil Officers are to be nominated by the Grand Council, and to receive the President General's Approbation, before they officiate. But in Case of Vacancy, by Death or Removal of any Officer, Civil or Military, under this Constitution, the Governor of the Provinces in which such Vacancy happens, may appoint, 'till the Pleasure of the President General and Grand Council can be known. That the particular Military as well as Civil Establishments in each Colony, remain in their present State, this General Constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden Emergencies, any Colony may defend itself, and lay the Accounts of Expence thence arisen, before the President General and Grand Council, who may allow and order Payment of the same, as far as they judge such Accounts just and reasonable."

—Stephen Hopkins, *A True Representation of the Plan formed at Albany in 1754, for uniting all the British Northern Colonies; with introd. and notes by S. S. Rider* (R. I. Hist. Tracts, No. 9).

ALSO IN: *Proceedings of Commissioners at Albany* (Doc. Hist. of N. Y., v. 2, pp. 545-617).—T. C. Haliburton, *Rule and Misrule of the English in Am.*, pp. 253-258.—J. R. Brodhead, ed. *Doc's relative to Col. Hist. of N. Y.*, v. 6, pp. 853-905.—*Journal of Cong. at Albany in 1754* (Mass. Hist. Soc. Col., series 3, v. 5).

A. D. 1755.—Demand of the royal governors in America for taxation of the colonies by act of Parliament.—At the congress of American governors which General Braddock convened at Alexandria, in April, 1755, on his first arrival in America as commander-in-chief of the British forces, "Braddock directed their attention, first of all, to the subject of a colonial revenue, on which his instructions commanded him to insist, and his anger kindled 'that no such fund was already established.' The governors present, recapitulating their strifes with their assemblies, made answer: 'Such a fund can never be established in the colonies without the aid of parliament. Having found it impracticable to obtain in their respective governments the proportion expected by his majesty toward defraying the expense of his service in North America, they are unanimously of opinion that

It should be proposed to his majesty's ministers to find out some method of compelling them to do it, and of assessing the several governments in proportion to their respective abilities.' This imposing document Braddock sent forthwith to the ministry, himself urging the necessity of laying some tax throughout his majesty's dominions in North America. . . . I have had in my hands vast masses of correspondence, including letters from servants of the crown in every royal colony in America; from civilians, as well as from Braddock and Dunbar and Gage; from Delancey and Sharpe, as well as from Dinwiddie and Shirley; and all were of the same tenor. The British ministry heard one general clamor from men in office for taxation by act of parliament. . . . In England, the government was more and more inclined to enforce the permanent authority of Great Britain."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (Author's last revision), v. 2, pp. 416-417.

**A. D. 1755-1760.—The French and Indian War, known in Europe as the Seven Years War: The English conquest of Canada.**—See CANADA: A. D. 1750-1753, to 1760; NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755; 1755; OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754, to 1755; CAPE BRETON ISLAND: A. D. 1758-1760; also, for an account of the accompanying Cherokee War, SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1759-1761.

**A. D. 1760-1775.—Crown, Parliament and Colonies.—The English theory and the American theory of their relations.**—"The people of every colony were subject to two jurisdictions, one local and one general, that must be adjusted to each other. To effect such adjustment caused no little friction; and the Colonies and the Mother Country got on peaceably as long as they did, only because neither one pushed its theory of colonial relations to an extreme, each yielding something to the other and thus effecting a compromise. The Colonies held that the dominion which the Cabots discovered in America belonged to the King, rather than to the Kingdom, of England. Englishmen adventuring into this dominion to plant colonies were entitled to all the privileges of free-born Englishmen at home; trial by jury, habeas corpus, and exemption from taxes that their own representatives had not voted. The British Empire was not one dominion, but several dominions. Every one of these dominions had, or should have, its own legislature to enact laws for its government. The Colonies were not one dominion, but 13 dominions; and in every one the legislature was as supreme as Parliament was in England. Parliament, therefore, had nothing more to do with Massachusetts or Virginia than the legislatures of those colonies had to do with England. The King, who alone had a voice in the matter, had, in their charters, guaranteed to the Colonies the common law so far as this was applicable to their condition, and he was now powerless to withdraw what he had thus conceded. Such, in outline, was the American theory of colonial relations. Still, no one pretended that this theory had ever been fully carried out in practice. It must also be said that it did not appear fully formed at once, but grew up gradually. The British theory was that Englishmen continued Englishmen when they emigrated to the American dominions of the King; that the power of Parliament, to which they were subject

in the old home, followed them to the new one; and that Parliament could yield them more or fewer powers of self-government for a time, and then withdraw them. It was also claimed that the Colonies were already represented in the House of Commons; since the several members of that body did not represent particular districts or constituencies, but the whole British Empire. Besides, it was asserted that the Colonies themselves had repeatedly acknowledged the authority of Parliament by submitting to its legislation. Still no one pretended that this theory had ever been fully carried out."—B. A. Hinsdale, *The American Gov't*, sect. 92-93.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Life and Times of Jos. Warren*, pp. 30-32.

**A. D. 1761.—Enforcement of revenue laws in Massachusetts.—The Writs of Assistance and Otis' speech.**—"Immediately after the conquest of Canada was completed, rumors were widely circulated . . . that the charters would be taken away, and the colonies reduced to royal governments. The officers of the customs began at once to enforce with strictness all the acts of parliament regulating the trade of the colonies, several of which had been suspended, or become obsolete, and thus had never been executed at all. The good will of the colonists or their legislatures, was no longer wanted in the prosecution of the war; and the commissioners of the customs were permitted and directed to enforce the obnoxious acts. Governor Bernard [of Massachusetts], who was always a supporter of the royal prerogative, entered fully into these views, and shewed by his opinion, his appointments and his confidential advisers, that his object would be, to extend the power of the government to any limits, which the ministry might authorize. The first demonstration of the new course intended to be pursued, was the arrival of an order in Council to carry into effect the Acts of trade, and to apply to the supreme judicature of the Province [Massachusetts], for Writs of Assistance, to be granted to the officers of the customs. In a case of this importance there can be no doubt, that Mr. Paxton, who was at the head of the customs in Boston, consulted with the Government and all the crown officers, as to the best course to be taken. The result was, that he directed his deputy at Salem, Mr. Cockle, in November, 1760, to petition the Superior Court, then sitting in that town, for 'writs of assistance.' Stephen Sewall who was the Chief Justice, expressed great doubt of the legality of such a writ, and of the authority of the Court to grant it. None of the other judges said a word in favour of it; but as the application was on the part of the Crown, it could not be dismissed without a hearing, which after consultation was fixed for the next term of the Court, to be held in February, 1761, at Boston, when the question was ordered to be argued. In the interval, Chief Justice Sewall died, and Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson was made his successor, thereby uniting in his person, the office of Lieutenant Governor with the emoluments of the commander of the castle, a member of the Council, Judge of Probate and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court! . . . The mercantile part of the community was in a state of great anxiety as to the result of this question. The officers of the Customs called upon Otis for his official assistance, as Advocate General, to argue



their cause. But, as he believed these writs to be illegal and tyrannical, he refused. He would not prostitute his office to the support of an oppressive act; and with true delicacy and dignity, being unwilling to retain a station, in which he might be expected or called upon to argue in support of such odious measures, he resigned it though the situation was very lucrative, and if filled by an incumbent with a compliant spirit, led to the highest favours of government. The merchants of Salem and Boston, applied to Mr. Pratt to undertake their cause, who was also solicited to engage on the other side; but he declined taking any part, being about to leave Boston for New York, of which province he had been appointed Chief Justice. They also applied to Otis and Thacher, who engaged to make their defence, and probably both of them without fees, though very great ones were offered. The language of Otis was, 'in such a cause, I despise all fees.' . . . The trial took place in the Council Chamber of the Old Town House, in Boston. . . . The judges were five in number, including Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson, who presided as Chief Justice. The room was filled with all the officers of government, and the principal citizens, to hear the arguments in a cause that inspired the deepest solicitude. The case was opened by Mr. Gridley, who argued it with much learning, ingenuity, and dignity, urging every point and authority, that could be found after the most diligent search, in favour of the Custom house petition; making all his reasoning depend on this consideration — 'if the parliament of Great Britain is the sovereign legislator of the British Empire.' He was followed by Mr. Thacher on the opposite side, whose reasoning was ingenious and able, delivered in a tone of great mildness and moderation. 'But,' in the language of President Adams, 'Otis was a flame of fire; with a promptitude of classical allusions, a depth of research, a rapid summary of historical events and dates, a profusion of legal authorities, a prophetic glance of his eyes into futurity, and a rapid torrent of impetuous eloquence, he hurried away all before him. American Independence was then and there born. The seeds of patriots and heroes, to defend the 'Non sine Diis animosus infans'; to defend the vigorous youth, were then and there sown. Every man of an immense crowded audience appeared to me to go away as I did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there, was the first scene of the first act of opposition, to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there, the child Independence was born. In fifteen years, i. e. in 1776, he grew up to manhood and declared himself free.' 'There were no stenographers in those days,' to give a complete report of this momentous harangue. How gladly would be exchanged for it, a few hundred verbose speeches on some of the miserable, transient topics of the day, that are circulated in worthless profusion. Yet on this occasion, 'the seeds were sown,' and though some of them doubtless fell by the wayside or on stony places, others fell on good ground, and sprang up and increased and brought forth in due season, thirty, sixty and an hundred fold. . . . After the close of his argument, the Court adjourned for consideration, and at the close of the term, Chief Justice Hutchinson pronounced the opinion: 'The Court has considered the subject of

writs of assistance, and can see no foundation for such a writ; but as the practice in England is not known, it has been thought best to continue the question to the next term, that in the meantime opportunity may be given to know the result.' No cause in the annals of colonial jurisprudence had hitherto excited more public interest; and none had given rise to such powerful argument. . . . An epoch in public affairs may be dated from this trial. Political parties became more distinctly formed, and their several adherents were more marked and decided. The nature of ultra-marine jurisdiction began to be closely examined; the question respecting raising a revenue fully discussed. The right of the British parliament to impose taxes was openly denied. 'Taxation without representation is tyranny,' was the maxim, that was the guide and watch word of all the friends of liberty. The crown officers and their followers adopted openly the pretensions of the British ministry and parliament, and considering their power to be irresistible, appealed to the selfishness of those who might be expectants of patronage, and to the fears of all quiet and timid minds, to adopt a blind submission, as the only safe or reasonable alternative. Otis took the side of his country, and as has been shewn, under circumstances that made his decision irrevocable. He was transferred at once from the ranks of private life, not merely to take the side, but to be the guide and leader of his country, in opposition to the designs of the British ministry. 'Although' says President Adams, 'Mr. Otis had never before interfered in public affairs, his exertions on this single occasion secured him a commanding popularity with the friends of their country, and the terror and vengeance of her enemies; neither of which ever deserted him.' His popularity was instantaneous, and universal; and the public were impatient for the approaching election, when they could make him a representative of Boston."—W. Tudor, *Life of James Otis*, ch. 5-7. —See, also, MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1761.

A. D. 1763.—The Treaty of Paris.—Acquisition of Florida and Eastern Louisiana (as well as Canada) by Great Britain. See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.

A. D. 1763.—The King's proclamation excluding settlers from the Western territory lately acquired from France. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE U. S. OF AM.: A. D. 1763.

A. D. 1763.—General effects, economically and politically, of the English trade regulations.—"Economically the general results of the trade regulations were important. Robert Giffen has repeatedly pointed out how difficult it is, even with modern comparatively accurate methods, to obtain reliable results from the use of export and import statistics. This difficulty is immeasurably enhanced when we have to rely on the meagre figures of a century and a half ago. For we neither know how these statistics were taken, nor at all how accurate they are; while their inadequacy becomes clearly evident when we consider the large amount of smuggling carried on both in England and the colonies. One general proposition, however, can be formulated from the examination of these statistics, and that is the balance of trade between England and the colonies was unfavorable to the latter. And this was an inherent consequence of the mercantile system, by which England regu-

lated these commercial relations. The colonies were unable to pay England for her manufactures entirely in raw materials, and the residue was paid in coin obtained from the favorable trade with Spain, Portugal, and the West Indies. All metal had to be sent to England; it was, as De Foe says, 'snatched up for returns to England in specie.' An important consequence followed from this continuous drain of specie. The colonies could with difficulty retain coin, and hence were forced either to fall back on barter, or to issue paper money. . . . While, on the one hand, the acts of trade and navigation are partially responsible for many sad passages in the fiscal history of the colonies, on the other hand they conduced to the development of a most important colonial industry. This industry was ship-building, for which the colonies were especially adapted on account of the cheapness of lumber. In developing this natural fitness, the protection afforded to English and colonial shipping by the Navigation Acts was an important factor. As a rule England did not discriminate against colonial and in favor of English ships, although the colonies frequently attempted by legislation to secure advantages for their own shipping. As a result of this policy ship building and the carrying trade increased rapidly, especially in the New England colonies. . . . So important did this industry become that in 1724 the ship carpenters of the Thames complained to the King, 'that their trade was hurt and their workmen emigrated since so many vessels were built in New England.' Massachusetts built ships not only for England, but also for European countries, and for the West Indies. . . . Politically the commercial regulations were not so important. Up to 1763 only slight political importance attaches to the system, for only in a negative way did it affect the political ideas of the colonists. The colonies were peopled by men of varied race and religion, who had little common consciousness of rights and wrongs and few common political ideals. The centrifugal forces among them were strong. Among centripetal forces, such as a common sovereign and a common system of private law, must be reckoned the fact that their commerce was regulated by a system which, as a rule, was uniform for all the colonies. When the acts of trade worked to their advantage, the colonists reaped common benefits; when they inflicted hardships, the colonists made common complaint. Moreover, the fact that England was unable to enforce certain of her acts, especially the Molasses Act, caused contempt for parliamentary authority. The continued and, by the very nature of things, the necessary violation of this law led to a questioning of its sanction, while the open favoritism shown in it towards the West India colonies naturally aroused disaffection in those of the continent. The colonial system, as it was administered before 1763, contributed but slightly in bringing about the revolution of 1776. As Mr. Ramsay has said, 'if no other grievances had been superadded to what existed in 1763, they would have been soon forgotten, for their pressure was neither great, nor universal. It was only when the fundamental basis of the acts was changed from one of commercial monopoly to one of revenue, that the acts became of vital political importance.'—G. L. Beer, *The Commercial Policy of England toward the Am. Colo-*

*nies (Columbia College Studies in History, etc., v. 3, no. 2), ch. 7, sect. 2.*

A. D. 1763-1764.—Pontiac's War. See PONTIAC'S WAR.

A. D. 1763-1764.—Determination in England to tax the colonies.—The Sugar (or Molasses) Act.—"It did not take four years after the peace of 1763 to show how rapidly the new situation of affairs was bearing fruit in America. . . . The overthrow of their ancient enemy [the French in Canada], while further increasing the self-confidence of the Americans, at the same time removed the principal check which had hitherto kept their differences with the British government from coming to an open rupture. Formerly the dread of French attack had tended to make the Americans complaisant toward the king's ministers, while at the same time it made the king's ministers unwilling to lose the good will of the Americans. Now that the check was removed, the continuance or revival of the old disputes at once foreboded trouble; and the old occasions for dispute were far from having ceased. On the contrary the war itself had given them fresh vitality. If money had been needed before, it was still more needed now. The war had entailed a heavy burden of expense upon the British government as well as upon the colonies. The national debt of Great Britain was much increased, and there were many who thought that, since the Americans shared in the benefits of the war, they ought also to share in the burden which it left behind it. People in England who used this argument did not realize that the Americans had really contributed as much as could reasonably be expected to the support of the war, and that it had left behind it debts to be paid in America as well as in England. But there was another argument which made it seem reasonable to many Englishmen that the colonists should be taxed. It seemed right that a small military force should be kept up in America, for defence of the frontiers against the Indians, even if there were no other enemies to be dreaded. The events of Pontiac's war now showed that there was clearly need of such a force; and the experience of the royal governors for half a century had shown that it was very difficult to get the colonial legislatures to vote money for any such purpose. Hence there grew up in England a feeling that taxes ought to be raised in America as a contribution to the war debt and to the military defence of the colonies; and in order that such taxes should be fairly distributed and promptly collected, it was felt that the whole business ought to be placed under the direct supervision and control of parliament. . . . It was in 1763 that George Grenville became prime minister, a man of whom Macaulay says that he knew of 'no national interests except those which are expressed by pounds, shillings, and pence.' Grenville proceeded to introduce into Parliament two measures which had consequences of which he little dreamed. The first of these measures was the Molasses Act [often called the Sugar Act], the second was the Stamp Act. Properly speaking, the Molasses Act was an old law which Grenville now made up his mind to revive and enforce. The commercial wealth of the New England colonies depended largely upon their trade with the fish which their fishermen caught along the coast and as far out as the banks of Newfoundland. The finest fish could be sold in



Europe, but the poorer sort found their chief market in the French West Indies. The French government, in order to ensure a market for the molasses raised in these islands, would not allow the planters to give anything else in exchange for fish. Great quantities of molasses were therefore carried to New England, and what was not needed there for domestic use was distilled into rum, part of which was consumed at home, and the rest carried chiefly to Africa wherewith to buy slaves to be sold to the southern colonies. All this trade required many ships, and thus kept up a lively demand for New England lumber, besides finding employment for thousands of sailors and shipwrights. Now in 1733 the British government took it into its head to 'protect' its sugar planters in the English West Indies by compelling the New England merchants to buy all their molasses from them; and with this end in view it forthwith laid upon all sugar and molasses imported into North America from the French islands a duty so heavy that, if it had been enforced, it would have stopped all such importation. . . . It proved to be impossible to enforce the act without causing more disturbance than the government felt prepared to encounter. Now in 1764 Grenville announced that the act was to be enforced, and of course the machinery of writs of assistance was to be employed for that purpose. Henceforth all molasses from the French islands must either pay the prohibitory duty or be seized without ceremony. Loud and fierce was the indignation of New England over this revival of the Molasses Act. Even without the Stamp Act, it might very likely have led that part of the country to make armed resistance, but in such case it is not so sure that the southern and middle colonies would have come to the aid of New England. But in the Stamp Act, Grenville provided the colonies with an issue which concerned one as much as another."—J. Fiske, *The War of Independence*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New Eng.*, bk. 6, ch. 2-3 (v. 5).—W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social Hist. of New Eng.*, ch. 19 (v. 2).

A. D. 1764.—The climax of the mercantile colonial policy of England, and its consequences.—"Historians, in treating of the American rebellion, have confined their arguments too exclusively to the question of internal taxation, and the right or policy of exercising this prerogative. The true source of the rebellion lay deeper, in our traditional colonial policy. Just as the Spaniards had been excited to the discovery of America by the hope of obtaining gold and silver, the English merchants utilized the discovery by the same fallacious method, and with the same fallacious aspirations. . . . A hundred years ago the commercial classes believed that the prime object of their pursuits was to get as much gold and silver into England as they could. They sought, therefore, to make their country, as nearly as they might, a solitary centre of the exportation of non-metallic commodities, that so she might be also the great reservoir into which the precious metals would flow in a return stream. On this base their colonial policy was erected. . . . So long as the colonies remained in their infancy the mercantile policy was less prejudicial to their interests. The monopoly of their commerce, the limitation of their markets, the discouragement of their

manufactures, in some cases amounting to absolute prohibition, were all less fatal in a country where labour was dear, than they would be in a state where population was more fully developed and land had become scarcer. . . . A contraband trade sprung up between them and the colonies of Spain. Our settlers imported goods from England, and re-exported them to the Spanish colonies, in return for bullion and other commodities. The result of this was that the Spanish colonists had access to useful commodities from which they would otherwise have been debarred, that the American colonists could without distress remit the specie which was required by the nature of their dealings with England, and that a large market was opened for English products. This widely beneficial trade was incontinently suppressed in 1764, by one of those efforts of short-sighted rigour which might be expected from any government where George Grenville's influence was prominent. All smuggling was to be put down, and as this trade was contraband, it must be put down like the rest. The Government probably acted as they did in answer to the prayers of the mercantile classes, who could not see that they were cutting off the streams that fed their own prosperity. They only saw that a colonial trade had sprung up, and their jealousy blinded them to the benefits that accrued to themselves as a consequence of it. Their folly found them out. The suppression of the colonial trade was entrusted to the commanders of men-of-war. . . . We may be sure that the original grievance of the colonists was not softened by the manners of the officers who had to put the law into execution. The result of the whole transaction was the birth of a very strong sense in the minds of the colonists that the mother country looked upon them as a sponge to be squeezed. This conviction took more than a passing hold upon them. It was speedily inflamed into inextinguishable heat, first by the news that they were to be taxed without their own consent, and next by the tyrannical and atrocious measures by which it was proposed to crush their resistance. The rebellion may be characterised as having first originated in the blind greediness of the English merchants, and as having then been precipitated by the arbitrary ideas of the patricians, in the first instance, and afterwards of the King and the least educated of the common people. If the severe pressure of the mercantile policy, unflinchingly carried out, had not first filled the colonists with resentment and robbed them of their prosperity, the imperial claim to impose taxes would probably have been submitted to without much ado. And if the suppression of their trade in 1764 had not been instantly followed by Grenville's plan for extorting revenue from them, they would probably in time have been reconciled to the blow which had been dealt to their commerce. It was the conjunction of two highly oppressive pieces of policy which taught them that they would certainly lose more by tame compliance than they could possibly lose by an active resistance."—J. Morley, *Edmund Burke*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: W. Massey, *Hist. of England, Reign of George III.*, v. 1, ch. 5.

A. D. 1764-1767.—Patriotic self-denials.—"Upon the news of the intention to lay [the Stamp Tax] . . . on the colonies, many people,

the last year, had associated, and engaged to forbear the importation, or consumption, of English goods; and particularly to break off from the custom of wearing black clothes, or other mourning [it being generally of British manufacture—Foot-note], upon the death of relations. This agreement was then signed by some of the council, and representatives, and by great numbers of people in the town of Boston, and the disuse of mourning soon became general. This was intended to alarm the manufacturers in England. And now [in 1765], an agreement was made, and signed by a great proportion of the inhabitants of Boston, to eat no lamb during the year. This was in order to increase the growth, and, of course, the manufacture of wool in the province. Neither of these measures much served the purpose for which they were professedly intended, but they served to unite the people in an unfavourable opinion of parliament.”—T. Hutchinson, *Hist. of the Province of Mass. Bay*, 1749-1774, pp. 116-117.—The movement thus started in Boston before the passage of the Stamp Act spread rapidly through the other provinces after the Act had been passed, and continued to be for several years a very serious expression of colonial patriotism and opposition to the oppressive policy of the mother country. See below: A. D. 1765.

**A. D. 1765.—The Stamp Act.**—“The scheme of the imposition by Parliament of a tax on the American colonists to be collected by stamps was not a new one. Nearly forty years before this time, ‘Sir William Keith, the late Governor of Pennsylvania, presented an elaborate disquisition to the King . . . proposing the extension of the stamp duties to the Colonies by Act of Parliament.’ It had been one of the projects of the factious Dunbar, during his short career of turbulence and intrigue in New Hampshire. Governor Sharpe of Maryland and Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia had recommended a resort to it at the time of the abortive movement for a union of the Colonies. Its renewal at this time has been said to have been especially due to Charles Jenkinson, then only private secretary to Lord Bute, but who rose afterwards to be Earl of Liverpool. The project, as now resolved upon, was pursued with inconsiderate obstinacy, though it encountered a spirited debate when it was brought into the House of Commons [February, 1765]. . . . The bill was pending in the House between three and four weeks, at the end of which time it was passed, the largest number of votes which had been given against it in any stage of its progress not having amounted to fifty. It was concurred in by the House of Lords, where it appears to have met no resistance, and in due course [March 22] received the royal assent. No apprehension of consequences counselled a pause. The Stamp Act—as it has ever since been called by eminence—provided . . . for the payment, by British subjects in America to the English Exchequer, of specified sums, greater or less, in consideration of obtaining validity for each of the common transactions of business.”—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New England*, bk. 6, ch. 3 (v. 5).

The following is the text of the Stamp Act:

Whereas, by an act made in the last session of parliament, several duties were granted, continued, and appropriated, towards defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and se-

curing the British colonies and plantations in America: and whereas, it is first necessary, that provision be made for raising a further revenue within your majesty's dominions in America, towards defraying the said expenses; we, your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the commons of Great Britain, in parliament assembled, have therefore resolved, to give and grant unto your majesty the several rites and duties hereinafter mentioned; and do most humbly beseech your majesty that it may be enacted, And be it enacted, by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That from and after the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and sixty five, there shall be raised, levied, collected and paid, unto his majesty, his heirs and successors, throughout the colonies and plantations in America, which now are, or hereafter may be, under the dominion of his majesty, his heirs and successors,

1. For every skin of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, or any copy thereof, in any court of law within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of three pence.

2. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any special bail, and appearance upon such bail in any such court, a stamp duty of two shillings.

3. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which may be engrossed, written or printed, any petition, bill, or answer, claim, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, in any court of chancery or equity, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

4. For every skin or piece of vellum, or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any copy of any petition, bill, answer, claim, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, in any such court, a stamp duty of three pence.

5. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any monition, libel, answer, allegation, inventory, or renunciation, in ecclesiastical matters, in any court of probate, court of the ordinary, or other court exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

6. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any copy of any will, (other than the probate thereof,) monition, libel, answer, allegation, inventory, or renunciation, in ecclesiastical matters, in any such court, a stamp duty of six pence.

7. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any donation, presentation, collation or institution, of or to any benefice, or any writ or instrument for the like purpose, or any register, entry, testimonial or certificate of any degree taken in any university, academy, college, or seminary of learning,



within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two pounds.

8. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any monition, libel, claim, answer, allegation, information, letter of request, execution, renunciation, inventory, or other pleading, in any admiralty court within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

9. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any copy of any such monition, libel, claim, answer, allegation, information, letter of request, execution, renunciation, inventory or other pleading, shall be engrossed, written or printed, a stamp duty of six pence.

10. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any appeal, writ of error, writ of dower, 'ad quod damnum,' certiorari, statute merchant, statute staple, attestation, or certificate, by any officer, or exemplification of any record or proceeding, in any court whatsoever within the said colonies and plantations, (except appeals, writs of error, certiorari, attestations, certificates, and exemplifications, for, or relating to the removal of any proceedings from before a single justice of the peace,) a stamp duty of ten shillings.

11. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any writ of covenant for levying fines, writ of entry for suffering a common recovery, or attachment issuing out of, or returnable into any court within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of five shillings.

12. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any judgment, decree, or sentence, or dismissal, or any record of nisi prius or postea, in any court within the said colonies or plantations, a stamp duty of four shillings.

13. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any affidavit, common bail, or appearance, interrogatory, deposition, rule, order or warrant of any court, or any 'dedimus potestatem,' capias, subpœna, summons, compulsory citation, commission, recognisance, or any other writ, process, or mandate, issuing out of, or returnable into, any court, or any office belonging thereto, or any other proceeding therein whatsoever, or any copy thereof, or of any record not herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, (except warrants relating to criminal matters, and proceedings thereon, or relation thereto,) a stamp duty of one shilling.

14. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any note or bill of lading, which shall be signed for any kind of goods, wares, or merchandize, to be exported from, or any docket or clearance granted within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of four pence.

15. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, letters of mart or commission for private ships of war, within

the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of twenty shillings.

16. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any grant, appointment, or admission of or to any public beneficial office or employment, for the space of one year, or any lesser time, of or above twenty pounds per annum, sterling money, in salary, fees, and perquisites, within the said colonies and plantations, (except commissions and appointments of officers of the army, navy, ordnance, or militia, of judges, and of justices of the peace,) a stamp duty of ten shillings.

17. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any grant of any liberty, privilege, or franchise, under the seal or sign manual, of any governor, proprietor, or public officer, alone, or in conjunction with any other person or persons, or with any council, or any council and assembly, or any exemplification of the same, shall be engrossed, written, or printed, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of six pounds.

18. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any license for retailing of spirituous liquors, to be granted to any person who shall take out the same, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of twenty shillings.

19. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any license for retailing of wine, to be granted to any person who shall not take out a license for retailing of spirituous liquors, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of four pounds.

20. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any license for retailing of wine, to be granted to any person who shall take out a license for retailing of spirituous liquors, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of three pounds.

21. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any probate of wills, letters of administration, or of guardianship for any estate above the value of twenty pounds sterling money, within the British colonies [and] plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands, a stamp duty of five shillings.

22. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such probate, letters of administration or of guardianship, within all other parts of the British dominions in America, a stamp duty of ten shillings.

23. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money, not exceeding the sum of ten pounds sterling money, within the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands, a stamp duty of six pence.

24. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall

be engrossed, written or printed, any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money above ten pounds, and not exceeding twenty pounds sterling money, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of one shilling.

25. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money above twenty pounds, and not exceeding forty pounds sterling money, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

26. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any order or warrant for surveying or setting out any quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred acres, issued by any governor, proprietor, or any public officer, alone, or in conjunction with any other person or persons, or with any council, or any council and assembly, within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of six pence.

27. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such order or warrant for surveying or setting out any quantity of land above one hundred and not exceeding two hundred acres, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

28. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such order or warrant for surveying or setting out any quantity of land above two hundred and not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres, and in proportion for every such order or warrant for surveying or setting out every other three hundred and twenty acres, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

29. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any original grant or deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatever, by which any quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands (except leases for any term not exceeding the term of twenty-one years) a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

30. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above one hundred and not exceeding two hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of two shillings.

31. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above two hundred, and not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres, shall

be granted, conveyed, or assigned, and in proportion for every such grant, deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument, granting, conveying or assigning every other three hundred and twenty acres, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of two shillings and six pence.

32. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within all other parts of the British dominions in America, a stamp duty of three shillings.

33. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above one hundred and not exceeding two hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within the same parts of the said dominions, a stamp duty of four shillings.

34. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above two hundred and not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, and in proportion for every such grant, deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument, granting, conveying, or assigning every other three hundred and twenty acres, within the same parts of the said dominions, a stamp duty of five shillings.

35. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any grant, appointment, or admission, of or to any beneficial office or employment, not hereinbefore charged, above the value of twenty pounds per annum sterling money, in salary, fees, or perquisites, or any exemplification of the same, within the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands, (except commissions of officers of the army, navy, ordnance, or militia, and of justices of the peace,) a stamp duty of four pounds.

36. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any such grant, appointment, or admission, of or to any such public beneficial office or employment, or any exemplification of the same, within all other parts of the British dominions in America, a stamp duty of six pounds.

37. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any indenture, lease, conveyance, contract, stipulation, bill of sale, charter party, protest, articles of apprenticeship or covenant, (except for the hire of servants not apprentices, and also except such other matters as hereinbefore charged,) within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of two shillings and six pence.

38. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any



warrant or order for auditing any public accounts, beneficial warrant, order, grant, or certificate, under any public seal, or under the seal or sign manual of any governor, proprietor, or public officer, alone, or in conjunction with any other person or persons, or with any council, or any council and assembly, not herein before charged, or any passport or letpass, surrender of office, or policy of assurance, shall be engrossed, written, or printed, within the said colonies and plantations, (except warrants or orders for the service of the army, navy, ordnance, or militia, and grants of offices under twenty pounds per annum, in salary, fees, and perquisite,) a stamp duty of five shillings.

39. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any notarial act, bond, deed, letter of attorney, procuration, mortgage, release, or other obligatory instrument, not herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two shillings and three pence.

40. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any register, entry, or enrolment of any grant, deed, or other instrument whatsoever, herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of three pence.

41. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any register, entry, or enrolment of any grant, deed, or other instrument whatsoever, not herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two shillings.

42. And for and upon every pack of playing cards, and all dice, which shall be sold or used within the said colonies and plantations, the several stamp duties following: (that is to say,)

43. For every pack of such cards, one shilling.

44. And for every pair of such dice, ten shillings.

45. And for and upon every paper called a pamphlet, and upon every newspaper, containing public news, or occurrences, which shall be printed, dispersed, and made public, within any of the said colonies and plantations, and for and upon such advertisements as are hereinafter mentioned, the respective duties following; (that is to say,)

46. For every such pamphlet and paper, contained in a half sheet, or any lesser piece of paper, which shall be so printed, a stamp duty of one half penny for every printed copy thereof.

47. For every such pamphlet and paper, (being larger than half a sheet, and not exceeding one whole sheet,) which shall be so printed, a stamp duty of one penny for every printed copy thereof.

48. For every pamphlet and paper, being larger than one whole sheet, and not exceeding six sheets in octavo, or in a lesser page, or not exceeding twelve sheets in quarto, or twenty sheets in folio, which shall be so printed, a duty after the rate of one shilling for every sheet of any kind of paper which shall be contained in one printed copy thereof.

49. For every advertisement to be contained in any gazette, newspaper, or other paper, or any pamphlet which shall be so printed, a duty of two shillings.

50. For every almanac or calendar, for any one particular year, or for any time less than a year, which shall be written or printed on one side only of any one sheet, skin, or piece of paper, parchment, or vellum, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two pence.

51. For every other almanac, or calendar, for any one particular year, which shall be written or printed within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of four pence.

52. And for every almanac or calendar, written or printed in the said colonies and plantations, to serve for several years, duties to the same amount respectively shall be paid for every such year.

53. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any instrument, proceeding, or other matter or thing aforesaid, shall be engrossed, written, or printed, within the said colonies and plantations, in any other than the English language, a stamp duty of double the amount of the respective duties before charged thereon.

54. And there shall be also paid, in the said colonies and plantations, a duty of six pence for every twenty shillings, in any sum not exceeding fifty pounds sterling money, which shall be given, paid, contracted, or agreed for, with or in relation to any clerk or apprentice, which shall be put or placed to or with any master or mistress, to learn any profession, trade, or employment. 2. And also a duty of one shilling for every twenty shillings, in any sum exceeding fifty pounds, which shall be given, paid, contracted, or agreed for, with, or in relation to, any such clerk or apprentice.

55. Finally, the produce of all the aforementioned duties shall be paid into his majesty's treasury; and there held in reserve, to be used, from time to time, by the parliament, for the purpose of defraying the expenses necessary for the defense, protection, and security of the said colonies and plantations.

**A. D. 1765.—News of the Stamp Act in the Colonies.**—Colonel Barré's speech and the Sons of Liberty.—Patrick Henry's speech in the Virginia Assembly.—Formal protests and informal mob-doings in Philadelphia, New York and Boston.—In the course of the debate in the British House of Commons, on the Stamp Act, February 6, 1765, Charles Townshend, after discussing the advantages which the American colonies had derived from the late war, asked the question: "And now will these American children, planted by our care, nourished up to strength and opulence by our indulgence, and protected by our arms, grudge to contribute their mite to relieve us from the heavy burden under which we lie?" This called to his feet Colonel Isaac Barré who had served in America with Wolfe, and who had a knowledge of the country and people which most members of Parliament lacked. "They planted by your care!" exclaimed Barré. "No: your oppressions planted them in America. They fled from your tyranny to a then uncultivated, un hospitable country, where they exposed themselves to almost all the hardships to which human nature is liable; and, among others, to the cruelties of a savage foe, the most subtle, and, I will take upon me to say, the most formidable of any people upon the face of God's earth; and yet, actuated by principles

of true English liberty, they met all hardships with pleasure, compared with those they suffered in their own country from the hands of those who should have been their friends. They nourished up by your indulgence! They grew by your neglect of them. As soon as you began to care about them, that care was exercised in sending persons to rule them in one department and another, who were, perhaps, the deputies of deputies to some members of this house, sent to spy out their liberties, to misrepresent their actions, and to prey upon them; men whose behavior on many occasions has caused the blood of those sons of Liberty to recoil within them; men promoted to the highest seats of justice, some who, to my knowledge, were glad, by going to a foreign country, to escape being brought to the bar of a court of justice in their own. They protected by your arms! They have nobly taken up arms in your defence; have exerted a valor amidst their constant and laborious industry, for the defence of a country whose frontier was drenched in blood, while its interior parts yielded all its little savings to your emolument. And believe me—remember I this day told you so—the same spirit of freedom which actuated that people at first will accompany them still. But prudence forbids me to explain myself further. God knows I do not at this time speak from motives of party heat; what I deliver are the genuine sentiments of my heart. However superior to me in general knowledge and experience the respectable body of this house may be, yet I claim to know more of America than most of you, having seen and been conversant in that country. The people, I believe, are as truly loyal as any subjects the king has; but a people jealous of their liberties, and who will vindicate them, if ever they should be violated. But the subject is too delicate; I will say no more.” Notes of Colonel Barré’s speech were taken by a Mr. Ingersoll, one of the agents for Connecticut, who sat in the gallery. He sent home a report of it, which was published in the newspapers at New London, and soon the name of the “Sons of Liberty,” which the eloquent defender of the resisting colonists had given to them, was on every lip.—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author’s last rev.)*, v. 3, ch. 8.—“Mean-time [in 1765], ‘The Sons of Liberty’—a term that grew into use soon after the publication of Barré’s speech—were entering into associations to resist, by all lawful means, the execution of the Stamp Act. They were long kept secret, which occasioned loyalists to say that there was a private union among a certain sect of republican principles from one end of the continent to the other. As they increased in numbers, they grew in boldness and publicity, announcing in the newspapers their committees of correspondence, and interchanging solemn pledges of support.”—R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic of the U. S.*, p. 183.—“The Stamp Act was passed March 23, 1765. A copy of it was printed in the ‘Pennsylvania Gazette’ on April 18th, but this must necessarily have been in advance of news of its passage. The people of Philadelphia began at once to show their determination to make it [the Stamp Act] a nullity so far as revenue was concerned. An enforced frugality was the first step. . . . In the ‘Pennsylvania Gazette’ of April 18th there was an article against expensive and ostentatious fu-

nerals, the writer saying that often £70 or £100 were squandered on such occasions. August 15th, when Alderman William Plumsted was buried at St. Peter’s Church, the funeral, by his own wish, was conducted in the plainest way, no pall, no mourning worn by relatives. In March, the Hibernia Fire Company resolved, ‘from motives of economy, and to reduce the present high price of mutton and encourage the breweries of Pennsylvania, not to purchase any lamb this season, nor to drink any foreign beer.’ Other fire companies and many citizens copied this example. . . . On October 25th the merchants and traders of Philadelphia subscribed to a non-importation agreement, such as were then being signed all over the country. In this article the subscribers agreed that, in consequence of the late acts of Parliament and the injurious regulations accompanying them, and of the Stamp Act, etc., in justice to themselves and in hopes of benefit from their example (1) to countermand all orders for English goods until the Stamp Act should be repealed; (2) a few necessary articles, or shipped under peculiar circumstances, are excepted; (3) no goods received for sale on commission to be disposed of until the Stamp Act should be repealed; and this agreement to be binding on each and all, as a pledge of word of honor.”—J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, *Hist. of Philadelphia*, ch. 16 (v. 1).—The first stern note of defiance came from Virginia. Patrick Henry had lately been elected to the colonial assembly. Having waited in vain for the older leaders of the house to move in the matter of expressing the feeling of the colony on the subject, on the 29th of May, when the session was within three days of its expected close, “Mr. Henry introduced his celebrated resolutions on the stamp act. I will not withhold from the reader a note of this transaction from the pen of Mr. Henry himself. It is a curiosity, and highly worthy of preservation. After his death, there was found among his papers one sealed, and thus endorsed: ‘Enclosed are the resolutions of the Virginia assembly in 1765, concerning the stamp act. Let my executors open this paper.’ Within was found the following copy of the resolutions, in Mr. Henry’s handwriting:—‘Resolved, That the first adventurers and settlers of this, his majesty’s colony and dominion, brought with them, and transmitted to their posterity, and all other his majesty’s subjects, since inhabiting in this, his majesty’s said colony, all the privileges, franchises, and immunities, that have at any time been held, enjoyed, and possessed by the people of Great Britain. Resolved, That by two royal charters, granted by King James I., the colonists, aforesaid, are declared entitled to all the privileges, liberties, and immunities of denizens and natural-born subjects, to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within the realm of England. Resolved, That the taxation of the people by themselves; or by persons chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to bear, and the easiest mode of raising them, and are equally affected by such taxes themselves, is the distinguishing characteristic of British freedom, and without which the ancient constitution cannot subsist. Resolved, That his majesty’s liege people of this most ancient colony, have uninterruptedly enjoyed the right of being thus governed by their own assembly, in the



article of their taxes and internal police, and that the same hath never been forfeited, or any other way given up, but hath been constantly recognised by the king and people of Great Britain. Resolved, therefore, That the general assembly of this colony have the sole right and power to lay taxes and impositions upon the inhabitants of this colony; and that every attempt to vest such power in any person or persons whatsoever, other than the general assembly aforesaid, has a manifest tendency to destroy British as well as American freedom.' On the back of the paper containing these resolutions, is the following endorsement, which is also in the handwriting of Mr. Henry himself:—'The within resolutions passed the house of burgesses in May, 1765. They formed the first opposition to the stamp act, and the scheme of taxing America by the British parliament. All the colonies, either through fear, or want of opportunity to form an opposition, or from influence of some kind or other, had remained silent. I had been for the first time elected a Burgess, a few days before, was young, inexperienced, unacquainted with the forms of the house, and the members that composed it. Finding the men of weight averse to opposition, and the commencement of the tax at hand, and that no person was likely to step forth, I determined to venture, and alone, unadvised, and unassisted, on a blank leaf of an old law-book wrote the within. Upon offering them to the house, violent debates ensued. Many threats were uttered, and much abuse cast on me, by the party for submission. After a long and warm contest, the resolutions passed by a very small majority, perhaps of one or two only. The alarm spread throughout America with astonishing quickness, and the ministerial party were overwhelmed. The great point of resistance to British taxation was universally established in the colonies. This brought on the war, which finally separated the two countries, and gave independence to ours. Whether this will prove a blessing or a curse will depend upon the use our people make of the blessings which a gracious God hath bestowed on us. If they are wise, they will be great and happy. If they are of a contrary character, they will be miserable. Righteousness alone can exalt them as a nation. Reader! whoever thou art, remember this; and in thy sphere, practise virtue thyself, and encourage it in others.—P. Henry.' Such is the short, plain, and modest account which Mr. Henry has left of this transaction. . . . It is not wonderful that even the friends of colonial rights who knew the feeble and defenceless situation of this country should be startled at a step so bold and daring. That effect was produced; and the resolutions were resisted, not only by the aristocracy of the house, but by many of those who were afterward distinguished among the brightest champions of American liberty. The following is Mr. Jefferson's account of this transaction: 'Mr. Henry moved and Mr. Johnston seconded these resolutions successively. They were opposed by Messrs. Randolph, Bland, Pendleton, Wythe, and all the old members, whose influence in the house had, till then, been unbroken. They did it, not from any question of our rights, but on the ground that the same sentiments had been, at their preceding session, expressed in a more conciliatory form, to which the answers

were not yet received. But torrents of sublime eloquence from Henry, backed by the solid reasoning of Johnston, prevailed. The last, however, and strongest resolution was carried but by a single vote. The debate on it was most bloody. I was then but a student, and stood at the door of communication between the house and the lobby (for as yet there was no gallery) during the whole debate and vote; and I well remember that, after the numbers on the division were told and declared from the chair, Peyton Randolph (the attorney-general) came out at the door where I was standing, and said, as he entered the lobby: "By God, I would have given 500 guineas for a single vote": for one would have divided the house, and Robinson was in the chair, who he knew would have negatived the resolution. Mr. Henry left town that evening; and the next morning, before the meeting of the house, Col. Peter Randolph, then of the council, came to the hall of burgesses, and sat at the clerk's table till the house-bell rang, thumbing over the volumes of journals, to find a precedent for expunging a vote of the house. . . . Some of the timid members, who had voted for the strongest resolution, had become alarmed; and as soon as the house met, a motion was made and carried to expunge it from the journals.' . . . The manuscript journal of the day is not to be found; whether it was suppressed, or casually lost, must remain a matter of uncertainty; it disappeared, however, shortly after the session. . . . In the interesting fact of the erasure of the fifth resolution, Mr. Jefferson is supported by the distinct recollection of Mr. Paul Carrington, late a judge of the court of appeals of Virginia, and the only surviving member, it is believed, of the house of burgesses of 1765. The statement is also confirmed, if indeed further confirmation were necessary, by the circumstance that instead of the five resolutions, so solemnly recorded by Mr. Henry, as having passed the house, the journal of the day exhibits only . . . four. . . . 'By these resolutions,' says Mr. Jefferson, 'and his manner of supporting them, Mr. Henry took the lead out of the hands of those who had, theretofore, guided the proceedings of the house; that is to say, of Pendleton, Wythe, Bland, Randolph.' It was, indeed, the measure which raised him to the zenith of his glory. He had never before had a subject which entirely matched his genius, and was capable of drawing out all the powers of his mind. . . . It was in the midst of this magnificent debate, while he was descanting on the tyranny of the obnoxious act, that he exclaimed in a voice of thunder, and with the look of a god: 'Cesar had his Brutus—Charles the First, his Cromwell—and George the Third—('Treason!' cried the speaker—'Treason, treason!' echoed from every part of the house. It was one of those trying moments which is decisive of character. Henry faltered not for an instant; but rising to a loftier attitude, and fixing on the speaker an eye of the most determined fire, he finished his sentence with the firmest emphasis)—may profit by their example. If this be treason, make the most of it.' This was the only expression of defiance which escaped him during the debate. He was, throughout life, one of the most perfectly and uniformly decorous speakers that ever took the floor of the house. . . . From the period of which we have been speaking, Mr. Henry became the idol of the

people of Virginia; nor was his name confined to his native state. His light and heat were seen and felt throughout the continent; and he was every where regarded as the great champion of colonial liberty."—W. Wirt, *Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry*, sect. 2.—"The publication of Mr. Henry's resolutions against the Stamp Act created a widespread and intense excitement. They were hailed as the action of the oldest, and hitherto the most loyal of the colonies; and as raising a standard of resistance to the detested Act. Mr. Otis pronounced them treasonable, and this was the verdict of the Government party. But, treasonable or not, they struck a chord which vibrated throughout America. Hutchinson declared that, 'nothing extravagant appeared in the papers till an account was received of the Virginia resolves.' Soon the bold exclamation of Mr. Henry in moving them was published, and he was hailed as the leader raised up by Providence for the occasion. The 'Boston Gazette' declared: 'The people of Virginia have spoken very sensibly, and the frozen politicians of a more northern government say they have spoken treason.' But the people were no longer to be held down by 'the frozen politicians,' north or south. They commenced to form secret societies pledged to the resistance of the Act by all lawful means, which we called 'The Sons of Liberty.'"—W. W. Henry, *Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches*, v. 1, pp. 93-94.—At New York, "in May articles began to appear in the papers congratulating the public on the patriotic and frugal spirit that was beginning to reign in the Province of New York. The principal gentlemen of the city clad themselves in country manufactures or 'turned clothes.' Weyman printed in large type in his paper, the N. Y. Gazette, the patriotic motto 'It is better to wear a homespun coat than lose our liberty.' Spinning was daily in vogue; materials being more wanting than industrial hands; a need the farmers were endeavoring to remedy by sewing more flax seed and keeping more sheep, and finally we notice the odd statement 'that little lamb came to market as no true lovers of their country or whose sympathetic breasts feel for its distresses will buy it, and that sassafras, balm and sage were greatly in use instead of tea and allowed to be more wholesome.' Funerals and mourning, which were then expensive luxuries, were modified and their extravagance curtailed. The Society for promoting Arts and Manufactures resolved to establish a bleaching field and to erect a flax spinning school where the poor children of the city should be taught the art. They also ordered large numbers of spinning wheels to be made and loaned to all who would use them. In September we find it announced that women's shoes were made, cheaper and better than the renowned Hoses,' by Wells, Lasher, Bolton, and Davis, and that there was a good assortment on hand; that boots and men's shoes were made, in every quarter of the city, better than the English made for foreign sale; wove thread stockings in sundry places; the making of linen, woolen, and cotton stuffs was fast increasing; gloves, hats, carriages, harness and cabinet work were plenty. The people were now self dependent; cards now appeared recommending that no true friend of his country should buy or import English goods, and the

dry goods men were warned that their importations would lie on hand to their cost and ruin. There being now a sufficiency of home made goods it was proposed on the 19th October to establish a market for all kinds of Home Manufactures; and a market was opened under the Exchange in Broad Street on the 23d. From the shortness of the notice the design was not sufficiently known in the country and there was neither plenty nor variety; but numbers of buyers appeared and everything went off readily at good prices. The gentlemen merchants of the city, as they were styled, were not behind any class in patriotism or sacrifice. A meeting was called for Monday 28th October at Jones' house in the Fields, 'The Freemasons Arms,' but the attendance, owing to the short notice, not being sufficient to enter upon business, they were again summoned on the 30th October to meet the next day at four o'clock at Mr. Burns' long room at the City Arms to fall upon such methods as they shall then think most advisable for their reciprocal interest. On the 31st there was a general meeting of the principal merchants at this tavern, which was known under the various names of the City Arms, the Province Arms, the New York Arms, and stood on the upper corner of Broadway and Stone, now Thames street, on the site later occupied by the City Hotel. Resolutions were adopted and subscribed by upwards of two hundred of the principal merchants; 1st, to accompany all orders to Great Britain for goods or merchandize of any nature kind or quality whatever with instructions that they be not shipped unless the Stamp Act be repealed; 2nd, to countermand all outstanding orders unless on the conditions mentioned in the foregoing resolution; 3rd, not to vend any goods sent on commission, shipped after the 1st January succeeding, unless upon the same condition. In consequence of these resolutions the retailers of goods subscribed a paper obliging themselves not to buy any goods, wares or merchandize after the 1st January unless the Stamp Act were repealed. This was the first of the famous Non Importation Agreement, the great commercial measure of offense and defense against Great Britain. It punished friends and foes alike and plunged a large portion of the English people into the deepest distress; at the same time it taught the Colonies the value and extent of their own resources."—J. A. Stevens, *The Stamp Act in New York (Magazine of Am. Hist., June, 1877)*.—The Stamp Act was reprinted in New York "with a death's-head upon it in place of the royal arms, and it was hawked about the streets under the title of 'The Folly of England and the Ruin of America.' In Boston, the church-bells were tolled, and the flags on the shipping put at half-mast. But formal defiance came first from Virginia." Patrick Henry had just been elected to the colonial assembly. "In a committee of the whole house, he drew up a series of resolutions, declaring that the colonists were entitled to all the liberties and privileges of natural-born subjects, and that 'the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by themselves to represent them, . . . is the distinguishing characteristic of British freedom, without which the ancient constitution cannot exist.' It was further declared that any attempt to vest the power of taxation in any other body than the colonial assembly was a



menace to British no less than to American freedom; that the people of Virginia were not bound to obey any law enacted in disregard of these fundamental principles; and that any one who should maintain the contrary should be regarded as a public enemy. It was in the lively debate which ensued upon these resolutions, that Henry uttered those memorable words commending the example of Tarquin and Cæsar and Charles I. to the attention of George III. Before the vote had been taken upon all the resolutions, Governor Fauquier dissolved the assembly; but the resolutions were printed in the newspapers, and hailed with approval all over the country. Meanwhile, the Massachusetts legislature, at the suggestion of Otis, had issued a circular letter to all the colonies, calling for a general congress, in order to concert measures of resistance to the Stamp Act. The first cordial response came from South Carolina, at the instance of Christopher Gadsden, a wealthy merchant of Charleston and a scholar learned in Oriental languages, a man of rare sagacity and most liberal spirit. . . . The first announcement of the Stamp Act had called into existence a group of secret societies of workmen known as 'Sons of Liberty,' in allusion to a famous phrase in one of Colonel Barré's speeches. These societies were solemnly pledged to resist the execution of the obnoxious law. On the 14th of August, the quiet town of Boston witnessed some extraordinary proceedings [see LIBERTY TREE]. . . . Twelve days after, a mob sacked the splendid house of Chief Justice Hutchinson, threw his plate into the street, and destroyed the valuable library which he had been thirty years in collecting, and which contained many manuscripts, the loss of which was quite irreparable. As usual with mobs, the vengeance fell in the wrong place, for Hutchinson had done his best to prevent the passage of the Stamp Act. In most of the colonies, the stamp officers were compelled to resign their posts. Boxes of stamps arriving by ship were burned or thrown into the sea. . . . In New York, the presence of the troops for a moment encouraged the lieutenant-governor, Colden, to take a bold stand in behalf of the law. He talked of firing upon the people, but was warned that if he did so he would be speedily hanged on a lamp-post, like Captain Porteous of Edinburgh. A torchlight procession, carrying images of Colden and of the devil, broke into the governor's coach-house, and, seizing his best chariot, paraded it about town with the images upon it, and finally burned up chariot and images on the Bowling Green, in full sight of Colden and the garrison, who looked on from the Battery, speechless with rage, but afraid to interfere. Gage did not dare to have the troops used, for fear of bringing on a civil war; and the next day the discomfited Colden was obliged to surrender all the stamps to the common council of New York, by whom they were at once locked up in the City Hall. Nothing more was needed to prove the impossibility of carrying the Stamp Act into effect."—J. Fiske, *The American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 1.—In Connecticut the stamp agent, Mr. Ingersoll, was compelled by a body of armed citizens to resign—see CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1765.

ALSO IN: D. R. Goodloe, *The Birth of the Republic*, ch. 1 (a compilation of accounts of proceedings in the several colonies).—W. Tudor, *Life of*

*Jas. Otis*, ch. 14.—W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 1, ch. 2.—I. W. Stuart, *Life of Jonathan Trumbull*, ch. 7-8.—T. Hutchinson, *Hist. of Province of Mass. Bay, 1749-1774*, pp. 117-141.—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 2.—M. C. Tyler, *Patrick Henry*, ch. 5.

A. D. 1765.—The Stamp Act Congress.—The delegates chosen, on the invitation of Massachusetts, to attend a congress for consultation on the circumstances of the colonies, met, October 7, 1765, in the City Hall at New York. "In no place were the Sons of Liberty more determined, or were their opponents more influential. It was the headquarters of the British force in America, the commander of which, General Gage, wielded the powers of a viceroy. A fort within the city was heavily mounted with cannon. Ships of war were moored near the wharves. The executive, Lieutenant-governor Colden, was resolved to execute the law. When the Massachusetts delegates called on him, he remarked that the proposed congress would be unconstitutional, and unprecedented, and he should give it no countenance. The congress consisted of twenty-eight delegates from nine of the colonies; four, though sympathizing with the movement, not choosing representatives. Here several of the patriots, who had discussed the American question in their localities, met for the first time. James Otis stood in this body the foremost speaker. His pen, with the pens of the brothers Robert and Phillip Livingston, of New York, were summoned to service in a wider field. John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania, was soon to be known through the colonies by 'The Farmer's Letters.' Thomas McKean and Cæsar Rodney were pillars of the cause in Delaware. Edward Tilghman was an honored name in Maryland. South Carolina, in addition to the intrepid Gadsden, had, in Thomas Lynch and John Rutledge, two patriots who appear prominently in the subsequent career of that colony. Thus this body was graced by large ability, genius, learning, and common sense. It was calm in its deliberations, seeming unmoved by the whirl of the political waters. The congress organized by the choice, by one vote, of Timothy Ruggles, a Tory,—as the chairman,—and John Cotton, clerk. The second day of its session, it took into consideration the rights, privileges, and grievances of 'the British American colonists.' After eleven days' debate, it agreed—each colony having one vote—upon a declaration of rights and grievances and ordered it to be inserted in the journal. [The following is the 'Declaration': 'The members of this congress, sincerely devoted, with the warmest sentiments of affection and duty, to his majesty's person and government, inviolably attached to the present happy establishment of the protestant succession, and with minds deeply impressed by a sense of the present and impending misfortunes of the British colonies on this continent; having considered, as maturely as time will permit, the circumstances of the said colonies, esteem it our indispensable duty to make the following declarations of our humble opinion, respecting the most essential rights and liberties of the colonists, and of the grievances under which they labor by reason of several late acts of parliament. 1. That his majesty's subjects in these colonies owe the same allegiance to the crown of Great Britain that is owing from his subjects born within the realm, and all due

subordination to that august body the parliament of Great Britain. 2. That his majesty's liege subjects in these colonies are entitled to all the inherent rights and liberties of his natural born subjects within the kingdom of Great Britain. 3. That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that no taxes be imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives. 4. That the people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the house of commons of Great Britain. 5. That the only representatives of these colonies are persons chosen therein by themselves, and that no taxes ever have been or can be constitutionally imposed upon them, but by their respective legislatures. 6. That all supplies to the crown being free gifts from the people, it is unreasonable and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the British constitution for the people of Great Britain to grant to his majesty the property of the colonists. 7. That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies. 8. That the late act of parliament entitled 'an act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, and other duties, in the British colonies and plantations in America,' &c., by imposing taxes on the inhabitants of these colonies; and the said act, and several other acts, by extending the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty beyond its ancient limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists. 9. That the duties imposed by several late acts of parliament, from the peculiar circumstances of these colonies, will be extremely burdensome and grievous; and from the scarcity of specie, the payment of them absolutely impracticable. 10. That as the profits of the trade of these colonies ultimately center in Great Britain, to pay for the manufactures which they are obliged to take from thence, they eventually contribute very largely to all supplies granted to the crown. 11. That the restrictions imposed by several late acts of parliament on the trade of these colonies, will render them unable to purchase the manufactures of Great Britain. 12. That the increase, prosperity, and happiness of these colonies depend on the full and free enjoyment of their rights and liberties, and an intercourse with Great Britain mutually affectionate and advantageous. 13. That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies to petition the king, or either house of parliament. 14. That it is the indispensable duty of these colonies, to the best of sovereigns, to the mother country, and to themselves, to endeavor, by a loyal and dutiful address to his majesty, and humble application to both houses of parliament, to procure the repeal of the act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, of all clauses of any other acts of parliament whereby the jurisdiction of the admiralty is extended as aforesaid, and of the other late acts for the restriction of American commerce.] . . . The delegates present from only six of the colonies — except Ruggles and Ogden — signed the petition; those from New York, Connecticut, and South Carolina not being authorized to sign. On the 25th of October, the congress adjourned. Special measures were taken to transmit the proceedings to the unrepresented colonies. The several assemblies, on meeting, heartily approved

of the course of their delegates who concurred in the action of congress; but Ruggles, of Massachusetts, was reprimanded by the speaker, in the name of the House, and Ogden, of New Jersey, was hung in effigy by the people. The action of the assemblies was announced in the press. Meanwhile the Sons of Liberty, through their committees of correspondence, urged a continental Union; pledged a mutual support in case of danger; in some instances stated the numbers of armed men that might be relied on; and thus evinced a common determination to resist the execution of the Stamp Act."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the Republic of the U. S.*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: T. Pitkin, *Hist of the U. S.*, v. 1, app. 5-9.—H. Niles, *Principles and Acts of the Revolution* (ed. of 1876), pp. 155-168.

**A. D. 1765-1768.—Treaties with the Indians at German Flats and Fort Stanwix.—Cession of Iroquois claims to western Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Kentucky.—The drawing of the Indian boundary line.**—"After the success of Bradstreet and Bouquet [see PONTIAC'S WAR], there was no difficulty in concluding a treaty with all the Western Indians; and late in April, 1765, Sir William Johnson, at the German Flats, held a conference with the various nations, and settled a definite peace. At this meeting two propositions were made; the one to fix some boundary line, west of which the Europeans should not go; and the savages named, as this line, the Ohio or Alleghany and Susquehannah; but no definite agreement was made, Johnson not being empowered to act. The other proposal was, that the Indians should grant to the traders, who had suffered in 1763, a tract of land in compensation for the injuries then done them, and to this the red men agreed. . . . During the very year that succeeded the treaty of German Flats, settlers crossed the mountains and took possession of lands in western Virginia and along the Monongahela. The Indians, having received no pay for these lands, murmured, and once more a border war was feared. . . . And not only were frontier men thus passing the line tacitly agreed on, but Sir William himself was even then meditating a step which would have produced, had it been taken, a general Indian war again. This was the purchase and settlement of an immense tract south of the Ohio River, where an independent colony was to be formed. How early this plan was conceived we do not learn, but, from Franklin's letters, we find that it was in contemplation in the spring of 1766. At that time Franklin was in London, and was written to by his son, Governor Franklin of New Jersey, with regard to the proposed colony. The plan seems to have been to buy of the Six Nations the lands south of the Ohio, a purchase which it was not doubted Sir William might make, and then to procure from the King a grant of as much territory as the Company which it was intended to form would require. Governor Franklin, accordingly, forwarded to his father an application for a grant, together with a letter from Sir William, recommending the plan to the ministry; all of which was duly communicated to the proper department. But at that time there were various interests bearing upon this plan of Franklin. The old Ohio Company [see OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754] was still suing, through its agent, Colonel George Mercer, for a perfection of the original grant. . . . General



Lyman, from Connecticut we believe, was soliciting a new grant similar to that now asked by Franklin; and the ministers themselves were divided as to the policy and propriety of establishing any settlements so far in the interior,—Shelburne being in favor of the new colony, Hillsborough opposed to it. The Company was organized, however, and the nominally leading man therein being Mr. Thomas Walpole, a London banker of eminence, it was known as the Walpole Company. . . . Before any conclusion was come to, it was necessary to arrange definitely that boundary line which had been vaguely talked of in 1765, and with respect to which Sir William Johnson had written to the ministry, who had mislaid his letters and given him no instructions. The necessity of arranging this boundary was also kept in mind by the continued and growing irritation of the Indians, who found themselves invaded from every side. . . . Franklin, the father, all this time, was urging the same necessity upon the ministers in England; and about Christmas of 1767, Sir William's letters on the subject having been found, orders were sent him to complete the proposed purchase from the Six Nations, and settle all differences. But the project for a colony was for the time dropped, a new administration coming in which was not that way disposed. Sir William Johnson having received, early in the spring, the orders from England relative to a new treaty with the Indians, at once took steps to secure a full attendance. Notice was given to the various colonial governments, to the Six Nations, the Delawares, and the Shawanese, and a Congress was appointed to meet at Fort Stanwix during the following October. It met upon the 24th of that month, and was attended by representatives from New Jersey, Virginia, and Pennsylvania; by Sir William and his deputies; by the agents of those traders who had suffered in the war of 1763; and by deputies from all of the Six Nations, the Delawares, and the Shawanese. The first point to be settled was the boundary line which was to determine the Indian lands of the West from that time forward; and this line the Indians, upon the 1st of November, stated should begin on the Ohio at the mouth of the Cherokee (or Tennessee) river; thence go up the Ohio and Alleghany to Kittaning; thence across to the Susquehanna, &c.; whereby the whole country south of the Ohio and Alleghany, to which the Six Nations had any claim, was transferred to the British. One deed, for a part of this land, was made on the 3d of November to William Trent, attorney for twenty-two traders, whose goods had been destroyed by the Indians in 1763. The tract conveyed by this was between the Kenhawa and Monongahela, and was by the traders named 'Indiana.' Two days afterward, a deed for the remaining western lands was made to the King, and the price agreed on paid down. These deeds were made upon the express agreement, that no claim should ever be based upon previous treaties, those of Lancaster, Logstown, &c.; and they were signed by the chiefs of the Six Nations, for themselves, their allies and dependents, the Shawanese, Delawares, Mingoes of Ohio, and others; but the Shawanese and Delaware deputies present did not sign them. Such was the treaty of Stanwix, whereon rests the title by purchase to Kentucky, western Virginia, and Pennsylvania. It was a better foundation,

perhaps, than that given by previous treaties, but was essentially worthless; for the lands conveyed were not occupied or hunted on by those conveying them. In truth, we cannot doubt that this immense grant was obtained by the influence of Sir William Johnson, in order that the new colony, of which he was to be governor, might be founded there. . . . The white man could now quiet his conscience when driving the native from his forest home, and feel sure that an army would back his pretensions. . . . Meantime more than one bold man had ventured for a little while into the beautiful valleys of Kentucky, and, on the 1st of May, 1769, there was one going forth from his 'peaceable habitation on the Yadkin river in North Carolina,' whose name has since gone far and wide over this little planet of ours, he having become the type of his class. This was Daniel Boone. He crossed the mountains, and spent that summer and the next winter in the West. But, while he was rejoicing in the abundance of buffalo, deer, and turkeys among the cane-brakes, longer heads were meditating still that new colony, the plan of which had been lying in silence for two years and more. The Board of Trade was again called on to report upon the application, and Lord Hillsborough, the President, reported against it. This called out Franklin's celebrated 'Ohio Settlement,' a paper written with so much ability, that the King's Council put by the official report, and granted the petition, a step which mortified the noble lord so much that he resigned his official station. The petition now needed only the royal sanction, which was not given until August 14th, 1772; but in 1770, the Ohio Company was merged in Walpole's, and, the claims of the soldiers of 1756 being acknowledged both by the new Company and by government, all claims were quieted. Nothing was ever done, however, under the grant to Walpole, the Revolution soon coming upon America. After the Revolution, Mr. Walpole and his associates petitioned Congress respecting their lands, called by them 'Vandalia,' but could get no help from that body. What was finally done by Virginia with the claims of this and other companies, we do not find written, but presume their lands were all looked on as forfeited."—J. H. Perkins, *English Discoveries in the Ohio Valley* (North Am. Rev., July, 1839).

ALSO IN: W. L. Stone, *Life and Times of Sir Wm. Johnson*, v. 2, ch. 16.—B. Franklin, *Works*, (ed. by Sparks), v. 4, pp. 233-241, and 302-380.

**A. D. 1766.—Examination of Dr. Franklin before Parliament.**—On the 28th of January, 1766, while the bill for the repeal of the Stamp Act was pending in Parliament, Dr. Franklin was examined before the House of Commons, in Committee. The questions and answers of this very interesting examination, as reported in the Parliamentary History, were as follows:

Q. What is your name, and place of abode?  
—A. Franklin, of Philadelphia.

Do the Americans pay any considerable taxes among themselves?—Certainly many, and very heavy taxes.

What are the present taxes in Pennsylvania, laid by the laws of the colony?—There are taxes on all estates real and personal, a poll-tax, a tax on all offices, professions, trades, and businesses, according to their profits; an excise on all wine, rum, and other spirit; and a duty of ten

pounds per head on all negroes imported, with some other duties.

For what purposes are those taxes laid?—For the support of the civil and military establishments of the country, and to discharge the heavy debt contracted in the last war.

How long are those taxes to continue?—Those for discharging the debt are to continue till 1772, and longer, if the debt should not be then all discharged. The others must always continue.

Was it not expected that the debt would have been sooner discharged?—It was, when the peace was made with France and Spain; but a fresh war breaking out with the Indians, a fresh load of debt was incurred, and the taxes, of course, continued longer by a new law.

Are not all the people very able to pay those taxes?—No. The frontier counties, all along the continent, having been frequently ravaged by the enemy, and greatly impoverished, are able to pay very little tax. And therefore, in consideration of their distresses, our late tax laws do expressly favour those counties, excusing the sufferers; and I suppose the same is done in other governments.

Are not you concerned in the management of the post office in America?—Yes; I am deputy post-master general of North America.

Don't you think the distribution of stamps, by post, to all the inhabitants, very practicable, if there was no opposition?—The posts only go along the sea coasts; they do not, except in a few instances, go back into the country; and if they did, sending for stamps by post would occasion an expence of postage, amounting, in many cases, to much more than that of the stamps themselves.

Are you acquainted with Newfoundland?—I never was there.

Do you know whether there are any post-roads on that island?—I have heard that there are no roads at all; but that the communication between one settlement and another is by sea only.

Can you disperse the stamps by post in Canada?—There is only a post between Montreal and Quebec. The inhabitants live so scattered and remote from each other, in that vast country, that posts cannot be supported among them, and therefore they cannot get stamps per post. The English colonies too, along the frontiers, are very thinly settled.

From the thinness of the back settlements, would not the Stamp Act be extremely inconvenient to the inhabitants if executed?—To be sure it would; as many of the inhabitants could not get stamps when they had occasion for them, without taking long journeys, and spending, perhaps, three or four pounds, that the crown might get sixpence.

Are not the colonies, from their circumstances, very able to pay the stamp duty?—In my opinion, there is not gold and silver enough in the colonies to pay the stamp duty for one year.

Don't you know that the money arising from the stamps was all to be laid out in America?—I know it is appropriated by the act to the American service; but it will be spent in the conquered colonies, where the soldiers are, not in the colonies that pay it.

Is there not a balance of trade due from the colonies where the troops are posted, that will bring back the money to the old colonies?—I think not. I believe very little would come

back. I know of no trade likely to bring it back. I think it would come from the colonies where it was spent directly to England; for I have always observed, that in every colony the more plenty of means of remittance to England, the more goods are sent for, and the more trade with England carried on.

What number of white inhabitants do you think there are in Pennsylvania?—I suppose there may be about 160,000.

What number of them are Quakers?—Perhaps a third.

What number of Germans?—Perhaps another third; but I cannot speak with certainty.

Have any number of the Germans seen service, as soldiers, in Europe?—Yes, many of them, both in Europe and America.

Are they as much dissatisfied with the stamp duty as the English?—Yes, and more; and with reason, as their stamps are, in many cases, to be double.

How many white men do you suppose there are in North America?—About 300,000, from 16 to 60 years of age.

What may be the amount of one year's imports into Pennsylvania from Britain?—I have been informed that our merchants compute the imports from Britain to be above 500,000*l*.

What may be the amount of the produce of your province exported to Britain?—It must be small, as we produce little that is wanted in Britain. I suppose it cannot exceed 40,000*l*.

How then do you pay the balance?—The balance is paid by our produce carried to the West Indies, and sold in our own islands, or to the French, Spaniards, Danes, and Dutch; by the same carried to other colonies in North America, as to New England, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Carolina, and Georgia; by the same carried to different parts of Europe, as Spain, Portugal and Italy. In all which places we receive either money, bills of exchange, or commodities that suit for remittance to Britain; which, together with all the profits on the industry of our merchants and mariners, arising in those circuitous voyages, and the freights made by their ships, centre finally in Britain to discharge the balance, and pay for British manufactures continually used in the province, or sold to foreigners by our traders.

Have you heard of any difficulties lately laid on the Spanish trade?—Yes, I have heard that it has been greatly obstructed by some new regulations, and by the English men of war and cutters stationed all along the coast in America.

Do you think it right, that America should be protected by this country, and pay no part of the expence?—That is not the case. The colonies raised, clothed and paid, during the last war, nearly 25,000 men, and spent many millions.

Were you not reimbursed by parliament?—We were only reimbursed what, in your opinion, we had advanced beyond our proportion, or beyond what might reasonably be expected from us; and it was a very small part of what we spent. Pennsylvania, in particular, disbursed about 500,000*l*., and the reimbursements, in the whole, did not exceed 60,000*l*.

You have said that you pay heavy taxes in Pennsylvania; what do they amount to in the pound?—The tax on all estates, real and personal, is eighteen pence in the pound, fully rated; and the tax on the profits of trades and



professions, with other taxes, do, I suppose, make full half a crown in the pound.

Do you know any thing of the rate of exchange in Pennsylvania, and whether it has fallen lately?—It is commonly from 170 to 175. I have heard that it has fallen lately from 175 to 162 and a half, owing, I suppose, to their lessening their orders for goods; and when their debts to this country are paid, I think the exchange will probably be at par.

Do not you think the people of America would submit to pay the stamp duty, if it was moderated?—No, never, unless compelled by force of arms.

Are not the taxes in Pennsylvania laid on unequally, in order to burden the English trade, particularly the tax on professions and business?—It is not more burdensome in proportion than the tax on lands. It is intended, and supposed to take an equal proportion of profits.

How is the assembly composed? Of what kinds of people are the members, landholders or traders?—It is composed of landholders, merchants, and artificers.

Are not the majority landholders?—I believe they are.

Do not they, as much as possible, shift the tax off from the land, to ease that, and lay the burthen heavier on trade?—I have never understood it so. I never heard such a thing suggested. And indeed an attempt of that kind could answer no purpose. The merchant or trader is always skilled in figures, and ready with his pen and ink. If unequal burdens are laid on his trade, he puts an additional price on his goods; and the consumers, who are chiefly landholders, finally pay the greatest part, if not the whole.

What was the temper of America towards Great Britain before the year 1763?—The best in the world. They submitted willingly to the government of the crown, and paid, in all their courts, obedience to acts of parliament. Numerous as the people are in the several old provinces, they cost you nothing in forts, citadels, garrisons or armies, to keep them in subjection. They were governed by this country at the expense only of a little pen, ink, and paper. They were led by a thread. They had not only a respect, but an affection for Great Britain, for its laws, its customs and manners, and even a fondness for its fashions, that greatly increased the commerce. Natives of Britain were always treated with particular regard; to be an Old-England man was, of itself, a character of some respect, and gave a kind of rank among us.

And what is their temper now?—O, very much altered.

Did you ever hear the authority of parliament to make laws for America questioned till lately?—The authority of parliament was allowed to be valid in all laws, except such as should lay internal taxes. It was never disputed in laying duties to regulate commerce.

In what proportion hath population increased in America?—I think the inhabitants of all the provinces together, taken at a medium, double in about 25 years. But their demand for British manufactures increases much faster, as the consumption is not merely in proportion to their numbers, but grows with the growing abilities of the same numbers to pay for them. In 1723, the whole importation from Britain to Pennsylvania, was but about 15,000*l.* sterling; it is now near half a million.

In what light did the people of America use to consider the parliament of Great Britain?—They considered the parliament as the great bulwark and security of their liberties and privileges, and always spoke of it with the utmost respect and veneration. Arbitrary ministers, they thought, might possibly, at times, attempt to oppress them; but they relied on it, that the parliament, on application, would always give redress. They remembered, with gratitude, a strong instance of this, when a bill was brought into parliament, with a clause to make royal instructions laws in the colonies, which the House of Commons would not pass, and it was thrown out.

And have they not still the same respect for parliament?—No; it is greatly lessened.

To what causes is that owing?—To a concurrence of causes; the restraints lately laid on their trade, by which the bringing of foreign gold and silver into the colonies was prevented; the prohibition of making paper money among themselves; and then demand a new and heavy tax by stamps; taking away at the same time, trials by juries, and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions.

Don't you think they would submit to the Stamp Act, if it was modified, the obnoxious parts taken out, and the duty reduced to some particulars, of small moment?—No; they will never submit to it.

What do you think is the reason that the people of America increase faster than in England?—Because they marry younger, and more generally.

Why so?—Because any young couple that are industrious, may easily obtain land of their own, on which they can raise a family.

Are not the lower rank of people more at their ease in America than in England?—They may be so, if they are sober and diligent, as they are better paid for their labour.

What is your opinion of a future tax, imposed on the same principle with that of the Stamp Act, how would the Americans receive it?—Just as they do this. They would not pay it.

Have not you heard of the resolution of this House, and of the House of Lords, asserting the right of parliament relating to America, including a power to tax the people there?—Yes, I have heard of such resolutions.

What will be the opinion of the Americans on those resolutions?—They will think them unconstitutional and unjust.

Was it an opinion in America before 1763, that the parliament had no right to lay taxes and duties there?—I never heard any objection to the right of laying duties to regulate commerce; but a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to be in parliament, as we are not represented there.

On what do you found your opinion, that the people in America made any such distinction?—I know that whenever the subject has occurred in conversation where I have been present, it has appeared to be the opinion of every one, that we could not be taxed in a parliament where we were not represented. But the payment of duties laid by act of parliament, as regulations of commerce, was never disputed.

But can you name any act of assembly, or public act of any of your governments, that made such distinction?—I do not know that

there was any; I think there was never an occasion to make any such act, till now that you have attempted to tax us; that has occasioned resolutions of assembly, declaring the distinction, in which I think every assembly on the continent, and every member in every assembly, have been unanimous.

What then could occasion conversations on that subject before that time?—There was, in 1754, a proposition made (I think it came from hence) that in case of a war, which was then apprehended, the governors of the colonies should meet, and order the levying of troops, building of forts, and taking every other necessary measure for the general defence; and should draw on the treasury here, for the sums expended, which were afterwards to be raised in the colonies by a general tax, to be laid on them by act of parliament. This occasioned a good deal of conversation on the subject, and the general opinion was, that the parliament neither would, nor could lay any tax on us, till we were duly represented in parliament, because it was not just, nor agreeable to the nature of an English constitution.

Don't you know there was a time in New York, when it was under consideration to make an application to parliament, to lay taxes on that colony, upon a deficiency arising from the assembly's refusing or neglecting to raise the necessary supplies for the support of the civil government?—I never heard of it.

There was such an application under consideration in New York; and do you apprehend they could suppose the right of parliament to lay a tax in America was only local, and confined to the case of a deficiency in a particular colony, by a refusal of its assembly to raise the necessary supplies?—They could not suppose such a case, as that the assembly would not raise the necessary supplies to support its own government. An assembly that would refuse it, must want common sense, which cannot be supposed. I think there was never any such case at New York, and that it must be a misrepresentation, or the fact must be misunderstood. I know there have been some attempts, by ministerial instructions from hence, to oblige the assemblies to settle permanent salaries on governors, which they wisely refused to do; but I believe no assembly of New York, or any other colony, ever refused duly to support government, by proper allowances, from time to time, to public officers.

But in case a governor, acting by instruction, should call on an assembly to raise the necessary supplies, and the assembly should refuse to do it, do you not think it would then be for the good of the people of the colony, as well as necessary to government, that the parliament should tax them?—I do not think it would be necessary. If an assembly could possibly be so absurd as to refuse raising the supplies requisite for the maintenance of government among them, they could not long remain in such a situation; the disorders and confusion occasioned by it, must soon bring them to reason.

If it should not, ought not the right to be in Great Britain of applying a remedy?—A right only to be used in such a case, I should have no objection to, supposing it to be used merely for the good of the people of the colony.

But who is to judge of that, Britain or the colony?—Those that feel can best judge.

You say the colonies have always submitted to external taxes, and object to the right of parliament only in laying internal taxes; now can you shew that there is any kind of difference between the two taxes to the colony on which they may be laid?—I think the difference is very great. An external tax is a duty laid on commodities imported; that duty is added to the first cost, and other charges on the commodity, and when it is offered to sale, makes a part of the price. If the people do not like it at that price, they refuse it; they are not obliged to pay it. But an internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, if not laid by their own representatives. The Stamp Act says, we shall have no commerce, make no exchange of property with each other, neither purchase nor grant, nor recover debts; we shall neither marry nor make our wills, unless we pay such sums, and thus it is intended to extort our money from us, or ruin us by the consequences of refusing to pay it.

But supposing the internal tax or duty to be laid on the necessities of life imported into your colony, will not that be the same thing in its effects as an internal tax?—I do not know a single article imported into the northern colonies, but what they can either do without or make themselves.

Don't you think cloth from England absolutely necessary to them?—No, by no means absolutely necessary; with industry and good management, they may very well supply themselves with all they want.

Will it not take a long time to establish that manufacture among them; and must they not in the mean while suffer greatly?—I think not. They have made a surprising progress already. And I am of opinion, that before their old clothes are worn out, they will have new ones of their own making.

Can they possibly find wool enough in North America?—They have taken steps to increase the wool. They entered into general combination to eat no more lamb, and very few lambs were killed last year. This course persisted in, will soon make a prodigious difference in the quantity of wool. And the establishing of great manufactories, like those in the clothing towns here, is not necessary, as it is where the business is to be carried on for the purposes of trade. The people will all spin and work for themselves, in their own houses.

Can there be wool and manufacture enough in one or two years?—In three years, I think, there may.

Does not the severity of the winter, in the northern colonies, occasion the wool to be of bad quality?—No, the wool is very fine and good.

In the more southern colonies, as in Virginia, don't you know that the wool is coarse, and only a kind of hair?—I don't know it. I never heard it. Yet I have been sometimes in Virginia. I cannot say I ever took particular notice of the wool there, but I believe it is good, though I cannot speak positively of it; but Virginia, and the colonies south of it, have less occasion for wool; their winters are short, and not very severe, and they can very well clothe themselves with linen and cotton of their own raising for the rest of the year.

Are not the people in the more northern colonies obliged to fodder their sheep all the winter?



—In some of the most northern colonies they may be obliged to do it some part of the winter.

Considering the resolutions of parliament as to the right, do you think, if the Stamp Act is repealed, that the North Americans will be satisfied?—I believe they will.

Why do you think so?—I think the resolutions of right will give them very little concern, if they are never attempted to be carried into practice. The colonies will probably consider themselves in the same situation, in that respect, with Ireland; they know you claim the same right with regard to Ireland, but you never exercise it. And they may believe you never will exercise it in the colonies, any more than in Ireland, unless on some very extraordinary occasion.

But who are to be the judges of that extraordinary occasion? Is not the parliament?—Though the parliament may judge of the occasion, the people will think it can never exercise such right, till representatives from the colonies are admitted into parliament, and that whenever the occasion arises, representatives will be ordered.

Did you never hear that Maryland, during the last war, had refused to furnish a quota towards the common defence?—Maryland has been much misrepresented in that matter. Maryland, to my knowledge, never refused to contribute, or grant aids to the crown. The assemblies every year, during the war, voted considerable sums, and formed bills to raise them. The bills were, according to the constitution of that province, sent up to the council, or upper house, for concurrence, that they might be presented to the governor, in order to be enacted into laws. Unhappy disputes between the two houses, arising from the defects of that constitution principally, rendered all the bills but one or two abortive. The proprietary's council rejected them. It is true, Maryland did not contribute its proportion, but it was, in my opinion, the fault of the government, not of the people.

Was it not talked of in the other provinces as a proper measure to apply to parliament to compel them?—I have heard such discourse: but as it was well known that the people were not to blame, no such application was ever made, or any step taken towards it.

Was it not proposed at a public meeting?—Not that I know of.

Do you remember the abolishing of the paper currency in New England, by act of assembly?—I do remember its being abolished in the Massachusetts Bay.

Was not lieutenant governor Hutchinson principally concerned in that transaction?—I have heard so.

Was it not at that time a very unpopular law?—I believe it might, though I can say little about it, as I lived at a distance from that province.

Was not the scarcity of gold and silver an argument used against abolishing the paper?—I suppose it was.

What is the present opinion there of that law? Is it as unpopular as it was at first?—I think it is not.

Have not instructions from hence been sometimes sent over to governors, highly oppressive and unpolitical?—Yes.

Have not some governors dispensed with them for that reason?—Yes, I have heard so.

Did the Americans ever dispute the controuling power of parliament to regulate the commerce?—No.

Can any thing less than a military force carry the Stamp Act into execution?—I do not see how a military force can be applied to that purpose.

Why may it not?—Suppose a military force sent into America, they will find nobody in arms; what are they then to do? They cannot force a man to take stamps who chuses to do without them. They will not find a rebellion; they may indeed make one.

If the act is not repealed, what do you think will be the consequences?—A total loss of the respect and affection the people of America bear to this country, and of all the commerce that depends on that respect and affection.

How can the commerce be affected?—You will find, that if the act is not repealed, they will take very little of your manufactures in a short time.

Is it in their power to do without them?—I think they may very well do without them.

Is it their interest not to take them?—The goods they take from Britain are either necessities, mere conveniences, or superfluities. The first, as cloth, &c. with a little industry they can make at home: the second they can do without, till they are able to provide them among themselves; and the last, which are much the greatest part, they will strike off immediately. They are mere articles of fashion, purchased and consumed, because the fashion in a respected country, but will now be detested and rejected. The people have already struck off, by general agreement, the use of all goods fashionable in mournings, and many thousand pounds worth are sent back as unsaleable.

Is it their interest to make cloth at home?—I think they may at present get it cheaper from Britain, I mean of the same fineness and neatness of workmanship; but when one considers other circumstances, the restraints on their trade, and the difficulty of making remittances, it is their interest to make every thing.

Suppose an act of internal regulations connected with the tax, how would they receive it?—I think it would be objected to.

Then no regulation with a tax would be submitted to?—Their opinion is, that when aids to the crown are wanted, they are to be asked of the several assemblies according to the old established usage, who will, as they have always done, grant them freely. And that their money ought not to be given away, without their consent, by persons at a distance, unacquainted with their circumstances and abilities. The granting aids to the crown, is the only means they have of recommending themselves to their sovereign, and they think it extremely hard and unjust, that a body of men, in which they have no representatives, should make a merit to itself of giving and granting what is not its own, but theirs, and deprives them of a right they esteem of the utmost value and importance, as it is the security of all their other rights.

But is not the post office, which they have long received, a tax as well as a regulation?—No; the money paid for the postage of a letter is not of the nature of a tax; it is merely a quantum meruit for a service done; no person is compellable to pay the money, if he does not chuse

to receive the service. A man may still, as before the act, send his letter by a servant, a special messenger, or a friend, if he thinks it cheaper and safer.

But do they not consider the regulations of the post-office, by the act of last year, as a tax?—By the regulations of last year the rate of postage was generally abated near thirty per cent. through all America; they certainly cannot consider such abatement as a tax.

If an excise was laid by parliament, which they might likewise avoid paying, by not consuming the articles excised, would they then not object to it?—They would certainly object to it, as an excise is unconnected with any service done, and is merely an aid which they think ought to be asked of them, and granted by them if they are to pay it, and can be granted for them, by no others whatsoever, whom they have not empowered for that purpose.

You say they do not object to the right of parliament, in laying duties on goods to be paid on their importation; now, is there any kind of difference between a duty on the importation of goods and an excise on their consumption?—Yes; a very material one; an excise, for the reasons I have just mentioned, they think you can have no right to lay within their country. But the sea is yours; you maintain, by your fleets, the safety of navigation in it, and keep it clear of pirates; you may have therefore a natural and equitable right to some toll or duty on merchandizes carried through that part of your dominions, towards defraying the expence you are at in ships to maintain the safety of that carriage.

Does this reasoning hold in the case of a duty laid on the produce of their lands exported? And would they not then object to such a duty?—If it tended to make the produce so much dearer abroad as to lessen the demand for it, to be sure they would object to such a duty; not to your right of laying it, but they would complain of it as a burden, and petition you to lighten it.

Is not the duty paid on the tobacco exported a duty of that kind?—That, I think, is only on tobacco carried coastwise from one colony to another, and appropriated as a fund for supporting the college at Williamsburgh, in Virginia.

Have not the assemblies in the West Indies the same natural rights with those in North America?—Undoubtedly.

And is there not a tax laid there on their sugars exported?—I am not much acquainted with the West Indies, but the duty of four and a half per cent., on sugars exported, was, I believe, granted by their own assemblies.

How much is the poll tax in your province laid on unmarried men?—It is, I think, fifteen shillings, to be paid by every single freeman, upwards of twenty one years old.

What is the annual amount of all the taxes in Pennsylvania?—I suppose about 20,000*l.* sterling.

Supposing the Stamp Act continued, and enforced, do you imagine that ill humour will induce the Americans to give as much for worse manufactures of their own and use them, preferably to better of ours?—Yes, I think so. People will pay as freely to gratify one passion as another, their resentment as their pride.

Would the people at Boston discontinue their trade?—The merchants are a very small num-

ber compared with the body of the people, and must discontinue their trade, if nobody will buy their goods.

What are the body of the people in the colonies?—They are farmers, husbandmen or planters.

Would they suffer the produce of their lands to rot?—No; but they would not raise so much. They would manufacture more, and plough less.

Would they live without the administration of justice in civil matters, and suffer all the inconveniences of such a situation for any considerable time, rather than take the stamps, supposing the stamps were protected by a sufficient force, where every one might have them?—I think the supposition impracticable, that the stamps should be so protected as that every one might have them. The Act requires sub-distributors to be appointed in every county town, district, and village, and they would be necessary. But the principal distributors, who were to have had a considerable profit on the whole, have not thought it worth while to continue in the office, and I think it impossible to find sub-distributors fit to be trusted, who, for the trifling profit that must come to their share, would incur the odium, and run the hazard that would attend it; and if they could be found, I think it impracticable to protect the stamps in so many distant and remote places.

But in places where they could be protected, would not the people use them rather than remain in such a situation, unable to obtain any right, or recover, by law, any debt?—It is hard to say what they would do. I can only judge what other people will think, and how they will act, by what I feel within myself. I have a great many debts due to me in America, and I had rather they should remain unrecoverable by any law than submit to the Stamp Act. They will be debts of honour. It is my opinion the people will either continue in that situation, or find some way to extricate themselves, perhaps by generally agreeing to proceed in the courts without stamps.

What do you think a sufficient military force to protect the distribution of the stamps in every part of America?—A very great force; I cannot say what, if the disposition of America is for a general resistance.

What is the number of men in America able to bear arms, or of disciplined militia?—There are, I suppose, at least — [Question objected to. He withdrew. Called in again.]

Is the American Stamp Act an equal tax on that country?—I think not.

Why so?—The greatest part of the money must arise from lawsuits for the recovery of debts, and be paid by the lower sort of people, who were too poor easily to pay their debts. It is therefore a heavy tax on the poor, and a tax upon them for being poor.

But will not this increase of expence be a means of lessening the number of lawsuits?—I think not; for as the costs all fall upon the debtor, and are to be paid by him, they would be no discouragement to the creditor to bring his action.

Would it not have the effect of excessive usury?—Yes, as an oppression of the debtor.

How many ships are there laden annually in North America with flax seed for Ireland?—I cannot speak to the number of ships, but I know



that in 1752, 10,000 hogsheads of flax seed, each containing seven bushels, were exported from Philadelphia to Ireland. I suppose the quantity is greatly increased since that time; and it is understood that the exportation from New York is equal to that from Philadelphia.

What becomes of the flax that grows with that flax seed?—They manufacture some into coarse, and some into a middling kind of linen.

Are there any slitting mills in America?—I think there are three, but I believe only one at present employed. I suppose they will all be set to work, if the interruption of the trade continues.

Are there any fulling mills there?—A great many.

Did you never hear that a great quantity of stockings were contracted for, for the army, during the war, and manufactured in Philadelphia?—I have heard so.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, would not the Americans think they could oblige the parliament to repeal every external tax law now in force?—It is hard to answer questions what people at such a distance will think.

But what do you imagine they will think were the motives of repealing the Act?—I suppose they will think that it was repealed from a conviction of its inexpediency; and they will rely upon it, that while the same inexpediency subsists, you will never attempt to make such another.

What do you mean by its inexpediency?—I mean its inexpediency on several accounts; the poverty and inability of those who were to pay the tax; the general discontent it has occasioned; and the impracticability of enforcing it.

If the Act should be repealed, and the legislature should shew its resentment to the opposers of the Stamp Act, would the colonies acquiesce in the authority of the legislature? What is your opinion they would do?—I don't doubt at all, that if the legislature repeal the Stamp Act, the colonies will acquiesce in the authority.

But if the legislature should think fit to ascertain its right to lay taxes, by any act laying a small tax, contrary to their opinion, would they submit to pay the tax?—The proceedings of the people in America have been considered too much together. The proceedings of the assemblies have been very different from those of the mobs, and should be distinguished, as having no connection with each other. The assemblies have only peaceably resolved what they take to be their rights; they have not built a fort, raised a man, or provided a grain of ammunition, in order to such opposition. The ringleaders of riot they think ought to be punished; they would punish them themselves, if they could. Every sober, sensible man would wish to see rioters punished, as otherwise peaceable people have no security of person or estate. But as to an internal tax, how small soever, laid by the legislature here on the people there, while they have no representatives in this legislature, I think it will never be submitted to.—They will oppose it to the last.—They do not consider it as at all necessary for you to raise money on them by your taxes, because they are, and always have been, ready to raise money by taxes among themselves, and to grant large sums, equal to their abilities, upon requisition from the crown.—They have not only granted equal to their abilities, but, during

all the last war, they granted far beyond their abilities, and beyond their proportion with this country, you yourselves being judges, to the amount of many hundred thousand pounds, and this they did freely and readily, only on a sort of promise from the secretary of state, that it should be recommended to parliament to make them compensation. It was accordingly recommended to parliament, in the most honourable manner, for them. America has been greatly misrepresented and abused here, in papers, and pamphlets, and speeches, as ungrateful, and unreasonable, and unjust, in having put this nation to immense expence for their defence, and refusing to bear any part of that expence. The colonies raised, paid, and clothed, near 25,000 men during the last war, a number equal to those sent from Britain, and far beyond their proportion; they went deeply into debt in doing this, and all their taxes and estates are mortgaged, for many years to come, for discharging that debt. Government here was at that time very sensible of this. The colonies were recommended to parliament. Every year the King sent down to the House a written message to this purpose, That his Majesty, being highly sensible of the zeal and vigour with which his faithful subjects in North America had exerted themselves, in defence of his Majesty's just rights and possessions, recommended it to the House to take the same into consideration, and enable him to give them a proper compensation. You will find those messages on your own journals every year of the war to the very last, and you did accordingly give 200,000*l.* annually to the crown, to be distributed in such compensation to the colonies. This is the strongest of all proofs that the colonies, far from being unwilling to bear a share of the burden, did exceed their proportion; for if they had done less, or had only equalled their proportion, there would have been no room or reason for compensation. Indeed the sums reimbursed them, were by no means adequate to the expence they incurred beyond their proportion; but they never murmured at that; they esteemed their sovereign's approbation of their zeal and fidelity, and the approbation of this House, far beyond any other kind of compensation; therefore there was no occasion for this act, to force money from a willing people; they had not refused giving money for the purposes of the act; no requisition had been made: they were always willing and ready to do what could reasonably be expected from them, and in this light they wish to be considered.

But suppose Great Britain should be engaged in a war in Europe, would North America contribute to the support of it?—I do think they would, as far as their circumstances would permit. They consider themselves as a part of the British empire, and as having one common interest with it; they may be looked on here as foreigners, but they do not consider themselves as such. They are zealous for the honour and prosperity of this nation, and while they are well used, will always be ready to support it, as far as their little power goes. In 1739 they were called upon to assist in the expedition against Carthagera, and they sent 3,000 men to join your army. It is true Carthagera is in America, but as remote from the northern colonies as if it had been in Europe. They make no distinction of wars, as to their duty of assisting in them.

I know the last war is commonly spoke of here as entered into for the defence, or for the sake of the people of America. I think it is quite misunderstood. It began about the limits between Canada and Nova Scotia, about territories to which the crown indeed laid claim, but were not claimed by any British colony; none of the lands had been granted to any colonist; we had therefore no particular concern or interest in that dispute. As to the Ohio, the contest there began about your right of trading in the Indian country, a right you had by the treaty of Utrecht, which the French infringed; they seized the traders and their goods, which were your manufactures; they took a fort which a company of your merchants, and their factors and correspondents, had erected there to secure that trade. Braddock was sent with an army to re-take that fort (which was looked on here as another incroachment on the King's territory) and to protect your trade. It was not till after his defeat that the colonies were attacked. They were before in perfect peace with both French and Indians; the troops were not therefore sent for their defence. The trade with the Indians, though carried on in America, is not an American interest. The people of America are chiefly farmers and planters; scarce any thing that they raise or produce is an article of commerce with the Indians. The Indian trade is a British interest; it is carried on with British manufactures, for the profit of British merchants and manufacturers; therefore the war, as it commenced for the defence of territories of the crown, the property of no American, and for the defence of a trade purely British, was really a British war—and yet the people of America made no scruple of contributing their utmost towards carrying it on, and bringing it to a happy conclusion.

Do you think then that the taking possession of the King's territorial rights, and strengthening the frontiers, is not an American interest?—Not particularly, but conjointly a British and an American interest.

You will not deny that the preceding war, the war with Spain, was entered into for the sake of America; was it not occasioned by captures made in the American seas?—Yes; captures of ships carrying on the British trade there, with British manufactures.

Was not the late war with the Indians, since the peace with France, a war for America only?—Yes: it was more particularly for America than the former, but it was rather a consequence or remains of the former war, the Indians not having been thoroughly pacified, and the Americans bore by much the greatest share of the expence. It was put an end to by the army under general Bouquet; there were not above 300 regulars in that army, and above 1,000 Pennsylvanians.

Is it not necessary to send troops to America, to defend the Americans against the Indians?—No, by no means; it never was necessary. They defended themselves when they were but a handful, and the Indians much more numerous. They continually gained ground, and have driven the Indians over the mountains, without any troops sent to their assistance from this country. And can it be thought necessary now to send troops for their defence from those diminished Indian tribes, when the colonies are become so

populous, and so strong? There is not the least occasion for it; they are very able to defend themselves.

Do you say there were no more than 300 regular troops employed in the late Indian war?—Not on the Ohio, or the frontiers of Pennsylvania, which was the chief part of the war that affected the colonies. There were garrisons at Niagara, Fort Detroit, and those remote posts kept for the sake of your trade; I did not reckon them, but I believe that on the whole the number of Americans, or provincial troops, employed in the war, was greater than that of the regulars. I am not certain, but I think so.

Do you think the assemblies have a right to levy money on the subject there, to grant to the crown?—I certainly think so; they have always done it.

Are they acquainted with the Declaration of Rights; and do they know that by that statute, money is not to be raised on the subject but by consent of parliament?—They are very well acquainted with it.

How then can they think they have a right to levy money for the crown, or for any other than local purposes?—They understand that clause to relate to subjects only within the realm; that no money can be levied on them for the crown, but by consent of parliament. The colonies are not supposed to be within the realm; they have assemblies of their own, which are their parliaments, and they are, in that respect, in the same situation with Ireland. When money is to be raised for the crown upon the subject in Ireland, or in the colonies, the consent is given in the parliament of Ireland, or in the assemblies of the colonies. They think the parliament of Great Britain cannot properly give that consent till it has representatives from America; for the Petition of Right expressly says, it is to be by common consent in parliament, and the people of America have no representatives in parliament, to make a part of that common consent.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, and an act should pass, ordering the assemblies of the colonies to indemnify the sufferers by the riots, would they obey it?—That is a question I cannot answer.

Suppose the King should require the colonies to grant a revenue, and the parliament should be against their doing it, do they think they can grant a revenue to the King, without the consent of the parliament of Great Britain?—That is a deep question. As to my own opinion I should think myself at liberty to do it, and should do it, if I liked the occasion.

When money has been raised in the colonies, upon requisitions, has it not been granted to the King?—Yes, always; but the requisitions have generally been for some service expressed, as to raise, clothe, and pay troops, and not for money only.

If the act should pass, requiring the American Assemblies to make compensation to the sufferers, and they should disobey it, and then the parliament should, by another act, lay an internal tax, would they then obey it?—The people will pay no internal tax: and I think an act to oblige the assemblies to make compensation is unnecessary, for I am of opinion, that as soon as the present heats are abated, they will take the matter into consideration, and if it is right to be done, they will do it of themselves.



Do not letters often come into the post offices in America, directed into some inland town where no post goes?—Yes.

Can any private person take up those letters, and carry them as directed?—Yes; any friend of the person may do it, paying the postage that has accrued.

But must not he pay an additional postage for the distance to such an inland town?—No.

Can the post-master answer delivering the letter, without being paid such additional postage?—Certainly he can demand nothing, where he does no service.

Suppose a person, being far from home, finds a letter in a post office directed to him, and he lives in a place to which the post generally goes, and the letter is directed to that place, will the post-master deliver him the letter, without his paying the postage received at the place to which the letter is directed?—Yes; the office cannot demand postage for a letter that it does not carry, or farther than it does carry it.

Are not ferrymen in America obliged, by act of parliament, to carry over the posts without pay?—Yes.

Is not this a tax on the ferrymen?—They do not consider it as such, as they have an advantage from persons travelling with the post.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, and the crown should make a requisition to the colonies for a sum of money, would they grant it?—I believe they would.

Why do you think so?—I can speak for the colony I live in; I had it in instruction from the assembly to assure the ministry, that as they always had done, so they should always think it their duty to grant such aids to the crown as were suitable to their circumstances and abilities, whenever called upon for the purpose, in the usual constitutional manner; and I had the honour of communicating this instruction to that hon. gentleman then minister.

Would they do this for a British concern; as suppose a war in some part of Europe, that did not affect them?—Yes, for any thing that concerned the general interest. They consider themselves as a part of the whole.

What is the usual constitutional manner of calling on the colonies for aids?—A letter from the secretary of state.

Is this all you mean, a letter from the secretary of state?—I mean the usual way of requisition, in a circular letter from the secretary of state, by his Majesty's command, reciting the occasion, and recommending it to the colonies to grant such aids as became their loyalty, and were suitable to their abilities.

Did the secretary of state ever write for money for the crown?—The requisitions have been to raise, clothe, and pay men, which cannot be done without money.

Would they grant money alone, if called on?—In my opinion they would, money as well as men, when they have money, or can procure it.

If the parliament should repeal the Stamp Act, will the assembly of Pennsylvania rescind their resolutions?—I think not.

Before there was any thought of the Stamp Act, did they wish for a representation in parliament?—No.

Don't you know that there is, in the Pennsylvania charter, an express reservation of the right of parliament to lay taxes there?—I know

there is a clause in the charter, by which the King grants that he will levy no taxes on the inhabitants, unless it be with the consent of the assembly, or by an act of parliament.

How then could the assembly of Pennsylvania assert, that laying a tax on them by the Stamp Act was an infringement of their rights?—They understand it thus: by the same charter, and otherwise, they are entitled to all the privileges and liberties of Englishmen; they find in the Great Charters, and the Petition and Declaration of Rights, that one of the privileges of English subjects is, that they are not to be taxed but by their common consent; they have therefore relied upon it, from the first settlement of the province, that the parliament never would, nor could, by colour of that clause in the charter, assume a right of taxing them, till it had qualified itself to exercise such right, by admitting representatives from the people to be taxed, who ought to make a part of that common consent.

Are there any words in the charter that justify that construction?—The common rights of Englishmen, as declared by Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, all justify it.

Does the distinction between internal and external taxes exist in the words of the charter?—No, I believe not.

Then may they not, by the same interpretation, object to the parliament's right of external taxation?—They never have hitherto. Many arguments have been lately used here to shew them that there is no difference, and that if you have no right to tax them internally, you have none to tax them externally, or make any other law to bind them. At present they do not reason so, but in time they may possibly be convinced by these arguments.

Do not the resolutions of the Pennsylvania assemblies say, all taxes?—If they do, they mean only internal taxes; the same words have not always the same meaning here and in the colonies. By taxes they mean internal taxes; by duties they mean customs; these are the ideas of the language.

Have you not seen the resolutions of the Massachusetts's Bay assembly?—I have.

Do they not say, that neither external nor internal taxes can be laid on them by parliament?—I don't know that they do; I believe not.

If the same tax should say neither tax nor imposition could be laid, does not that province hold the power of parliament can lay neither?—I suppose that by the word imposition, they do not intend to express duties to be laid on goods imported, as regulations of commerce.

What can the colonies mean then by imposition as distinct from taxes?—They may mean many things, as impressing of men, or of carriages, quartering troops on private houses, and the like; there may be great impositions that are not properly taxes.

Is not the post-office rate an internal tax laid by act of parliament?—I have answered that.

Are all parts of the colonies equally able to pay taxes?—No, certainly; the frontier parts, which have been ravaged by the enemy, are greatly disabled by that means, and therefore, in such cases, are usually favoured in our tax laws.

Can we, at this distance, be competent judges of what favours are necessary?—The parlia-

ment have supposed it, by claiming a right to make tax laws for America; I think it impossible.

Would the repeal of the Stamp Act be any discouragement of your manufactures? Will the people that have begun to manufacture decline it?—Yes, I think they will; especially if, at the same time, the trade is opened again, so that remittances can be easily made. I have known several instances that make it probable. In the war before last, tobacco being low, and making little remittance, the people of Virginia went generally into family manufactures. Afterwards, when tobacco bore a better price, they returned to the use of British manufactures. So fulling mills were very much disused in the last war in Pennsylvania, because bills were then plenty, and remittances could easily be made to Britain for English cloth and other goods.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, would it induce the assemblies of America to acknowledge the right of parliament to tax them, and would they erase their resolutions?—No, never.

Is there no means of obliging them to erase those resolutions?—None, that I know of; they will never do it, unless compelled by force of arms.

Is there a power on earth that can force them to erase them?—No power, how great soever, can force men to change their opinions.

Do they consider the post office as a tax, or as a regulation?—Not as a tax, but as a regulation and convenience; every assembly encouraged it, and supported it in its infancy, by grants of money, which they would not otherwise have done; and the people have always paid the postage.

When did you receive the instructions you mentioned?—I brought them with me, when I came to England, about 15 months since.

When did you communicate that instruction to the minister?—Soon after my arrival, while the stamping of America was under consideration, and before the Bill was brought in.

Would it be most for the interest of Great Britain, to employ the hands of Virginia in tobacco, or in manufactures?—In tobacco, to be sure.

What used to be the pride of the Americans?—To indulge in the fashions and manufactures of Great Britain.

What is now their pride?—To wear their old clothes over again, till they can make new ones.

—Withdrew.—*Parliamentary History of England*, v. 16, pp. 138–160.—“Mr. Sparks very justly says that there was no event in Franklin’s life more creditable to his talents and character, or which gave him so much celebrity, as this examination before the House of Commons. His further statement, however, that Franklin’s answers were given without premeditation and without knowing beforehand the nature or form of the question that was to be put, is a little too sweeping. In a memorandum which Franklin gave to a friend who wished to know by whom the several questions were put, he admitted that many were put by friends to draw out in answer the substance of what he had before said upon the subject.”—J. Bigelow, *Life of Benjamin Franklin*, v. 1, p. 507, foot-note.

**A. D. 1766.—The repeal of the Stamp Act and passage of the Declaratory Act.—Speech of Pitt.**—“The Grenville Ministry had fallen in July [1765], and had been succeeded by that of

Rockingham; and Conway, who had been one of the few opponents of the Stamp Act, was now Secretary of State for the Colonies. . . . The Stamp Act had contributed nothing to the downfall of Grenville; it attracted so little attention that it was only in the last days of 1765 or the first days of 1766 that the new ministers learnt the views of Pitt upon the subject; it was probably a complete surprise to them to learn that it had brought the colonies to the verge of rebellion, and in the first months of their power they appear to have been quite uncertain what policy they would pursue. . . . Parliament met on December 17, 1765, and the attitude of the different parties was speedily disclosed. A powerful Opposition, led by Grenville and Bedford, strenuously urged that no relaxation or indulgence should be granted to the colonists. . . . Pitt, on the other hand, rose from his sick-bed, and in speeches of extraordinary eloquence, and which produced an amazing effect on both sides of the Atlantic, he justified the resistance of the colonists.”—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of England in the 18th Century*, ch. 12 (p. 3).—The following is the main part of the speech delivered by Pitt (not yet made Lord Chatham) on the 14th of January, 1766, as imperfectly reported: “It is my opinion, that this kingdom has no right to lay a tax upon the colonies. At the same time, I assert the authority of this kingdom over the colonies to be sovereign and supreme, in every circumstance of government and legislation whatsoever. They are the subjects of this kingdom; equally entitled with yourselves to all the natural rights of mankind and the peculiar privileges of Englishmen; equally bound by its laws, and equally participating in the constitution of this free country. The Americans are the sons, not the bastards of England! Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone. . . . When . . . in this House, we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax, what do we do? ‘We, your Majesty’s Commons for Great Britain, give and grant to your Majesty’—what? Our own property! No! ‘We give and grant to your Majesty’ the property of your Majesty’s Commons of America! It is an absurdity in terms. . . . There is an idea in some that the colonies are virtually represented in the House. I would fain know by whom an American is represented here. Is he represented by any knight of the shire, in any county in this kingdom? Would to God that respectable representation was augmented to a greater number! Or will you tell him that he is represented by any representative of a borough? a borough which, perhaps, its own representatives never saw! This is what is called the rotten part of the Constitution. It cannot continue a century. If it does not drop, it must be amputated. The idea of a virtual representation of America in this House is the most contemptible idea that ever entered into the head of a man. It does not deserve a serious refutation. The Commons of America represented in their several assemblies, have ever been in the possession of this, their



constitutional right, of giving and granting their own money. They would have been slaves if they had not enjoyed it! At the same time, this kingdom, as the supreme governing and legislative power, has always bound the colonies by her laws, by her regulations, and restrictions in trade, in navigation, in manufactures, in every thing, except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent. Here I would draw the line. . . . Gentlemen, sir, have been charged with giving birth to sedition in America. They have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy act, and that freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty of speech in this House imputed as a crime. But the imputation shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise. No gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a liberty by which the gentleman who calumniates it might have profited. He ought to have desisted from his project. The gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest. . . . Since the accession of King William, many ministers, some of great, others of more moderate abilities, have taken the lead of government. . . . None of these thought or even dreamed, of robbing the colonies of their constitutional rights. That was reserved to mark the era of the late administration. Not that there were wanting some, when I had the honor to serve his Majesty, to propose to me to burn my fingers with an American stamp act. With the enemy at their back, with our bayonets at their breasts, in the day of their distress, perhaps the Americans would have submitted to the imposition; but it would have been taking an ungenerous, an unjust advantage. The gentleman boasts of his bounties to America! Are not these bounties intended finally for the benefit of this kingdom? If they are not, he has misapplied the national treasures! I am no courtier of America. I stand up for this kingdom. I maintain that the Parliament has a right to bind, to restrain America. Our legislative power over the colonies is sovereign and supreme. I would advise every gentleman to sell his lands, if he can, and embark for that country. When two countries are connected together like England and her colonies, without being incorporated, the one must necessarily govern. The greater must rule the less. But she must so rule it as not to contradict the fundamental principles that are common to both. . . . The gentleman asks, When were the colonies emancipated? I desire to know, when were they made slaves? But I dwell not upon words. When I had the honor of serving his Majesty, I availed myself of the means of information which I derived from my office. I speak, therefore, from knowledge. My materials were good. I was at pains to collect, to digest, to consider them; and I will be bold to affirm, that the profits to Great Britain from the trade of the colonies through all its branches, is two millions a year. This is the fund that carried you triumphantly through the last war. The estates that were rented at two thousand pounds a year, three-score years ago, are at three thousand at present. Those estates sold then from fifteen to eighteen

years purchase; the same may now be sold for thirty. You owe this to America. This is the price America pays you for her protection. And shall a miserable financier come with a boast, that he can bring 'a pepper-corn' into the exchequer by the loss of millions to the nation? I dare not say how much higher these profits may be augmented. . . . I am convinced on other grounds that the commercial system of America may be altered to advantage. You have prohibited where you ought to have encouraged. You have encouraged where you ought to have prohibited. Improper restraints have been laid on the continent in favor of the islands. You have but two nations to trade with in America. Would you had twenty! Let acts of Parliament in consequence of treaties remain; but let not an English minister become a custom-house officer for Spain, or for any foreign power. Much is wrong! Much may be amended for the general good of the whole! . . . A great deal has been said without doors of the power, of the strength of America. It is a topic that ought to be cautiously meddled with. In a good cause, on a sound bottom, the force of this country can crush America to atoms. I know the valor of your troops. I know the skill of your officers. There is not a company of foot that has served in America, out of which you may not pick a man of sufficient knowledge and experience to make a governor of a colony there. But on this ground, on the Stamp Act, which so many here will think a crying injustice, I am one who will lift up my hands against it. In such a cause your success would be hazardous. America, if she fell, would fall like the strong man; she would embrace the pillars of the State, and pull down the Constitution along with her. Is this your boasted peace—not to sheathe the sword in its scabbard, but to sheathe it in the bowels of your countrymen? . . . The Americans have not acted in all things with prudence and temper: they have been wronged: they have been driven to madness by injustice. Will you punish them for the madness you have occasioned? Rather let prudence and temper come first from this side. I will undertake for America that she will follow the example. . . . Upon the whole I will beg leave to tell the House what is my opinion. It is that the Stamp Act be repealed absolutely, totally and immediately. That the reason for the repeal be assigned, viz., because it was founded on an erroneous principle. At the same time, let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever; that we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent."—*Representative British Orations*, pp. 98–119.—The views of Pitt "were defended in the strongest terms by Lord Camden, who pledged his great legal reputation to the doctrine that taxation is not included under the general right of legislation, and that taxation and representation are morally inseparable. . . . The task of the ministers in dealing with this question was extremely difficult. The great majority of them desired ardently the repeal of the Stamp Act; but the wishes of the King, the abstention of Pitt, and the divided condition of parties had compelled Rockingham to include in his Government Charles Townshend, Barrington,

and Northington, who were all strong advocates of the taxation of America. . . . In addition to all these difficulties the ministers had to deal with the exasperation which was produced in Parliament by the continual outrages and insults to which all who represented the English Government in America were exposed. Their policy consisted of two parts. They asserted in the strongest and most unrestricted form the sovereignty of the British Legislature, first of all by resolutions and then by a Declaratory Act affirming the right of Parliament to make laws binding the British colonies 'in all cases whatsoever,' and condemning as unlawful the votes of the colonial Assemblies which had denied to Parliament the right of taxing them. Side by side with this measure they brought in a bill repealing the Stamp Act. . . . The great and manifest desire of the commercial classes throughout England had much weight; the repeal was carried [March, 1766] through the House of Commons, brought up by no less than 200 members to the Lords, and finally carried amid the strongest expressions of public joy. Burke described it as 'an event that caused more universal joy throughout the British dominions than perhaps any other that can be remembered.'—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng. in the 18th Century*, ch. 12 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: *Parliamentary Hist.*, v. 16, pp. 112-205.—B. Franklin, *Works (Sparks' ed.)*, v. 4.—Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *Hist. of Eng.* 1713-1783, ch. 45.—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1765-1768.

**A. D. 1766-1767.—The Townshend measures.**—"The liberal Rockingham administration, after a few months of power, disappeared [July, 1766], having signalized itself as regarded America by the repeal of the Stamp Act, and by the Declaratory Act. Of the new ministry the leading spirit was Charles Townshend, a brilliant statesman, but unscrupulous and unwise. His inclinations were arbitrary; he regretted the repeal of the Stamp Act, as did also the king and Parliament in general, who felt themselves to have been humiliated. Pitt, indeed, now Earl of Chatham, was a member of the government; but, oppressed by illness, he could exercise no restraint upon his colleague, and the other members were either in sympathy with Townshend's views, or unable to oppose him. Townshend's three measures affecting America, introduced on the 13th of May, 1767, were: a suspension of the functions of the legislature of New York for contumacy in the treatment of the royal troops; the establishment of commissioners of the customs, appointed with large powers to superintend laws relating to trade; and lastly an impost duty upon glass, red and white lead, painters' colors, paper, and tea [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1765-1768]. This was an 'external' duty to which the colonists had heretofore expressed a willingness to submit; but the grounds of the dispute were shifting. Townshend had declared that he held in contempt the distinction sought to be drawn between external and internal taxes, but that he would so far humor the colonists in their quibble as to make his tax of that kind of which the right was admitted. A revenue of £40,000 a year was expected from the tax, which was to be applied to the support of a 'civil list,' namely, the paying the salaries of the new commissioners of customs, and of the judges and governors, who were to be relieved wholly or in part from their dependence upon

the annual grants of the Assemblies; then, if a surplus remained, it was to go to the payment of troops for protecting the colonies. To make more efficient, moreover, the enforcement of the revenue laws, the writs of assistance, the denunciation of which by James Otis had formed so memorable a crisis, were formally legalized. The popular discontent, appeased by the repeal of the Stamp Act, was at once awake again, and henceforth in the denial of the right of Parliament to tax, we hear no more of acquiescence in commercial restrictions and in the general legislative authority of Parliament. . . . The plan for resistance adopted by the cooler heads was that of Samuel Adams, namely, the non-importation and the non-consumption of British products. From Boston out, through an impulse proceeding from him, town-meetings were everywhere held to encourage the manufactures of the Province and reduce the use of superfluities, long lists of which were enumerated. Committees were appointed everywhere to procure subscriptions to agreements looking to the furtherance of home industries and the disuse of foreign products. . . . Before the full effects of the new legislation could be seen, Townshend suddenly died; but in the new ministry that was presently formed Lord North came to the front, and adopted the policy of his predecessor, receiving in this course the firm support of the king, whose activity and interest were so great in public affairs that he 'became his own minister.'—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Life and Times of Joseph Warren*, ch. 3.—W. Belsham, *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.*, v. 1, pp. 139-142.

**A. D. 1767-1768.—The Farmer's Letters of John Dickinson.**—The Circular Letter of Massachusetts, and the "Unrescinding Ninety-two."—"The English ministry was probably misled by the strong emphasis which had been laid here during the controversies concerning the Stamp Act upon the alleged distinction between external and internal taxation. We had refused to submit to the latter, but admitted that the former might be binding upon the whole empire as a commercial regulation. In form the duties levied on paints, glass, tea, etc., were undoubtedly such a regulation, but it was at once contended here that, in point of fact and of principle, this was as much an exercise of the alleged right of Parliamentary taxation for the purpose of raising a revenue for imperial purposes as the Stamp Act itself. Although it was passed by the opponents of the Stamp Act, and by the Rockingham ministry, who professed to be our friends, the act met at once with opposition here. Late in October, 1767, it was denounced by a public meeting in Boston, which suggested a non-importation agreement as the best means of rendering its operations ineffective. These agreements were favorite expedients for manifesting political discontent in those days, but, as they were voluntary, their obligation sat somewhat loosely upon those who signed them. The truth is, that those who were most decided in opposition to the course of the ministry were somewhat puzzled as to the plan they should adopt to exhibit the earnestness of their discontent. . . . While the leaders of the opposition throughout the country were doubtful and hesitating, there appeared in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* for the 2d of December, 1767, the first of a series of letters on the political situation,



afterwards known as the 'Farmer's Letters.' . . . The letters, fourteen in number, followed one another in quick succession, and they were read by men of all classes and opinions throughout the continent as no other work of a political kind had been hitherto read in America. It was, of course, soon known that John Dickinson was their author, and people remembered that he was the person who had formulated what was a genuine Bill of Rights in the Stamp Act Congress. The more these letters were read, the more convinced people became that in the comprehensive survey they took of our political relations with the mother-country, especially as these were affected by the last obnoxious act of Parliament, and in the plans which were proposed to remedy the evil, Mr. Dickinson had struck the true key-note of the opposition to the ministerial measures. He appeared at this crisis, as he did in the Stamp Act Congress, as the leader and guide in the controversy. From this time until the Declaration of Independence the Pennsylvania idea, which was embodied by Mr. Dickinson in these Farmer's Letters, 'controlled the destinies of the country;' and Mr. Bancroft only does justice to Mr. Dickinson's position when he recognizes fully his commanding influence during that period. We may say with pardonable pride (and it is one of those truths which many of our historians have managed in various ways to relegate to obscurity), that, as the leading spirit in the Stamp Act Congress, Dickinson gave form and color to the agitation in this country which brought about the repeal of that act, and that the arguments by which the claim of the ministry to tax us for revenue by such an act of Parliament as that levying duties on glass, paints, etc. was answered in the 'Farmer's Letters' first convinced the whole body of our countrymen, groping blindly for a cure for their grievances, that there was a legal remedy, and then forced the ministry to consent in a measure to the demand for a repeal of some of its most obnoxious provisions. It is worth remarking that when the ministry yielded at all it yielded to argument, and not to the boastful threats which were so common. The 'Farmer's Letters' gave courage and force to those who in February denounced the law in Pennsylvania; they formed the mainspring of the movement which resulted in the circular letter sent by the legislature of Massachusetts on the 17th of that month to the Assemblies of the other Colonies; in short, they had the rare good fortune not only of convincing those who suffered that the remedy was in their own hands, but also of persuading those who had the power to abandon, or at least to modify their arbitrary measures. . . . Mr. Dickinson begins these grave essays with an air of simplicity as charming as it is calculated to attract the attention of the reader. 'I am a farmer,' he says, 'settled, after a variety of fortunes, near the banks of the river Delaware, in the Province of Pennsylvania. I received a liberal education, and have been engaged in the busy scenes of life, but am now convinced that a man may be as happy without bustle as with it. Being generally master of my time, I spend a good deal of it in my library, which I think the most valuable part of my small estate. I have acquired, I believe, a greater knowledge of history and of the laws and constitution of my country than is generally attained by men of my class,'

etc. He then explains the nature of the controversy with the mother-country, making it so clear that the points in dispute are comprehensible by a child. . . . As to our method of asserting our rights, he says, with an elevation of sentiment which reminds one of Edmund Burke more than of any other political writer, 'The cause of liberty is a cause of too much dignity to be sullied by turbulence and tumult. It ought to be maintained in a manner suitable to her nature. Those who engage in it should breathe a sedate yet fervent spirit, animating them to actions of prudence, justice, modesty, bravery, humanity, and magnanimity.' He shrinks, evidently with terror, from speaking of what may be the consequences of the persistent refusal of England to change her oppressive measures. . . . After showing in the most striking manner the nature of our wrongs, the letters turn gladly to the remedy that lies open to us. That remedy is based upon a cultivation of the spirit of conciliation on both sides, and Mr. Dickinson urges again and again upon his English readers the folly of their policy, by showing them the value of the American Colonies to them, and especially how the trade and wealth of the English merchants are bound up in the adoption of a liberal policy towards us. This is one of the most interesting and important topics discussed in these letters, and the subject is treated with elaborate skill, leading to convincing conclusions drawn from our history. It must not be forgotten that prior to the Revolution an impression widely prevailed among the most thoughtful of our own people, as well as among our friends in England, that if the English people could be made to understand the frightful losses they would suffer in case of a war in which we should be fighting for our independence, or even during a short interruption of the trade between the two countries, they would force the government to yield rather than run the risk of the consequences. . . . Even Dr. Franklin in London, who had had so many proofs of the indifference and contempt with which the representations of the Colonies in England were regarded . . . thought the appeal of the Farmer to Englishmen so irresistible that, although no friend of Dickinson's, he arranged that these letters should be reprinted in London.—C. J. Stillé, *The Life and Times of John Dickinson*, ch. 4.—In February, 1768, "the Legislature of Massachusetts sent a Circular Letter [ascribed to Samuel Adams] to the Assemblies of the other colonies, in which was set forth the necessity of all acting together harmoniously, and of freely communicating the mind of each to the others. The course Massachusetts had pursued was described, with the contents of the petition and letters which had been written, and with the hope expressed that she would have their cordial co-operation in resistance to the ministerial measures. The notion that political independence was aimed at was strenuously denied, and the trust was entertained that what had been done would meet the approval of their 'common head and father,' and that the liberties of the colonies would be confirmed. This letter elicited response from some, others returned none officially, but all who answered replied favorably. It gave, however, the greatest offence to the ministry, and particularly to Lord Hillsborough, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It seems that he read it entirely

by the light which a letter from Governor Bernard to Lord Barrington had shed upon it. This epistle declared the real motive of the colonies to be a determination to be independent. Hillsborough, filled with this idea, communicated it to the other members of the cabinet, and thus the Circular Letter was laid before them, prejudged. It was determined that it merited consideration, but that the only notice to be given it should be one of censure, and, on the spur of the moment, they resolved upon two things: to require the Massachusetts Assembly to rescind the Letter, and to require the other legislatures before whom it had been laid to reject it. This was done, and the consequences were, that the General Court, or Legislature, of Massachusetts voted, by ninety-two to seventeen, that they would do nothing of the kind, and that the other legislatures gave the outcast a hearty welcome. As for the people, they showed their approval of their representatives by toasting, from one end of the country to the other, 'The unrescinding Ninety-two,' with whom was coupled the number Forty-five, or that of the famous 'North Briton'; while the Bostonians added fuel to the flame by a riot on the score of the sloop Liberty, in which they attacked the houses of the Commissioners of the Customs, and made a bonfire of the Collector's boat. Shortly afterward, (but not by reason of the riot), four ships of war anchored in Boston harbor, and two regiments of soldiers were quartered on the town."—E. G. Scott, *The Development of Const. Liberty*, ch. 10 (with corrections by the author).

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic of the U. S.*, ch. 6.—J. W. Thornton, *The Pulpit of the Revolution*, p. 150.

**A. D. 1768-1770.—The quartering of troops in Boston.—The Massacre, and the removal of the troops.**—See BOSTON: A. D. 1768; and 1770.

**A. D. 1769.—Massachusetts threatened, and Virginia roused to her support.**—"The proceedings in Massachusetts attracted in England the greatest attention, elicited the severest comment, and, because a military force had been ordered to Boston to support the stand of the administration, created the greatest solicitude. . . . The king, on opening parliament, characterized the action of Boston as a subversion of the Constitution and evincing a disposition to throw off dependence on Great Britain. The indictment against the colonies was presented in sixty papers laid before parliament. Both Houses declared that the proceedings of the Massachusetts assembly in opposition to the revenue acts were unconstitutional, and derogatory to the rights of the crown and the parliament; that the Circular Letter tended to create unlawful combinations; that the call of a convention by the selectmen of Boston was proof of a design of setting up an independent authority; and both Houses proposed to transport the originators of the obnoxious proceedings to England for trial and condign punishment, under the cover of an obsolete act of Henry VIII. . . . The administration determined to make an example of Massachusetts, as the ring-leading province in political mischief, by transporting its popular leaders to England to be tried for their lives in the king's bench. Such was the purport of an elaborate despatch which Lord Hillsborough sent to Governor Bernard, directing an inquiry to be instituted into the conduct

of any persons who had committed any overt act of resistance to the laws. . . . Thus a great issue was created that affected all the colonies. . . . There was no adequate step taken to meet the threatened aggression until the House of Burgesses of Virginia convened in May."—R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic of the U. S.*, ch. 6.—"On the day of the prorogation of parliament [May 9, 1769] the legislature of Virginia assembled at Williamsburg. Great men were there; some who were among the greatest—Washington, Patrick Henry, and, for the first time, Jefferson. Botetourt [the governor], who opened the session in state, was in perfect harmony with the council, received from the house of burgesses a most dutiful address, and entertained fifty-two guests at his table on the first day, and as many more on the second. . . . But the assembly did not forget its duty, and devised a measure which became the example for the continent. It claimed the sole right of imposing taxes on the inhabitants of Virginia. With equal unanimity, it asserted the lawfulness and expediency of a concert of the colonies in defence of the violated rights of America. It laid bare the flagrant tyranny of applying to America the obsolete statute of Henry VIII.; and it warned the king of 'the dangers that would ensue' if any person in any part of America should be seized and carried beyond sea for trial. It consummated its work by communicating its resolutions to every legislature in America, and asking their concurrence. The resolves were concise, simple, and effective; so calm in manner and so perfect in substance that time finds no omission to regret, no improvement to suggest. The menace of arresting patriots lost its terrors; and Virginia's declaration and action consolidated union. . . . The next morning, the assembly had just time to adopt an address to the king, when the governor summoned them, and said: 'I have heard of your resolves, and augur ill of their effects; you have made it my duty to dissolve you, and you are dissolved accordingly.' Upon this, the burgesses met together as patriots and friends, with their speaker as moderator. They adopted the resolves which Washington had brought with him from Mount Vernon, and which formed a well-digested, stringent, and practicable scheme of non-importation, until all the 'unconstitutional' revenue acts should be repealed. . . . The voice of the Old Dominion roused the merchants of Pennsylvania to approve what had been done. The assembly of Delaware adopted the Virginia resolves word for word; and every colony south of Virginia followed the example."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (Author's last revision), pp. 347-348.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 1, ch. 29.

**A. D. 1770.—Repeal of the Townshend duties except on Tea.**—On the 5th of March, 1770—the same day on which the tragical encounter of the king's troops with citizens of Boston occurred—Lord North introduced a motion in Parliament for the partial repeal of Townshend's revenue act; "not on the petitions of America, because they were marked by a denial of the right, but on one from merchants and traders of London. 'The subject,' said he, 'is of the highest importance. The combinations and associations of the Americans for the tem-



porary interruption of trade have already been called unwarrantable in an address of this house; I will call them insolent and illegal. The duties upon paper, glass, and painters' colors bear upon the manufacturers of this country, and ought to be taken off. It was my intention to have extended the proposal to the removal of the other duties; but the Americans have not deserved indulgence. The preamble to the act and the duty on tea must be retained, as a mark of the supremacy of parliament and the efficient declaration of its right to govern the colonies.' . . . Thomas Pownall moved the repeal of the duty on tea. The house of commons, like Lord North in his heart, was disposed to do the work of conciliation thoroughly. . . . Had the king's friends remained neutral, the duty on tea would have been repealed; with all their exertions, in a full house, the majority for retaining it was but 62. Lord North seemed hardly satisfied with his success; and reserved to himself liberty to accede to the repeal, on some agreement with the East India Company. The decision came from the king."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 3, pp. 381-382.

ALSO IN: Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *Hist. of Eng.*, 1713-1783, ch. 48 (v. 5.)

**A. D. 1771.—Suppression of the Regulators of North Carolina.** See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1766-1771.

**A. D. 1772.—The Watauga Association.—The founding of the State of Tennessee.** See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1769-1772.

**A. D. 1772.—The burning of the Gaspé.**—"One of the first overt acts of resistance that took place in this celebrated struggle [in the war of independence] occurred in 1772, in the waters of Rhode Island. A vessel of war had been stationed on the coast to enforce the laws, and a small schooner, with a light armament and twenty-seven men, called the Gaspé, was employed as a tender, to run into the shallow waters of that coast. On the 17th of June, 1772, a Providence packet, that plied between New York and Rhode Island, named the Hannah, and commanded by a Captain Linzee, hove in sight of the man-of-war, on her passage up the bay. The Hannah was ordered to heave-to, in order to be examined; but her master refused to comply; and being favoured by a fresh southerly breeze, that was fast sweeping him out of gunshot, the Gaspé was signalled to follow. The chase continued for five-and-twenty miles, under a press of sail, when the Hannah coming up with a bar, with which her master was familiar, and drawing less water than the schooner, Captain Linzee led the latter on a shoal, where she struck. The tide falling, the Gaspé . . . was not in a condition to be removed for several hours. The news of the chase was circulated on the arrival of the Hannah at Providence. A strong feeling was excited among the population, and towards evening the town drummer appeared in the streets, assembling the people in the ordinary manner. As soon as a crowd was collected, the drummer led his followers in front of a shed that stood near one of the stores, when a man disguised as an Indian suddenly appeared on the roof, and proclaimed a secret expedition for that night, inviting all of 'stout hearts' to assemble on the wharf, precisely at nine, disguised like himself. At the appointed hour, most of the men in the place collected at the

spot designated, when sixty-four were selected for the bold undertaking that was in view. This party embarked in eight of the launches of the different vessels lying at the wharves, and taking with them a quantity of paving stones, they pulled down the river in a body. . . . On nearing the Gaspé, about two in the morning, the boats were hailed by a sentinel on deck. This man was driven below by a volley of the stones. The commander of the Gaspé now appeared, and ordering the boats off, he fired a pistol at them. This discharge was returned from a musket, and the officer was shot through the thigh. By this time, the crew of the Gaspé had assembled, and the party from Providence boarded. The conflict was short, the schooner's people being soon knocked down and secured. All on board were put into the boats, and the Gaspé was set on fire. Towards morning she blew up."—J. F. Cooper, *Naval Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: S. G. Arnold, *Hist. of Rhode Island*, ch. 19 (v. 2).

**A. D. 1772-1773.—The instituting of the Committees of Correspondence.—The Tea Ships and "the Boston Tea-Party."**—"The surest way to renew and cement the union [of the colonies] was to show that the ministry had not relaxed in its determination to enforce the principal of the Townshend acts. This was made clear in August, 1772, when it was ordered that in Massachusetts the judges should henceforth be paid by the crown. Popular excitement rose to fever heat, and the judges were threatened with impeachment should they dare accept a penny from the royal treasury. The turmoil was increased next year by the discovery in London of the package of letters which were made to support the unjust charge against Hutchinson and some of his friends that they had instigated and aided the most extreme measures of the ministry. In the autumn of 1772 Hutchinson refused to call an extra session of the assembly to consider what should be done about the judges. Samuel Adams then devised a scheme by which the towns of Massachusetts could consult with each other and agree upon some common course of action in case of emergencies. For this purpose each town was to appoint a standing committee, and as a great part of their work was necessarily done by letter they were called 'committees of correspondence.' This was the step that fairly organized the Revolution."—J. Fiske, *The War of Independence*, ch. 5.—"The town records of Boston [November 2, 1772] say:—'It was then moved by Mr. Samuel Adams that a Committee of Correspondence be appointed, to consist of twenty-one persons, to state the rights of the colonists and of this Province in particular as men and Christians and as subjects; and to communicate and publish the same to the several towns and to the world as the sense of this town, with the infringements and violations thereof that have been or from time to time may be made.' The motion occasioned some debate and seems to have been carried late at night; the vote in its favor, at last, was nearly unanimous. The colleagues of Adams, who had left him almost alone thus far, now declined to become members of the committee, regarding the scheme as useless or trifling. The committee was at last constituted without them; it was made up of men of little prominence but of

thorough respectability. James Otis, in another interval of sanity, was made chairman, a position purely honorary, the town in this way showing its respect for the leader whose misfortunes they so sincerely mourned. The Committee of Correspondence held its first meeting in the representatives' chamber at the town-house, November 3, 1772, where at the outset each member pledged himself to observe secrecy as to their transactions, except those which, as a committee, they should think it proper to divulge. According to the motion by which the committee was constituted, three duties were to be performed: 1st, the preparation of a statement of the rights of the colonists, as men, as Christians, and as subjects; 2d, a declaration of the infringement and violation of those rights; 3d, a letter to be sent to the several towns of the Province and to the world, giving the sense of the town. The drafting of the first was assigned to Samuel Adams, of the second to Joseph Warren, of the third to Benjamin Church. In a few days tidings came from the important towns of Marblehead, Roxbury, Cambridge, and Plymouth, indicating that the example of Boston was making impression and was likely to be followed. On November 20, at a town-meeting in Faneuil Hall, the different papers were presented: Otis sat as moderator, appearing for the last time in a sphere where his career had been so magnificent. The report was in three divisions, according to the motion. . . . In the last days of 1772, the document, having been printed, was transmitted to those for whom it had been intended, producing at once an immense effect. The towns almost unanimously appointed similar committees; from every quarter came replies in which the sentiments of Samuel Adams were echoed. In the library of Bancroft is a volume of manuscripts, worn and stained by time, which have an interest scarcely inferior to that possessed by the Declaration of Independence itself, as the fading page hangs against its pillar in the library of the State Department at Washington. They are the original replies sent by the Massachusetts towns to Samuel Adams's committee sitting in Faneuil Hall, during those first months of 1773. One may well read them with bated breath, for it is the touch of the elbow as the stout little democracies dress up into line, just before they plunge into actual fight at Concord and Bunker Hill. There is sometimes a noble scorn of the restraints of orthography, as of the despotism of Great Britain, in the work of the old town clerks, for they generally were secretaries of the committees; and once in a while a touch of Dogberry's quaintness, as the punctilious officials, though not always 'putting God first,' yet take pains that there shall be no mistake as to their piety by making every letter in the name of the Deity a rounded capital. Yet the documents ought to inspire the deepest reverence. They constitute the highest mark the town-meeting has ever touched. Never before and never since have Anglo-Saxon men, in lawful folk-mote assembled, given utterance to thoughts and feelings so fine in themselves and so pregnant with great events. To each letter stand affixed the names of the committee in autograph. This awkward scrawl was made by the rough fist of a Cape Ann fisherman, on shore for the day to do at town-meeting the duty his fellows had laid upon him; the hand that wrote

this other was cramped from the scythe-handle, as its possessor mowed an interval on the Connecticut; this blotted signature, where smutted fingers have left a black stain, was written by a blacksmith of Middlesex, turning aside a moment from forging a barrel that was to do duty at Lexington. They were men of the plainest; but as the documents containing statements of the most generous principles and the most courageous determination, were read in the town-houses, the committees who produced them, and the constituents for whom the committees stood, were lifted above the ordinary level. Their horizon expanded to the broadest; they had in view not simply themselves, but the welfare of the continent; not solely their own generation, but remote posterity. It was Samuel Adams's own plan, the consequences of which no one foresaw, neither friend nor foe. Even Hutchinson, who was scarcely less keen than Samuel Adams himself, was completely at fault. 'Such a foolish scheme,' he called it, 'that the faction must necessarily make themselves ridiculous.' But in January the eyes of men were opening. One of the ablest of the Tories, Daniel Leonard, wrote:—'This is the foulest, subtlest, and most venomous serpent ever issued from the egg of sedition. I saw the small seed when it was implanted; it was a grain of mustard. I have watched the plant until it has become a great tree.' It was the transformation into a strong cord of what had been a rope of sand."—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*, ch. 13.—"In the spring of 1773, Virginia carried this work of organization a long step further, when Dabney Carr suggested and carried a motion calling for committees of correspondence between the several colonies. From this point it was a comparatively short step to a permanent Continental Congress. It happened that these preparations were made just in time to meet the final act of aggression which brought on the Revolutionary War. The Americans had thus far successfully resisted the Townshend acts and secured the repeal of all the duties except on tea. As for tea they had plenty, but not from England; they smuggled it from Holland in spite of custom-houses and search-warrants. Clearly unless the Americans could be made to buy tea from England and pay the duty on it, the king must own himself defeated. Since it appeared that they could not be forced into doing this, it remained to be seen if they could be tricked into doing it. A truly ingenious scheme was devised. Tea sent by the East India Company to America had formerly paid a duty in some British port on the way. This duty was now taken off, so that the price of the tea for America might be lowered. The company's tea thus became so cheap that the American merchant could buy a pound of it and pay the threepence duty beside for less than it cost him to smuggle a pound of tea from Holland. It was supposed that the Americans would of course buy the tea which they could get most cheaply, and would thus be beguiled into submission to that principle of taxation which they had hitherto resisted. Ships laden with tea were accordingly sent in the autumn of 1773 to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston; and consignees were appointed to receive the tea in each of these towns. Under the guise of a commercial operation, this was purely a political trick. It was an insulting



challenge to the American people, and merited the reception which they gave it. They would have shown themselves unworthy of their rich political heritage had they given it any other. In New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston mass-meetings of the people voted that the consignees should be ordered to resign their offices, and they did so. At Philadelphia the tea-ship was met and sent back to England before it had come within the jurisdiction of the custom-house. At Charleston the tea was landed, and as there was no one to receive it or pay the duty, it was thrown into a damp cellar and left there to spoil. In Boston things took a different turn."—J. Fiske, *The War of Independence*, ch. 5. "Acting upon the precedent of the time of the Stamp Act, when Oliver, the stamp commissioner, had resigned his commission under the Liberty Tree, a placard was posted everywhere on the 3d of November, inviting the people of Boston and the neighboring towns to be present at Liberty Tree that day at noon, to witness the resignation of the consignees of the tea, and hear them swear to re-ship to London what teas should arrive. The placard closed,—‘Show me the man that dares take this town.’ At the time appointed, representatives Adams, Hancock, and Phillips, the selectmen and town clerk, with about five hundred more, were present at the Liberty Tree. But no consignees arrived, whereupon Molineux and Warren headed a party who waited upon them. The consignees, Clarke, a rich merchant, and his sons, Benjamin Faneuil, Winslow, and the two sons of Hutchinson, Thomas and Elisha, sat together in the counting-house of Clarke in King Street. Admittance was refused the committee, and a conversation took place through a window, during which the tone of the consignees was defiant. There was some talk of violence, and when an attempt was made to exclude the committee and the crowd attending them from the building, into the first story of which they had penetrated, the doors were taken off their hinges and threats uttered. Molineux, generally impetuous enough, but now influenced probably by cooler heads, dissuaded the others from violence. . . . A town-meeting on November 5, in which an effort of the Tories to make head against the popular feeling came to naught, showed how overwhelming was the determination to oppose the introduction of the tea. . . . When news arrived on the 17th that three tea-ships were on the way to Boston, for a second time a town-meeting demanded through a committee, of which Samuel Adams was a member, the resignation of the consignees. They evaded the demand; the town-meeting voted their answer not satisfactory, and at once adjourned without debate or comment. The silence was mysterious; what was impending none could tell. . . . On the 28th, the first of the tea-ships, the Dartmouth, Captain Hall, sailed into the harbor. Sunday though it was, the Committee of Correspondence met, obtained from Benjamin Rotch, the Quaker owner of the Dartmouth, a promise not to enter the vessel until Tuesday, and made preparations for a mass-meeting at Faneuil Hall for Monday forenoon, to which Samuel Adams was authorized to invite the surrounding towns. A stirring placard the next morning brought the townsmen and their neighbors to the place. After the organization, Samuel Adams, arising among the thousands,

moved that: ‘As the town have determined at a late meeting legally assembled that they will to the utmost of their power prevent the landing of the tea, the question be now put,—whether this body are absolutely determined that the tea now arrived in Captain Hall shall be returned to the place from whence it came.’ There was not a dissenting voice. . . . In the afternoon, the meeting having resolved that the tea should go back in the same ship in which it had come, Rotch, the owner of the Dartmouth, protested, but was sternly forbidden, at his peril, to enter the tea. Captain Hall also was forbidden to enter any portion of it. ‘Adams was never in greater glory,’ says Hutchinson. The next morning, November 30, the people again assembling, the consignees made it known that it was out of their power to send the tea back; but they promised that they would store it until word should come from their ‘constituents’ as to its disposal. . . . The Dartmouth each night was watched by a strong guard; armed patrols, too, were established, and six couriers held themselves ready, if there should be need to alarm the country. . . . During the first week in December arrived the Eleanor and the Beaver, also tea-ships, which were moored near the Dartmouth, and subjected to the same oversight. The ‘True Sons of Liberty’ posted about the town the most spirited placards. . . . The days flew by. At length came the end of the time of probation. If the cargo of the Dartmouth had not been ‘entered’ within that period, the ship according to the revenue laws, must be confiscated. Rotch, the Quaker owner, had signified his willingness to send the ship back to England with the cargo on board, if he could procure a clearance. The customs officials stood on technicalities; under the circumstances a clearance could not be granted. The grim British admiral ordered the Active and the Kingfisher from his fleet to train their broadsides on the channels, and sink whatever craft should try to go to sea without the proper papers. The governor alone had power to override these obstacles. It was competent for him to grant a permit which the revenue men and the admiral must respect. If he refused to do this, then on the next day the legal course was for the revenue officers to seize the Dartmouth and land the tea under the guns of the fleet. It was the 16th of December. A crowd of seven thousand filled the Old South and the streets adjoining. Nothing like it had ever been known. Town-meeting had followed town-meeting until the excitement was at fever heat. The indefatigable Committee of Correspondence had, as it were, scattered fire throughout the whole country. . . . Poor Quaker Rotch . . . felt himself, probably, the most persecuted of men, when the monster meeting forced him in the December weather to make his way out to Milton Hill to seek the permit from Hutchinson. . . . Meantime darkness had fallen upon the short winter day. The crowd still waited in the gloom of the church, dimly lighted here and there by candles. Rotch reappeared just after six, and informed the meeting that the governor refused to grant the permit until the vessels were properly qualified. As soon as the report had been made, Samuel Adams arose, for it was he who had been moderator, and exclaimed: ‘This meeting can do nothing more to save the country.’ It was evidently a concerted

signal, for instantly . . . the famous war-whoop was heard, and the two or three score of 'Mohawks' rushed by the doors, and with the crowd behind them hurried in the brightening moonlight to Griffin's wharf, where lay the ships. The tea could not go back to England; it must not be landed. The cold waters of the harbor were all that remained for it. Three hundred and forty-two chests were cast overboard. Nothing else was harmed, neither person nor property. All was so quiet that those at a distance even could hear in the calm air the ripping open of the thin chests as the tea was emptied. The 'Mohawks' found helpers, so that in all perhaps one hundred and fifty were actively concerned. Not far off in the harbor lay the ships of the fleet, and the Castle with the 'Sam Adams Regiments.' But no one interfered."—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*, ch. 16.

ALSO IN: W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 1, pp. 372-375, 495-512; v. 2, pp. 1-9, 24-29, 61-63, 80-81, 103-130.—R. Frothingham, *Life of Joseph Warren*, ch. 9.—Force's *Am. Archives*, v. 1.—See, also, BOSTON: A. D. 1773; and NEW YORK: A. D. 1773-1774.

A. D. 1774 (March-April).—The Boston Port Bill.—The Massachusetts Act and the Quebec Act.—"The spoken defiance of the other colonies had been quite as efficient as the combination of threats and force to which Boston was compelled to resort, but Lord North launched the first retaliatory and punitive measure against that city. . . . The first of Lord North's bills was the Boston Port Act, which closed the harbor until indemnity for the tea there destroyed should be paid and the king be satisfied that thereafter the city would obey the laws. The demand for indemnity was fair but the indefinite claim of obedience was not only infamous in itself but, as Burke said, punished the innocent with the guilty. . . . North's second bill was a virtual abrogation of the Massachusetts charter. The council of twenty-eight had been hitherto elected every year in joint session of the assembly. The king might now appoint the whole body to any number, from twelve to thirty-six, and remove them at pleasure. The men so appointed were designated mandamus councillors. Thereafter town-meetings could be held only by permission of the governor and for the sole purpose of electing officers [General Gage was made governor under this act, and four regiments were placed in Boston for his support]. Sheriffs were to return all juries, and were to be named by the governor and hold office during his pleasure. The third bill was really a device of the king's, and it is said that the ministry was confused and shamefaced in presenting it. It ordained that magistrates, revenue officers, or other officials indicted in Massachusetts for capital offences were to be tried either in Nova Scotia or Great Britain. Another measure made legal the billeting of troops, against which Boston had hitherto striven with success, and a fifth, known as the Quebec Act, though depriving that province of the right of habeas corpus, restored the French customary law ('coutume de Paris'), established Roman Catholicism as the state religion, and by extending its boundaries to the Ohio and Mississippi, shut off the Northern English Colonies from westward extension. This was intended as an arbitrary settlement of a vexed question. The Puri-

tans, however, . . . exclaimed that the next step would be the establishment among them of English episcopacy."—W. M. Sloane, *The French War and the Revolution*, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: A. Johnston, *The United States: its Hist. and Const.*, sect. 57-58.—*Parliamentary Hist.*, v. 17.—*American Archives*, series 4, v. 1, pp. 35-220.—Lord Fitzmaurice, *Life of the Earl of Shelburne*, v. 2, ch. 8.—On the Quebec Act, see, also, CANADA: A. D. 1763-1774.

A. D. 1774 (April-October).—Lord Dunmore's War with the Indians.—The Western territorial claims of Virginia. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1774.

A. D. 1774 (May-June).—Effects of the Boston Port Bill.—The call for a Continental Congress.—"The Boston Port Bill was received in America with honors not accorded even to the Stamp Act. It was cried through the streets as 'A barbarous, cruel, bloody, and inhuman murder,' and was burnt by the common hangman on a scaffold forty-five feet high. The people of Boston gathered together in town-meeting at Faneuil Hall, and expresses were sent off with an appeal to all Americans throughout America. The responses from the neighborhood came like snow-flakes. Marblehead offered the use of its wharves to the Boston merchants; Salem averred that it would be lost to all feelings of humanity were it to raise its fortunes on the ruins of its neighbor. Newburyport voted to break off trade with Great Britain, and to lay up its ships. Connecticut, as her wont is, when moved by any vital occurrence, betook herself to prayer and humiliation, first, however, ordering an inventory to be taken of her cannon and military stores. Virginia, likewise, resolved to invoke the divine interposition, but, before another resolution which called for a Congress could be introduced, her House was precipitately dissolved; whereupon the resolution was brought up and passed at a meeting called in 'the Apollo,' where it was further declared that an attack on one colony was an attack upon all. Two days later the Massachusetts letter itself was received, upon which the Virginians called a convention. From all parts contributions in money poured into Boston, and resolutions were everywhere passed, declaring that no obedience was due the late acts of Parliament; that the right of imperial taxation did not exist; that those who had accepted office under pay of the king had violated their public duty; that the Quebec act establishing Roman Catholicism in Canada was hostile to the Protestant religion, and that the inhabitants of the colonies should use their utmost diligence to acquaint themselves with the art of war, and for that purpose should turn out under arms at least once a week. In the fulness of time, a cordon of ships was drawn around Boston, and six regiments and a train of artillery were encamped on the Common—the only spot in the thirteen colonies where the government could enforce an order. The conflict between constitutional liberty and absolutism had now reached that dangerous point where physical force became one of its elements. . . . The situation was at once recognized throughout the colonies, and the knowledge that in union there is strength, manifested itself in one general impulse toward a Colonial Congress. Committees of Correspondence were organized in every county, and throngs attended the public meetings. 'One great, wise, and



noble spirit; one masterly soul animating one vigorous body,' was the way John Adams described this impulse. The Canadas alone remained inanimate. . . . But not so those to whom constitutional liberty was as the breath of life. On the 17th of June (1774) the Massachusetts Assembly, which had been removed by a royal order to Salem, answered Virginia by resolving on a call for a Continental Congress at Philadelphia. The governor, hearing of what was going on, sent the secretary of the colony to dissolve the Assembly, but, finding the doors shut upon him, he had to content himself with reading the message to the crowd outside. The House went on with its work, while, at the same time, a great meeting, with John Adams in the chair, was being held at Boston in Faneuil Hall. Twelve colonies agreed to send delegates to a Continental Congress to be held at Philadelphia in September."—E. G. Scott, *The Development of Const. Liberty in the Eng. Colonies of Am.* ch. 11 (with corrections by the author).

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (Author's last revision) v. 4, ch. 1.—See, also, Boston: A. D. 1774.

A. D. 1774 (May—July).—Governor Hutchinson's departure for England.—His conversation with King George.—In May, 1774, Governor Hutchinson, of Massachusetts, who had applied some months before for leave of absence to visit England, was relieved by General Gage and took his departure. General Gage was temporarily commissioned to be "Captain General and Governor-in-Chief" of the Province of Massachusetts, and "Vice-Admiral of the same," combining the civil and military powers in himself. It was then supposed that Hutchinson's absence would be brief; but, to his endless grief, he never saw the country again. Soon after his arrival in England he had an interview with the king, which is reported at length in his Diary. The conversation is one of great historical interest, exhibiting King George's knowledge and ideas of American affairs, and representing the opinions of a high-minded American loyalist. It is reprinted here exactly as given in Governor Hutchinson's Diary, published by his great-grandson in 1883:

"July 1st.—Received a card from Lord Dartmouth desiring to see me at his house before one o'clock. I went soon after 12, and after near an hour's conversation, his Lordship proposed introducing me immediately to the King. I was not dressed as expecting to go to Court, but his Lordship observing that the King would not be at St. James's again until Wednesday [this was Friday], I thought it best to go; but waited so long for his Lordship to dress, that the Levée was over; but his Lordship going in to the King, I was admitted, contrary, as L<sup>d</sup> Pomfret observed to me, to custom, to kiss His Majesty's hand in his closet: after which, as near as I can recollect, the following conversation passed.

K.—How do you do M<sup>r</sup> H. after y<sup>r</sup> voyage?

H.—Much reduced Sir by sea-sickness; and unfit upon that account, as well as my New England dress, to appear before your Majesty.

Lord D. observed—M<sup>r</sup> H. apologised to me for his dress, but I thought it very well, as he is just come ashore; to which the K. assented.

K.—How did you leave your Government, and how did the people receive the news of the late measures in Parliament?

H.—When I left Boston we had no news of any Act of Parliament, except the one for shutting up the port, which was extremely alarming to the people.

(Lord D. said, Mr. H. came from Boston the day that Act was to take place, the first of June. I hear the people of Virginia have refused to comply with the request to shut up their ports, from the people of Boston, and M<sup>r</sup> H. seems to be of opinion that no colony will comply with that request.)

K.—Do you believe, M<sup>r</sup> H., that the account from Virginia is true?

H.—I have no other reason to doubt it, except that the authority for it seems to be only a newspaper; and it is very common for articles to be inserted in newspapers without any foundation. I have no doubt that when the people of Rhode Island received the like request, they gave this answer—that if Boston would stop all the vessels they then had in port, which they were hurrying away before the Act commenced, the people of R. Island would then consider of the proposal.

The King smiled.

Lord D.—M<sup>r</sup> H., may it please y<sup>r</sup> Majesty, has shewn me a newspaper with an address from a great number of Merchants, another from the Episcopal Clergy, another from the Lawyers, all expressing their sense of his conduct in the most favourable terms. Lord Dartmouth thereupon took the paper out of his pocket and shewed it.

K.—I do not see how it could be otherwise. I am sure his conduct has been universally approved of here by people of all parties.

H.—I am very happy in your Majesty's favourable opinion of my administration.

K.—I am intirely satisfied with it. I am well acquainted with the difficulties you have encountered, and with the abuse & injury offered you. Nothing could be more cruel than the treatment you met with in betraying your private letters.

The K., turning to Lord D.—My Lord, I remember nothing in them to which the least exception could be taken.

Lord D.—That appears, Sir, from the report of the Committee of Council, and from your Majesty's orders thereon.

H.—The correspondence, Sir, was not of my seeking. It was a meer matter of friendly amusement, chiefly a narrative of occurrences, in relating of which I avoided personalities as much as I could, and endeavoured to treat persons, when they could not be avoided, with tenderness, as much as if my letters were intended to be exposed; whereas I had no reason to suppose they ever would be exposed.

K.—Could you ever find M<sup>r</sup> H. how those letters came to New England?

H.—Doctor F., may it please your Majesty, has made a publick declaration that he sent them, and the Speaker has acknowledged to me that he rec<sup>d</sup> them: I do not remember that he said directly from Doctor F., but it was understood between us that they came from him. I had heard before that they came either direct from him, or that he had sent them through another channel, and that they were to be communicated to six persons only, and then to be returned without suffering any copies to be taken. I sent for the Speaker and let him know

what I had heard, which came from one of the six to a friend, and so to me. The Speaker said they were sent to him, and that he was at first restrained from shewing them to any more than six persons.

K.—Did he tell you who were the persons?

H.—Yes, sir. There was Mr Bowdoin, Mr Pitts, Doctor Winthrop, Dr Chauncy, Dr Cooper, and himself. They are not all the same which had been mentioned before. The two Mr. Adamses had been named to me in the room of Mr Pitts and Dr Winthrop.

K.—Mr B. I have heard of.

Lord D.—I think he is father-in-law to Mr T. [Temple].

K.—Who is Mr Pitts?

H.—He is one of the Council—married Mr B.'s sister.

K.—I have heard of Dr Ch. and Dr Cooper, but who is Doctor Winthrop?

H.—He is not a Doctor of Divinity, Sir, but of Law; a Professor of Mathematicks and Natural Philosophy at the College, and last year was chose of the Council.

K.—I have heard of one Mr Adams, but who is the other?

H.—He is a Lawyer, Sir.

K.—Brother to the other?

H.—No, Sir, a relation. He has been of the House, but is not now. He was elected by the two Houses to be of the Council, but negatived. The speaker further acquainted me that, after the first letter, he received another, allowing him to shew the Letters to the Committee of Correspondence; and afterwards a third, which allowed him to shew them to such persons as he could confide in, but always enjoined to send them back without taking copies. I asked him how he could be guilty of such a breach of trust as to suffer them to be made public? He excused it by saying that he was against their being brought before the House, but was overruled; and when they had been read there, the people abroad compelled their publication, or would not be satisfied without it. Much more passed with which I will not trouble your Majesty; but after the use had been made of the Letters, which is so well known, they were all returned.

K., turning to L<sup>d</sup> D.—This is strange:—where is Doctor F., my lord?

Lord D.—I believe, Sir, he is in Town. He was going to America, but I fancy he is not gone.

K.—I heard he was going to Switzerland, or to some part of the Continent.

L<sup>d</sup> D.—I think, Sir, there has been such a report.

K.—In such abuse, Mr H., as you met with, I suppose there must have been personal malvolence as well as party rage?

H.—It has been my good fortune, Sir, to escape any charge against me in my private character. The attacks have been upon my publick conduct, and for such things as my duty to your Majesty required me to do, and which you have been pleased to approve of. I don't know that any of my enemies have complained of a personal injury.

K.—I see they threatened to pitch and feather you.

H.—Tarr & feather, may it please your Majesty; but I don't remember that ever I was threatened with it.

Lord D.—Oh! yes, when Malcolm was tarred and feathered [Almanac for 1770, May, MS. Note], the committee for tarring and feathering blamed the people for doing it, that being a punishment res<sup>d</sup> for a higher person, and we suppose you was intended.

H.—I remember something of that sort, which was only to make diversion, there being no such committee, or none known by that name.

K.—What guard had you, Mr H.?

H.—I depended, Sir, on the protection of Heaven. I had no other guard. I was not conscious of having done anything of which they could justly complain, or make a pretence for offering violence to my person. I was not sure, but I hoped they only meant to intimidate. By discovering that I was afraid, I should encourage them to go on. By taking measures for my security I should expose myself to calumny, and being censured as designing to render them odious for what they never intended to do. I was, therefore, obliged to appear to disregard all the menaces in the newspapers, and also private intimations from my friends who frequently advised me to take care of myself.

K.—I think you generally live in the country, Mr H.; what distance are you from town?

H.—I have lived in the country, Sir, in the summer for 20 years; but, except the winter after my house was pulled down, I have never lived in the country in winter until the last. My house is 7 or 8 miles from the Town, a pleasant situation, and most gentlemen from abroad say it has the finest prospect from it they ever saw, except where great improvements have been made by art, to help the natural view. The longest way the road is generally equal to the turnpike roads here; the other way rather rough.

K.—Pray, what does Hancock do now? How will the late affair affect him?

H.—I don't know to what particular affair your Majesty refers.

K.—Oh, a late affair in the city, his bills being refused. (Turning to Lord D.) Who is that in the city, my Lord?

Lord D. not recollecting—

H.—I have heard, Sir, that Mr Haley, a merchant in the city, is Mr Hancock's principal correspondent.

K.—Ay, that's the name.

H.—I heard, may it please your Majesty, before I came from N. England, that some small sums were returned, but none of consequence.

K.—Oh, no, I mean within this month, large sums.

Lord D.—I have heard such rumours, but don't know the certainty.

H.—Mr Hancock, Sir, had a very large fortune left him by his uncle, and I believe his political engagements have taken off his attention from his private affairs. He was sensible not long ago of the damage it was to him, and told me he was determined to quit all publick business, but soon altered his mind.

K.—Then there's Mr Cushing: I remember his name a long time: is not he a great man of the party?

H.—He has been many years Speaker, but a Speaker, Sir, is not always the person of the greatest influence. A Mr Adams is rather considered as the opposer of Government, and a sort of Wilkes in New England.



K.—What gave him his importance?

H.—A great pretended zeal for liberty, and a most inflexible natural temper. He was the first that publicly asserted the Independency of the colonies upon the Kingdom, or the supreme Authority of it.

K.—I have heard, M<sup>r</sup> H., that your ministers preach that, for the sake of promoting liberty or the publick good, any immorality or less evil may be tolerated?

H.—I don't know, Sir, that such doctrine has ever been preached from the pulpit; but I have no doubt that it has been publicly asserted by some of the heads of the party who call themselves sober men, that the good of the publick is above all other considerations, and that truth may be dispensed with, and immorality is excusable, when this great good can be obtained by such means.

K.—That's a strange doctrine, indeed. Pray, M<sup>r</sup> H., what is your opinion of the effect from the new regulation of the Council? Will it be agreeable to the people, and will the new appointed Councillors take the trust upon them?

H.—I have not, may it please y<sup>r</sup> Majesty, been able to inform myself who they are. I came to Town late last evening, and have seen nobody. I think much will depend upon the choice that has been made.

K.—Enquiry was made and pains taken that the most suitable persons should be appointed.

H.—The body of the people are Dissenters from the Church of England; what are called Congregationalists. If the Council shall have been generally selected from the Episcopalians, it will make the change more disagreeable.

K.—Why are they not Presbyterians?

H.—There are very few Churches which call themselves Presbyterians, and form themselves voluntarily into a Presbytery without any aid from the civil government, which the Presbyterian Church of Scotland enjoys.

Lord D.—The Dissenters in England at this day are scarce any of them Presbyterians, but like those in New England, Congregationalists, or rather Independents.

K.—Pray, what were your Ancestors, M<sup>r</sup> H.?

H.—In general, Sir, Dissenters.

K.—Where do you attend?

H.—With both, Sir. Sometimes at your Majesty's chapel, but more generally at a Congregational church, which has a very worthy minister, a friend to Government, who constantly prays for your Majesty, and all in authority under you.

K.—What is his name?

H.—Doctor Pemberton.

K.—I have heard of Doctor Pemberton that he is a very good man. Who is minister at the chapel?

H.—The Rector is Dr. Caner, a very worthy man also, who frequently inculcates upon his hearers due subjection to Government, and condemns the riotous violent opposition to it; and besides the prayers in the Liturgy, generally in a short prayer before sermon, expressly prays for your Majesty, and for the chief Ruler in the Province.

K.—Why do not the Episcopal ministers in general do the same?

H.—In general, Sir, they use no other prayer before sermon than a short collect out of the Liturgy.

K.—No—(turning to Lord D.) It is not so here, my Lord?

Lord D.—I believe it is, Sir. In your Majesty's Chapel they always use such a prayer. It is a form adapted.

K.—I think you must be mistaken.

Lord D.—No, Sir. This prayer used to be printed formerly, but of late it has not been printed with the service. In general the ministers use a collect, as M<sup>r</sup> Hutchinson says; sometimes the collect in the Communion service—'Prevent us, O Lord,' &c., but I think oftener the collect for the second Sunday in Advent.

H.—My education, Sir, was with the Dissenters. I conceive there is no material difference between reading a prayer out of a book, and saying it 'memoriter,' without book.

Lord D.—I think, Sir, it is not very material. The prayers of the Dissenters are in substance very much the same with those in the service of the church.

K.—I see no material difference, if the prayers be equally good, but will not that depend upon the minister? But, pray, M<sup>r</sup> H., why do your ministers generally join with the people in their opposition to Government?

H.—They are, Sir, dependent upon the people. They are elected by the people, and when they are dissatisfied with them, they seldom leave till they get rid of them.

K.—That must be very dangerous. If the people oblige them to concur with them in their erroneous principles on Government, they may do it in religion also, and this must have a most fatal tendency.

H.—There is one check, Sir, upon the people. Unless a minister be dismissed by a council of Churches, the Province law makes provision for the recovery of the salary; but we have no instance where a minister, for any length of time, has brought suits for the recovery of his salary, after the people refuse to hear him. They generally weary him, and sooner or later they get clear of him.

Lord D.—That's a considerable tye, however.

K.—Pray, M<sup>r</sup> H., does population greatly increase in your Province?

H.—Very rapidly, Sir. I used to think that Doctor F., who has taken such pains in his calculations, carried it too far when he supposed the inhabitants of America, from their natural increase, doubled their number in 25 years; but I rather think now that he did not; and I believe it will appear from the last return I made to the Secretary of State, that the Massachusetts has increased in that proportion. And the increase is supposed, including the importation of foreigners, to be, upon the whole, greater in most of the Southern Colonies than in the Massachusetts. We import no settlers from Europe, so as to make any sensible increase.

K.—Why do not foreigners come to y<sup>r</sup> Province as well as to the Southern Governments?

H.—I take it, Sir, that our long cold winters discourage them. Before they can bring the land to such a state as to be able in summer to provide for their support in winter, what little substance they can bring with them is expended, and many of them have greatly suffered. The Southern colonies are more temperate.

K.—What is the reason you raise no wheat in your Province?

H.—In most places, especially near the sea, it blasts.

K.—To what cause is that owing?

H.—It has been observed that when the grain is so forward as to be out of the milk the beginning of July, it seldom blasts; and that about the 8<sup>th</sup> or 10<sup>th</sup> of that month the weather becomes exceeding hot, and what are called the honey dews of the night are fixed upon the grains by the scalding sun in a hot morning, and if the grain be then in the milk it shrivels up, and the straw becomes rusty and black. This is a pretty general opinion of the cause.

K.—To what produce is your climate best adapted?

H.—To grazing, Sir; your Majesty has not a finer Colony for grass in all your dominions: and nothing is more profitable in America that pasture, because labour is very dear.

K.—Then you import all your bread corn from the other Colonies?

H.—No, Sir, scarce any, except for the use of the maritime towns. In the country towns the people raise grain enough for their own expending, and sometimes for exportation. They live upon coarse bread made of rye and corn mixed, and by long use they learn to prefer this to flour or wheat bread.

K.—What corn?

H.—Indian corn, or, as it is called in Authors, Maize.

K.—Ay, I know it. Does that make good bread?

H.—Not by itself, Sir; the bread will soon be dry and husky; but the Rye keeps it moist, and some of our country people prefer a bushel of Rye to a bushel of Wheat, if the price should be the same.

K.—That's very strange.

Lord D.—In many parts of Scotland, Sir, Rye is much esteemed as making good and wholesome bread.

The King enquired very particularly into many other parts of the produce of the country, and the natural history of it, to which I gave the best answers I was capable of.

K.—New York, I think, comes the next to Boston in their opposition to Government?

H.—Does your Majesty think nearer than Pensilvania?

K.—Why, I can't say that they do of late. K.—Rhode Island, M<sup>r</sup> H., is a strange form of Government.

H.—They approach, Sir, the nearest to a Democracy of any of your Colonies. Once a year all power returns to the people, and all their Officers are new elected. By this means the Governor has no judgment of his own, and must comply with every popular prejudice.

K.—Who is their Governor now?

H.—His name, Sir, is Wanton, a Gentleman who I have reason to think wishes to see Government maintained as much as any they could find in the Colonies.

K.—How is it with Connecticut? are they much better?

H.—The constitutions, Sir, are much the same; but Connecticut are a more cautious people; strive to make as little noise as may be, and have in general retained a good share of that virtue which is peculiarly necessary in such a form of Government.

More was said upon the state of these and some of the other Colonies. There being something of a pause about this time, I turned to Lord Dartmouth and asked—Does your Lordship remember when you had the first account of the Lieutenant Governor's death, and whether it was before the Letters which I wrote by Governor Tryon?

Lord D.—Oh, yes, I had a letter from you several weeks before that, giving an account of it.

H.—There was a vessel sailed for Lisbon the day after he died, and I gave a letter to the master in charge, to put it on board the first Vessel for London, but was doubtful of the conveyance.

K.—We never could find out which way that letter came. Is the present L. Governor a relation to the late M<sup>r</sup> Oliver?

H.—No, Sir, not of the same family. I have no connection with him, nor did I ever let him know that I had mentioned him as one of the persons I thought might be proper for a L. Governor.

K.—The Chief Justice, I think, is brother to the late L<sup>t</sup> Governor?

H.—Yes, Sir.

K.—We had thought of him, but as he was not one of those you had named, the present Gentleman, upon enquiry, appeared under all circumstances the most proper.

H.—I had some particular inducement not to mention the Chief Justice. He is related to me, and his appointment would have increased the envy against both of us.

K.—How is he related to you?

H.—One of his sons, Sir, married one of my daughters. I was, besides, uncertain whether the salary would be continued; and if it should be, his salary as Chief Justice exceeded it, except in case of my absence, and then the expense of living, and the additional trouble from his post, I considered as more than an equivalent. I considered further, that the controversy in which he had been engaged as Chief Justice would render the administration peculiarly difficult just at that time; and I supposed it would immediately devolve upon him by my absence, having then no expectation of being superseded. I never took more pains to divest myself of all personal views than in mentioning proper persons for this place. I should have been more anxious, if I had not thought it not improbable that some person might be appointed, and sent from England.

K.—What number of Indians had you in your Government?

H.—They are almost extinct. Perhaps there are 50 or 60 families at most upon the Eastern Frontier, where there is a small fort maintained; tho' I conceive the inhabitants would not be in the least danger. It looks, Sir, as if in a few years the Indians would be extinct in all parts of the Continent.

K.—To what is that owing?

H.—I have thought, Sir, in part to their being dispirited at their low despicable condition among the Europeans, who have taken possession of their country, and treat them as an inferior race of beings; but more to the immoderate use of spirituous liquors. There are near 100 families, perhaps more, of Indians who are domiciliated, and live, some in other towns, but most of them



at a place called Mashpee, where they have a church, and a Missionary to preach to them, and also an Indian Minister who has been ordained, and preaches sometimes in their own language.

K.—What, an Episcopal Minister?

H.—No, Sir, of the Congregational persuasion or form of worship.

The King was particular in many other enquiries relative to my Administration, to the state of the Province, and the other Colonies. I have minutely what remained the clearest upon my mind, and as near the order in which they passed as I am able. He asked also what part of my family I brought with me, and what I left behind, and at length advised me to keep house a few days for the recovery of my health. I then withdrew. I was near two hours in the K. closet. Lord D. feared I was tired so long standing. I observed that so gracious a reception made me insensible of it."—*Diary and Letters of Thos. Hutchinson*, ch. 5.

A. D. 1774 (September).—The meeting of the First Continental Congress.—"On the 5th day of September most of the delegates elected to the congress were in Philadelphia. They were invited by the speaker of the Pennsylvania assembly to hold their sessions in the State House, but decided to meet in the hall owned by the carpenters,—a fine brick building, having commodious rooms for the use of the committees, and an excellent library in the chambers. It is still in good preservation. At ten o'clock in the morning the delegates met at the City Tavern, walked to Carpenters' Hall, and began the sessions of the Continental Congress. This assembly, when all the members had taken their seats, consisted of 55 delegates, chosen by 12 colonies. They represented a population of 2,200,000, paying a revenue of £80,000 sterling. Georgia, which did not elect delegates, gave a promise to concur with her 'sister colonies' in the effort to maintain their right to the British Constitution. . . . In general, the delegates elect were men of uncommon ability, who had taken a prominent part in the political action of their several localities. . . . New England presented, in John Sullivan, vigor; in Roger Sherman, sterling sense and integrity; in Thomas Cushing, commercial knowledge; in John Adams, large capacity for public affairs; in Samuel Adams, a great character, with influence and power to organize. The Middle colonies presented, in Philip Livingston, the merchant prince of enterprise and liberality; in John Jay, rare public virtue, juridical learning, and classic taste; in William Livingston, progressive ideas tempered by conservatism; in John Dickinson, 'The Immortal Farmer,' erudition and literary ability; in Cæsar Rodney and Thomas McKean, working power; in James Duane, timid Whiggism, halting, but keeping true to the cause; in Joseph Galloway, downright Toryism, seeking control, and at length going to the enemy. The Southern colonies presented, in Thomas Johnson, the grasp of a statesman; in Samuel Chase, activity and boldness; in the Rutledges, wealth and accomplishment; in Christopher Gadsden, the genuine American; and in the Virginia delegation, an illustrious group,—in Richard Bland, wisdom; in Edmund Pendleton, practical talent; in Peyton Randolph, experience in legislation; in Richard Henry Lee, statesmanship in union with high culture; in Patrick Henry, genius and elo-

quence; in Washington, justice and patriotism. 'If,' said Patrick Henry, 'you speak of solid information and sound judgment, Washington unquestionably is the greatest man of them all.'

. . . The congress was organized by the choice of Peyton Randolph of Virginia for President, and Charles Thomson of Philadelphia, not a member, for Secretary. . . . A discussion . . . arose on the rules to be observed in determining questions, . . . which was renewed the next day, when it was agreed that each colony should have one vote."—R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic of the U. S.*, ch. 9.

ALSO IN: J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, *Hist. of Philadelphia*, v. 1, ch. 16.—C. J. Stillé, *Life and Times of John Dickinson*, ch. 5.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, ch. 13.

A. D. 1774 (September—October).—The action of the Congress.—"The Congress first resolved 'to state the rights of the colonies in general, the several instances in which those rights were violated or infringed, and the means most proper for a restoration of them.' Next, 'to examine and report the several statutes which affect the trade and manufactures of the colonies,' not earlier than the last nine years. While these subjects were under consideration, resolutions of Boston and its neighbors [Middlesex and Suffolk counties] were laid before them, stating their wrongs and merely defensive measures to which they would adhere, 'as long as such conduct may be vindicated by reason and the principles of self-preservation, but no longer.' . . . Congress unanimously approved and recommended 'a perseverance in this firm and temperate conduct,' trusting a change in the councils of the British nation. The merchants were urged not to order goods, and to suspend those ordered; and it was resolved, that after the first of next December there should be no importation of British goods, and no consumption of, or traffic in them. A loyal petition to the king was ordered, assuring him that by abolishing the system of laws and regulations of which the colonies complained, enumerating them, the jealousies they had caused would be removed, and harmony restored. 'We ask but for peace, liberty and safety. We wish not a diminution of the prerogative, nor do we solicit the grant of any new right in our favor. Your royal authority over us, and our connection with Great Britain, we shall always carefully and zealously endeavor to support and maintain.' General Gage was entreated to discontinue the erection of the fortifications on Boston Neck, and to prevent all injuries on the part of the troops; and Massachusetts was asked 'temporarily to submit to a suspension of the administration of justice where it could not be procured in a legal and peaceable manner.' Persons accepting office under the recent act, changing the form of her government, were denounced, 'as the wicked tools of that despotism which is preparing to destroy those rights which God, nature, and compact have given to America.' A memorial was next ordered to the inhabitants of the British colonies there represented, exposing their common wrongs and urging a united 'commercial opposition,' warning them to extend their views 'to mournful events,' to be 'in all respects prepared for every contingency, and to implore the favor of Almighty God.' An appeal was made to the

enlightened sympathies of the British people. . . . Finally, an address was made to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, inviting their co-operation. In the meantime, the form of a non-exportation, non-consumption association was adopted, and signed by each of the delegates. . . . A declaration of the rights and injuries of the colonies was made, in which the most difficult question was disposed of. The right to participate in the legislative council of their common country, was declared to be the foundation of English liberty and of all free government. . . . Of all these proceedings the language was that of peace, except where other language was demanded. For they approved the opposition of the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay to the execution of the late acts of Parliament, and declared, 'If these acts shall be attempted to be carried into execution by force, in such case all America ought to support them in their opposition,' and 'that seizing or attempting to seize any person in America, in order to transport such person beyond the sea for trial of offences committed within the body of a county in America, being against law, will justify, and ought to meet with, resistance and reprisal.' These were the essential resolutions. They bound the colonies to a common resistance to acts of force against all, or any one of them. They also declared their opinion of the necessity that another Congress should be held in the ensuing month of May, unless the redress of grievances which they had desired was obtained before that time, and that all the colonies in North America choose deputies, as soon as possible, to attend such Congress. On the twenty-sixth of October, after a secret session of fifty-one days, this body adjourned. The recommendations of this Congress were received with marked respect among the patriots of the colonies."—J. C. Hamilton, *Hist. of the U. S. as traced in the writings of Alex. Hamilton*, ch. 3 (v. 1).—"Trained in all the theories of the mercantile system, America had been taught to believe (1) that two countries could continue to trade, though one of necessity did so at a loss; (2) that in the trade between England and the colonies, the former both through natural advantages and through law was the party to which the profit accrued; (3) that England was 'a shop-keeping nation,' whose very existence depended on her trade and manufactures. A suspension of trade between England and America therefore would mean misery, if not ruin, to the mother country, while the colonies would 'both save and gain.' With measures of non-importation, non-exportation and non-consumption, accordingly, did this otherwise powerless body hope to coerce the English people and government. Though founded on an economic fallacy, this method of action was certain to have a great effect in England. Twice already had it been employed on a limited scale—against the Stamp Act and against the revenue acts,—and each time with sufficient success to warrant the belief that its wider application would result in victory. Now the agents of the colonies in London were writing home: 'If you have virtue enough to resolve to stop, and to execute the resolution of stopping, your exports and imports for one year, this country must do you justice.' . . . In both England and America the temporary destruction of British trade was viewed not merely as an effective weapon, but as the only

peaceful one which the colonies possessed. A failure to unite in a non-importation agreement against England would, according to a prominent English politician, leave nothing for the colonies 'but to decide between ruin and submission.' The question for the Congress was not, therefore, a choice of remedies, but merely whether, and to how great an extent, the delegates could be brought to agree to the only one within their reach. For even while accepting the system as effective against Great Britain, the delegates and their constituents had so far progressed as to realize that it bore with uneven force on the different colonies. The southern colonies were really no more diversified in their industries than the West India islands. South Carolina grew rice and indigo; North Carolina depended largely on tar, pitch and turpentine; Virginia raised tobacco. Unless these products could be exported to Europe, those colonies might suffer for the necessities of life. . . . The first consideration of the subject in the Congress revealed serious difficulties. The Virginia delegation, 'to avoid the heavy injury that would arise,' were prevented by their instructions from agreeing to an immediate cessation of trade relations. Imports would cease on November 1, 1774, but exports must continue till August 10, 1775. It was in vain they were told 'that a non-exportation at a future day cannot avail,' and that at the Virginia date non-exportation would not operate before the fall of 1776. The Virginians had determined to cure and sell their tobacco crop of 1774 before 'consideration of interest and of equality of sacrifice should be laid aside.' So vital, however, did most of the delegates consider the immediate enforcement, that it was proposed to act without Virginia; for Boston and New England, it was said, would need active support before that date. This proposition was defeated by the refusal of the delegates of North Carolina and Maryland to join unless Virginia should also make the sacrifice. With sorry grace the Congress had to accept the dictation of Virginia. But the trouble did not end here. Virginia's selfish interest having been triumphant, the South Carolina delegation sought for an equal advantage, and demanded that the two great products of that colony should be especially reserved from the non-exportation clause. . . . Rather than yield, the Congress preferred a cessation of business for several days, in order 'to give our [South Carolina] deputies time to recollect themselves.' But when the Association was ready for signing, the South Carolina delegates, with but one exception, seceded from the Congress, and their assent was only secured eventually through a compromise, by virtue of which rice alone was excluded from the agreement, while indigo was brought under its terms. Such were the secret deliberations of the Congress, in endeavoring to unite the colonies in the use of their only weapon. The first public results appeared in the form of a unanimous resolution, passed and published on September 22, requesting 'the merchants and others in the several colonies not to send to Great Britain any orders for goods,' and to delay or suspend orders already sent. Five days later it was unanimously resolved that after December 1, 1774, 'there should be no importation into British America from Great Britain or Ireland, or from any other place,' of any goods, wares or



merchandise exported from Great Britain or Ireland. Three days later, with no assertion of unanimity, a resolution was announced to the effect 'that from and after the 10th day of September, 1775, the exportation of all merchandise and every commodity whatsoever to Great Britain, Ireland and the West Indies ought to cease, unless the grievances of America are redressed before that time,' and a committee was appointed to draft a plan for carrying into effect these resolves. On October 12 this committee brought in a report, which, after consideration and amendment, was on the 18th of October agreed to and ordered signed. On October 20 it was signed and ordered to be printed. Possessed of no real power, the Congress relied on the people to enforce this agreement. It was recommended that in every county, city and town a committee be chosen 'whose business it shall be attentively to observe the conduct of all persons touching this Association.' With hardly an exception, this recommendation was adopted. . . . As America had refused to trade with Great Britain and her colonies, the government replied by acts prohibiting any such trade. The policy of 'exhausting its opponent by injuring itself' was at last to have a fair trial, but through British, not American action. The colonies were by law interdicted from all commerce, trade and fishing. But before the legislation went into effect blood had been shed at Lexington. The contest could no longer be fought with acts of Parliament and resolves of Congress; 'blows must decide.' The Association was distinctively a peace weapon. Had the Congress really expected war, no action could have been more foolish. A garrison soon to be beleaguered virtually shut its ports to supplies. No better proof is needed of how little the delegates wished or worked for separation."—P. L. Ford, *The Association of the First Congress* (*Pol. Sci. Quarterly*, Dec., 1891).—"It is only after a careful study of the proceedings of this Congress, and the subsequent history of some of its members, that we come at its real character. It was a Peace Congress. Some of the colonies had been compromised by their attitude in respect to the East India Company's teas; and the extreme measures of the British government in closing the port of Boston, and altering the charter of the contumacious people of Massachusetts, excited the apprehension of other colonies as to the ulterior purposes of the ministry. While it was the patriotic desire of the Congress to express their sympathies and to stand by the people of Boston in the hour of their sufferings, it was hoped and expected that some conciliatory course would be followed which would allow the ministry and the Massachusetts people to extricate themselves from their difficulties without recourse to war. John Adams had no faith in the efficacy of the petition to the king, nor in the addresses to the people of Great Britain and the Canadas. Matters had gone so far in New England that they would be satisfied with no terms short of the withdrawal of the royal troops, the re-opening of the port of Boston, and the total repeal of all measures designed to reduce them to obedience. At the same time, not only the British ministry, but the British people also, were demanding the complete submission of the Bostonians, or the infliction of condign punishment. So far as Massachusetts was concerned, the war was inevitable. John Adams saw it to be so, and

prepared himself for it. He endeavored to prepare the Congress for it, and not without valuable results. The great work effected by this Congress was the bringing the colonies on to common ground by a declaration of their rights. Opinions were divided. A compromise ensued, and the famous fourth article was the result. It was drawn by John Adams, and carried mainly by his influence, and reads as follows:—"That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council; and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their local and other circumstances cannot be properly represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their rights of representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed. But from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament as are bona fide restrained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country; and the commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America, without their consent." This was not precisely what John Adams wanted, but it was much. When this declaration went forth, the cause of Massachusetts, in whatever it might eventuate, was the cause of the colonies. It was nationalized. This was John Adams's greatest feat of statesmanship. On it the success of the impending war, and the Declaration of Independence rested."—M. Chamberlain, *John Adams, the Statesman of the Am. Rev.*, pp. 78-80.—"How far the authority of this first congress extended, according to the instructions of the delegates, it is impossible to determine with certainty at this distance of time. But it is probable that the original intention was that it should consult as to the ways and means best calculated to remove the grievances and to guaranty the rights and liberties of the colonies, and should propose to the latter a series of resolutions, furthering these objects. But the force of circumstances at the time compelled it to act and order immediately, and the people, by a consistent following of its orders, approved this transcending of their written instructions. The congress was therefore not only a revolutionary body from its origin, but its acts assumed a thoroughly revolutionary character. The people, also, by recognizing its authority, placed themselves on a revolutionary footing, and did so not as belonging to the several colonies, but as a moral person; for to the extent that congress assumed power to itself and made bold to adopt measures national in their nature, to that extent the colonists declared themselves henceforth to constitute one people, inasmuch as the measures taken by congress could be translated from words into deeds only with the consent of the people. This state of affairs essentially continued up to March 1, 1781. Until that time, that is, until the adoption of the articles of confederation by all the states, congress continued a revolutionary

body, which was recognized by all the colonies as 'de jure' and 'de facto' the national government, and which as such came in contact with foreign powers and entered into engagements, the binding force of which on the whole people has never been called in question. The individual colonies, on the other hand, considered themselves, up to the time of the Declaration of Independence, as legally dependent upon England and did not take a single step which could have placed them before the mother country or the world in the light of 'de facto' sovereign states. They remained colonies until the 'representatives of the United States' 'in the name of the good people of these colonies' solemnly declared 'these united colonies' to be 'free and independent states.' The transformation of the colonies into 'states' was, therefore, not the result of the independent action of the individual colonies. It was accomplished through the 'representatives of the United States'; that is, through the revolutionary congress, in the name of the whole people. Each individual colony became a state only in so far as it belonged to the United States and in so far as its population constituted a part of the people.—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 2, pp. 213-247.—J. Adams, *Diary (Works, v. 2)*, pp. 358-401.—*Journal of the Congress which met at Phila. Sept. 5, 1774 (London: J. Almon)*.

**A. D. 1774-1775.—Provincial Congress of Massachusetts and Committee of Safety.—Military preparations.**—"Governor Gage issued writs, dated September 1, convening the General Court at Salem on the 5th of October, but dissolved it by a proclamation dated September 28, 1774. The members elected to it, pursuant to the course agreed upon, resolved themselves into a Provincial Congress. This body, on the 26th of October, adopted a plan for organizing the militia, maintaining it, and calling it out when circumstances should render it necessary. It provided that one quarter of the number enrolled should be held in readiness to muster at the shortest notice, who were called by the popular name of minute-men. An executive authority—the Committee of Safety—was created, clothed with large discretionary powers; and another called the Committee of Supplies. On the 27th Jedediah Preble, (who did not accept,) Artemas Ward, and Seth Pomeroy, were chosen general officers; and on the 28th, Henry Gardner was chosen treasurer of the colony, under the title of Receiver-General. Among the energetic acts of this memorable Congress, was one authorizing the collection of military stores. It dissolved December 10. The committee of safety, as early as November, authorized the purchase of materials for an army, and ordered them to be deposited at Concord and Worcester. These proceedings were denounced by General Gage, in a proclamation dated November 10, as treasonable, and a compliance with them was forbidden. In a short time the king's speech and the action of Parliament were received, which manifested a firm determination to produce submission to the late acts, and to maintain 'the supreme authority' of Great Britain over the colonies. General Gage regarded this intelligence as having 'cast a damp upon the faction,' and as having produced a happy effect upon the royalist cause. However, a second Provincial Congress (February 1 to 16, 1775) re-

newed the measures of its predecessor; and gave definiteness to the duties of the committee of safety, by 'empowering and directing' them (on the 9th of February) to assemble the militia whenever it was required to resist the execution of the two acts, for altering the government and the administration of justice. At the same time it appointed two additional generals, John Thomas, and William Heath, and made it the duty of the five general officers to take charge of the militia when called out by the committee of safety, and to 'effectually oppose and resist such attempt or attempts as shall be made for carrying into execution by force' the two acts. . . . The conviction was fast becoming general that force only could decide the contest. Stimulated and sustained by such a public opinion, the committees of safety and supplies were diligent, through the gloomy months of winter, in collecting and storing at Concord and Worcester materials for the maintenance of an army."—R. Frothingham, Jr., *History of the Siege of Boston*, ch. 1.—The following citizens composed the Committee of Public Safety, viz., "John Hancock, Joseph Warren, Benjamin Church, Richard Devens, Benjamin White, Joseph Palmer, Abraham Watson, Azor Orne, John Pigeon, William Heath, and Thomas Gardner. The following 'Committee of Supplies' was announced, viz., Elbridge Gerry, David Cheever, Benjamin Lincoln, Moses Gill, and Benjamin Hall. . . . By the first day of January, 1775, the garrison of Boston had been increased to thirty-five hundred men, and mounted three hundred and seventy men as a daily guard-detail, besides a field officers' guard of one hundred and fifty men on Boston Neck. Three brigades were organized and were officered, respectively by Generals Lord Percy, Pigott and Jones. In November of 1774, General Gage had advised the British government, that he, 'was confident, that to begin with an army twenty thousand strong, would in the end save Great Britain blood and treasure.' Meanwhile, the militia drilled openly, rapidly completed company organizations, and made many sacrifices to procure arms, powder and other materials of war. The Home government, in view of the serious aspect of affairs, ordered Generals Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne to join General Gage, and announced that 'ample reinforcements would be sent out, and the most speedy and effectual measures would be taken to put down the rebellion,' then pronounced to already exist. On the eighth of April, the Provincial Congress resolved to take effectual measures to raise an army, and requested the coöperation of Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Connecticut. On the thirteenth, it voted to raise six companies of artillery, to pay them and keep them at drill. On the fourteenth it advised citizens to leave Boston and to remove to the country. On the fifteenth, it solemnly appointed a day for 'Public Fasting and Prayer,' and adjourned to the tenth day of May. The Committee of Public Safety at once undertook the task of securing powder, cannon and small arms. A practical embargo was laid upon all trade with Boston. The garrison could obtain supplies only with great difficulty, and, as stated by Gordon, 'nothing was wanting but a spark, to set the whole continent in a flame.'"—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *The Am. Rev.*, ch. 3 (v. 1).



**A. D. 1775 (January—March).—Vain efforts toward pacific statesmanship in the British Parliament, by Chatham, Burke, and others.**—A newly elected British Parliament “met on November 30, 1774; but no serious measure relating to America was taken till January 1775, when the House reassembled after the Christmas vacation. The Ministers had a large majority, and even apart from party interest the genuine feeling of both Houses ran strongly against the Americans. Yet at no previous period were they more powerfully defended. I have already noticed that Chatham, having returned to active politics after his long illness in 1774, had completely identified himself with the American cause, and had advocated with all his eloquence measures of conciliation. He . . . moved an address to the King praying that he would as soon as possible, ‘in order to open the way towards a happy settlement of the dangerous troubles in America,’ withdraw the British troops stationed in Boston. In the course of his speech he represented the question of American taxation as the root-cause of the whole division, and maintained that the only real basis of conciliation was to be found in a distinct recognition of the principle that ‘taxation is theirs, and commercial regulation ours;’ that England has a supreme right of regulating the commerce and navigation of America, and that the Americans have an inalienable right to their own property. He fully justified their resistance, predicted that all attempts to coerce them would fail, and eulogised the Congress at Philadelphia as worthy of the greatest periods of antiquity. Only eighteen peers voted for the address, while sixty-eight opposed it. On February 1 he reappeared with an elaborate Bill for settling the troubles in America. It asserted in strong terms the right of Parliament to bind the colonies in all matters of imperial concern, and especially in all matters of commerce and navigation. It pronounced the new colonial doctrine that the Crown had no right to send British soldiers to the colonies without the assent of the Provincial Assemblies, dangerous and unconstitutional in the highest degree, but at the same time it recognised the sole right of the colonists to tax themselves, guaranteed the inviolability of their charters, and made the tenure of their judges the same as in England. It proposed to make the Congress which had met at Philadelphia an official and permanent body, and asked it to make a free grant for imperial purposes. England, in return, was to reduce the Admiralty Courts to their ancient limits, and to suspend for the present the different Acts complained of by the colonists. The Bill was not even admitted to a second reading. Several other propositions tending towards conciliation were made in this session. On March 22, 1775, Burke, in one of his greatest speeches, moved a series of resolutions recommending a repeal of the recent Acts complained of in America, reforming the Admiralty Court and the position of the judges, and leaving American taxation to the American Assemblies, without touching upon any question of abstract right. A few days later, Hartley moved a resolution calling upon the Government to make requisitions to the colonial Assemblies to provide of their own authority for their own defence; and Lord Camden in the House of Lords and Sir G. Savile in the House of Commons endeavoured to

obtain a repeal of the Quebec Act. All these attempts, however, were defeated by enormous majorities. The petition of Congress to the King was referred to Parliament, which refused to receive it, and Franklin, after vain efforts to effect a reconciliation, returned from England to America.”—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng. in the 18th Century*, ch. 12 (v. 3).

The following are the more important passages of the speech of Burke, on moving the resolutions which he introduced in the House of Commons, March 22, 1775:

“The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord, fomented from principle, in all parts of the empire; not peace to depend on the juridical determination of perplexing questions, or the precise marking the shadowy boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace, sought in its natural course and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific. I propose, by removing the ground of the difference, and by restoring the former unsuspecting confidence of the colonies in the mother country, to give permanent satisfaction to your people,—and (far from a scheme of ruling by discord) to reconcile them to each other in the same act and by the bond of the very same interest which reconciles them to British government. My idea is nothing more. Refined policy ever has been the parent of confusion,—and ever will be so, as long as the world endures. Plain good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view as fraud is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is an healing and cementing principle. . . . The capital leading questions on which you must this day decide are these two: First, whether you ought to concede; and secondly, what your concession ought to be. On the first of these questions we have gained . . . some ground. But I am sensible that a good deal more is still to be done. Indeed, Sir, to enable us to determine both on the one and the other of these great questions with a firm and precise judgment, I think it may be necessary to consider distinctly the true nature and the peculiar circumstances of the object which we have before us: because, after all our struggle, whether we will or not, we must govern America according to that nature and to those circumstances, and not according to our own imaginations, not according to abstract ideas of right, by no means according to mere general theories of government, the resort to which appears to me, in our present situation, no better than arrant trifling. . . . The first thing that we have to consider with regard to the nature of the object is the number of people in the colonies. I have taken for some years a good deal of pains on that point. I can by no calculation justify myself in placing the number below two millions of inhabitants of our own European blood and color,—besides at least 500,000 others, who form no inconsiderable part of the strength and opulence of the whole. This, Sir, is, I believe, about the true number. There is no occasion to exaggerate, where plain truth is of so much weight and importance. But whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is a matter of little

moment. Such is the strength with which population shoots in that part of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations. . . . But the population of this country, the great and growing population, though a very important consideration, will lose much of its weight, if not combined with other circumstances. The commerce of your colonies is out of all proportion beyond the numbers of the people. . . . The trade with America alone is now within less than £500,000 of being equal to what this great commercial nation, England, carried on at the beginning of this century with the whole world! . . . But, it will be said, is not this American trade an unnatural protuberance, that has drawn the juices from the rest of the body? The reverse. It is the very food that has nourished every other part into its present magnitude. Our general trade has been greatly augmented, and augmented more or less in almost every part to which it ever extended, but with this material difference: that of the six millions which in the beginning of the century constituted the whole mass of our export commerce the colony trade was but one twelfth part; it is now (as a part of sixteen millions) considerably more than a third of the whole. . . . I choose, Sir, to enter into these minute and particular details; because generalities, which in all other cases are apt to heighten and raise the subject, have here a tendency to sink it. When we speak of the commerce of our colonies, fiction lags after truth, invention is unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren. . . . I pass . . . to the colonies in another point of view,—their agriculture. This they have prosecuted with such a spirit, that, besides feeding plentifully their own growing multitude, their annual export of grain, comprehending rice, has some years ago exceeded a million in value. Of their last harvest, I am persuaded, they will export much more. At the beginning of the century some of these colonies imported corn from the mother country. For some time past the Old World has been fed from the New. The scarcity which you have felt would have been a desolating famine, if this child of your old age, with a true filial piety, with a Roman charity, had not put the full breast of its youthful exuberance to the mouth of its exhausted parent. As to the wealth which the colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet the spirit by which that enterprising employment has been exercised ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and admiration. And pray, Sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale-fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits,

whilst we are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the South. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. . . . I am sensible, Sir, that all which I have asserted in my detail is admitted in the gross, but that quite a different conclusion is drawn from it. America, gentlemen say, is a noble object,—it is an object well worth fighting for. Certainly it is, if fighting a people be the best way of gaining them. Gentlemen in this respect will be led to their choice of means by their complexions and their habits. Those who understand the military art will of course have some predilection for it. Those who wield the thunder of the state may have more confidence in the efficacy of arms. But I confess, possibly for want of this knowledge, my opinion is much more in favor of prudent management than of force,—considering force not as an odious, but a feeble instrument, for preserving a people so numerous, so active, so growing, so spirited as this, in a profitable and subordinate connection with us. First, Sir, permit me to observe, that the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. My next objection is its uncertainty. Terror is not always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed, you are without resource: for, conciliation failing, force remains; but, force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and authority are sometimes bought by kindness; but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A further objection to force is, that you impair the object by your very endeavors to preserve it. The thing you fought for is not the thing which you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and consumed in the contest. Nothing less will content me than whole America. I do not choose to consume its strength along with our own; because in all parts it is the British strength that I consume. I do not choose to be caught by a foreign enemy at the end of this exhausting conflict, and still less in the midst of it. I may escape, but I can make no insurance against such an event. Let me add, that I do not choose wholly to break the American spirit; because it is the spirit that has made the country. Lastly, we have no sort of experience in favor of force as an instrument in the rule of our colonies. Their growth and their utility has been owing to methods altogether different. Our ancient indulgence has been said to be pursued to a fault. It may be so; but we know, if feeling is evidence, that our fault was more tolerable than our attempt to mend it, and our sin far more salutary than our penitence. These, Sir, are my reasons for not entertaining that high opinion of untried force by which many gentlemen, for whose sentiments in other particulars I have great respect, seem to be so greatly captivated. But there is still behind a third consideration concerning this object, which serves to determine



my opinion on the sort of policy which ought to be pursued in the management of America, even more than its population and its commerce: I mean its temper and character. In this character of the Americans a love of freedom is the predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole. . . . This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English colonies, probably, than in any other people of the earth, and this from a great variety of powerful causes; which, to understand the true temper of their minds, and the direction which this spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open somewhat more largely. First, the people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. England, Sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas and on English principles. . . . Your mode of governing them, whether through lenity or indolence, through wisdom or mistake, confirmed them in the imagination, that they, as well as you, had an interest in these common principles. They were further confirmed in this pleasing error by the form of their provincial legislative assemblies. Their governments are popular in an high degree: some are merely popular; in all, the popular representative is the most weighty; and this share of the people in their ordinary government never fails to inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with a strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief importance. If anything were wanting to this necessary operation of the form of government, religion would have given it a complete effect. Religion, always a principle of energy, in this new people is no way worn out or impaired; and their mode of professing it is also one main cause of this free spirit. The people are Protestants, and of that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. . . . All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance: it is the dissidence of dissent, and the protestantism of the Protestant religion. . . . Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies, which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of this untractable spirit: I mean their education. In no country, perhaps, in the world is the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous and powerful, and in most provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavour to obtain some smattering in that science. I have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many books as those on the law exported to the plantations. The colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's 'Commentaries' in America as in England. General Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter on your table. He states, that all the people in his government are lawyers, or smatterers in law,—and that in Bos-

ton they have been enabled, by successful chicanery, wholly to evade many parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. . . . The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them. No contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in weakening government. Seas roll, and months pass, between the order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to defeat an whole system. . . . Then, Sir, from these six capital sources, of descent, of form of government, of religion in the northern provinces, of manners in the southern, of education, of the remoteness of situation from the first mover of government,—from all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in your colonies, and increased with the increase of their wealth: a spirit, that, unhappily meeting with an exercise of power in England, which, however lawful, is not reconcilable to any ideas of liberty, much less with theirs, has kindled this flame that is ready to consume us. . . . The question is not, whether their spirit deserves praise or blame,—what, in the name of God, shall we do with it? You have before you the object, such as it is,—with all its glories, with all its imperfections on its head. You see the magnitude, the importance, the temper, the habits, the disorders. By all these considerations we are strongly urged to determine something concerning it. We are called upon to fix some rule and line for our future conduct, which may give a little stability to our politics, and prevent the return of such unhappy deliberations as the present. . . . It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there is a very wide difference, in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men, who disturb order within the state, and the civil dissensions which may, from time to time, on great questions, agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people. . . . I am not ripe to pass sentence on the gravest public bodies, intrusted with magistracies of great authority and dignity, and charged with the safety of their fellow-citizens, upon the very same title that I am. I really think that for wise men this is not judicious, for sober men not decent, for minds tinctured with humanity not mild and merciful."

In the closing part of his speech, Mr. Burke introduced successively and commented upon the following propositions, or resolutions, which formed in their entirety his plan of conciliation. At the end of his speaking they were rejected by a vote of 270 against 78:

"That the colonies and plantations of Great Britain in North America, consisting of 14 separate governments, and containing two millions and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had the liberty and privilege of electing and sending any knights and burgesses, or others, to represent them in the high court of Parliament.

That the said colonies and plantations have been made liable to, and bounden by, several subsidies, payments, rates, and taxes, given and granted by Parliament, though the said colonies and plantations have not their knights and burgesses in the said high court of Parliament, of their own election, to represent the condition of their country; by lack whereof they have been oftentimes touched and grieved by subsidies, given, granted, and assented to, in the said court, in a manner prejudicial to the common wealth, quietness, rest, and peace of the subjects inhabiting within the same.

That, from the distance of the said colonies, and from other circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for procuring a representation in Parliament for the said colonies.

That each of the said colonies hath within itself a body, chosen, in part or in the whole, by the freemen, freeholders, or other free inhabitants thereof, commonly called the General Assembly, or General Court, with powers legally to raise, levy, and assess, according to the several usages of such colonies, duties and taxes towards defraying all sorts of public services.

That the said general assemblies, general courts, or other bodies legally qualified as aforesaid, have at sundry times freely granted several large subsidies and public aids for his Majesty's service, according to their abilities, when required thereto by letter from one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State; and that their right to grant the same, and their cheerfulness and sufficiency in the said grants, have been at sundry times acknowledged by Parliament.

That it hath been found by experience, that the manner of granting the said supplies and aids by the said general assemblies hath been more agreeable to the inhabitants of said colonies, and more beneficial and conducive to the public service, than the mode of giving and granting aids and subsidies in Parliament, to be raised and paid in the said colonies.

That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 7th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in America; for allowing a drawback of the duties of customs, upon the exportation from this kingdom, of coffee and cocoa-nuts, of the produce of the said colonies or plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks payable on China earthen ware exported to America; and for more effectually preventing the clandestine running of goods in the said colonies and plantations.'

That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act to discontinue, in such manner and for such time as are therein mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading or shipping, of goods, wares, and merchandise, at the town and within the harbor of Boston, in the province of Massachusetts Bay, in North America.'

That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for the impartial administration of justice, in the cases of persons questioned for any acts done by them, in the execution of the law, or for the suppression of riots and tumults, in the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.'

That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year of the reign of his present Maj-

esty, intituled, 'An act for the better regulating the government of the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.'

That it may be proper to explain and amend an act, made in the 35th year of the reign of King Henry VIII., intituled, 'An act for the trial of treasons committed out of the king's dominions.'

That, from the time when the general assembly, or general court, of any colony or plantation in North America, shall have appointed, by act of assembly duly confirmed, a settled salary to the offices of the chief justice and other judges of the superior courts, it may be proper that the said chief justice and other judges of the superior courts of such colony shall hold his and their office and offices during their good behaviour, and shall not be removed therefrom, but when the said removal shall be adjudged by his Majesty in council, upon a hearing on complaint from the governor, or the council, or the house of representatives, severally, of the colony in which the said chief justice and other judges have exercised the said offices.

That it may be proper to regulate the courts of admiralty or vice-admiralty, authorized by the 15th chapter of the 4th George III., in such a manner as to make the same more commodious to those who sue or are sued in the said courts; and to provide for the more decent maintenance of the judges of the same."—Edmund Burke, *Works*, v. 2.

ALSO IN: T. MacKnight, *Life and Times of Edmund Burke*, ch. 21 (v. 2).—J. Adolphus, *Hist. of England, Reign of Geo. III.*, ch. 25 (v. 2).

A. D. 1775 (January—April).—Aims at independence disclaimed.—"The denial that independence was the final object, was constant and general. To obtain concessions and to preserve the connection with England was affirmed everywhere; and John Adams, after the peace, went farther than this, for he said:—'There was not a moment during the Revolution, when I would not have given everything I possessed for a restoration to the state of things before the contest began, provided we could have had a sufficient security for its continuance.' If Mr. Adams be regarded as expressing the sentiments of the Whigs, they were willing to remain Colonists, provided they could have had their rights secured to them; while the Tories were contented thus to continue, without such security. Such, as it appears to me, was the only difference between the two parties prior to hostilities. . . . Franklin's testimony, a few days before the affair at Lexington, was, that he had 'more than once travelled almost from one end of the continent to the other, and kept a variety of company, eating, drinking, and conversing with them freely, [and] never had heard from any person, drunk or sober, the least expression of a wish for a separation, or a hint that such a thing would be advantageous to America.' Mr. Jay is quite as explicit. 'During the course of my life,' said he, 'and until the second petition of Congress in 1775, I never did hear an American of any class, or of any description, express a wish for the independence of the Colonies.' 'It has always been, and still is, my opinion and belief, that our country was prompted and impelled to independence by necessity, and not by choice.' Mr. Jefferson affirmed, 'What, east-



ward of New York, might have been the dispositions towards England before the commencement of hostilities, I know not; but before that I never heard a whisper of a disposition to separate from Great Britain; and after that its possibility was contemplated with affliction by all.' Washington, in 1774, fully sustains these declarations, and, in the 'Fairfax County Resolves,' it was complained that 'malevolent falsehoods' were propagated by the ministry to prejudice the mind of the king: 'particularly that there is an intention in the American Colonies to set up for independent States.' Mr. Madison was not in public life until May, 1776, but he says, 'It has always been my impression, that a reestablishment of the Colonial relations to the parent country, as they were previous to the controversy, was the real object of every class of the people, till the despair of obtaining it,' &c. . . . The only way to dispose of testimony like this, is to impeach the persons who have given it.'—L. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the Am. Rev.*, v. 1, pp. 64–66.

**A. D. 1775 (January—September).—Revolution in South Carolina.** See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775.

**A. D. 1775 (April).—The Beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Lexington.—Concord.**—"On April 19, 1775, the committees of safety could only count up twelve field-pieces in Massachusetts; and there had been collected in that colony 21,549 fire-arms, 17,441 pounds of powder, 22,191 pounds of ball, 144,699 flints, 10,108 bayonets, 11,979 pouches, 15,000 canteens. There were also 17,000 pounds of salt fish, 35,000 pounds of rice, with large quantities of beef and pork. Viewed as an evidence of the forethought of the colonists, these statistics are remarkable; but there was something heroic and indeed almost pathetic in the project of going to war with the British government on the strength of twelve field-pieces and seventeen thousand pounds of salt fish. Yet when, on the night of the 18th of April, 1775, Paul Revere rode beneath the bright moonlight through Lexington to Concord, with Dawes and Prescott for comrades, he was carrying the signal for the independence of a nation. He had seen across the Charles River the two lights from the church-steeple in Boston which were to show that a British force was going out to seize the patriotic supplies at Concord; he had warned Hancock and Adams at Rev. Jonas Clark's parsonage in Lexington, and had rejected Sergeant Monroe's caution against unnecessary noise, with the rejoinder, 'You'll have noise enough here before long—the regulars are coming out.' As he galloped on his way the regulars were advancing with steady step behind him, soon warned of their own danger by alarm-bells and signal-guns. When Revere was captured by some British officers who happened to be near Concord, Colonel Smith, the commander of the expedition, had already halted, ordered Pitcairn forward, and sent back prudently for reinforcements. It was a night of terror to all the neighboring Middlesex towns, for no one knew what excesses the angry British troops might commit on their return march. The best picture we have of this alarm is in the narrative of a Cambridge woman, Mrs. Hannah Winthrop, describing 'the horrors of that midnight cry,' as she calls it. The women of that town were roused

by the beat of drums and ringing of bells; they hastily gathered their children together and fled to the outlying farm-houses; seventy or eighty of them were at Fresh Pond, within hearing of the guns at Menotomy, now Arlington. The next day their husbands bade them flee to Andover, whither the college property had been sent, and thither they went, alternately walking and riding, over fields where the bodies of the slain lay unburied. Before 5 A. M. on April 19, 1775, the British troops had reached Lexington Green, where thirty-eight men, under Captain Parker, stood up before six hundred or eight hundred to be shot at, their captain saying, 'Don't fire unless you are fired on; but if they want a war let it begin here.' It began there; they were fired upon; they fired rather ineffectually in return, while seven were killed and nine wounded. The rest, after retreating, reformed and pursued the British towards Concord, capturing seven stragglers—the first prisoners taken in the war. Then followed the fight at Concord, where four hundred and fifty Americans, instead of thirty-eight, were rallied to meet the British. The fighting took place between two detachments at the North Bridge, where 'once the embattled farmers stood, And fired the shot heard round the world.' There the American captain, Isaac Davis, was killed at the first shot—he who had said, when his company was placed at the head of the little column, 'I haven't a man that is afraid to go.' He fell and Major Buttrick gave the order, 'Fire! for God's sake fire!' in return. The British detachment retreated in disorder, but their main body was too strong to be attacked, so they disabled a few cannon, destroyed some barrels of flour, cut down the liberty-pole, set fire to the court-house and then began their return march. It ended in a flight; they were exposed to a constant guerilla fire; minute-men flocked behind every tree and house; and only the foresight of Colonel Smith in sending for reinforcements had averted a surrender. At 2 P. M., near Lexington, Percy with his troops met the returning fugitives, and formed a hollow square, into which they ran and threw themselves on the ground exhausted. Then Percy in turn fell back. Militia still came pouring in from Dorchester, Milton, Dedham, as well as the nearer towns. A company from Danvers marched sixteen miles in four hours. The Americans lost ninety-three in killed, wounded and missing that day; the British, two hundred and seventy-three. But the important result was that every American colony now recognized that war had begun."—T. W. Higginson, *History of the United States of America*, ch. 10.

Also in: R. Frothingham, *Hist. of the Siege of Boston*, ch. 2.—E. H. Goss, *Life of Paul Revere*, v. 1, ch. 7.—J. L. Watson, *Paul Revere's Signal* (*Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, Nov. 1876).—P. Force, *ed. Am. Archives*, series 4, v. 2.—E. Phinney, *Hist. of Battle at Lexington*.—C. Hudson, *Hist. of Lexington*, ch. 6–8.

**A. D. 1775 (April).—The first Provincial Convention in New York.** See NEW YORK: A. D. 1775 (APRIL).

**A. D. 1775 (April—May).—The siege of Boston begun.**—"Reinforcements of foreign troops and supplies were constantly arriving in Boston. Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne came, as generals, on the 25th of May. Bitterness, ridicule, and boasting, with all the irritating taunts of a mer-

cenary soldiery, were freely poured on the patriots and on the 'mixed multitude' which composed the germ of their army yet to be. The British forces had cooped themselves up in Boston, and the provincials determined that they should remain there, with no mode of exit save by the sea. The pear-shaped peninsula, hung to the mainland only by the stem called the 'Neck,' over which the tide-waters sometimes washed, was equally an inconvenient position for crowding regiments in war-like array, and a convenient one for the extemporized army which was about to beleaguer them there. . . . The town of Charlestown, which lay under the enemy's guns, had contained a population of between two and three thousand. The interruption of all the employments of peace, and the proximity of danger, had brought poverty and suffering upon the people. They had been steadily leaving the town, with such of their effects as they could carry with them. It proved to be well for them that they had acted upon the warning. It would seem that there were less than 200 of its inhabitants remaining in it at the time of the battle, when the flames kindled by the enemy and bombs from a battery on Copp's Hill laid it in ashes. On the third day after the affair at Concord, the Provincial Congress again assembled, voted to raise at once 13,000 men, to rally at Cambridge and the neighborhood, and asked aid from the other provinces, to which Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire responded. The forts, magazines, and arsenals, such as they then were, were secured for the country. . . . Of the 15,000 men then gathered, by the cry of war, at Cambridge and Roxbury, all virtually, but not by formal investment, under the command of General Ward, nearly 10,000 belonged to Massachusetts, and the remainder to New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. They have been designated since, at various times and by different writers, under the extreme contrast of terms, as an 'organized army,' and a 'mob.' Either of these terms would be equally inappropriate. . . . Our troops were 'minute-men' extemporized into fragmentary companies and skeleton regiments. The officers, chosen on the village-green or in its public-house, paying for the honor by a treat, or perhaps because they kept the premises where the treat could be most conveniently furnished, were not commissioned or ranked as the leaders of an army for campaign service. The yeomen of town and village had not come together at the summons of a commander-in-chief through adjutant, herald, or advertisement. They came unbidden, at an alarm from the bell on their meeting-house, or from a post-rider, or from the telegrams transmitted by tongue and ear. . . . And for the most part they were as free to go away as they had been to come. They were enlisted after a fashion, some prime conditions of which were their own convenience or pleasure. . . . Such of them as came from the seaboard might bring with them old sails for tents, while the midsummer days made it scarcely a hardship to many to have only the heavens for a roof. Generally their towns were expected to keep them supplied with food. . . . The forces then mustered at Cambridge as a central camp, and, stretching from the left at Chelsea almost round to Dorchester on the right, for nearly three quarters of a circle, were indeed not organized, nor yet had they any characteristic of

a mere mob. They combined in fact four independent armies, united in resistance to a foreign enemy. . . . Each of the Provinces had raised, commissioned, and assumed the supply of its respective forces, holding them subject to their several orders. After the battle in Charlestown, the Committee of War in Connecticut ordered their generals, Spencer and Putnam, while they were on the territory of this Province, to regard General Ward as the commander-in-chief, and suggested to Rhode Island and New Hampshire to issue the same instructions to their soldiers. . . . General Artemas Ward was a conscientious and judicious patriot. In the French war he had earned some military experience and fame. . . . On October 27, 1774, the Provincial Congress, in which he was a delegate, appointed him a general officer, and on May 19 following, Commander-in-chief. As such he served at Cambridge till the arrival of Washington. On the very day of the battle in Charlestown, when the great chieftain was selected for his high service, Ward was chosen by the Continental Congress as its first major-general. Though he was only in his 48th year when he was burdened with the responsibility of the opening warfare, his body was infirm from disease and exposure. Lieutenant-General Thomas, two years the senior of Ward, was second in command. . . . General Israel Putnam preceded his Connecticut troops in hurrying to the scene of war on the news of the affair at Lexington and Concord. His men soon followed him, with like enthusiasm. The New Hampshire troops, on their arrival at Medford, made choice of Colonel John Stark as their leader. Colonel Nathaniel Greene commanded a regiment from Rhode Island. . . . A few days after the affair at Lexington, when virtually the siege began, General Gage, the British commander, at the solicitation of some of the leading citizens assembled in Faneuil Hall, had, by a mutual understanding, entered into an agreement that such of the inhabitants as wished to depart from the town should be at liberty to do so, if they would leave their arms behind them and covenant not to engage in any hostility against his army. The agreement was availed of by many of the suffering and frightened people. . . . But the original freedom and fullness of this understanding, on the part of General Gage, were soon reduced by a very strict examination of those who sought to go out of the town, and by a rigid search of the effects which they wished to take with them. . . . Several of the inhabitants remained in it from different motives: some as devoted loyalists; some as timid neutrals; some as spies, to watch each hostile movement and to communicate it to their friends outside. . . . After hostilities commenced, General Gage, of course, regarded the citizens as alike prisoners, either in the same sense in which he was himself under restraint, or as abettors of those who were his enemies. . . . The population of the town, independent of the military, was then about 18,000. To all those who were not in sympathy with them the British behaved in an insulting and exasperating manner. . . . To show, as members of the English Church establishment, their contempt of congregational places of worship, they removed the pews and pulpit from the Old South meeting-house, and, covering the floor with earth, they converted it into a riding-school for Burgoyne's squadron of



cavalry. The two eastern galleries were allowed to remain, one for spectators, the other for a liquor-shop, while the fire in the stove was occasionally kindled by books and pamphlets from the library of a former pastor, Dr. Prince, which were in a room in the tower. . . . At the time of the skirmishes at Lexington and Concord there were about 4,000 British troops in Boston and at the Castle. The number was increased to more than 10,000 before the action in Charlestown."—G. E. Ellis, *Hist. of the Battle of Bunker's Hill*, pp. 4-26.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Hist. of the Siege of Boston*, ch. 3.—George Washington, *Writings*, ed. by W. C. Ford, v. 3.—Jos. Reed, *Life and Cor.*, v. 1.—C. Stedman [English], *Hist. of the Am. War*, v. 1, ch. 1 and 5.

A. D. 1775 (April—June).—The spreading of revolt.—All the colonies in line with New England.—“On the 23d of April, the day after the dissolution of the provincial Congress of New York, the news from Lexington burst upon the city. Though it was Sunday, the inhabitants speedily unloaded two sloops which lay at the wharfs, laden with flour and supplies for the British at Boston, of the value of £80,000. . . . The royal government lay hopelessly prostrate. Isaac Sears concerted with John Lamb to stop all vessels going to Quebec, Newfoundland, Georgia, or Boston, where British authority was still supreme. The people shut up the custom-house, and the merchants whose vessels were cleared out dared not let them sail. In the following days the military stores of the city of New York were secured, and volunteer companies paraded in the streets. . . . On the 1st of May the people, at the usual places of election, chose for the city and county a new general committee of one hundred, who ‘resolved in the most explicit manner to stand or fall with the liberty of the continent.’ All parts of the colony were summoned to send delegates to a provincial convention, to which the city and county of New York deputed one-and-twenty as their representatives. . . . On the 2d of May the New Jersey committee of correspondence called a provincial congress for the 23d at Trenton. To anticipate its influence, the governor convened the regular assembly eight days earlier at Burlington, and laid before them the project of Lord North [adopted by the British parliament in February, offering to each colony freedom from taxation on its making satisfactory provision for the general defense and for support of government]. The assembly could see in the proposition no avenue to reconciliation, and declared their intention to ‘abide by the united voice of the continental congress.’ Such, too, was the spirit of Pennsylvania. ‘Let us not have it said of Philadelphia that she passed noble resolutions and neglected them,’ were the words of Mifflin, youngest of the orators who on the 25th of April addressed the town-meeting called in that city on receiving the news from Lexington. Thousands were present, and agreed ‘to associate for the purpose of defending with arms their lives, their property, and liberty.’ Thomas Paine from that day ‘rejected the sullen Pharaoh of the British throne forever.’ . . . In Philadelphia, thirty companies, with 50 to 100 in each, daily practiced the manual exercise of the musket. One of them was raised from the Quakers. . . . The Pennsylvania assembly, which met on

the first day of May, rejecting the overtures of the governor, ‘could form no prospect of lasting advantages for Pennsylvania but from a communication of rights and property with the other colonies.’ . . . On the 5th Franklin arrived, after a voyage over the smoothest seas, and the next morning was unanimously elected a deputy to the congress. . . . In Maryland, at the request of the colonels of militia, Eden, at Annapolis, gave up the arms and ammunition of the province to the freemen of the county. Pleased with his concession, the provincial convention distinguished itself by its moderation; and its delegates to congress determined to labor for a reconciliation. In Virginia [where, in the night of April 20th, Governor Dunmore had carried off the gunpowder stored in the colony’s magazine at Williamsburg, and where, as a consequence, the excited people were already in arms, though no further action had yet been taken], on the 2d of May, at the cry from Lexington, the independent company of Hanover and its county committee were called together by Patrick Henry. The soldiers, most of them young men, elected him their chief, and marched for Williamsburg, on the way greatly increasing in numbers. Alarmed by the ‘insurrections,’ Dunmore convened the council, and in a proclamation of the 3d pretended that he had removed the ammunition, lest it should be seized by slaves. Message after message could not arrest the march or change the purpose of Henry. . . . At sunrise on the 4th the governor’s messenger met Henry at New Kent, and, as a compensation for the gunpowder taken out of the magazine, paid him £330, for which he was to account to the convention of Virginia. The sum was found to be more than the value of the powder, and the next Virginia convention directed the excess to be paid back. . . . In twelve or thirteen days the message from Lexington was borne to Newbern, in North Carolina, where it ‘wrought a great change.’ The governor, in his panic, ordered the cannon in the town to be dismounted; and, after a remonstrance made in the name of the inhabitants by Abner Nash, ‘the oracle of their committee and a principal promoter of sedition,’ he shipped his wife to New York and fled to Fort Johnston, where a sloop-of-war had its station. In South Carolina, Charles Pinckney, on learning the inflexibility of parliament, using power intrusted to him by the provincial congress, appointed a committee of five to place the colony in a state of defence; on the 21st of April, the very night after their organization, men of Charleston, without disguise, under their direction, seized all the powder in the public magazines, and removed 800 stand of arms and other military stores from the royal arsenal. The tidings from Lexington induced the general committee to hasten the meeting of the provincial congress, whose members, on the 2d of June, Henry Laurens being their president, associated themselves for defence against every foe; ‘ready to sacrifice their lives and fortunes to secure her freedom and safety.’ They resolved to raise two regiments of infantry and a regiment of rangers. . . . ‘The people of Charleston are as mad as they are here in Boston,’ was the testimony of Gage. The skirmish at Lexington became known in Savannah on the 10th of May, and added Georgia to the union. At that time she had about 17,000 white inhabitants and 15,000 Africans. Her militia was not

less than 3,000. Her frontier, which extended from Augusta to St. Mary's, was threatened by the Creeks, with 4,000 warriors; the Chickasas, with 450; the Cherokees, with 3,000; the Choc-tas, with 2,500. But danger could not make her people hesitate. On the night of the 11th, Noble Wimberley Jones, Joseph Habersham, Edward Telfair, and others, broke open the king's magazine in the eastern part of the city, and took from it over 500 pounds of powder. To the Boston wanderers they sent 63 barrels of rice and £122 in specie; and they kept the king's birthday by raising a liberty-pole."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 4, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: T. Jones, *Hist. of N. Y. during the Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 2.—W. Wirt, *Life of Patrick Henry*, sect. 5.—W. B. Stevens, *Hist. of Georgia*, bk. 4, ch. 1 (v. 2).—*Proceedings of N. Y. Provincial Congress (N. Y. State Archives*, v. 1).—W. H. Egle, *Hist. of Penn.*, ch. 8.

A. D. 1775 (May).—The surprising of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.—"Early in the year 1775, as soon as it was made manifest by the attitude assumed on the part of the British government against the colonies, and by the conduct of General Gage in Boston, that open hostilities must inevitably commence in a short time, it began to be secretly whispered among the principal politicians in New England that the capture of Ticonderoga was an object demanding the first attention. In the month of March, Samuel Adams and Dr. Joseph Warren, as members of the Committee of Correspondence in Boston, sent an agent privately into Canada, on a political mission, with instructions to ascertain the feelings of the people there in regard to the approaching contest, and to make such reports as his observations should warrant. . . . This agent sent back intelligence from Montreal, and among other things advised, that by all means the garrison of Ticonderoga should be seized as quickly as possible after the breaking out of hostilities, adding that the people of the New Hampshire Grants had already agreed to undertake the task, and that they were the most proper persons to be employed in it. This hint was given three weeks anterior to the battle of Lexington, and how far it influenced future designs may not be known; but it is certain that, eight days after that event, several gentlemen at that time attending the Assembly in Hartford, Connecticut, concerted a plan for surprising Ticonderoga and seizing the cannon in that fortress, for the use of the army then marching from all quarters to the environs of Boston."—J. Sparks, *Life of Ethan Allen (Library of Am. Biog.*, v. 1), p. 270.—The gentlemen above mentioned "borrowed of the Connecticut Treasury some 1,800 dollars, and enlisted Mott and Phelps of Hartford, and Blagden of Salisbury, to beat up recruits. With these they went northward, and at Pittsfield got the co-operation of Captains Easton and Brown. No time was to be lost, and they pushed on with some forty men to find that Vermont giant, Ethan Allen, at Bennington. Allen at once agreed to go; he sought out Seth Warner, and roused the 'Green Mountain Boys,' who were mostly Connecticut and Massachusetts men; so that, in a few days, there gathered at Castleton (7th of May, 1775) two hundred and seventy strong men. Allen was their first leader, Easton second, and Warner

third. Their larger body was to cross the Lake in boats from Shoreham, and surprise 'Ty.' Captain Herrick, with thirty men, was to seize the pass of Skenesborough (now Whitehall) at the head of the Lake, and Captain Douglass was to search for and seize all boats and batteaux. While these things were in progress, the ambitious, active, and daring Benedict Arnold heard of this expedition, and at once got leave from the Committee of Safety at Cambridge, to lead it. He rode post-haste through Massachusetts to raise men, and, with a single follower, reached Castleton, and claimed the command. These rough cubs of the forest could not well understand why he should lead them, for had they not Allen, and Warner, and Easton, and Phelps, and Bigelow, and others? But they consented that he should join Allen as an equal; and so forward they went. On the 8th of May Captain Noah Phelps, disguised with rough farmer clothes, and a long beard, blundered into the fort at Ticonderoga, pretending he wanted to be shaved. He found the gates open, and discipline loose; for no telegraph had carried the Lexington news to them, nor had the winds wafted the smell of blood, or the sounds of muskets there. When the darkness was deepest on the night of the 9th, Allen and Arnold, with 83 men, pulled across the Lake, landed near the fort, and then sent back the boats for Warner and his men. They had a boy, Nathan Beman, for a guide, and were full of courage. Allen formed his men, made them a little speech, and all was ready, when the question arose as to who should have the honor of entering the fort first. The dispute was warm between Arnold and Allen, but was finally quieted; and, side by side, at daylight, they rushed through the gate of the fort, defended only by sleeping men. The sentinel snapped his musket, and ran, giving the alarm; the garrison hastily turned out, to find themselves in the face of superior numbers. Allen sought and found the Commander's bed-room, and when Captain Delaplace waked, he saw any thing but an Angel of Mercy with white wings. Delaplace opened the door, with trowers in hand, and there the great gaunt Ethan stood, with a drawn sword in his hand. 'Surrender!' said Ethan. 'To you?' asked Delaplace. 'Yes, to me, Ethan Allen.' 'By whose authority?' asked Laplace. Ethan was growing impatient, and raising his voice, and waving his sword, he said: 'In the name of the Great Jehovah, and of the Continental Congress, by God!' Delaplace little comprehended the words, but surrendered at once. Thus, on the morning of 10th of May, the strong fortress of Ticonderoga was taken by the border-men, and with it 44 prisoners, 120 iron cannon, with swivels, muskets, balls, and some powder, without the loss of a single man. The surprise was planned and paid for by Connecticut, and was led by Allen, a Connecticut-born man, but was carried out by the 'Green Mountain Boys.' Skenesborough (Whitehall) was surprised and seized, while Major Skene was out shooting. Arnold at once manned a schooner, taken at Skenesborough, and led an attack against an armed sloop at St. John's; he took her and the place, and returned in triumph to meet Allen, who, in batteaux, was coming to sustain him. Warner led a party against Crown Point, and took it, with its hundred cannon, and small garrison of 12 men.



News of these things was carried to the Continental Congress, reassembled at Philadelphia, which caused almost as much surprise there, as Allen's demand did to Captain Delaplace, and more exultation. They requested the Committees of Safety of New York and Albany, to have an inventory made of the stores, so that they might be returned 'when the restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies' should render it safe."—C. W. Elliott, *The New England Hist.*, v. 2, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *The Am. Revolution*, ch. 3 (v. 1).—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, ch. 17.

**A. D. 1775 (May).—The Mecklenburg Declaration.** See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775 (May).

**A. D. 1775 (May—August).—The Second Continental Congress and its work.—Its powers, theoretical and actual.—Its opportunity.—Its influence.—The New England Army adopted as the "Continental Army," and Washington made Commander-in-chief.—"The second General Congress assembled at Philadelphia on the 10th of May. Peyton Randolph was again elected as president; but being obliged to return, and occupy his place as speaker of the Virginia Assembly, John Hancock, of Massachusetts, was elevated to the chair. . . . Many of those most active in vindicating colonial rights, and Washington among the number, still indulged the hope of an eventual reconciliation, while few entertained, or, at least, avowed the idea of complete independence. A second 'humble and dutiful' petition to the king was moved, but met with strong opposition. John Adams condemned it as an imbecile measure, calculated to embarrass the proceedings of Congress. He was for prompt and vigorous action. Other members concurred with him. Indeed, the measure itself seemed but a mere form, intended to reconcile the half-scrupulous; for subsequently, when it was carried, Congress, in face of it, went on to assume and exercise the powers of a sovereign authority. A federal union was formed, leaving to each colony the right of regulating its internal affairs according to its own individual constitution, but vesting in Congress the power of making peace or war; of entering into treaties and alliances; of regulating general commerce; in a word, of legislating on all such matters as regarded the security and welfare of the whole community. The executive power was to be vested in a council of twelve, chosen by Congress from among its own members, and to hold office for a limited time. Such colonies as had not sent delegates to Congress might yet become members of the confederacy by agreeing to its conditions. Georgia, which had hitherto hesitated, soon joined the league, which thus extended from Nova Scotia to Florida. Congress lost no time in exercising their federated powers. In virtue of them, they ordered the enlistment of troops, the construction of forts in various parts of the colonies, the provision of armies, ammunition, and military stores; while, to defray the expense of these, and other measures, avowedly of self-defence, they authorized the emission of notes to the amount of \$3,000,000, bearing the inscription of 'The United Colonies'; the faith of the confederacy being pledged for their redemption. A retaliating decree was passed, prohibiting all supplies of**

provisions to the British fisheries; and another, declaring the province of Massachusetts Bay absolved from its compact with the crown, by the violation of its charter; and recommending it to form an internal government for itself. . . . The situation of the New England army, actually besieging Boston, became an early and absorbing consideration. It was without munitions of war, without arms, clothing, or pay; in fact, without legislative countenance or encouragement. Unless sanctioned and assisted by Congress, there was danger of its dissolution. . . . The disposition to uphold the army was general; but the difficult question was, who should be commander-in-chief? . . . The opinion evidently inclined in favor of Washington; yet it was promoted by no clique of partisans or admirers. More than one of the Virginia delegates, says Adams, were cool on the subject of this appointment. . . . Adams, in his diary, claims the credit of bringing the members of Congress to a decision. . . . On the 15th of June, the army was regularly adopted by Congress, and the pay of the commander-in-chief fixed at \$500 a month. Many still clung to the idea, that in all these proceedings they were merely opposing the measures of the ministry, and not the authority of the crown, and thus the army before Boston was designated as the Continental Army, in contradistinction to that under General Gage, which was called the Ministerial Army. In this stage of the business, Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, rose, and nominated Washington for the station of commander-in-chief. The election was by ballot, and was unanimous. It was formally announced to him by the president, on the following day, when he had taken his seat in Congress. Rising in his place, he briefly expressed his high and grateful sense of the honor conferred on him, and his sincere devotion to the cause. 'But,' added he, 'lest some unlucky event should happen unfavorable to my reputation, I beg it may be remembered by every gentleman in the room, that I this day declare, with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with. As to pay, I beg leave to assure the Congress that, as no pecuniary consideration could have tempted me to accept this arduous employment, at the expense of my domestic ease and happiness, I do not wish to make any profit on it. I will keep an exact account of my expenses. Those, I doubt not, they will discharge, and that is all I desire.'" Four major-generals,—Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler and Israel Putnam,—and eight brigadier-generals,—Seth Pomeroy, Richard Montgomery, David Wooster, William Heath, Joseph Spencer, John Thomas, John Sullivan, and Nathaniel Greene—were appointed. "At Washington's express request, his old friend, Major Horatio Gates, then absent at his estate in Virginia, was appointed adjutant-general, with the rank of brigadier."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 1, ch. 39.—"The Congress of 1775 was not content with mere expression of opinions. It took a large view of its powers. It realized that its efficiency depended wholly upon the acceptance of its acts by the principals of the different delegations; but, following its judgment as to what the patriotism of the colonies would approve and sustain, it initiated action of various kinds, which, from the beginning, assumed the certainty of adoption by the colo-

nies, and derived all its energy from the probability of such ratification. The Congress doubtless exceeded the letter of the instructions received by a portion of its members; but this was not from any misconception of those instructions. . . . In pointing out to the colonies the direction which their preparations for resistance ought to take, the Congress no more acted upon an imagined authority to command the colonies than does the lookout at the bow of the ship, when he reports the direction of danger to the officer of the deck. The Congress unquestionably enjoyed a prestige at this juncture which it subsequently lost. The people, and even the provincial conventions, occasionally addressed it in a tone which indicated that they unconsciously attributed to it power which it plainly did not possess."—A. W. Small, *The Beginnings of Am. Nationality* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, 8th series, 1-2) p. 73.—"With the energy and recklessness of a French revolutionary body it might have blotted out the distinctions between colonies, and established a centralized government, to be modified in time by circumstances. In fact, it took no such direction. It began its course by recommendations to the new colonial governments; it relied on them for executive acts; and, as soon as the new colonies were fairly under way, they seized on the power of naming and recalling the delegates to the Congress. From that time the decadence of the Congress was rapid; the national idea became dimmer; and the assertions of complete sovereignty by the political units became more pronounced."—A. Johnston, *The United States: its History and Constitution*, sect. 63-66 (ch. 3).

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic*, ch. 10.—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 1.—P. Force, *Am. Archives*, v. 2.

**A. D. 1775 (June).—End of Royal Government in New Hampshire.** See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.

**A. D. 1775 (June).—The end of Royal Government in Virginia.** See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1775.

**A. D. 1775 (June).—The Battle of Bunker Hill.**—"British reinforcements, under three generals, Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne, arrived at Boston soon after the fight at Lexington. Gage had now about 10,000 men. These occupied the town of Boston, which lay on a peninsula covering the middle of the harbor. Around them, on the hills of the mainland, there were about twice their number of undisciplined and poorly-armed Americans, without cannon and almost without food. Just north of Boston, another peninsula ran out into the harbor. On it there were several hills, and the Americans determined to seize and fortify one of them, called Bunker Hill. About 1,000 men, under Colonel Prescott, were sent into the peninsula for this on a suitable night. For some reason, they passed beyond Bunker Hill, and seized Breed's Hill, much closer to Boston. Breed's Hill is now usually called Bunker Hill, and the Bunker Hill monument is erected upon it. The American fortification was continued silently and swiftly through the night. In the morning of June 17, 1775, the British in Boston woke to see a long line of intrenchments running across the hill above them, and an American working-party busily strengthening it. For a time, the British frigates in the harbor kept up a slow and distant fire, to which

the working-party paid no attention; but at noon the work was stopped, for the British troops were coming across the harbor in boats. Three thousand well armed, uniformed, and drilled soldiers, who had never known defeat in equal fight, landed near Charlestown, under General Howe. Here they formed at the water-side, and in a long, steady line began to move upward to scatter the 1,500 farmers who were watching them from the top of the hill. From the roofs of the houses in Boston, the rest of the British army and the townspeople were watching, anxious to see 'whether the Yankees would fight.' Most of the watchers expected to see the untrained soldiers in the fort fire a few hasty shots at a safe distance, and run. The fort held a threatening silence until the attacking column was within 150 feet. Then, at the word, came a sheet of fire from the marksmen within; and, when the smoke lifted, part of the British line was lying dead or wounded, and the rest were retreating hastily down the hill. The British were not cowards; the officers re-formed the line at the bottom of the hill, and, after setting fire to Charlestown, again advanced to the attack. Again there was a steady silence in the fort, a close and deadly fire, and the British line was driven down the hill again. The British then moved up the hill for the third time. The powder in the fort was now gone, and the garrison fought for a few minutes with gunstocks and stones against the British bayonets. But such a struggle was hopeless, and the British gained the fort. They were too tired to pursue the garrison, who escaped to the mainland."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of the U. S. for schools*, sect. 195-197.—"As soon as Prescott saw the defence was hopeless, he ordered a retreat, and friend and foe mingled together as they surged out of the sally-port amid the clouds of dust which the trampling raised, for a scorching sun had baked the new-turned soil. It was now, while the confused mass of beings rocked along down the rear slope of the hill, that Warren [who had joined the defending force that morning as a volunteer] fell, shot through the head. No one among the Americans knew certainly that he was dead, as they left him. . . . Prescott did not conceal his indignation at not having been better supported, when he made his report at Ward's headquarters. He knew he had fought well; but neither he nor his contemporaries understood at the time how a physical defeat might be a moral victory. Not knowing this, there was little else than mortification over the result,—indeed, on both sides. . . . The general opinion seems to be that the Americans had about 1,500 men engaged at one time, and that from 3,000 to 4,000 at different times took some part in it. The British had probably about the same numbers in all, but were in excess of the Americans at all times while engaged. The conflict with small arms lasted about ninety minutes."—J. Winsor, *The Conflict Precipitated* (*Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am.*, v. 6, ch. 2).—"How can we exaggerate the relative importance of this day's action? Did it not, in fact, not only open, but make the contest, dividing into two parties not only those determined for the ministry or for enfranchisement, but also all timid, hesitating, reluctant neutrals? It was impossible after this to avoid taking a side. It rendered all reconciliation impossible, till it



should offer itself in the shape of independence. It echoed the gathering cry that brought together our people from their farms and workshops, to learn the terrible art which grows more merciful only as it is more ferociously, that is, skilfully, pursued. The day needs no rhetoric to magnify it in our revolutionary annals. When its sun went down, the provincials had parted with all fear, hesitation, and reluctance. They found that it was easy to fight. . . . General Gage's account of the battle, acknowledging the loss of 226 killed and 828 wounded, was received in London, July 25th. While the ministry received with dismay this official intelligence, and kept it back from publication, many private letters accompanying it in its transit anticipated with exaggerations its humiliating details."—G. E. Ellis, *Hist. of the Battle of Bunker's Hill*, pp. 102–105.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Hist. of the Siege of Boston*, ch. 4–7.—The same, *Life and Times of Jos. Warren*, ch. 16.—I. N. Tarbox, *Life of Israel Putnam*, ch. 7–11.—H. B. Dawson, *Bunker Hill* (*Historical Mag.*, June, 1868).—S. A. Drake, *Historic Fields and Mansions of Middlesex*, ch. 3.—P. Force, ed., *Am. Archives*, series 4, v. 2.—F. Moore, ed., *Diary of the Am. Rev.*, v. 1, pp. 97–103.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Am. Rev.*, v. 1.

**A. D. 1775 (August—December).—Unsuccessful expedition to Canada.**—"The exploits of Allen and Arnold at Ticonderoga . . . had invited further conquests; but the Continental Congress hesitated to take any steps which might seem to carry war across the line till the Canadians had the opportunity of casting in their lot with their neighbors. On the 1st of June, 1775, Congress had distinctly avowed this purpose of restraint; and they well needed to be cautious, for the Canadian French had not forgotten the bitter aspersions on their religion which Congress had, with little compunction, launched upon its professors, under the irritation of the Quebec Act. Still their rulers were aliens, and the traditional hatred of centuries between races is not easily kept in abeyance. Ethan Allen was more eager to avail himself of this than Congress was to have him; but the march of events converted the legislators, and the opportunity which Allen grieved to see lost was not so easily regained when Congress at last authorized the northern invasion. Arnold and Allen had each aimed to secure the command of such an expedition, the one by appealing to the Continental Congress, the other by representations to that of New York. Allen had also gone in person to Philadelphia, and he and his Green Mountain Boys were not without influence upon Congress, in their quaint and somewhat rough ways, as their exuberant patriotism later made the New York authorities forget their riotous opposition to the policy which that province had been endeavoring to enforce in the New Hampshire Grants. Connecticut had already sent forward troops to Ticonderoga to hold that post till Congress should decide upon some definite action; and at the end of June, 1775, orders reached Schuyler which he might readily interpret as authorizing him, if the Canadians did not object, to advance upon Canada. He soon started to assume command, but speedily found matters unpromising. The Johnsons were arming the Indians up the Mohawk and beyond in a way that boded no

good, and they had entered into compacts with the British commanders in Canada. Arnold had been at Ticonderoga, and had quarrelled with Hinman, the commander of the Connecticut troops. Schuyler heard much of the Green Mountain Boys, but he only knew them as the lawless people of the Grants, and soon learned that Allen and Warner had themselves set to quarrelling. . . . In August the news from Canada began to be alarming. Richard Montgomery, an Irish officer who had some years before left the army to settle on the Hudson and marry, was now one of the new brigadiers. He urged Schuyler to advance and anticipate the movement now said to be intended by Carleton, the English general commanding in Canada. At this juncture Schuyler got word from Washington that a coöperating expedition would be dispatched by way of the Kennebec, which, if everything went well, might unite with Schuyler's before Quebec."—J. Winsor, *The Conflict Precipitated* (*Narr. and Crit. Hist. of Am.*, v. 6).—The two movements were made, from Ticonderoga and from the Kennebec, with results which will be found related under CANADA: A. D. 1775–1776. "No expedition during the American Revolution had less elements of permanent value than those which were undertaken against Canada during the year 1775. Great results were anticipated, but none were realized. The obstacles were too substantial, and failure was inevitable. Wonderful endurance and great physical courage were manifested, and these were accompanied by a prodigious amount of faith, but there was neither ability nor opportunity for works commensurate with the faith. Certain Acts of Parliament, known as the Canadian Acts, were as offensive to Canadians as other legislation was to Americans; but the former were not pressed to the extremity of armed resistance. The people themselves having no harmony of religious or political views, were equally divided in language and race. Neither did the Canadians invite the aid of the colonies. The hypothesis that Canada would blend her destiny with that of New England, and would unite in resistance to the crown, certainly involved some identity of interest as well as of action. But the characters of the two people were too unlike to be unified by simple opposition to English legislation, and Canadians had no antecedents such as would prompt a hearty sympathy with New England and its controlling moral sentiment. Neither was there such a neighborly relation as admitted of prompt and adequate aid from one to the other, in emergencies calling for a combined effort. As a base of operations for a British army moving upon the colonies, Canada had the single advantage of being less distant from England than an Atlantic base, and many supplies could be procured without the expense and delay of their transportation across the Atlantic; but between Canada and the American colonies there was an actual wilderness. Hence a British offensive movement from Canada involved constant waste of men and materials, a deep line through an uninhabited or hostile region, and such a constant backing, as was both inconsistent with the resources of the base, and with a corresponding support of armies resting upon the sea coast. The British government was not ready for operations so extensive and so exhaustive of men and treasure; neither

did it realize the necessity for that expenditure. There were two alternatives, one illustrated by General Carleton's plan, viz., to hold the forts of Lake Champlain, as advanced, defensive positions; and the other, that of Burgoyne, to strike through the country and depend upon support from the opposite base. The true defense of the colonies from such expeditions depended upon the prompt seizure and occupation of the frontier posts. An American advance upon Canada was not only through a country strategically bad, but the diversion of forces for that purpose endangered the general issue, and entrusted its interests to the guardianship of an army already insufficient to meet the pressing demands of the crisis. The occupation of New York in 1775, by an adequate British force, would have infinitely outweighed all possible benefit from the complete conquest of Canada. At the very time when Washington could hardly hold the British garrison of Boston in check,—when he had an average of but nine rounds of ammunition per man, he was required to spare companies, ammunition, and supplies for a venture, profitless at best,—with the certainty that reinforcements could not be supplied as fast as the enemy could draw veteran regiments from Great Britain and Ireland, to defend or recover Canadian soil. In giving a rapid outline of this first attempt of the colonies to enlarge the theatre of active operations, it should be noticed that the initiative had been taken before General Washington had been elected commander-in-chief, and that Congress itself precipitated the final movement.”—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the Am. Rev.*, ch. 19.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, *Life and Times of Philip Schuyler*, v. 1, ch. 19-29, and v. 2, ch. 1-4.—J. Armstrong, *Life of Richard Montgomery* (*Library of Am. Biog.*, v. 1).—J. J. Henry, *Account of Arnold's Campaign against Quebec, by one of the Survivors*.—I. N. Arnold, *Life of Benedict Arnold*, ch. 3-5.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 2, ch. 4-5, 8-9, 12, 15-16, 19-20.

A. D. 1775 (September).—Flight of Governor Tryon from New York. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1775 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1775-1776.—Washington in command at Cambridge.—The British forced out of Boston.—Washington “arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 2d of July [1775], and on the following day presented himself at the head of the army. His head-quarters remained at Cambridge, till the evacuation of Boston by the royal forces on the 17th of March, 1776. The position of affairs was one of vast responsibility and peril. The country at large was highly excited, and expected that a bold stroke would be struck and decisive successes obtained. But the army was without organization and discipline; the troops unused to obey, the officers for the most part unaccustomed, some of them incompetent, to command. A few of them only had had a limited experience in the Seven Years' War. Most of the men had rushed to the field on the first alarm of hostilities, without any enlistment; and when they were enlisted, it was only till the end of the year. There was no military chest; scarce anything that could be called a commissariat. The artillery consisted of a few old field-pieces of various sizes, served with a very few exceptions by persons wholly untrained in gunnery. There was no siege train, and an almost total want of every description of ordnance

stores. Barrels of sand, represented as powder, were from time to time brought into the camp, to prevent the American army itself from being aware of its deficiency in that respect. In the autumn of 1775, an alarm of small-pox was brought from Boston, and the troops were subjected to inoculation. There was no efficient power, either in the Provincial Assembly or the Congress at Philadelphia, by which these wants could be supplied and these evils remedied. Such were the circumstances under which General Washington took the field, at the head of a force greatly superior in numbers to the royal army, but in all other respects a very unequal match. Meantime the British were undisputed masters of the approaches to Boston by water. Washington's letters disclose extreme impatience under the inaction to which he was condemned; but the gravest difficulties attended the expulsion of the royal forces from Boston. It could only be effected by the bombardment and assault of that place; an attempt which must in any event have been destructive to the large non-combatant population, that had been unable to remove into the country, and which would have been of doubtful success, for the want of a siege train, and with troops wholly unused to such an undertaking. Having in the course of the year received some captured ordnance from Canada [from Fort Ticonderoga], and a supply of ammunition taken by privateers at sea, Washington was strongly disposed to assault the town, as soon as the freezing of the bay on the western side of the peninsula would allow the troops to pass on the ice. The winter, however, remained open longer than usual, and a council of war dissuaded this attempt. He then determined to occupy Nook's Hill (an eminence at the extremity of Dorchester 'Neck,' as it was called, separated from Boston by a narrow arm of the harbor), and Dorchester Heights, which commanded Nook's Hill and the town itself. In this way the royal forces would be compelled to take the risk of a general action, for the purpose of dislodging the Americans, or else to evacuate the town. The requisite preparations having been made with secrecy, energy, and despatch, the heights were covered with breastworks on the night of the 4th of March, 1776, as ‘by enchantment.’ A partial movement, undertaken by the royal army to dislodge the Americans, was frustrated by stress of weather; and on the 17th of March, in virtue of an agreement to that effect with the municipal government, the town and harbor of Boston were evacuated by the British army and navy without firing a gun. Thus, without a battle and without the destruction of a building in Boston, the first year of the war was brought to a successful and an auspicious close.”—E. Everett, *Life of Washington*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: G. Washington, *Writings*; ed. by Ford, v. 3.—R. Frothingham, *Hist. of the Siege of Boston*, ch. 8-13.

A. D. 1775-1776.—The beginning of the American Navy, and the early fitting out of Privateers.—“Before the end of 1775 the Continental Congress ordered that five ships of 32 guns should be built, five of 28, and three of 24. This order was carried out, and these vessels are the proper beginning of the navy of the United States. Almost every one of them, before the war was over, had been captured, or burned to avoid capture. But the names of the little fleet



will always be of interest to Americans, and some of those names have always been preserved on the calendar of the navy. They are the 'Washington,' 'Raleigh,' 'Hancock,' 'Randolph,' 'Warren,' 'Virginia,' 'Trumbull,' 'Efighingam,' 'Congress,' 'Providence,' 'Boston,' 'Delaware,' 'Montgomery.' The State of Rhode Island, at the very outbreak of hostilities, commissioned Abraham Whipple, who went with his little vessel as far as Bermuda, and, from his experience in naval warfare earned in the French War, he was recognized as commodore of the little fleet of American cruisers. . . . Meanwhile, every maritime State issued commissions to privateers, and established admiralty or prize courts, with power to condemn prizes when brought in. Legitimate commerce had been largely checked, and . . . the seamen of the country, who had formerly been employed in the fisheries, or in our large foreign trade with the West India Islands and with Europe, gladly volunteered in the private service. Till the end of the war the seamen preferred the privateer service to that of the government. . . . The larger maritime States had in commission one or more vessels from the beginning, but they found the same difficulty which the Congress found in enlisting seamen, when any bold privateer captain came into rivalry with them. . . . As early as the 22d of December, in 1775, Congress had appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of its navy, and had named four captains besides, with several lieutenants, the first of whom was John Paul Jones. . . . On the 10th of October [1776] a resolution of Congress fixed the rank of captains in the navy, . . . Paul Jones eighteenth on a list of twenty-four. Jones was not pleased that his rank was not higher, but eventually his achievements were such that his reputation probably now stands higher as a successful officer than that of any of the number."—E. E. Hale, *Naval Hist. of the Am. Rev. (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am. v. 6, ch. 7).*

ALSO IN: J. F. Cooper, *Naval Hist. of the U. S. v. 1, ch. 4-6.*

**A. D. 1776 (January).—Adoption of a Constitution in New Hampshire.** See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.

**A. D. 1776 (January—June).—King George's war measures and Paine's "Common Sense."**—The setting of the tide of opinion toward national independence.—"Disastrous news arrived from England before the close of the winter of 1775-6. The King had opened Parliament with a speech in which he had denounced the Colonists as rebels, seeking, with deceitful pretences, to establish an independent empire; and his Majesty recommended decisive, coercive measures against them. . . . The answer to the Royal Address (adopted by a vote of seventy-six to thirty-three in the Lords, and two hundred and seventy-eight to one hundred and eight in the Commons) gave assurances of the firm support of Parliament to the proposed measures. The very moderately conciliatory propositions made by the Duke of Richmond, Mr. Burke, and the Duke of Grafton, were summarily voted down, and not far from the middle of December the atrocious 'Prohibitory Act,' as it was generally designated, passed. It was, in effect, a declaration of war, and a war unrestrained by the customs, and unmitigated by the decencies

of civilization. It authorized the confiscation of American vessels and cargoes, and those of all nations found trading in American ports. It authorized British commanders to impress American crews into the British Navy, and to place them on the same footing with voluntarily enlisted seamen; that is, to give them a choice between parricide and being hung at a yard-arm! Finally, it referred all future negotiations to two Commissioners, to be sent out along with a conquering armament, who were allowed to grant pardons to individuals and Colonies, on submission, thus leaving no future alternative opposed to the latter but the sword, and indicating that henceforth all appeals to King or Parliament were cut off. . . . Concurrently with these legislative steps, the practical ones for carrying on the war, with a large army, were entered upon. Finding it difficult or impossible to obtain the necessary recruits at home, and that the existing English and Irish regiments embarked with such reluctance that it was necessary to keep a guard upon the transports 'to keep them from deserting by wholesale,' the Ministry successively applied to Russia, the States-General, and finally, several of the German States for mercenaries. . . . The infamy of filling up the British armament was reserved for the Princes of three or four petty German States. . . . As the news of these events successively reached the American Congress and people, in the winter and spring of 1775-6, the contest took a new coloring. Not only the bold, but the moderate began now to see the real alternative before them. And at a critical moment the remedy, and the path to it, were pointed out by a master hand. 'Common Sense' was published by Thomas Paine, and a more effective popular appeal never went to the bosoms of a nation. Its tone, its manner, its biblical illusions, its avoidance of all openly impassioned appeals to feeling, and its unanswerable common sense were exquisitely adapted to the great audience to which it was addressed; and calm investigation will satisfy the historical student that its effect in preparing the popular mind for the Declaration of Independence, exceeded that of any other paper, speech, or document made to favor it, and it would scarcely be exaggeration to add, than all other such means put together. John Adams, with a childish petulance, and with a rancor so vehement that it appears ridiculous, spares no occasion to underrate Paine's services, and to assault his opinions and character. . . . His transparent motive seems to be to decry the author of a paper which had too much the credit of preparing the public mind for the Declaration of Independence, a credit which Mr. Adams was more than anxious to monopolize. Let us be just. Paine's services in paving the way to the Declaration are not to be mentioned on the same page with John Adams's. Moreover, Independence would have been declared, and, perhaps, nearly as early, had Paine never written. But he did, at a propitious moment, and with consummate adaptation, write a paper which went like the arrow which pierces the centre of the target. Its effect was instantaneous and tremendous. . . . The work ran through innumerable editions in America and France. The world rung with it. . . . It admits of no doubt that pretty early in 1776, all the true Whigs in Congress, moderates as well as ultras, became satis-

fied of the necessity and expediency of separation, and that henceforth it was only a question of time with them. Enactments placing the struggle on the footing of open war, instead of mere insurrection—issuing letters of marque and reprisal against the enemies of our commerce—advising the local authorities to disarm the disaffected—opening the ports of the country to all nations but Great Britain—directing negotiations for foreign alliances to be undertaken—were successively made. Finally, on the 10th of May, a resolution, prepared by John Adams and R. H. Lee, passed the House, advising all the Colonies to form governments for themselves; and in this, unlike preceding instances of giving advice on the same subject, no limitation of the duration of the governments to be formed ‘to the continuance of the present dispute’ was inserted. This, with a befitting preamble, written by John Adams, was adopted on the 15th, . . . and was, obviously, a long and bold stride in the direction of independence, and must have been understood by all as its signal and precursor. . . . Congress cheered on those whom peculiar circumstances had rendered more backward, and it tarried for them a little by the way; on the other hand, it prudently waited for the prompting of the more forward. Thus it avoided the appearance of dominating over public opinion—thus it ‘kept front and rear together.’ Early in April (12th), North Carolina ‘empowered’ her delegates ‘to concur with the delegates of other Colonies in declaring independency.’ At its ‘May session’ (the day of the month not appearing in the record under our eye), the General Assembly of Rhode Island abolished its act of allegiance, and directed all commissions and legal processes henceforth to issue in the name and under the authority of the ‘Governor and Company.’ The Connecticut General Assembly, which met on the 9th of May, before its adjournment (date not before us), repealed its act against high treason, and made the same order with Rhode Island in regard to legal processes. On the 15th of May, Virginia took a still more decisive step, by instructing its delegates in Congress to move for a Declaration of Independence. . . . The Virginia delegates in Congress made choice of Richard H. Lee to move the resolutions contained in their instructions of May 15th; and he did so on Friday, the 7th day of June, John Adams seconding them. Their consideration was postponed until the next day, when they were referred to a committee of the whole, and debated throughout Saturday and the succeeding Monday. On the latter day (10th) Congress resolved: ‘That the consideration of the first resolution be postponed to Monday, the first day of July next; and in the meanwhile, that no time be lost, in case the Congress agree thereto, that a committee be appointed to prepare a declaration to the effect of the said first resolution, which is in these words: That these Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown; and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.’—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *Hist. of U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 4, ch. 24-28.—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the Republic*, ch. 11.—W. C. Rives, *Life*

and *Times of Madison*, v. 1, ch. 4-5.—*Am. Archives*, series 4, v. 6.—E. G. Scott, *The Development of Const. Liberty in the Eng. Colonies*, ch. 11.—C. J. Stillé, *Life and Times of John Dickinson*, ch. 5.—See, also, NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776; and VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.

A. D. 1776 (January-June).—Engagement of hiring Hessians to reinforce the British arms.—“The [British] Cabinet had entertained some hopes of Russian auxiliaries [application for 20,000 of whom had been made to the Empress Catherine, who refused them with hardly concealed scorn], but the negotiation for that object could not be matured. Early in the year treaties were signed with the Landgrave of Hesse for taking into British pay 12,000 of his men; with the Duke of Brunswick and other petty potentates of Germany for 5,000 more. These little princes, seeing the need of England, which did not choose to lean, as she might and should have done, on her own right arm, insisted on obtaining, and did obtain, most usurious terms. Under the name of levy-money, there was to be paid to them the price of 30 crowns for every foot-soldier. Under the name of subsidy, each of their Serene Highnesses was moreover to be indulged with a yearly sum, irrespective of the pay and subsistence of the troops; and on the plea that in this case no certain number of years was stipulated as the term of service, the Landgrave of Hesse claimed and was promised a double subsidy, namely 450,000 crowns a year. The men were to enter into pay before they began to march! The subsidies were to be continued for one full year at least after the war was over and the troops had returned to their respective homes. Never yet, in short, was the blood of brave men sold on harder terms. The disgrace of this transaction to the German Princes who engaged in it requires little comment. . . . The ablest by far of the German Princes at that time, Frederick of Prussia, was not in general a man of compassionate feelings. He had no especial love or care for the North American cause. . . . Yet even Frederick expressed in strong terms his contempt for the scandalous man-traffic of his neighbours. It is said that whenever any of the newly hired Brunswickers or Hessians had to pass through any portion of his territory he claimed to levy on them the usual toll as for so many head of cattle, since he said they had been sold as such! Nor can the British ministry in this transaction be considered free from blame. . . . Certain it is that among the various causes which at this period wrought upon our trans-Atlantic brethren to renounce their connection with us, there was none more cogent in their minds than the news that German mercenaries had been hired and were coming to fight against them.”—Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *Hist. of Eng.*, 1713-1783, ch. 53 (v. 6).—“The first German troops to start for America were the Brunswickers. These marched from Brunswick on February 22d, 1776, 2,282 strong, and were embarked at Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe. The second division of Brunswickers embarked at the end of May—about 2,000 men. The first Hessians set out from Cassel early in March, and were shipped at Bremerlehe, near the mouth of the Weser. The second division was embarked in June. Together they numbered between 12,000 and 13,000 men. They were for the most part excellent troops and



well equipped, for the Landgrave's little army was one of the best in Germany. . . . The Prince of Waldeck sent his regiment through Cassel without trouble. The Prince of Hesse-Hanau, the Margrave of Anspach-Bayreuth, and the Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst had a longer road."—E. J. Lowell, *The Hessians in the Revolutionary War*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: M. von Eelking, *Memoirs of Gen. Riedesel*, v. 1, pp. 18-88, and app.—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 4, ch. 22.

**A. D. 1776 (February).—Flight of the Royal Governor from Georgia.** See GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777.

**A. D. 1776 (March).—State government organized and a Constitution adopted in South Carolina.** See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY—APRIL).

**A. D. 1776 (April).—North Carolina the first colony to declare for independence.** See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776.

**A. D. 1776 (May).—Rhode Island renounces allegiance to the King.** See RHODE ISLAND: A. D. 1776.

**A. D. 1776 (May).—Popular vote for independence in Massachusetts.** See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1776 (APRIL—MAY).

**A. D. 1776 (May).—Arnold's retreat from Canada.** See CANADA: A. D. 1775-1776.

**A. D. 1776 (May—June).—Independence declared and Constitution adopted in Virginia.** See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.

**A. D. 1776 (June).—The British repulsed at Charleston.**—"Early in 1776 the task was assigned to Clinton, who had in January departed from Boston, . . . to force and hold the Southern colonies to their allegiance [see NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776], and Cornwallis, with troops, was sent over under convoy of Sir Peter Parker's fleet, to give Clinton the army he needed. The fleet did not reach North Carolina till May. In March, [Charles] Lee, while in New York, had wished to be ordered to the command in Canada, as 'he was the only general officer on the continent who could speak and think in French.' He was disappointed, and ordered farther south. By May he was in Virginia, ridding the country of Tories, and trying to find out where Parker intended to land. It was expected that Clinton would return north to New York in season to operate with Howe, when he opened the campaign there in the early summer, as that general expected to do, and the interval for a diversion farther south was not long. Lee had now gone as far as Charleston (S. C.), and taken command in that neighborhood, while in charge of the little fort at the entrance of the harbor was William Moultrie, upon whom Lee was inculcating the necessity of a slow and sure fire, in case it should prove that Parker's destination, as it might well be, was to get a foothold in the Southern provinces, and break up the commerce which fed the rebellion through that harbor. The people of Charleston had been for some time engaged on their defences, and 'seem to wish a trial of their mettle,' wrote a looker-on. The fort in question was built of palmetto logs, and was unfinished on the land side. Its defenders had four days' warning, and the neighboring militia were summoned. On the 4th of June the hostile fleet appeared, and having landed troops on an adjacent island, it was not till the

27th that their dispositions were made for an attack. Their ships threw shot at the fort all day, which did very little damage, while the return fire was rendered with a precision surprising in untried artillerymen, and seriously damaged the fleet, of which one ship was grounded and abandoned. The expected land attack from Clinton's troops, already ashore on Long Island, was not made. A strong wind had raised the waters of the channel between that island and Sullivan's Island so high that it could not be forded, and suitable boats for the passage were not at hand. A few days later the shattered vessels and the troops left the neighborhood, and Colonel Moultrie had leisure to count the cost of his victory, which was twelve killed and twice as many wounded. The courage of Sergeant Jasper, in replacing on the bastion a flag which had been shot away, became at once a household anecdote."—J. Winsor, *The Conflict Precipitated (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am. v. 6, ch. 2)*.

ALSO IN: H. Flanders, *Life of John Rutledge*, ch. 10 (*Lives of the Chief Justices*, v. 1).—C. B. Hartley, *Life of Gen. William Moultrie (Heroes and Patriots of the South)*, ch. 2.

**A. D. 1776 (June).—Resolutions for Independence.—Making ready for the Declaration.**—"Things were now verging on every side to the same point. North Carolina had conferred the necessary powers to vote for independence and foreign alliances as early as the 12th of April. And now came the news from Richard Lee, to Mr. Adams, that on the very day of the passage of the significant preamble in congress, the 15th of May, the convention of Virginia had gone a step further, and had instructed their delegates to propose independence. Authority to assent to its natural consequences, a confederation and foreign alliances, followed as a matter of course. On the other hand, the convention of Massachusetts had referred the subject back to the people, to be considered and acted upon at their primary town meetings, and the responses had been for some time coming in unequivocally enough. So decided was the feeling that Joseph Hawley, impatient of the delay, was stimulating the nowise reluctant Gerry to greater exertions. Perceiving these encouraging indications in opposite quarters, the friends of independence now consulted together, and made up their minds that the moment had come for a final demonstration. Resolutions, embracing the three great points, were carefully matured, which it was arranged that Richard Henry Lee, on behalf of the delegates of Virginia, should present, and John Adams should second, for Massachusetts. The movement took place, accordingly, on the 7th of June. It appears on the journal, recorded with the customary caution, as follows: 'Certain resolutions respecting independency being moved and seconded,—Resolved, that the consideration of them be referred till to-morrow morning; and that the members be enjoined to attend punctually at ten o'clock, in order to take the same into their consideration.' It was well that a measure of so momentous a character should be accompanied with as much of the forms of notice and special assignment as the body could properly give it. The record of what passed at the appointed time has come down to us very barren of details. We only know that the resolutions were referred to the committee of the whole, where they were de-

bated with great spirit during that day, Saturday, and again on Monday, the 10th, by which time it had become quite clear that a majority of the colonies were prepared to adopt the first and leading resolution. This majority was composed of the four New England, and three out of the four southern colonies. But it being deemed inadvisable to place this great act upon so narrow a basis, and a prospect being held out of securing a more general concurrence by delaying the decision, a postponement until the 1st of July was effected by a change of the votes of two colonies. In the mean while, however, as it was thought suitable to accompany the act with an elaborate exposition of the causes which were held to justify it, a committee was ordered to have in charge the preparation of such a paper in season for the adjourned debate. . . . At the same time that Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, all but the last named being of the movement, were appointed the committee to prepare a declaration, as mentioned, the congress formally voted a second committee, with powers to prepare and digest a form of confederation to be entered into between the colonies; and yet a third, to mature a plan of treaties to be proposed to foreign powers. In this compass were included all the elements of national sovereignty abroad and at home. . . . The bulk of opposition now centred in the five middle colonies, and the pillar upon which it leaned was John Dickinson. But under the combined assaults conducted by the leading colonies of Virginia and Massachusetts, it was plain that victory was become a mere question of time. Jonathan D. Sergeant, who had left congress to hasten a change in the counsels of New Jersey, had been so successful in spurring up the assembly as to be able to write, on the 15th of June, to Mr. Adams, that the delegates about to be elected would be on the spot by the 1st of July, the day to which the question had been assigned, and that they would 'vote plump.' Equally favorable news soon came from Maryland. . . . Thus were two States secured. But Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York yet remained to move. In the first of these, recourse was had once more to the so-called committees of conference. . . . And here, on the 23d of June, Dr. Benjamin Rush, then a young man, but acting entirely in sympathy and co-operation with the leaders in congress, moved and carried the appointment of a committee to declare the sense of the conference with respect to an independence of the province on the crown of Great Britain. He and James Smith were then joined with Thomas McKean, the chairman of the conference, in a committee, which was ready the next day with a report affirming the willingness of the deputies of the conference to concur in a vote declaring the United Colonies free and independent States. The report was adopted unanimously, was presented to congress on the 25th, and, doubtless, had its effect in determining those delegates of the colony to absent themselves on the final vote, upon whose resistance its adverse decision depended. As the hesitation of Delaware was chiefly owing to the feeling that pervaded the county of Sussex, Mr. Rodney had repaired thither for the purpose of bringing about a favorable change, in which errand the news came that he was laboring with success. The dele-

gates from New York, no longer interposing any active opposition, yet unwilling to assume a responsibility which their constituents had not authorized, preferred to withdraw from participation in the decision. Such was the state of affairs on the 1st of July, to which day the discussion had been adjourned. There was then little doubt of an affirmative vote on the part of all but four colonies."—J. Q. Adams and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, v. 1, pp. 308–318.

**A. D. 1776 (June).—End of proprietary and royal government in Maryland.** See MARYLAND: A. D. 1776.

**A. D. 1776 (July).—Authorship, adoption and signing of the Declaration of Independence.**—"For the last hundred years one of the first facts taught to any child of American birth is, that Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence. The original draft in his handwriting was afterward deposited in the State Department. It shows two or three trifling alterations, interlined in the handwritings of Franklin and Adams. Otherwise it came before Congress precisely as Jefferson wrote it. Many years afterward John Adams gave an account of the way in which Jefferson came to be the composer of this momentous document, differing slightly from the story told by Jefferson. But the variance is immaterial. . . . Jefferson's statement seems the better entitled to credit, and what little corroboration is to be obtained for either narrator is wholly in his favor. He says simply that when the Committee came together he was pressed by his colleagues unanimously to undertake the draft; that he did so; that, when he had prepared it, he submitted it to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams, separately, requesting their corrections, 'which were two or three only and merely verbal,' interlined in their own handwritings'; that the report in this shape was adopted by the committee, and a 'fair copy,' written out by Mr. Jefferson, was then laid before Congress. A somewhat more interesting discussion concerns the question, how Jefferson came to be named first on the committee, to the entire exclusion of Lee, to whom, as mover of the resolution [see, above, (JANUARY—JUNE)], parliamentary etiquette would have assigned the chairmanship. Many explanations have been given, of which some at least appear the outgrowth of personal likings and dislikings. It is certain that Jefferson was not only preëminently fitted for the very difficult task of this peculiar composition, but also that he was a man without an enemy. His abstinence from any active share in debate had saved him from giving irritation; and it is a truth not to be concealed, that there were cabals, bickerings, heart-burnings, perhaps actual enmities among the members of that famous body, which, grandly as it looms up, and rightly too, in the mind's eye, was after all composed of jarring human ingredients. It was well believed that there was a faction opposed to Washington, and it was generally suspected that irascible, vain, and jealous John Adams, then just rising from the ranks of the people, made in this matter common cause with the aristocratic Virginian Lees against their fellow-countrymen. . . . So it is likely enough that a timely illness of Lee's wife was a fortunate excuse for passing him by, and that partly by reason of admitted aptitude, partly because no risk could be run of any interference of personal



feelings in so weighty a matter, Jefferson was placed first on the committee, with the natural result of doing the bulk of its labor. On July 1, pursuant to assignment, Congress, in committee of the whole, resumed consideration of Mr. Lee's resolution, and carried it by the votes of nine colonies. South Carolina and Pennsylvania voted against it. The two delegates from Delaware were divided. Those from New York said that personally they were in favor of it and believed their constituents to be so, but they were hampered by instructions drawn a twelvemonth since and strictly forbidding any action obstructive of reconciliation, which was then still desired. The committee reported, and then Edward Rutledge moved an adjournment to the next day, when his colleagues, though disapproving the resolution, would probably join in it for the sake of unanimity. This motion was carried, and on the day following the South Carolinians were found to be converted; also a third member 'had come post from the Delaware counties' and caused the vote of that colony to be given with the rest; Pennsylvania changed her vote; and a few days later the Convention of New York approved the resolution, 'thus supplying the void occasioned by the withdrawing of her delegates from the vote.' On the same day, July 2, the House took up Mr. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration, and debated it during that and the following day and until a late hour on July 4. Many verbal changes were made, most of which were conducive to closer accuracy of statement, and were improvements. Two or three substantial amendments were made by the omission of passages; notably there was stricken out a passage in which George III. was denounced for encouraging the slave-trade. . . . No interpolation of any consequence was made. Jefferson had ample cause to congratulate himself upon this event of the discussion. . . . He himself spoke not a word in the debate. . . . The burden of argument, from which Jefferson wisely shrank, was gallantly borne by John Adams, whom Jefferson gratefully called 'the colossus of that debate.' Jefferson used afterward to take pleasure in tingeing the real solemnity of the occasion with a coloring of the ludicrous. The debate, he said, seemed as though it might run on interminably, and probably would have done so at a different season of the year. But the weather was oppressively warm, and the room occupied by the deputies was hard by a stable, whence the hungry flies swarmed thick and fierce, alighting on the legs of the delegates and biting hard through their thin silk stockings. Treason was preferable to discomfort, and the members voted for the Declaration and hastened to the table to sign it and escape from the horse-fly. John Hancock, making his great familiar signature, jestingly said that John Bull could read that without spectacles; then, becoming more serious, began to impress on his comrades the necessity of their 'all hanging together in this matter.' 'Yes, indeed,' interrupted Franklin, 'we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.' . . . Amid such trifling, concealing grave thoughts, Jefferson saw his momentous document signed at the close of that summer afternoon."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Thomas Jefferson*, ch. 3.—"The statements relative to signing the Declaration are conflicting. Jefferson states

that it was signed generally on the 4th (Memoirs i, 94), and he in other places reiterates this statement, but this manuscript is not known to be extant. . . . According to the journals, Congress, on the 19th of July, resolved that the 'declaration, passed on the 4th, be fairly engrossed on parchment, with the title and style of "The unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America," and that the same, when engrossed, be signed by every member of Congress.' On the 2d day of August, the journals say, 'The Declaration being engrossed, and compared at the table, was signed by the members.' . . . This manuscript is preserved in the office of the Secretary of State.—R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic*, p. 545 and foot-note.—"Because statesmen like Dickinson and communities like Maryland were slow in believing that the right moment for a declaration of independence had come, the preposterous theory has been suggested that the American Revolution was the work of an unscrupulous and desperate minority, which, through intrigue mingled with violence, succeeded in forcing the reluctant majority to sanction its measures. Such a misconception has its root in an utter failure to comprehend the peculiar character of American political life, like the kindred misconception which ascribes the rebellion of the colonies to a sordid unwillingness to bear their due share of the expenses of the British Empire. It is like the misunderstanding which saw an angry mob in every town-meeting of the people of Boston, and characterized as a 'riot' every deliberate expression of public opinion. No one who is familiar with the essential features of American political life can for a moment suppose that the Declaration of Independence was brought about by any less weighty force than the settled conviction of the people that the priceless treasure of self-government could be preserved by no other means. It was but slowly that this unwelcome conviction grew upon the people; and owing to local differences of circumstances it grew more slowly in some places than in others. Prescient leaders, too, like the Adamses and Franklin and Lee, made up their minds sooner than other people. Even those conservatives who resisted to the last, even such men as John Dickinson and Robert Morris, were fully agreed with their opponents as to the principle at issue between Great Britain and America, and nothing would have satisfied them short of the total abandonment by Great Britain of her pretensions to impose taxes and revoke charters. Upon this fundamental point there was very little difference of opinion in America. As to the related question of independence, the decision, when once reached, was everywhere alike the reasonable result of free and open discussion; and the best possible illustration of this is the fact that not even in the darkest days of the war already begun did any state deliberately propose to reconsider its action in the matter. The hand once put to the plough, there was no turning back."—J. Fiske, *The Am. Revolution*, ch. 4 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (Author's last revision), v. 4, ch. 28.—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 5.—C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, ch. 4.—J. Madison, *Papers*, v. 1, pp. 9-27.—J. Sanderson, *Biog. of the Signers of the Declaration*.—See, also, INDEPENDENCE HALL.

**A. D. 1776 (July).—Text of the Declaration of Independence.**—The following is the text of the great manifesto:

"When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has endeavoured to prevent the population

of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our People, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free People. Nor have We been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have



appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.—John Hancock. **New Hampshire**—Josiah Bartlett, Wm. Whipple, Matthew Thornton. **Massachusetts Bay**—Saml. Adams, John Adams, Robt. Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry. **Rhode Island**—Step. Hopkins, William Ellery. **Connecticut**—Roger Sherman, Sam'l Huntington, Wm. Williams, Oliver Wolcott. **New York**—Wm. Floyd, Phil. Livingston, Frans. Lewis, Lewis Morris. **New Jersey**—Richd. Stockton, Jno. Witherspoon, Frans. Hopkinson, John Hart, Abra. Clark. **Pennsylvania**—Robt. Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benja. Franklin, John Morton, Geo. Clymer, Jas. Smith, Geo. Taylor, James Wilson, Geo. Ross. **Delaware**—Cæsar Rodney, Geo. Read, Tho. M'Kean. **Maryland**—Samuel Chase, Wm. Paca, Thos. Stone, Charles Carroll of Carrollton. **Virginia**—George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Th Jefferson, Benja. Harrison, Thos. Nelson, jr., Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton. **North Carolina**—Wm. Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn. **South Carolina**—Edward Rutledge, Thos. Heyward, Junr., Thomas Lynch, Junr., Arthur Middleton. **Georgia**—Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, Geo. Walton."

**A. D. 1776 (July).—Constitutional effect of the Declaration of Independence.**—"The Declaration of Independence did not create thirteen sovereign states, but the representatives of the people declared that the former English colonies, under the name which they had assumed of the United States of America, became, from the 4th day of July, 1776, a sovereign state and a member of the family of nations, recognized by the law of nations; and further, that the people would support their representatives with their blood and treasure, in their endeavor to make this declaration a universally recognized fact. Neither congress nor the people relied in this upon any positive right belonging either to the individual colonies or to the colonies as a whole. Rather did the Declaration of Independence and the war destroy all existing

political jural relations, and seek their moral justification in the right of revolution inherent in every people in extreme emergencies. . . . Political theories had nothing to do with this development of things. It was the natural result of given circumstances and was an accomplished fact before anyone thought of the legal consequences which might subsequently be deduced from it."—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 1.

**A. D. 1776 (July).—Independence declared in New Jersey and Governor Franklin arrested.** See **NEW JERSEY**: A. D. 1774-1776.

**A. D. 1776 (August).—The struggle for New York and the Hudson.—Battle of Long Island.**—"Washington had been informed, early in January, that General Sir Henry Clinton had sailed from Boston, with a considerable body of troops, on a secret expedition. Apprehending that the city of New York was his destination, he immediately dispatched General Charles Lee to Connecticut to raise troops, and to proceed to that city to watch and oppose Clinton wherever he might attempt to land. Six weeks before the evacuation of Boston [March 17, 1776], Lee had encamped near New York with twelve hundred militia. Already the Sons of Liberty had been busy, and overt acts of rebellion had been committed by them. They had seized the cannons at Fort George, and driven Tryon, the royal governor, on board the *Asia*, a British armed vessel in the harbor. In March, Clinton arrived at Sandy Hook, just outside New York harbor, and on the same day, the watchful Lee providentially entered the city. The movement, although without a knowledge of Clinton's position, was timely, for it kept him at bay. Foiled in his attempt upon New York, that commander sailed southward. . . . The destination of Howe, when he left Boston, was also unknown to Washington. Supposing he, too, would proceed to New York, he put the main body of his army in motion toward that city, as soon as he had placed Boston in a state of security. He arrived in New York about the middle of April [April 14], and proceeded at once to fortify the town and vicinity, and also the passes of the Hudson Highlands, fifty miles above. In the mean while, General Lee, who had been appointed to command the American forces in the South, had left his troops in the charge of General Lord Stirling [March 7], and was hastening toward the Carolinas to watch the movements of Clinton, arouse the Whigs, and gather an army there. . . . Pursuant to instructions, General Howe proceeded toward New York, to meet General Clinton and Parker's fleet. He left Halifax on the 11th of June, [1776], and arrived at Sandy Hook on the 29th. On the 2d of July he took possession of Staten Island, where he was joined by Sir Henry Clinton [July 11], from the South, and his brother, Admiral Lord Howe [July 12], with a fleet and a large land force, from England. Before the first of August, other vessels arrived with a part of the Hessian troops, and on that day, almost 30,000 soldiers, many of them tried veterans, stood ready to fall upon the republican army of 17,000 men, mostly militia, which lay intrenched in New York and vicinity, less than a dozen miles distant. The grand object in view was the seizure of New York and the country along the Hudson, so as to keep open a communication with Canada, separate the

patriots of New England from those of the other states, and to overrun the most populous portion of the revolted colonies. This was the military plan, arranged by ministers. They had also prepared instructions to their commanding generals, to be pacific, if the Americans appeared disposed to submit. Lord Howe and his brother, the general, were commissioned to 'grant pardon to all who deserved mercy,' and to treat for peace, but only on terms of absolute submission on the part of the colonies, to the will of the King and parliament. After making a foolish display of arrogance and weakness, in addressing General Washington as a private gentleman, and being assured that the Americans had been guilty of no offense requiring a 'pardon' at their hands, they prepared to strike an immediate and effective blow. The British army was accordingly put in motion on the morning of the 22d of August [1776], and during that day, 10,000 effective men, and forty pieces of cannon, were landed on the western end of Long Island, between the present Fort Hamilton and Gravesend village. Already detachments of Americans under General Sullivan, occupied a fortified camp at Brooklyn, opposite New York, and guarded seven passes on a range of hills which extend from the Narrows to the village of Jamaica. When intelligence of the landing of the invading army reached Washington, he sent General Putnam, with large reinforcements, to take the chief command on Long Island; and to prepare to meet the enemy. The American troops on the island now [August 26], numbered about 5,000. The British moved in three divisions. The left, under General Grant, marched along the shore toward Gowanus; the right, under Clinton and Cornwallis, toward the interior of the island; and the center, composed chiefly of Hessians, under De Heister, marched up the Flatbush road, south of the hills. Clinton moved under cover of night, and before dawn on the morning of the 27th, he had gained possession of the Jamaica pass, near the present East New York. At the same time, Grant was pressing forward along the shore of New York Bay, and at day-break, he encountered Lord Stirling, where the monuments of Greenwood cemetery now dot the hills. De Heister advanced from Flatbush at the same hour, and attacked Sullivan, who, having no suspicions of the movements of Clinton, was watching the Flatbush Pass. A bloody conflict ensued, and while it was progressing, Clinton descended from the wooded hills, by the way of Bedford, to gain Sullivan's rear. As soon as the latter perceived his peril, he ordered a retreat to the American lines at Brooklyn. It was too late; Clinton drove him back upon the Hessian bayonets, and after fighting desperately, hand to hand, with the foe in front and rear, and losing a greater portion of his men, Sullivan was compelled to surrender. As usual, misfortunes did not come single. While these disasters were occurring on the left, Cornwallis descended the port-road to Gowanus, and attacked Stirling. They fought desperately, until Stirling was made prisoner. Many of his troops were drowned while endeavoring to escape across the Gowanus Creek, as the tide was rising; and a large number were captured. At noon the victory for the British was complete. About 500 Americans were killed or wounded, and 1,100 were made prisoners. These were soon suffering dreadful

horrors in prisons and prison-ships, at New York. The British loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was 367. It was with the deepest anguish that Washington had viewed, from New York, the destruction of his troops, yet he dared not weaken his power in the city, by sending reinforcements to aid them. He crossed over on the following morning [August 28], with Mifflin, who had come down from the upper end of York island with a thousand troops, and was gratified to find the enemy encamped in front of Putnam's lines, and delaying an attack, until the British fleet should co-operate with him. This delay allowed Washington time to form and execute a plan for the salvation of the remainder of the army, now too weak to resist an assault with any hope of success. Under cover of a heavy fog, which fell upon the hostile camps at midnight of the 29th, and continued until the morning of the 30th, he silently withdrew them from the camp, and, unperceived by the British, they all crossed over to New York in safety, carrying everything with them but their heavy cannons. . . . Howe, who felt sure of his prey, was greatly mortified, and prepared to make an immediate attack upon New York, before the Americans should become reinforced, or should escape from it."—B. J. Lossing, *Family Hist. of the U. S.*, period 5, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: H. P. Johnston, *The Campaign of 1776 around N. Y. and Brooklyn*, ch. 1-5 (*Mem's of Long Island Hist. Soc.*, v. 3).—T. W. Field, *The Battle of Long Island* (*Mem's of L. I. Hist. Soc.*, v. 2).—W. A. Duer, *Life of Wm. Alexander, Earl of Stirling*, ch. 5.—J. Fiske, *The American Revolution*, ch. 5 (v. 1).

A. D. 1776 (September).—Quiet death of proprietary government in Pennsylvania and adoption of a State Constitution. See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776.

A. D. 1776 (September–November).—The struggle for New York and the Hudson.—Successes of the British.—Washington's retreat into New Jersey.—"At daybreak the British awoke, but it was too late. They had fought a successful battle, they had had the American army in their grasp, and now all was over. The victory had melted away, and, as a grand result, they had a few hundred prisoners, a stray boat with three camp-followers, and the deserted works in which they stood. To make such a retreat as this was a feat of arms as great as most victories, and in it we see, perhaps as plainly as anywhere, the nerve and quickness of the man who conducted it. It is true it was the only chance of salvation, but the great man is he who is entirely master of his opportunity, even if he have but one. The outlook, nevertheless, was, as Washington wrote, 'truly distressing.' The troops were dispirited, and the militia began to disappear, as they always did after a defeat. Congress would not permit the destruction of the city; different interests pulled in different directions, conflicting opinions distracted the councils of war, and, with utter inability to predict the enemy's movements, everything led to halfway measures and to intense anxiety, while Lord Howe tried to negotiate with Congress, and the Americans waited for events, Washington, looking beyond the confusion of the moment, saw that he had gained much by delay, and had his own plan well defined. . . . Every one else, however, saw only past defeat and present peril.



The British ships gradually made their way up the river, until it became apparent that they intended to surround and cut off the American army. Washington made preparations to withdraw, but uncertainty of information came near rendering his precautions futile. September 15th the men-of-war opened fire, and troops were landed near Kip's Bay. The militia in the breastworks at that point had been at Brooklyn and gave way at once, communicating their panic to two Connecticut regiments. Washington, galloping down to the scene of battle, came upon the disordered and flying troops. He dashed in among them, conjuring them to stop, but even while he was trying to rally them they broke again on the appearance of some sixty or seventy of the enemy, and ran in all directions. In a tempest of anger Washington drew his pistols, struck the fugitives with his sword, and was only forced from the field by one of his officers seizing the bridle of his horse and dragging him away from the British, now within a hundred yards of the spot. . . . The rout and panic over, Washington quickly turned to deal with the pressing danger. With coolness and quickness he issued his orders, and succeeded in getting his army off, Putnam's division escaping most narrowly. He then took post at King's Bridge, and began to strengthen and fortify his lines. While thus engaged, the enemy advanced, and on the 16th a sharp skirmish was fought, in which the British were repulsed, and great bravery was shown by the Connecticut and Virginia troops, the two commanding officers being killed. This affair, which was the first gleam of success, encouraged the troops, and was turned to the best account by the general. Still a successful skirmish did not touch the essential difficulties of the situation, which then as always came from within, rather than without. To face and check 25,000 well equipped and highly disciplined soldiers, Washington had now some 12,000 men, lacking in everything which goes to make an army, except mere individual courage and a high average of intelligence. Even this meagre force was an inconstant and diminishing quantity, shifting, uncertain, and always threatening dissolution. The task of facing and fighting the enemy was enough for the ablest of men; but Washington was obliged also to combat and overcome the inertness and dulness born of ignorance, and to teach Congress how to govern a nation at war. . . . Meanwhile the days slipped along, and Washington waited on the Harlem Plains, planning descents on Long Island, and determining to make a desperate stand where he was, unless the situation decidedly changed. Then the situation did change, as neither he nor any one else apparently had anticipated. The British warships came up the Hudson past the forts, brushing aside our boasted obstructions, destroying our little fleet, and getting command of the river. Then General Howe landed at Frog's Point, where he was checked for the moment by the good disposition of Heath, under Washington's direction. These two events made it evident that the situation of the American army was full of peril, and that retreat was again necessary. Such certainly was the conclusion of the council of war, on the 16th, acting this time in agreement with their chief. Six days Howe lingered on Frog's Point, bringing up stores or artillery

or something, . . . and gave six days to Washington. They were of little value to Howe, but they were of inestimable worth to Washington, who employed them in getting everything in readiness, in holding his council of war, and then on the 17th in moving deliberately off to very strong ground at White Plains. . . . On the 28th, Howe came up to Washington's position, and found the Americans quite equal in numbers, strongly intrenched, and awaiting his attack with confidence. He hesitated, doubted, and finally feeling that he must do something, sent 4,000 men to storm Chatterton Hill, an outlying post, where some 1,400 Americans were stationed. There was a short, sharp action, and then the Americans retreated in good order to the main army, having lost less than half as many men as their opponents. With caution now much enlarged, Howe sent for reinforcements, and waited two days. The third day it rained, and on the fourth Howe found that Washington had withdrawn to a higher and quite impregnable line of hills, where he held all the passes in the rear and awaited a second attack. Howe contemplated the situation for two or three days longer, and then broke camp and withdrew to Dobbs Ferry. Such were the great results of the victory of Long Island, two wasted months, and the American army still untouched. Howe was resolved, however, that his campaign should not be utterly fruitless, and therefore directed his attention to the defences of the Hudson, Fort Lee, and Fort Washington, and here he met with better success. Congress, in its military wisdom, had insisted that these forts must and could be held. . . . An attempt was made to hold both forts, and both were lost, as he [Washington] had foreseen. From Fort Lee the garrison withdrew in safety. Fort Washington was carried by storm, after a severe struggle. Twenty-six hundred men and all the munitions of war fell into the hands of the enemy. It was a serious and most depressing loss, and was felt throughout the continent. Meantime Washington had crossed into the Jerseys, and, after the loss of Fort Lee, began to retreat before the British, who, flushed with victory, now advanced rapidly under Lord Cornwallis."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the Am. Rev.*, ch. 33-36.—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathaniel Greene*, ch. 8-11 (v. 1).—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Am. Rev.*, v. 2, ch. 23.

A. D. 1776 (October).—Connecticut assumes independence and sovereignty. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776.

A. D. 1776-1777.—Washington's retreat through New Jersey and his masterly return movement.—The victories at Trenton and Princeton retrieving the situation.—"On the 17th [of November] Washington ordered Lee [who had lately returned from the south, and who had command of 7,000 men at Northcastle] to come over and join him; but Lee disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Washington. A good many people were finding fault with the latter for losing the 3,000 men at Fort Washington, although, as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of Congress. Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he

would surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they had been able to do for themselves since they started from Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3,000 men. Here was another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time had expired. It was generally believed that Washington's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the occasion. While the case looked so desperate for Washington, events at the north had taken a less unfavourable turn. Carleton [who began preparations to invade the province of New York as soon as Arnold retreated from Canada] had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in that latitude. The resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hudson with 4,000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown. Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was. Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Washington. Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6,000 men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776,

and the following nine days, all Washington's most brilliant powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians, 1,000 strong, was posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at Burlington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts, and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2,500 in number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hessians at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton. By the 31st Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia, waking up his friends to borrow the \$50,000, which he sent off to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a rear-guard of 2,000 men left to protect his communications, came on toward Trenton. When he reached that town, late in the afternoon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware river. 'Oho!' said Cornwallis, 'at last we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning.' He sent back to Princeton, and ordered the rear-guard to come up. He expected next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and then press him back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his camp-fires. Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown. There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York—which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In nine days the tables had been completely turned. The attack upon



an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The illtimed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means."—J. Fiske, *The War of Independence*, ch. 6.—"The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting his way through the British posts, back to a point where he threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick, give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: 'Washington has shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this country.' Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations until the next season. Meantime the country took heart, Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited and organized on a better basis. 'The business of war is the result of Experience,' wrote Wolcott from Congress, with faith unshaken during the darkest hours of the campaign; and experience was now put to good profit. The crisis was passed. Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do no more than she had done to conquer America; while America was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence was established in the present campaign—in the year of its declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to Princeton."—H. P. Johnston, *Campaign of 1776* (*Memoirs of the Long Island Hist. Soc.*, v. 3), pt. 1, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: J. F. Hageman, *Hist. of Princeton*, ch. 4, sect. 4-5 (v. 1).—J. O. Raum, *Hist. of N. J.*, ch. 20 (v. 2).—W. B. Reed, *Life of Jos. Reed*, v. 1, ch. 4.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, ch. 21.

**A. D. 1776-1777.—Prisoners and exchanges.**—**British treatment of captives.**—**The Jersey Prison-ship and the Sugar-house prison.**—In New York, during the British occupation of the city, "wretched indeed was the condition of the poor refugee, of the sick soldier, and, above all, the patriot prisoner. The newspapers are filled with calls for charitable contributions for women and children perishing with cold and hunger, for disabled soldiers and families without a shelter. . . . But if the favored Tories suffered, what must have been the condition of the patriot prisoners, confined by thousands in bleak barracks, churches, and prison-ships? Let us pass up Broadway, amidst the uncleared ruins,

and, turning down Liberty Street, pause before a huge brick building near the Middle Dutch Church. It is five stories high, with broken windows, through which the fierce winds of winter rush unrestrained. Through its imperfect roof and various openings, snow, ice, and water penetrate to every part of the building. Sentries pace round its walls prepared to fire upon any of its maddened inmates who attempt in desperation to escape. Wounded men crawl to the windows begging aid; but the impassive sentinel turns back the gifts of the charitable. No communication with the prisoners can be allowed. The walls within are bare and cheerless, nor do any of the common conveniences of life soften the horrors of those dreary chambers. Yet the old Sugar-House is the most crowded building in New York, and hundreds of prisoners, some chained, others at large, fill its comfortless interior. In the old Sugar-House were confined the prisoners of Long Island, the captives of sudden forays, the patriot citizen, and the heroes of the rebel army. Clothed in rags and scarcely covered from the winter air, crowded in narrow apartments and broken by hunger and disease, the prisoners died by thousands. The sick lay down on beds of snow to perish; the feeble wounded quivered in the February blast. Food of the coarsest kind was served out to them in scanty measure, and devoured with the eagerness of famine. Every night ten or twenty died; every day their corpses were thrown into pits without a single rite of burial. When led out to be exchanged, the glad hope of freedom gave them no joy—they died on the way to their friends, or lingered out a few weeks of miserable decline in the hospitals of the Jerseys. So wretched was their condition that Washington refused to consider them fit subjects for exchange. 'You give us only the dead or dying,' he wrote to Howe, 'for our well-fed and healthy prisoners.' Howe, as if in mockery, replied that they had been kept in 'airy, roomy buildings,' on the same fare as his own soldiers. Washington pointed to the condition in which they reached him—diseased, famished, emaciated, and dying, as they were conducted to his quarters. Across the river, in Wallabout Bay, lay the prison-ship 'Jersey.' She was the hulk of a 64 gun ship, long unseaworthy, her masts and rigging gone, her figure-head broken off, and her whole appearance singularly repulsive. Yet on board of the Jersey were confined 1,200 captured seamen. She was never cleansed, and lay in that condition seven years. No fires warmed her occupants in winter, no screen sheltered them from the August sun; no physician visited the sick, no clergyman consoled the dying there. Poor and scanty food, the want of clothing, cleanliness, and exercise, and raging diseases that never ceased their ravages, made the Jersey a scene of human suffering to which the Black Hole of Calcutta might favorably compare. Benevolent Tories would sometimes convey by stealth food or clothing to her unhappy inmates; but this was little. Toward the close of the war the British, from shame or pity, made some improvement in her condition; but she remained throughout the contest a centre of sickness and death, always decimated by disease and always replenished with new victims. The bones of her dead, estimated at 11,000, lie buried on the

Brooklyn shore. The crowded city itself was never free from contagion. In winter the small-pox made fearful ravages."—E. Lawrence, *New York in the Revolution* (*Harper's Magazine*, July, 1868).

ALSO IN: *Force's Am. Archives*, 4th Series, v. 6, 5th Ser., v. 1-3.—*Hist. Mag.* 1866, *sup.*—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, ch. 21.

**A. D. 1776-1778.—Attitude and feeling of France.—Her disposition to aid the colonies and the reasons for it.—The American embassy to the French court.—Silas Deane and Beaumarchais.—Franklin at Passy.**—"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine (secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years evading the search of historians, . . . was brought to light by De Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the continuance of the civil war in America, and on the other hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in case of failure in North America, England would, to recover its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by this internecine war would prostrate both England and her Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following inferences: (1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English ministry in a state of false security with respect to the intentions of France and Spain. (2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it. (3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or interest to make an open contract

with the insurgents until their independence was achieved. (4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance, they should look for no other return than the success of the political object they had at that moment in view, leaving themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any future arrangements. (5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit. The English, he adds, respect only those who can make themselves feared. (6) That the result to which all these considerations led was that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues, the maintenance of peace with that power was the least probable. . . . It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as well as of India would give her a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth, which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the young nobility and among officers in the army for America, which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards had great power in forming French public opinion. By the enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold, weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign who then, with little political experience but high notions of duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."—F. Wharton, ed., *Revolutionary Diplomatic Corr. of the U. S.*, *Introd.*, ch. 4 (v. 1).—"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even before there was a declaration of independence or an assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected. He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first and second congresses, had failed of reelection to the third, and was now without employment. Mr. Parton describes him as 'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man would make an imposing figure at an European court. He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he could not even speak French; and it



proved an ill hour for himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor. . . . Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco, rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the disposition of the French government really held for the insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000 troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply as a merchant conducting his own affairs. . . . Before the arrival of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit, keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. . . . He became frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue, inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial cause."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Benjamin Franklin*, ch. 9.—Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which, after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed. Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but, the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was chosen in his place. These

transactions were placed on the secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any specific information concerning them, or to state more than, 'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000 sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than it had been at any time during the war with both France and Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that the American merchants might freely vend in them every article of commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or to enter into any formal negotiation with them."—J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 7.—"It is . . . a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when, from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial intimation, it should have been known that such reception would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be received, at least in a private capacity, France being then ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this reception was accorded . . . first to Silas Deane, then to Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of recognition of the United States as an independent sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it, should wait till there was some such recognition before thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money. Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. . . . The policy of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers were not received worked injuriously to the United States from the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority, considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the American legation. Thus Ralph Izard,

commissioned to Tuscany, never went there, but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission. When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to receive them, and in the still more important question of the attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French court, Adams agreed with Lee. . . . It is due to Adams to say that he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues associated with him."—F. Wharton, *Introd. to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of The U. S.*, ch. 1, sect. 16-17, and ch. 9, sect. 106 (v. 1).—Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside "all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and satisfactorily solved, . . . it appears that a large part of the misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776. Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London, was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was that he should appear as a merchant. . . . In May, there was a plan on the part of the French government to employ a real merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This was exactly the rôle which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill, and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all the accessories of a house of business, as the same are understood and represented on the stage. At that time it was believed that

the colonists had plenty of exportable products which they could and would contribute for the purpose [purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their main difficulty would be to find any market in which they could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance, therefore, which they would need from France would be secret permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the balance of account, which the French government might have to make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot now be fixed.' . . . August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops; and that without waiting for their consent he has already procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns, with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales & Co. . . . A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais, August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy, if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to the cause. . . . When Arthur Lee received his appointment as Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais . . . had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been settled between Deane and Hortales. . . . Arthur Lee always held the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain atten-



tion. . . . September 8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make contracts with persons to come to America. November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of belief that he was making great gain out of his position. . . . The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him President of the United States, by winning him votes from Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which conduct others to glory.' . . . He is in terror of bankruptcy. Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage. Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American produce is to be exported and consigned to this house. Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."—W. G. Sumner, *The Financier and the Finances of the Am. Revolution*, ch. 8 (v. 1).—"The episode of Beaumarchais . . . was a survival of the secret diplomacy of Louis XV, for a short time exercising an extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by his predecessor in full

operation; and, . . . for one or two delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign, Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest activity it must be remembered that he was not technically Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by Broglie in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais' political influence ceased . . . when, on the arrival of Franklin, Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American diplomacy."—F. Wharton, *Introduct. to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S.*, ch. 4, sect. 55 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*.—J. Bigelow, ed., *Life of Franklin, by himself*, v. 2, ch. 13-15.—J. Parton, *Life of Franklin*, pt. 6 (v. 2).—L. de Lomenie, *Beaumarchais and his Times*, ch. 20-23 (v. 3).—*Papers in relation to the Case of Silas Deane (Seventy-Six Soc. 1855)*.—C. Tower, Jr., *The Marquis de La Fayette in the Am. Rev.*, v. 1, ch. 5.—See, also, below: A. D. 1778 (FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1776-1779.—The Thirteen Colonies become States.—The framing and adoption of State Constitutions.—"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the general congress; the work was done by the several states, in the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts, which was the first state to frame a government independent of the king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May 1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king. In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and this constitution, having been approved by the people, went into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was

approved by the people, and established on the 31st of the following October. The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the 26th of March 1776. In March 1778, a permanent constitution was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776, required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in the style of its public acts. A disfranchisement of Catholics had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June 1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October. Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the series, first in the completeness of her work, by a legislative convention without any further consultation of the people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of independence, and a constitution. On the second of July 1776, New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. Delaware next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of September 1776, the representatives in convention having been chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose, finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised, and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough organization for more than five months. The delegates of Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its constitution with great deliberation; it was established on the 9th of the following November. On the 18th of December 1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its convention. Last of the thirteen came New York, whose empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a constitution that, in humane liberality, excelled them all. The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent, the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So, too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina it was enough to own in the district or town a certain freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to 'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future state of rewards and punishments.' White men alone could claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the law classed the free octoroon as a white, even though descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported African slave; the other ten states raised no question of color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about \$200, in Georgia at £10. Similar condi-

tions had always existed, with the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves. Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy to his representative by writing his own name on the back of his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end of the war, the other eight without delay."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 5, ch. 9.

ALSO IN: *American Archives*, series 5, v. 2-3 (as indexed).—See, also, VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776; SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY—APRIL); NEW YORK: A. D. 1777; CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776; NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776; PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776; MARYLAND: A. D. 1776; GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777; NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.

A. D. 1777 (January—December).—The campaign on the Delaware.—Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia.—Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown.—The winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.—"Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of June Howe marched from Brunswick and . . . endeavored to bring on a general engagement, . . . but Washington refused to leave the strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. . . . On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. . . . Signal fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry." Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation on the approach of the enemy, but "the pacific influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to bear down all military efforts. . . . To impress the lukewarm with the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic,



on the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia. The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats." The advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until the 11th of September that the Americans encountered him, at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position. In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above, while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford. "The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the British, 579. . . . The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and attack their rear should they attempt to follow." But Wayne was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having occupied Germantown the day before. "The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city." Here, on the morning of October 4th, Washington attacked him, and, for a time, with great success; but confusion and misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose, which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. "The Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British 521. . . . While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that, though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still aggressive." The next few weeks were employed by Howe in reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon Washington's lines, at White-marsh, intending an attack; but found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt, and returned to Philadelphia. "As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection of huts

began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the open fires. . . . The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. 'The unfortunate soldiers,' wrote Lafayette in after-years, 'were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary to amputate them. . . . The army frequently remained whole days without provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which each moment served to renew.' . . . While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have greatly depreciated.'—F. D. Stone, *The Struggle for the Delaware* (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., v. 6, ch. 5).—The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of Congress, December 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he wrote, "we have had no assistance from the quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this department the commissary-general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as a further proof of the inability of an army, under the circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight

men now in camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty; notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reproaching the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which, by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul, I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose myself to detraction and calumny.”—George Washington, *Writings*, ed. by W. C. Ford, v. 6, pp. 259-262. —It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed

American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account of the state of things which he found he says: “My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place, I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the departments, and their various branches in the European armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon the functions of the quarter-masters (*maréchaux généraux de logis*) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system, bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies. But whether it was that they thought such a system impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were supreme. . . . The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number, that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal! . . . The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the armies of Europe



together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men, they could give still less an account of their arms, accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that, previous to the establishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. . . . The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woollen bed-cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. . . . I commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. . . . I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army, and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander-in-chief. . . . The most interesting narrative of the energy employed by Steuben, and the success of

his system, is given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt! Without understanding a word of the English language, to think of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word, a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a changeament to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more rejoiced." . . . Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp, and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time, no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite, galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept. Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite sufficient.' . . . Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief. Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in the army, he had greater power and authority than any general could boast of."—F. Kapp, *Life of Frederick William von Steuben*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 13, 18-19, and 23-27.—G. W. Greene, *Life of General Nathanael Greene*, bk. 2, ch. 16-25 (v. 1).—J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, *Hist. of Philadelphia*, ch. 17 (v. 1).—C. J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne*, ch. 3.

A. D. 1777 (June).—Vermont denied admission to the Union. See VERMONT: A. D. 1777-1778.

A. D. 1777 (July).—The coming of Lafayette.—"La Fayette, barely nineteen years old, was in garrison at Metz, when he was invited to a dinner that his commander, the Count de Broglie, gave to the brother of the king of England, the Duke of Gloucester, then on his way through the city. News had just been received of the proclamation of the independence of the United States, and, the conversation having naturally fallen on this subject, La Fayette plied the duke with questions to acquaint himself with the events, entirely new to him, which were happening in America. Before the end of the dinner he had made his decision, and, from that moment, he no longer thought of anything else

except setting out for the new world. He went to Paris and confided his project to his friends, the Count de Ségur and the Viscount de Noailles, who were to accompany him. The Count de Broglie, whom he also informed, tried to turn him from his design. 'I saw your uncle die in Italy,' he said to him, 'and your father at Minden, and I do not wish to contribute to the ruin of your family by allowing you to go.' Nevertheless, he put La Fayette in communication with the former agent of Choiseul in Canada, the Baron de Kalb, who became his friend. De Kalb presented him to Silas Deane, who, considering him too young, wished to dissuade him from his project. But the news of the disasters experienced by the Americans before New York, at White Plains and in New Jersey, confirmed La Fayette in his resolution. He bought and fitted out a vessel at his own expense, and disguised his preparations by making a journey to London. Nevertheless his design was disclosed at Court. His family became angry with him. He was forbidden to go to America, and, to render this order effective, a *lettre de cachet* was issued against him. Nevertheless he left Paris with an officer named Mauroy, disguised himself as a courier, went on board his ship at Passage in Spain, and set sail April the 26th, 1777. He had several officers on board. La Fayette successfully avoided the English cruisers and the French vessels sent in pursuit of him. Finally, after a hazardous passage of seven weeks, he reached Georgetown, and, furnished with letters of recommendation from Deane, he reported to Congress.—T. Balch, *The French in America during the War of Independence*, ch. 7.—In consideration of the great personal sacrifice he had made in quitting France, and his offer to serve the American cause at his own expense and without pay, Congress, with hesitation, conferred on the young marquis the rank of Major General, but without command. He succeeded, too, in procuring a like commission for Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied him. While La Fayette was still busy with these arrangements, Washington came to Philadelphia, and they met at a dinner party. They seem to have been drawn to one another at the first exchange of words, and a friendship began which lasted through their lives. Lafayette was soon invited to become a member of the military family of the commander-in-chief.—B. Tuckerman, *Life of General Lafayette*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: C. Tower, Jr., *The Marquis de La Fayette in the Am. Rev.*, v. 1, ch. 1.

**A. D. 1777 (July—October).—The struggle for the Hudson.—Burgoyne's expedition from Canada.—His surrender at Saratoga.**—Early in the summer of 1777 a formidable expedition under General Burgoyne was set in motion from Canada toward Lake Champlain. "It was a part of Burgoyne's plan, not merely to take Ticonderoga, but to advance thence upon Albany, and, with the co-operation of the troops at New York, to get possession also of the posts in the Highlands. The British would then command the Hudson through its whole extent, and New England, the head of the rebellion, would be completely cut off from the middle and southern colonies. Burgoyne started on this expedition with a brilliant army of 8,000 men, partly British and partly Germans, besides a large number of Canadian boatmen, laborers and skirmishers.

On the western shore of Lake Champlain, near Crown Point, he met the Six Nations in council, and after a feast and a speech, some 400 of their warriors joined this army. His next step was to issue a proclamation . . . threatening with all the extremities of war all who should presume to resist his arms. Two days after the issue of this proclamation, Burgoyne appeared [July 1] before Ticonderoga." The commander of that important fort, General St. Clair, found defense impracticable and evacuated the place. He was vigorously pursued in his retreat and only escaped with the loss of most of his baggage and stores, besides several hundred men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. "After a seven days' march, he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward, on the Hudson. Here was assembled the whole force of the northern army, amounting to about 5,000 men; but a considerable part were militia hastily called in; many were without arms; there was a great deficiency of ammunition and provisions; and the whole force was quite disorganized. The region between Skenesborough [now Whitehall, where Burgoyne had halted] and the Hudson was an almost unbroken wilderness. Wood Creek was navigable as far as Fort Anne [which the Americans had fired and abandoned]; from Fort Anne to the Hudson, over an exceedingly rough country, . . . extended a single military road. While Burgoyne halted a few days at Skenesborough to put his forces in order, and to bring up the necessary supplies, Schuyler hastened to destroy the navigation of Wood Creek," and to make the road from Fort Anne as nearly impassable as a wilderness road can be made. "All the stock in the neighborhood was driven off, and the militia of New England was summoned to the rescue. . . . The advance from Skenesborough cost the British infinite labor and fatigue; but . . . [the] impediments were at length overcome; and Burgoyne, with his troops, artillery, and baggage, presently appeared [July 29] on the banks of the Hudson. . . . Fort Edward was untenable. As the British approached, the Americans crossed the river, and retired, first to Saratoga, and then to Stillwater, a short distance above the mouth of the Mohawk. Hardly had Schuyler taken up this position, when news arrived of another disaster and a new danger. While moving up Lake Champlain, Burgoyne had detached Colonel St. Leger, with 200 regulars, Sir John Johnson's Royal Greens, some Canadian Rangers, and a body of Indians under Brant, to harass the New York frontier from the west. St. Leger laid siege to Fort Schuyler, late Fort Stanwix, near the head of the Mohawk, then the extreme western post of the State of New York. General Herkimer raised the militia of Tryon county, and advanced to the relief of this important post, which was held by Gansevoort and Willett, with two New York regiments. About six miles from the fort [near Oriskany, August 6], owing to want of proper precaution, Herkimer fell into an ambush. Mortally wounded, he supported himself against a stump, and encouraged his men to the fight. By the aid of a successful sally by Willett, they succeeded at last in repulsing the assailants, but not without a loss of 400, including many of the leading patriots of that region, who met with no mercy at the hands of the Indians and refugees. Tryon county, which included the whole district



west of Albany, abounded with Tories. It was absolutely necessary to relieve Fort Schuyler." General Arnold was accordingly despatched thither, with three regiments, and on his approach St. Leger, deserted by most of his Indian allies, retreated precipitately, leaving most of his stores and baggage behind. Meantime, Burgoyne was beginning to find his situation serious. To feed and otherwise supply his army was the chief difficulty. He could bring enough of stores to the head of Lake George, by the water carriage which he commanded, from Canada; but to transport them thence to the Hudson, though the distance was only eighteen miles, proved nearly impracticable. "The roads were so bad, and the supply of draft cattle so small, that, after a fortnight's hard labor, the British army had only four days' provision in advance." To improve his supplies, and partly, moreover, in the hope of finding discontent among the settlers of the New Hampshire Grants, Burgoyne sent 800 men, under Colonel Baum, into Vermont. They were defeated [August 16] at Bennington by the New Hampshire and Vermont militia under Colonel John Stark, and again defeated a second time the same day, after reinforcements had been sent to them. "Besides the killed, about 200 in number, the Americans took near 600 prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, as many swords, and four pieces of artillery. . . . The American loss was only 14 killed and 42 wounded. . . . The victory of Stark had a magical effect in reviving the spirits of the people and the courage of the soldiers."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S., ch. 36 (v. 3)*.—"Burgoyne's position was by this time very dangerous. His Indians were leaving him; many of his best men had been killed or captured; and he was getting short of provisions. The army opposed to him was increasing: Congress was hurrying men up the Hudson; and the country militia were coming in rapidly. Burgoyne, therefore, desperately attempted to force his way through the American army. He crossed the Hudson, and moved slowly down its west bank toward the Mohawk. About the same time, Gates, who had been sent by Congress to take Schuyler's place, felt strong enough to move up the west bank of the Hudson, away from the Mohawk. The two armies met [September 19] at Bemis Heights, between Saratoga Lake and the Hudson. The battle which followed [called by some writers the battle of Freeman's Farm] was not decisive: the British held the ground; but the Americans had shown that Burgoyne could not break through."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of the U. S. for Schools, sect. 222-223*.—"Burgoyne now halted again, and strengthened his position by field-works and redoubts; and the Americans also improved their defences. The two armies remained nearly within cannon-shot of each other for a considerable time, during which Burgoyne was anxiously looking for intelligence of the promised expedition from New York, which, according to the original plan, ought by this time to have been approaching Albany from the south. At last, a messenger from Clinton made his way, with great difficulty, to Burgoyne's camp, and brought the information that Clinton was on his way up the Hudson to attack the American forts which barred the passage up that river to Albany. Burgoyne, in reply, on the 30th of September, urged Clinton

to attack the forts as speedily as possible, stating that the effect of such an attack, or even the semblance of it, would be to move the American army from its position before his own troops. By another messenger, who reached Clinton on the 5th of October, Burgoyne informed his brother general that he had lost his communications with Canada, but had provisions which would last him till the 20th. Burgoyne described himself as strongly posted, and stated that though the Americans in front of him [at Stillwater] were strongly posted also, he made no doubt of being able to force them, and making his way to Albany; but that he doubted whether he could subsist there, as the country was drained of provisions. He wished Clinton to meet him there, and to keep open a communication with New York. Burgoyne had over-estimated his resources, and in the very beginning of October found difficulty and distress pressing him hard. The Indians and Canadians began to desert him; while, on the other hand, Gates's army was continually reinforced by fresh bodies of the militia. . . . Finding the number and spirit of the enemy to increase daily, and his own stores of provisions to diminish, Burgoyne determined on attacking the Americans in front of him, and by dislodging them from their position, to gain the means of moving upon Albany, or at least of relieving his troops from the straitened position in which they were cooped up. Burgoyne's force was now reduced to less than 6,000 men. The right of his camp was on some high ground a little to the west of the river; thence his entrenchments extended along the lower ground to the bank of the Hudson, the line of their front being nearly at a right angle with the course of the stream. The lines were fortified with redoubts and field-works. . . . The numerical force of the Americans was now greater than the British, even in regular troops, and the numbers of the militia and volunteers which had joined Gates and Arnold were greater still. General Lincoln, with 2,000 New England troops, had reached the American camp on the 29th of September. Gates gave him the command of the right wing, and took in person the command of the left wing, which was composed of two brigades under Generals Poor and Leonard, of Colonel Morgan's rifle corps, and part of the fresh New England Militia. The whole of the American lines had been ably fortified under the direction of the celebrated Polish General, Kosciusko, who was now serving as a volunteer in Gates's army. The right of the American position, that is to say, the part of it nearest to the river, was too strong to be assailed with any prospect of success; and Burgoyne therefore determined to endeavour to force their left. For this purpose he formed a column of 1,500 regular troops, with two twelve-pounders, two howitzers, and six six-pounders. He headed this in person, having Generals Philips, Riedesel, and Fraser under him. The enemy's force immediately in front of his lines was so strong that he dared not weaken the troops who guarded them, by detaching any more to strengthen his column of attack. It was on the 7th of October that Burgoyne led his column forward; and on the preceding day, the 6th, Clinton had successfully executed a brilliant enterprise against the two American forts which barred his progress up the Hudson. He had captured them both,

with severe loss to the American forces opposed to him; he had destroyed the fleet which the Americans had been forming on the Hudson, under the protection of their forts; and the upward river was laid open to his squadron. He had also, with admirable skill and industry, collected in small vessels, such as could float within a few miles of Albany, provisions sufficient to supply Burgoyne's army for six months. He was now only 156 miles distant from Burgoyne; and a detachment of 1,700 men actually advanced within 40 miles of Albany. Unfortunately Burgoyne and Clinton were each ignorant of the other's movements; but if Burgoyne had won his battle on the 7th, he must on advancing have soon learned the tidings of Clinton's success, and Clinton would have heard of his. A junction would soon have been made of the two victorious armies, and the great objects of the campaign might yet have been accomplished. All depended on the fortune of the column with which Burgoyne, on the eventful 7th of October, 1777, advanced against the American position." It failed in the attempt to break the American line. Arnold, who had been deprived of his command by Gates, rushed into the fight at its fiercest stage and assumed a lead, without authority, which contributed greatly to the result. General Fraser, on the British side, was wounded mortally by a sharp-shooter under Morgan's command. Burgoyne's whole force was driven back, with heavy losses in killed and wounded, leaving six cannon behind them, and the Americans, pursuing, carried part of their entrenchments by storm. By this success, the latter "acquired the means of completely turning the right flank of the British, and gaining their rear. To prevent this calamity, Burgoyne effected during the night an entire change of position. With great skill he removed his whole army to some heights near the river, a little northward of the former camp, and he there drew up his men, expecting to be attacked on the following day. But Gates was resolved not to risk the certain triumph which his success had already secured for him. He harassed the English with skirmishes, but attempted no regular attack. Meanwhile he detached bodies of troops on both sides of the Hudson to prevent the British from recrossing that river, and to bar their retreat. When night fell, it became absolutely necessary for Burgoyne to retire again, and, accordingly, the troops were marched through a stormy and rainy night towards Saratoga, abandoning their sick and wounded, and the greater part of their baggage, to the enemy. . . . Burgoyne now took up his last position on the heights near Saratoga; and hemmed in by the enemy, who refused any encounter, and baffled in all his attempts at finding a path of escape, he there lingered until famine compelled him to capitulate. The fortitude of the British army during this melancholy period has been justly eulogised by many native historians, but I prefer quoting the testimony of a foreign writer, as free from all possibility of partiality. Botta says: 'It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable condition to which the British army was now reduced. The troops were worn down by a series of toil, privation, sickness, and desperate fighting. They were abandoned by the Indians and Canadians; and the effective force of the whole army was now diminished by repeated and heavy losses,

which had principally fallen on the best soldiers and the most distinguished officers, from 10,000 combatants to less than one-half that number. Of this remnant, little more than 3,000 were English. In these circumstances, and thus weakened, they were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose position extended three parts of a circle round them; who refused to fight them, as knowing their weakness, and who, from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any part. In this helpless condition, obliged to be constantly under arms, while the enemy's cannon played on every part of their camp, and even the American rifle-balls whistled in many parts of the lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their customary firmness, and while sinking under a hard necessity, they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. They could not be reproached with an action or a word, which betrayed a want of temper or of fortitude.' At length the 13th of October arrived, and as no prospect of assistance appeared, and the provisions were nearly exhausted, Burgoyne, by the unanimous advice of a council of war, sent a messenger to the American camp to treat of a convention. General Gates in the first instance demanded that the royal army should surrender prisoners of war. He also proposed that the British should ground their arms. Burgoyne replied, 'This article is inadmissible in every extremity; sooner than this army will consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.' After various messages, a convention for the surrender of the army was settled, which provided that 'The troops under General Burgoyne were to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river, where the arms and artillery were to be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers. A free passage was to be granted to the army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest.' The articles of capitulation were settled on the 15th of October; and on that very evening a messenger arrived from Clinton with an account of his successes, and with the tidings that part of his force had penetrated as far as Esopus, within 50 miles of Burgoyne's camp. But it was too late. The public faith was pledged; and the army was, indeed, too debilitated by fatigue and hunger to resist an attack if made; and Gates certainly would have made it, if the convention had been broken off. Accordingly, on the 17th, the convention of Saratoga was carried into effect. By this convention 5,790 men surrendered themselves as prisoners. The sick and wounded left in the camp when the British retreated to Saratoga, together with the numbers of the British, German, and Canadian troops, who were killed, wounded, or taken, and who had deserted in the preceding part of the expedition, were reckoned to be 4,689. The British sick and wounded who had fallen into the hands of the Americans after the battle of the 7th, were treated with exemplary humanity; and when the convention was executed, General Gates showed a noble delicacy of feeling, which deserves the highest degree of honour. Every circumstance was avoided which could give the appearance of triumph. The



American troops remained within their lines until the British had piled their arms; and when this was done, the vanquished officers and soldiers were received with friendly kindness by their victors, and their immediate wants were promptly and liberally supplied. Discussions and disputes afterwards arose as to some of the terms of the convention; and the American Congress refused for a long time to carry into effect the article which provided for the return of Burgoyne's men to Europe; but no blame was imputable to General Gates or his army, who showed themselves to be generous as they had proved themselves to be brave."—Sir E. Creasy, *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: Gen. J. Burgoyne, *State of the Expedition from Canada*.—S. A. Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*.—W. L. Stone, *Campaign of Burgoyne*.—M. von Eelking, *Memoir of Gen. Riedesel*, v. 1, pp. 88-218.—B. J. Lossing, *Life and Times of Philip Schuyler*, v. 2, ch. 6-21.—Col. M. Willett, *Narrative of Military Actions*, ch. 5.—C. Stark, *Memoir of Gen. John Stark*, pp. 46-140.—T. Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York*, v. 3, pp. 220-233.

A. D. 1777-1778.—The British in Philadelphia.—Their gay winter. See PHILADELPHIA: A. D. 1777-1778.

A. D. 1777-1778.—The Conway Cabal.—The capitulation of Burgoyne at Saratoga "was an all-important event in its influence on the progress of the war; but its immediate effect was unpropitious to the reputation of the Commander-in-chief, who was compelled, at the close of the year, to place his army in a state of almost total destitution in winter-quarters at Valley Forge. The brilliant success of General Gates at Saratoga, in contrast with the reverses which had befallen the American Army under the immediate command of Washington, encouraged the operations of a cabal against him, which had been formed by certain disaffected officers of the army, and was countenanced by a party in Congress. The design was, by a succession of measures implying a want of confidence, to drive Washington to retire from the service in disgust; and, when this object was effected, to give the command of the army to General Gates, who lent a willing ear to these discreditable intrigues. A foreign officer in the American Army, of the name of Conway, was the most active promoter of the project, which was discovered by the accidental disclosure of a part of his correspondence with Gates. Washington bore himself on this occasion with his usual dignity, and allowed the parties concerned, in the army and in Congress, to take refuge in explanations, disclaimers, and apologies, by which those who made them gained no credit, and those who accepted them were not deceived. A part of the machinery of this wretched cabal was the publication, in London, and the republication in New York of [a] collection of forged letters . . . bearing the name of Washington, and intended to prove his insincerity in the cause of the Revolution. Nothing perhaps more plainly illustrates his conscious strength of character, than the disdainful silence with which he allowed this miserable fabrication to remain for twenty years without exposure. It was only in the year 1796, and when about to retire from the Presidency, that he filed, in the department of State, a denial of its authenticity."—E. Everett,

*Life of Washington*, ch. 6.—In a letter written May 30, 1778, addressed to Landon Carter, from the camp at Valley Forge, Washington alluded to the subject of the cabal as follows: "With great truth I think I can assure you, that the information you received from a gentleman at Sabine Hall, respecting a disposition in the northern officers to see me superseded in my command by General G——s is without the least foundation. I have very sufficient reasons to think, that no officers in the army are more attached to me, than those from the northward, and of those, none more so than the gentlemen, who were under the immediate command of G——s last campaign. That there was a scheme of this sort on foot, last fall, admits of no doubt; but it originated in another quarter; with three men who wanted to aggrandize themselves; but finding no support, on the contrary, that their conduct and views, when seen into, were likely to undergo severe reprehension, they slunk back, disavowed the measure, and professed themselves my warmest admirers. Thus stands the matter at present. Whether any members of Congress were privy to this scheme, and inclined to aid and abet it, I shall not take upon me to say; but am well informed, that no whisper of the kind was ever heard in Congress."—George Washington, *Writings*, ed. by W. C. Ford, v. 7, p. 39.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 28-30.—J. C. Hamilton, *Hist. of the U. S. in the Writings of Alex. Hamilton*, v. 1, ch. 13-14.—J. Sparks, *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, v. 1, ch. 10.—W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, ch. 46 (v. 2).

A. D. 1777-1781.—Adoption and ratification of the Articles of Confederation.—"On the 11th of June, 1776, the same day on which the committee for preparing the declaration of independence was appointed, congress resolved, that 'a committee be appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these colonies'; and on the next day a committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of a member from each colony. Nearly a year before this period (viz. on the 21st of July, 1775), Dr. Franklin had submitted to congress a sketch of articles of confederation, which does not, however, appear to have been acted on. . . . On the 12th of July, 1776, the committee appointed to prepare articles of confederation presented a draft, which was in the hand-writing of Mr. Dickenson, one of the committee, and a delegate from Pennsylvania. The draft, so reported, was debated from the 22d to the 31st of July, and on several days between the 5th and 20th of August, 1776. On this last day, congress, in committee of the whole, reported a new draft, which was ordered to be printed for the use of the members. The subject seems not again to have been touched until the 8th of April, 1777, and the articles were debated at several times between that time and the 15th of November of the same year. On this last day the articles were reported with sundry amendments, and finally adopted by congress. A committee was then appointed to draft, and they accordingly drafted, a circular letter, requesting the states respectively to authorize their delegates in congress to subscribe the same in behalf of the state. . . . It carried, however, very slowly conviction to the minds of the local legislatures. Many objections were

stated, and many amendments were proposed. All of them, however, were rejected by congress, not probably because they were all deemed inexpedient or improper in themselves; but from the danger of sending the instrument back again to all the states, for reconsideration. Accordingly, on the 26th of June, 1778, a copy, engrossed for ratification, was prepared, and the ratification begun on the 9th day of July following. It was ratified by all the states, except Delaware and Maryland, in 1778; by Delaware in 1779, and by Maryland on the 1st of March, 1781, from which last date its final ratification took effect, and was joyfully announced by congress. In reviewing the objections taken by the various states to the adoption of the confederation in the form in which it was presented to them, . . . that which seemed to be of paramount importance, and which, indeed, protracted the ratification of the confederation to so late a period, was the alarming controversy in respect to the boundaries of some of the states, and the public lands, held by the crown, within these reputed boundaries."—J. Story, *Commentaries on the Const. of the U. S.*, bk. 2, ch. 2 (v. 1).

The following is the text of the Articles of Confederation:

"**Article I.**—The style of this Confederacy shall be, 'The United States of America.' **Art. II.**—Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. **Art. III.**—The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. **Art. IV.**—The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States or either of them. If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State shall flee from justice and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State. **Art. V.**—For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be

annually appointed in such manner as the Legislature of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own delegates in any meeting of the States and while they act as members of the Committee of the States. In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonment during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on, Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. **Art. VI.**—No State, without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States, in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. No State shall lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain. No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States, in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State or its trade, nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use in public stores a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay



till the United States, in Congress assembled, can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States, in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States, in Congress assembled, shall determine otherwise. **Art. VII.**—When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of Colonel shall be appointed by the Legislature of each State respectively by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment. **Art. VIII.**—All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense, or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to, or surveyed for, any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures of the several States, within the time agreed upon by the United States, in Congress assembled. **Art. IX.**—The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth Article; of sending and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatever; of establishing rules for deciding, in all cases, what captures on land and water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace; appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another, shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice

thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination; and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present, shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court, to be appointed in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive; the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned; provided, that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the State where the cause shall be tried, 'well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward.' Provided, also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they may respect such lands, and the States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States; fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States; regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated; establishing and regulating post-offices from one State to another, throughout all the

United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office; appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers; appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States; making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated 'A Committee of the States,' and to consist of one delegate from each State, and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction; to appoint one of their number to preside; provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses; to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted; to build and equip a navy; to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State, which requisition shall be binding; and thereupon the Legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled; but if the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other State should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless the Legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number can not be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared, and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same, nor shall a question on any other

point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States, in Congress assembled. The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State, on any question, shall be entered on the journal when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the Legislatures of the several States. **Art. X.**—The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States, in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite. **Art. XI.**—Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States. **Art. XII.**—All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged. **Art. XIII.**—Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State. **AND WHEREAS** it hath pleased the great Governor of the world to incline the hearts of the Legislatures we respectively represent in Congress to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify, the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, know ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by the said Confederation are submitted to them;



and that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual. In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, and in the third year of the independence of America."

"Under these Articles of Confederation the treaty of peace with England was concluded and the American nation was governed until the final adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The main defect of the Articles of Confederation was, that although powers sufficiently adequate to create a government were ceded, there was no power to raise revenue, to levy taxes, or to enforce the law, except with the consent of nine States; and although the government had power to contract debts, there were no means by which to discharge them. The government had power to raise armies and navies, but no means wherewith to pay them, unless the means were voted by the States themselves; they could make treaties with foreign powers, but had no means to coerce a State to obey such treaty. In short, it was a government which had the power to make laws, but no power to punish infractions thereof. Washington himself said: 'The Confederation appears to me to be little more than the shadow without the substance, and Congress a nugatory body.' Chief Justice Story, in summing up the leading defects of the Articles of Confederation, says: 'There was an utter want of all coercive authority to carry into effect its own constitutional measures; this of itself was sufficient to destroy its whole efficiency as a superintendent government, if that may be called a government which possessed no one solid attribute of power. In truth, Congress possessed only the power of recommendation. Congress had no power to exact obedience or punish disobedience of its ordinances; they could neither impose fines nor direct imprisonments, nor divest privileges, nor declare forfeitures, nor suspend refractory officers. There was no power to exercise force.'"—S. Sterne, *Constitutional Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 1.—"The individual states had attributed to themselves, in the Articles of Confederation, no powers which could place them in relation to foreign nations in the light of sovereign states. They felt that all such claims would be considered ridiculous, because back of these claims there was no real corresponding power. Congress therefore remained, as heretofore, the sole outward representative of sovereignty. But the power to exercise the prerogatives was taken from it, and this without placing it in any other hands. The changes effected by the Articles of Confederation were rather of a negative than of a positive nature. They did not give the State which was just coming into being a definite form, but they began the work of its dissolution. . . . The practical result . . . was that the United States tended more and more to split up into thirteen independent republics, and . . . virtually ceased to be a member of the family of nations bound together by the 'jus gentium.'"—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Formation of the Const.*, v. 1, ch. 1.—D. R. Goodloe, *The*

*Birth of the Republic*, pp. 353-366.—H. W. Preston, *Doc's illustrative of Am. Hist.*, pp. 218-231.—On the operation and failure of the Articles of Confederation, see below, A. D. 1783-1787.—On the question of the western territorial claims of several of the States, and the obstacle which it brought in the way of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, see below, 1781-1786.

A. D. 1778 (February).—The Treaty with France.—"The account of Burgoyne's surrender, which was brought to France by a swift-sailing ship from Boston, threw Turgot and all Paris into transports of joy. None doubted the ability of the states to maintain their independence. On the 12th of December their commissioners had an interview with Vergennes. 'Nothing,' said he, 'has struck me so much as General Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's army. To bring troops raised within the year to this, promises everything. The court of France, in the treaty which is to be entered into, intend to take no advantage of your present situation. Once made, it should be durable; and therefore it should contain no condition of which the Americans may afterward repent, but such only as will last as long as human institutions shall endure, so that mutual amity may subsist forever. Entering into a treaty will be an avowal of your independence. Spain must be consulted, and Spain will not be satisfied with an undetermined boundary on the west. Some of the states are supposed to run to the South Sea, which might interfere with her claim to California.' It was answered that the last treaty of peace adopted the Mississippi as a boundary. 'And what share do you intend to give us in the fisheries?' asked Vergennes; for in the original draft of a treaty the United States had proposed to take to themselves Cape Breton and the whole of the island of Newfoundland. Explanations were made by the American commissioners that their later instructions removed all chances of disagreement on that subject. . . . The question of a French alliance . . . was discussed by Vergennes with the Marquis d'Ossun, the late French ambassador in Madrid, as the best adviser with regard to Spain, and the plan of action was formed. Then these two met the king at the apartment of Maurepas, where the plan, after debate, was finally settled. Maurepas, at heart opposed to the war, loved ease and popularity too well to escape the sway of external opinion; and Louis XVI. sacrificed his own inclination and his own feeling of justice to policy of state and the opinion of his advisers. So, on the 6th of February, a treaty of amity and commerce and an eventual defensive treaty of alliance were concluded between the king of France and the United States, on principles of equality and reciprocity, and for the most part in conformity to the proposals of congress. In commerce each party was to be placed on the footing of the most favored nation. The king of France promised his good offices with the princes and powers of Barbary. As to the fisheries, each party reserved to itself the exclusive possession of its own. Accepting the French interpretation of the treaties of Utrecht and of Paris, the United States acknowledged the right of French subjects to fish on the banks of Newfoundland, and their exclusive right to half the coast of that island for drying-places. On the question of

ownership in the event of the conquest of Newfoundland the treaty was silent. The American proposal, that free ships give freedom to goods and to persons, except to soldiers in actual service of an enemy, was adopted. Careful lists were made out of contraband merchandises. The absolute and unlimited independence of the United States was described as the essential end of the defensive alliance; and the two parties mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until it should be assured by the treaties terminating the war. Moreover, the United States guaranteed to France the possessions then held by France in America, as well as those which it might acquire by a future treaty of peace; and, in like manner, the king of France guaranteed to the United States their present possessions and acquisitions during the war from the dominions of Great Britain in North America. A separate and secret act reserved to the king of Spain the power of acceding to the treaties. Within forty-two hours of the signature of these treaties of commerce and alliance the British ministry received the news by special messenger from their spy in Paris, but it was not divulged." It was officially communicated to the British government on the 18th of March, when ambassadors were withdrawn on both sides and war soon followed.—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last rev.)*, v. 5, ch. 17.

ALSO IN: *Treaties and Conventions of the U. S. (ed. of 1889)*, p. 296.—T. Balch, *The French in Am. during the War of Independence*, ch. 8.—See, also, above, A. D. 1776–1778.

**A. D. 1778 (June).—Peace-proposals from England.—British evacuation of Philadelphia and march to New York.—Battle of Monmouth.**—"On May 11th, Sir Henry Clinton relieved Sir William Howe at Philadelphia, and the latter took his departure in a blaze of mock glory. . . . The new commander was more active than his predecessor, but no cleverer, and no better fitted to cope with Washington. . . . Expecting a movement by the enemy, Washington sent Lafayette forward to watch Philadelphia. Clinton, fresh in office, determined to cut him off, and by a rapid movement nearly succeeded in so doing. Timely information, presence of mind, and quickness, alone enabled the young Frenchman to escape, narrowly but completely. Meantime, a cause for delay, that curse of the British throughout the war, supervened. A peace commission, consisting of the Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, and Governor Johnstone, arrived. They were excellent men, but they came too late. Their propositions three years before would have been well enough, but as it was they were worse than nothing. Coolly received, they held a fruitless interview with a committee of Congress, tried to bribe and intrigue, found that their own army had been already ordered to evacuate Philadelphia [in apprehension of the arrival of the expected French fleet] without their knowledge, and finally gave up their task in angry despair, and returned to England to join in the chorus of fault-finding which was beginning to sound very loud in ministerial ears. Meanwhile, Washington waited and watched, puzzled by the delay, and hoping only to harass Sir Henry with militia on the march to New York. But, as the days slipped by, the Americans grew stronger, while Sir Henry weakened himself by sending 5,000 men to the West Indies,

and 3,000 to Florida. When he finally started [evacuating Philadelphia June 17], he had with him less than 10,000 men, while the Americans had 13,000, nearly all continental troops. Under these circumstances, Washington determined to bring on a battle. He was thwarted at the outset by his officers, as was wont to be the case. Lee had returned more whimsical than ever, and at the moment was strongly adverse to an attack. . . . Washington was harassed of course by all this, but he did not stay his purpose, and as soon as he knew that Clinton actually had marched, he broke camp at Valley Forge and started in pursuit. There were more councils of an old-womanish character, but finally Washington took the matter into his own hands, and ordered forth a strong detachment to attack the British rear-guard. They set out on the 25th, and as Lee, to whom the command belonged, did not care to go, Lafayette [see above: A. D. 1777 (JULY)] was put in charge. As soon as Lafayette had departed, however, Lee changed his mind, and insisted that all the detachments in front, amounting to 6,000 men, formed a division so large that it was unjust not to give him the command. Washington, therefore, sent him forward next day with two additional brigades, and then Lee by seniority took command on the 27th of the entire advance. In the evening of that day, Washington came up, reconnoitred the enemy, and saw that, although their position was a strong one, another day's unmolested march would make it still stronger. He therefore resolved to attack the next morning, and gave Lee then and there explicit orders to that effect. In the early dawn he despatched similar orders, but Lee apparently did nothing except move feebly forward, saying to Lafayette, 'You don't know the British soldiers; we cannot stand against them.' He made a weak attempt to cut off a covering party, marched and counter-marched, ordered and countermanded, until Lafayette and Wayne, eager to fight, knew not what to do, and sent hot messages to Washington to come to them. Thus hesitating and confused, Lee permitted Clinton to get his baggage and train to the front, and to mass all his best troops in the rear under Cornwallis, who then advanced against the American lines. Now there were no orders at all, and the troops did not know what to do, or where to go. They stood still, then began to fall back, and then to retreat. A very little more and there would have been a rout. As it was, Washington alone prevented disaster. . . . As the ill tidings grew thicker, Washington spurred sharper and rode faster through the deep sand and under the blazing mid-summer sun. At last he met Lee and the main body all in full retreat. He rode straight at Lee, savage with anger, not pleasant to look at, one may guess, and asked fiercely and with a deep oath, tradition says, what it all meant. . . . Lee gathered himself and tried to excuse and palliate what had happened, but although the brief words that followed are variously reported to us across the century, we know that Washington rebuked him in such a way, and with such passion, that all was over between them. Lee . . . went to the rear, thence to a court-martial, thence to dismissal and to a solitary life. . . . Having put Lee aside, Washington rallied the broken troops, brought them into position, turned them back, and held the enemy in check. It was not



an easy feat, but it was done, and when Lee's division again fell back in good order the main army was in position, and the action became general. The British were repulsed, and then Washington, taking the offensive, drove them back until he occupied the battlefield of the morning. Night came upon him still advancing. He halted his army, lay down under a tree, his soldiers lying on their arms about him, and planned a fresh attack, to be made at daylight. But when the dawn came it was seen that the British had crept off, and were far on their road. The heat prevented a rapid pursuit, and Clinton got into New York. Between there and Philadelphia he had lost 2,000 men, Washington said, and modern authorities put it at about 1,500, of whom nearly 500 fell at Monmouth. . . . Monmouth has never been one of the famous battles of the Revolution, and yet there is no other which can compare with it as an illustration of Washington's ability as a soldier. . . . Its importance lies in the evidence which it gives of the way in which Washington, after a series of defeats, during a winter of terrible suffering and privation, had yet developed his ragged volunteers into a well-disciplined and effective army. The battle was a victory, but the existence and the quality of the army that won it were a far greater triumph. The dreary winter at Valley Forge had indeed borne fruit."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 7.

Also in: H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the Am. Rev.*, ch. 54-56.—Mrs. M. Campbell, *Life of Gen. W. Hull*, ch. 14.—*The Lee Papers*, v. 2-3 (*N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll.*, 1872-1873).

A. D. 1778 (June—November).—The war on the border.—Activity of Tories and Indians.—The Massacre at Cherry Valley.—"The Six Nations were stirred to hostility by Sir John Johnson and the Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, with Walter Butler, of infamous name. Their tory partisans were more cruel than the red men. At Cobleskill, Schoharie county, June 1, 1778, Brant won a savage triumph with a mixed force, and burned and plundered the settlement. Springfield was also destroyed, and the assailants retired. A month later the Indians were again at Cobleskill, and, burning where they went, beat off a force that attempted to check them. The valley of the Schohariekill was in the succeeding year subjected to invasions from the Senecas, and suffered severely. About Fort Stanwix the tories and red men were continually hovering, and more than once persons were pounced upon and scalped in sight of the works. In 1778, in the early autumn, German Flats was visited by Brant and his followers, and was entirely destroyed, although all the inhabitants but two were warned in season to escape with their lives. An expedition was sent after the Indians, but failed to bring the warriors to battle, and was rewarded only by laying waste the Indian villages of Unadilla and Oquaga, and capturing a large supply of cattle and provisions. At Cherry Valley a fort had been built, and the village was occupied by a band of colonial troops under Colonel Ichabod Alden. He rested in security, and the settlers were scattered in their habitations, regardless of warnings of approaching foes. Under cover of a severe storm of snow and rain, November 11, Brant and Butler, with 800 Indians and tories, swooped upon the homes, and 43 persons, including women and children,

were butchered, 40 taken prisoners, all the buildings were burned, and the domestic animals seized. So brutal was the massacre that Brant charged Butler and the tories with acting against his protests. Brant himself was content, July 19, 1779, with destroying the church, mills, houses, and barns at Minnisink, Orange county, without sacrificing lives, but turned upon a party sent in pursuit, and, after capturing a detachment, butchered the wounded, and slew 45 who tried to escape. Such deeds produced a terror in the colony. No one knew where the red men and tories would strike next. To check and counteract them, excursions were made against the tribes in their homes. One of these was led by Colonels Van Schaick and Willett from Fort Stanwix in April, 1779. Proceeding by Wood Creek and Oneida Lake, they penetrated the villages of the Onondagas, which they destroyed, and seized the provisions and even the weapons of the red men, who fled into the wilderness."—E. H. Roberts, *New York*, ch. 24 (v. 2).—The following account of the attack on Cherry Valley is from a pen friendly to Butler and from sources favorable to the Tory side: "After an exhausting march next day through a blinding snow-storm and over ground covered with deep wet snow and mud, Butler halted his men at dark in a pine wood which afforded them some shelter, six miles from Cherry Valley. He assembled the chiefs and proposed that as soon as the moon rose, they should resume their march and surround the house occupied by the officers, while he made a rush upon the fort with the rangers. They readily assented, but before the time appointed arrived it began to rain violently, and they obstinately refused to move until daybreak. It was then arranged that Capt. McDonnell with 50 picked rangers and some Indians should storm the house, while Butler with the remainder assailed the fort. Without tents, blankets or fires, they spent a sleepless night cowering beneath the pines, and were glad to move as soon as day appeared. They had approached unperceived within a mile of the fort by passing through a dense swamp, when the Indians in front fired at two men cutting wood. One fell dead; the other, though bleeding, ran for his life and the entire body of Indians set up a whoop and followed at full speed. Unhappily the rangers had just been halted to fix flints and load their rifles, and the Indians obtained a long start. The Continental officers attempted to escape to the fort but only two or three reached it. The colonel, five other officers and twenty soldiers, were killed on the way and the lieutenant-colonel, three subalterns, and ten privates were taken. The colors of the regiment were abandoned in the house and burnt in it. The garrison of the fort was fully alarmed, and opened a fierce fire of artillery and small arms. The rangers seized and burnt a detached block-house, and fired briskly at the loop-holes in the palisades for ten minutes, when Butler saw with horror and consternation that the Indians had set their officers at defiance, and dispersed in every direction to kill and plunder. Their wretched misconduct forced him to collect all the rangers into a compact body on an eminence near the principal entrance to the fort, to oppose a sally by the garrison, which then undoubtedly outnumbered them considerably. There he was obliged to remain inactive all day under a cease-

less, chilling rain, while blazing houses and shrieks of agony told their pitiful tale in the settlement below. At nightfall he marched a mile down the valley and encamped. He then struggled with indifferent success to rescue the prisoners. Those surrendered were placed next the camp fires and protected by his whole force. Next morning most of the Indians and the feeblest men among the rangers were sent away with a huge drove of captured cattle for the supply of the garrison at Niagara, and McDonnell and Brant, with 60 rangers and 50 Indians, swept the valley from end to end, ruthlessly burning every building and stack in sight, while Butler, with the remainder, again stood guard at the gate of the fort. He hoped that this appalling spectacle would provoke the garrison to sally out and fight, but the lesson of Wyoming had not been lost on them, and they continued to look on from the walls in silent fury. Another great herd of cattle was collected, and Butler leisurely began his retreat, having had only two rangers and three Indians wounded during the expedition. He did not disguise the dark side of the story in his letter to Col. Bolton of the 17th November. 'I have much to lament,' he said, 'that notwithstanding my utmost precautions to save the women and children, I could not prevent some of them falling victims to the fury of the savages. They have carried off many of the inhabitants and killed more, among them Colin Cloyd, a very violent rebel. I could not prevail on the Indians to leave the women and children behind, though the second morning Captain Johnson (to whose knowledge of the Indians and address in managing them I am much indebted) and I got them to permit twelve, who were loyalists, and whom I concealed, with the humane assistance of Mr. Joseph Brant and Captain Jacobs of Ochquaga, to return. The death of the women and children on this occasion may, I believe, be truly ascribed to the rebels having falsely accused the Indians of cruelty at Wyomen. This has much exasperated them, and they are still more incensed at finding that the colonel and those who had then laid down their arms, soon after marching into their country intending to destroy their villages, and they declared that they would be no more accused falsely of fighting the enemy twice, meaning they would in future give no quarter.'—E. Cruikshank, *The Story of Butler's Rangers*, pp. 55-56.

ALSO IN: W. W. Campbell, *Annals of Tryon County*, ch. 5.—*Centennial Celebrations of New York*, pp. 359-383.—W. L. Stone, *Life of Brant*, v. 1, ch. 17.

A. D. 1778 (July).—The war on the border.—Bloody work of the Tories and their Indian allies.—The Massacre at Wyoming.—"In 1778, according to the plan of campaign as given by Guy Johnson in his correspondence, the English forces on the western borders of New York were divided into two bodies: one, consisting of Indians under Brant, to operate in New York, while Deputy Superintendent Butler with the other should penetrate the settled district on the Susquehanna. Brant [Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief], who, according to Colonel Claus, 'had shown himself to be the most faithful and zealous subject his majesty could have in America,' did his work unsparingly, and ruin marked his track. In the valley of the upper Mo-

hawk and the Schoharie nothing but the garrison-houses escaped, and labor was only possible in the field when muskets were within easy reach. Occasionally blows were struck at the larger settlements. . . . In July, 1778, the threatened attack on Wyoming took place. This region was at that time formally incorporated as the county of Westmoreland of the colony of Connecticut. . . . In the fall of 1776, two companies, on the Continental establishment, had been raised in the valley, in pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and were shortly thereafter ordered to join General Washington. Several stockaded forts had been built during the summer at different points. The withdrawal of so large a proportion of the able-bodied men as had been enlisted in the Continental service threw upon the old men who were left behind the duty of guarding the forts. . . . In March, 1778, another military company was organized, by authority of Congress, to be employed for home defence. In May, attacks were made upon the scouting parties by Indians, who were the fore-runners of an invading army. The exposed situation of the settlement, the prosperity of the inhabitants, and the loyalty with which they had responded to the call for troops, demanded consideration from Connecticut, to whose quota the companies had been credited, and from Congress, in whose armies they had been incorporated; but no help came. On June 30th, an armed labor party of eight men, which went out from the upper fort, was attacked by Major Butler, who, with a force estimated by the American commander in his report at 800 men, Tories and Indians in equal numbers, had arrived in the valley. This estimate was not far from correct; but if we may judge from other raiding forces during the war, the proportion of whites is too large, for only a few local Tories had joined Butler. The little forts at the upper end of the valley offered no resistance to the invaders. On July 3d, there were collected at 'Forty Fort,' on the banks of the river, about three miles above Wilkesbarré, 230 Americans, organized in six companies (one of them being the company authorized by Congress for home defence), and commanded by Colonel Zebulon Butler, a resident in the valley and an officer in the Continental army. It was determined, after deliberation, to give battle. In the afternoon of that day, this body of volunteers, their number being swelled to nearly 300 by the addition of old men and boys, marched up the valley. The invaders had set fire to the forts of which they were in possession. This perplexed the Americans, as was intended, and they pressed on towards the spot selected by the English officer for giving battle. This was reached about four in the afternoon, and the attack was at once made by the Americans, who fired rapidly in platoons. The British line wavered, but a flanking fire from a body of Indians concealed in the woods settled the fate of the day against the Americans. They were thrown into confusion. No efforts of their officers could rally them while exposed to a fire which in a short time brought down every captain in the band. The Indians now cut off the retreat of the panic-stricken men, and pressed them towards the river. All who could saved their lives by flight. Of the 300 who went out that morning from Forty Fort, the names are recorded of 162 officers and men killed



in the action or in the massacre which followed. Major Butler, the British officer in command, reported the taking of 'two hundred and twenty-seven scalps' 'and only five prisoners.' Such was the exasperation of the Indians, according to him, that it was with difficulty he saved these few. He gives the English loss at two whites killed and eight Indians wounded. During the night the worst passions of the Indians seem to have been aroused in revenge for Oriskany. Incredible tales are told of the inhumanity of the Tories. These measures of vengeance fell exclusively upon those who participated in the battle, for all women and children were spared. As soon as the extent of the disaster was made known, the inhabitants of the lower part of the valley deserted their homes, and fled in the direction of the nearest settlements. Few stayed behind who had strength and opportunity to escape. In their flight many of the fugitives neglected to provide themselves with provisions, and much suffering and some loss of life ensued. The fugitives from the field of battle took refuge in the forts lower down the valley. The next day, Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the remnants of the company for home defence, consisting of only fourteen men, escaped from the valley. Colonel Denison, in charge of Forty Fort, negotiated with Major Butler the terms of capitulation which were ultimately signed. In these it was agreed that the inhabitants should occupy their farms peaceably, and their lives should be preserved 'intire and unhurt.' With the exception that Butler executed a British deserter whom he found among the prisoners, no lives were taken at that time. Shortly thereafter, the Indians began to plunder, and the English commander, to his chagrin, found himself unable to check them. Miner even goes so far as to say that he promised to pay for the property thus lost. Finding his commands disregarded, Butler mustered his forces and withdrew, without visiting the lower part of the valley. The greater part of the Indians went with him, but enough remained to continue the devastation, while a few murders committed by straggling parties of Indians ended the tragedy. The whole valley was left a scene of desolation."—A. McF. Davis, *The Indians and the Border Warfare of the Rev. (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., v. 6, ch. 8).*—"Rarely, indeed, does it happen that history is more at fault in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may be applied to nearly every writer who has attempted to narrate the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler. Ramsay, and Gordon, and Marshall—nay, the British historians themselves—have written gross exaggerations. Marshall, however, in his revised edition, has made corrections. . . . Other writers, of greater or less note, have gravely recorded the same fictions, adding, it is to be feared, enormities not even conveyed to them by tradition. The grossest of these exaggerations are contained in Thatcher's Military Journal and Drake's Book of the Indians. The account of the marching out of a large body of Americans from one of the forts, to hold a parley, by agreement, and then being drawn into an ambuscade and all put to death, is false; the account of 70 Continental soldiers being butchered, after having surrendered, is also totally untrue. No regular troops surrendered, and all escaped who survived the battle

of the 3d. . . . There is still another important correction to be made. . . . This correction regards the name and the just fame of Joseph Brant, whose character has been blackened with all the infamy, both real and imaginary, connected with this bloody expedition. Whether Captain Brant was at any time in company with this expedition is doubtful; but it is certain, in the face of every historical authority, British and American, that, so far from being engaged in the battle, he was many miles distant at the time of its occurrence. . . . It will, moreover, be seen, toward the close of the present work, that after the publication of Campbell's 'Gertrude of Wyoming,' in which poem the Mohawk chieftain was denounced as 'the Monster Brant,' his son repaired to England, and, in a correspondence with the poet, successfully vindicated his father's memory."—W. L. Stone, *Life of Joseph Brant*, v. 1, p. 339, foot-note, 338 and foot-note.—"No lives were taken by the Indians after the surrender; but numbers of women and children perished in the dismal swamp on the Pokono range of mountains, in the flight. . . . The whole number of people killed and missing was about 300. . . . The greatest barbarities of this celebrated massacre were committed by the Tories."—The same, *Poetry and Hist. of Wyoming*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. P. Miner, *Hist. of Wyoming*, Letter 17-18.—G. Peck, *Wyoming*.—J. Fiske, *The Am. Revolution*, ch. 11 (v. 2).

A. D. 1778 (July—November).—The French fleet and army and their undertakings.—Ill fortune and ill-feeling between the new allies.—The failure at Newport.—"The first minister of France to the United States, M. Gérard, came accompanied by a fleet and army, under D'Estaing, (July.) 'Unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances,' as Washington wrote, 'lessened the importance of the French services in a great degree.' In the first place, the arrival was just late enough to miss the opportunity of surprising the British fleet in the Delaware, not to mention the British army on its retreat to New York. In the next place, the French vessels proved to be of too great draught to penetrate the channel and coöperate in an attack upon New York. Thus disappointing and disappointed, D'Estaing engaged in an enterprise against Newport, still in British hands. It proved another failure. But not through the French alone; the American troops that were to enter the island at the north being greatly behindhand. The same day that they took their place, under Sullivan, Greene, and Lafayette, the French left theirs at the lower end of the island, in order to meet the British fleet arriving from New York, (August 10.) A severe storm prevented more than a partial engagement; but D'Estaing returned to Newport only to plead the injuries received in the gale as compelling his retirement to Boston for repairs. The orders of the French government had been peremptory, that in case of any damage to the fleet it should put into port at once. So far was D'Estaing from avoiding action on personal grounds, that when Lafayette hurried to Boston to persuade his countrymen to return, the commander offered to serve as a volunteer until the fleet should be refitted. The Americans, however, talked of desertion and of inefficiency,—so freely, indeed, as to affront their faithful Lafayette. At the

same time, large numbers of them imitated the very course which they censured, by deserting their own army. The remaining forces retreated from their lines to the northern end of the island, and, after an engagement, withdrew to the mainland, (August 30.) It required all the good offices of Lafayette, of Washington, and of Congress, to keep the peace between the Americans and their allies. D'Estaing, soothed by the language of those whom he most respected, was provoked, on the other hand, by the hostility of the masses, both in the army and amongst the people. Collisions between his men and the Bostonians kept up his disgust; and, when his fleet was repaired, he sailed for the West Indies, (November.) . . . On the part of the British, there was nothing attempted that would not have been far better unattempted. Marauding parties from Newport went against New Bedford and Fairhaven. Others from New York went against Little Egg Harbor. Tories and Indians — 'a collection of banditti,' as they were rightly styled by Washington, descended from the northern country to wreak massacre at Wyoming and at Cherry Valley. The war seemed to be assuming a new character: it was one of ravages unworthy of any cause, and most unworthy of such a cause as the British professed to be. Affairs were at a low state amongst the Americans."—S. Eliot, *Hist. of the U. S.*, pt. 3, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: S. G. Arnold, *Hist. of R. I.*, ch. 21-22 (v. 2).—O. W. B. Peabody, *Life of Gen. John Sullivan* (Library of Am. Biog., series 2, v. 3).—J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 9.

**A. D. 1778 (December).—Anxieties of Washington.—His opinion of Congress.—The serious defects and errors of that body.**—"Much of the winter was passed by Washington in Philadelphia, occupied in devising and discussing plans for the campaign of 1779. It was an anxious moment with him. Circumstances which inspired others with confidence, filled him with solicitude. The alliance with France had produced a baneful feeling of security, which, it appeared to him, was paralyzing the energies of the country. England, it was thought, would now be too much occupied in securing her position in Europe, to increase her force or extend her operations in America. Many, therefore, considered the war as virtually at an end; and were unwilling to make the sacrifices, or supply the means necessary for important military undertakings. Dissensions, too, and party feuds were breaking out in Congress, owing to that relaxation of that external pressure of a common and imminent danger, which had heretofore produced a unity of sentiment and action. That august body had, in fact, greatly deteriorated since the commencement of the war. Many of those whose names had been as watchwords at the Declaration of Independence had withdrawn from the national councils; occupied either by their individual affairs, or by the affairs of their individual States. Washington, whose comprehensive patriotism embraced the whole Union, deprecated and deplored the dawning of this sectional spirit."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 38.—The following, from a letter written by Washington in December, 1778, to Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, intimates the grave anxieties which filled his mind, and the opinion of Congress with which he had returned from a visit

to Philadelphia: "It appears as clear to me as ever the Sun did in its meridian brightness, that America never stood in more eminent need of the wise, patriotic, and spirited exertions of her Sons than at this period; and if it is not a sufficient cause for genl. lamentation, my misconception of the matter impresses it too strongly upon me, that the States, separately, are too much engaged in their local concerns, and have too many of their ablest men withdrawn from the general council, for the good of the common weal. . . . As there can be no harm in a pious wish for the good of one's Country, I shall offer it as mine, that each State wd. not only choose, but absolutely compel their ablest men to attend Congress; and that they would instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the causes, that have produced so many disagreeable effects in the army and Country; in a word, that public abuses should be corrected & an entire reformation worked. Without these, it does not in my Judgment require the spirit of divination to foretell the consequences of the present administration; nor to how little purpose the States individually are framing constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is mismanaged, must sink in the general wreck, and will carry with it the remorse of thinking, that we are lost by our own folly and negligence, or the desire perhaps of living in ease and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so great a revolution, in the effecting of which the greatest abilities, and the honestest men our (i. e. the American) world affords, ought to be employed. It is much to be feared, my dear Sir, that the States, in their separate capacities, have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Removed (some of them) far distant from the scene of action, and seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their wishes, they conceive that the contest is at an end, and that to regulate the government and police of their own State is all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished, that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a thunder-clap, that is little expected. I do not mean to designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections upon any one. The Public believe (and, if they do believe it, the fact might almost as well be so), that the States at this time are badly represented, and that the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through the discord & party views of some individuals. . . . P. S. Phila: 30th. This letter was to have gone by Post from Middlebrook but missed that conveyance, since which I have come to this place at the request of Congress whence I shall soon return. I have seen nothing since I came here (on the 22d Inst.) to change my opinion of Men or Measures., but abundant reason to be convinced that our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition than they have been in since the commencement of the War.—By a faithful laborer then in the cause.—By a man who is daily injuring his private Estate without even the smallest earthly advantage not common to all in case of a favorable Issue to the dispute.—By one who wishes the prosperity of America most devoutly and sees or thinks he sees it, on the brink of ruin, you are beseeched most earnestly, my dear Colo.



Harrison, to exert yourself in endeavoring to rescue your Country by (let me add) sending your ablest and best Men to Congress—these characters must not slumber nor sleep at home in such times of pressing danger—they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of places of honor or profit in their own Country while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin in which theirs also must ultimately be involved. If I was to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of Men, from what I have seen, and heard, and in part know, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation & extravagance seems to have laid fast hold of most of them.—That speculation—peculation—and an insatiable thirst for riches seems to have got the better of every other consideration and almost of every order of Men.—That party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day whilst the momentous concerns of an empire—a great and accumulated debt—ruined finances—depreciated money—and want of credit (which in their consequences is the want of everything) are but secondary considerations and postponed from day to day—from week to week as if our affairs wear the most promising aspect—after drawing this picture, which from my Soul I believe to be a true one, I need not repeat to you that I am alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused.—I have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at any particular characters,—this I can declare upon my honor for I have every attention paid me by Congress that I can possibly expect and have reason to think that I stand well in their estimation, but in the present situation of things I cannot help asking—Where is Mason—Wythe—Jefferson—Nicholas—Pendleton—Nelson—and another I could name—and why, if you are sufficiently impressed with your danger do you not (as New Yk. has done in the case of Mr. Jay) send an extra member or two for at least a certain limited time till the great business of the Nation is put upon a more respectable and happy establishment.—Your Money is now sinking 5 pr. ct. a day in this city; and I shall not be surprised if in the course of a few months a total stop is put to the currency of it.—And yet an Assembly—a concert—a Dinner—or supper (that will cost three or four hundred pounds) will not only take Men off from acting in but even from thinking of this business while a great part of the Officers of ye Army from absolute necessity are quitting the service and ye more virtuous few rather than do this are sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want.—I again repeat to you that this is not an exaggerated acct.; that it is an alarming one I do not deny, and confess to you that I feel more real distress on acct. of the prest. appearances of things than I have done at any one time since the commencement of the dispute—but it is time to bid you once more adieu.—Providence has heretofore taken me up when all other means and hope seemed to be departing from me in this.”—George Washington, *Writings*, ed. by W. C. Ford, v. 7, pp. 297-303.—“The first Continental Congress enjoyed and deserved in a remarkable degree the respect and confidence of the country. The second Congress was composed of eminent men, and succeeded, for a time, to the honors and reputation of the first. But when it attempted to pass from dis-

cussion to organization, and to direct as well as to frame the machinery of administration, its delays and disputes and errors and contradictions and hesitations excited a well-founded distrust of its executive skill. Conscious of this distrust, it became jealous of its authority; and instead of endeavoring to regain, by correcting its errors, the ground which it had lost by committing them, it grew suspicious and exacting in proportion to the decay of its strength. And while this critical change in its relations to the country was taking place, important changes took place also in the materials of which it was composed,—some of its wisest members being removed by death, or imperative calls to other fields of duty, or by failing of re-election at the regular expiration of their terms of office. Among the first elements with which it was brought into collision were the newly organized governments of the States. The question of State rights, that unsolved problem of our history, begins almost with the beginning of the war. How abundant and active the materials of disunion were, and how difficult it was even for leading men to rise above them might be proved by numerous passages in the letters of Washington and Greene, if it were not still more evident from the conduct of the local legislatures. How far this spirit might have been counteracted or controlled if the policy of the Congress had been that policy of prompt decision and energetic action which, commanding respect at all times, commands in times of general danger general and implicit obedience, it is impossible to say. . . . Another element with which it was brought into immediate and constant relations was the army; and, unfortunately for both, these relations, from their very nature, brought into immediate and constant contrast the elements of opposition which they both contained, rather than the elements of harmonious action, which they also contained in an almost equal degree. If the Congress was composed of the representatives of the people, the army was composed in a large proportion of the constituents of the Congress. More than once also, during the course of the war, men who had done good work for their country as soldiers, withdrawing from their original field of action, did equally good service for her as statesmen. And more than once, too, men who had proved themselves wise and eloquent in counsel were found at the head of a regiment, or even in more subordinate positions in the army. . . . The real interest and the real object of the citizen in arms and of the citizen in the toga were still the same. But their point of view was different. The ever-present object of Congress was discussion as a means of organization. The ever-present object of the leaders of the army was decision as a means of action. Congress counted obstacles, weighed difficulties, balanced opposing advantages, eating and sleeping meanwhile and refreshing mind and body as nature bade. But while Congress was deliberating upon the best way of procuring meat, the army was often brought to the verge of starvation for the want of it. While Congress was discussing by a warm fire the most eligible method of providing the army with tents and blankets, half the army was sleeping on the snow without either blanket or tent. While Congress was framing elaborate resolutions, and drawing out and equipping regiments upon paper, officers

in the field were standing disheartened before their thinned and disheartened ranks. . . . Errors of statesmanship, like errors of generalship, would easily have been forgiven and forgotten; for both statesmen and generals had still much to learn. Unfortunately, while the best generals strove earnestly to correct their errors by their experience, Congress, in too many things, clung obstinately to its errors, in spite of the most decisive experience. Those errors were twofold,—errors of policy and errors of principle,—the one tending to undermine the respect which, in the beginning, was felt for their wisdom; the other, to awaken a general distrust of their justice. The first year of the war demonstrated the danger of short enlistments and temporary levies. But more than half the second year was allowed to pass before it was decided to raise an army for the whole duration of the war. The first campaign demonstrated the necessity of providing by regularly organized departments for the food, clothing, and transportation of the army; but it was not till late in the second year that a board of war was organized; and not till later still that the Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General were allowed to devote themselves to their duty in camp, instead of waiting idly for orders at the door of Congress. All experience and the simplest reasoning showed the importance of strengthening the hands of their General by passing promptly all the acts needed for the conduct of an army in the field, or the support and instruction of an army in quarters; but, in spite of all experience and the plainest reason, Congress persisted in its unseasonable delays. . . . The policy of the Congress, in the organization and support of the army, was a policy of tergiversation and delay. No wonder that the army, leaders and all, should early lose their confidence in its wisdom! But the dissatisfaction did not end here. One of the earliest felt of the numerous wants of the army was the want of good officers. . . . To select them in the beginning from the mass of unproved candidates was impossible; but in the course of two campaigns, the characters and pretensions of men were well tried, the chaff thoroughly sifted, and what remained might be confidently accepted as sound. . . . It was evidently the policy of Congress to secure by all proper and reasonable inducements the services of such officers for the war. It was the duty of Congress, in its dealings with them, to remember that in becoming soldiers, and exposing themselves to the dangers and privations of a soldier's life, they adopted, with the ideas of subordination that lie at the basis of military discipline, the ideas of rank and grade which define and circumscribe that subordination. But Congress remembered nothing of this. It required of them the service of officers, but gave them a pay hardly sufficient to enable them to live like private soldiers. It demanded the present sacrifice of cold, hunger, hard service, and exposure to sickness, wounds, and death; and refused the prospective reward of half-pay or pension when sickness or wounds should have incapacitated them for further exertion, or death should have made their wives unprotected widows, and their children helpless orphans. Forgetting that pride is an essential element of the military character, and that self-respect is essential to a healthy and sustaining pride, it trifled with their claims to rank by the

accepted rules of service, and claimed and exercised the power of dealing with commissions according to its own good pleasure.”—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, bk. 2, ch. 18 (v. 1).

**A. D. 1778-1779.—Clark's conquest of the Northwest for Virginia, and its annexation to the district of Kentucky.**—“Virginia . . . had more western enterprise than any other colony. In 1774 Dunmore's war gave her the ‘backlands,’ into which her frontiersmen had been for some time pressing. Boone was a Carolinian, but Kentucky was a distinctively Virginia colony. In 1776 the Virginia legislature erected the County of Kentucky, and the next year a Virginia judge dispensed justice at Harrodsburg. Soon the colony was represented in the legislature of the parent state. While thus extending her jurisdiction over the region southwest of the Ohio, the Old Dominion did not forget the language of [her charter] of 1609, ‘up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest.’ George Rogers Clark, a Virginian who had made Kentucky his home, was endowed with something of the general's and statesman's grasp. While floating down the Ohio in 1776, being then 24 years of age, he conceived the conquest of the country beyond the river. . . . Clark says he had since the beginning of the war taken pains to make himself acquainted with the true situation of the Northwestern posts; and in 1777 he sent two young hunters to spy out the country more thoroughly, and especially to ascertain the sentiments of the ‘habitants.’ On the return of these hunters with an encouraging report, he went to Williamsburg, then the capital of Virginia, where he enlisted Governor Patrick Henry and other leading minds in a secret expedition to the Illinois. Acting under a vaguely worded law, authorizing him to aid ‘any expedition against their Western enemies,’ Governor Henry gave Clark some vague public instructions, directing him to enlist, in any county of the commonwealth, seven companies of men who should act under his command as a militia, and also private instructions that were much more full and definite. . . . Both the public and private instructions are dated January 2, 1778. The governor also gave the young captain a small supply of money. Clark immediately re-crossed the mountains and began to recruit his command. . . . Overcoming as best he could the difficulties that environed him, he collected his feeble command at the Falls of the Ohio. On June 26, 1778, he began the descent of the river. Leaving the Ohio at Fort Massac, forty miles above its mouth, he began the march to Kaskaskia. This fell into his hands, July 5th, and Cahokia soon after, both without the loss of a single life. Clark found few Englishmen in these villages, and the French, who were weary of British rule, he had little difficulty in attaching to the American interest. Vincennes, soon after, surrendered to a mere proclamation, when there was not an American soldier within one hundred miles of the place. . . . Clark prevailed upon 100 men to re-enlist for eight months; he then filled up his companies with recruits from the villages, and sent an urgent call to Virginia for re-enforcements. The salutary influence of the invasion upon the Indians was felt at once; it ‘began to spread among the nations even to the border of



the lakes;' and in five weeks Clark settled a peace with ten or twelve different tribes. . . . And now Clark began really to feel the difficulties of his situation. Destitute of money, poorly supplied, commanding a small and widely scattered force, he had to meet and circumvent an active enemy who was determined to regain what he had lost. Governor Hamilton [the British governor at Detroit] projected a grand campaign against the French towns that had been captured and the small force that held them. The feeble issue was the capture, in December, 1778, of Vincennes, which was occupied by but two Americans. Clark, who was in the Illinois at the time of this disaster, at once put his little force in motion for the Wabash, knowing, he says, that if he did not take Hamilton, Hamilton would take him; and, February 25, 1779, at the end of a march of 250 miles, that ranks in peril and hardship with Arnold's winter march to Canada, he again captured the town, the fort, the governor, and his whole command. Hamilton was sent to Virginia a prisoner of war, where he was found guilty of treating American prisoners with cruelty, and of offering the Indians premiums for scalps, but none for prisoners." Clark was ambitious to extend his march to Detroit, but could not compass the necessary means. "'Detroit lost for a few hundred men,' was his pathetic lament as he surrendered an enterprise that lay near his heart. Had he been able to achieve it, he would have won and held the whole Northwest. As it was he won and held the Illinois and the Wabash in the name of Virginia and of the United States. The bearing of this conquest on the question of western boundaries will be considered in another place, but here it is pertinent to remark that the American Commissioners, in 1782, at Paris, could plead 'uti possidetis' in reference to much of the country beyond the Ohio, for the flag of the Republic, raised over it by George Rogers Clark, had never been lowered. It would not be easy to find in our history a case of an officer accomplishing results that were so great and far-reaching with so small a force. Clark's later life is little to his credit, but it should not be forgotten that he rendered the American cause and civilization a very great service. All this time the British were not idle. War-party after war-party was sent against the American border. In 1780 a grand expedition was organized at Detroit and sent to Kentucky under the command of Captain Bird. But it accomplished nothing commensurate with its magnitude and cost. . . . The Northwest had been won by a Virginia army, commanded by a Virginia officer, put in the field at Virginia's expense. Governor Henry had promptly announced the conquest to the Virginia delegates in Congress. . . . But before Patrick Henry wrote this letter, Virginia had welded the last link in her chain of title to the country beyond the Ohio. In October, 1778, her Legislature declared: 'All the citizens of the commonwealth of Virginia, who are actually settlers there, or who shall hereafter be settled, on the west side of the Ohio, shall be included in the district of Kentucky which shall be called Illinois County.' Nor was this all. Soon after, Governor Henry appointed a lieutenant-commandant for the new county, with full instructions for carrying on the government. The French settlements remained under Vir-

ginia jurisdiction until March, 1784."—B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest*, ch. 9.

ALSO IN: *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois (Ohio Valley Hist. Series, 3)*.—J. H. Perkins, *Annals of the West*, ch. 7.—A. Davidson and B. Stuvé, *Hist. of Illinois*, ch. 16-18.—T. Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, v. 2, ch. 2-3.

A. D. 1778-1779.—*The French Alliance.—Peril of France.—Doubtful feeling in America.—Spanish mediation with England.*—"From the third volume of Doniol's comprehensive work on the 'Participation de la France à l'établissement des États Unis,' published in 1888, we are able to learn for the first time the extreme peril of France in 1778-'79. When Vergennes advised the recognition of the independence of the United States, it was on the same grounds that Canning advised the recognition of the independence of the Spanish South American States many years afterwards. The fair distribution of power in the civilized world, which was threatened in the latter period by the Holy Alliance, was threatened in the former period by the assumption of maritime supremacy by Britain. In each the object was to call up a new sovereignty in America, so as to check an undue concentration of sovereignty in Europe. Undoubtedly Vergennes was aided, as Canning was aided, by the enthusiasm felt by men of liberal views for a revolution that was expected to extend the domain of liberalism; but with Vergennes, as with Canning, the object was the establishing of a power abroad which could resist a dangerous aggression at home. When in February, 1778, France acknowledged the independence of the United States, Vergennes had good reason to hold either that Britain would not resent the insult by war, or that she would find that in such a war the odds were against her. A British army had just capitulated at Saratoga. America, so it was reported to Vergennes and so he believed, was unanimous in determining to defend her liberties to the last. In Holland there was a strong party which was expected to force the States-General into a recognition of their sister republic. Spain had already secretly advanced a million of francs to the American commissioners. From Frederick the Great, delighted to see his British relatives, who had not always supported him in his troubles, annoyed by a revolt in their own domain, came words very encouraging to the American envoys. Catharine II listened with apparent satisfaction to a scheme which would relieve her infant shipping from British oppression. It looked as if, should Britain declare war against France, she would have against her the armies and navies of all continental Europe, aided by the people of her American Colonies in a compact mass. But in a few months there came a great change. The British army under Howe was so largely re-enforced as for the immediate present to give it a great superiority over any army Congress could bring against it in open field. . . . It is true that the news in April of the French treaty revived the energies of the revolutionists; but this treaty had its drawbacks, as the old dislike of France, in part inherited from England, in part the product of the Seven-years war, intensified the yearning for the mother country which in many hearts still remained. French officers complained that on their first arrival in New England they were received with sullen aversion

by the people, though welcomed by the revolutionary leaders. The French army and navy, for the first year in which they were engaged in America, did no good to the American cause; and so great was the popular irritation at their inactivity, so strong, it was said, continued to be the old race attachment to England, that intelligent French observers in America advised Vergennes that he must move warily, for at any moment America might make a separate peace with Britain and then join the British forces against France. No doubt these reports, so far as they pronounced this to be the drift of a large minority in Congress, were unfounded in fact. They were nevertheless communicated under high sanction to Vergennes, and produced in his mind the liveliest anxiety. . . . English influence had for a time regained its ascendancy in Holland. Prussia and Russia, having tasted the delights of neutral commerce, let it be plainly understood that they would not abandon a neutrality so profitable for the risks of belligerency. And Spain had taken alarm and was backing out not merely from the family compact, but from her recent promise to aid the insurgents. Aiding the insurgents, her minister declared, would be cutting her own throat, and no aid to the insurgents should be given except on a very heavy equivalent. If France was to meet the shock of the British navy alone she might be swept from the seas, and, aside from this danger, her finances were in such a ruinous condition that her bankruptcy was imminent. One of two courses must be adopted, not only to save France but to save the independence of the United States and the consequent equipoise of power for which France has gone to war. There must be either a general peace, which would include the independence of the United States, or there must be war, with Spain joining the allies. . . . It was in this condition of affairs that the position of Spain in 1778-'79 became of commanding importance. She offered herself as mediator between the allies and their common enemy, and through her the terms of pacification were discussed. In the negotiations, protracted and on both sides largely insincere, between Spain and Britain relative to the proposed pacification, the winter of 1778-'79 was consumed."—F. Wharton, *Introd. to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S.*, ch. 5, sect. 86 (v. 1).

**A. D. 1778-1779.—The War carried into the South.**—Savannah taken and Georgia subdued.—Towards the end of November, 1778, a "body of troops, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, sailed [from New York] for Georgia in the squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker; the British cabinet having determined to carry the war into the Southern States. At the same time General Prevost, who commanded in Florida, was ordered by Sir Henry Clinton to march to the banks of the Savannah River, and attack Georgia in flank, while the expedition under Campbell should attack it in front on the seaboard. . . . The squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker anchored in the Savannah River towards the end of December. An American force of about 600 regulars, and a few militia under General Robert Howe, were encamped near the town, being the remnant of an army with which that officer had invaded Florida, in the preceding summer, but had been obliged to evacuate it by a mortal malady which desolated

his camp. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell landed his troops on the 29th of December, about three miles below the town. The whole country bordering the river is a deep morass, cut up by creeks, and only to be traversed by causeways. Over one of these, 600 yards in length, with a ditch on each side, Colonel Campbell advanced, putting to flight a small party stationed to guard it. General Howe had posted his little army on the main road, with the river on his left and a morass in front. A negro gave Campbell information of a path leading through the morass, by which troops might get unobserved to the rear of the Americans. Sir James Baird was detached with the light infantry by this path, while Colonel Campbell advanced in front. The Americans, thus suddenly attacked in front and rear, were completely routed; upwards of 100 were either killed on the spot, or perished in the morass; 38 officers and 415 privates were taken prisoners, the rest retreated up the Savannah River and crossed into South Carolina. Savannah, the capital of Georgia, was taken possession of by the victors, with cannon, military stores and provisions; their loss was only seven killed and nineteen wounded. Colonel Campbell conducted himself with great moderation; protecting the persons and property of the inhabitants, and proclaiming security and favor to all that should return to their allegiance. Numbers in consequence flocked to the British standard: the lower part of Georgia was considered as subdued, and posts were established by the British to maintain possession. While Colonel Campbell had thus invaded Georgia in front, General Prevost entered the State from Florida, "took Sunbury, the only remaining fort of importance, and marched to Savannah, where he assumed the general command, detaching Colonel Campbell against Augusta. By the middle of January (1779) all Georgia was reduced to submission. A more experienced American general than Howe had by this time arrived to take command of the Southern Department, Major-general Lincoln, who had gained such reputation in the campaign against Burgoyne, and whose appointment to this station had been solicited by the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia. He had received his orders from Washington in the beginning of October."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 37.

ALSO IN: W. B. Stevens, *Hist. of Georgia*, bk. 4, ch. 4 (v. 2).

**A. D. 1778-1779.—Washington guarding the Hudson.—The storming of Stony Point.—Marauding warfare of the British.**—"After Clinton slipped away from Monmouth and sought refuge in New York, Washington took post at convenient points and watched the movements of the enemy. In this way the summer passed. As always, Washington's first object was to guard the Hudson, and while he held this vital point firmly, he waited, ready to strike elsewhere if necessary. It looked for a time as if the British intended to descend on Boston, seize the town, and destroy the French fleet, which had gone there to refit. Such was the opinion of Gates, then commanding in that department, and as Washington inclined to the same belief, the fear of this event gave him many anxious moments. He even moved his troops so as to be in readiness to march eastward at short notice; but he gradually became convinced that the



enemy had no such plan. . . . The main army, therefore, remained quiet, and when the autumn had passed went into winter-quarters in well-posted detachments about New York. In December Clinton made an ineffectual raid [in New Jersey], and then all was peaceful again, and Washington was able to go to Philadelphia and struggle with Congress, leaving his army more comfortable and secure than they had been in any previous winter. . . . He now hoped and believed that the moment would come when, by uniting his army with the French, he should be able to strike the decisive blow. Until that time came, however, he knew that he could do nothing on a great scale, and he felt that meantime the British, abandoning practically the eastern and middle States, would make one last desperate struggle for victory, and would make it in the south. Long before any one else, he appreciated this fact, and saw a peril looming large in that region. . . . All this, however, did not change his own plans one jot. He believed that the south must work out its own salvation, as New York and New England had done with Burgoyne, and he felt sure that in the end it would be successful. But he would not go south, nor take his army there. . . . The British might overrun the north or invade the south, but he would stay where he was, with his grip upon New York and the Hudson River. The tide of invasion might ebb and flow in this region or that, but the British were doomed if they could not divide the eastern colonies from the others. When the appointed hour came, he was ready to abandon everything and strike the final and fatal blow; but until then he waited and stood fast with his army, holding the great river in his grasp. He felt much more anxiety about the south than he had felt about the north, and expected Congress to consult him as to a commander, having made up his mind that Greene was the man to send. But Congress still believed in Gates, who had been making trouble for Washington all winter; and so Gates was sent, and Congress in due time got their lesson, and found once more that Washington understood men better than they did. In the north the winter was comparatively uneventful. The spring passed, and in June Clinton came out and took possession of Stony Point and Verplanck's Point, and began to fortify them. It looked a little as if Clinton might intend to get control of the Hudson by slow approaches, fortifying, and then advancing until he reached West Point. With this in mind, Washington at once determined to check the British by striking sharply at one of their new posts. Having made up his mind, he sent for Wayne and asked him if he would storm Stony Point. Tradition says that Wayne replied, 'I will storm hell, if you will plan it.' A true tradition, probably, in keeping with Wayne's character, and pleasant to us to-day as showing with a vivid gleam of rough human speech the utter confidence of the army in their leader, that confidence which only a great soldier can inspire. So Washington planned, and Wayne stormed [July 15, 1779], and Stony Point fell. It was a gallant and brilliant feat of arms, one of the most brilliant of the war. Over 500 prisoners were taken, the guns were carried off, and the works destroyed, leaving the British to begin afresh with a good deal of increased caution and respect. Not long

after, Harry Lee stormed Paulus Hook with equal success, and the British were checked and arrested, if they intended any extensive movement. On the frontier, Sullivan, after some delays, did his work effectively. . . . In these various ways Clinton's circle of activity was steadily narrowed, but it may be doubted whether he had any coherent plan. The principal occupation of the British was to send out marauding expeditions and cut off outlying parties. Tryon burned and pillaged in Connecticut [at New Haven, Fairfield and Norwalk], Matthews in Virginia [at Norfolk, Portsmouth and elsewhere], and others on a smaller scale elsewhere in New Jersey and New York. . . . It was enough for Washington to hold fast to the great objects he had in view, to check Clinton and circumscribe his movements. Steadfastly he did this through the summer and winter of 1779."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 38-40, and v. 4, ch. 1.—B. J. Lossing, *Field-book of the Rev.*, v. 1, ch. 31.—J. Armstrong, *Life of Anthony Wayne* (*Library of Am. Biog.*, v. 4).—C. J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne*, ch. 5.—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nath'l Greene*, bk. 3, ch. 3-7 (v. 2).—See, also, WEST POINT.

A. D. 1779 (August-September).—General Sullivan's expedition against the Senecas.—For the purpose of putting an end to the destructive and bloody incursions of Tories and Indians from western New York, directed against the border settlements of that state and Pennsylvania—as at Cherry Valley and Wyoming—General Washington, in the early part of the year 1779, determined upon a measure for carrying the war into the home of the invaders. "The command was entrusted to Gen. Sullivan. The army organized for the expedition was in three divisions. That part of it under the immediate command of Gen. Sullivan, coming from Pennsylvania, ascended the Susquehannah to Tioga Point. Another division under the command of Gen. James Clinton, constructing bateaux at Schenectady, ascended the Mohawk and rendezvoused at Canajoharie, opened a road to the head of Otsego Lake, and from thence proceeded in a formidable fleet of over 200 bateaux, to Tioga Point, forming a junction with the force under Gen. Sullivan, on the 22d of August. Previous to the arrival of Gen. Clinton, Sullivan had sent forward a detachment which fell in with a scouting party of Indians, and a skirmish ensued. The combined forces amounted to 5,000 men. The expedition had been so long preparing, and upon the march, that the enemy were well apprized of all that was going on. Their plan of defence contemplated a decisive engagement upon the Chemung river. For this purpose the Rangers and regular British troops, under the command of Col. John Butler, Cols. Guy and Sir John Johnson, Major Walter N. Butler and Capt. McDonald, and the Indians under Brant, had concentrated their forces upon a bend of the river, near the present village of Elmira [then called Newtown], where they had thrown up a long breast work of logs. The united forces of the British allies, as computed by Gen. Sullivan, was about 1,500. Having ascertained their position, Gen. Sullivan marched in full force and attacked them in the forenoon of the 29th of August. . . . The battle had been

waged about two hours, when the British and Indians perceiving their forces inadequate, and that a maneuver to surround them was likely to be successful, broke and fled in great disorder. 'This,' says John Salmon, of Livingston county, who belonged to the expedition and gave an account of it to the author of the *Life of Mary Jemison*, 'was the only regular stand made by the Indians. In their retreat they were pursued by our men to the Narrows, where they were attacked and killed in great numbers, so that the sides of the rocks next the River looked as if blood had been poured on them by pailfuls.' The details of all that transpired in this campaign are before the public in so many forms, that their repetition here is unnecessary. The route of the army was via 'French Catherine's Town,' head of Seneca Lake, down the east shore of the Lake to the Indian village of Kanadesaga (Old Castle), and from thence to Canandaigua, Honeoye, head of Conesus Lake, to Groveland. The villages destroyed (with the apple trees and growing crops of the Indians,) were at Catherinestown, Kendal, or 'Apple Town' on the east side of the Lake, eleven miles from its foot, Kanadesaga, Honeoye, Conesus, Canascraga, Little Beard's Town, Big Tree, Canawagus, and on the return of the army, Scawayce, a village between the Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, and several other Cayuga villages. . . . The march of Sullivan, the devastations committed by his army, would at this distant period seem like Vandalism, in the absence of the consideration that he was acting under strict orders; and that those orders were approved, if not dictated, by Washington. The campaign was a matter of necessity; to be effectual, it was not only necessary that its acts should be retaliatory and retributive, but that the haunts, the retreats, of a foe so ruthless, must be broken up. The object was to destroy all the means of subsistence of the Senecas, desolate their homes, prevent their return to them, and if possible, induce their permanent retreat beyond the Niagara River. The imprudence, the want of sagacity, which Col. Stone has imputed to Gen. Sullivan in alarming every village he approached by the sound of his cannon, the author conceives a misapprehension of his motives. Stealthy, quiet approaches, would have found as victims, in every village, the old men, the women and children—the warriors away, banded with their British allies. Humanity dictated the forewarning, that those he did not come to war against could have time to flee. . . . The march of Gen. Sullivan, after leaving the Chemung, was bloodless, except in a small degree—just as it should have been, if he could not make victims of those he was sent to punish. The third expedition of this campaign, which has generally been lost sight of by historians, was that of Gen. Broadhead. He left Fort Pitt in August with 600 men, and destroyed several Mingo and Muncie tribes living on the Allegany, French Creek, and other tributaries of the Ohio. The heavy artillery that Gen. Sullivan brought as far as Newton, would indicate that Niagara was originally the destination. There the General and his officers, seeing how long it had taken to reach that point, in all probability determined that too much of the season had been wasted, to allow of executing their tasks in the Indian country, making their roads and moving the army and

all its appointments to Niagara before the setting in of winter. Besides, before the army had reached the valley of the Chemung, the fact was ascertained that there would be a failure in a contemplated junction with the army under Gen. Broadhead. After the expedition of Gen. Sullivan, the Indians never had any considerable permanent re-occupancy of their villages east of the Genesee river. They settled down after a brief flight, in their villages on the west side of the river in the neighborhood of Genesee, Mt. Morris and Avon, and at Gardeau, Canadea, Tonawanda, Tuscarora, Buffalo Creek, Cattaraugus and Allegany."—O. Turner, *Hist. of the Pioneer Settlement of Phelps and Gorham's Purchase*, pt. 1, ch. 4.—"In his general orders of the 17th of October, General Washington announced to the army the result of the expedition, as follows: 'The Commander-in-chief has now the pleasure of congratulating the army on the complete and full success of Maj. Gen. Sullivan, and the troops under his command, against the Seneca and other tribes of the Six Nations, as a just and necessary punishment for their wanton depredations, their unparalleled and innumerable cruelties, their deafness to all remonstrances and entreaty, and their perseverance in the most horrid acts of barbarity. Forty of their towns have been reduced to ashes, some of them large and commodious; that of the Genesee alone containing one hundred and twenty-eight houses. Their crops of corn have been entirely destroyed, which, by estimation, it is said, would have provided 160,000 bushels, besides large quantities of vegetables of various kinds. Their whole country has been overrun and laid waste, and they themselves compelled to place their security in a precipitate flight to the British fortress at Niagara. And the whole of this has been done with the loss of less than forty men on our part, including the killed, wounded, captured, and those who died natural deaths. The troops employed in this expedition, both officers and men, throughout the whole of it, and in the action they had with the enemy, manifested a patience, perseverance and valor that do them the highest honor. In the course of it, when there still remained a large extent of the enemy's country to be prostrated, it became necessary to lessen the issues of provisions to half the usual allowance. In this the troops acquiesced with a most general and cheerful concurrence, being fully determined to surmount every obstacle, and to prosecute the enterprise to a complete and successful issue. Maj. Gen. Sullivan, for his great perseverance and activity, for his order of march and attack, and the whole of his dispositions; the Brigadiers and officers of all ranks, and the whole of the soldiers engaged in the expedition, merit and have the Commander-in-chief's warmest acknowledgements for their important services upon this occasion.' On the 9th of November, 1779, General Sullivan wrote to the President of Congress: 'It is with the deepest regret I find myself compelled to request from Congress liberty to retire from the army. My health is so much impaired by a violent bilious disorder, which seized me in the commencement and continued during the whole of the western expedition, that I have not the smallest hope of a perfect recovery.' . . . General Sullivan, in transmitting to Congress an official account of his operations, reported that . . . 'Every creek and



river has been traced, and the whole country explored in search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that, except one town situated near the Alleghany, about fifty-eight miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the country of the Five Nations. . . . I flatter myself that the orders with which I was entrusted are fully executed, as we have not left a single settlement or field of corn in the country of the Five Nations, or is there even the appearance of an Indian on this side of Niagara. Messengers and small parties have been constantly passing, and some imprudent soldiers who straggled from the army mistook the route and went back almost to Chinesee without discovering even the track of an Indian.' Sullivan was mistaken in regard to the destruction of all the Indian towns as there were several small villages undiscovered by his troops. The principal villages, however, and probably nine-tenths of the growing crops, upon which the Indians had depended for sustenance during the following winter, were effectually destroyed. . . . While Sullivan fully accomplished the task given him to perform, the results expected were not fully realized. The power of the savages had been weakened, but they were not entirely subdued until years afterward, when 'Mad Anthony Wayne' defeated the confederated bands of the Indians of the west, in 1794, a measure which thoroughly humbled the Indians of Western New York, and gave to the settlers peace and security. Sullivan's expedition was fruitful of great results in other ways, however, than the temporary subjugation of the Indians. The fertile and beautiful country now forming the western part of the State of New York, was then an unknown wilderness, and its value and attractiveness were first made known to the white people through this expedition. . . . Soon after the close of the war the tide of emigration commenced to flow westward. From the New England States, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, came hardy pioneers, led on by the glowing accounts they had heard of the new country, and the vicinity of the inland lakes, the borders of the flowing streams, the forest-covered hills became the dwelling places of a rapidly growing band of settlers. The road which Sullivan had opened from the Susquehanna valley was followed by many of the settlers, even to the banks of the Genesee. Thus many of those who had shared the perils and privations of Sullivan's expedition against the Indian tribes of Western New York, afterward became settlers of the land they had aided to conquer."—A. T. Norton, *History of Sullivan's Campaign against the Iroquois*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: L. L. Doty, *Hist. of Livingston Co., N. Y.*, ch. 7.—O. W. B. Peabody, *Life of John Sullivan* (Library of Am. Biog. series 2, v. 3), ch. 7.—*Journals of the Military Expedition of Maj. Gen. John Sullivan, with records of Centennial Celebrations (including Hist. Address by Rev. David Craft*, pp. 331–388).—J. E. Seaver, *Life of Mary Jemison*, app. 2.

A. D. 1779 (September).—Paul Jones' great sea-fight.—The Bon Homme Richard and the Serapis.—"Near the end of July [1779], Paul Jones, a Scot by birth, in the service of the United States, sailed from l' Orient as commander of a squadron, consisting of the Poor Richard ['Bon Homme Richard,' Jones named her, in compliment to Franklin and to the language of

the country from which Franklin's influence procured the ship] of 40 guns, many of them unserviceable; the Alliance of 36 guns, both American ships-of-war; the Pallas, a French frigate of 32; and the Vengeance, a French brig of 12 guns. They ranged the western coast of Ireland, turned Scotland, and, cruising off Flamborough Head, descried the British merchant fleet from the Baltic, under the convoy of the Serapis of 44 guns and the Countess of Scarborough of 20 guns. An hour after sunset, on the 23d of September, the Serapis, having a great superiority in strength, engaged the Poor Richard. Paul Jones, after suffering exceedingly in a contest of an hour and a half within musket-shot, bore down upon his adversary, whose anchor he hooked to his own quarter. The muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides. Jones could use only three nine-pounders beside muskets from the round-tops, but combustible matters were thrown into every part of the Serapis, which was on fire no less than ten or twelve times. There were moments when both ships were on fire. After a two-hours' conflict in the first watch of the night, the Serapis struck its flag. Jones raised his pendant on the captured frigate, and the next day had but time to transfer to it his wounded men and his crew before the Poor Richard went down. The French frigate engaged and captured the Countess of Scarborough. The Alliance, which from a distance had raked the Serapis during the action, not without injuring the Poor Richard, had not a man injured. On the fourth of October the squadron entered the Texel with its prizes. The British ambassador, of himself and again under instructions, reclaimed the captured British ships and their crews, 'who had been taken by the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, a rebel and a traitor.' 'They,' he insisted, 'are to be treated as pirates whose letters of marque have not emanated from a sovereign power.' The grand pensionary would not apply the name of pirate to officers bearing the commissions of congress. In spite of the stadholder, the squadron enjoyed the protection of a neutral port."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (Author's last rev.), v. 5, p. 350.

ALSO IN: A. S. Mackenzie, *Life of Paul Jones*, ch. 8–9 (v. 1).—*Life and Corr. of John Paul Jones*, pp. 179–235.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, ch. 24.

A. D. 1779 (September–October).—Unsuccessful attack on Savannah by the Americans and French.—"The state of affairs in the South had called so imperatively for the attention of Congress that a portion of Washington's army had been detached to join General Lincoln. Washington solicited more powerful aid from D'Estaing, who then commanded in the West Indies an army sufficiently powerful to crush entirely the English in Georgia. The French admiral received this application just after having fought a hard battle against Commodore Byron without any decisive result, yet such as obliged the latter to go into port to refit. The former, being thus for a time master of the sea, determined at once to comply with the request, took on board 6,000 land-troops, and steered direct for Savannah, where, arriving quite unexpectedly, he captured by surprise a fifty-gun ship and three frigates. Prevost, too, was very unprepared, having his force broken up into detachments distributed along the frontier; but

these being instantly ordered in, obeyed with such promptitude that, before the French had landed and formed a junction with Lincoln, nearly all had arrived. On the 16th of September, D'Estaing appeared before the place and summoned it to surrender. Prevost, under pretext of negotiation, obtained a suspension for twenty-four hours, during which Colonel Maitland entered with the last and largest detachment, eluding the Americans by a route supposed impassable; and the full determination to resist was then announced. The opinion of all military men now is that D'Estaing was guilty of the most outrageous folly in not marching at once to the attack of the city, without summoning the weakened garrison to surrender at all. The surprise would have then been complete, and the victory sure. . . . A regular siege was now commenced. Heavy ordnance and stores were brought up from the fleet, and the besieging army broke ground. By the 1st of October they had pushed their sap within 300 yards of the abattis, on the left of the British lines. Several batteries were opened on the besieged, which played almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on them. The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the British force in that State. He became uneasy for the possessions of France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for the safety of the ships under his command. The naval officers remonstrated strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of the year, and urged the danger of being overtaken by a British squadron when broken and scattered by a storm." D'Estaing accordingly decided that he must either raise the siege or attempt the enemy's works by storm. "The latter part of the alternative was adopted. . . . On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, . . . about 3,500 French and 1,000 Americans, of whom between 600 and 700 were regulars and the residue militia of Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing and Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception was warmer than had been expected. . . . Both the French and Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were killed in great numbers while endeavoring to force their way into the works. For about fifty minutes the contest was extremely obstinate." Then the assailants gave way and a retreat was ordered. "In this unsuccessful attempt the French lost in killed and wounded about 700 men. Among the latter were the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges, and several other officers of distinction. The continental troops lost 234 men, and the Charleston militia, who, though associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed and six privates wounded. Count Pulaski was among the slain. The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and wounded it amounted only to 55. So great was the advantage of the cover afforded by their works. . . . Count D'Estaing, having committed a blunder at the beginning, had committed a worse blunder at the end, by insisting on the assault, as unnecessary as it was rash. . . . He [now] insisted on raising the siege, and

both the French and American armies moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October. D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies; and Lincoln recrossed the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and again encamped in South Carolina."—C. B. Hartley, *Life of General Marion (Heroes and Patriots of the South)*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: C. C. Jones, Jr., *Hist. of Georgia*, v. 2, ch. 20-21.—J. Sparks, *Life of Pulaski (Library of Am. Biog., series 2, v. 4)*.

A. D. 1780 (January—April).—The gloomy winter at Morristown.—Depreciation to worthlessness of the Continental Currency.—Consequent sufferings of the army and the country.—"The year 1780 opened upon a famishing camp. 'For a fortnight past,' writes Washington, on the 8th of January, 'the troops, both officers and men, have been almost perishing with want. Yet,' adds he, feelingly, 'they have borne their sufferings with a patience that merits the approbation, and ought to excite the sympathies, of their countrymen.' The severest trials of the Revolution, in fact, were not in the field, where there were shouts to excite and laurels to be won; but in the squalid wretchedness of ill-provided camps, where there was nothing to cheer and everything to be endured. To suffer was the lot of the revolutionary soldier. A rigorous winter had much to do with the actual distresses of the army, but the root of the evil lay in the derangement of the currency. Congress had commenced the war without adequate funds, and without the power of imposing direct taxes. To meet pressing emergencies, it had emitted paper money, which, for a time, passed currently at par; but sank in value as further emissions succeeded, and that already in circulation remained unredeemed. The several States added to the evil by emitting paper in their separate capacities: thus the country gradually became flooded with a 'continental currency,' as it was called; irredeemable, and of no intrinsic value. The consequence was a general derangement of trade and finance. The continental currency declined to such a degree that forty dollars in paper were equivalent to only one in specie. Congress attempted to put a stop to this depreciation by making paper money a legal tender, at its nominal value, in the discharge of debts, however contracted. This opened the door to knavery, and added a new feature to the evil. The commissaries now found it difficult to purchase supplies for the immediate wants of the army, and impossible to provide any stores in advance. They were left destitute of funds, and the public credit was prostrated by the accumulating debts suffered to remain uncanceled. The changes which had taken place in the commissary department added to this confusion. The commissary-general, instead of receiving, as heretofore, a commission on expenditures, was to have a fixed salary in paper currency, and his deputies were to be compensated in like manner, without the usual allowance of rations and forage. No competent agents could be procured on such terms. . . . In the present emergency Washington was reluctantly compelled, by the distresses of the army, to call upon the counties of the State for supplies of grain and cattle, proportioned to their respective abilities. . . . Wherever a compliance with this call was refused, the articles required were to be impressed: it was a painful



alternative, yet nothing else could save the army from dissolution or starving. . . . As the winter advanced, the cold increased in severity. It was the most intense ever remembered in the country. The great bay of New York was frozen over. . . . The insular security of the place was at an end. . . . Washington was aware of the opportunity which offered itself for a signal 'coup de main,' but was not in a condition to profit by it."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 1 and 4.—"Paper for \$9,000,000 was issued before any depreciation began. The issues of the separate colonies must have affected it, but the popular enthusiasm went for something. Pelatiah Webster, almost alone as it seems, insisted on taxation, but a member of Congress indignantly asked if he was to help tax the people when they could go to the printing-office and get a cartload of money. In 1776, when the depreciation began, Congress took harsh measures to try to sustain the bills. Committees of safety also took measures to punish those who 'forestalled' or 'engrossed,' these being the terms for speculators who bought up for a rise. . . . The enemy, perceiving the terrible harm the Americans were doing themselves, thought it well to help on the movement. They counterfeited the bills and passed them through the lines. At the end of 1779 Congress was at its wit's end for money. Its issues had put specie entirely out of reach, and the cause was in danger of being drowned under the paper sea. . . . The French alliance helped more by giving means of procuring loans in Europe than by military assistance. Congress promised to limit its issues to \$200,000,000, and tried a new form of note; also loan offices and lotteries. Over 350,000,000 were issued in all, but it is doubtful if more than 200,000,000 were out at any one time. In the spring of 1780 the bills were worth two cents on the dollar, and then ceased to circulate. Specie now came into circulation, being brought by the French, and also that expended by the English passing the lines. The paper was now worth more for an advertisement or a joke than for any prospect of any kind of redemption. A barber's shop in Philadelphia was papered with it, and a dog, coated with tar, and with the bills stuck all over him, was paraded in the streets."—W. G. Sumner, *Hist. of Am. Currency*, pp. 44-47.

ALSO IN: The same, *The Financier and Finances of the Am. Rev.*, ch. 4 (v. 1).—A. S. Bolles, *Financial Hist. of the U. S.*, 1774-1789, bk. 1.—J. J. Knox, *United States Notes*, ch. 2.—See, also, MONEY AND BANKING, A. D. 1775-1780.

**A. D. 1780 (February–August).**—The siege and capture of Charleston by the British.—**Defeat of Gates at Camden.**—South Carolina subdued.—"After the failure of the attack on Savannah was learned by Sir Henry Clinton, he sent a large additional force to the South. Reinforcements were also sent on to Lincoln, while the main body of the American army went into winter quarters near Morristown, New Jersey. Sir Henry Clinton, as soon as his forces, which had been dispersed by a storm, had been collected at Savannah, proceeded to invest Charleston," landing his troops on St. John's Island in February. The blockading of the port and operations for the investment of the city were conducted cautiously and with success. On the 12th of May, the American commander, General Lincoln, "finding himself incapable of

defending Charleston, decided on capitulating; and he acceded to the terms which the besiegers had first offered. The fortifications, shipping, artillery, and public stores were all surrendered. The garrison, and all who had borne arms, were prisoners of war. The militia were allowed to return home on parole. In the siege the British lost 76 killed, and 189 wounded. The Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to 5,618, counting all the adult males of the town. To bring the country entirely under subjection, Clinton sent forth three detachments. The first and largest, in the northern part of the State, was under Lord Cornwallis. He detached Colonel Tarleton with his legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, to disperse Colonel Buford, then encamped near the North Carolina line. [Buford] was overtaken at the Waxhaws, and, on his refusal to surrender, Tarleton made a furious charge on Buford's men, when some, in dismay, threw down their arms and asked for quarter, and some fired on the enemy. After this partial resistance, no quarter was given. Colonel Buford, with a few of the horse, and about 100 infantry, escaped; 113 were killed on the spot; 150 so badly wounded as to be incapable of being moved; and 53 were brought away as prisoners. The American officers deny (what the British assert), that any who had laid down their arms had again taken them up. All further resistance to the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia seems then to have ceased. The two other detachments of the British army every where received the submission of the inhabitants, who either gave their parole not again to bear arms against the king, or took the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation for settling the government, Sir Henry Clinton required all to return to their allegiance on pain of being treated as rebels and enemies. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command, with 4,000 troops. . . . Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. . . . A considerable force, under Baron de Kalb, had been ordered for the Southern army by Congress; but, for want of money, and a sufficient Commissary department, they were so delayed in their march, that it was late in July before they reached Cape Fear River. Here they were joined by General Gates, who had been appointed to the command of the Southern army. The men of this detachment, ill-fed, suffered greatly from dysentery. In South Carolina, Gates was joined by Porterfield's Virginia regiment, Rutherford's corps of North Carolina militia, and Arnaud's legion. . . . Gates having under him about 4,000 men, of whom the regulars were less than 1,000, took post at Clermont. As the force of the Americans was daily increasing, Cornwallis, having under him about 2,000 men, of whom 1,900 were regulars, decided on attacking the American army. It so happened, that the period chosen by Cornwallis to surprise Gates, was the very moment in which Gates proposed to surprise his adversary; and thus the advanced corps of both armies unexpectedly met at two o'clock in the morning [Aug. 6, near Camden]. After some

skirmishing, in which the British seemed to have had a decided advantage, both parties suspended their operations till the morning. On the first onset of the British, the Virginia militia under General Stevens fled with precipitation, and were followed by the infantry of Armstrong; and, except Colonel Dixon's regiment, the whole South Carolina division followed the example. Very few of the militia of either State discharged a single musket. Gates was borne away by the torrent, and, with General Caswell, retreated to Clermont, in the hope of collecting a sufficient number of the fugitives to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the hope was vain. He was fain to proceed to Hillsborough, to concert the future plan of operations. Thus left with an inadequate force on the field, De Kalb made a stout resistance; but in an impetuous charge he fell, after having received twelve wounds. His troops were then unable to rally, and their discomfiture was complete. Their loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners, could not have been less than 1,000 men. The British lost 325 men. Just before the action, Sumter had captured a convoy, and made 200 prisoners; but was subsequently surprised by Tarleton, who recaptured the stores, killed 150, and took 300 prisoners. Sumter escaped with difficulty. There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina, and Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction; and Sumter was able to collect a new force, with which he greatly annoyed the north-western parts of the State."—G. Tucker, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 3 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: D. Ramsey, *Hist. of S. Carolina*, sect. 7 (v. 1).—H. Lee, *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Dept.*, ch. 17.—F. Bowen, *Life of Benj. Lincoln*, ch. 5.

**A. D. 1780 (July).—Fresh help from France.**—The arrival of Rochambeau and his army, with a fleet.—"La Fayette's second visit to his native country [1779], was most opportune. He arrived in Paris at the moment when the war for the independence of America was in high popularity throughout France. He was put in arrest a week for his disobedience to the order not to leave France, but this was a mere formality. Vergennes received him in private. His example had roused the spirit of the French nobles. The stage resounded with his applauses. Crowds followed his steps. Marie Antoinette, with her quick, enthusiastic spirit, joyed at his distinction. The council of state, the Parliament, the towns, the corporations mingled in the noble excitement. The Royal Treasury was assured support by patriotic offers of contributions, and then was formed the auxiliary army that was to bear succor to America. This public enthusiasm triumphed over the hesitating reluctance of Maurepas, and the economical prudence of Necker. The army, placed under the command of the veteran Rochambeau, commended for his 'steadiness, wisdom, ability and prudence,' a pupil of the Marshal de Belle Isle, distinguished in frequent service, was to be composed of 6,000 troops. Among these shone forth the most brilliant of the nobility."—J. C. Hamilton, *Hist. of*

*the U. S.*, as traced in the Writings of Alex. Hamilton, ch. 20 (v. 2).—"La Fayette . . . made the ministers understand that if he was not placed in command of the expedition, which would surprise the Americans, at least it was imperative to place over it a French general who would consent to serve under the American commander-in-chief. But he knew well that his old companions in arms in France were jealous of his rapid military fortune and brilliant renown. He knew still better that the officers who were his seniors in rank would be unwilling to serve under him. His first proposition, therefore, was only made to satisfy public feeling in America, which left the management of this affair almost entirely in his hands. In view of the serious difficulties that necessarily would result from the adoption of such a decision—difficulties that might have most disastrous consequences for the cause to which he had devoted himself—he promised to make the Americans understand that he had preferred remaining at the head of one of their divisions and that he had refused the command of the French forces. But he insisted upon this point, that, in order to avoid wounding the self-respect of the Americans, it was indispensable to choose a general to command the expedition, whose promotion had been recent and whose talents were certainly equal to his mission, but who, considering this mission as a distinction, would consent to acknowledge General Washington's supremacy. The choice that was made, under these conditions, of the Count de Rochambeau was perfectly satisfactory to him, and, without waiting for the departure of the expedition, he embarked at Rochefort, on February the 18th, 1780, on board the frigate *Hermione*, which the king had given him as being a swift sailer. . . . He was anxious to inform Washington of the good news himself, and immediately upon his landing at Boston, on April the 28th, he hastened to Morristown to rejoin his well-beloved and revered friend, as he called him in his letters. . . . General Heath, who commanded the militia in the State of Rhode Island, announced on the 11th of July, the arrival of the French squadron to General Washington, who was then with his staff at Bergen. La Fayette set out almost immediately, provided with instructions from the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th, to repair to the French general and admiral to confer with them. For some time Washington had been considering a plan of offensive operation for the capture of the city and the garrison of New York. This plan, which conformed with the wishes of the French government, was only to be carried out upon certain conditions. First, it was necessary that the French troops should unite with the American forces, and, secondly, that the French should have a naval superiority over the forces of Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot, who had effected their junction at New York the day after the arrival of the French at Newport. This last condition was far from being fulfilled. . . . It had been foreseen that the English, who had concentrated their land and naval forces at New York, would not give the French time to establish themselves on Rhode Island; and Washington informed Rochambeau that Sir Henry Clinton was embarking his troops and would come shortly to attack the forces of the expedition with the squadrons assembled under the com-



mand of Admiral Arbuthnot, which were anchored at Sandy Hook, beyond New York, at the mouth of the Hudson River. The American general watched these movements, and, while he gave frequent information to the French of the projected attack upon them, he tried to prevent it. . . . At the same time, Washington crossed the Hudson above West Point with the greater part of his troops, and proceeded to King's Bridge, at the northern end of the island, where he made some hostile demonstrations. This manœuvre detained General Clinton, who had already embarked eight thousand men upon the ships of Arbuthnot. He landed his troops and gave up his project. Nevertheless, the English admiral set sail and appeared before Rhode Island with several ships of the line and a few frigates, twelve days after the French had landed. . . . On August the 9th, when La Fayette had returned to the headquarters of Washington, which were at Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right bank of the North River, he wrote to Rochambeau and de Ternay an urgent dispatch, in which he finished, in the name of the American general, by proposing to the French generals to come at once to attempt an attack on New York. . . . On the other hand, the same courier brought a letter from Washington which made no mention of this project, but which only replied by a kind of refusal to the request of Rochambeau for a conference, 'wherein in an hour of conversation they could agree upon more things than in volumes of correspondence.' Washington said with truth that he did not dare to leave his army in front of New York, for it might be attacked at any moment, and that by his presence he prevented the departure of the large body of the English forces that might have been sent against Rhode Island. Indeed, it is certain that if some differences had not arisen between General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, the French might have found themselves in a dangerous position at the beginning. From the earliest letters exchanged upon this occasion some discord resulted between La Fayette, Rochambeau and Washington, but, owing to the good sense of Rochambeau, matters were soon smoothed over. He wrote in English to the American general to ask him thereafter to address himself directly to him, and to explain the reasons that induced him to postpone assuming the offensive. At the same time he urgently requested a conference. From that moment the relations between the two leaders were excellent. The mere presence of the French squadron and army, though they were still paralyzed and really blockaded by Admiral Arbuthnot, had effected a useful diversion, since the English had not been able to profit by all the advantages resulting from the capture of Charleston, and, instead of carrying on operations in the Carolinas with superior forces, they had had to bring the greater part of them back to New York."—T. Balch, *The French in America in the War of Independence*, ch. 10-11.

A. D. 1780 (August—September).—The Treason of Benedict Arnold.—"Washington contemplated the aspect of affairs with the greatest alarm. Doubtful if the army could be kept together for another campaign, he was exceedingly anxious to strike some decisive blow. He proposed to Rochambeau, commanding the French troops at Newport, an attack upon New

York; but that was not thought feasible without a superior naval force. Letters were sent to the French admiral in the West Indies entreating assistance; and Washington presently proceeded to Hartford, there to meet Rochambeau, to devise some definite plan of operations. During Washington's absence at Hartford, a plot came to light for betraying the important fortress of West Point and the other posts of the Highlands into the hands of the enemy, the traitor being no other than Arnold, the most brilliant officer and one of the most honored in the American army. The qualities of a brilliant soldier are unfortunately often quite distinct from those of a virtuous man and a good citizen. . . . Placed in command at Philadelphia, . . . he [Arnold] lived in a style of extravagance far beyond his means, and he endeavored to sustain it by entering into privateering and mercantile speculations, most of which proved unsuccessful. He was even accused of perverting his military authority to purposes of private gain. The complaints on this point, made to Congress by the authorities of Pennsylvania, had been at first unheeded; but, being presently brought forward in a solemn manner, and with some appearance of offended dignity on the part of the Pennsylvania council, an interview took place between a committee of that body and a committee of Congress, which had resulted in Arnold's trial by a court martial. Though acquitted of the more serious charges, on two points he had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief. Arnold claimed against the United States a large balance, growing out of the unsettled accounts of his Canada expedition. This claim was greatly cut down by the treasury officers and when Arnold appealed to Congress, a committee reported that more had been allowed than was actually due. Mortified and soured, and complaining of public ingratitude, Arnold attempted, but without success, to get a loan from the French minister. Some months before, he had opened a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton under a feigned name, carried on through Major Andre, adjutant general of the British army. Having at length made himself known to his correspondents, to give importance to his treachery, he solicited and obtained from Washington, who had every confidence in him, the command in the Highlands, with the very view of betraying that important position into the hands of the enemy. To arrange the terms of the bargain, an interview was necessary with some confidential British agent; and Andre, though not without reluctance, finally volunteered for that purpose. Several previous attempts having failed, the British sloop-of-war Vulture, with Andre on board, ascended the Hudson as far as the mouth of Croton River, some miles below King's Ferry. Information being sent to Arnold under a flag, the evening after Washington left West Point for Hartford he dispatched a boat to the Vulture, which took Andre on shore, for an interview on the west side of the river, just below the American lines. Morning appeared before the arrangements for the betrayal of the fortress could be definitely completed, and Andre was reluctantly persuaded to come within the American lines, and to remain till the next night at the house of one Smith, a dupe or tool of Arnold's, the same who

had been employed to bring Andre from the ship. For some reason not very clearly explained, Smith declined to convey Andre back to the Vulture. . . . Driven thus to the necessity of returning by land, Andre laid aside his uniform, assumed a citizen's dress, and, with a pass from Arnold in the name of John Anderson, a name which Andre had often used in their previous correspondence, he set off toward sunset on horseback, with Smith for a guide. They crossed King's Ferry, passed all the American guards in safety, and spent the night near Crom Pond, with an acquaintance of Smith's. The next morning, having passed Pine's Bridge, across Croton River, Smith left Andre to pursue his way alone. The road led through a district extending some thirty miles above the island of New York, not included in the lines of either army, and thence known as the 'Neutral Ground,' a populous and fertile region, but very much infested by bands of plunderers called 'Cow Boys' and 'Skinners.' The 'Cow Boys' lived within the British lines, and stole or bought cattle for the supply of the British army. The rendezvous of the 'Skinners' was within the American lines. They professed to be great patriots, making it their ostensible business to plunder those who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the State of New York." On the morning of Andre's journey, the road to Tarrytown, on which he rode, was being guarded by a small party of men, who watched for cattle thieves, and for suspicious travelers generally. Three of these intercepted the unfortunate young officer and discovered his character. Arnold received intelligence of what had happened in time to make his escape to the Vulture. André was examined before a board of which Lafayette, Steuben and Greene were members, and on his own statements was executed as a spy. The sympathy with him was very great, among Americans as well as among his own countrymen; but lenity in the case appeared too dangerous to Washington and his military advisers.—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 41 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 2, 7, and 9-11.—B. J. Lossing, *The Two Spies*.—J. Sparks, *Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold* (*Library of Am. Biog.*, v. 3, ch. 8-15).—W. Sargent, *Life of Major John André*, ch. 11-21.—I. N. Arnold, *Life of Benedict Arnold*, ch. 13-18.—J. H. Smith, *Authentic Narrative of the Causes which led to the Death of Major André*.—B. J. Lossing, *Field-book of the Rev.*, v. 1, ch. 30-32.—See, also, WEST POINT.

A. D. 1780 (August—December).—Partisan warfare in South Carolina.—Sumter and Marion.—A name "which recalls thrilling tales of desperate enterprise, surprises at midnight, sudden attacks in the gray twilight of morning, lurking-places in the depths of forests, restless activity, and untiring perseverance, is the name of Thomas Sumter. He comes before us tall, vigorous, dauntless, with a bold bearing, and imperious brow, stern to look upon, fierce in his self-will, arrogant in his decisions, tenacious in his prejudices, resolute and vigorous in the execution of his own plans, remiss and almost lukewarm in carrying out the plans of others. Born in South Carolina just as that colony had passed from the control of the Proprietaries to the control of the King, he lived to see her take the first decided step towards passing out of the Union.

Little has been preserved of his early life, although his subsequent career in the Senate of the United States proves that he was not deficient in education then, wherever or whenever acquired. In the Revolution he took an early part, and soon made himself conspicuous as a bold and enterprising officer. But it was not till after the siege of Charleston that his talents were brought fully into play. Then at the head of a body of volunteers he moved rapidly from point to point, keeping alive the hopes of the Whigs and the fears of the Tories in the regions watered by the Broad River, the Ennoree, and the Tiger. . . . History, like tradition, has her favorite characters, on which she dwells with peculiar fondness, delighting herself in preserving the memory of every exploit, and giving the brightest tints to every circumstance connected with their career. . . . Of these children of a happy star, no one holds in our Revolutionary history the same place as Francis Marion. His story, irregularly told by a friend and companion, took an early hold upon the heart of the people; and the romantic traits of his career, warming the imagination of a great poet, have been recorded in beautiful verse. Impartial judgment and sober research have left his own laurels unimpaired, although they have dissipated the halo which tradition and fancy had shed around his men. His life forms one of those pictures upon which the mind loves to dwell, from the singular combination of rare qualities which it displays. His ancestors were Huguenot exiles, who took refuge in South Carolina, from the dragonnades of Louis XIV. His father was a planter near Georgetown, who, portioning out his estate to his children as they came of age, had nothing left for Francis, the youngest, and his next nearest brother, while they were yet children. At sixteen Francis found himself compelled to choose a pursuit for his support. With only a common English education, and no money to carry him through the preparatory courses, he could neither be a physician nor a lawyer. He resolved to be a sailor, and started upon a voyage to the West Indies. But his ship was burnt in a gale, and after tossing about eight days in an open boat, without water and with nothing but the raw flesh and skin of a single dog to eat, and seeing several of his companions die of hunger, he, with the starving survivors, were rescued, barely alive. He renounced the sea, returned to Georgetown, and engaged in farming. The Cherokee war of 1759 found him hard at his work. He was now twenty-six, small in frame, low in stature, but vigorous, active, and healthy. By nature he was taciturn and reticent, with nothing in the expression of his face to attract or interest a casual observer, but still inspiring confidence and commanding respect in those who were brought into intimate relations with him. When, therefore, a company of volunteers was raised to serve against the Indians, he was chosen lieutenant. In a second expedition, which soon after became necessary, he was made captain. Next came the War of Independence; and joining the first South Carolina levies, he was presently made a major; and with this rank took part in the gallant defense of Fort Moultrie in 1776. His next promotion was to the command of a regiment as lieutenant-colonel. During the siege of Charleston his leg was accidentally broken, a lucky accident, which



left him free when the city fell, to engage in an adventurous system of warfare which was the only possible system in that low state of our fortunes. In the course of this he was promoted by Governor Rutledge to a brigadiership. When he first appeared in Gates's camp, he had but twenty men with him, or rather twenty between men and boys. Some of them were negroes. With these he rescued 150 of the prisoners of Camden, coming upon the British escort by surprise and overpowering it. Early in September a body of 200 Tories attempted to surprise him. He had 53 men with him when he heard of their intention, and instantly setting forward, surprised an advance party of 45, killing or wounding all but 15, and then attacked the main body of 200, and put them to flight. Before the end of the month he surprised another body of 60 men; and in October one of 200. His force was constantly fluctuating between 20 men and 70. Up to the 18th of October he had never had over 70. They went and came as they chose, their number ever ebbing and flowing like the tide. Sometimes the very men who had fought with him were ranged in arms against him; a few only serving from honest zeal and true love of country. . . . As his slender form concealed a lion heart, so under his cold, impassive face, there was a perpetual glow of tender sympathies. . . . Without claiming for Marion those powers of combination which belong to the highest order of military genius, he must be allowed to have excelled in all the qualities which form the consummate partisan,—vigilance, promptitude, activity, energy, dauntless courage, and unshaken self-control. . . . Two principles controlled all his actions, and shaped all his ends; the love of country, pure, earnest, and profound; the love of right, sincere, undeviating, and incorruptible."—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathaniel Greene*, bk. 4, ch. 7 (v. 3).—"The other partisans . . . had been compelled to take refuge in the mountains. Marion found his security in the swamps. This able partisan maintained his ground below and along the Santee river, and managed, among the defiles and swamps of that region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. His force had been collected chiefly among his own neighbors, were practised in the swamps, and familiar with the country. Like Sumter, utterly unfurnished with the means of war at first, he procured them by similar means. He took possession of the saws from the mills, and converted them into sabres. So much was he distressed for ammunition that he has engaged in battle when he had not three rounds of powder to each man of his party. . . . Various were the means employed to draw off or drive away his followers. The houses on the banks of the Pedee, Lynch's Creek, and Black river, from whence they were chiefly taken, were destroyed by fire, the plantations devastated, and the negroes carried away. But the effect of this wantonness was far other than had been intended. Revenge and despair confirmed the patriotism of these ruined men, and strengthened their resolution. . . . For months, their only shelter was the green wood and the swamp—their only cover the broad forest and the arch of heaven. . . . With a policy that nothing could distract—a caution that no artifice could mislead—Marion led his followers from thicket to thicket in safety, and was never more perfectly secure

than when he was in the neighborhood of his foe. He hung upon his flanks along the march—he skirted his camp in the darkness of the night—he lay in wait for his foraging parties—he shot down his sentries, and, flying or advancing, he never failed to harass the invader, and extort from him a bloody toll at every passage through swamp, thicket, or river, which his smaller parties made. In this sort of warfare—which is peculiarly adapted to the peculiarities of the country in Carolina, and consequently to the genius of her people—he contrived almost wholly to break up the British communications by one of the most eligible routes between the seaboard and the interior."—W. G. Simms, *Hist. of S. Carolina*, bk. 5, ch. 6.

Also in: C. B. Hartley, *Life of Gen. Francis Marion (Heroes and Patriots of the South)*, ch. 14-15.—W. G. Simms, *Life of Francis Marion*.—Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*.

A. D. 1780-1781.—Vermont as an independent State negotiating with the British. See VERMONT: A. D. 1781.

A. D. 1780-1781.—Greene's campaign in the south.—King's Mountain.—The Cowpens.—Guilford Court House.—Hobkirk's Hill.—Eutaw Springs.—The British shut up in Charleston.—Cornwallis withdrawn to Virginia.—"After his victory at Camden, Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting that he would soon conquer all the states south of the Susquehanna river. . . . In traversing Mecklenburg county Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far into the mountains. The backwoodsmen of Tennessee and Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused; and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier, Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. . . . In the series of events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow him. The events, however, were much more complicated in Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves. . . . As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army, recruited and re-organized since its crushing defeat at Camden, advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December. Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry

Lee, familiarly known as 'Light-horse Harry,' father of the great general, Robert Edward Lee. The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the British infantry." To increase this small force, Steuben [Baron Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the Revolutionary armies,—see above: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY—DECEMBER)] was sent down to Virginia, for the purpose of recruiting and organizing troops. Thereupon detachments from the British army at New York were dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was given command of them. "The presence of these subsidiary forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into two bodies, one of which coöperated with Marion's partisans in the northeastern part of the state, and threatened Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks, Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost 12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light-armed troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to march the two parts of his army in converging directions northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in South Carolina. . . . The two wings of the American army came together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course Corn-

wallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene, after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford, faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles distant. . . . Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in which both sides claimed the victory. . . . Here, however, as always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. After Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under cover of their ships, and the American government was reestablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in history that have been conducted with small armies, there have been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's." —J. Fiske, *The War of Independence*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: *The same*, *The Am. Rev.*, ch. 15 (v. 2).—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the Am. Rev.*, ch. 65-71.—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, v. 3, ch. 1-23.—L. C. Draper, *King's Mountain and its Heroes*.—H. Lee, *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Dept.*, ch. 18-34.—J. Graham, *Life of Gen. Daniel Morgan*, ch. 13-17.

A. D. 1781 (January).—**The Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.**—"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign, which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says: 'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now served almost twelve months without pay.' . . . On the 1st of January the Pennsylvania line revolted; Captain Billings was killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns, started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d of January of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt its control. His second impression was to reserve his



influence and authority until all other means were exhausted. The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult passages in the war, and was so handled that the Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control of the army. . . . General Clinton received information of the revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and sent messengers to the American army with propositions, looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a portion of the troops were discharged without critical examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up arms. . . . La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardest and most patient that are to be found in the world.'"—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the Am. Revolution*, ch. 67.

ALSO IN: W. H. Egle, *Hist. of Penn.*, ch. 12.  
—C. J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne*, ch. 6.

**A. D. 1781 (January–May).—Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia.—Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.**—"In January, 1781, the news reached headquarters in the Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had landed in Virginia with a considerable force, was laying waste the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to the assistance of Cornwallis, who, with a superior force, was pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his designs was, therefore, of the

utmost importance. For this purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette. That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust, because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander, and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but, the coöperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime, been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his instructions required him to abandon the expedition and return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took command of all the forces there, and this had increased the anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis. With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. . . . Lafayette marched with such rapidity . . . that he reached Richmond, where there were valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent a considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South Carolina, he determined to join Philips. That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island to take possession of

Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's arrival. . . . On the 13th of May, General Philips died at Petersburg of a fever. . . . Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men, which number was soon increased to 8,000."—B. Tuckerman, *Life of Lafayette*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 3, ch. 17.

**A. D. 1781 (May—October).—Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell.—Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans.—Surrender of the British army.**—"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops, marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg, where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion of Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not venture any fighting. . . . Cornwallis . . . moved between Lafayette and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received his expected reinforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect the property of the State without losing his army. Through his scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his men through it and took up a strong position before the town. There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains, and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did not venture an attack. . . . The British commander, so far foiled in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British, harassing their rear and flanks."—B. Tuckerman, *Life of General Lafayette*, v. 1, ch. 6.—"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in daily operations and excitements. The State north of the James was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham, on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river, encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill, then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots in the State. . . . The entire British army was soon after concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made to transport a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette, meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not return to the Northern army. . . .

But while the marquis and Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand. Instead of any part going to New York, the British force suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August, at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned but three weeks before. Here again was a new situation. Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia, not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth, a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval station for the protection of the British shipping. In addition, if it appeared necessary, for the better security of the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done. Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on account of its great width. Then, following what he believed to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender. His occupation of the place was simply an incident of the campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of the navy and the health of his command."—H. P. Johnston, *The Yorktown Campaign*, ch. 3.—"The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia was the first emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to plan an efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for extensive field service at the north, that the American Commander-in-chief determined to attack that post, and as a secondary purpose, thereby to divert General Clinton from giving further aid to troops in the Southern States. As a matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia campaign eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an army, including militia, nearly as large as that of Washington, and the nominal strength of the allied army near Yorktown, early in September, was nearly or quite as great as that of Lord Cornwallis. There were other elements which, as in previous campaigns, hampered operations at the north. The Indians were still troublesome in Western New York, and the Canadian frontier continued to demand attention. The American navy had practically disappeared. The scarcity of money and a



powerless recruiting service, increased the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner that would use to the best advantage the troops of France. . . . The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time was one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State authorities failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian reinforcements had landed at New York, and the government as well as himself would be compromised before the whole world by failure to meet the just demands which the French auxiliaries had a right to press upon his attention. Relief came most opportunely. The frigate *Concorde* arrived at Newport, and a reiteration of the purpose of Count de Grasse to leave St. Domingo on the 3d of August, for the Chesapeake direct, was announced by a special messenger. The possibilities of the future at once quickened him to immediate action. With a reticence so close that the army could not fathom his plans, he re-organized his forces for a false demonstration against New York and a real movement upon Yorktown. . . . Letters to the Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture New York. Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse embodied such intimations of his plans as would induce proper caution to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure transportation at Head of Elk. Other letters to authorities in New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly defining a plan of operations against New York via Staten Island, with the assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to interception and fell into the hands of General Clinton. As late as the 19th, the roads leading to King's Bridge were cleared of obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey regiment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry, to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to cover some bake-houses which were being erected for the purpose of giving color to the show of operations against New York. The plan of a large encampment had been prepared, which embraced Springfield and the Chatham Pass to Morristown, and this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's headquarters. General Heath was assigned to command of the Hudson-river posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery, Sheldon's dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies, and the militia. The following forces were selected to accompany the Commander-in-chief, viz., the light infantry under Colonel Scammel, four light companies from New York and Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, under the new army establishment, two New York regiments, that of New Jersey and Hazen's regiment, (the last two already across the Hudson) and Lamb's artillery, in all about 2,000 men. The American troops crossed on the 21st, at King's Ferry, and encamped near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the army was united on the 25th. . . . General Washington and suite reached Philadelphia about noon, August 30th. The army had already realized the fact that they were destined southward. Some dissatisfaction was manifested; but Count de Rochambeau advanced \$20,000 in gold upon the pledge of Robert Morris that he would refund the sum by the 1st of October, and the effect upon the troops, who

had long been without any pay, was inspiring."—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the Am. Rev.*, ch. 74. —"Leaving Philadelphia, with the Army, on the 5th of September, Washington meets an express near Chester, announcing the arrival, in Chesapeake Bay, of the Count de Grasse, with a fleet of twenty-eight ships of the line, and with 3,500 additional French troops, under the command of the Marquis de St. Simon, who had already been landed at Jamestown, with orders to join the Marquis de La Fayette! 'The joy' says the Count William de Deux-Ponts, in his precious journal, 'the joy which this welcome news produces among all the troops, and which penetrates General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau, is more easy to feel than to express.' But, in a foot-note to that passage, he does express and describe it, in terms which cannot be spared and could not be surpassed, and which add a new and charming illustration of the emotional side of Washington's nature. 'I have been equally surprised and touched,' says the gallant Deux-Ponts, 'at the true and pure joy of General Washington. Of a natural coldness and of a serious and noble approach, which in him is only true dignity, and which adorn so well the chief of a whole nation, his features, his physiognomy, his deportment, all were changed in an instant. He put aside his character as arbiter of North America, and contented himself for a moment with that of a citizen, happy at the good fortune of his country. A child, whose every wish had been gratified, would not have experienced a sensation more lively, and I believe I am doing honor to the feelings of this rare man in endeavoring to express all their ardor.' Thanks to God, thanks to France, from all our hearts at this hour, for 'this true and pure joy' which lightened the heart, and at once dispelled the anxieties of our incomparable leader. It may be true that Washington seldom smiled after he had accepted the command of our Revolutionary Army, but it is clear that on the 5th of September he not only smiled but played the boy. . . . 'All now went merry,' with him, 'as a marriage bell.' Under the immediate influence of this joy, which he had returned for a few hours to Philadelphia to communicate in person to Congress, . . . and while the Allied Armies are hurrying southward, he makes a hasty trip with Colonel Humphreys to his beloved Mount Vernon and his more beloved wife — his first visit home since he left it for Cambridge in 1775. Rochambeau, with his suite, joins him there on the 10th, and Chastellux and his aids on the 11th; and there with Mrs. Washington, he dispenses for two days, 'a princely hospitality' to his foreign guests. But the 13th finds them all on their way to rejoin the Army at Williamsburg, where they arrive on the 15th, 'to the great joy of the troops and the people,' and where they dine with the Marquis de St. Simon. On the 18th Washington and Rochambeau, with Knox and Chastellux and Du Portail, and with two of Washington's aids, Colonel Cobb of Massachusetts, and Colonel Jonathan Trumbull, jr., of Connecticut, embark on the 'Princess Charlotte' for a visit to the French fleet. . . . A few days more are spent at Williamsburg on their return, where they find General Lincoln already arrived with a part of the troops from the North, having hurried them as Washington besought him, 'on the wings of speed,' and where the word is soon

given, 'On, on, to York and Gloucester!' Washington takes his share of the exposure of this march, and the night of the 28th of September finds him, with all his military family, sleeping in an open field within two miles of Yorktown, without any other covering, as the journal of one of his aids states, 'than the canopy of the heavens, and the small spreading branches of a tree,' which the writer predicts 'will probably be rendered venerable from this circumstance for a length of time to come.' . . . Everything now hurries, almost with the rush of a Niagara cataract, to the grand fall of Arbitrary Power in America. Lord Cornwallis had taken post here at Yorktown as early as the 4th of August, after being foiled so often by 'that boy' as he called La Fayette, whose Virginia campaign of four months was the most effective preparation for all that was to follow, and who, with singular foresight, perceived at once that his lordship was now fairly entrapped, and wrote to Washington, as early as the 21st of August, that 'the British army must be forced to surrender.' Day by day, night by night, that prediction presses forward to its fulfillment. The 1st of October finds our engineers reconnoitering the position and works of the enemy. The 2d witnesses the gallantry of the Duke de Lauzun and his legion in driving back Tarleton, whose raids had so long been the terror of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the 6th, the Allied Armies broke ground for their first parallel, and proceeded to mount their batteries on the 7th and 8th. On the 9th, two batteries were opened—Washington himself applying the torch to the first gun; and on the 10th three or four more were in play—'silencing the enemy's works, and making,' says the little diary of Colonel Cobb, 'most noble music.' On the 11th, the indefatigable Baron Steuben was breaking the ground for our second parallel, within less than four hundred yards of the enemy, which was finished the next morning, and more batteries mounted on the 13th and 14th. But the great achievement of the siege still awaits its accomplishment. Two formidable British advanced redoubts are blocking the way to any further approach, and they must be stormed. The allied troops divide the danger and the glory between them, and emulate each other in the assault. One of these redoubts is assigned to the French grenadiers and chasseurs, under the general command of the Baron de Viomesnil. The other is assigned to the American light infantry, under the general command of La Fayette. But the detail of special leaders to conduct the two assaults remains to be arranged. Viomesnil readily designates the brave Count William to lead the French storming party, who, though he came off from his victory wounded, counts it 'the happiest day of his life.' A question arises as to the American party, which is soon solved by the impetuous but just demand of our young Alexander Hamilton to lead it. And lead it he did, with an intrepidity, a heroism, and a dash unsurpassed in the whole history of the war. . . . Both redoubts were soon captured; and these brilliant actions virtually sealed the fate of Cornwallis. 'A small and precipitate sortie,' as Washington calls it, was made by the British on the following evening, resulting in nothing; and the next day a vain attempt to evacuate their works, and to escape by crossing over to Gloucester, was defeated by a violent and, for

us . . . most providential storm of rain and wind. . . . A suspension of hostilities, to arrange terms of capitulation, was proposed by Cornwallis on the 17th; the 18th was occupied at Moore's House in settling those terms; and on the 19th the articles were signed by which the garrison of York and Gloucester, together with all the officers and seamen of the British ships in the Chesapeake, 'surrender themselves Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America and France.'—Robert C. Winthrop, *Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Oct. 19, 1881.*

Also in: Marquis Cornwallis, *Correspondence*, v. 1, ch. 4-5.—The same, *Answer to Sir H. Clinton*.—Count de Deux-Ponts, *My Campaigns in America, 1781*.—T. Balch, *The French in Am. during the War of Independence*, ch. 13-22.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 25-26, and 28.—Geo. Washington, *Writings*, ed. by W. C. Ford, v. 9.—C. Tower, *The Marquis de La Fayette in the Am. Rev.*, v. 2, ch. 25-28.

**A. D. 1781-1782.—Practical suspension of hostilities.—Difficulty of maintaining the army.—Financial distress of the country.**—“Immediately after the surrender of Yorktown Washington returned with his army to the vicinity of New York [see NEWBURGH], but he felt himself far too weak to attempt its capture, and hostilities were restricted to a few indecisive skirmishes or predatory enterprises. It is curious to notice how far from sanguine Washington appeared even after the event which in the eyes of most men, outside America, had determined the contest without appeal. It was still impossible, he maintained, to do anything decisive unless the sea were commanded by a naval force hostile to England, and France alone could provide this force. The difficulties of maintaining the army were unabated. 'All my accounts,' he wrote in April 1782, 'respecting the recruiting service are unfavourable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived to my knowledge from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence of the requisitions of Congress in December last.' He strongly urged the impossibility of recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment, and recommended that, in addition to the compulsory enrolment of Americans, German prisoners should be taken into the army. Silas Deane, in private letters, expressed at this time his belief that it would be utterly impossible to maintain the American army for another year; and even after the surrender of Cornwallis, no less a person than Sir Henry Clinton assured the Government that, with a reinforcement of only 10,000 men he would be responsible for the conquest of America. . . . Credit was gone, and the troops had long been unpaid. 'The long sufferance of the army,' wrote Washington in October 1782, 'is almost exhausted. It is high time for a peace.' Nothing, indeed, except the great influence, the admirable moderation and good sense, and the perfect integrity of Washington could have restrained the army from open revolt. . . . Holland, immediately after the surrender of Yorktown, had recognised the independence of America, which had as yet only been recognised by France. John Adams was received as representative at the Hague, and after several abortive efforts he succeeded in raising a Dutch loan. France, as her ablest ministers well knew, was drifting rapidly towards bankruptcy; yet two



American loans, amounting together to £600,000, were extorted in the last year of the war. Up to the very eve of the formal signature of peace, and long after the virtual termination of the war, the Americans found it necessary to besiege the French Court for money. As late as December 5, 1782, Franklin wrote from Paris to Livingston complaining of the humiliating duty which was imposed on him. . . . The reply of Livingston was dated January 6, 1783, and it paints vividly the extreme distress in America. 'I see the force,' he writes, 'of your objections to soliciting the additional twelve millions, and I feel very sensibly the weight of our obligations to France, but every sentiment of this kind must give way to our necessities. It is not for the interest of our allies to lose the benefit of all they have done by refusing to make a small addition to it. . . . The army demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The treasury is empty, and no adequate means of filling it presents itself. The people pant for peace; should contributions be exacted, as they have hitherto been, at the point of the sword, the consequences may be more dreadful than is at present apprehended. I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the States in not providing greater supplies. Some of them might do more than they have done; none of them all that is required. It is my duty to confide to you, that if the war is continued in this country, it must be in a great measure at the expense of France. If peace is made, a loan will be absolutely necessary to enable us to discharge the army, that will not easily separate without pay.' It was evident that the time for peace had come. The predatory expeditions which still continued in America could only exasperate still further both nations, and there were some signs—especially in the conflicts between loyalists and revolutionists—that they were having this effect. England had declared herself ready to concede the independence America demanded. Georgia and South Carolina, where the English had found so many faithful friends, were abandoned in the latter half of 1782, and the whole force of the Crown was now concentrated at New York and in Canada. France and Spain for a time wished to protract negotiations in hopes that Rodney might be crushed, that Jamaica and afterwards Gibraltar might be captured; but all these hopes had successively vanished. . . . If the war continued much longer America would almost certainly drop away, and France, and perhaps Spain, become bankrupt."—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng. in the 18th Century*, ch. 15 (v. 4).

**A. D. 1781-1786.**—The cession of Western Territory by the States to the Federal Union. —The Western Reserve of Connecticut.—Although the Articles of Confederation were adopted by Congress in 1777 and ratified immediately by most of the States, it was not until 1781 that they became operative by the assent of all. "New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland held out against ratifying them for from two to four years. The secret of their resistance was in the claims to the western territory. . . . The three recalcitrant States had always had fixed western boundaries, and had no legal claim to a share in the western territory. . . . New Jersey and Delaware gave up the struggle in 1778 and 1779; but Maryland would not and did not yield, until her claims were satisfied. Dr. H. B. Adams has

shown that the whole question of real nationality for the United States was bound up in this western territory; that even a 'league government' could not continue long to govern a great and growing territory like this without developing into a real national government, even without a change of strict law; and that the Maryland leaders were working under a complete consciousness of these facts."—A. Johnston, *The United States: Its Hist. and Const.*, sect. 89-90. —The western claims of Virginia were the most sweeping and were founded upon the oldest historical document. "The charter granted by James I. to South Virginia, in 1609 [see VIRGINIA: A. D. 1609-1616] . . . embraced the entire north-west of North America, and, within certain limits, all the islands along the coast of the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. . . . The following is the grant: 'All those lands, countries and territories situate, lying and being in that part of America called Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the northward 200 miles; and from the said Point or Cape Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the southward 200 miles; and all that space and circuit of land lying from the sea-coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west; and also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of both seas of the precinct aforesaid.' The extraordinary ambiguity of this grant of 1609, which was always appealed to as a legal title by Virginia, was first shown by Thomas Paine. . . . The chief ambiguity . . . lay in the interpretation of the words 'up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west.' From which point was the north-west line to be drawn, from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above, or from the point 200 miles below Cape Comfort? . . . The more favorable interpretation for Virginia and, perhaps, in view of the expression 'from sea to sea,' more natural interpretation, was to draw the north-western line from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above Point Comfort, and the western line from the southern limit below Point Comfort. This gave Virginia the greater part, at least, of the entire north-west, for the lines diverged continually. . . . At the outbreak of the Revolution, Virginia had annexed the 'County of Kentucky' to the Old Dominion, and, in 1778, after the capture of the military posts in the north-west by Colonel George Rogers Clarke, . . . that enterprising State proceeded to annex the lands beyond the Ohio, under the name of the County of Illinois [see, above: A. D. 1778-1779, CLARKE'S CONQUEST]. The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong, but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable consideration for the services of other colonies in defending the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and military title of Virginia to the great north-west. . . . The claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the charter granted by Charles II., in 1662. . . . The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in southern

Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the region comprehended by the extension westward of her present southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was 'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake Winnipiseogee in New Hampshire. The western claims of Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern boundaries—41° and 42° 2' north latitude—extended westward] covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. . . . The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies, the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.; again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves under the protection of England, and that they had always been treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780, Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the claimant States began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims, providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the Articles and the first legal union of the United States was complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were acting with a mutual understanding. . . . The offer of Virginia, reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky; the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammelled by burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three offers were now prominently before the country. . . . On the 29th of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of March, 1781. . . . On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia, of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty of Virginia's

boundary, and the annulling of all other titles to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."—H. B. Adams, *Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the U. S.* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, 3d ser. No. 1), pp. 9-11, 19-22, 36-39.—The Massachusetts deed of cession was executed April 19, 1785. It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands "west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20 miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River"—that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. . . . After a severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone voting in the negative."—B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest*, ch. 13.—South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in 1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.—A. Johnston, *Connecticut*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: T. Donaldson, *The Public Domain: its History*, ch. 3.—A. Johnston, *Connecticut*, ch. 15.—See, also, OHIO: A. D. 1786-1796.

**A. D. 1782 (February—May).—Peace Resolutions in the British House of Commons.—Retirement of Lord North.—Pacific overtures through General Carleton.**—"Fortunately for the United States, the temper of the British nation on the question of continuing the American war was not in unison with that of its sovereign. That war into which the nation had entered with at least as much eagerness as the minister had now become almost universally unpopular. Motions against the measures of administration respecting America were repeated by the opposition, and on every new experiment the strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of February [1782], general Conway moved in the house of commons, 'that it is the opinion of this house that a further prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies, and tend to increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his majesty and the country, all those who should advise or attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to



the commanding officers of his Britannic majesty's forces in America which conformed to them. . . . Early in May, sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded sir Henry Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in conjunction with admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill which had been introduced on the part of administration, authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of North America. These papers he said would manifest the dispositions prevailing with the government and people of England towards those of America, and if the like pacific temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter containing the same communications, and he solicited from the American general a passport for the person who should convey it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a law; nor was any assurance given that the present commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he requested were refused by congress, to whom the application was, of course, referred. . . . The several states passed resolutions expressing their objections to separate negotiations, and declaring those to be enemies to America who should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But the public votes which have been stated, and probably the private instructions given to the British general, restrained him from offensive war, and the state of the American army disabled general Washington from making any attempt on the posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently passed away without furnishing any military operations of moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the respective commanders in chief."—J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 11.

Also in: Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope) *Hist. of Eng.*, 1713–1783, ch. 65 (v. 7).—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782–1783.

**A. D. 1782 (April).—Recognition by the Dutch Republic.**—"Henry Laurens, the American plenipotentiary to the Netherlands, having been taken captive and carried to England, John Adams was appointed in his place. The new envoy had waited more than eight months for an audience of reception. Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January 1782 Adams presented himself to the president of the states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland, and, following the order of their rank in the confederation, repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure. Not one of the representa-

tives of foreign powers at the Hague believed that it could succeed;" but, beginning with Friesland, in February, the seven states, one by one, declared in favor of receiving the American envoy. "On the day which chanced to be the seventh anniversary of 'the battle of Lexington' their high mightinesses, the states-general, reporting the unanimous decision of the seven provinces, resolved that John Adams should be received as the minister of the United States of America. The Dutch republic was the second power in the world to recognise their independence."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 5, p. 527.

Also in: J. Q. and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, ch. 6 (v. 1).

**A. D. 1782 (September).—The opening of negotiations for Peace.**—The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: A. D. 1782–1783), "though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity, and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1780–1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may be given to the reports of the day, the government looked forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been appointed to the command of the forces in North America. . . . Mr. Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, '82, observes, 'I cannot see a probability that the English will ever make peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil war.' It was not till September of the same year, under Lord Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner, Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the colonies. . . . This is the first instruction given by the British Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now made in the preliminaries. . . . The commission, under which the preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was issued by Congress in June '81. It empowered 'John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power and authority, general and special commission, . . . to sign, and thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally present and acted therein.' All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present

during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did not leave it, as a report reached the government that the preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in proper form was not issued till the 21st of September."—*The Diplomacy of the U. S., ch. 8.*—"At the moment . . . that negotiations were set on foot, there seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It was therefore his wish to recognize that independence immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace. Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions would be asked by France, and that the best chance England possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the recognition of independence as part of the valuable consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable terms, and to use the points where the interests of France, Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and the United States to balance one another, and so make France paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States, and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had determined to obtain formal possession of these territories, and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached the great lakes. The United States, according to both the French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by almost the same line which France had contended for against England after the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1779, when the alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure of M. Gerard, the French envoy, had adopted the following conditions as the ultimatum of peace: (1.) The acknowledgment

of the independence of the United States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation for peace. (2.) The Mississippi as their western boundary. (3.) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of the States with a port below it. They also passed a resolution to the effect that any interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus belli. 'The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American interests, and their own discretion,' were in other matters to guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts. As however the war progressed, and French assistance, especially in money, became of greater and greater importance to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and then of Count Luzerne, his successor. On the 25th January 1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United States extended no further west than the limits to which settlements were permitted by the English proclamation of 1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of the river; that Spain would probably conquer both Floridas, and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On the 15th February, Congress having considered this communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne, the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered. Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran, 'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual support in every thing that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless independence of character, and because of the tenacity with which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment he



had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The French he hated. He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he believed their interests as a power required them to adopt. Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and warned them that if France was to be asked to continue hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to say what the result might be, for the system of France depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at war."—Lord E. Fitzmaurice, *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, v. 3, ch. 4.—"Benjamin Franklin, now venerable with years, had been doing at the court of Versailles a work hardly less important than that of Washington on the battle-fields of America. By the simple grace and dignity of his manners, by his large good sense and freedom of thought, by his fame as a scientific discoverer, above all by his consummate tact in the management of men, the whilom printer, king's postmaster-general for America, discoverer, London colonial agent, delegate in the Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence, had completely captivated elegant, free-thinking France. Learned and common folk, the sober and the frivolous alike swore by Franklin. Snuff-boxes, furniture, dishes, even stoves were gotten up 'à la Franklin.' The old man's portrait was in every house. That the French Government, in spite of a monarch who was half afraid of the rising nation beyond sea, had given America her hearty support, was in no small measure due to the influence of Franklin. And his skill in diplomacy was of the greatest value in the negotiations now pending."—E. B. Andrews, *Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, pp. 208–209.

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*, v. 2, ch. 3–4.—Lord J. Russell, *Life of Fox*, ch. 16–17 (v. 1).

A. D. 1782 (September–November).—The Peace parleyings at Paris.—Distrust of French aims by Jay and Adams.—A secret and separate negotiation with England.—"The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by [the change of ministry which placed Lord Shelburne at the head of affairs in England] . . . and by the total defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar in September [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1780–1782]. Six months before, England had seemed worsted in every quarter. Now England, though defeated in America was victorious as regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United States,

and this point was now substantially gained. The chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to persuade England to cede the great stronghold in exchange for West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain at the expense of the United States; and he did this the more willingly as he had no love for the Americans, and did not wish to see them become too powerful. France had strictly kept her pledges; she had given us valuable and timely aid in gaining our independence; and the sympathies of the French people were entirely with the American cause. But the object of the French government had been simply to humiliate England, and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of her thirteen colonies. The immense territory extending from the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and from the border of West Florida to the Great Lakes, had passed from the hands of France into those of England at the peace of 1763; and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. . . . Vergennes maintained that the Americans ought to recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to England all the territory north of the Ohio River. The region south of this limit should, he thought, be made an Indian territory, and placed under the protection of Spain and the United States. . . . Upon another important point the views of the French government were directly opposed to American interests. The right to catch fish on the banks of Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the king of Great Britain, had participated in this privilege. The matter was of very great importance, not only to New England, but to the United States in general. . . . The British government was not inclined to grant the privilege, and on this point Vergennes took sides with England, in order to establish a claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in some other quarter. . . . Jay [who had lately arrived in Paris to take part in the negotiations] soon began to suspect the designs of the French minister. He found that he was sending M. de Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne under an assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the United States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of legation at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American claim to the Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned these facts, he sent his friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him that it was greatly for the interest of England to dissolve the alliance between America and France, he declared himself ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the recognition of independence, provided that Oswald's commission should speak of the thirteen United States of America, instead of calling them colonies and naming

them separately. This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own responsibility, and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been averse to anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served to set the ball rolling at once. . . . Lord Shelburne at once perceived the antagonism that had arisen between the allies, and promptly took advantage of it. A new commission was made out for Oswald, in which the British government first described our country as the United States; and early in October negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the part of England the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey and Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In the course of the month John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens. . . . The arrival of Adams fully decided the matter as to a separate negotiation with England. He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as far as possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of alliance between France and the United States had expressly stipulated that neither power should ever make peace without the consent of the other. . . . In justice to Vergennes, it should be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith with us in regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated. . . . At the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated, Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it is undeniable that, without departing technically from the obligations of the alliance, Jay and Adams—two men as honourable as ever lived—played a very sharp defensive game against him. . . . The treaty with England was not concluded until the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the express stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed agreement was reached as to what the purport of the treaty should be, while our not too friendly ally was kept in the dark.”—J. Fiske, *The Critical Period of Am. Hist.*, ch. 1.—“If his [Vergennes’] policy had been carried out, it seems clear that he would have established a claim for concessions from England by supporting her against America on the questions of Canada and the Canadian border and the Newfoundland fishery. . . . The success of such a policy would have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay and Adams defeated it. . . . The act was done, and if it can be justified by success, that justification, at least, is not wanting.”—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng. in the 18th Century*, ch. 15 (v. 4).—“The instructions of congress, given to the American commissioners under the instigation of the French court, were absolute and imperative, ‘to undertake nothing without the knowledge and concurrence of that court, and ultimately to govern themselves by their advice and opinion.’ These orders, transmitted at the time of the enlargement of the commission, had just been reinforced by assurances given to quiet the uneasiness created in France by the British overtures through Governor Carleton. Thus far, although the commissioners had felt them to be derogatory to the honor of their country, as well as to their own character as its representatives, there had been no necessity for action either under or against them. But now that matters were coming to the point of a serious negotiation, and the secondary questions of interest to America were to be

determined, especially those to which France had shown herself indifferent, not to say adverse, it seemed as if no chance remained of escaping a decision. Mr. Jay, jealous of the mission of De Rayneval, of which not a hint had been dropped by the French court, suspicious of its good faith from the disclosures of the remarkable dispatch of Marbois, and fearful of any advice like that of which he had received a foretaste through M. de Rayneval, at the same time provoked that the confidence expected should be all on one side, the Count communicating nothing of the separate French negotiation, came to the conclusion that the interests of America were safest when retained in American hands. He therefore declared himself in favor of going on to treat with Great Britain, without consulting the French court. Dr. Franklin, on the other hand, expressing his confidence in that court, secured by his sense of the steady reception of benefits by his country, signified his willingness to abide by the instructions he had received. Yet it is a singular fact, but lately disclosed, that, notwithstanding this general feeling, which was doubtless sincerely entertained, Dr. Franklin had been the first person to violate those instructions, at the very inception of the negotiations, by proposing to Lord Shelburne the cession of Canada, and covering his proposal with an earnest injunction to keep it secret from France, because of his belief that she was adverse to the measure. . . . It may fairly be inferred that, whatever Franklin might have been disposed to believe of the French court, his instincts were too strong to enable him to trust them implicitly with the care of interests purely American. And, in this, there can be no reasonable cause for doubt that he was right. The more full the disclosures have been of the French policy from their confidential papers, the more do they show Count de Vergennes assailing England in America, with quite as fixed a purpose as ever Chatham had to conquer America in Germany. Mr. Adams had no doubt of it. He had never seen any signs of a disposition to aid the United States from affection or sympathy. On the contrary, he had perceived their cause everywhere made subordinate to the general considerations of continental politics. Perhaps his impressions at some moments carried him even further, and led him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and depress America. In this he fell into the natural mistake of exaggerating the importance of his own country. In the great game of nations which was now playing at Paris under the practised eye of France’s chief (for Count de Maurepas was no longer living), the United States probably held a relative position, in his mind, not higher than that of a pawn, or possibly a knight, on a chess-table. Whilst his attention was absorbed in arranging the combinations of several powers, it necessarily followed that he had not the time to devote that attention to any one, which its special representative might imagine to be its due. But even this hypothesis was to Mr. Adams justification quite sufficient for declining to submit the interests of his country implicitly to the Count’s control. If not so material in the Count’s eyes, the greater the necessity of keeping them in his own care. He therefore seized the first opportunity to announce to his colleagues his preference for the views of Mr. Jay. After some little reflection, Dr. Frank-



lin signified his acquiescence in this decision. His objections to it had doubtless been increased by the peculiar relations he had previously sustained to the French court, and by a very proper desire to be released from the responsibility of what might from him be regarded as a discourteous act. No such delicacy was called for on the part of the other commissioners. Neither does it appear that Count de Vergennes manifested a sign of discontent with them at the time. He saw that little confidence was placed in him, but he does not seem to have made the slightest effort to change the decision or even to get an explanation of it. The truth is, that the course thus taken had its conveniences for him, provided only that the good faith of the American negotiators, not to make a separate peace, could be depended upon. Neither did he ever affect to complain of it, excepting at one particular moment when he thought he had cause to fear that the support he relied on might fail."—J. Q. and C. F. Adams, *The Life of John Adams*, v. 2, ch. 7.—"The radical difference between Franklin and his colleagues was in the question of trust. Franklin saw no reason to distrust the fidelity of France at any time to her engagements to the United States during the revolutionary war. His colleagues did not share this confidence, and yet, while impressed by this distrust of their ally, they made no appeal for explanation. The weight of opinion, as will hereafter be more fully seen, is now that Franklin was right, and they in this respect wrong. But whatever may have been the correctness of their view, it was proper that, before making it the basis of their throwing off the burden of treaty obligation and their own instructions, they should have first notified France of their complaint. Obligations cannot be repudiated by one party on the ground of the failure of the other party to perform some condition imposed on him, without giving him notice of the charge against him, so that he could have the opportunity of explanation. It may be added, on the merits, that the extenuation set up by Jay and Adams, that France was herself untrue to her obligations, however honestly they believed it, can not now be sustained. Livingston, who knew more of the attitude of France than any public man on the American side except Franklin, swept it aside as groundless. Edward Everett, one of the most accomplished historical writers and diplomatists the country has ever produced, speaks, as we shall see, to the same effect, and other historical critics of authority, to be also hereafter cited, give us the same conclusion. Yet there are other reasons which may excuse their course, and that of Franklin, who concurred with them rather than defeat a peace. In the first place, such was their isolation, that their means of communication with Congress was stopped; and they might well have argued that if Congress knew that the English envoys refused to treat with them except in secret conference their instructions would have been modified. In the second place we may accept Adams' statement that Vergennes was from time to time informally advised of the nature of the pending propositions. In the third place, the articles agreed on in 1782 were not to be a definite treaty except with the assent of France. . . . It now appears that the famous Marbois letter, handed to Jay by one of the British loyalists, and relied

on by him as showing France's duplicity, was disavowed by Marbois; and there are, aside from this, very strong reasons to distrust its genuineness. In the second place, we have in the correspondence of George III a new light thrown on the action taken by Jay in consequence of this letter. . . . Benjamin Vaughan, while a gentleman of great amiability and personal worth, was, when Jay sent him without Franklin's knowledge on a confidential mission to the British ministry, in the employ of that ministry as secret agent at Paris. It is due to Jay to say that he was ignorant of this fact, though he would have been notified of it had he consulted Franklin. One of the most singular incidents of this transaction is that George III, seeking double treachery in thus sending back to him his own agent in the guise of an agent from the American legation, regarded it as a peculiarly subtle machination of Franklin, which it was his duty to baffle by utterly discrediting Benjamin Vaughan. It should be added that Franklin's affection for Benjamin Vaughan was in no wise diminished by Vaughan's assumption, with an honesty which no one who knew him would question, of this peculiar kind of mediatorship. And in Jay Franklin's confidence was unabated. He more than once said that no one could be found more suited than Jay to represent the United States abroad. And when, in view of death, he prepared to settle his estate, he selected Jay as his executor."—F. Wharton, *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S.*, ch. 9, sect. 111, and ch. 13, sect. 158 (v. 1).—Writing to M. de la Luzerne, the French Minister in the United States, under date of December 19, 1782, Count de Vergennes expressed himself on the conduct of the American Commissioners as follows: "You will surely be gratified, as well as myself, with the very extensive advantages, which our allies, the Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly will not be less surprised than I have been, at the conduct of the Commissioners. According to the instructions of Congress, they ought to have done nothing without our participation. I have informed you, that the King did not seek to influence the negotiation any further than his offices might be necessary to his friends. The American Commissioners will not say that I have interfered, and much less that I have wearied them with my curiosity. They have cautiously kept themselves at a distance from me. Mr. Adams, one of them, coming from Holland, where he had been received and served by our ambassador, had been in Paris nearly three weeks, without imagining that he owed me any mark of attention, and probably I should not have seen him till this time, if I had not caused him to be reminded of it. Whenever I have had occasion to see any one of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise, when, on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have mutually made, not to sign except conjointly. I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on







the next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly complain that I received them without demonstrations of sensibility. It was not till some days after, that, when this minister had come to see me, I allowed myself to make him perceive that his proceeding in this abrupt signature of the articles had little in it, which could be agreeable to the King. He appeared sensible of it, and excused, in the best manner he could, himself and his colleagues. Our conversation was amicable."—J. Bigelow, *Life of Benjamin Franklin*, v. 3, p. 207, note.

ALSO IN: J. Jay, *The Peace Negotiations of 1782-3* (*Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am.*, v. 7, ch. 2).—E. Fitzmaurice, *Life of the Earl of Shelburne*, v. 3, ch. 6.—E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*, v. 2, ch. 5-8.—H. Doniol, *Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'établissement des États-Unis d'Amérique*, tome 5.—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

A. D. 1782-1783.—**Grievances of the Army.**—**The Newburgh Addresses.**—"Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of the army, and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and if so, that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and irritated by the neglect of Congress; destitute of money and credit and of the means of living from day to day; oppressed with debts; saddened by the distresses of their families at home, and by the prospect of misery before them,—they presented a memorial to Congress in December [1782], in which they urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered to commute the half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or for such a sum in gross as should be agreed on by their committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress of the memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in this document, as well as from other evidence, that the officers were nearly driven to desperation, and that their offer of commutation was wrung from them by a state of public opinion little creditable to the country. . . . The committee of the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole winter, and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their constituents that nothing had been done. At this moment, the predicament in which Washington stood, in the double relation of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and patriotism, all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side, and his fidelity to the government, on the other, were severely tried. On the 10th of March, an anonymous address was circulated among the officers at Newburgh, calling a meeting of the general and field officers, and of one officer from each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the late letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to determine what measures should be adopted to obtain that redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in vain. It was written with great ability and skill [by John Armstrong, afterwards General]. . . . Washington met the crisis with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper, and directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th, to hear the report of their committee, and to delib-

erate what further measures ought to be adopted as most rational and best calculated to obtain the just and important object in view. The senior officer in rank present [General Gates] was directed to preside, and to report the result to the Commander-in-chief. On the next day after these orders were issued, a second anonymous address appeared from the same writer. In this paper he affected to consider the orders of General Washington, assuming the direction of the meeting, as a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed. Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the meeting himself, or that his name would be used to justify measures which he intended to discountenance and prevent. He therefore attended the meeting, and under his influence, seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all attempts to seduce them from their civil allegiance, referred the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration of Congress. Even at this distant day, the peril of that crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the Commander-in-chief been other than Washington, had the leading officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood of a civil war."—G. T. Curtis, *Hist. of the Const. of the U. S.*, bk. 2, ch. 1 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 11.

A. D. 1782-1784.—**Persecution and flight of the Tories or Loyalists.** See **TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.**

A. D. 1783 (April).—**Formation of the Society of the Cincinnati.** See **CINCINNATI, THE SOCIETY OF THE.**

A. D. 1783 (September).—**The definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States.**—The four difficult questions on which the British and American negotiators at Paris arrived, after much discussion and wise compromise, at a settlement of differences originally wide, were (1) Boundaries; (2) Fishing rights; (3) Payment of debts from American to British merchants that were outstanding when the war began; (4) Amnesty to American loyalists, or Tories, and restoration of their confiscated property. Within two months after the separate negotiations with England opened an agreement had been reached, and preliminary or provisional articles were signed on the 30th of November, 1782. The treaty was not to take effect, otherwise than by the cessation of hostilities, until terms of peace should be agreed upon between England and France. This occurred in the following January, and on the 3d of September, 1783, the definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States was signed [at Paris]. Its essential provisions were the following: "Art. I. His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the Government, pro-



priety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof. Art. II. And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the subject of the boundaries of the United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are, and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint Croix River to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence, by a line due west on the said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the middle of said water communication into the Lake Huron; thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake to the most northwestern point thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line last mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the Equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean. East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia. Art. III. It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of Saint Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have lib-

erty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground. Art. IV. It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted. Art. V. It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of His Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the said United States. . . . Art. VI. That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenc'd, against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war. . . . Art. VII. There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall from henceforth cease: All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States. . . . Art. VIII. The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain, and the citizens of the United States."—*Doc's Illustrative of Am. Hist.*, ed. by H. W. Preston, p. 232.

ALSO IN: *Treaties and Conventions between the U. S. and other Powers* (ed. of 1889), pp. 370–379. —*Parliamentary Hist. of Eng.*, v. 23.

A. D. 1783 (November–December). — The British evacuation of New York.—Dissolution of the Continental Army and Washington's farewell to it.—"The definitive treaty had been signed at Paris on the 3d of September, 1783, and was soon to be ratified by the United States in Congress assembled. The last remnant of the British army in the east had sailed down the Narrows on the 25th of November, a day which, under the appellation of Evacuation Day, was long held in grateful remembrance by the inhabitants of New York, and was, till a few years since, annually celebrated with fireworks and with military display. Of the continental army scarce a remnant was then [at the beginning of 1784] in the service of the States, and these few were under the command of General Knox. His great work of deliverance over, Washington had resigned his commission, had gone back to his estate on the banks of the

Potomac, and was deeply engaged with plans for the improvement of his plantations. The retirement to private life of the American Fabius, as the newspapers delighted to call him, had been attended by many pleasing ceremonies, and had been made the occasion for new manifestations of affectionate regard by the people. The same day that witnessed the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from New York also witnessed the entry into that city of the army of the States. Nine days later Washington bid adieu to his officers. About noon on Thursday, the 4th of December, the chiefs of the army assembled in the great room of Fraunces's Tavern, then the resort of merchants and men of fashion, and there Washington joined them. Rarely as he gave way to his emotions, he could not on that day get the mastery of them. . . . He filled a glass from a decanter that stood on the table, raised it with a trembling hand, and said: 'With a heart full of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most devoutly wish your latter days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable.' Then he drank to them, and, after a pause, said: 'I cannot come to each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged if you will each come and shake me by the hand.' General Knox came forward first, and Washington embraced him. The other officers approached one by one, and silently took their leave. A line of infantry had been drawn up extending from the tavern to Whitehall ferry, where a barge was in waiting to carry the commander across the Hudson to Paulus Hook. Washington, with his officers following, walked down the line of soldiers to the water. The streets, the balconies, the windows, were crowded with gazers. All the churches in the city sent forth a joyous din. Arrived at the ferry, he entered the barge in silence, stood up, took off his hat and waved farewell. Then, as the boat moved slowly out into the stream amid the shouts of the citizens, his companions in arms stood bareheaded on the shore till the form of their illustrious commander was lost to view."—J. B. McMaster, *Hist. of the People of the U. S.*, ch. 2 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 33.—Mrs. M. J. Lamb, *Hist. of the City of N. Y.*, v. 2, ch. 6-7.

**A. D. 1783-1787.—After the war.—Resistance to the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace.—National feebleness and humiliation.—Failure of the Articles of Confederation.—Movements toward a firmer Constitution.**—"The revolution was at last accomplished. The evils it had removed, being no longer felt, were speedily forgotten. The evils it had brought pressed heavily upon them. They could devise no remedy. They saw no way of escape. They soon began to grumble, became sullen, hard to please, dissatisfied with themselves and with everything done for them. The States, differing in habits, in customs, in occupations, had been during a few years united by a common danger. But the danger was gone; old animosities and jealousies broke forth again with all their strength, and the union seemed likely to be dissolved. In this state of public discontent the House met at Philadelphia early in January, 1784. Some days were spent in examining credentials of new members, and in waiting for the delinquents to come in. It was not till the 14th of

the month that the definitive treaty was taken under consideration and duly ratified. Nothing remained, therefore, but to carry out the stipulations with as much haste as possible. But there were some articles which the people had long before made up their minds never should be carried out. While the treaty was yet in course of preparation the royal commissioners had stoutly insisted on the introduction of articles providing for the return of the refugees and the payment of debts due to British subjects at the opening of the war. The commissioners on behalf of the United States, who well knew the tempers of their countrymen, had at first firmly stood out against any such articles. But some concessions were afterward made by each party, and certain stipulations touching the debts and the refugees inserted. Adams, who wrote in the name of his fellow-commissioners, . . . hoped that the middle line adopted would be approved. The middle line to which Adams referred was that Congress should recommend the States to make no more seizures of the goods and property of men lately in arms against the Confederation, and to put no bar in the way of the recovery of such as had already been confiscated. It was distinctly understood by each side that these were recommendations, and nothing more than recommendations. Yet no sooner were they made known than a shout of indignation and abuse went up from all parts of the country. The community in a moment was divided between three parties. The smallest of the three was made up of the Tories, who still hoped for place and power, and still nursed the delusion that the past would be forgotten. Yet they daily contributed to keep the remembrance of it alive by a strong and avowed attachment to Great Britain. Opposed to these was the large and influential body of violent Whigs, who insisted vehemently that every loyalist should instantly be driven from the States. A less numerous and less violent body of Whigs constituted the third party." The fury of the violent Whigs proved generally irresistible and great numbers of the obnoxious Tories fled (see **TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION**) before it. Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain, and founded settlements which their descendants have since raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England, beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused, with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the severe restrictions which England began to lay on American commerce. Many more . . . set out for Nova Scotia. . . . The open contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into which Congress had fallen was most wretched. . . . Each of the thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against



the central government. Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond the borders of the State was made with protestations, with trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. . . . From beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of population. . . . But this absolute equality of the States was more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once created for preferring a representation of two to a representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all. While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed, some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the organization of the Government under the Constitution six years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a period of thirteen consecutive days. . . . No occasion, however impressive or important, could call out a large attendance. Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built. In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing was more diverting than the un-

certain wanderings of Congress. . . . In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in the army and come rapidly into vogue. . . . The men who, in after years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution, who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents, cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."—J. B. McMaster, *Hist. of the People of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 2.—Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of the Federalist, of the state of the country in 1787, is very graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an

opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded what indication is there of National disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? . . . The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. . . . There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations, for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. . . . If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a National Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a Government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of Government.”—Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist*, no. 15.—“Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless. Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they could lay any desired burden upon American

commerce without fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785 Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States. The Federal Government, in short, was despised abroad and disobeyed at home. The apparent remedy was the possession by Congress of the power of levying and collecting internal taxes and duties on imports, but, after long urging, it was found impossible to gain the necessary consent of all the States to the article of taxation by Congress. In 1786, therefore, this was abandoned, and, as a last resort, the States were asked to pass an Amendment intrusting to Congress the collection of a revenue from imports. This Amendment was agreed to by all the States but one. New York alone rejected it, after long debate, and her veto seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds of many for an immediate and complete revision of the government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In 1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786, delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the States were not represented. The general conclusion was that the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed, May 14th, 1787.”—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, 2d ed., ch. 1.—“Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of perpetual duration. . . . But this brief interval was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience during that period.”—G. T. Curtis, *Hist. of the Const.*, bk. 3, ch. 1.—“It is not too much to say that the period of five years following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people.”—J. Fiske, *Critical Period of Am. Hist.*, p. 55.

Also in: J. S. Landon, *Const. Hist. and Gov't of the U. S.*, lect. 3.



**A. D. 1783-1789.—Depressed state of Trade and Industry.**—Commercial consequences of the want of nationality.—“The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the United States, was not so disastrous as might have been expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt. Before the Revolution the colonies had had open trade with their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar, cotton, rum, and indigo. . . . As a result of independence, the West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of the United States then came in on the footing of foreign vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of the mainland for the necessities of life. Pitt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as to articles that were the produce of either country. The measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen. Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the necessary supply of food when their own crops had been destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition of the West India trade, another and more important cause had operated to check the prosperous development of American commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others.”—J. R. Soley, *Maritime Industries of Am. (The United States of Am., ed. by N. S. Shaler, v. 1, ch. 10).*—“The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities called the United States, from 1783 to 1789, was probably

the poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country. England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784, and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and detail of the internal management of this commerce added to the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time. Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming of the troops had been to the political rights of the old colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about three weeks the mechanics and artisans met in the old Green Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries. The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process. Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to treat with any power which excluded American shipping from its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports were closed to American products unless they were brought in British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade, and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the whole country.”—W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social Hist. of New Eng., 1620-1789, ch. 22 (v. 2).*

**A. D. 1784.—Plans for new States in the Northwest Territory.** See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE U. S.: A. D. 1784.

A. D. 1784.—Revolt in Tennessee against the territorial cession to Congress.—The State of Franklin. See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1776-1784; and 1785.

A. D. 1784.—The first daily Newspaper publication. See PRINTING and PRESS: A. D. 1784-1813.

A. D. 1784.—The financial administration of Robert Morris.—Cost of the war.—From May, 1781, until April, 1785, the burden of the financial management of the revolutionary struggle rested upon Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, who held the office which Congress had created and entitled "the Superintendent of Finances." Morris's detractors argued that he deserved no great credit for his management of the finances as compared with his predecessors, because in his time everything turned in his favour. It is true that if things had remained as before, he could not have restored the finances; for the miracle of carrying on a war without means has never yet been performed by anybody. The events which gave him an opportunity to restore the finances, by intelligent and energetic action, were as follows. The first was the collapse of the paper currency and its absolute removal from circulation, in May, 1781, just before he took office. As soon as it was out of the way, specie came in. He was able to throw aside all the trammels in which the treasury operations had been entangled by the paper system. It is true that he did not succeed in his attempt to relieve himself entirely from these anticipations, which, inasmuch as they were anticipations, would have used up the revenues of his time; but it was a great gain for him to be able to conduct his current operations at least in terms of specie. The second thing in his favour was the great help granted by France in 1781, and especially the importation of a part of this in specie. This enabled him to found the bank, from which he borrowed six times what he put into it. The chief use of the bank to him, however, was to discount the notes which he took for bills of exchange. Then also it was possible for him to reduce the expenses in a way which his predecessors had not had the courage or the opportunity to accomplish, because in their time the abuses of the old method had not gone far enough to force acquiescence in the reforms. In Morris's time, and chiefly, as it appears, by his exertions and merit, the expenditures were greatly reduced for an army of a given size. When the war came to an end, it was possible for him to reduce the entire establishment to a very low scale. Next we notice that the efforts to introduce taxation bore fruit which, although it was trivial in one point of view, was large enough to be very important to him in his desperate circumstances. Finally, when his need was the greatest, and these advantages and opportunities proved inadequate, the rise of American credit made the loan in Holland possible [\$3,600,000, obtained in four different loans]. . . . By the Report of 1790 the total amount of expenditures and advances at the treasury of the United States, during the war, in specie value, was estimated as follows: 1775 and 1776, \$20,064,666.—1777, \$24,986,646.—1778, \$24,289,438.—1779, \$10,794,620.—1780, \$3,000,000.—1781, \$1,942,465.—1782, \$3,632,745.—1783, \$3,226,583.—1784, \$548,525 to November 1.—Total \$92,485,693. This table shows how the

country lapsed into dependence on France after the alliance was formed. The round number opposite 1780 is very eloquent. It means anarchy and guesswork. . . . According to the best records we possess, the cost of the war to the United States, reduced to specie value year by year at the official scale of depreciation, which, being always below the truth, makes these figures too high, was, as above stated, \$92,485,693, at the treasury. There were also certificates of indebtedness out for \$16,708,009. There had been expended in Europe, which never went through the treasury, \$5,000,000. The States were estimated to have expended \$21,000,000. Total, \$135,000,000. Jefferson calculated it at \$140,000,000, by adding the debts incurred and the continental currency. The debt contracted by England during the war was £115,000,000, for which £91,000,000 were realized. The Comptroller of the Treasury of France said that it cost 60,000,000 livres a year to support the army in America. Vergennes told Lafayette, in November, 1782, that France had expended 250,000,000 livres in the war. There is an often-repeated statement that the war cost France 1,200,000,000 livres, or 1,280,000,000, or 1,500,000,000. Arthur Young put it at £50,000,000, sterling. Probably if 60,000,000 a year for five years, or \$60,000,000, was taken as the amount directly expended for and in America by France, it would be as fair a computation as could be made of her contribution to American independence. She had large expenditures elsewhere in the prosecution of her war against Great Britain, and her incidental losses of ships, etc., were great. When England abandoned the effort to subdue the colonies, she was in a far better position for continuing it than either of her adversaries. George III. was by no means stupid in his comments and suggestions about the war. No Englishman of the period said things which now seem wiser in the retrospect. As early as September, 1780, he said: 'America is distressed to the greatest degree. The finances of France, as well as Spain, are in no good situation. This war, like the last, will prove one of credit.' This opinion was fully justified in 1782. French finances were then hastening toward bankruptcy, so that France could not continue the war expenses or the loans and subsidies to America. English credit was high. October 2, 1782, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, that the English fleet was stronger than at the beginning of the war, while the fleets of France and Spain were weaker; that French finances were greatly weakened, while English credit was high; that England had recovered influence in Russia, and through Russia on Prussia and Austria. He wanted peace and reconciliation with England in order to act with her in eastern Europe. If England had chosen to persevere in the war, the matter of credit would have been the most important element in her chances of success, aside from the natural difficulties of the enterprise."—W. G. Sumner, *The Financier and the Finances of the Am. Revolution*, ch. 23 (v. 2).

A. D. 1784-1788.—Disputes with England over the execution of the Treaty of Peace.—Difficulties with Spain.—The question of the Navigation of the Mississippi.—Eastern jealousy and Western excitement.—"Serious disputes soon arose, concerning the execution of the



treaty of peace; and each nation complained of infractions by the other. On the part of the United States, it was alleged that negroes had been carried away, contrary to the treaty; and as early as May, 1783, congress instructed their ministers for negotiating peace to remonstrate to the British court against this conduct of their commander in America, and to take measures to obtain reparation. The United States, also, complained that the western posts had not been surrendered, agreeably to treaty stipulations. Great Britain, on her part, alleged that legal impediments had been interposed to prevent the collection of British debts in America; and that the 5th and 6th articles, relating to the property of the loyalists, had not been complied with. In June, 1784, the legislature of Virginia not only declared that there had been an infraction on the part of Great Britain of the 7th article, in detaining the slaves and other property of the citizens of the United States, but instructed their delegates in congress to request that a remonstrance be presented to the British court against such infraction and to require reparation. They also directed them to inform congress that the state of Virginia conceived a just regard to the national honor and interest obliged her assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete fulfilment of the treaty until the success of such remonstrance was known, or they should have further directions from congress. They at the same time declared, that as soon as reparation for such infraction should be made, or congress should judge it indispensably necessary, such acts as inhibited the recovery of British debts should be repealed, and payment made, in such time and manner as should consist with the exhausted situation of the state. In consequence of these difficulties and disputes, congress, early in the year 1785, determined to send a minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain; and on the 24th of February John Adams was appointed to represent the United States at the court of London. He was instructed 'in a respectful but firm manner to insist that the United States be put, without further delay, into possession of all the posts and territories within their limits which are now held by British garrisons.' . . . Mr. Jefferson was soon after appointed to represent the United States at the court of Versailles, in the room of Dr. Franklin, who had leave to return home, after an absence of nine years. Mr. Livingston having resigned the office of secretary of foreign affairs, Mr. Jay, in March, 1784, and before his return from Europe, was appointed in his place. Mr. Adams repaired to the British court, and was received as the first minister from the United States since their independence was acknowledged. . . . In December, 1785, Mr. Adams presented a memorial to the British secretary of state, in which, after stating the detention of the western posts contrary to the stipulations in the treaty of peace, he in the name and in behalf of the United States required 'that all his majesty's armies and garrisons be forthwith withdrawn from the said United States, from all and every of the posts and fortresses before enumerated, and from every port, place and harbor, within the territory of the said United States, according to the true intention of the treaties.' To this memorial the British secretary, lord Carmarthen, returned an answer, on the 28th of February, 1786, in which he acknowledges the detention of

the posts, but alleges a breach of the 4th article of the treaty of peace on the part of the United States, by interposing impediments to the recovery of British debts in America. . . . This answer was accompanied with a statement of the various instances in which the 4th article had been violated by acts of the states. The complaints of Great Britain also extended to breaches of the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty, relating to the recovery of certain property and to confiscations. The answer of the British secretary was submitted to congress; and in order to remove the difficulties complained of, that body, in March, 1787, unanimously declared that all the acts, or parts of acts, existing in any of the states, repugnant to the treaty of peace, ought to be repealed; and they recommended to the states to make such repeal by a general law. . . . A circular letter to the states accompanied these declarations, in which congress say, 'we have deliberately and dispassionately examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by Great Britain, as infractions of the treaty of peace, on the part of America, and we regret that, in some of the states, too little attention has been paid to the public faith pledged by that treaty.' In consequence of this letter, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed acts complying with the recommendations contained in it. The operation of the act of Virginia, however, which repealed all acts preventing the recovery of debts due to British subjects, was suspended until the governor of that state should issue a proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had delivered up the western posts, and was also taking measures for the further fulfilment of the treaty of peace by delivering up the negroes belonging to the citizens of that state, carried away contrary to the 7th article of the treaty, or by making compensation for the same. . . . The British court was not yet disposed to enter into any commercial treaty with the United States. The ministers were, no doubt, satisfied that the advantages they enjoyed under their own regulations were greater than could be obtained by any treaty they could make with America. And this was, probably, one of the principal reasons of their refusal to enter into any such treaty. As the British court declined sending a minister to the United States, Mr. Adams, in October, 1787, at his request, had leave to return home. . . . The United States had also at this period to encounter difficulties with Spain as well as Great Britain. The two Floridas having been ceded to his catholic majesty, serious disputes soon arose, not only on the old subject of the navigation of the Mississippi, but with respect to the boundaries of Louisiana and the ceded territory. The Spanish court still persisted in its determination to exclude the Americans from the navigation of the Mississippi. . . . In December, 1784, congress declared it necessary to send a minister to Spain, for the purpose of adjusting the interfering claims of the two nations respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, and other matters highly interesting to the peace and good understanding which ought to subsist between them. This was prevented by the appointment of Don Diego Gardoqui, a minister from Spain, who arrived in the United States and was acknowledged by congress in the summer of 1785. Soon after his

arrival, Mr. Jay, then secretary of foreign affairs, was appointed to treat with the Spanish minister on the part of the United States. . . . As Mr. Jay, by his instructions, was not to conclude a treaty until the same was communicated to congress and approved by them, and was also specially directed to obtain a stipulation acknowledging the right of the United States to their territorial claims and the free navigation of the Mississippi, as established in their treaty with Great Britain, he, on the 3d of August, 1786, submitted to congress the . . . plan of a commercial treaty, and stated the difficulties in obtaining the stipulation required. . . . 'Circumstanced as we are [said Mr. Jay] I think it would be expedient to agree that the treaty should be limited to twenty five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean. Thus the duration of the treaty and of the forbearance in question should be limited to the same period.' . . . Among other reasons, Mr. Jay stated that the navigation of the Mississippi was not at that time very important, and would not probably become so in less than twenty five or thirty years, and that a forbearance to use it, while it was not wanted, was no great sacrifice—that Spain then excluded the people of the United States from that navigation, and that it could only be acquired by war, for which the United States were not then prepared; and that in case of war France would no doubt join Spain. Congress were much divided on this interesting subject. The seven states at the north, including Pennsylvania, were disposed, in case a treaty could not otherwise be made, to forbear the use of the navigation of the Mississippi below the southern boundary of the United States, for a limited time, and a resolution was submitted to congress repealing Mr. Jay's instructions of the 25th of August, 1785, and which was carried, seven states against five. . . . This, however, was to be on the express condition that a stipulation of forbearance should not be construed to extinguish the right of the United States, independent of such stipulation, to use and navigate said river from its source to the ocean; and that such stipulation was not to be made unless it should be agreed in the same treaty that the navigation and use of the said river above such intersection to its source should be common to both nations—and Mr. Jay was to make no treaty unless the territorial limits of the United States were acknowledged and secured according to the terms agreed between the United States and Great Britain. . . . As by the confederation the assent of nine states was necessary in making a treaty the same number was considered requisite in giving specific instructions in relation to it; . . . and it was questioned whether the previous instructions given to Mr. Jay could be rescinded without the assent of nine states. These proceedings in congress, though with closed doors, soon became partly known, and excited great alarm in Virginia and in the western settlements. . . . While these negotiations were pending, the fertile country at the west was settling with a rapidity beyond the most sanguine calculations; and it is not surprising that the news of an actual or intended abandonment of the navigation of the Mississippi, the only outlet for their productions, should have excited great alarm

among its inhabitants. They were much exasperated by the seizure and confiscation of American property by the Spaniards, on its way down the river, which took place about the same time. The proposition made in congress was magnified into an actual treaty, and called from the western people most bitter complaints and reproaches. . . . To quiet the apprehensions of the western inhabitants, the delegates from North Carolina, in September, 1788, submitted to congress a resolution declaring that 'whereas many citizens of the United States, who possess lands on the western waters, have expressed much uneasiness from a report that congress are disposed to treat with Spain for the surrender of their claim to the navigation of the river Mississippi; in order therefore to quiet the minds of our fellow citizens by removing such ill founded apprehensions, resolved, that the United States have a clear, absolute, and unalienable claim to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, which claim is not only supported by the express stipulations of treaties, but by the great law of nature.' The secretary of foreign affairs, to whom this resolution was referred, reported, that as the rumor mentioned in the resolution was not warranted by the negotiations between the United States and Spain, the members be permitted to contradict it, in the most explicit terms. Mr. Jay also stated, there could be no objection to declaring the right of the United States to the navigation of the river clear and absolute—that this had always been his opinion; and that the only question had been whether a modification of that right for equivalent advantages was advisable; and though he formerly thought such a modification might be proper, yet that circumstances and discontents had since interposed to render it questionable. He also advised that further negotiations with Spain be transferred to the new general government. On this report, congress, on the 16th of September, 1788, in order to remove the apprehensions of the western settlers, declared that the members be permitted to contradict the report referred to by the delegates from North Carolina; and at the same time resolved 'that the free navigation of the river Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the United States, and that the same ought to be considered and supported as such.' All further negotiations with Spain were also referred to the new federal government."—T. Pitkin, *Political and Civil Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 17 (v. 2).—"It was important for the frontiersmen to take the Lake Posts from the British; but it was even more important to wrest from the Spaniards the free navigation of the Mississippi. While the Lake Posts were held by the garrisons of a foreign power, the work of settling the northwestern territory was bound to go forward slowly and painfully; but while the navigation of the Mississippi was barred, even the settlements already founded could not attain to their proper prosperity and importance. . . . The Westerners were right in regarding as indispensable the free navigation of the Mississippi. They were right also in their determination ultimately to acquire the control of the whole river, from the source to the mouth. However, the Westerners wished more than the privilege of sending down stream the products of their woods and pastures and tilled farms. They had already begun to cast longing eyes on the fair Spanish



possessions. . . . Every bold, lawless, ambitious leader among the frontier folk dreamed of wresting from the Spaniard some portion of his rich and ill-guarded domain. It was not alone the attitude of the frontiersmen towards Spain that was novel, and based upon a situation for which there was little precedent. Their relations with one another, with their brethren of the seaboard, and with the Federal Government, likewise had to be adjusted without much chance of profiting by antecedent experience. Many phases of these relations between the people who stayed at home and those who wandered off to make homes, between the frontiersmen as they formed young States, and the Central Government representing the old States, were entirely new, and were ill-understood by both parties. . . . The attitude towards the Westerners of certain portions of the population in the older States, and especially in the northeastern States, was one of unreasoning jealousy and suspicion; and though this mental attitude rarely crystallized into hostile deeds, its very existence, and the knowledge that it did exist, embittered the men of the West. . . . In the northeastern States, and in New England especially, this feeling showed itself for two generations after the close of the Revolutionary War. On the whole the New Englanders have exerted a more profound and wholesome influence upon the development of our common country than has ever been exerted by any other equally numerous body of our people. They have led the nation in the path of civil liberty and sound governmental administration. But too often they have viewed the nation's growth and greatness from a narrow and provincial standpoint, and have grudgingly acquiesced in, rather than led the march towards, continental supremacy. In shaping the nation's policy for the future their sense of historic perspective seemed imperfect. . . . The extreme representatives of this northeastern sectionalism not only objected to the growth of the West at the time now under consideration, but even avowed a desire to work it harm, by shutting the Mississippi, so as to benefit the commerce of the Atlantic States. . . . These intolerant extremists not only opposed the admission of the young western States into the Union, but at a later date actually announced that the annexation by the United States of vast territories beyond the Mississippi offered just cause for the secession of the northeastern States. Even those who did not take such an advanced ground felt an unreasonable dread lest the West might grow to overtop the East in power. . . . A curious feature of the way many honest men looked at the West was their inability to see how essentially transient were some of the characteristics to which they objected. Thus they were alarmed at the turbulence and the lawless shortcomings of various kinds which grew out of the conditions of frontier settlement and sparse population. They looked with anxious foreboding to the time when the turbulent and lawless people would be very numerous, and would form a dense and powerful population; failing to see that in exact proportion as the population became dense, the conditions which caused the qualities to which they objected would disappear. Even the men who had too much good sense to share these fears, even men as broadly patriotic as Jay, could not realize the

extreme rapidity of western growth. Kentucky and Tennessee grew much faster than any of the old frontier colonies had ever grown; and from sheer lack of experience, eastern statesmen could not realize that this rapidity of growth made the navigation of the Mississippi a matter of immediate and not of future interest to the West. . . . While many of the people on the eastern seaboard thus took an indefensible position in reference to the trans-Alleghany settlements, in the period immediately succeeding the Revolution, there were large bodies of the population of these same settlements, including very many of their popular leaders, whose own attitude towards the Union was, if anything, more blame-worthy. They were clamorous about their rights, and were not unready to use veiled threats of disunion when they deemed these rights infringed; but they showed little appreciation of their own duties to the Union. . . . They demanded that the United States wrest from the British the Lake Posts, and from the Spaniards the navigation of the Mississippi. Yet they seemed incapable of understanding that if they separated from the Union they would thereby forfeit all chance of achieving the very purposes they had in view, because they would then certainly be at the mercy of Britain, and probably, at least for some time, at the mercy of Spain also. They opposed giving the United States the necessary civil and military power, although it was only by the possession and exercise of such power that it would be possible to secure for the westerners what they wished. In all human probability, the whole country round the Great Lakes would still be British territory, and the mouth of the Mississippi still in the hands of some European power, had the folly of the separatists won the day and had the West been broken up into independent states. . . . This final triumph of the Union party in these first-formed frontier States was fraught with immeasurable good."—T. Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, v. 3, ch. 3.—See FLORIDA: A. D. 1783-1787; and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1785-1800.

A. D. 1785-1787.—First troubles and dealings with the Barbary pirates. See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785-1801.

A. D. 1786-1787.—Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1786-1787.

A. D. 1787.—The Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory.—Exclusion of Slavery forever. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1787; also, EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1880.

A. D. 1787.—The framing of the Federal Constitution.—The Union constructed of compromises.—The convention of delegates appointed to revise the Articles of Confederation, but which took upon itself the task of framing anew a Federal Constitution for the States, assembled at Philadelphia on the 25th of May, 1787, eleven days later than the day appointed for its meeting. "The powers conferred by the several states were not uniform. Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey appointed their delegates 'for the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution;' North Carolina, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia 'to decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of the Federal Union;' New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 'for the sole and

express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation; South Carolina and Maryland 'to render the Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation.' Rhode Island held aloof. She was governed by a class of men who wanted to pay their debts in paper money, and she did not wish to surrender her power to collect duties upon the goods that came into her port. The trade of Newport at that day surpassed that of New York. Connecticut came in reluctantly, and New Hampshire late in July, 1787. . . . Washington was made president of the convention. . . . Many names great in the revolutionary struggle were absent from the roll of delegates. John and Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, were not there. Patrick Henry of Virginia refused to attend. Thomas Jefferson and John Jay were absent from the country. George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, however, were there. . . . Among the younger men was James Madison of Virginia. . . . Alexander Hamilton came from New York. . . . Charles C. Pinckney was a delegate from South Carolina. . . . James Wilson of Pennsylvania was a Scotchman. He surpassed all others in his exact knowledge of the civil and common law, and the law of nations. . . . Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman came from Connecticut. . . . Many of the 55 delegates shared Hamilton's contempt for a democracy, but the strength they would repose in a government they preferred to retain in the states. . . . The first business of the convention was the adoption of rules. Each state was to have one vote. Such was the rule in the Confederate Congress. Seven states made a quorum. The convention was to sit with closed doors, and everything was to be kept secret: nothing was to be given to the public except the completed work. This injunction of secrecy was never removed. Fortunately James Madison kept a pretty full account of the debates and proceedings, all in his own hand."—J. S. Landon, *Const. Hist. and Gov't of the U. S.*, lect. 3.—"Madison tells us in his report of these debates that previous to the opening of the Convention it had been a subject of discussion among the members present, as to how the States should vote in the Convention. Several of the members from Pennsylvania had urged that the large States unite in refusing to the small States an equal vote, but Virginia, believing this to be injudicious if not unjust, 'discountenanced and stifled the project.' On the 29th the real business of the Convention was opened by Edmund Randolph, who as Governor of Virginia was put forward as spokesman by his colleagues. He began by saying that as the Convention had originated from Virginia, and the delegation from this State supposed that some proposition was expected from them, the task had been imposed on him. After enumerating the defects of the Confederation, he detailed the remedy proposed. This latter was set forth in fifteen resolutions and was called afterwards the Virginia plan of government. Charles Pinckney from South Carolina had also a draft of a federal government, which was read and like the former referred to a committee of the whole House. . . . The Committee of the Whole . . . debated from day to day the resolutions contained in the Virginia plan, and on the 13th of June they reported nineteen resolutions based upon those of Vir-

ginia, forming a system of government in outline. On the following day Mr. Paterson, of New Jersey, asked for time to prepare another plan founded on the Articles of Confederation. This was submitted to the Convention on the 15th. The Virginia and the New Jersey plan were contrasted briefly by one of the members: Virginia plan proposes two branches in the legislature, Jersey, a single legislative body; Virginia, the legislative powers derived from the people, Jersey, from the States; Virginia, a single executive, Jersey, more than one; Virginia, a majority of the legislature can act, Jersey, a small majority can control; Virginia, the legislature can legislate on all national concerns, Jersey, only on limited objects; Virginia, legislature to negative all State laws, Jersey, giving power to the executive to compel obedience by force; Virginia, to remove the executive by impeachment, Jersey, on application of a majority of the States; Virginia, for the establishment of inferior judiciary tribunals, Jersey, no provision. Neither of these plans commended themselves to men like Hamilton, who wanted a strong government, and were afraid of democracy or giving power to the people. He thought the Virginia plan 'but pork still with a little change of the sauce.' The Articles of Confederation amended, as in the New Jersey plan, set forth a government approved of by the opposite wing of the Convention, consisting of men like Lansing, who professed an ultra devotion to the rights and autonomy of the States. . . . The Convention did not go again into committee of the whole, but continued to debate the nineteen resolutions from the 19th of June until the 23d of July. Some of these were referred to grand committees, consisting of one member from each State, or they were referred to select committees consisting of five members."—K. M. Rowland, *Life of Geo. Mason*, v. 2, ch. 4.—"The plan presented by Mr. Patterson, called the New-Jersey plan, was concerted and arranged between the deputations of that State, of Delaware, of New York, and of Connecticut, with the individual co-operation of Mr. Luther Martin, one of the delegates of Maryland. The extreme jealousy . . . manifested by the representatives of the two first-named States with regard to the equal suffrage of the States in the common councils of the Confederacy, was the principal source of their aversion to the plan reported by the committee of the whole. The delegates of Connecticut, and Messrs. Lansing and Yates,—forming a majority of the delegation of New York,—united with the deputations of New Jersey and Delaware, not so much from an exclusive attachment to the principle of the sovereignty and equality of the States, as from the policy of preserving the existing framework of the confederation, and of simply vesting in Congress, as then organized, a few additional powers. It was under the influence of these mixed political views that the New-Jersey plan was conceived and prepared. It proposed to vest in the existing Congress,—a single body in which all the States had an equal suffrage,—in addition to the powers already given to it by the articles of confederation, that of raising revenue by imposts and stamp and postage duties, and also that of passing acts for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between the States; leaving the enforcement of all such acts,



in the first instance, to the State courts, with an ultimate appeal to the tribunals of the United States. Whenever requisitions on the States for contributions should be made, and any State should fail to comply with such requisitions within a specified time, Congress was to be authorized to direct their collection in the non-complying States, and to pass the requisite acts for that purpose. None of the foregoing powers, however, were to be exercised by Congress without the concurrence of a certain number of the States, exceeding a bare majority of the whole. The plan also proposed the organization of a Federal executive and a Federal judiciary. . . . It was, finally, provided that if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution any act of Congress passed in virtue of the powers granted to that body, or any treaty made and ratified under the authority of the United States, the Federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to the acts, or an observance of the treaties, whose execution shall have been so opposed or prevented. Such were the salient features of the plan now brought forward as a substitute for the Virginia propositions, as reported by the committee of the whole. . . . In the progress of the discussion upon the two plans, Colonel Hamilton, of New York, made an elaborate speech, declaring himself to be opposed to both, and suggesting a third and more absolute plan, which he thought was alone adequate to the exigencies of the country. He frankly avowed his distrust of both republican and federal government, under any modification. He entered into a minute analysis of the various sources and elements of political power, in order to show that all these would be on the side of the State governments, so long as a separate political organization of the States was maintained, and would render them an over-match for any general government that could be established, unless a 'complete sovereignty' was vested in the latter. He thought it essential, therefore, to the ends of a good and efficient government of the whole country, that the State governments, with their vast and extensive apparatus, should be extinguished; though 'he did not mean,' he said, 'to shock public opinion by proposing such a measure.' He also expressed his despair of the practicability of establishing a republican government over so extensive a country as the United States. He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. Yet 'he had no scruple,' he said, 'in declaring that, in his private opinion, the British government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America.' He descanted upon the securities against injustice, violence, and innovation, afforded, in the English system, by the permanent constitution of the House of Lords, and by the elevated and independent position of the monarch. He thence deduced the necessity of as permanent a tenure as public opinion in this country would bear, of the leading branches of the new government. 'Let one branch of the legislature,' he said, 'hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the executive also be for life.' In concluding, he expressed his conviction that 'a great progress

was going on in the public mind; that the people will, in time, be unshackled from their prejudices; and, whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan brought forward by Mr. Randolph [the Virginia plan] would place them, but would be ready to go as far, at least, as he proposed.' He then read a plan of government he had prepared, which, he said, he did not submit as a proposition to the convention, but as giving a correct sketch of his ideas, and to suggest the amendment which he should probably offer to the Virginia plan in the future stages of its consideration. . . . The convention now had presented for their consideration three distinct schemes of government: one purely Federal, founded upon the idea of preserving undiminished the sovereignty and equality of the States, and of constituting a special political agency in Congress for certain purposes, but still under the dependence and control of the States; another of a consolidated character, bottomed on the principle of a virtual annihilation of the State sovereignties and the creation of a central government, with a supreme and indefinite control over both individuals and communities; the third a mixed and balanced system, resting upon an agreed partition of the powers of sovereignty between the States and the Union,—one portion to be vested in the Union for certain objects of common and national concern, the residue retained by the States for the regulation of the general mass of their interior and domestic interests. . . . On the 19th of June . . . Mr. King, of Massachusetts, moved that 'the committee do now rise, and report that they do not agree to the propositions offered by the Honorable Mr. Patterson; and that they report to the House the resolutions offered by the Honorable Mr. Randolph, heretofore reported from a committee of the whole.' The motion was carried by the votes of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, in the affirmative,—New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voting in the negative; and Maryland, divided."—W. C. Rives, *Life and Times of James Madison*, ch. 29. —"It appeared," wrote Madison, in a letter to Jefferson, October 24th "to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the Convention to cherish and preserve the Union of the States. No proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies. It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary observance of the federal law by all the members could never be hoped for. A compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent and the guilty, the necessity of a military force, both obnoxious and dangerous, and, in general, a scene resembling much more a civil war than the administration of a regular Government. Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which, instead of operating on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion of representation. This ground-work being laid, the great objects which presented themselves were: 1. To unite a proper energy

in the Executive, and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with the essential characters of Republican Government. 2. To draw a line of demarkation which would give to the General Government every power requisite for general purposes, and leave to the States every power which might be most beneficially administered by them. 3. To provide for the different interests of different parts of the Union. 4. To adjust the clashing pretensions of the large and small States. Each of these objects was pregnant with difficulties. The whole of them together formed a task more difficult than can well be conceived by those who were not concerned in the execution of it. Adding to these considerations the natural diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle. The first of these objects, as respects the Executive, was peculiarly embarrassing. On the question whether it should consist of a single person or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions took place. The plurality of co-ordinate members had finally but few advocates. Governor Randolph was at the head of them. The modes of appointment proposed were various: as by the people at large, by electors chosen by the people, by the Executives of the States, by the Congress; some preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses; some, a separate concurrent ballot, allowing to each a negative on the other house; some, a nomination of several candidates by one House, out of whom a choice should be made by the other. Several other modifications were started. The expedient at length adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction to the members. As to the duration in office, a few would have preferred a tenure during good behaviour; a considerable number would have done so in case an easy and effectual removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated whether a long term, seven years for example, with a subsequent and perpetual ineligibility, or a short term, with a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual degeneracy of re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then a hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity to be reappointed on the independent exercise of the Executive authority. On the other side it was contended that the prospect of necessary degradation would discourage the most dignified characters from aspiring to the office; would take away the principal motive to the faithful discharge of its duties—the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment; would stimulate ambition to violent efforts for holding over the constitutional term; and instead of producing an independent administration and a firmer defence of the constitutional rights of the department, would render the officer more indifferent to the importance of a place which he would soon be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield to the encroachments of the Legislature, of which he might again be a member. The questions concerning the degree of power turned chiefly on the appointment to offices, and the controul on the Legislature. An absolute appointment to all offices, to some offices, to no

offices, formed the scale of opinions on the first point. On the second, some contended for an absolute negative, as the only possible mean of reducing to practice the theory of a free Government, which forbids a mixture of the Legislative and Executive powers. Others would be content with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three-fourths of both Houses. It was warmly urged that the judiciary department should be associated in the revision. The idea of some was, that a separate revision should be given to the two departments; that if either objected, two-thirds, if both, three-fourths, should be necessary to overrule. In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the government, the questions, as they come within the first object, turned mostly on the mode of appointment, and the duration of it. The different modes proposed were: 1. By the House of Representatives. 2. By the Executive. 3. By electors chosen by the people for the purpose. 4. By the State Legislatures. On the point of duration, the propositions descended from good behaviour to four years, through the intermediate terms of nine, seven, six, and five years. The election of the other branch was first determined to be triennial, and afterwards reduced to biennial. The second object, the due partition of power between the General and local Governments, was perhaps, of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an entire abolition of the States; some, for indefinite power of Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of the States; some, for such a power without a negative; some, for a limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the majority, finally, for a limited power without the negative. The question with regard to the negative underwent repeated discussions, and was finally rejected by a bare majority. . . . I return to the third object above mentioned, the adjustments of the different interests of different parts of the continent. Some contended for an unlimited power over trade, including exports as well as imports, and over slaves as well as other imports; some, for such a power, provided the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses were required; some, for such a qualification of the power, with an exemption of exports and slaves; others, for an exemption of exports only. The result is seen in the Constitution. South Carolina and Georgia were inflexible on the point of the slaves. The remaining object created more embarrassment, and a greater alarm for the issue of the Convention, than all the rest put together. The little States insisted on retaining their equality in both branches, unless a complete abolition of the State Governments should take place; and made an equality in the Senate a *sine qua non*. The large States, on the other hand, urged that as the new Government was to be drawn principally from the people immediately, and was to operate directly on them, not on the States; and, consequently, as the States would lose that importance which is now proportioned to the importance of their voluntary compliance with the requisitions of Congress, it was necessary that the representation in both Houses should be in proportion to their size. It ended in the compromise which you will see, but very much to the dissatisfaction of several members from the large States.”—J. Madison, *Letters and other Writings*, v. 1, pp. 344–354.—“Those who pro-



posed only to amend the old Articles of Confederation and opposed a new Constitution, objected that a government formed under such a Constitution would be not a federal, but a national, government. Luther Martin said, when he returned to Maryland, that the delegates 'appeared totally to have forgot the business for which we were sent. . . . We had not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of America considered as individuals. . . . That the system of government we were intrusted to prepare was a government over these thirteen States; but that in our proceedings we adopted principles which would be right and proper only on the supposition that there were no state governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in their individual capacity, without government, and in a state of nature.' He added that, 'in the whole system there was but one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance.' The Senate, the second house as it was called in the convention, was in part created, it is needless to say, to meet, or rather in obedience to, reasoning like this. . . . The Luther Martin protestants were too radical to remain in the convention to the end, when they saw that such a confederacy as they wanted was impossible. But there were not many who went the length they did in believing that a strong central government was necessarily the destruction of the state governments. Still fewer were those who would have brought this about if they could. . . . The real difficulty, as Madison said in the debate on that question, and as he repeated again and again after that question was settled, was not between the larger and smaller States, but between the North and South; between those States that held slaves and those that had none. Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so much trouble to the Abolitionists of this century, and, indeed, to everybody else, gave quite as much in the last century to those who put it there. Many of the wisest and best men of the time, Southerners as well as Northerners, and among them Madison, were opposed to slavery. . . . Everywhere north of South Carolina, slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it was exceedingly desirable to be free from at the earliest possible moment; everywhere north of Mason and Dixon's Line, measures had already been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to put an end to it; and by the Ordinance for the government of all the territory north of the Ohio River, it was absolutely prohibited by Congress, in the same year in which the Constitutional Congress met. But it was, nevertheless, a thing to the continued existence of which the anti-slavery people of that time could consent without any violation of conscience. Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful, cruel, a mockery of every pretense of respect for the rights of man, they did not believe it to be absolutely wicked. . . . The question with the North was, how far could it yield; with the South, how far could it encroach. It turned mainly on representation. . . . There were some who maintained at first that the slave population should not be represented at all. Hamilton proposed in the first days of the convention 'that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature

ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants.'—S. H. Gay, *James Madison, ch. 7-8*.—"When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur Morris, and was all ready for the signatures [September 17, 1787], the aged Franklin produced a paper, which was read for him, as his voice was weak. Some parts of this Constitution, he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find it so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he would sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every member of the convention who still had objections would on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and for the sake of unanimity put his name to this instrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he said, by refusing to sign, might do infinite mischief. . . . From these appeals, as well as from Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see how distinctly it was realized that the country was on the verge of civil war. Most of the members felt so, but to some the new government seemed far too strong, and there were three who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph, and Gerry refused to sign. . . . In the signatures the twelve states which had taken part in the work were all represented, Hamilton signing alone for New York."—J. Fiske, *The Critical Period of Am. Hist., p. 303*.—A "popular delusion with regard to the Constitution is that it was created out of nothing; or, as Mr. Gladstone puts it, that 'It is the greatest work ever struck off at any one time by the mind and purpose of man.' The radical view on the other side is expressed by Sir Henry Maine, who informs us that the 'Constitution of the United States is a modified version of the British Constitution . . . which was in existence between 1760 and 1787.' The real source of the Constitution is the experience of Americans. They had established and developed admirable little commonwealths in the colonies; since the beginning of the Revolution they had had experience of State governments organized on a different basis from the colonial; and, finally, they had carried on two successive national governments, with which they had been profoundly discontented. The general outline of the new Constitution seems to be English; it was really colonial. The President's powers of military command, of appointment, and of veto were similar to those of the colonial governor. National courts were created on the model of colonial courts. A legislature of two houses was accepted because such legislatures had been common in colonial times. In the English Parliamentary system as it existed before 1760 the Americans had had no share; the later English system of Parliamentary responsibility was not yet developed, and had never been established in colonial governments; and they expressly excluded it from their new Constitution. They were little more affected by the experience of other European nations. . . . The chief source of the details of the Constitution was the State constitutions and laws then in force. Thus the clause conferring a suspensive veto on the President is an almost literal transcript from the Massachusetts constitution. In fact, the principal experiment in the Constitution was the establishment of an electoral college; and of all parts of the system this has worked least as the framers expected. The Constitution represents,

therefore, the accumulated experience of the time. . . . The real boldness of the Constitution is the novelty of the federal system which it set up."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union* (*Epochs of Am. Hist.*), sect. 62.—"That a constitution should be framed in detail by a body of uninstructed delegates, expressly chosen for that purpose, was familiar in the States of the Union; but was perhaps unexampled elsewhere in the world, and was certainly unexampled in the history of federations. That the instrument of federal government should provide for proportional representation in one house, and for a federal court, was a step in federal organization which marks a new federal principle. For many purposes the Union then created was stronger than the Prussian monarchy at that moment. In many respects the States were left stronger than the little nominally independent German principalities. The great merit of the members of the convention is their understanding of the temper of their own countrymen. They selected out of English, or colonial, or State usages such practices and forms as experience had shown to be acceptable to the people. . . . The Convention had further the wisdom to express their work in general though carefully stated principles. All previous federal governments had been fettered either by an imperfect and inadequate statement, as in the constitution of the United Netherlands, or by an unwritten constitution with an accumulation of special precedents, as in the Holy Roman Empire. The phrases of the Constitution of 1787 were broad enough to cover cases unforeseen. A third distinction of the federal Convention is the skill with which it framed acceptable compromises upon the three most difficult questions before it. The two Houses of Congress satisfied both large and small States; the three-fifths representation of slaves postponed an inevitable conflict; the allowance of the slave trade for a term of years made it possible for Congress to perfect commercial legislation. The Convention had profited by the experience of the Confederation: on every page of the Constitution may be found clauses which would not have stood there had it been framed in 1781. An adequate revenue was provided; foreign and interstate commerce was put under the control of Congress; the charge of foreign affairs was given entirely to the central authority; the powers of government were distributed among three departments."—A. B. Hart, *Introduction to the Study of Federal Government*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: I. Eliot, *Debates in the Convention at Philadelphia, 1787*.—J. Madison, *Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution*.—W. C. Rives, *Life and Times of James Madison*, ch. 27-33 (v. 2).—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Formation of the Const. of the U. S.*—G. T. Curtis, *Hist. of the Const. of the U. S.*—C. E. Stevens, *Sources of the Const. of the U. S.*—J. H. Robinson, *The Original and Derived Features of the Const. (Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Social Science, v. 1)*.—For the text of the Constitution, see CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

A. D. 1787-1789.—The struggle for the Federal Constitution in the States.—Its ratification.—The end of the Confederation.—"The fate of the proposed Constitution remained doubtful for many months after the adjournment of the convention. Hamilton said it would be arrogance to conjecture the result. . . .

Delaware was the first state to accept it [Dec. 7, 1787]. Gratified by the concession of equality in the federal Senate, the ratification was prompt, enthusiastic, and unanimous. Pennsylvania was the second [Dec. 12]. The opposition was sharp, but Franklin was president of the state, and Wilson a delegate to the state convention. Their influence was great. . . . The ratification was effected by a vote of 46 to 23. Then New Jersey [Dec. 18] and Georgia [Jan. 2, 1788] followed unanimously. Next came Connecticut [Jan. 9] by a vote of 128 to 40. The result in these five states was the more easily obtained because the friends of the Constitution were prompt to act. With delay in the other states came a bitterness of contention which made the result doubtful. The first close struggle was in Massachusetts. The public creditor favored the proposed Constitution. He saw in it some hope of his long deferred pay. But the debtor class opposed it; for it would put an end to cheap paper money, with which they hoped to pay their debts, when it became still cheaper. . . . Hancock and Adams scarcely favored the Constitution. They feared it infringed upon the rights of the people, and especially upon the rights of the states. . . . Hancock finally came forward as a mediator. He proposed that the Constitution be ratified, with an accompanying recommendation that it be amended in the particulars in which it was thought to be defective. His proposition was adopted, and the Constitution was ratified [Feb. 6] by a vote of 187 [186] to 168. Maryland next ratified the Constitution with much unanimity [April 28], notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of Luther Martin. . . . South Carolina followed next [May 23], and ratified the Constitution by a majority of 76, but recommended amendments substantially like those of Massachusetts. South Carolina was the eighth state; and, if one more could be obtained, the Constitution would take effect between the nine ratifying states. There remained the five states of Virginia, New York, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. The state convention of Virginia was called for the 2d of June 1788, of New York for the 17th, and of New Hampshire for the 18th of the same month. The result was expected to be adverse in every one of these states. In Virginia the opposition was led by Patrick Henry. . . . Henry was ably seconded by Richard Henry Lee, William Grayson, and George Mason. . . . James Monroe followed their lead. James Madison and Governor Randolph were the leading champions of the new Constitution. . . . John Marshall, afterwards chief justice, came to their assistance. . . . The debate lasted a month. It may be read with instruction, as it is reported in the volumes of Elliot. The ratification prevailed [June 25] by a majority of 10 [11] in a vote of 186 [167]. . . . The influence of Washington procured the result. . . . Meanwhile, the state of New Hampshire had ratified the Constitution [June 21], but the fact was not known in Virginia. The opposition to the Constitution was great and bitter in the State of New York. Fortunately the convention was held so late that New Hampshire, the ninth state, had ratified while the New York convention was engaged in its heated discussions. Two thirds of the delegates were elected to oppose it. . . . The friends of the Constitution felt, long before the convention assembled, that



public discussion might be useful in overcoming the hostile attitude of the state. Accordingly, a series of essays in exposition of the Constitution was written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, over the common signature of 'Publius.' These essays were published in a newspaper, between October, 1787, and June, 1788. . . . They were subsequently collected and published in a volume styled 'The Federalist.' From that day to this, 'The Federalist' has held unequalled rank as an authority upon the construction of the Constitution." On the 24th of June a fleet courier, employed by Hamilton, brought from Concord to Poughkeepsie, where the New York convention sat, news of the ratification of the Constitution by New Hampshire, the ninth state. "Now, indeed, the situation was changed. There was no longer a confederacy; the Union was already formed. . . . The state must either join the new system or stay out of it. New York was not favorably situated for a separate nation. New England on the east, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania on the south, belonged to the new Union. Canada was on the north. . . . Delay, with its altered circumstances, finally brought to Hamilton and his party the victory that had been denied to argument and eloquence. But the Anti-Federalists were reluctant to yield, and the debate was prolonged," until the 26th of July, when the ratification was carried by 30 votes against 27. "North Carolina remained out of the Union until November, 1789, and Rhode Island until June, 1790. . . . The ratification by nine states having been certified to the Congress of the Confederacy, that body adopted a resolution fixing the first Wednesday of March, 1789, as the day when the new government should go into operation. As the day fell on the 4th of March, that day became fixed for the beginning and the end of congressional and presidential terms."—J. S. Landon, *Const. Hist. and Gov't of the U. S.*, lect. 4.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *The Critical Period of Am. Hist.*, ch. 7.—G. T. Curtis, *Hist. of the Const. of the U. S.*, bk. 5 (v. 2).—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Formation of the Const.*, bk. 4 (v. 2).—J. Elliot, ed., *Debates in the State Conventions on the Adoption of the Fed. Const.*—*The Federalist*.—A. Hamilton, *Works*, v. 2.—W. C. Rives, *Life and Times of Madison*, ch. 34-36 (v. 2).—K. M. Rowland, *Life of Geo. Mason*, v. 2, ch. 6-8.

**A. D. 1789.—The First Presidential Election.**—Washington called to the head of the new Government.—"The adoption of the Federal constitution was another epoch in the life of Washington. Before the official forms of an election could be carried into operation a unanimous sentiment throughout the Union pronounced him the nation's choice to fill the presidential chair. He looked forward to the possibility of his election with characteristic modesty and unfeigned reluctance; as his letters to his confidential friends bear witness. . . . The election took place at the appointed time [the first Wednesday in January, 1789], and it was soon ascertained that Washington was chosen President for the term of four years from the 4th of March. By this time the arguments and entreaties of his friends, and his own convictions of public expediency, had determined him to accept. . . . From a delay in forming a quorum of Congress the votes of the electoral college were not counted until early in April, when they

were found to be unanimous in favor of Washington. 'The delay,' said he in a letter to General Knox, 'may be compared to a reprieve; for in confidence I tell you (with the world it would obtain little credit), that my movements to the chair of government will be accompanied by feelings not unlike those of a culprit, who is going to the place of his execution; so unwilling am I, in the evening of a life nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a peaceful abode for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of political skill, abilities and inclination, which are necessary to manage the helm.' . . . At length on the 14th of April he received a letter from the president of Congress, duly notifying him of his election; and he prepared to set out immediately for New York, the seat of government."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 37.—The secondary electoral votes, by which the Vice President was, at that time, chosen, were scattered among eleven candidates. John Adams received the greater number (34) though not quite a majority of the 69, and was elected.

**A. D. 1789.—Passage of the Act of Congress organizing the Supreme Court of the United States.** See SUPREME COURT.

**A. D. 1789-1792.—Hamilton's report on Manufactures.** See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1789-1791.

**A. D. 1789-1792.—Organization of the Federal government and first administration of Washington.—The dividing of Parties.—Federalists and Democratic Republicans.**—"March 4th, 1789, had been appointed for the formal inauguration of the new Government, but the members elect had not yet unlearned the Confederacy's slovenly habits. It was not until April 6th that a sufficient number of members of Congress arrived in New York to form a quorum and count the electoral votes. At that time, and until 1805, no electoral votes were cast distinctively for President and Vice-President. Each elector voted by ballot for two persons. If a majority of all the votes were cast for any person, he who received the greatest number of votes became President, and he who received the next greatest number became Vice-President. When the votes were counted in 1789 they were found to be, for George Washington, of Virginia, 69 (each of the electors having given him one vote), for John Adams, of Massachusetts, 34, and 35 for various other candidates. Washington received notice of his election, and, after a triumphal progress northward from his home at Mount Vernon, was sworn into office April 30th [at Federal Hall, corner Wall and Nassau Streets, New York]. The Vice-President had taken his place as presiding officer of the Senate a few days before. Frederick A. Muhlenberg, of Pennsylvania, was chosen Speaker of the House, but the vote had no party divisions, for Parties were still in a state of utter confusion. Between the extreme Anti-federalists, who considered the Constitution a long step toward a despotism, and the extreme Federalists, who desired a monarchy modeled on that of England, there were all varieties of political opinion. . . . The extreme importance of Washington lay in his ability, through the universal confidence in his integrity and good judgment, to hold together this alliance of moderate men for a time, and to prevent party contests upon the interpretation of federal powers until the Constitution should show its

merit and be assured of existence. The President selected his Cabinet with a careful regard to the opposite opinions of his supporters. The Treasury Department was given to Alexander Hamilton, of New York, a Federalist. . . . The War Department was given to General Henry Knox, of Massachusetts, also a Federalist. The State Department was given to Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, an Anti-federalist. . . . Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, also an Anti-federalist, was appointed Attorney-General, and John Jay, of New York, a Federalist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Twelve Amendments were adopted by this Session of Congress, in order to meet the conscientious objections of many moderate Anti-federalists, and to take the place of a 'Bill of Rights.' Ten of these, having received the assent of the necessary number of States, became a part of the Constitution, and now stand the first ten of the Amendments. They were intended to guarantee freedom of religion, speech, person, and property. . . . January 9th [1790] Hamilton offered his famous Report on the Settlement of the Public Debt. It consisted of three recommendations, first, that the foreign debt of the Confederacy should be assumed and paid in full; second, that the domestic debt of the Confederacy, which had fallen far below par and had become a synonym for worthlessness, should also be paid at its par value; and third, that the debts incurred by the States during the Revolution, and still unpaid, should be assumed and paid in full by the Federal Government. Hamilton's First recommendation was adopted unanimously. The Second was opposed, even by Madison and many moderate Anti-federalists, on the ground that the domestic debt was held by speculators, who had bought it at a heavy discount, and would thus gain usurious interest on their investment. Hamilton's supporters argued that, if only for that reason, they should be paid in full, that holders of United States securities might learn not to sell them at a discount, and that the national credit might thus be strengthened for all time to come. After long debate the second recommendation was also adopted. Hamilton's Third recommendation involved a question of the powers of the Federal Government. It therefore for the first time united all the Anti-federalists in opposition to it. They feared that the rope of sand of the Confederacy was being carried to the opposite extreme; that the 'money power' would, by this measure, be permanently attached to the Federal Government; and that the States would be made of no importance. But even this recommendation was adopted, though only by a vote of 31 to 26 in the House. A few days later, however, the Anti-federalists received a reinforcement of seven newly arrived North Carolina members. The third resolution was at once reconsidered, and voted down by a majority of two. Hamilton secured the final adoption of the third resolution by a bargain which excited the deep indignation of the Anti-federalists. A National Capital was to be selected. The Federalists agreed to vote that it should be fixed upon the Potomac River [see WASHINGTON (CITY): A. D. 1791], after remaining ten years in Philadelphia, and two Anti-federalist members from the Potomac agreed in return to vote for the third resolution, which was then finally adopted. Hamilton's entire report was thus successful. Its

immediate effects were to appreciate the credit of the United States, and to enrich the holders of the Continental debt. Its further effect was to make Hamilton so much disliked by Anti-federalists that, despite his acknowledged talents, his party never ventured to nominate him for any elective office. . . . Party Organization may be considered as fairly begun about the close [of the first Session of the Second Congress, in 1792]. . . . The various Anti-federalist factions, by union in resisting the Federalists, had learned to forget minor differences and had been welded into one party which only lacked a name. That of Anti-federalist was no longer applicable, for its opposition to the Federal Union had entirely ceased. A name was supplied by Jefferson, the recognized leader of the party, after the French Revolution had fairly begun its course. That political convulsion had, for some time after 1789, the sympathy of both Federalists and Anti-federalists, for it seemed the direct outgrowth of the American Revolution. But, as its leveling objects became more apparent, the Federalists grew cooler and the Anti-federalists warmer towards it. The latter took great pains, even by dress and manners, to show the keenness of their sympathy for the Republicans of France, and about this time adopted the name Democratic-Republican, which seemed sufficiently comprehensive for a full indication of their principles. This has always been the official party title. It is now abbreviated to Democratic, though the name Democrat was at first used by Federalists as one of contempt, and the party called itself Republican, a title which it could hardly claim with propriety, for its tendency has always been toward a democracy, as that of its opponents has been toward a strong republic. The name Republican, therefore, belongs most properly to its present possessors (1879). But it must be remembered that the party which will be called Republican until about 1823 was the party which is now called Democratic."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, ch. 2.—Jefferson's bitterness of hostility to the Federalists was due to the belief that they aimed at the overthrow of the Republic. His conviction as to these really treasonable purposes in the leaders of the party was often expressed, but never more distinctly than in a letter written in 1813 to an English traveller, Mr. Melish. At the same time, he set forth the principles and aims of his own party: "Among that section of our citizens called federalists," he wrote, "there are three shades of opinion. Distinguishing between the leaders and people who compose it, the leaders consider the English constitution as a model of perfection, some, with a correction of its vices, others, with all its corruptions and abuses. This last was Alexander Hamilton's opinion, which others, as well as myself, have often heard him declare, and that a correction of what are called its vices would render the English an impracticable government. This government they wished to have established here, and only accepted and held fast, at first, to the present constitution, as a stepping-stone to the final establishment of their favorite model. This party has therefore always clung to England as their prototype and great auxiliary in promoting and effecting this change. A weighty minority, however, of these leaders, considering the voluntary conversion of our government into a monarchy as too distant, if not desperate, wish



to break off from our Union its eastern fragment, as being, in truth, the hot-bed of American monarchism, with a view to a commencement of their favorite government, from whence the other States may gangrene by degrees, and the whole be thus brought finally to the desired point. For Massachusetts, the prime mover in this enterprise, is the last State in the Union to mean a final separation, as being of all the most dependent on the others. Not raising bread for the sustenance of her own inhabitants, not having a stick of timber for the construction of vessels, her principal occupation, nor an article to export in them, where would she be, excluded from the ports of the other States, and thrown into dependence on England, her direct, and natural, but now insidious rival? At the head of this minority is what is called the Essex Junto of Massachusetts. But the majority of these leaders do not aim at separation. In this, they adhere to the known principle of General Hamilton, never, under any views, to break the Union. Anglomany, monarchy, and separation, then, are the principles of the Essex federalists. Anglo-many and monarchy, those of the Hamiltonians, and Anglomany alone, that of the portion among the people who call themselves federalists. These last are as good republicans as the brethren whom they oppose, and differ from them only in their devotion to England and hatred of France which they have imbibed from their leaders. The moment that these leaders should avowedly propose a separation of the Union, or the establishment of regal government, their popular adherents would quit them to a man, and join the republican standard; and the partisans of this change, even in Massachusetts, would thus find themselves an army of officers without a soldier. The party called republican is steadily for the support of the present constitution. They obtained at its commencement all the amendments to it they desired. These reconciled them to it perfectly, and if they have any ulterior view, it is only, perhaps, to popularize it further, by shortening the Senatorial term, and devising a process for the responsibility of judges, more practicable than that of impeachment. They esteem the people of England and France equally, and equally detest the governing powers of both. This I verily believe, after an intimacy of forty years with the public councils and characters, is a true statement of the grounds on which they are at present divided, and that it is not merely an ambition for power. An honest man can feel no pleasure in the exercise of power over his fellow citizens. And considering as the only offices of power those conferred by the people directly, that is to say, the executive and legislative functions of the General and State governments, the common refusal of these, and multiplied resignations, are proofs sufficient that power is not alluring to pure minds, and is not, with them, the primary principle of contest. This is my belief of it; it is that on which I have acted; and had it been a mere contest who should be permitted to administer the government according to its genuine republican principles, there has never been a moment of my life in which I should have relinquished for it the enjoyments of my family, my farm, my friends and books. You expected to discover the difference of our party principles in General Washington's valedictory, and my inaugural address.

Not at all. General Washington did not harbor one principle of federalism. He was neither an Angloman, a monarchist, nor a separatist. He sincerely wished the people to have as much self-government as they were competent to exercise themselves. The only point on which he and I ever differed in opinion, was, that I had more confidence than he had in the natural integrity and discretion of the people, and in the safety and extent to which they might trust themselves with a control over their government. He has asseverated to me a thousand times his determination that the existing government should have a fair trial, and that in support of it he would spend the last drop of his blood. He did this the more repeatedly, because he knew General Hamilton's political bias, and my apprehensions from it."—T. Jefferson, *Letter to Mr. Melish*, Jan. 13, 1813 (*Writings*, ed. by Washington, v. 6). —The view taken at the present day of the Federalism and the Federalists of the first three decades of the Union, among those who see more danger in the centrifugal than in the centripetal forces in government, are effectively stated in the following: "The popular notion in regard to Federalism is that to which the name naturally gives rise. By Federalists are commonly understood those men who advocated a union of the States and an efficient Federal government. This conception is true, but is at the same time so limited that it may fairly be called superficial. The name arose from its first object which the friends of the Constitution strove to achieve; but this object, the more perfect union, and even the Constitution itself, were but means to ends of vastly more importance. The ends which the Federalists sought formed the great principles on which the party was founded, and it can be justly said that no nobler or better ends were ever striven for by any political party or by any statesmen. The first and paramount object of the Federalists was to build up a nation and to create a national sentiment. For this they sought a more perfect union. Their next object was to give the nation they had called into existence not only a government, but a strong government. To do this, they had not only to devise a model, to draw a constitution, to organize a legislature, executive, and judiciary, but they had to equip the government thus formed with all those adjuncts without which no government can long exist under the conditions of modern civilization. The Federalists had to provide for the debt, devise a financial and foreign policy, organize an army, fortify the ports, found a navy, impose and collect taxes, and put in operation an extensive revenue system. We of the English race—whose creed is that governments and great political systems grow and develop slowly, are the results of climate, soil, race, tradition, and the exigencies of time and place, who wholly disavow the theory that perfect governments spring in a night from the heated brains of Frenchmen or Spaniards—can best appreciate the task with which our ancestors grappled. . . . Upon a people lately convulsed by civil war, upon a people who had lost their old political habits and traditions without finding new ones in their stead, it was necessary to impose a government, and to create a national sentiment. This the Federalists did, and they need no other eulogy. With no undue national pride, we can justly say that the adoption and support of the

Constitution offer an example of the political genius of the Anglo-Saxon race to which history cannot furnish a parallel. The political party to whose exertions these great results were due was the Federal party. They were the party of order, of good government, and of conservatism. Against them was ranged a majority of their fellow-citizens. But this majority was wild, anarchical, disunited. The only common ground on which they could meet was that of simple opposition. The only name they had was anti-Federalists. They had neither leaders, discipline, objects, nor even a party cry. Before the definite aims and concentrated ability of the Federalists, they fled in helpless disorder, like an unarmed mob before advancing soldiers. But, though dispersed, the anti-Federalists were still in a numerical majority. They needed a leader, organization, and opportunity, and they soon found all three. Thomas Jefferson arrived in New York, not only to enter into Washington's cabinet, and lend the aid of his great talents to the success of the new scheme, but soon also to put himself at the head of the large though demoralized opposition to the administration he had sworn to support. Filled with the wild democratic theories which his susceptible nature had readily imbibed in France, Jefferson soon infused them into the minds of most of his followers. Instead of a vague dislike to any and all government, he substituted a sharp and factious opposition to each and every measure proposed by the friends of the Constitution."—H. C. Lodge, *Life and Letters of George Cabot*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: W. C. Rives, *Life and Times of Madison*, ch. 37-46 (v. 3).—J. Parton, *Life of Jefferson*, ch. 42-47.—M. Van Buren, *Political Parties in the U. S.*, ch. 2-4.—J. D. Hammond, *Hist. of Pol. Parties in N. Y.*, v. 1, ch. 1-2.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 5, ch. 1-16.

A. D. 1789-1810.—Founding of the Roman Episcopate. See PAPACY: A. D. 1789-1810.

A. D. 1790.—The First Census.—Total population, 3,929,827, classed and distributed as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut.....	232,581	2,801	2,759
Maine.....	96,002	538	....
Massachusetts.....	373,254	5,463	....
New Hampshire....	141,111	630	158
New Jersey.....	169,954	2,762	11,423
New York.....	314,142	4,654	21,324
Pennsylvania.....	424,099	6,537	3,737
Rhode Island.....	64,689	3,469	952
Vermont.....	85,144	255	17
	1,900,976	27,109	40,370

	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Delaware.....	46,310	3,899	8,887
Georgia.....	52,886	398	29,264
Kentucky.....	61,133	114	11,830
Maryland.....	208,649	8,043	103,036
North Carolina.....	288,204	4,975	100,572
South Carolina.....	140,178	1,801	107,094
Tennessee.....	32,013	361	3,417
Virginia.....	442,115	12,766	293,427
	1,271,488	32,357	657,527

A. D. 1790-1795.—War with the Indian tribes of the Northwest.—Disastrous expedi-

tions of Harmar and St. Clair, and Wayne's decisive victory. See NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY: A. D. 1790-1795.

A. D. 1791.—Admission of Vermont to the Union. See VERMONT: A. D. 1790-1791.

A. D. 1791.—Incorporation of the first Bank of the United States. See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816.

A. D. 1791.—The founding of the Federal Capital. See WASHINGTON (CITY): A. D. 1791.

A. D. 1791.—Adoption of the first ten Amendments to the Federal Constitution.—The first ten amendments to the Constitution (see CONSTITUTION OF THE U. S. OF AM.), embodying a declaration of rights which was thought to be necessary by many who had consented to the adoption of the Constitution, but only with the understanding that such amendments should be added, were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the First Congress, on the 25th of September, 1789. At different dates between November 20, 1789 and December 15, 1791, they were ratified by eleven of the then fourteen States. "There is no evidence on the journals of Congress that the legislatures of Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified them."—*Constitution, Rules and Manual of the U. S. Senate* (1885) p. 61.

A. D. 1792.—Admission of Kentucky to the Union.—Slavery in the Constitution of the new State. See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1789-1792.

A. D. 1792.—Second Presidential Election.—George Washington re-elected with unanimity, receiving 132 votes of the Electoral College, John Adams, Vice President, receiving 77 votes, with 50 cast for George Clinton, 4 for Jefferson and 1 for Burr.

A. D. 1793.—The First Fugitive Slave Law.—For some time after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, its provision relating to the rendition of persons "held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another" remained without legislation to execute it; "and it is a striking fact that the call for legislation came not from the South, but from a free State; and that it was provoked, not by fugitive slaves, but by kidnappers. . . . A free negro named John was seized at Washington, Pennsylvania, in 1791, and taken to Virginia. The Governor of Pennsylvania, at the instigation of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, asked the return of the three kidnappers; but the Governor of Virginia replied that, since there was no national law touching such a case, he could not carry out the request. On the matter being brought to the notice of Congress by the Governor of Pennsylvania," a bill was passed which "became law by the signature of the President, February 12, 1793. . . . The act provided at the same time for the recovery of fugitives from justice and from labor; but the alleged criminal was to have a protection through the requirement of a requisition, a protection denied to the man on trial for his liberty only. The act was applicable to fugitive apprentices as well as to slaves, a provision of some importance at the time. In the Northwest Territory there were so-called negro apprentices, who were virtually slaves, and to whom the law applied, since it was in terms extended to all the Territories. Proceedings began with the forcible seizure of the alleged fugitive. The act, it will be observed, does not admit a trial by jury. It



allowed the owner of the slave, his agent or attorney, to seize the fugitive and take him before any judge of a United States Circuit or District Court, or any local magistrate. The only requirement for the conviction of the slave was the testimony of his master, or the affidavit of some magistrate in the State from which he came, certifying that such a person had escaped. Hindering arrest or harboring a slave was punishable by a fine of five hundred dollars. The law thus established a system allowing the greatest harshness to the slave and every favor to the master. Even at that time, when persons might still be born slaves in New York and New Jersey, and gradual emancipation had not yet taken full effect in Rhode Island and Connecticut, it was repellant to the popular sense of justice; there were two cases of resistance to the principle of the act before the close of 1793. Until 1850 no further law upon this subject was passed, but as the provisions of 1793 were found ineffectual, many attempts at amendment were made."—M. G. McDougall, *Fugitive Slaves, 1619-1865* (*Hay House Monographs*, no. 3), pp. 17-19.—"The fugitive-slave clause in the Constitution is of course obligatory, but there is a wide distinction between the fugitive-slave clause and the fugitive-slave law. The Constitution gives no power to Congress to legislate on the subject, but imposes on the States the obligation of rendition. Chief-Justice Hornblower, of New York, and Chancellor Walworth, of New York, long since pronounced the fugitive law of '93 unconstitutional on this very ground."—William Jay, *Letter to Josiah Quincy* (quoted in B. Tuckerman's "*William Jay and the Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery*").

**A. D. 1793.—Popular sympathy with the French Revolution.—Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality.—Insolent conduct of the French minister, Genet.**—"The French Revolution, as was natural from the all-important services rendered by France to the United States in their own revolutionary struggle, enlisted the warm sympathy of the American people. . . . As the United States were first introduced to the family of nations by the alliance with France of 1778, the very important question arose, on the breaking out of the war between France and England, how far they were bound to take part in the contest. The second article of the treaty of alliance seemed to limit its operation to the then existing war between the United States and Great Britain; but by the eleventh article the two contracting powers agreed to 'guarantee mutually from the present time and forever, against all other powers,' the territories of which the allies might be in possession respectively at the moment the war between France and Great Britain should break out, which was anticipated as the necessary consequence of the alliance. Not only were the general sympathies of America strongly with France, but the course pursued by Great Britain toward the United States, since the peace of 1783, was productive of extreme irritation, especially her refusal to give up the western posts, which . . . had the effect of involving the northwestern frontier in a prolonged and disastrous Indian war. These causes, together with the recent recollections of the revolutionary struggle, disposed the popular mind to make common cause with France, in what was regarded as the war of

a people struggling for freedom against the combined despots of Europe. Washington, however, from the first, determined to maintain the neutrality of the country;" and, with the unanimous advice of his cabinet, he issued (April 22, 1793) a proclamation of neutrality. "This proclamation, though draughted by Mr. Jefferson and unanimously adopted by the Cabinet, was violently assailed by the organs of the party which followed his lead. . . . The growing excitement of the popular mind was fanned to a flame by the arrival at Charleston, South Carolina [April 9], of 'Citizen' Genet, who was sent as the minister of the French Republic to the United States. Without repairing to the seat of government, or being accredited in any way, in his official capacity, he began to fit out privateers in Charleston, to cruise against the commerce of England. Although the utmost gentleness and patience were observed by the executive of the United States in checking this violation of their neutrality, Genet assumed from the first a tone of defiance, and threatened before long to appeal from the government to the people. These insolent demonstrations were of course lost upon Washington's firmness and moral courage. They distressed, but did not in the slightest degree intimidate him; and their effect on the popular mind was to some extent neutralized by the facts, that the chief measures to maintain the neutrality of the country had been unanimously advised by the Cabinet, and that the duty of rebuking his intemperate course had devolved upon the secretary of state [Jefferson], the recognized head of the party to which Genet looked for sympathy."—E. Everett, *Life of Washington*, ch. 8.—A demand for "Genet's recall was determined on during the first days of August. There was some discussion over the manner of requesting the recall, but the terms were made gentle by Jefferson, to the disgust of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War [Hamilton and Knox], who desired direct methods and stronger language. As finally toned up and agreed upon by the President and cabinet, the document was sufficiently vigorous to annoy Genet, and led to bitter reproaches addressed to his friend in the State Department. . . . The letter asking Genet's recall, as desired by Washington, went in due time, and in the following February came a successor. Genet, however, did not go back to his native land, for he preferred to remain here and save his head, valueless as that article would seem to have been. He spent the rest of his days in America, married, harmless, and quite obscure. His noise and fireworks were soon over, and one wonders now how he could ever have made as much flare and explosion as he did."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 2, pp. 155-156.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 4.—J. T. Morse, *Life of Hamilton*, v. 2, ch. 3.—*Am. State Papers*, v. 1, pp. 140-188, 243-246, and 311-314.

**A. D. 1793.—Whitney's Cotton-gin and the series of inventions which it made complete.—Their political effect.—The strengthening of the Slave Power, and the strengthening of Unionism.**—"Some English artisans, who, about the middle of the last century, were obtaining a scanty living by spinning, weaving and other such occupations, turned their inventive talent to the improvement of their art. Paul and

Wyatt introduced the operation of spinning by rollers; Highs, or Hargreaves, invented the jenny, by which a great many threads could be spun as easily as one. Paul devised the rotating carding-engine; Crompton the mule; Arkwright the water-frame, which produced any number of threads of any degree of fineness and hardness. These ingenious machines constituted a very great improvement on the spindle and distaff of ancient times, and on the spinning-wheel, originally brought from Asia, or perhaps reinvented in Europe. At length one spinner was able to accomplish as much work as one hundred could have formerly done. While the art of producing threads was undergoing this singular improvement, Cartwright, a clergyman, invented, in 1785, the power-loom, intended to supersede the operation of weaving by hand, and to make the production of textile fabrics altogether the result of machinery. After some modifications, that loom successfully accomplished the object for which it was devised. As these inventions succeeded, they necessarily led to a demand for motive power. In the first little cotton factory, the germ of that embodiment of modern industry, the cotton-mill, a water-wheel was employed to give movement to the machinery. The establishment was, therefore, necessarily placed near a stream, where a sufficient fall could be obtained. The invention of the steam-engine by Watt, which was the consequence of the new and correct views of the nature of vapors that had been established by Dr. Black, supplied, in due time, the required motive power, and by degrees the water-wheel went almost out of use. Textile manufacture needed now but one thing more to become of signal importance—it needed a more abundant supply of raw material. . . . Cotton, the fibre chiefly concerned in these improvements, was obtained in limited quantities from various countries; but, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, not a single pound was exported from the United States. What was grown here was for domestic consumption. Every good housewife had her spinning-wheel, every plantation its hand-loom. The difficulty of supplying cotton fibre in quantity sufficient to meet the demands of the new machinery was due to the imperfect means in use for separating the cotton from its seeds—a tedious operation, for the picking was done by hand. Eli Whitney, a native of Massachusetts, by his invention of the cotton-gin in 1793, removed that difficulty. The fibre could be separated from the seeds with rapidity and at a trifling cost. There was nothing now to prevent an extraordinary development in the English manufactures. A very few years showed what the result would be. In 1790 no cotton was exported from the United States. Whitney's gin was introduced in 1793. The next year about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million of pounds were exported; in 1795, about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  millions; in 1860, the quantity had reached 2,000 millions of pounds. The political effect of this mechanical invention, which thus proved to be the completion of all the previous English inventions, being absolutely necessary to give them efficacy, was at once seen in its accomplishing a great increase and a redistribution of population in England. . . . In the United States the effects were still more important. Cotton could be grown through all the Southern Atlantic and the Gulf States. It was more profitable than any other crop—but it was

raised by slaves. Whatever might have been the general expectation respecting the impending extinction of slavery, it was evident that at the commencement of this century the conditions had altogether changed. A powerful interest had come into unforeseen existence both in Europe and America which depended on perpetuating that mode of labor. Moreover, before long it was apparent that, partly because of the adaptation of their climate to the growth of the plant, partly because of the excellence of the product, and partly owing to the increasing facilities for interior transportation, the cotton-growing states of America would have a monopoly in the supply of this staple. But, though mechanical invention had reinvigorated the slave power by bestowing on it the cotton-gin, it had likewise strengthened unionism by another inestimable gift—the steam-boat. At the very time that the African slave-trade was prohibited, Fulton was making his successful experiment of the navigation of the Hudson River by steam. This improvement in inland navigation rendered available, in a manner never before contemplated, the river and lake system of the continent; it gave an instantaneous value to the policy of Jefferson, by bringing into effectual use the Mississippi and its tributaries; it crowded with population the shores of the lakes; it threw the whole continent open to commerce; it strengthened the central power at Washington by diminishing space, and while it extended geographically the domain of the republic, it condensed it politically. It bound all parts of the Union more firmly together. . . . In the Constitution it had been agreed that three fifths of the slaves should be accounted as federal numbers in the apportionment of federal representation. A political advantage was thus given to slave labor. This closed the eyes of the South to all other means of solving its industrial difficulties. . . . To the cotton-planter two courses were open. He might increase his manual force, or he might resort to machinery. . . . It required no deep political penetration for him to perceive that the introduction of machinery must in the end result in the emancipation of the slave. Machinery and slavery are incompatible—the slave is displaced by the machine. In the Southern States political reasons thus discouraged the introduction of machinery. Under the Constitution an increased negro force had a political value, machinery had none. The cotton interest was therefore persuaded by those who were in a position to guide its movements, that its prosperity could be secured only through increased manual labor.”—Dr. J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, sect. 3, ch. 16 (v. 1).—See, also, below: A. D. 1818-1821.

A. D. 1794.—Resistance to the Excise.—The Whisky Insurrection in Pennsylvania. See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1794.

A. D. 1794-1795.—Threatening relations with Great Britain.—The Jay Treaty.—“The daily increasing ‘love-frenzy for France,’ and the intemperate language of the Democratic press, naturally emphasized in England that reaction against America which set in with the treaty of peace. On the other hand, the retention of the frontier posts in violation of that treaty was a thorn in the side of the young Republic. In the course of the war England had adopted, by successive Orders in Council, a policy ruinous to the



commerce of neutral nations, especially of the United States. In the admiralty courts of the various British West India islands hundreds of ships from New England were seized and condemned, for carrying French produce or bearing cargoes of provisions chartered to French ports. The New England fishermen and shipowners were vociferous for war, and the Democratic clubs denounced every British insult and celebrated every French victory. On March 26, 1794, an embargo against British ships was proclaimed for thirty days, and then extended for thirty days longer. The day after the embargo was laid, Dayton, of New Jersey, moved in Congress to sequester all moneys due to British creditors, and apply it towards indemnifying shipowners for losses incurred through the Orders in Council; and on April 21st the Republicans moved a resolution to suspend all commercial intercourse with Great Britain till the western posts should be given up, and indemnity be paid for injuries to American commerce in violation of the rights of neutrals. The passage of such an act meant war; and for war the United States was never more unprepared. . . . Peace could be secured only by immediate negotiation and at least a temporary settlement of the causes of neutral irritation, and for such a task the ministers at London and Washington were incompetent or unsuited. . . . In this crisis Washington decided to send to England a special envoy. Hamilton was his first choice, but Hamilton had excited bitter enmities." On Hamilton's recommendation, John Jay, the Chief Justice, was chosen for the difficult mission, and he sailed for England in May, 1794, landing at Falmouth on the 8th of June. Within the succeeding five months he accomplished the negotiation of a treaty, which was signed on the 19th of November. "The main points that Jay had been instructed to gain were compensation for negroes [carried away by the British armies on the evacuation of the country in 1783], surrender of the posts, and compensation for spoiliations; in addition, a commercial treaty was desired. When Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jay had argued that the negroes, some 3,000 in number, who, at the time of the evacuation, were within the British lines, relying on proclamations that offered freedom, and who followed the troops to England, came within that clause of the treaty of peace which provided that the army should be withdrawn without 'carrying away any negroes or other property.' Lord Grenville, however, insisted upon refusing any compensation. Once within the British lines, he said, slaves were free for good and all. . . . From any point of view the matter was too insignificant to wreck the treaty upon it, and Jay waived the claim. As to the western posts [Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, Mackinaw, etc.], it was agreed that they should be surrendered by June 12, 1796. But compensation for the detention was denied on the ground that it was due to the breach of the treaty by the United States in permitting the States to prevent the recovery of British debts." For the determination and payment of such debts, it was now provided that a board of five commissioners should sit at Philadelphia; while another similar board at London should award compensation for irregular and illegal captures or condemnations made during the war between Great Britain and France. "Under this clause Ameri-

can merchants received \$10,345,000. . . . The disputed questions of boundaries, arising from the construction of the treaty of peace, were referred to joint commissioners: properly enough, as the confusion was due to ignorance of the geography of the Northwest. British and American citizens holding lands at the time respectively in the United States and in any of the possessions of Great Britain were secured in their rights; a clause much objected to in America, but which was obviously just. A still more important provision followed, a novelty in international diplomacy, and a distinct advance in civilization: that war between the two countries should never be made the pretext for confiscation of debts or annulment of contracts between individuals. In the War of 1812 the United States happened for the moment to be the creditor nation, and the millions which this provision saved to her citizens it would be difficult to estimate. . . . It was the commercial articles which excited the most intense hostility in America. . . . To unprejudiced eyes, after the lapse of a hundred years, considering the mutual exasperation of the two peoples, the pride of England in her successes in the war with France, the weakness and division of the United States, the treaty seems a very fair one. Certainly one far less favorable to America would have been infinitely preferable to a war, and would probably in the course of time have been accepted as being so. The commercial advantages were not very considerable, but they at least served as 'an entering wedge,' to quote Jay's expression, and they were 'pro tanto' a clear gain to America. . . . The treaty was not published till July 2d. . . . Even before its contents were known, letters, signed 'Franklin,' appeared abusing the treaty; and in Philadelphia an effigy of Jay was placed in the pillory, and finally taken down, guillotined, the clothes fired, and the body blown up. It was clear, then, that it was not this particular treaty, but any treaty at all with Great Britain, that excited the wrath of the Republicans. On July 4th toasts insulting Jay or making odious puns on his name, were the fashion. . . . On June 24th the treaty was ratified by the Senate, with the exception of the article about the West India trade. On August 15th it was signed, with the same exception by Washington."—G. Pellew, *John Jay*, ch. 11.—"The reception given to the treaty cannot be fully explained by the existing relations between the United States and England. It was only in consequence of its Francomania that the opposition assumed the character of blind rage."—H. von Holst, *Const. and Political Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, p. 124.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 4-6.—W. Jay, *Life of John Jay*, v. 1, ch. 8-10 and v. 2, pp. 216-264.—*Am. State Papers*, v. 1, pp. 464-525.—J. B. McMaster, *Hist. of the People of the U. S.*, v. 2, ch. 9.

A. D. 1796.—Admission of Tennessee to the Union. See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1785-1796.

A. D. 1796.—Washington's Farewell Address.—"The period for the presidential election was drawing near, and great anxiety began to be felt that Washington would consent to stand for a third term. No one, it was agreed, had greater claim to the enjoyment of retirement, in consideration of public services rendered; but it was thought the affairs of the country would be in a very precarious condition should he retire

before the wars of Europe were brought to a close. Washington, however, had made up his mind irrevocably on the subject, and resolved to announce, in a farewell address, his intention of retiring. Such an instrument, it will be recollected, had been prepared for him from his own notes, by Mr. Madison, when he had thought of retiring at the end of his first term. As he was no longer in confidential intimacy with Mr. Madison, he turned to Mr. Hamilton as his adviser and coadjutor, and appears to have consulted him on the subject early in the present year [1796], for, in a letter dated New York, May 10th, Hamilton writes: 'When last in Philadelphia, you mentioned to me your wish that I should "re-dress" a certain paper which you had prepared. As it is important that a thing of this kind should be done with great care and much at leisure, touched and retouched, I submit a wish that, as soon as you have given it the body you mean it to have, it may be sent to me.' The paper was accordingly sent, on the 15th of May, in its rough state, altered in one part since Hamilton had seen it. 'If you should think it best to throw the whole into a different form,' writes Washington, 'let me request, notwithstanding, that my draft may be returned to me (along with yours) with such amendments and corrections as to render it as perfect as the formation is susceptible of; curtailed if too verbose, and relieved of all tautology not necessary to enforce the ideas in the original or quoted part. My wish is, that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb.' We forbear to go into the vexed question concerning this address; how much of it is founded on Washington's original 'notes and heads of topics'; how much was elaborated by Madison, and how much is due to Hamilton's recasting and revision. The whole came under the supervision of Washington; and the instrument, as submitted to the press, was in his handwriting, with many ultimate corrections and alterations. Washington had no pride of authorship; his object always was to effect the purpose in hand, and for that he occasionally invoked assistance, to ensure a plain and clear exposition of his thoughts and intentions. The address certainly breathes his spirit throughout, is in perfect accordance with all his words and actions, and 'in an honest, unaffected, simple garb,' embodies the system of policy on which he had acted throughout his administration. It was published in September [17], in a Philadelphia paper called the *Daily Advertiser*. The publication of the Address produced a great sensation. Several of the State legislatures ordered it to be put on their journals."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 5, ch. 30.

The following is the text of the Address.

"To the people of the United States. Friends and Fellow-Citizens: The period for a new election of a citizen, to administer the executive government of the United States, being not far distant, and the time actually arrived, when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person, who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those, out of whom a choice is to be made. I beg you,

at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured, that this resolution has not been taken without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation, which binds a dutiful citizen to his country; and that, in withdrawing the tender of service, which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest; no deficiency of grateful respect for your past kindness; but am supported by a full conviction that the step is compatible with both. The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped, that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives, which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement, from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice, that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty, or propriety; and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that, in the present circumstances of our country, you will not disapprove my determination to retire. The impressions, with which I first undertook the arduous trust, were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust, I will only say, that I have, with good intentions, contributed towards the organization and administration of the government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious, in the outset, of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more, that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied, that, if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services, they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe, that, while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it. In looking forward to the moment, which is intended to terminate the career of my public life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude, which I owe to my beloved country for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead, amidst appearances sometimes dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging, in situations in which not unfrequently want of



success has countenanced the spirit of criticism, the constancy of your support was the essential prop of the efforts, and a guarantee of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence; that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual; that the free constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained; that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption of every nation, which is yet a stranger to it. Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments, which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all-important to the permanency of your felicity as a People. These will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion. Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment. The unity of Government, which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so: for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillity at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very Liberty, which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that, from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment, that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national Union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the Palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion, that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts. For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens, by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of Ameri-

can, which belongs to you, in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of Patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common cause fought and triumphed together; the Independence and Liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels, and joint efforts, of common dangers, sufferings, and successes. But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those, which apply more immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the Union of the whole. The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds, in the productions of the latter, great additional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The South, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the agency of the North, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the North, it finds its particular navigation invigorated; and, while it contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The East, in a like intercourse with the West, already finds, and in the progressive improvement of interior communications by land and water, will more and more find, a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The West derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connexion with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious. While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in Union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from Union an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently afflict neighbouring countries not tied together by the same governments, which their own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce, but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and embitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to Republican Liberty. In this sense it is, that your Union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that

the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other. These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the Union as a primary object of Patriotic desire. Is there a doubt, whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope, that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to Union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those, who in any quarter may endeavour to weaken its bands. In contemplating the causes, which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by Geographical discriminations, Northern and Southern, Atlantic and Western; whence designing men may endeavour to excite a belief, that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heart-burnings, which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those, who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head; they have seen, in the negotiation by the Executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate, of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event, throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the General Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi; they have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that with Great Britain, and that with Spain, which secure to them every thing they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, towards confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the Union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren, and connect them with aliens? To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a Government for the whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions, which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a Constitution of Government better calculated than your former for an intimate Union, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This Government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision

for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true Liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their Constitutions of Government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish Government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established Government. All obstructions to the execution of the Laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels, and modified by mutual interests. However combinations or associations of the above descriptions may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government; destroying afterwards the very engines, which have lifted them to unjust dominion. Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the prettexts. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the constitution, alterations, which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard, by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that, for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprise of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tran-



quill enjoyment of the rights of person and property. I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight,) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another, fomenting occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume. It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution, in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the

human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way, which the constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for, though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield. Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and Citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connexions with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who, that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric? Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened. As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is, to use it as sparingly as possible; avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts, which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burthen, which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that public opinion should coöperate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be Revenue; that to have Revenue there must be taxes; that

no taxes can be devised, which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant, that the intrinsic embarrassment, inseparable from the selection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties), ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate. Observe good faith and justice towards all Nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and Morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great Nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt, that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages, which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a Nation with its Virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices? In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential, than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular Nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The Nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the Government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The Government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times, it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of Nations has been the victim. So likewise, a passionate attachment of one Nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite Nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite Nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the Nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to the favorite nation,) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own

country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base of foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent Patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practise the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the Public Councils! Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens,) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake; since history and experience prove, that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of Republican Government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defence against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests. The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connexion as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality, we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore,



let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard. In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course, which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even flatter myself, that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated. How far in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them. In relating to the still subsisting war in Europe, my Proclamation of the 23d of April, 1793, is the index to my Plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your Representatives, in both Houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it. After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon me, to maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and firmness. The considerations, which respect the right to hold this conduct, it

is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe, that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the Belligerent Powers, has been virtually admitted by all. The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations. The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavour to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes. Though, in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error, I am nevertheless too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope, that my Country will never cease to view them with indulgence; and that, after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its service with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest. Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it, which is so natural to a man, who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations; I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat, in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence of good laws under a free government, the ever favorite object of my heart, and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers. GEORGE WASHINGTON."

**A. D. 1796.—Third Presidential Election.—**Washington succeeded by John Adams.—After the appearance of Washington's Farewell Address, the result of the Presidential election became exceedingly doubtful. "There was no second man to whom the whole of the nation could be won over. The Federalists . . . could not bring forward a single candidate who could calculate on the unanimous and cheerful support of the entire party. There still prevailed at the time a feeling among the people that the vice-president had a sort of claim to the succession to the presidency. But even apart from this, Adams would have been one of the most prominent candidates of the Federalists. The great majority of them soon gave him a decided preference over all other possible candidates. On the other hand, some of the most distinguished and influential of the Federalists feared serious consequences to the party and the country from the vanity and violence as well as from the egotism and irresolution with which he was charged. But to put him aside entirely was not possible, nor was it their wish. They thought, however, to secure a greater number of electoral votes for Th. Pinckney, the Federal candidate for the vice-presidency, which, as the constitution then stood, would have made him presi-

dent and Adams vice-president. Although this plan was anxiously concealed from the people, it caused the campaign to be conducted by the party with less energy than if the leaders had been entirely unanimous. France was naturally desirous of Jefferson's success. . . . Wolcott asserted that Adet had publicly declared that France's future policy towards the United States would depend on the result of the election. Some did not hesitate to say that, on this account, Jefferson should have the preference, but on the more thoughtful Federalists it exerted the very opposite influence. There is no reason for the assumption that the issue of the election would have been different, had Adet behaved more discreetly. But his indiscretion certainly contributed to make the small majority expected for Adams completely certain, while Hamilton's flank movement in favor of Pinckney helped Jefferson to the vice-presidency. . . . The result of the election, however, left the country in a very serious condition. Washington's withdrawal removed the last restraint from party passion."—H. von Holst, *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 3. —Adams received 71 votes in the Electoral College and Jefferson 68. As the constitution then provided, the majority of votes elected the President and the next greatest number of votes elected the Vice President.

**A. D. 1797-1799.—Troubles with the French Republic.**—The X, Y, Z correspondence.—On the brink of war.—"Mr. Adams took his cabinet from his predecessor; it was not a strong one, and it was devoted to Hamilton, between whom and the new President there was soon a divergence, Hamilton being fond of power, and Adams having a laudable purpose to command his own ship. The figure of speech is appropriate, for he plunged into a sea of troubles, mainly created by the unreasonable demands of the French government. The French 'Directory,' enraged especially by Jay's treaty with England, got rid of one American minister by remonstrance, and drove out another [Pinckney] with contempt. When Mr. Adams sent three special envoys [Gerry, Marshall, and Pinckney], they were expected to undertake the most delicate negotiations with certain semi-official persons designated in their correspondence only by the letters X, Y, Z. The plan of this covert intercourse came through the private secretary of M. de Talleyrand, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the impudence of these three letters of the alphabet went so far as to propose a bribe of 1,200,000 francs (some \$220,000) to be paid over to this minister. 'You must pay money, a great deal of money,' remarked Monsieur Y ('Il faut de l'argent, beaucoup de l'argent'). The secret of these names was kept, but the diplomatic correspondence was made public, and created much wrath in Europe as well as in America. Moreover, American vessels were constantly attacked by France, and yet Congress refused to arm its own ships. At last the insults passed beyond bearing, and it was at this time that 'Millions for defence, not one cent for tribute,' first became a proverbial phrase, having been originally used by Charles C. Pinckney. . . . Then, with tardy decision, the Republicans yielded to the necessity of action, and the Federal party took the lead. War was not formally proclaimed, but

treaties with France were declared to be no longer binding. An army was ordered to be created, with Washington as Lieutenant-general and Hamilton as second in command; and the President was authorized to appoint a Secretary of the Navy and to build twelve new ships-of-war. Before these were ready, naval hostilities had actually begun; and Commodore Truxtun, in the U. S. frigate *Constellation*, captured a French frigate in West Indian waters (Feb. 9, 1799), and afterwards silenced another, which however escaped. Great was the excitement over these early naval successes of the young nation. Merchant-ships were authorized to arm themselves, and some 300 acted upon this authority. . . . The result of it all was that France yielded. Talleyrand, the very minister who had dictated the insults, now disavowed them, and pledged his government to receive any minister the United States might send. The President, in the most eminently courageous act of his life, took the responsibility of again sending ambassadors; and did this without even consulting his cabinet, which would, as he well knew, oppose it. They were at once received, and all danger of war with France was at an end. This bold stroke separated the President permanently from at least half of his own party, since the Federalists did not wish for peace with France. His course would have given him a corresponding increase of favor from the other side, but for the great mistake the Federalists had made in passing certain laws, called the 'Alien' law and the 'Sedition' law."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: J. T. Austin, *Life of Elbridge Gerry*, v. 2, ch. 5-8.—J. Q. and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, ch. 10 (v. 2).

**A. D. 1797-1800.—Early attitude of the Slavocracy in Congress.—Treatment of Free Blacks.**—"Many people will not allow the least blame to be cast on this period [the later years of the 18th century], because it does not harmonize with their admiration of the 'fathers,' and because they have adopted, without any proof, the common view that the deeper shadows of slavery and slavocracy first appeared comparatively late. . . . In reading through the debates [in Congress], single striking instances of injustice do not make the deepest impression. It is the omnipresent unwillingness to practice justice towards colored persons,—yes, even to recognize them as actual beings. When the defense of their rights is demanded, then congress has always a deaf ear. . . . Swanwick of Pennsylvania laid before the house of representatives, Jan. 30, 1797, a petition from four North Carolina negroes who had been freed by their masters. Since a state law condemned them to be sold again, they had fled to Philadelphia. There they had been seized under the fugitive slave law . . . and now prayed congress for its intervention. Blount of North Carolina declared that only when it was 'proved' that these men were free, could congress consider the petition. Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania asked, in reply to this, what sort of proof was offered that the four negroes were not free. This question received no answer. Smith of South Carolina and Christie of Maryland simply expressed their amazement that any member whatever could have presented a petition of 'such an unheard-of nature.' Swanwick and some other representatives affirmed



that the petition must be submitted to a committee for investigation and consideration, because the petitioners complained of violation of their rights under a law of the Union. No reply could be made to this and no reply was attempted. This decisive point was simply set aside, and it was voted by fifty ayes to thirty-three noes not to receive the petition. . . . In order to reach this result, Smith had produced the customary impression by the declaration that the refusal of the demand made by the representatives from the southern states would drive a 'wedge' into the Union. When, three years later, the same question was brought before congress again by a petition of the free negroes of Philadelphia, Rutledge of South Carolina declared in even plainer terms that the south would be forced to the sad necessity of going its own way. . . . The whites who troubled themselves about slaves or free colored persons had no better reception. . . . In all the cases mentioned, the tactics of the representatives of the slaveholding interest were the same. . . . If congress was urged to act in any way which did not please them, then slavery was always a 'purely municipal affair.'—H. von Holst, *Const. and Political Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 8.

**A. D. 1798.—Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution.**—The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution was proclaimed January 8, 1798. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

**A. D. 1798.—The Alien and Sedition Laws and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.**—"The outrages which we suffered from the injustice of England and France gave additional bitterness to the strife between parties at home. The anti-federal press was immoderate in its assaults upon the administration. It so happened that several of the anti-federal papers were conducted by foreigners. Indeed, there were many foreigners in the country whose sympathies were with the French, and their hostility to the administration was open and passionate. The federal leaders determined to crush out by the strong arm of the law these publishers of slanders and fomenters of discontent. Hence the famous 'alien and sedition laws' were passed. The remedy devised was far worse than the disease. It hastened the federal party to its tomb, and was the occasion of the formulation of that unfortunate creed of constitutional construction and of state sovereignty known as the 'Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions' of 1798-99."—J. S. Landon, *Const. Hist. and Govt. of the U. S.*, lect. 6.—The series of strong measures carried by the Federalists comprised the Naturalization Act of June 18, the Alien Act of June 25, the second Alien Act, of July 6, and the Sedition Act of July 14, 1798.

The text of the Naturalization Act is as follows:

June 18, 1798. Acts of the Fifth Congress, Statute II., Chap. liv.: "An Act supplementary to, and to amend the act, intitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject.'

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or of any state, unless in the manner prescribed by the act, intitled 'An act to

establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject,' he shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, five years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the United States fourteen years, at least, and within the state or territory where, or for which such court is at the time held, five years, at least, besides conforming to the other declarations, renunciations and proofs, by the said act required, anything therein to the contrary hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year after the passing of this act—and any alien who shall have made the declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, in conformity to the provisions of the act, intitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject,' may, within four years after having made the declaration aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by the said act, upon his making proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States: And provided also, that no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation or state with whom the United States shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United States."—*Statutes at Large of the United States*, ed. 1850, v. 1, pp. 566-567.

The following is the text of the two Alien Acts:

June 25, 1798. Statute II., Chap. lviii.—"An Act Concerning Aliens.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order, which order shall be served on such alien by delivering him a copy thereof, or leaving the same at his usual abode, and returned to the office of the Secretary of State, by the marshal or other person to whom the same shall be directed. And in case any alien, so ordered to depart, shall be found at large within the United States after the time limited in such order for his departure, and not having obtained a license from the President to reside therein, or having obtained such license shall not have conformed thereto, every such alien shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years, and shall never after be admitted to become a citizen of the United States. Provided always and be it further enacted, that if any alien so ordered to depart shall prove to the satisfaction of the President, by evidence to be taken before such person or persons as the President shall

direct, who are for that purpose hereby authorized to administer oaths, that no injury or danger to the United States will arise from suffering such alien to reside therein, the President may grant a license to such alien to remain within the United States for such time as he shall judge proper, and at such place as he may designate. And the President may also require of such alien to enter into a bond to the United States, in such penal sum as he may direct, with one or more sufficient sureties to the satisfaction of the person authorized by the President to take the same, conditioned for the good behavior of such alien during his residence in the United States, and not violating his license, which license the President may revoke whenever he shall think proper.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, whenever he may deem it necessary for the public safety, to order to be removed out of the territory thereof, any alien who may or shall be in prison in pursuance of this act; and to cause to be arrested and sent out of the United States such of those aliens as shall have been ordered to depart therefrom and shall not have obtained a license as aforesaid, in all cases where, in the opinion of the President, the public safety requires a speedy removal. And if any alien so removed or sent out of the United States by the President shall voluntarily return thereto, unless by permission of the President of the United States, such alien on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned so long as, in the opinion of the President, the public safety may require.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That every master or commander of any ship or vessel which shall come into any port of the United States after the first day of July next, shall immediately on his arrival make report in writing to the collector, or other chief officer of the customs of such port, of all aliens, if any, on board his vessel, specifying their names, age, the place of nativity, the country from which they shall have come, the nation to which they belong and owe allegiance, their occupation and a description of their persons, as far as he shall be informed thereof, and on failure, every such master and commander shall forfeit and pay three hundred dollars, for the payment whereof on default of such master or commander, such vessel shall also be holden, and may by such collector or other officer of the customs be detained. And it shall be the duty of such collector, or other officer of the customs, forthwith to transmit to the officer of the department of state true copies of all such returns.

Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the circuit and district courts of the United States, shall respectively have cognizance of all crimes and offences against this act. And all marshals and other officers of the United States are required to execute all precepts and orders of the President of the United States issued in pursuance or by virtue of this act.

Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for any alien who may be ordered to be removed from the United States, by virtue of this act, to take with him such part of his goods, chattels, or other property, as he may find convenient; and all property left in the United States by any alien, who may be removed, as aforesaid, shall be, and remain subject to his

order and disposal, in the same manner as if this act had not been passed.

Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue and be in force for and during the term of two years from the passing thereof.

Approved, June 25, 1798.—*Statutes at Large of the United States*, ed. 1850, Vol. I., pp. 570–572.

July 6, 1798. Statute II., Chap. lxvi.—“An Act respecting Alien Enemies.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President of the United States shall make public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies. And the President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby authorized, in any event, as aforesaid, by his proclamation thereof or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, towards the aliens who shall become liable as aforesaid; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those, who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, shall refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which shall be found necessary in the premises and for the public safety: Provided, that aliens resident within the United States, who shall become liable as enemies, in the manner aforesaid, and who shall not be chargeable with actual hostility, or other crime against the public safety, shall be allowed for the recovery, disposal, and removal of their goods and effects, and for their departure, the full time which is, or shall be stipulated by any treaty, where any shall have been between the United States and the hostile nation or government, of which they shall be natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects: and when no such treaty shall have existed, the President of the United States may ascertain and declare such reasonable time as may be consistent with the public safety, and according to the dictates of humanity and national hospitality.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That after any proclamation shall be made as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the several courts of the United States, and of each state, having criminal jurisdiction, and of the several judges and justices of the courts of the United States, and they shall be, and are hereby respectively, authorized upon complaint, against any alien or alien enemies, as aforesaid, who shall be resident and at large within such jurisdiction or district, to the danger of the public peace or safety, and contrary to the tenor or intent of such proclamation, or other regulations which



the President of the United States shall and may establish in the premises, to cause such alien or aliens to be duly apprehended and conveyed before such court, judge or justice; and after a full examination and hearing on such complaint, and sufficient cause therefor appearing, shall and may order such alien or aliens to be removed out of the territory of the United States, or to give such sureties for their good behaviour, or to be otherwise restrained, conformably to the proclamation or regulations which shall or may be established as aforesaid, and may imprison, or otherwise secure such alien or aliens, until the order which shall and may be made, as aforesaid, shall be performed.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the marshal of the district in which any alien enemy shall be apprehended, who by the President of the United States, or by the order of any court, judge or justice, as aforesaid, shall be required to depart, and to be removed, as aforesaid, to provide therefor, and to execute such order, by himself or his deputy, or other discreet person or persons to be employed by him, by causing a removal of such alien out of the territory of the United States; and for such removal the marshal shall have the warrant of the President of the United States, or of the court, judge or justice ordering the same, as the case may be.

Approved, July 6, 1798."—*Statutes at Large of the United States*, ed. of 1850, Vol. I, p. 577.

The text of the Sedition Act is as follows:

JULY 14, 1798. Chap. lxxiv.—"An Act in addition to the act, entitled 'An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States.'

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That if any persons shall unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States, which are or shall be directed by proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a place or office in or under the government of the United States, from undertaking, performing or executing, his trust or duty; and if any person or persons, with intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such conspiracy, threatening, counsel, advice, or attempt shall have the proposed effect or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars and by imprisonment during a term not less than six months nor exceeding five years; and further at the discretion of the court may be holden to find sureties for his good behavior in such sum, and for such time, as the said court may direct.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and ma-

licious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either, or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States, and one in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted and declared, That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act, for the writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.

Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue and be in force until the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and one, and no longer: Provided that the expiration of the act shall not prevent or defeat a prosecution and punishment of any offence against the law, during the time it shall be in force. Approved July 14, 1798."

"There has been a general effort on the part of biographers to clear their respective heroes from all responsibility for these ill-fated measures. The truth is, that they had the full support of the congressmen and senators who passed them, of the President who signed them, and of all the leaders in the States, who almost all believed in them; and they also met with very general acceptance by the party in the North. Hamilton went as far in the direction of sustaining the principle of these laws as any one. He had too acute a mind to believe with many of the staunch Federalist divines of New England, that Jefferson and Madison were Marats and Robespierres, and that their followers were Jacobins who, when they came to power, were ready for the overthrow of religion and society, and were prepared to set up a guillotine and pour out blood in the waste places of the federal city. But he did believe, and so wrote to Washington, after the appearance of the X. Y. Z. letters that there was a party in the country ready to 'new model' the constitution on French principles, to form an offensive and defensive alliance with France, and make the United States a French province. He felt, in short, that there was a party in America ready for confiscation and social confusion. A year later, in 1799, he wrote to Dayton, the speaker of the national House of Representatives, a long letter in which

he set forth very clearly the policy which he felt ought to be pursued. He wished to give strength to the government, and increase centralization by every means, by an extension of the national judiciary, a liberal system of internal improvements, an increased and abundant revenue, an enlargement of the army and navy, permanence in the laws for the volunteer army, extension of the powers of the general government, subdivision of the States as soon as practicable, and finally a strong sedition law, and the power to banish aliens. This was what was termed at that day a 'strong and spirited' policy; it would now be called repressive, but by whatever name it is designated, it was the policy of Hamilton, and is characteristic of both his talents and temperament. Except as to the subdivision of States, it was carried out pretty thoroughly in all its main features by the Federalists. The alien and sedition laws, although resisted in Congress, did not much affect public opinion at the elections which immediately ensued, and the Federalists came into the next Congress with a large majority."—H. C. Lodge, *Alexander Hamilton*, ch. 9.—"The different portions of the country were affected according to the dominant political opinion. Where the Federalists were strong political feeling bore them headlong into prosecutions under the new powers. In the Republican States a sense of injury and danger went hand in hand, and the question of the hour was how to repel the threatening destruction. Mr. Jefferson did not fail to see that the great opportunity for his party had come. His keen political sagacity detected in an instant the fatal mistake the administration had made, and he began at once to look about him for the best means to turn his opponents' mistake to his own advantage. Naturally he felt some delicacy in appearing too forward in assailing a government of which he himself was the second in office. Nevertheless he lent himself willingly to the task of organizing, in a quiet way, a systematic assault upon these laws of Congress, and at once opened a correspondence calculated to elicit the best judgment of his coadjutors and gradually drew out a programme of action. Virginia was by no means unanimous in reprobating these laws. She had a large and influential body of Federalists. . . . But the influence of Jefferson was paramount and the result of Jeffersonian principles soon appeared on every hand. Meetings were held in many of the counties upon their county court days at which were adopted addresses or series of resolutions condemning or praying for the repeal of these laws. . . . New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania sent petitions of appeal to Congress. . . . But it was in Kentucky that the greatest resistance was evoked. The feeling in that State was, indeed, little short of frenzy, and a singular unanimity was displayed even in the most extreme acts and sentiments. This grew out of no passing passion. It was based upon the most vigorous elements in her character as a people. Kentucky was at this time somewhat apart from the rest of the Union. . . . Her complaints, just and unjust, had been many, but hitherto she had not gained the nation's ear. But the time was now ripe for her to assert herself."—E. D. Warfield, *The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798*, ch. 1.—The famous Kentucky Resolutions, substantially drafted by Jefferson, as

he acknowledged fifteen years afterwards, but introduced in the Legislature of Kentucky by John Breckenridge, on the 8th of November, 1798, were adopted by that body, in the lower branch on the 10th and in the upper on the 13th. Approved by the Governor on the 16th, they were immediately printed and copies officially sent to every other state and to members of Congress. They were as follows:

"I. Resolved, that the several states composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their General Government; but that by compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States and of amendments thereto, they constituted a General Government for special purposes, delegated to that Government certain definite powers, reserving each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self Government; and that whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthorized, void, and are of no force: That to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party, its co-states forming as to itself, the other party: That the Government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.

II. Resolved, that the Constitution of the United States having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, piracies and felonies committed on the High Seas, and offences against the laws of nations, and no other crimes whatever, and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, 'that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people,' therefore also the same act of Congress passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, and entitled 'An act in addition to the act entitled an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States;' as also the act passed by them on the 27th of June, 1798, entitled 'An act to punish frauds committed on the Bank of the United States' (and all other their acts which assume to create, define, or punish crimes other than those enumerated in the constitution) are altogether void and of no force, and that the power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved, and of right appertains solely and exclusively to the respective states, each within its own Territory.

III. Resolved, that it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitution that 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people;' and that no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or



to the people: That thus was manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use, should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed; and thus also they guarded against all abridgment by the United States of the freedom of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right of protecting the same, as this state by a Law passed on the general demand of its Citizens, had already protected them from all human restraint or interference; and that in addition to this general principle and express declaration, another and more special provision has been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution which expressly declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,' thereby guarding in the same sentence, and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press, inasmuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the act of the Congress of the United States passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, entitled 'An act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,' which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void and of no effect.

IV. Resolved, that alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the state wherein they are; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states distinct from their power over citizens; and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, that 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively or to the people,' the act of the Congress of the United States passed on the 22d day of June, 1798, entitled 'An act concerning aliens,' which assumes power over alien friends not delegated by the Constitution, is not law, but is altogether void and of no force.

V. Resolved, that in addition to the general principle as well as the express declaration, that powers not delegated are reserved, another and more special provision inserted in the Constitution from abundant caution has declared, 'that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808.' That this Commonwealth does admit the migration of alien friends described as the subject of the said act concerning aliens; that a provision against prohibiting their migration, is a provision against all acts equivalent thereto, or it would be nugatory; that to remove them when migrated is equivalent to a prohibition of their migration, and is therefore contrary to the said provision of the Constitution, and void.

VI. Resolved, that the imprisonment of a person under the protection of the Laws of this

Commonwealth on his failure to obey the simple order of the President to depart out of the United States, as is undertaken by the said act entitled 'An act concerning aliens,' is contrary to the Constitution, one amendment to which has provided, that 'no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law,' and that another having provided 'that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence,' the same act undertaking to authorize the President to remove a person out of the United States who is under the protection of the Law, on his own suspicion, without accusation, without jury, without public trial, without confrontation of the witnesses against him, without having witnesses in his favour, without defence, without counsel, is contrary to these provisions also of the Constitution, is therefore not law but utterly void and of no force. That transferring the power of judging any person who is under the protection of the laws, from the Courts to the President of the United States, as is undertaken by the same act concerning Aliens, is against the article of the Constitution which provides, that 'the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in Courts, the Judges of which shall hold their offices during good behaviour,' and that the said act is void for that reason also; and it is further to be noted, that this transfer of Judiciary powers is to that magistrate of the General Government who already possesses all the Executive, and a qualified negative in all the Legislative power.

VII. Resolved, that the construction applied by the General Government (as is evinced by sundry of their proceedings) to those parts of the Constitution of the United States which delegate to Congress a power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence, and general welfare of the United States, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any department thereof, goes to the destruction of all the limits prescribed to their power by the Constitution — That words meant by that instrument to be subsidiary only to the execution of the limited powers, ought not to be so construed as themselves to give unlimited powers, nor a part so to be taken, as to destroy the whole residue of the instrument: That the proceedings of the General Government under colour of these articles, will be a fit and necessary subject for revision and correction at a time of greater tranquility, while those specified in the preceding resolutions call for immediate redress.

VIII. Resolved, that the preceding Resolutions be transmitted to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this Commonwealth, who are hereby enjoined to present the same to their respective Houses, and to use the best endeavours to procure at the next session of Congress, a repeal of the aforesaid unconstitutional and obnoxious acts.

IX. Resolved lastly, that the Governor of this Commonwealth be, and is hereby authorised

and requested to communicate the preceding Resolutions to the Legislatures of the several States, to assure them that this Commonwealth considers Union for specified National purposes, and particularly for those specified in their late Federal compact, to be friendly to the peace, happiness, and prosperity of all the states: that faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation: that it does also believe, that to take from the states all the powers of self government, and transfer them to a general and consolidated Government, without regard to the special delegations and reservations solemnly agreed to in that compact, is not for the peace, happiness, or prosperity of these states: And that therefore, this Commonwealth is determined, as it doubts not its Co-states are, tamely to submit to undelegated and consequently unlimited powers in no man or body of men on earth: that if the acts before specified should stand, these conclusions would flow from them; that the General Government may place any act they think proper on the list of crimes and punish it themselves, whether enumerated or not enumerated by the Constitution as cognizable by them: that they may transfer its cognizance to the President or any other person, who may himself be the accuser, counsel, judge, and jury, whose suspicions may be the evidence, his order the sentence, his officer the executioner, and his breast the sole record of the transaction: that a very numerous and valuable description of the inhabitants of these states, being by this precedent reduced as outlaws to the absolute dominion of one man and the barrier of the Constitution thus swept away from us all, no rampart now remains against the passions and the power of a majority of Congress, to protect from a like exportation or other more grievous punishment the minority of the same body, the Legislatures, Judges, Governors, and Counsellors of the states, nor their other peaceable inhabitants who may venture to reclaim the constitutional rights and liberties of the states and people, or who for other causes, good or bad, may be obnoxious to the views or marked by the suspicions of the President, or be thought dangerous to his or their elections or other interests public or personal: that the friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment: but the citizen will soon follow, or rather has already followed; for already has a Sedition Act marked him as its prey: that these and successive acts of the same character, unless arrested on the threshold, may tend to drive these states into revolution and blood, and will furnish new calumnies against Republican Governments, and new pretexts for those who wish it to be believed that man cannot be governed but by a rod of iron: that it would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of our rights: that confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism: free government is founded in jealousy and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which and no further our confidence may go; and let the honest advocate of confidence read the Alien

and Sedition Acts, and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing limits to the Government it created, and whether we should be wise in destroying those limits? Let him say what the Government is if it be not a tyranny, which the men of our choice have conferred on the President, and the President of our choice has assented to and accepted over the friendly strangers, to whom the mild spirit of our Country and its laws had pledged hospitality and protection: that the men of our choice have more respected the bare suspicions of the President than the solid rights of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms and subsistence of law and justice. In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution. That this Commonwealth does therefore call on its Co-states for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning Aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes hereinbefore specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not authorized by the Federal Compact? And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced as to prove their attachment unaltered to limited Government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their Co-states will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own: That they will concur with this Commonwealth in considering the said acts so palpably against the Constitution as to amount to an undisguised declaration, that the compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the General Government, but that it will proceed in the exercise over these states of all powers whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of the states and consolidating them in the hands of the General Government with a power assumed to bind the states (not merely in cases made federal) but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, but by others against their consent: That this would be to surrender the form of Government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will, and not from our authority; and that the Co-states recurring to their natural right in cases not made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress."

In the month following this declaration from Kentucky, on the 21st of December, Virginia affirmed substantially the same threatening doctrine, more temperately and cautiously set forth in resolutions drawn by Madison as follows:

"Resolved, that the General Assembly of Virginia doth unequivocally express a firm resolution to maintain and defend the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of this state against every aggression, either foreign or domestic, and that they will support the government of the United States in all measures warranted by the former.

That this Assembly most solemnly declares a warm attachment to the union of the states, to maintain which, it pledges all its powers; and that for this end it is their duty to watch over and oppose every infraction of those principles which constitute the only basis of that union, because a faithful observance of them can alone secure its existence, and the public happiness.



That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers of the Federal Government, as resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties; as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact; as no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact, and that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.

That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a spirit has in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Government, to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter which defines them; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases (which having been copied from the very limited grant of powers in the former articles of confederation were the less liable to be misconstrued), so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration, which necessarily explains and limits the general phrases; and so as to consolidate the states by degrees into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable consequence of which would be to transform the present republican system of the United States into an absolute, or at best a mixed monarchy.

That the General Assembly doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the 'Alien and Sedition Acts,' passed at the last session of Congress, the first of which exercises a power nowhere delegated to the Federal Government; and which by uniting legislative and judicial powers to those of executive, subverts the general principles of free government, as well as the particular organization and positive provisions of the federal constitution: and the other of which acts, exercises in like manner a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto; a power which more than any other ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.

That this state having by its convention which ratified the federal constitution, expressly declared, 'that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States,' and from its extreme anxiety to guard these rights from every possible attack of sophistry or ambition, having with other states recommended an amendment for that purpose, which amendment was in due time annexed to the constitution, it would mark a reproachful inconsistency and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now shown to the most palpable violation of one of the rights thus declared and secured, and to the establishment of a precedent which may be fatal to the other.

That the good people of this commonwealth having ever felt and continuing to feel the most sincere affection to their brethren of the other states, the truest anxiety for establishing and perpetuating the union of all, and the most scrupulous fidelity to that constitution which is the pledge of mutual friendship, and the instrument of mutual happiness: The General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions of the other states, in confidence that they will concur with this commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the acts aforesaid are unconstitutional, and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each for co-operating with this state, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

That the Governor be desired to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to the executive authority of each of the other states, with a request, that the same may be communicated to the legislature thereof.

And that a copy be furnished to each of the Senators and Representatives, representing this state in the Congress of the United States.

In later years, after Calhoun and his school had pushed these doctrines to their logical conclusion, Madison shrank from the result, and endeavored to disown the apparent meaning of what Jefferson had written and he had seemed to endorse in 1798. He denounced Nullification and Secession as "twin heresies," and denied that they were contained or implied in the resolutions of 1798—either those adopted in Kentucky or the responsive ones written by himself for the legislature of Virginia. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were followed in 1799 by another series, in which the right of a sovereign State to nullify obnoxious laws of the Federal Government was no longer asserted by implication, but was put into plain terms—as follows: "That the principle and construction, contended for by sundry of the state legislatures, that the general government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop not short of despotism,—since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the Constitution, would be the measure of their powers: That the several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction; and, That a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy." It was Mr. Madison's desire to cast on these resolutions of 1799, with which Jefferson had nothing to do, the odium of the nullification doctrine, and to remove the stigma from the resolutions of 1798, in which the word "nullification" makes no appearance; "neither that," pleaded Madison, "nor any equivalent term." But, when Madison made this plea, in 1830, "it was not then generally known, whether Mr. Madison knew it or not, that one of the resolutions and part of another which Jefferson wrote to be offered in the Kentucky legislature in 1798 were omitted by Mr. Nicholas [to whom Mr. Jefferson had entrusted them], and that therein was the assertion . . . 'where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy.' The next year, when additional resolutions were offered by Mr. Breckenridge, this idea in similar, though not in precisely the same language, was

presented [as quoted above]. . . . In 1832, this fact, on the authority of Jefferson's grandson and executor, was made public; and further, that another declaration of Mr. Jefferson's in the resolution not used was an exhortation to the co-States, 'that each will take measures of its own for providing that neither these acts nor any others of the general government, not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories.'"—S. H. Gay, *James Madison*, ch. 15.—"The publication of the Kentucky resolutions . . . was instantly followed by a new crop of remonstrances and petitions from the people. . . . Such memorials as reached the House were sent to a committee, who, late in February, reported. . . . The report closed with three resolutions, and these were: that it was not in the interest of the public good to repeal either the Alien Law, or the Sedition Law, or any of the laws respecting the army, the navy, or the revenue of the United States. On the twenty-fifth of February, the House being in Committee of the Whole, the three resolutions were taken up one by one" and adopted. "The House then agreed to the action of the committee on each of the three resolutions. The Federal party was now at the height of its prosperity and power. It controlled the Senate. It controlled the House. Outwardly it was great and powerful, but within that dispute had begun which, in a few short months, drove Pickering and M'Henry from the Cabinet, split the party in twain, and gave to the country the strange spectacle of staunch and earnest Federalists wrangling and contending and overwhelming each other with abuse."—J. B. McMaster, *A History of the United States*, ch. 11 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 8.—J. Madison, *Works*, v. 4.—T. Jefferson, *Works*, v. 7, p. 229; and v. 9, pp. 464-471.—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, p. 148.—J. T. Morse, *Life of Hamilton*, v. 2, ch. 6.

A. D. 1799.—The Death of Washington.—A great sorrow fell upon the country, with a shock of surprise, in the last month of the year. Washington was stricken with a suddenly fatal disease, and died after an illness of two days. On the 12th of December he seemed to be in perfect health, but exposed himself to a cold rain that day, in a long ride about his estate. The next day he had a slight sore throat, and in the night he suffered difficulty in breathing, which followed a severe chill. Physicians were called on the morning of the 14th, who bled him copiously, according to the medical practice of that day. His struggle for breath increased steadily, and he knew that it meant death, facing the prospect with great calmness and thoughtfully arranging his affairs. He was conscious to the end, which came about ten o'clock that night. It is now understood that Washington's disease (which the physicians then called quinsy) was what is known as acute oedematous laryngitis, which might have been overcome by an operation of tracheotomy.—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 2, ch. 6.

A. D. 1800.—The convention with France and the French Spoliation Claims incident to it.—"In the instructions to the American envoys in France they had been directed to secure a claims commission, the abrogation of the former treaties, and the abolition of the guarantee of

1778, as it was called, contained in Article XI. of the Treaty of Alliance of that year, and covering 'the present possessions of the Crown of France in America, as well as those which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace.' Upon none of these points were the envoys able to carry out their instructions. In reference to claims, a distinction, which was finally embodied in the treaty, was drawn by the French government between two classes of claims: first, debts due from the French government to American citizens for supplies furnished, or prizes whose restoration had been decreed by the courts; and secondly, indemnities for prizes alleged to have been wrongfully condemned. The treaty provided that the first class, known as debts, should be paid, but excluded the second, or indemnity class. In reference to the indemnity claims, and to the questions involved in the old treaties, including, of course, the guarantee of 1778, as the envoys were not able to come to an agreement, the treaty declared that the negotiation was postponed. The Senate of the United States expunged this latter article, inserting in its place a clause providing for the duration of the present convention; and this amendment was accepted by the French government, with the proviso that both governments should renounce the pretensions which were the object of the original article. To this the Senate also agreed, and upon this basis the convention was finally ratified. It thus appears that the United States surrendered the claims of its citizens against France for wrongful seizures, in return for the surrender by France of whatever claim it might have had against the United States for the latter's failure to fulfil the obligations assumed in the earlier treaties [especially the guaranty of the possessions of France in America, which was undertaken in the treaty of 1778]. The United States, therefore, having received a consideration for its refusal to prosecute the claims of its citizens, thereby took the place, with respect to the claimants, of the French government, and virtually assumed the obligations of the latter. . . . The claims for indemnity thus devolving upon the United States, known as the French Spoliation Claims, have been from that day to this the subject of frequent report and discussion in Congress, but with no result until the passage of the act of Jan. 20, 1885, referring them to the Court of Claims. At the present time (1888) they are undergoing judicial examination before that tribunal."—J. R. Soley, *The Wars of the U. S., 1789-1850 (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., v. 7, ch. 6; and ed's foot-note).*

ALSO IN: F. Wharton, *Digest of the International Law of the U. S.*, sect. 248 (v. 2, pp. 714-728).—D. Webster, *Works*, v. 4, pp. 152-178.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 117-120.—W. H. Seward, *Works*, v. 1, pp. 132-155.—*Rep't of Sec. of State (U. S. Senate, Ex. Doc. no. 74 and 102, 49th Cong. 1st sess.)*.—Spoliations committed by the French in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars subsequently to the year 1800, were indemnified under the provisions of the treaty for the Louisiana purchase (see LOUISIANA: A. D. 1798-1803); under the treaty with Spain in 1819, and under a later treaty with France which was negotiated in Andrew Jackson's most imperative manner in 1831. These do not enter into what have become historically specialized as the French Spoliation Claims.



**A. D. 1800. — The Second Census. — Total population, 5,305,937, (an increase of slightly more than 85 per cent. since 1790), classed and distributed as follows:**

**North.**

	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut . . . . .	244,721	5,330	951
Indiana . . . . .	4,577	163	135
Maine . . . . .	150,901	818	....
Massachusetts . . . . .	416,793	6,452	....
New Hampshire . . . . .	182,898	856	8
New Jersey . . . . .	195,125	4,402	12,422
New York . . . . .	556,039	10,374	20,343
Ohio . . . . .	45,028	337	....
Pennsylvania . . . . .	586,094	14,561	1,706
Rhode Island . . . . .	65,437	3,304	381
Vermont . . . . .	153,908	557	....
	2,601,521	47,154	35,946

**South.**

	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Delaware . . . . .	49,852	8,268	6,153
District of Columbia . . . . .	10,066	783	3,244
Georgia . . . . .	101,678	1,019	59,404
Kentucky . . . . .	179,871	741	40,343
Maryland . . . . .	216,326	19,587	105,635
Mississippi . . . . .	5,179	182	3,489
North Carolina . . . . .	337,764	7,043	133,296
South Carolina . . . . .	196,255	3,185	146,151
Tennessee . . . . .	91,709	309	13,584
Virginia . . . . .	514,280	20,124	345,796
	1,702,980	61,241	857,095

**A. D. 1800-1801. — The Fourth Presidential Election. — Presidency of Jefferson. —** "Adams, whom Dr. Franklin aptly described as 'always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some things absolutely out of his senses,' was approaching the end of his term as President, and public attention was absorbed in the task of choosing a successor. . . . At the time of Adams's election, a sectional feeling, destined in the future to work so much evil, had already been developed; and he in consequence received from States south of the Potomac but two electoral votes. New York had given him her twelve, yet the entire majority over his competitor was but three in all the colleges. The national parties were not unequally matched in the State; and it was evident that, could its vote be diverted to Jefferson in the next contest, his victory would be assured. Hence, strenuous efforts were made to accomplish this end, and for months society was like a seething caldron. The trouble with France had, for the moment, swelled the numbers of the Federalists, and closed up their ranks; but the capricious course of the President, and the violent disruption of the cabinet, rent them asunder, never to be re-united. . . . During the French excitement, it seemed almost certain that, after the local election, they would have a majority in the new Legislature, and thus retain for their candidate the electoral vote of New York. This pleasing prospect was soon obscured. When its people found Mr. Adams sternly enforcing the Sedition Law, and exercising the power it conferred in an unfeeling manner upon one of their most esteemed citizens [Judge Peck], they turned with disgust from a party which they held responsible for its enactment, as well as for this violent

procedure. The permanent ascendancy which the Republicans seemed to have acquired in the metropolis had been wrested from them, in the spring of 1799, by the unpopularity of a scheme of Burr's, already conspicuous in the State as an unscrupulous political tactician. He had been a member of the assembly the preceding year, and, under the pretence of supplying pure and wholesome water, obtained a charter which enabled the corporators to engage in banking. In consequence of the feeling this aroused, he did not dare present himself again as a candidate, but, with great tact and unwearied efforts, succeeded in healing divisions in his party, and nominating a delegation for the assembly, which embraced the Republicans most eminent for wealth, station, or family influence. Gov. Clinton headed the list. . . . The result followed which Burr had anticipated. The Federal majority of the last year was overcome, and New York City secured by the Republicans, giving them control of the State. Adams subsequently received but four electoral votes south of Maryland, and Jefferson became his successor. Burr, to whose untiring exertions this great victory was due, was thereby inducted into the office of Vice-President. At that time, the Legislature appointed the electors for the State; and the Republicans, then anticipating a defeat, had at a previous session advocated that, for the future, these should be chosen directly by the people in separate districts, hoping thus to secure a sufficient number to elect their Presidential candidate. The Federalists, thinking their supremacy in the assembly assured, refused to support the plan. Now, however, when it became known that their adversaries had gained a majority in the Legislature on which would devolve the duty of choosing the electors, Hamilton addressed a letter to Gov. Jay, suggesting that the present body, whose term would not expire before July, should be again convened, in order to pass a measure which, when before proposed by the Republicans, had been denounced as unconstitutional. Jay had too much regard for principle to entertain the idea. After his death, the letter was found among his papers, endorsed, 'Proposing a measure for party purposes which I think it would not become me to adopt.' It is related that a noted French duellist, when required to forgive his enemies before receiving absolution, exclaimed, 'My enemies? I have none. I have killed them all!' Mr. Jefferson might have responded in the same manner, the morrow after the Presidential election. To the one party, the result seemed like the breaking up of an ice gorge — the harbinger of spring. To the other it appeared as an avalanche of French principles, destructive alike of religion and established government. Both were at fault. President Jefferson was quite as unable to destroy the work of his predecessors as he was to depart from their policy of neutrality. The Sedition and Alien Laws soon expired by limitation; but the great measures of the former administrations were too wise, and had struck their roots too deep into the national sentiment, to be suddenly overturned." — W. Whitelock, *Life and Times of John Jay*, ch. 22. — In the Electoral College, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both Democratic Republicans, received an equal number of votes (73), and the election was carried into the House of Representatives, where Jefferson was chosen

President and Burr Vice President. "Adams, stung to the heart by the election of Jefferson, refused to witness the hateful spectacle of his successor's inauguration. He spent his last hours in filling up vacancies to place patronage out of Jefferson's reach; then he departed, the old order in his person giving place with a frown and a shudder to the new. Adams did not hate monarchy, he thought that for England it was good. In the eyes of Jefferson monarchy was the incarnate spirit of evil and to rid mankind of it by example was the mission of the American Republic. Every vestige of the half-monarchical state which Washington had retained was now banished from the President's mansion and life. No more coaches-and-six, no more court dress, no more levées. Although Jefferson did not, as legend says, ride to his inauguration and tie his horse to the fence, he was inaugurated with as little ceremony as possible. He received an ambassador in slippers down at the heel, and in the arrangement of his dinner parties was so defiant of the rules of etiquette as to breed trouble in the diplomatic circle. Yet with all his outward simplicity the Virginian magnate and man of letters, though he might be a Republican, could not in himself be a true embodiment of democracy. He was the friend of the people, but not one of them. . . . The desired day had come when the philosopher was to govern. The words of the address which Jefferson, unlike the demagogic sons of thunder in the present day, read in a very low voice, are the expression by its great master and archetype of the republican idea which has hitherto reigned supreme in the mind of the American people. These words are monumental, 'Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies, the preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigour, as the sheet-anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the People; a mild and safe correction of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first movements in war, till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labour may be lightly burdened; the honest payment of our debts, and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid, the diffusion of information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason; freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the "habeas corpus," and trial by jurors impartially selected;—these principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation.' Jefferson's wand was the pen. Yet he is strangely apt to fall into mixed

metaphors and even into platitudes. This address has not escaped criticism."—Goldwin Smith, *The United States*, ch. 3.—"Jefferson had reached the presidential chair at a most fortunate moment. . . . The prospect of a speedy peace in Europe promised effectual and permanent relief from those serious embarrassments to which, during war on the ocean, American commerce was ever exposed from the aggressions of one or of all the belligerents. The treasury was fuller, the revenue more abundant than at any previous period. Commerce was flourishing, and the pecuniary prosperity of the country very great. All the responsibility of framing institutions, laying taxes, and providing for debts, had fallen on the ousted administration. Succeeding to the powers and the means of the Federal government without sharing any of the unpopularity at the expense of which they had been attained, and ambitious not so much of a splendid as of a quiet and popular administration, the new president seemed to have before him a very plain and easy path. . . . To the offices of Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General, left vacant by the resignation of the late incumbents, Jefferson nominated James Madison, Henry Dearborn, and Levi Lincoln, the latter an early leader of the opposition in Massachusetts. . . . As the Senate stood at present, still containing, as it did, of the members present a majority of Federalists, Jefferson did not think proper to make any further nominations; but, soon after the adjournment, he appointed as Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, all along the financial member of the opposition. . . . The Navy Department, after being refused by Chancellor Livingston, was given to Robert Smith, brother of the Baltimore member of Congress. Livingston, however, having reached the age of sixty, and being obliged, under a Constitutional provision, to vacate the chancellorship of New York, consented to accept the embassy to France. . . . Habersham was continued as post-master-general for some six months, . . . but he presently gave way to Gideon Granger, a leader of the Connecticut Republicans."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, 2d series, ch. 16 (v. 2, or v. 5 of whole work).—"The first act of the new Cabinet was to reach a general understanding in regard to the objects of the Administration. These appear to have been two only in number: reduction of debt and reduction of taxes, and the relation to be preserved between them."—H. Adams, *Life of Albert Gallatin*, p. 276.—"Under President Jefferson, the heads of the great departments of the government were changed, nor was there any just reason to complain of this measure; as they formed a part of his political council; and, as the chief executive officer of government, he had a perfect right to select his confidential friends and advisers. But when afterwards, and within a few months, he removed able and upright men from offices of a subordinate grade, his conduct was considered improper and arbitrary, and as partaking somewhat of the 'right of prerogative,' usually claimed and exercised by royal princes. . . . In his inaugural address, Mr. Jefferson said, 'We have gained little, if we encourage a political intolerance as wicked as impolitic. We are all brethren of the same principles; we are all republicans, and all federalists.' Yet in less than fifty days he removed fourteen federal



officers, without any allegation of unfaithfulness or inefficiency: on the plea, indeed, that his predecessor had removed two public officers on account of their political opinions; and had appointed none to office in the government but such as were of the same sentiments and views as the administration. 'Few died, and none resigned,' he said; and therefore, to equalize public offices between the two great political parties, it was necessary, in his opinion, to remove a part of those then employed, and to appoint others more friendly to the new administration. For a very few of the removals there might have been sufficient or justifiable reasons offered; but in most instances the changes were made merely for political opinions."—A. Bradford, *Hist. of the Federal Gov't*, 1789-1839, ch. 6.

**A. D. 1801.—Appointment of John Marshall to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.—His Constitutional decisions.**—On the 31st of January, 1801, near the close of the term of President Adams, the latter appointed John Marshall, who had been Secretary of State in his cabinet since the previous May, to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It was a memorable appointment,—the most memorable, perhaps, that has ever been made by official and not popular selection, in America, since Washington was appointed to the command of the continental army. Its result was to place the new, uninterpreted, plastic Constitution of the Federal Republic under the hands of a master, during thirty-four years of the period in which it hardened into practical, determined law. It decided the character of the Constitution, and by that decision the great instrument was made a bond of nationality, firm, strenuous and enduring. "The abilities of the new Chief Justice were recognized by the profession and the public at the time of his appointment, but the attractive qualities of his heart and his kindly manners soon caused respect and reverence to ripen into affection. Perhaps no American citizen except Washington ever conciliated so large a measure of popularity and public esteem. . . . In surveying the results of the labors of thirty-four years recorded in thirty-two volumes of reports, it is obvious that it was in the decision of cases involving international and constitutional law that the force and clearness of the Chief Justice's intellect shone most conspicuous. Such was the ready assent of his colleagues on the bench to his supremacy in the exposition of constitutional law, that in such causes a dissenting opinion was almost unknown. Having had occasion to discuss and thoroughly study the Constitution, both in the Virginia convention which adopted it and afterward in the legislature, he had pre-conceived opinions concerning it, as well as perfect familiarity with it. But in the hot contest waging between the friends of a strict and those of a liberal construction of its language, he wished to take no part. He stated that there should be neither a liberal nor a strict construction, but that the simple, natural, and usual meaning of its words and phrases should govern their interpretation. In the case of *Gibbons v. Ogden*, in which he is called upon to define the true rule of construction of the United States Constitution regarding the rights of the States and the rights and powers of the general government, he studiously avoids each extreme, steering safely in the middle course. He lays

down his own rule thus clearly and definitely:—'This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly; but why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants expressly the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred, nor is there one sentence in the Constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not therefore think ourselves justified in adopting it. If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as a rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded.' . . . Marshall's dictum that there must be neither a strict nor a liberal construction of the Constitution, but that the natural meaning of the words must govern, was undoubtedly sound and wise. The broad proposition was above criticism; it meant only that the language of the instrument should not be stretched or wrenched in any direction; and however politicians or even statesmen might feel, there was no other possible ground for a judge to take. Jefferson might regard it as a duty to make the Constitution as narrow and restricted as possible; Hamilton might feel that there was an actual obligation upon him to make it as broad and comprehensive as its words would admit. But Jefferson and Hamilton, in a different department of public life from Marshall, had duties and obligations correspondingly different from his. They might properly try to make the Constitution mean what it seemed to them for the public welfare that it should mean. Marshall could not consider any such matter; he had only to find and declare what it did mean, what its words actually and properly declared, not what they might possibly or desirably be supposed or construed to declare. This was the real force and the only real force of his foregoing assertion. As an abstract statement of his function it was impregnable. But, as with most broad principles, the difficulty lay in the application of it to particular cases. The constitutional questions which came before Marshall chiefly took the form of whether or not the Constitution conferred some power or authority upon Congress, or upon the Executive. Then the Federalist lawyers tried to show how much the language could mean, and the anti-Federal-







1st counsel sought to show how little it could mean, and each urged that public policy was upon his side. The decision must be yes or no; the authority did or did not rest in the government. It was easy to talk about the natural and proper meaning of the words; but after all it was the question at issue; did they (not could they) say yes, or did they (not could they) say no, to the special authority sought to be exercised. Now it is one thing to be impartial and another to be colorless in mind. Judge Marshall was impartial and strongly possessed of the judicial instinct or faculty. But he was by no means colorless. He could no more eliminate from his mind an interest in public affairs, and opinions as to the preferable forms of government and methods of administration, than he could cut out and cast away his mind itself. Believing that the Constitution intended to create and did create a national government, and having decided notions as to what such a government must be able to do, he was subject to a powerful though insensible influence to find the existence of the required abilities in the government. . . . The great majority of his decisions were in accordance with Federalist principles of construction and of policy. The Republicans all denounced him as a Federalist, even of an extreme type."—A. B. Magruder, *John Marshall*, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: H. Flanders, *Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court*, v. 2.—J. Story, *John Marshall* (*N. Am. Rev.*, v. 26).

A. D. 1801.—First American naval demonstration against the Barbary Pirates. See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785–1801.

A. D. 1802.—Admission of Ohio to the Union. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1788–1802.

A. D. 1802–1804.—Land cessions of Georgia annexed to Mississippi Territory. See MISSISSIPPI: A. D. 1798–1804.

A. D. 1803.—The Louisiana Purchase.—Its constitutional and political aspects.—“The Mississippi question, which had played so important a part in the times of the confederation, had arisen again and demanded a solution, as Spain had, on the 1st of October, 1800, ceded the whole of Louisiana to France. The United States had had experience enough already of how dangerous and how great an obstacle in the way of the commercial development of the country it might become, if the mouth of the Mississippi were in the possession of a foreign power, even if it were no stronger than Spain. Jefferson had not shared in this experience in vain. This was one of the instances in which he gave evidence of a really statesmanlike insight. He wrote on the 18th of April, 1802, to his ambassador Livingston in Paris: This cession ‘completely reverses all the political relations of the United States, and will form a new epoch in our political course. . . . There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy.’ Livingston was instructed to enter into negotiations immediately for the cession of New Orleans and the Floridas, in case France should consider the possession of Louisiana indispensably necessary. As Bonaparte at this very time entertained the idea of resuming the old French colonial policy, the negotiations remained long without result. The uprising of the negroes in San Domingo and the

warlike turn which the affairs of Europe began again to assume, disposed him more favorably towards the American offer. On the 30th of April, 1803, the treaty, ceding the whole of Louisiana to the United States for \$15,000,000, was concluded in Paris [see LOUISIANA: A. D. 1798–1803]. Hamilton shared Jefferson's view, that the purchase of Louisiana was a question of the greatest, and even of vital, importance for the Union. His opposition on other occasions to the policy of the administration, and his personal enmity to the president, did not prevent his lending him a helping hand in this matter when an opportunity offered. The great majority of the Federalists opposed this increase of the territory of the Union with as much decision as Hamilton advocated it. They showed in their attitude towards this question a short-sightedness which would have been astonishing even among the doctrinaires of the opposite party.”—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, pp. 183–185.—“Mr. Jefferson belonged to the school of strict construction, and was in fact its leader and apostle. . . . Under a construction of the Constitution as strict as he had been insisting upon, it was plain that the government would have no power to acquire foreign territory by purchase, and that any attempt in that direction would be usurpation. . . . To give the necessary authority an amendment of the Constitution would be essential, and amendment would be a slow process which might not be accomplished in time to meet the emergency. The case would be complicated by the fact that if the territory was acquired a considerable population would be brought into the Union and thus made citizens by a process of naturalization not contemplated by the Constitution. Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State, agreed with the President in his views. To use Mr. Jefferson's words, ‘The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory; still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union.’ But under circumstances so imperative he thought the political departments of the government should meet the emergency by consummating the purchase, and ‘then appeal to the nation for an additional article in the Constitution approving and confirming an act which the nation had not previously authorized.’ He did not conceal from himself, however, that in so doing ground would be occupied which it would be difficult to defend, and he proceeds to say: ‘The less that is said about any constitutional difficulty the better. Congress should do what is necessary in silence. I find but one opinion as to the necessity of shutting up the Constitution for some time.’ Mr. John Quincy Adams held similar views. . . . But it is difficult to conceive of any doctrine more dangerous or more distinctly antagonistic to the fundamental ideas of the American Union than the doctrine that the Constitution may be ‘shut up’ for a time in order that the government may accomplish something not warranted by it. The political immorality was obvious and glaring; more so in the case of the apostle of strict construction than it could have been if advanced by any other statesman of the day. . . . But Mr. Jefferson's political mistake was scarcely greater than that committed by his opponents; and, indeed, from a party standpoint it was no mistake whatsoever, but a bold measure of wise policy



... The purchase, according to the Federal view of the Constitution, was perfectly legitimate. . . . But the Federalists in general took narrow and partisan views, and in order to embarrass the administration resorted to quibbles which were altogether unworthy the party which had boasted of Washington as its chief and Hamilton as the exponent of its doctrines. . . . The Federal leaders did not stop at cavils; they insisted that the unconstitutional extension of territory was in effect a dissolution of the Union, so that they were at liberty to contemplate and plan for a final disruption."—Judge T. M. Cooley, *The Acquisition of Louisiana* (*Indiana Hist. Soc. Pamphlets*, no. 3).—The result of the debates on the Louisiana treaty, in the Senate and the House, "decided only one point. Every speaker, without distinction of party, agreed that the United States government had the power to acquire new territory either by conquest or by treaty; the only difference of opinion regarded the disposition of this territory after it was acquired. Did Louisiana belong to the central government at Washington, or to the States? . . . Whether the government at Washington could possess Louisiana as a colony or admit it as a State, was a difference of no great matter if the cession were to hold good; the essential point was that for the first time in the national history all parties agreed in admitting that the government could govern. . . . Even in 1804 the political consequences of the act were already too striking to be overlooked. Within three years of his inauguration Jefferson bought a foreign colony without its consent and against its will, annexed it to the United States by an act which he said made blank paper of the Constitution; and then he who had found his predecessors too monarchical, and the Constitution too liberal in powers,—he who had nearly dissolved the bonds of society rather than allow his predecessor to order a dangerous alien out of the country in a time of threatened war,—made himself monarch of the new territory, and wielded over it, against its protests, the powers of its old kings. Such an experience was final; no century of slow and half-understood experience could be needed to prove that the hopes of humanity lay thenceforward, not in attempting to restrain the government from doing whatever the majority should think necessary, but in raising the people themselves till they should think nothing necessary but what was good."—H. Adams, *Hist. of the U. S. of Am. during the first Administration of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 4-6.

Also in: *Treaties and Conventions between the U. S. and other Powers* (ed. of 1889), pp. 331-342.

**A. D. 1803.—Report on the British impressment of seamen from American ships.**—"In consequence of a resolution of the Senate, calling upon the President for information respecting the violation of the national flag, and the impressment of American seamen, he communicated to that body a letter from the Secretary of State, specifying all the cases of impressment which had come to the knowledge of that Department. The Secretary had no information of the violation of the national flag, except in the recent aggression of Morocco. It appeared, by this report, that 43 citizens of the United States had been impressed by the British, of whom 12 had protections. Ten were natives of the British dominions, and 17 of other

countries, none of whom were stated to have been naturalized. Thus a practice which, even within the British dominions, violates the dearest rights of personal liberty, and which their courts have never ventured to justify, and which is excused and acquiesced in on the plea of necessity, was unhesitatingly exercised by British navy officers on board of American vessels."—G. Tucker, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 12 (v. 2).—"When the captain of a British frigate overhauled an American merchant-vessel for enemy's property or contraband of war, he sent an officer on board who mustered the crew, and took out any seamen whom he believed to be British. The measure, as the British navy regarded it, was one of self-protection. If the American government could not or would not discourage desertion, the naval commander would recover his men in the only way he could. Thus a circle of grievances was established on each side. . . . The growth of American shipping stimulated desertions from the British service to the extent of injuring its efficiency; and these desertions in their turn led to a rigorous exercise of the right of impressment. To find some point at which this vicious circle could be broken was a matter of serious consequence to both countries, but most so to the one which avowed that it did not mean to protect its interest by force. Great Britain could have broken the circle by increasing the pay and improving the condition of her seamen; but she was excessively conservative, and the burdens already imposed on her commerce were so great that she could afford to risk nothing. . . . Conscious of her own power, she thought that the United States should be first to give way. Had the American government been willing to perform its neutral obligations strictly, the circle might have been broken without much trouble; but the United States wished to retain their advantage, and preferred to risk whatever England might do rather than discourage desertion, or enact and enforce a strict naturalization law, or punish fraud. The national government was too weak to compel the States to respect neutral obligations, even if it had been disposed to make the attempt. The practice of impressment brought the two governments to a deadlock on an issue of law. No one denied that every government had the right to command the services of its native subjects, and as yet no one ventured to maintain that a merchant-ship on the high seas could lawfully resist the exercise of this right; but the law had done nothing to define the rights of naturalized subjects or citizens. The British government might, no doubt, impress its own subjects; but almost every British sailor in the American service carried papers of American citizenship, and although some of these were fraudulent, many were genuine. The law of England, as declared from time out of mind by every generation of her judges, held that the allegiance of a subject was indefeasible, and therefore that naturalization was worthless. The law of the United States, as declared by Chief-Justice Ellsworth in 1799, was in effect the same."—H. Adams, *History of the U. S. of Am. during the first Administration of Thomas Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 14.—"Great Britain was clearly in the wrong. She ought to have kept her seamen by increasing their pay and putting an end to the grievances which produced the mutiny of the *Nore*. In heartlessly neglecting to render the service just

to the common sailor, and at the same time making a brutal use of impressment, aristocratic government showed its dark side. It is true that impressment was conscription in a coarse form, and that the extreme notion of indefeasible allegiance still prevailed. But the practice, however lawful, was intolerable, and its offensiveness was sure to be aggravated by the conduct of British commanders full of the naval pride of their nation and perhaps irritated by the loss of their crews; for it is not denied that many British seamen were seduced from the service and that the American marine, both mercantile and national, was largely manned in this way."—Goldwin Smith, *The United States*, ch. 3.—See, also, below: A. D. 1804-1809.

**A. D. 1803-1804.—Federalist Secession movement.**—"In the winter . . . of 1803-4, immediately after, and as a consequence of, the acquisition of Louisiana, certain leaders of the Federal party conceived the project of the dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a Northern Confederacy. The justifying causes to those who entertained it were, that the annexation of Louisiana to the Union transcended the constitutional powers of the government of the United States; that it created, in fact, a new confederacy, to which the States, united by the former compact, were not bound to adhere; that it was oppressive to the interests and destructive to the influence of the Northern section of the Confederacy, whose right and duty it therefore was to secede from the new body politic, and to constitute one of their own. It was lamented that one inevitable consequence of the annexation of Louisiana to the Union would be to diminish the relative weight and influence of the Northern section; that it would aggravate the evil of the slave representation; and endanger the Union itself, by the expansion of its bulk, and the enfeebling extension of its line of defence against foreign invasion. A Northern Confederacy was thought to be the only probable counterpoise to the manufacture of new States in the South. This project was quietly and extensively discussed at the time, by the members of Congress from Massachusetts and Connecticut especially. General Hamilton, indeed, was chosen as the person to be placed, at the proper time, at the head of the military movement which, it was foreseen, would be necessary for carrying the plan into execution. He was consulted on the subject; and although it is quite certain that he was opposed to it, he consented to attend a meeting of Federalists in Boston in the autumn of 1804, but his untimely death, in the summer of that year, prevented the meeting. To whatever proportions, however, the project might otherwise have gone, it was checked by the advantage which was evident to all of the securing of so large a domain, by the great desirableness of preventing France from holding the mouth of our great river, and by the settlement of the question of our national boundaries. These considerations gave a quietus for a time to the suggestions of sectional jealousy."—C. F. Robertson, *The Louisiana Purchase in its Influence upon the Am. System (Papers of the Am. Hist. Ass'n, v. 1)*, pp. 262-263.

**A. D. 1804.—Fifth Presidential Election.**—Thomas Jefferson, Democratic Republican, re-elected by the vote of 162 Electors in the College, against 14 voting for Charles C. Pinckney,

Federalist. George Clinton chosen Vice President.

**A. D. 1804-1805.—Impeachment and trial of Judge Chase.**—In the closing hours of the session of Congress which expired March 4, 1803, proceedings of impeachment were begun for the removal from the bench of Judge Pickering, United States District Judge of New Hampshire, who had become mentally incapable of discharging the duties of his office. "By the federalists, the attack on Judge Pickering was taken as the first of a series of impeachments, intended to revolutionize the political character of the courts, but there is nothing to prove that this was then the intent of the majority. The most obnoxious justice on the supreme bench was Samuel Chase of Maryland, whose violence as a political partisan had certainly exposed him to the danger of impeachment; but two years had now passed without producing any sign of an intention to disturb him, and it might be supposed that the administration thus condoned his offences. Unluckily, Judge Chase had not the good taste or the judgment to be quiet. He irritated his enemies by new indiscretions, and on May 13, 1803, nearly three months after Pickering's impeachment, Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to Joseph H. Nicholson, suggested that it would be well to take him in hand:—"You must have heard of the extraordinary charge of Chase to the grand jury at Baltimore. Ought this seditious and official attack on the principles of our Constitution and on the proceedings of a State to go unpunished? And to whom so pointedly as yourself will the public look for the necessary measures? I ask these questions for your consideration. As for myself, it is better that I should not interfere." . . . Nicholson seems to have passed on to Randolph the charge he had received from the President. . . . On January 5, 1804, Randolph rose to move for an inquiry into the conduct of Judge Chase. . . . After a long debate, the inquiry was ordered, and Randolph, with his friend Nicholson, was put at the head of the committee. On March 26, 1804, they reported seven articles of impeachment. . . . With this the session ended, and the trial went over to the next year. . . . The impeachment of Justice Chase is a landmark in American history, because it was here that the Jeffersonian republicans fought their last aggressive battle, and, wavering under the shock of defeat, broke into factions which slowly abandoned the field and forgot their discipline. That such a battle must one day be fought for the control of the Judiciary was from the beginning believed by most republicans who understood their own principles. Without controlling the Judiciary, the people could never govern themselves in their own way; and although they might, over and over again, in every form of law and resolution, both state and national, enact and proclaim that theirs was not a despotic but a restricted government, which had no right to exercise powers not delegated to it, and over which they, as States, had absolute control, it was none the less certain that Chief Justice Marshall and his associates would disregard their will, and would impose upon them his own. The people were at the mercy of their creatures. The Constitutions of England, of Massachusetts, of Pennsylvania, authorized the removal of an obnoxious judge on a mere address of the legislature, but the Constitution of



the United States had so fenced and fortified the Supreme Court that the legislature, the Executive, the people themselves, could exercise no control over it. A judge might make any decision, violate any duty, trample on any right, and if he took care to commit no indictable offence he was safe in office for life. On this license the Constitution imposed only one check: it said that all civil officers should be removed from office 'on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.' This right of impeachment was as yet undefined, and if stretched a little beyond strict construction it might easily be converted into something for which it had not been intended. . . . Judge Chase's offences were serious. The immediate cause of impeachment, his address to the grand jury at Baltimore on the 2d May, 1803, proved that he was not a proper person to be trusted with the interpretation of the laws. In this address he said that those laws were rapidly destroying all protection to property and all security to personal liberty. 'The late alteration of the federal Judiciary,' said he, 'by the abolition of the office of the sixteen circuit judges, and the recent change in our state Constitution by the establishing of universal suffrage, and the further alteration that is contemplated in our state Judiciary, if adopted, will, in my judgment, take away all security for property and personal liberty. The independence of the national Judiciary is already shaken to its foundations, and the virtue of the people alone can restore it.' That by this reference to the virtue of the people he meant to draw a contrast with the want of virtue in their government was made clear by a pointed insult to Mr. Jefferson: 'The modern doctrines by our late reformers, that all men in a state of society are entitled to enjoy equal liberty and equal rights, have brought this mighty mischief upon us, and I fear that it will rapidly progress until peace and order, freedom and property, shall be destroyed.' . . . There was gross absurdity in the idea that the people who, by an immense majority, had decided to carry on their government in one way should be forced by one of their own servants to turn about and go in the opposite direction; and the indecorum was greater than the absurdity, for if Judge Chase or any other official held such doctrines, even though he were right, he was bound not to insult officially the people who employed him. On these grounds Mr. Jefferson privately advised the impeachment, and perhaps Randolph might have acted more wisely had he followed Mr. Jefferson's hint to rely on this article alone, which in the end came nearer than any other to securing conviction. . . . The articles of impeachment which Randolph presented to the House on March 26, 1804, and which were, he claimed, drawn up with his own hand, rested wholly on the theory of Chase's criminality; they contained no suggestion that impeachment was a mere inquest of office. But when Congress met again, and, on December 3, the subject came again before the House, it was noticed that two new articles, the fifth and sixth, had been quietly interpolated, which roused suspicion of a change in Randolph's plan. . . . No one could doubt that Randolph and his friends, seeing how little their ultimate object would be advanced by a conviction on the old charges, inserted these new articles in order to correct their mistake and to

make a foundation for the freer use of impeachment as a political weapon. The behavior of Giles and his friends in the Senate strengthened this suspicion. He made no concealment of his theories, and labored earnestly to prevent the Senate from calling itself a court, or from exercising any functions that belonged to a court of law."—H. Adams, *John Randolph*, ch. 4-6. The doctrine of impeachment which Giles (Senator from Virginia) and John Randolph maintained, in connection with the trial of Judge Chase, and which seems to have been acquiesced in by the majority of their party, is reported by John Quincy Adams from a conversation to which he was a listener. In Mr. Adams' Memoirs, under date of December 21, 1804, the incident is related as follows: "There was little business to do [in the Senate], and the adjournment took place early. Sitting by the fireside afterwards, I witnessed a conversation between Mr. Giles and Mr. Israel Smith, on the subject of impeachments; during which Mr. John Randolph came in and took part in the discussion. Giles labored with excessive earnestness to convince Smith of certain principles, upon which not only Mr. Chase, but all the other Judges of the Supreme Court, excepting the one last appointed, must be impeached and removed. He treated with the utmost contempt the idea of an 'independent' judiciary—said there was not a word about such an independence in the Constitution, and that their pretensions to it were nothing more nor less than an attempt to establish an aristocratic despotism in themselves. The power of impeachment was given without limitation to the House of Representatives; the power of trying impeachments was given equally without limitation to the Senate; and if the Judges of the Supreme Court should dare, as they had done, to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, or to send a mandamus to the Secretary of State, as they had done, it was the undoubted right of the House of Representatives to impeach them, and of the Senate to remove them, for giving such opinions, however honest and sincere they may have been in entertaining them. Impeachment was not a criminal prosecution; it was no prosecution at all. The Senate sitting for the trial of impeachments was not a court, and ought to discard and reject all process of analogy to a court of justice. A trial and removal of a judge upon impeachment need not imply any criminality or corruption in him. Congress had no power over the person, but only over the office. And a removal by impeachment was nothing more than a declaration by Congress to this effect: You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry them into effect you will work the destruction of the nation. We want your offices, for the purpose of giving them to men who will fill them better. In answer to all this, Mr. Smith only contended that honest error of opinion could not, as he conceived, be a subject of impeachment. And in pursuit of this principle he proved clearly enough the persecution and tyranny to which those of Giles and Randolph inevitably lead. It would, he said, establish 'a tyranny over opinions,' and he traced all the arguments of Giles to their only possible issue of rank absurdity. In all this conversation I opened my lips but once, in which I told Giles that I could not assent to his definition of the term impeachment."—J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, ed. by C. F. Adams, v. 1, pp. 322-323.—The trial of

Judge Chase was opened on the 9th of February, 1805, and ended on the 23d. By votes ranging from 15 to 34 (the total number of Senators being 34), he was acquitted on each of the charges—a result attributed considerably to the offensive and incapable manner in which the prosecution had been conducted by John Randolph.—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 2, p. 77.

**A. D. 1804-1805.—Expedition of Lewis and Clark across the continent.**—The first exploration of the Missouri and beyond.—Captain Meriwether Lewis and Captain William Clark “were the first men to cross the continent in our zone, the truly golden zone. A dozen years before them, Mackenzie had crossed in British dominions far north, but settlements are even now sparse in that parallel. Still earlier had Mexicans traversed the narrowing continent from the Gulf to the Pacific, but seemed to find little worth discovery. It was otherwise in the zone penetrated by Lewis and Clark. There development began at once and is now nowhere surpassed. Along their route ten States, with a census in 1890 of eight and a half millions, have arisen in the wilderness. . . . The credit of our Great Western discovery is due to Jefferson, though he never crossed the Alleghanies. When Columbus saw the Orinoco rushing into the ocean with irrepressible power and volume, he knew that he had anchored at the mouth of a continental river. So Jefferson, ascertaining that the Missouri, though called a branch, at once changed the color and character of the Mississippi, felt sure that whoever followed it would reach the innermost recesses of our America. Learning afterward that Capt. Gray had pushed into the mouth of the Columbia only after nine days’ breasting its outward current, he deemed that river a worthy counterpart of the Missouri, and was convinced that their headwaters could not be far apart in longitude. Inaugurated in 1801, before his first Presidential term was half over he had obtained, as a sort of secret-service fund, the small sum which sufficed to fit out the expedition. He had also selected Lewis, his private secretary, for its head, and put him in a course of special training. But the actual voyage up the Missouri, purchased April 30, 1803, was not begun till the middle of May, 1804. Forty-five persons in three boats composed the party. . . . After 171 days the year’s advance ended with October, for the river was ready to freeze. The distance up stream they reckoned at 1,600 miles, or little more than 9 miles a day, a journey now made by railroad in forty-four hours. . . . Winter quarters were thirty miles above the Bismarck of our day. Here they were frozen in about five months. The huts they built and abundant fuel kept them warm. Thanks to their hunters and Indian traffic, food was seldom scarce. Officials of the Hudson’s Bay Company (who had a post within a week’s journey) and many inquisitive natives paid them visits. From all these it was their tireless endeavor to learn everything possible concerning the great unknown of the river beyond. Scarcely one could tell about distant places from personal observation, but some second-hand reports were afterward proved strangely accurate, even as to the Great Falls, which turned out to be a thousand miles away. It was not long, however, before they learned that the wife of Chaboneau, whom they had taken as a local interpreter, was

a captive whose birth had been in the Rocky Mountains. She, named the Bird-woman, was the only person discoverable after a winter’s search who could by possibility serve them as interpreter and guide among the unknown tongues and labyrinthine fastnesses which they must encounter. Early in April, 1805, the explorers, now numbering thirty-two, again began to urge their boats up the river, for their last year’s labors had brought them no more than half-way to their first objective, its source. No more Indian purveyors or pilots: their own rifles were the sole reliance for food. Many a wigwam, but no Indian, was espied for four months and four days after they left their winter camp. It was through the great Lone Land that they groped their dark and perilous way. In twenty days after the spring start they arrived at the Yellowstone, and in thirty more they first sighted the Rocky Mountains. Making the portage at the Great Falls cost them a month of vexatious delay. Rowing on another month brought them on August 12 to a point where one of the men stood with one foot each side of the rivulet, and ‘thanked God that he had lived to bestride the Missouri, heretofore deemed endless.’ They dragged their canoes, however, up the rivulet for five days longer. It was 460 days since they had left the mouth of the river, and their mileage on its waters had been 3,096 miles. A mile further they stood on the great divide, and drank of springs which sent their water to the Pacific. But meantime they had been ready to starve in the mountains. Their hunters were of the best, but they found no game: buffaloes had gone down into the lowlands, the birds of heaven had fled, and edible roots were mostly unknown to them. For more than four months they had looked, and lo! there was no man. It was not till August 13 that, surprising a squaw so encumbered with papposes that she could not escape, and winning her heart by the gift of a looking-glass and painting her cheeks, they formed friendship with her nation, one of whose chiefs proved to be a brother of their Bird-woman. Horses were about all they could obtain of these natives, streams were too full of rapids to be navigable, or no timber fit for canoes was within reach. So the party, subsisting on horse-flesh, and afterwards on dog-meat, toiled on along one of the worst possible routes. Nor was it till the 7th of October that they were able to embark in logs they had burned hollow, upon a branch of the Columbia, which, after manifold portages and perils, bore them to its mouth and the goal of their pilgrimage, late in November. Its distance from the starting-point, according to their estimate, was 4,134 miles. . . . Many an episode in this eventful transcontinental march and countermarch will hereafter glorify with romantic associations islands, rivers, rocks, cañons, and mountains all along its track. Among these none can be more touching than the story of the Bird-woman, her divination of routes, her courage when men quailed, her reunion with a long-lost brother, her spreading as good a table with bones as others could with meat, her morsel of bread for an invalid benefactor, her presence with her infant attesting to savages that the expedition could not be hostile. But when bounties in land and money were granted to others, she was unthought of. Statues of her, however, must yet be reared by grateful dwellers in lands



she laid open for their happy homes. Western poets will liken her to Ariadne and Beatrice."—*The Nation*, Oct. 26, 1893 (*Reviewing Dr. Coues' edition of "History of the Expedition under the Command of Lewis and Clark"*).

**A. D. 1804-1805.—Jefferson's Plans of National defense.—His Gunboat fleet.**—Mr. Jefferson's views as to the measures required for national defense, in the disturbed foreign relations of the country, were indicated in his message to Congress, when it assembled in November, 1804, but were afterwards communicated more fully to Mr. Nicholson, of Maryland, chairman of the committee to which the subject was referred. "Concerning fortifications, he remarks that the plans and estimates of those required for our principal harbours, made fifty millions of dollars necessary for their completion. It would require 2,000 men to garrison them in peace, and 50,000 in war. When thus completed and manned, they would avail but little, as, all military men agree that when vessels might pass a fort without tacking, though it may annoy, it cannot prevent them. Two modes of effecting the same object might be 'adopted in aid of each other.' 1. Heavy cannon on travelling carriages, with militia trained to the management of them. 2. Floating batteries or gunboats. There were, he estimated, fifteen harbours in the United States needing and deserving defence. They would require 250 gunboats. The cost of these had been estimated at 2,000 dollars each, but he puts it down at 4,000, amounting in all to 1,000,000 dollars. Such of them as were kept under a shelter, ready to be launched, when wanted, would cost nothing more than an inclosure, or sentinel; those that were afloat, with men enough to take care of them, about 2,000 dollars a year each; and those fully manned for action about 8,000 dollars a year. He thought twenty-five of the second description enough, when France and England were at war. When at war ourselves, some of the third description would be required, the precise number depending on circumstances. There were ten then built and building, and fifteen more it was thought would be sufficient to put every harbour into a respectable state of defence. Congress, neither fulfilling the wishes of the President, nor altogether resisting them, gave the President the means of partially trying his favourite scheme, by the appropriation of 60,000 dollars. The sufficiency of this species of naval defence occasioned a good deal of discussion about this time between the opponents and the supporters of the administration. . . . The scheme was vehemently assailed by his adversaries in every form of argument and ridicule, and was triumphantly adduced as a further proof that he was not a practical statesman. The officers of the navy were believed to be, with scarcely an exception, opposed to the system of gunboats, especially those who were assigned to this service, partly because it was found to be personally very uncomfortable, and yet more, perhaps, because the power they wielded was so inferior, and their command so insignificant, compared with that to which they had been familiarized. It was like compelling a proud man to give up a fine richly caparisoned charger for a pair of panniers and a donkey. To stem the current of public opinion, which so far as it was manifested, set so strong against

these gunboats, and to turn it in their favour, Mr. Jefferson prevailed on Paine, who had since his return been addressing the people of the United States on various topics, through the newspapers, to become their advocate. He set about it with his wonted self-confidence and real talent in enforcing his views, and proceeded to show that a gun from a gunboat would do the same execution as from a seventy-four, and cost no more, perhaps less; but a ship carrying seventy-four guns, could bring only one half to bear on an enemy at once, whereas if they were distributed among seventy-four boats, they could all be equally effective at once. In spite of this logic, the public, pinning its faith on experienced men, remained incredulous; and when, soon afterwards, many of the new marine were driven ashore in a tempest, or were otherwise destroyed, no one seemed to regard their loss as a misfortune, and the officers of the navy did not affect to conceal their satisfaction: nor has any attempt been since made to replace them. . . . The error of Mr. Jefferson was not, as his enemies charged, in adopting a visionary scheme of defence, but in limiting his views from a motive of economy, to the protection of the harbours, and in leaving his country's commerce and seamen, on the ocean, defenceless."—G. Tucker, *The Life of Thomas Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 8.

**A. D. 1804-1809.—Difficulties with Great Britain.—Neutral rights.—The Right of Search.—Impressment.—Blockade by Orders in Council and the Berlin and Milan Decrees.—Embargo and Non-intercourse.**—For a time, after 1803, almost the whole carrying trade of Europe was in American hands. "The merchant flag of every belligerent, save England, disappeared from the sea. France and Holland absolutely ceased to trade under their flags. Spain for a while continued to transport her specie and her bullion in her own ships protected by her men-of-war. But this, too, she soon gave up, and by 1806 the dollars of Mexico and the ingots of Peru were brought to her shores in American bottoms. It was under our flag that the gum trade was carried on with Senegal; that the sugar trade was carried on with Cuba; that coffee was exported from Caracas; and hides and indigo from South America. From Vera Cruz, from Carthagena, from La Plata, from the French colonies in the Antilles, from Cayenne, from Dutch Guiana, from the Isles of France and Reunion, from Batavia and Manilla, great fleets of American merchantmen sailed for the United States, there to neutralize the voyage and then go on to Europe. They filled the warehouses at Cadiz and Antwerp to overflowing. They glutted the markets of Embden and Lisbon, Hamburg and Copenhagen with the produce of the West Indies and the fabrics of the East, and, bringing back the products of the looms and forges of Germany to the New World, drove out the manufactures of Yorkshire, Manchester, and Birmingham. But this splendid trade was already marked for destruction. That Great Britain should long treat it with indifference was impossible. . . . She determined . . . to destroy it, and to destroy it in two ways: by paper blockades and by admiralty decisions. In January, 1804, accordingly, Great Britain blockaded the ports of Guadeloupe and Martinique. In April her commander at Jamaica blockaded Curaçoa. In August she extended the blockade to the

Straits of Dover and the English Channel."—J. B. McMaster, *Hist. of the People of the U. S.*, v. 3, pp. 225-226.—"It had not yet come to be the acknowledged law of nations that free ships make free goods. But nearly the same purpose was answered, if the property of belligerents could be safely carried in neutral ships under the pretense of being owned by neutrals. The products of the French colonies, for example, could be loaded on board of American vessels, taken to the United States and reshipped there for France as American property. England looked upon this as an evasion of the recognized public law that property of belligerents was good prize. . . . It was denied that neutrals could take advantage of a state of war to enter upon a trade which had not existed in time of peace; and American ships were seized on the high seas, taken into port, and condemned in the Admiralty Courts for carrying enemy's goods in such a trade. The exercise of that right, if it were one by the recognized law of nations, would be of great injury to American commerce, unless it could be successfully resisted. . . . A war with England must be a naval war; and the United States not only had no navy of any consequence, but it was a part of Mr. Jefferson's policy, in contrast with the policy of the preceding administrations, that there should be none, except . . . gunboats kept on wheels and under cover in readiness to repel an invasion. But there was no fear of invasion, for by that England could gain nothing. 'She is renewing,' Madison wrote in the autumn of 1805, 'her depredations on our commerce in the most ruinous shapes, and has kindled a more general indignation among our merchants than was ever before expressed.' These depredations were not confined to the seizing and confiscating American ships under the pretense that their cargoes were contraband. Seamen were taken out of them on the charge of being British subjects and deserters, not only on the high seas in larger numbers than ever before, but within the waters of the United States. No doubt these seamen were often British subjects and their seizure was justifiable, provided England could rightfully extend to all parts of the globe and to the ships of all nations the merciless system of impressment to which her own people were compelled to submit at home. . . . But even if it could be granted that English naval officers might seize such men without recourse to law, wherever they should be found and without respect for the flag of another nation, it was a national insult and outrage, calling for resentment and resistance, to impress American citizens under the pretense that they were British subjects. But what was the remedy? As a last resort in such cases, nations have but one. Diplomacy and legislation may be first tried, but if these fail, war must be the final ordeal. For this the Administration made no preparation, and the more evident the unreadiness the less was the chance of redress in any other way. . . . The first measure adopted to meet the aggressions of the English was an act prohibiting the importation of certain British products. This had always been a favorite policy with Madison. . . . The President and Secretary were in perfect accord; for Jefferson preferred anything to war, and Madison was persuaded that England would be brought to terms by the loss of the best market

for her manufactures. . . . But the Administration did not rely upon legislation alone in this emergency. The President followed up the act prohibiting the introduction of British goods by sending William Pinkney to England in the spring of 1806, to join Monroe, the resident minister, in an attempt at negotiation. These commissioners soon wrote that there was good reason for hoping that a treaty would be concluded, and thereupon the non-importation act was for a time suspended. In December came the news that a treaty was agreed upon, and soon after it was received by the President. . . . Monroe and Pinkney were enjoined, in the instructions written by the Secretary of State, to make the abandonment of impressment the first condition of a treaty. A treaty, nevertheless, was agreed upon, without this provision. . . . Without consulting the Senate, though Congress was in session when the treaty was received, and although the Senate had been previously informed that one had been agreed upon, the President rejected it. . . . As England's need of seamen increased, the captains of her cruisers, encouraged by the failure of negotiation, grew bolder in overhauling American ships. . . . In the summer of 1807 an outrage was perpetrated on the frigate *Chesapeake*, as if to emphasize the contempt with which a nation must be looked upon which only screamed like a woman at wrongs which it wanted the courage and strength to resent, or the wisdom to compound for. The *Chesapeake* was followed out of the harbor of Norfolk by the British man-of-war *Leopard*, and when a few miles at sea, the *Chesapeake* being brought to under the pretense that the English captain wished to put some dispatches on board for Europe, a demand was made for certain deserters supposed to be on the American frigate. Commodore Barron replied that he knew of no deserters on his ship, and that he could permit no search to be made, even if there were. After some further altercation the Englishman fired a broadside, killing and wounding a number of the *Chesapeake's* crew. Commodore Barron could do nothing else but surrender, for he had only a single gun in readiness for use, and that was fired only once and then with a coal from the cook's galley. The ship was then boarded, the crew mustered, and four men arrested as deserters. Three of them were negroes,—two natives of the United States, the other of South America. The fourth man, probably, was an Englishman. . . . For this direct national insult, explanation, apology, and reparation were demanded, and at the same time the President put forth a proclamation forbidding all British ships of war to remain in American waters. . . . Some preparation was made for war, but it was only to call upon the militia to be in readiness, and to order Mr. Jefferson's gunboats to the most exposed ports. Great Britain was not alarmed. The captain of the *Leopard*, indeed, was removed from his command, as having exceeded his duty; but a proclamation on that side was also issued, requiring all ships of war to seize British seamen on board foreign merchantmen, to demand them from foreign ships of war, and if the demand was refused to report the fact to the admiral of the fleet. . . . New perils all the while were besetting American commerce. In November, 1806, Napoleon's Berlin decree was promulgated, for-



bidding the introduction into France of the products of Great Britain and her colonies, whether in her own ships or those of other nations. . . . The decree, it was declared, was a rightful retaliation of a British order in council of six months before, which had established a partial blockade of a portion of the French coast. . . . In the autumn of 1807 [the President] called a special session of Congress. . . . He sent a special message to the Senate, recommending an embargo. An act was almost immediately passed, which, if anything more was needed to complete the ruin of American commerce, supplied that deficiency. A month before this time the English ministry had issued a new order in council—the news of which reached Jefferson as he was about to send in his message—proclaiming a blockade of pretty much all Europe, and forbidding any trade in neutral vessels, unless they had first gone into some British port and paid duties on their cargoes; and within 24 hours of the President's message, recommending the embargo, Napoleon proclaimed a new decree from Milan, by which it was declared that any ship was lawful prize that had anything whatever to do with Great Britain. . . . Within four months of its enactment, Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts declared, in a debate in Congress, that 'an experiment, such as is now making, was never before—I will not say tried—it never before entered into the human imagination. There is nothing like it in the narrations of history or in the tales of fiction.' . . . The prosperity and tranquillity which marked the earlier years of Jefferson's administration disappeared in its last year. . . . The mischievous results of the embargo policy were evident enough to a sufficient number of Republicans to secure, in February, 1809, the repeal [by the Non-intercourse Bill] of that measure, to take effect the next month as to all countries except England and France."—S. H. Gay, *James Madison*, ch. 17.—The Non-intercourse Bill which repealed the general provisions of the Embargo Act "excluded all public and private vessels of France and England from American waters; forbade under severe penalties the importation of British or French goods; . . . and gave the President authority to reopen by proclamation the trade with France or England in case either of these countries should cease to violate neutral rights. . . . Such a non-intercourse merely sanctioned smuggling."—H. Adams, *Hist. of the U. S.: Second Administration of Jefferson*, v. 2, p. 445.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 3, ch. 3-7.—E. Schuyler, *Am. Diplomacy*, ch. 5 and 7.—A. T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power on the French Rev.*, ch. 17-18 (v. 2).—F. Wharton, *Digest of the International Law of the U. S.*, ch. 7, 16, and 21 (v. 2-3).—See, also, above: A. D. 1803; below: A. D. 1812, and FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.

A. D. 1806-1807.—Aaron Burr's filibustering scheme.—His arrest and trial.—Aaron Burr had been chosen vice-president in 1800. But he had lost all his friends in both parties in the election. In the course of a bitter political quarrel in New York, in 1804, he challenged Hamilton to a duel. Hamilton was mad enough to accept the challenge and was killed. Burr, "after his duel with Gen. Hamilton, and after the term of his office as vice-president had expired, . . . seemed to be left alone, and abandoned by all

political parties. The state of public feeling in New-York was such, after the death of Hamilton, that his presence in that city could not be endured. In New-Jersey he had been indicted by a grand jury for murder. Thus situated, his ambitious, active and restless spirit rendered his condition intolerable to himself. On the 22nd March, but a few days after he left forever the presidency of the United States senate, he wrote to his son-in-law, Mr. Joseph Alston, that he 'was under ostracism. In New-York,' said he, 'I am to be disfranchised, and in New-Jersey to be hanged. Having substantial objections to both, I shall not, for the present, hazard either, but shall seek another country.' Accordingly, early in May, he left Philadelphia for the western country, and arrived at Lexington, in Kentucky, on the 20th of that month. After travelling with great rapidity through that state, he directed his course to Nashville, in Tennessee, and from thence he journeyed through the woods to Natchez. From Natchez he went by land to New-Orleans, where he arrived on the 25th June, 1805. At that time, Gen. Wilkinson was in that city, or in its neighborhood, and commanded the United States troops stationed there. It does not appear that he remained long in New-Orleans, but soon again returned to Lexington, in Kentucky, by the way of Nashville. He was at Cincinnati, and at several places in Ohio, but in a very short time made his appearance at St. Louis, in Missouri, and from thence he travelled to Washington, at which place he arrived on the 29th day of November. These immense journeys he performed in a little more than six months; before the great western rivers were rendered navigable by steam, and when the roads were badly constructed; and through a considerable part of the country traversed by him there were no roads at all. His movements were veiled in mystery, and all men wondered what could be the motive which induced these extraordinary journeys. From January, 1806, to the month of August following, he spent his time principally in Washington and Philadelphia; but, in the month of August, he again set his face towards the west, and was soon afterwards found in Kentucky. About this time boats were provided, provisions and munitions of war were collected, and men were gathering at different points on the Ohio and Cumberland rivers. Government now began to be alarmed. Mr. Tiffin, governor of Ohio, under the advice of the president (Jefferson), seized the boats and their cargo, and Burr was arrested in Kentucky; but no sufficient proof appearing against him he was discharged. On the 23d January, 1807, Mr. Jefferson sent a message to congress, accompanied by several affidavits, in which he gave the history of Burr's transactions, so far as they had come to the knowledge of the administration. The message stated that, on the 21st of October, Gen. Wilkinson wrote to the president that, from a letter he had received from Burr, he had ascertained that his objects were, a severance of the union on the line of the Allegany mountains, an attack upon Mexico, and the establishment of an independent government in Mexico, of which Burr was to be the head. That to cover his movements, he had purchased, or pretended to have purchased, of one Lynch, a tract of country claimed by Baron Bastiop, lying near Natchitoches, on which he proposed to

make a settlement. That he had found, by the proceedings of the governor and people of Ohio and Kentucky, that the western people were not prepared to join him; but notwithstanding, there was reason to believe that he intended, with what force he could collect, to attack New-Orleans, get the control of the funds of the bank, seize upon the military and naval stores which might be found there, and then proceed against Mexico. The president assured congress that there was no reason to apprehend that any foreign power would aid Col. Burr. A considerable part of the evidence going to show that Burr entertained criminal designs, depended on the affidavit of Wilkinson. It is not my intention to examine into the proofs of the guilt or innocence of Burr, further than to remark, that from the character of the vain, vamping and unprincipled Wilkinson, as before and since developed, no dependence can safely be placed upon his statements, unless supported by strong circumstances, or other evidence; and I believe it will not at this day be doubted, that if Burr plotted treason, Wilkinson, in the first instance, agreed to be his accomplice; that, as their operations progressed, he began seriously to doubt of success, and then communicated his knowledge of the affair to the government, in order to save himself, and perhaps obtain a reward. . . . That Burr himself was deceived by Wilkinson, there can be no doubt. . . . But there was other evidence besides that of Wilkinson, against Burr, which has never been explained. . . . If his object was merely an attack upon Mexico, why did he not openly avow it, when charged and indicted for treason against his country? . . . Again, unless Col. William Eaton, the man who had then recently so gallantly distinguished himself on the Barbary coasts, has perjured himself, Burr did form a treasonable plot against his country. Col. Eaton, on the 26th January, deposed, in open court, held before Judge Cranch and others, at Washington, that during the preceding winter (1806), Burr called upon him, and, in the first instance, represented that he was employed by the government to raise a military force to attack the Spanish Provinces in North America, and invited Eaton to take a command in the expedition; that Eaton, being a restless, enterprising man, readily acceded to the proposal; that Burr made frequent calls upon him, and in his subsequent interviews complained of the inefficiency and timidity of the government, and, eventually, fully developed his project; which was to separate the western states from the union, and establish himself as sovereign of the country. . . . Burr did not succeed in collecting and organizing a force on the western waters; but, on the 1st day of March, he was discovered wandering alone in the Tombigbee country, near the line of Florida. . . . The trial of the indictment against Burr, for treason, occupied many weeks, but he was finally acquitted by the jury, without swearing any witness in his defence. The acquittal seems to have been on technical grounds. . . . After his acquittal, Col. Burr appears still to have persevered in the project of making an effort to detach Mexico from the Spanish government. On the 7th of June, 1808, he sailed from New-York for Europe, it would seem in the hope of engaging the British government to fit out an expedition against Mexico,

in which he would take a part. In this he was entirely unsuccessful. His application to the French government was equally vain and useless. He spent four years wandering about in Europe."—J. D. Hammond, *Hist. of Political Parties in the State of N. Y.*, ch. 12 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: W. H. Safford, *The Blennerhassett Papers*, ch. 6-15.—M. L. Davis, *Memoirs of Burr*, v. 2, ch. 17-20.—J. Parton, *Life of Burr*, ch. 21-26 (v. 2).—H. Adams, *Hist. of the U. S.: Second Administration of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 10-14 and 19.—D. Robertson, *Rep't of Trials of Burr*.—See BLANNERHASSETT'S ISLAND.

**A. D. 1806-1812.—The Cumberland Road.**—The first National work of "Internal Improvement."—"In 1806 the United States began the Cumberland Road, its first work of the kind; but it was intended to open up the public lands in Ohio and the country west, and was nominally paid for out of the proceeds of those public lands. Just as the embargo policy was taking effect, Gallatin, encouraged by the accumulation of a surplus in the Treasury, brought in a report, April 4, 1808, suggesting the construction of a great system of internal improvements: it was to include coastwise canals across the isthmuses of Cape Cod, New Jersey, upper Delaware and eastern North Carolina; roads were to be constructed from Maine to Georgia, and thence to New Orleans, and from Washington westward to Detroit and St. Louis. He estimated the cost at twenty millions, to be provided in ten annual instalments. Jefferson himself was so carried away with this prospect of public improvement that he recommended a constitutional amendment to authorize such expenditures. The whole scheme disappeared when the surplus vanished; but from year to year small appropriations were made for the Cumberland Road, so that up to 1812 more than \$200,000 had been expended upon it."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union (Epochs of Am. Hist.)*, sect. 121.—"The Cumberland Road was always a pet enterprise with Mr. Clay. . . . Its eastern terminus was Cumberland on the Potomac, from which it takes its name. Thence it was projected to Wheeling on the Ohio, crossing the Alleghanies; from Wheeling to Columbus, Ohio; and thence westward through Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, to Jefferson, the capital of the latter State. . . . After Mr. Clay went to Congress in 1806, and while he was there, this great national work required and realized his constant attention and zealous advocacy. It was owing to his exertions chiefly that it ever reached Wheeling, and passed on so far into the State of Ohio. The last appropriations made for this road were in 1834 and 1835, with a view of repairing it, and giving it over to the States through which it passed, if they would accept it, and keep it in repair."—C. Colton, *Life, Corr., and Speeches of Henry Clay*, v. 6, p. 7.

**A. D. 1807.—Practical beginning of steam-boat navigation.** See STEAM NAVIGATION.

**A. D. 1807.—Abolition of the Slave-Trade.**—The measure in Congress.—Significance of Southern action.—By the terms of the Constitution, Congress was deprived of power to interfere with the importation of slaves before the year 1808, but no longer. The time now approached when that restraint would cease, and the President in his annual message brought the subject to notice. "It was referred to a com-



mittee of which Mr. Early of Georgia was the chairman. There was no difference of opinion as to the prohibition of the traffic, or at least no expression of any; but the practical details of the law, the penalties by which it was to be enforced, and, above all, the disposition to be made of such negroes as might be brought into the country in violation of it, gave rise to violent and excited debates. The committee reported a law prohibiting the slave-trade after the 31st of December, 1807, imposing certain penalties for its breach, and providing that all negroes imported after that date should be forfeited. The object of this provision undoubtedly was to obtain directly what the Constitution only gave indirectly and by implication,—the sanction of the government of the United States to the principle of slave-holding, by making it hold and sell men as property. The astuteness of the slave-holding mind on all points touching slavery was shown in this proposition, and all the tactics of bullying and bluster with which later Congressional campaigns have made us familiar, were employed in the debate to which it gave rise. It having been moved that the words 'shall be entitled to his or her freedom' should be inserted after the word 'forfeited,' a furious fight ensued over this amendment. The Southern members resisted it, on the ground that the emancipation of the imported Africans would increase the number of free negroes, who, as Mr. Early affirmed, 'were considered in the States where they are found in considerable numbers as instruments of murder, theft, and conflagration.' And so craftily was this proposition of forfeiture to the government qualified, that its drift was not at first discerned by the Northern members. For, strong as was their disapprobation of slavery in the abstract, they felt no disposition to expose their Southern brethren to all the horrors of insurrection which it was assumed would follow the multiplication of free negroes. Indeed, Mr. Early candidly said, that, if these negroes were left free in the Southern States, not one of them would be alive in a year. And although the Federalists as a party, and Mr. Quincy eminently among them, regarded the political element of slavery as full of dangers to the future of the nation, these opinions had worked no personal and social alienation between Northern and Southern men, such as has since taken place. . . . There was, therefore, quite disposition enough to arrange this matter in the way the most satisfactory to the masters, without so rigid a regard to the rights of the negroes as, it is to be hoped, would have been had in later times. Mr. Quincy at first opposed striking out the forfeiture clause, on the ground that this was the only way in which the United States could get the control of the Africans, so as to dispose of them in the manner most for their own interest. . . . These views influenced a majority of the Northern members until the question of the final passage of the bill approached. At last they came to a sense of the disgrace which the forfeiture of the negroes to the government, and the permission to it to sell them as slaves if it so pleased, would bring upon the nation, and the whole matter was recommitted to a committee of one from each State. . . . This committee reported a bill providing that such imported negroes should be sent to such States as had abolished slavery, there

to be bound out as apprentices for a term of years, at the expiration of which they should be free. This bill produced a scene of great and violent excitement on the part of the slaveholders. Mr. Early declared that the people of the South would resist this provision with their lives! This resistance to a measure which proposed doing all the slaveholders had demanded for their own safety, to wit, removing the imported negroes from the slaveholding domain and providing for them in the Free States, showed that their purpose was, at least in part, to have the negroes sold as slaves to themselves. This object they did virtually gain at last, as the final settlement was by a bill originating in the Senate, providing that, though neither importer nor purchaser should have a title to such negroes, still the negroes should be subject to any regulation for their disposal that should be made by the States into which they might be brought. The design of the slaveholding party to make the United States recognize the rightfulness of property in man was thus avoided, but it was at the cost of leaving the imported Africans to the tender mercies of the Slave States. The fact that the slaveholders were greatly incensed at the result, and regarded it as an injury and an affront, does not make this disposition of these unfortunates any the less discreditable to Congress or the nation.—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 5.—See, also, SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1792-1807.

A. D. 1808.—The effects of the Embargo.—“The dread of war, radical in the Republican theory, sprang not so much from the supposed waste of life or resources as from the retroactive effects which war must exert upon the form of government; but the experience of a few months showed that the embargo as a system was rapidly leading to the same effects. . . . Personal liberties and rights of property were more directly curtailed in the United States by embargo than in Great Britain by centuries of almost continuous foreign war. . . . While the constitutional cost of the two systems was not altogether unlike, the economical cost was a point not easily settled. No one could say what might be the financial expense of embargo as compared with war. Yet Jefferson himself in the end admitted that the embargo had no claim to respect as an economical measure. . . . As the order was carried along the seacoast, every artisan dropped his tools, every merchant closed his doors, every ship was dismantled. American produce—wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco, rice—dropped in value or became unsalable; every imported article rose in price; wages stopped; swarms of debtors became bankrupt; thousands of sailors hung idle round the wharves trying to find employment on coasters, and escape to the West Indies or Nova Scotia. A reign of idleness began; and the men who were not already ruined felt that their ruin was only a matter of time. The British traveller, Lambert, who visited New York in 1808, described it as resembling a place ravaged by pestilence:—‘The port indeed was full of shipping, but they were dismantled and laid up; their decks were cleared, their hatches fastened down, and scarcely a sailor was to be found on board. Not a box, bale, cask, barrel, or package was to be seen upon the wharves.’ . . . In New England, where the struggle of existence was keenest, the embargo

struck like a thunderbolt, and society for a moment thought itself at an end. Foreign commerce and shipping were the life of the people, —the ocean, as Pickering said, was their farm. The outcry of suffering interests became every day more violent, as the public learned that this paralysis was not a matter of weeks, but of months or years. . . . The belief that Jefferson, sold to France, wished to destroy American commerce and to strike a deadly blow at New and Old England at once, maddened the sensitive temper of the people. Immense losses, sweeping away their savings and spreading bankruptcy through every village, gave ample cause for their complaints. Yet in truth, New England was better able to defy the embargo than she was willing to suppose. She lost nothing except profits which the belligerents had in any case confiscated; her timber would not harm for keeping, and her fish were safe in the ocean. The embargo gave her almost a monopoly of the American market for domestic manufactures; no part of the country was so well situated or so well equipped for smuggling. . . . The growers of wheat and live stock in the Middle States were more hardly treated. Their wheat, reduced in value from two dollars to seventy-five cents a bushel, became practically unsalable. . . . The manufacturers of Pennsylvania could not but feel the stimulus of the new demand; so violent a system of protection was never applied to them before or since. Probably for that reason the embargo was not so unpopular in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, and Jefferson had nothing to fear from political revolution in this calm and plodding community. The true burden of the embargo fell on the Southern States, but most severely upon the great State of Virginia. Slowly decaying, but still half patriarchal, Virginia society could neither economize nor liquidate. Tobacco was worthless; but 400,000 negro slaves must be clothed and fed, great establishments must be kept up, the social scale of living could not be reduced, and even bankruptcy could not clear a large landed estate without creating new encumbrances in a country where land and negroes were the only forms of property on which money could be raised. Stay-laws were tried, but served only to prolong the agony. With astonishing rapidity Virginia succumbed to ruin, while continuing to support the system that was draining her strength." —H. Adams, *Hist. of the U. S.: Second Administration of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 12. —"Our passion," said Jefferson, "is peace." He not only recoiled as a philanthropist from bloodshed, but as a politician he with reason dreaded military propensities and sabre sway. Such preparations for war as he could be induced to make were scrupulously defensive, and his fleet of gun-boats for the protection of the coast to be launched when the invader should appear excited a smile. Alone among all statesmen he tried to make war without bloodshed by means of an embargo on trade. . . . It is not the highest of his titles to fame in the eyes of his countrymen, but it may be not the lowest in the court of humanity, that he sacrificed his popularity in the attempt to find a bloodless substitute for war. His memory recovered from the shock and his reign over American opinion endured."—Goldwin Smith, *The United States: An outline of Political History*, 1492-1871, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: H. A. Hill, *Trade and Commerce of Boston, 1780-1880* (*Memorial Hist. of Boston*, v. 4, pt. 2, ch. 8).—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 6-7.

A. D. 1808.—Sixth Presidential Election.—Jefferson succeeded by Madison.—"In anticipation of Jefferson's retirement there had been . . . no little dispute and lively canvassing as to the next incumbency of the presidential chair. . . . Upon Madison, it was generally considered that Jefferson had fixed his personal preference. . . . But Madison had many political enemies in the Republican ranks among Virginians themselves. . . . Monroe was the growing favorite. Republicans in Congress, who, from one cause or another, had become disaffected to the Secretary of State, made their new choice manifest. The Quids [see QUIDS], having courted Monroe by letter when he was abroad, crowded about him when he passed through Washington on his way home, just as the Embargo became a law. . . . Monroe hesitated, unwilling to make a breach; and rather than hazard the Republican cause, or the future prospects of their favorite, his more temperate friends took him off the list of candidates, so that at the usual Congressional caucus, held at the capital, Madison was nominated almost unanimously for President, and George Clinton for Vice-President. But out of 139 Republican Senators and Representatives only 89 were present at this caucus, some being sick or absent from the city, and others keeping away because dissatisfied. Clinton had been a disappointed candidate, as well as Monroe, for the highest honors. . . . His ambition was pursued beyond the caucus, notwithstanding his renomination as Vice-President, until the friends of Madison, who had profited by the diversion among competitors, threatened to drop Clinton from the regular ticket unless he relinquished his pretensions to a higher place than that already assigned him. Meantime the schismatic Republicans had united in protesting to the country against Congressional dictation, at the same time pronouncing that the caucus which had nominated Madison was irregularly held. This open letter was signed by 17 Republican members of Congress. . . . Unfortunately for their influence in the canvass, however, they could not agree as to whether Monroe or Clinton should head the ticket. Objectionable, moreover, as the Congressional caucus might be, many more Presidential terms elapsed before other nominating machinery superseded it. National delegates, the national congress or convention of a party, was an idea too huge as yet for American politics to grasp in these days of plain frugality. . . . Harassed with foes within and without, with dissensions among the friends of rival candidates for the succession, with an odious and profitless measure to execute, against which citizens employed both cunning and force, it seemed, at one time, as if the administration party would go down in the fall elections. But Jefferson's wonderful popularity and the buoyancy of Republican principles carried the day. The regular Presidential ticket prevailed, not without a diminished majority."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 6, sect. 2 (v. 2).—James Madison, Democratic Republican, was elected, receiving 122 votes in the Electoral College; George Clinton, of the same party, receiving 6, and Charles C. Pinckney, Federalist, 47. George Clinton was chosen Vice President.



**A. D. 1808-1810.—Substitution of Non-intercourse for Embargo.—Delusive conduct of Napoleon.**—"All through the year 1808 and the first two months of 1809, the heavy hand of the embargo was laid on American commerce. The close of Jefferson's administration was signalized by an important change in the policy of the American Government. Almost the last act which Jefferson performed as President was to sign the new law which repealed the embargo, and substituted non-intercourse—a law which instead of universal prohibition of trade, merely prohibited commerce with Great Britain and with the countries under French control. The statute further authorized the President to suspend this prohibition as to either Great Britain or France as soon as one or the other should desist from violating neutral rights. An excuse for renewing commercial relations was not long delayed. On April 21, 1809, immediately upon the rather unexpected conclusion of a liberal and satisfactory diplomatic arrangement with Erskine, the British minister in Washington, the non-intercourse act was suspended as to Great Britain; and foreign trade, long dormant, suddenly sprang into excessive activity. This happy truce was short-lived. Erskine had effected his arrangement by a deliberate and almost defiant disregard of Canning's instructions; and his acts were promptly disavowed by his government. His recall was followed by a renewal of non-intercourse under a presidential proclamation of August 9, 1809. But notwithstanding the disavowal of Erskine, the British Government had made an apparent concession to the United States by the adoption of new orders in council which revoked the stringent prohibitions of the orders of 1807, and substituted a paper blockade of all ports and places under the government of France—a distinction which, on the whole, was perhaps without any important difference. France, on the other hand, entered upon a course of further aggressions. Louis Bonaparte was driven from his kingdom of Holland because he refused to attack neutral commerce, and all American ships found lying at Amsterdam were seized. Finally, by the decree of Rambouillet, every American ship found in any French port was confiscated and ordered sold. England and the United States thus seemed for the moment to be slowly drawing together in the presence of a common enemy, when suddenly the whole situation of affairs was changed by the formal announcement on August 5, 1810, of the Emperor's intended revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, such revocation to take place on the first day of the following November, provided the British Government revoked their orders in council, or (and this was the important provision) the United States caused their rights to be respected. This promise, as Napoleon had privately pointed out a few days before, committed him to nothing; but it was accepted with all seriousness on the part of the United States. In reliance upon the imperial word, commercial intercourse with Great Britain—which had been once more resumed in May, 1810—was for the third time suspended. This, it was thought, was 'causing American rights to be respected'; and although the condemnation of American ships went on without a pause in every continental port, the Government of the United States clung with the strongest pertinacity to

the belief that Napoleon's declarations were sincere. The practical effect of all this was to bar the door against any possible settlement with Great Britain. Commerce was now permanently suspended; there was a long list of grievances to be redressed, and negotiation was exhausted."

—G. L. Rives, ed., *Selections from the Corr. of Thomas Barclay*, ch. 6.

**A. D. 1810.—The Third Census.**—Total population, 7,215,791 (being an increase of nearly 36½ per cent. over the population shown in 1800), classed and distributed as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut . . .	255,279	6,453	310
Illinois . . . . .	11,501	613	168
Indiana . . . . .	23,890	393	237
Maine . . . . .	227,736	969	....
Massachusetts . .	465,303	6,737	....
Michigan . . . . .	4,618	120	24
New Hampshire . .	213,390	970	....
New Jersey . . . .	226,861	7,843	10,851
New York . . . . .	918,699	25,333	15,017
Ohio . . . . .	228,861	1,899	....
Pennsylvania . . .	786,804	22,492	795
Rhode Island . . .	73,314	3,609	108
Vermont . . . . .	216,963	750	....
	3,653,219	78,181	27,510
	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Delaware . . . . .	55,361	13,136	4,177
District of Columbia . . . . .	16,079	2,549	5,395
Georgia . . . . .	145,414	1,801	105,218
Kentucky . . . . .	324,237	1,713	80,561
Louisiana . . . . .	34,311	7,585	34,660
Maryland . . . . .	235,117	33,927	111,502
Mississippi . . . .	23,024	240	17,088
Missouri . . . . .	17,227	607	3,011
North Carolina . .	376,410	10,266	168,824
South Carolina . .	214,196	4,554	196,365
Tennessee . . . . .	215,875	1,317	44,535
Virginia . . . . .	551,534	30,570	392,518
	2,208,785	108,265	1,163,854

**A. D. 1810-1812.—Continued provocation from England and France.—The "War of 1812" against Great Britain declared.**—"Congress, on May 1, 1810, passed an act providing that commercial non-intercourse with the belligerent powers should cease with the end of the session, only armed ships being excluded from American ports; and further, that, in case either of them should recall its obnoxious orders or decrees, the President should announce the fact by proclamation, and if the other did not do the same within three months, the non-intercourse act should be revived against that one,—a measure adopted only because Congress, in its helplessness, did not know what else to do. The conduct of France had meanwhile been no less offensive than that of Great Britain. On all sorts of pretexts American ships were seized in the harbors and waters controlled by French power. A spirited remonstrance on the part of Armstrong, the American Minister, was answered by the issue of the Rambouillet Decree in May, 1810, ordering the sale of American vessels and cargoes seized, and directing like confiscation of all American vessels entering any

ports under the control of France. This decree was designed to stop the surreptitious trade that was still being carried on between England and the continent in American bottoms. When it failed in accomplishing that end, Napoleon instructed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Champagny, to inform the American Minister that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, and would cease to have effect on November 1, 1810, if the English would revoke their Orders in Council, and recall their new principles of blockade, or if the United States would 'cause their rights to be respected by the English,'—in the first place restore the non-intercourse act as to Great Britain. . . . The British government, being notified of this by the American Minister, declared on September 29 that Great Britain would recall the Orders in Council when the revocation of the French decrees should have actually taken effect, and the commerce of neutrals should have been restored. . . . Madison, . . . leaning toward France, as was traditional with the Republican party, and glad to grasp even at the semblance of an advantage, chose to regard the withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees as actual and done in good faith, and announced it as a matter of fact on November 1, 1810. French armed ships were no longer excluded from American ports. On February 2, 1811, the non-importation act was revived as to Great Britain. In May the British Court of Admiralty delivered an opinion that no evidence existed of the withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, which resulted in the condemnation of a number of American vessels and their cargoes. Additional irritation was caused by the capture, off Sandy Hook, of an American vessel bound to France, by some fresh cases of search and impressment, and by an encounter between the American frigate *President* and the British sloop *Little Belt*, which fired into one another, the British vessel suffering most. But was American commerce safe in French ports? By no means. . . . Outrages on American ships by French men-of-war and privateers went on as before. . . . The pretended French concession was, therefore, a mere farce. Truly, there were American grievances enough. Over 900 American ships had been seized by the British, and more than 550 by the French. . . . By both belligerents the United States had been kicked and cuffed like a mere interloper among the nations of the earth, who had no rights entitled to respectful consideration. Their insolence seemed to have been increased by the irresolution of the American government, the distraction of counsel in Congress, and the division of sentiment among the people. . . . But . . . young Republican leaders came to the front to interpret the 'national spirit and expectation.' They totally eclipsed the old chiefs by their dash and brilliancy. Foremost among them stood Henry Clay; then John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes, Felix Grundy, Langdon Cheves, and others. They believed that, if the American Republic was to maintain anything like the dignity of an independent power, and to preserve, or rather regain, the respect of mankind in any degree,—ay, its self-respect,—it must cease to submit to humiliation and contemptuous treatment; it must fight,—fight somebody who had wronged or insulted it. The Republicans having always a tender side for France, and the fiction of

French concessions being accepted, the theory of the war party was that, of the two belligerents, England had more insolently maltreated the United States. Rumors were spread that an Indian war then going on, and resulting in the battle of Tippecanoe on November 7, 1811, was owing to English intrigues. Adding this to the old Revolutionary reminiscences of British oppression, it was not unnatural that the national wrath should generally turn against Great Britain. . . . Not only the regular army was increased, but the President was authorized to accept and employ 50,000 volunteers. Then a bill was introduced providing for the building of ten new frigates. . . . The war spirit in the country gradually rose, and manifested itself noisily in public meetings, passing resolutions, and memorializing Congress. It was increased in intensity by a sensational 'exposure,' a batch of papers laid before Congress by the President in March, 1812. They had been sold to the government by John Henry, an Irish adventurer, and disclosed a confidential mission to New England, undertaken by Henry in 1809 at the request of Sir James Craig, the governor of Canada, to encourage a disunion movement in the Eastern States. This was the story. Whatever its foundation, it was believed, and greatly increased popular excitement." On the 4th of April the President signed a bill laying an embargo on commerce with Great Britain for ninety days. "All over the country the embargo was understood as meaning an immediate preparation for war. . . . In May, 1812, President Madison was nominated for reelection by the congressional caucus. It has been said that he was dragged into the war policy by Clay and his followers with the threat that, unless he yielded to their views, another candidate for the presidency would be chosen. This Clay denied, and there was no evidence to discredit his denial. Madison was simply swept into the current by the impetuosity of Young America. . . . On June 1 the President's war message came. On June 18 a bill in accordance with it, which had passed both Houses, was signed by the President, who proclaimed hostilities the next day. Thus Young America, led by Henry Clay, carried their point. But there was something disquieting in their victory. The majority they commanded in Congress was not so large as a majority for a declaration of war should be. In the House, Pennsylvania and the states south and west of it gave 62 votes for the war, and 32 against it; the states north and east of Pennsylvania gave 17 yeas and 32 nays,—in all 79 for and 49 against war. This showed a difference of sentiment according to geographical divisions. Not even all the Republicans were in favor of war. . . . Nor were the United States in any sense well prepared for a war with a first-class power."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 1, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: S. Perkins, *Hist. of the Late War*, ch. 1-2.—C. J. Ingersoll, *Hist. Sketch of the Second War between the U. S. and Great Britain*, v. 1, ch. 1.—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 9-12.

A. D. 1811.—Refusal to re-charter the Bank of the United States. See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816.

A. D. 1811.—General Harrison's campaign against Tecumseh and his league.—The Battle of Tippecanoe.—"During the interval



between the Tripolitan war and the war of 1812, one noticeable campaign was made against the Indians. The operation took place in 1811, under General William H. Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, and was directed against the Shawnees and other tribes which adhered to Tecumseh. This chief, with his brother, known as 'the Prophet,' had been engaged since 1806 in planning a species of crusade against the whites, and had acquired great influence among the northwestern Indians. For the previous two years Harrison's suspicions had been aroused by reports of Tecumseh's intrigues, and attempts had been made from time to time to negotiate with him, but without satisfactory results. In the summer of 1811 it was decided to strike a decisive blow at the Indians, and in the autumn Harrison, with a regiment of regulars under Colonel Boyd, and a force of militia, marched upon Tecumseh's town, situated on the Tippecanoe River. On the 7th of November the Indians, in Tecumseh's absence, attempted to surprise Harrison's camp, but in the battle which followed they were driven off, and presently abandoned their town, which Harrison burned. The invading force then retired. The importance of the expedition was largely due to the military reputation which Harrison acquired by it."—J. R. Soley, *The Wars of the U. S. (Narrative and Critical Hist. of the U. S., v. 7, ch. 6).*

ALSO IN: *Am. State Papers: Indian Affairs*, v. 1, p. 776.—E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye, *Tecumseh*, ch. 12-23.—H. Adams, *Hist. of the U. S.: First Administration of Madison*, v. 2, ch. 4-5.—J. B. Dillon, *Hist. of Indiana*, ch. 35-38.

**A. D. 1812 (April).—Admission of Louisiana into the Union.** See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1812.

**A. D. 1812 (June—October).—Rioting at Baltimore.**—The opening of the war and the unreadiness of the nation for it.—Hull's disastrous campaign and surrender, at Detroit.—"It was perhaps characteristic of the conduct of the war, that the first blood spilled should be American blood, shed by Americans. . . . In the night of June 22d, three days after the proclamation of war, a mob in Baltimore sacked the office of the 'Federal Republican,' edited by Alexander Hanson, because he had opposed the war policy. The mob also attacked the residences of several prominent Federalists, and burned one of them. Vessels in the harbor, too, were visited and plundered. About a month later Hanson resumed the publication of his paper, and in the night of July 26th the mob gathered again." This time they were resisted and one was killed; whereupon the authorities seized Hanson and his friends and lodged them in jail. "The rioters, thus encouraged by those whose business it was to punish them, attacked the jail the next night, murdered General Lingan [one of Hanson's defenders], injured General [Henry] Lee so that he was a cripple for the rest of his life, and beat several of the other victims and subjected them to torture. The leaders of the mob were brought to trial, but were acquitted! In this state of affairs, the war party in the country being but little stronger than the peace party, the youngest and almost the weakest of civilized nations went to war with one of the oldest and most powerful. The regular army of the United States numbered only 6,000 men; but Congress had passed an act authori-

zing its increase to 25,000, and in addition to this the President was empowered to call for 50,000 volunteers, and to use the militia to the extent of 100,000. Henry Dearborn, of Massachusetts, was made a major-general and appointed to command the land forces. Against the thousand vessels and 144,000 sailors of the British navy, the Americans had 20 war-ships and a few gun-boats, the whole carrying about 300 guns. But these figures, taken alone, are deceptive; since a very large part of the British force was engaged in the European wars, and the practical question was, what force the United States could bring against so much as England could spare for operations on the high seas and on this side of the Atlantic. In that comparison, the discrepancy was not so great, and the United States had an enormous element of strength in her fine merchant marine. Her commerce being temporarily suspended to a large degree, there was an abundance both of ships and sailors, from which to build up a navy and fit out a fleet of privateers. Indeed, privateering was the business that now offered the largest prizes to mariners and ship-owners. . . . War with Great Britain being determined upon, the plan of campaign that first and most strongly presented itself to the Administration was the conquest of the British provinces on our northern border. . . . In planning for the invasion of Canada, the Administration counted largely upon a supposed readiness of the Canadians to throw off their allegiance to Great Britain and join with the United States. Such expectations have almost never been realized, and in this instance they were completely disappointed. In the preceding February, William Hull, Governor of the Territory of Michigan, who had rendered distinguished service in the Revolution, had been made a brigadier-general and placed in command of the forces in Ohio, with orders to march them to Detroit, to protect the Territory against the Indians, who were becoming troublesome. In June he was in command of about 2,000 men, in northern Ohio, moving slowly through the wilderness. On the day when war was declared, June 18th, the Secretary of War wrote him two letters. The first, in which the declaration was not mentioned, was despatched by a special messenger, and reached General Hull on the 24th. The other informed him of the declaration of war, but was sent by mail to Cleveland, there to take its chance of reaching the General by whatever conveyance might be found. The consequence was, that he did not receive it till the 2d of July. But every British commander in Canada learned the news several days earlier. Hull arrived at Detroit on the 5th of July and set about organizing his forces. On the 9th he received from the War Department orders to begin the invasion of Canada by taking possession of Malden, 15 miles below Detroit, on the other side of the river, if he thought he could do so with safety to his own posts. He crossed on the 12th, and issued a proclamation to the Canadians." He found the enemy too strongly fortified at Malden to be prudently assaulted with raw troops and without artillery. "So it was decided to defer the attack, and in a few days came the news that, on the declaration of war, a force of over 600—British and Indians—had promptly moved against the American post at Michilimackinac—on the rocky little island of

Mackinaw, commanding the strait between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan—and the garrison of 61 officers and men capitulated on the 16th of July. This disaster to the Americans roused the Indians to renewed hostility against them, while it proportionately disheartened Hull, and seems to have been the first step in the breaking down of his courage. After a few skirmishes, he recrossed to Detroit on the 7th of August. Meanwhile the British Colonel Proctor had arrived at Malden with reinforcements, and on Hull's withdrawal to Detroit he threw a force across the river to intercept his supplies. This force consisted of a small number of British regulars and a considerable number of Indians commanded by the famous Tecumseh. Two considerable engagements occurred between this force and detachments sent out to meet an expected supply train. In the first, the Americans were badly beaten; in the second, they drove the enemy to their boats with heavy loss; but the supply train was not secured. "During this gloomy state of things at Detroit, a bloody affair took place on ground that is now within the city of Chicago. Fort Dearborn stood at the mouth of Chicago River, and was occupied by a garrison of about 50 soldiers, with several families. Captain Nathan Heald, commanding the post, had been ordered by General Hull to abandon it and remove his force to Detroit." To conciliate the neighboring Indians who professed friendliness, he promised to give them all the property in the fort which he could not carry; but before making the delivery to them he foolishly destroyed all the arms, the gunpowder and the liquors. Enraged by this proceeding, which they considered a trick, the savages pursued Captain Heald's small party, waylaid them among the Sand-hills on the lake shore, and massacred the greater part, twelve children included. The scalps which they took were sold to Colonel Proctor, "who had offered a premium for American scalps." The same day on which this occurred, August 15th, "the British General Isaac Brock, who had arrived at Malden a few days before and assumed command there, formally demanded the surrender of Detroit. This demand included a plain threat of massacre in case of refusal. Said Brock in his letter: 'It is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination; but you must be aware that the numerous bodies of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond my control the moment the contest commences.' . . . Brock's force, according to his own testimony, numbered 1,330 men, including 600 Indians, and he had also two ships of war. Hull had present for duty about 1,000 men. Brock sent a large body of Indians across the river that night, at a point five miles below the fort, and early in the morning crossed with the remainder of his troops, and at once marched on the place." On the approach of the attacking force Hull offered to surrender. "The articles of capitulation were drawn up, and the American general surrendered, not merely the fort and its garrison, but the whole Territory of Michigan, of which he was Governor. . . . Hull's officers were incensed at his action, and he was subsequently court-martialled, convicted of cowardice, and condemned to death; but the President pardoned him, in consideration of his age and his services in the Revolution. . . . Subsequent investiga-

tions, if they do not exonerate General Hull, have at least greatly modified the blame attached to him."—R. Johnson, *Hist. of the War of 1812–15*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: J. F. Clarke, *Hist. of the Campaign of 1812 and Surrender of the Post at Detroit*.—B. J. Lossing, *Hull's Surrender* (*Potter's Am. Monthly*, Aug., 1875).—F. S. Drake, *Memorials of the Mass. Soc. of the Cincinnati*, pp. 341–354.—S. C. Clark, *Hull's Surrender at Detroit* (*Mag. of Am. Hist.*, v. 27).

A. D. 1812.—The opposition of the Federalists to the war.—"Unfortunately for the Federalists, while they were wholly right in many of their criticisms on the manner in which the war came about, they put themselves in the wrong as to its main feature. We can now see that in their just wrath against Napoleon they would have let the nation remain in a position of perpetual childhood and subordination before England. No doubt there were various points at issue in the impending contest, but the most important one, and the only one that remained in dispute all through the war, was that of the right of search and impressment. . . . It must be understood that this was not a question of reclaiming deserters from the British navy, for the seamen in question had very rarely belonged to it. There existed in England at that time an outrage on civilization, now abandoned, called impressment, by which any sailor and many who were not sailors could be seized and compelled to serve in the navy. The horrors of the 'press-gang,' as exhibited in the sea-side towns of England, have formed the theme of many novels. It was bad enough at home, but when applied on board the vessels of a nation with which England was at peace, it became one of those outrages which only proceed from the strong to the weak, and are never reciprocated. Lord Collingwood said well, in one of his letters, that England would not submit to such an aggression for an hour. Merely to yield to visitation for such a purpose was a confession of national weakness; but the actual case was far worse than this. . . . We have . . . Cobbett's statement of the consequences. 'Great numbers of Americans have been impressed,' he adds, 'and are now in our navy. . . . That many of these men have died on board our ships, that many have been worn out in the service, there is no doubt.' . . . In 1806 the merchants of Boston had called upon the general government to 'assert our rights and support the dignity of the United States.' . . . Yet it shows the height of party feeling that when, in 1812, Mr. Madison's government finally went to war for these very rights, the measure met with the bitterest opposition from the whole Federalist party, and from the commercial States generally. A good type of the Federalist opposition on this particular point is to be found in the pamphlets of John Lowell. John Lowell was the son of the eminent Massachusetts judge of that name; he was a well-educated lawyer, who was president of the Massachusetts Agricultural Society, and wrote under the name of 'A New England Farmer.' In spite of the protests offered half a dozen years before by his own neighbors, he declared the whole outcry against impressment to be a device of Mr. Madison's party. . . . He argued unflinchingly for the English right of search, called it a 'consecrated' right, main-



tained that the allegiance of British subjects was perpetual, and that no residence in a foreign country could absolve them. . . . While such a man, with a large party behind him, took this position, it must simply be said that the American republic had not yet asserted itself to be a nation. Soon after the Revolution, when some one spoke of that contest to Franklin as the war for independence, he said, 'Say rather the war of the Revolution; the war for independence is yet to be fought.' The war of 1812 was just the contest he described. To this excitement directed against the war, the pulpit very largely contributed, the chief lever applied by the Federalist clergy being found in the atrocities of Napoleon. . . . The Federalist leaders took distinctly the ground that they should refuse to obey a conscription law to raise troops for the conquest of Canada; and when that very questionable measure failed by one vote in the Senate, the nation may have escaped a serious outbreak. . . . It might, indeed, have been far more dangerous than the Hartford Convention of 1814 [see below: A. D. 1814 (DECEMBER)], which was, after all, only a peaceable meeting of some two dozen men, with George Cabot at their head—men of whom very few had even a covert purpose of dissolving the Union, but who were driven to something very near desperation by the prostration of their commerce and the defencelessness of their coast."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 15.

Also in: H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 6.—H. C. Lodge, *Life and Letters of George Cabot*, ch. 11–12.—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 11–14.—See, also, BLUE-LIGHT FEDERALISTS.

A. D. 1812 (September—November).—The opening of the war on the New York frontier.—The Battle of Queenstown Heights.—"To put Dearborn [who commanded in the northern department] in a condition to act with effect, Governor Tompkins [of the state of New York] made the greatest efforts to get out the New York quota of militia. The Democratic Legislature of Vermont voted to add to the pay of their militia in service as much as was paid by the United States. At the same time they passed a stringent drafting law, and offered \$30 bounty to volunteers. By the co-operating exertions of these states and of the war department, some 3,000 regulars and 2,000 militia were presently assembled on Lake Champlain, under Dearborn's immediate command. Another force of 2,000 militia was stationed at different points along the south bank of the St. Lawrence, their left resting on Sackett's Harbor. A third army was collected along the Niagara River, from Fort Niagara to Buffalo, then a village of a thousand or two inhabitants, in the midst of a newly-settled district. This latter force of nearly 6,000 men, half regulars and volunteers and half militia, was under the immediate command of Major-general Van Rensselaer, a Federalist. . . . The first skirmishes on the New York frontier grew out of attempts, not unsuccessful, made principally from Ogdensburg, a new but much the largest village on the American side of the St. Lawrence, to intercept the British supplies proceeding upward in boats. The militia officer in command at Ogdensburg was General Jacob Brown. A Pennsylvanian by birth, a Quaker by education, while employed as a teacher in

the city of New York, some newspaper essays of his had attracted the attention of Alexander Hamilton, to whom, during the quasi war of '98, he became military secretary. Removing afterward to the new settlements of Northwestern New York, his enterprise had founded the flourishing village of Brownsville, not far from Sackett's Harbor. . . . His success in repulsing a British force of 700 men, which attempted to cross from Prescott to attack Ogdensburg, laid the foundation of a military reputation which soon placed him at the head of the American army. There had been built on Lake Ontario, out of the gun-boat appropriations, but by a fortunate improvement upon Jefferson's model, a sloop of war of light draft, mounting 16 guns. This vessel, called the Oneida, just before the breaking out of the war had been furnished with a regular-bred commander and crew. She was attacked shortly after at Sackett's Harbor by five British vessels, three of them larger than herself, but manned only by lake watermen. By landing part of her guns, and establishing a battery on shore, she succeeded, however, in beating them off. Hull's failure having shown how important was the control of the lakes, a judicious selection was made of Captain Chauncey, hitherto at the head of the New York Navy Yard, to take command on those waters. Along with Henry Eckford as naval constructor, and soon followed by ship-carpenters, naval stores, guns, and presently by parties of seamen, he was sent to Sackett's Harbor [September, 1812], then held by a garrison of 200 regulars. That newly-settled region could supply nothing but timber; every thing else had to be transported from Albany at vast expense. . . . A 24-gun ship was at once commenced; for immediate use, Chauncey purchased six of the small schooners employed in the then infant commerce of the lake, which, though very ill adapted for war, he armed with four guns each. With these and the Oneida he put out on the lake, and soon [November 8] drove the British ships into Kingston. . . . While thus employed, Chauncey had sent Lieutenant Elliot to Buffalo, with a party of seamen, to make arrangements for a force on the upper lakes. Elliot, soon after his arrival, succeeded in cutting out [October 9] from under the guns of Fort Erie, nearly opposite Buffalo, two British vessels just arrived from Detroit. One, the late Adams, which the British had armed and equipped, grounded, and it became necessary to destroy her. The other, the Caledonia, of two guns, was brought off, and became the nucleus of the naval force of Lake Erie. Elliot also purchased several small schooners lying in the Niagara River; but they, as well as the Caledonia, lay blockaded at Black Rock [now a part of the city of Buffalo], the passage into the lake being commanded by the guns of Fort Erie. The troops along the Niagara frontier, highly excited by Elliot's exploit, demanded to be led against the enemy; and, under the idea that the British village of Queenstown, at the foot of the falls [a few miles below] might furnish comfortable winter quarters for a part of his troops, Van Rensselaer resolved to attack it."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, 2d series, ch. 25 (v. 3).—"The Niagara River, 35 miles long, which conducts the waters of the upper lakes through Erie into Ontario, constituted an important military frontier in such a war; its banks sparsely

settled, and the crossing a narrow one. Below the roaring cataracts had assembled another little army, supplied in great measure by regiments of the New York quota, Major-General Van Rensselaer, of the militia of that State, a prominent Federalist, being in command. Hull's sudden surrender left Brock free to confront this second adversary with a moderate force from the Canada side, not without feeling uncertain as to where the American blow would be struck. By October Van Rensselaer had 6,000 men, half of them regulars; and, yielding to the impatience of his volunteers and the public press, he gave orders to cross the river from Lewiston to Queenston. High bluffs arose on either side. There were not boats enough provided to carry more than half the advance party at a time. Too much reliance was placed upon militia, while regulars won the laurels. Wool, a young captain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Scott did gallant work on Queenston Heights; and General Brock, the conqueror of Detroit, fell mortally wounded; but reinforcements crossed too slowly, and with the green militia dreading death, many of the reserve pleading legal exemption from service in an enemy's country, their deserted comrades on the Canada side, unable to return, were forced to surrender. Van Rensselaer, whose advance had been premature, resigned in disgust, leaving a less capable but more pretentious officer, of Virginia birth, General Alexander Smyth, to succeed him. Smyth had a gift of windy composition, which fortunately, imposed upon the inhabitants of Western New York just long enough to check despondency and restore a glow to the recruiting service. 'Come on, my heroes,' was his cry, 'and when you attack the enemy's batteries, let your rallying word be: "The cannon lost at Detroit, or death!"' All this inkshed promised an exploit for invading Canada from the upper end of the Niagara, between Fort Erie and Chippewa. By the 27th of November Smyth had concentrated at Black Rock, near Buffalo, a fair army, 4,500 troops, comprising, in addition to the regulars, volunteer regiments from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York; the last under the command of General Porter, the representative in Congress, whose report, twelve months before, had given the first loud note of war. The big moment approached; but, notwithstanding the sonorous promise of 'memorable to-morrows,' and an embarkation to the music of 'Yankee Doodle,' one or two shivering attempts were made to land on the opposite shore, and then the volunteers were dismissed to their homes, and regulars ordered into winter-quarters. Disorderly scenes ensued. Our insubordinate and mortified soldiers discharged their muskets in all directions. Porter having openly charged Smyth with cowardice, the two crossed to Grand Island to fight a duel, and then shook hands. . . . But the country could not be reconciled to such generalship, and Smyth was presently cashiered."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 2, ch. 8, sect. 2.

ALSO IN: S. Van Rensselaer, *Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown*.—J. Symons, *The Battle of Queenstown Heights*.—Gen. W. Scott, *Memoirs, by himself*, v. 1, ch. 6.—W. H. Merritt, *Journal during the War of 1812*.—H. Adams, *Hist. of the U. S.: First Administration of Madison*, v. 2, ch. 16.—F. B. Tupper, *Life and Corr. of Major-Gen. Sir Isaac Brock*, ch. 13-14.

**A. D. 1812.—Seventh Presidential Election.**—James Madison re-elected, receiving in the electoral college 128 votes, against 89 cast for DeWitt Clinton, Federalist. Elbridge Gerry was elected Vice President.

**A. D. 1812-1813.—Possession of West Florida taken from the Spaniards.**—See FLORIDA: A. D. 1810-1813.

**A. D. 1812-1813.—Indifference to the Navy at the beginning of the war.—Its Efficiency and its Early Successes.**—"The young leaders of the war party in congress looked to successes on land and territorial conquest, and had an indifference to the field which the ocean afforded. And yet the triumphs of our young fleet in the Revolution, the alarm which John Paul Jones excited in English homes, and, later, the brilliant achievements in the Mediterranean, the heroes of which were still in the prime of their service, might have inspired better counsel. Madison's cabinet were said to have without exception opposed the increase and use of our navy; indeed, somewhat after Jefferson's idea in imposing the embargo—to save our vessels by laying them up. The advice of Captains Charles Stewart and William Bainbridge, who happened to be in Washington at the time of the declaration of war, determined Madison to bring the navy into active service. One of the chief causes of the war being the impressment of our seamen, it seems to-day surprising that their ardor in defense of 'Free Trade and Sailors' Rights,'—the cry under which our greatest triumphs were won—should have been either passed by or deprecated."—J. A. Stevens, *Second War with Great Britain (Mag. of Am. Hist., May-June, 1893)*.—"Although [the American navy] had never been regarded by the government with favor, it happened that the three most essential measures had been adopted to secure its efficiency,—the ships built for it were the best of their class in the world, the officers had been carefully selected (200 out of a total of 500 having been retained under the Peace Establishment Act), and they had received—at least a large number of them—in Preble's squadron at Tripoli a training such as had fallen to the lot of few navies, either before or since. To these three causes the successes of 1812 were directly due; and although Commodore Preble died in 1807, the credit of the later war belongs more to him than to any other one man. It was not only that he formed many of the individual officers who won the victories of 1812-15,—for Hull, Decatur, Bainbridge, Macdonough, Porter, Lawrence, Biddle, Chauncey, Warrington, Charles Morris, and Stewart were all in his squadron,—but he created in the navy the professional spirit or idea, which was the main quality that distinguished it from the army in the war with Great Britain. At the outbreak of the war there were 18 vessels in the navy, ranging from 44-gun frigates to 12-gun brigs. There were also 176 gunboats, on which a large sum of money had been expended, but which were of no use whatever. . . . Immediately after the declaration of war, the frigates in commission in the home ports, together with two of the sloops, put to sea as a squadron under Commodore John Rodgers. They fell in with the English frigate 'Belvidera,' but she got away from them; and after an ineffectual cruise across the Atlantic, they returned home, without meeting anything of conse-



quence. Three weeks later, the 'Constitution,' under Captain Hull, sailed from Annapolis. Soon after leaving the Chesapeake she came upon a British squadron of one sixty-four and four frigates, and then ensued the famous three days' chase, in the course of which, by a marvel of good seamanship and good discipline, the American frigate escaped. After a short respite in Boston, Hull set out again, and on the 19th of August he fought and captured the 'Guerrière,' Captain Dacres, in an engagement lasting about an hour. The 'Constitution,' being armed with 24-pounders instead of 18's, threw at a broadside a weight of shot half as large again as that of the 'Guerrière,' and her crew was numerically superior in a still greater degree. Nevertheless, the immensely greater disproportion in the casualties which the 'Constitution' inflicted and received, and the short time which she took to do the work, cannot be explained by the difference in force alone; for the 'Guerrière' had five times as many killed and wounded as her opponent, and at the close of the engagement she was a dismantled wreck, while the 'Constitution' had suffered no injury of importance. The essential point of difference lay in the practical training and skill of the crews in gunnery. . . . In the next action, in October, the sloop 'Wasp,' Captain Jacob Jones, captured the English brig 'Frolic,' of approximately the same force. The relative loss of English and Americans was again five to one. Both vessels were soon after taken by a seventy-four. Later in the same month, another frigate action took place, the 'United States,' under Decatur, capturing the 'Macedonian.' The advantage of the Americans in men was about the same as in the first action, while in guns it was greater. The American casualties were 13, the English 104. This difference was not due to the fact that the American guns were 24's and 42's, instead of 18's and 32's, or that the Americans had three more of them in a broadside; it was really due to the way in which the guns on both sides were handled. Shortly after this capture, a cruise in the Pacific was projected for a squadron to be composed of the 'Constitution,' 'Essex,' and 'Hornet.' The 'Essex' failed to meet the other vessels at the rendezvous off the coast of Brazil, and went on the Pacific cruise alone [having great success]. The 'Constitution,' now commanded by Bainbridge, met the frigate 'Java,' near Brazil, on the 29th of December. The antagonists were more nearly matched than in the previous frigate actions, but the fight, lasting a little over an hour, resulted in the total defeat and surrender of the 'Java,' with a loss of 124 to the Americans' 34. The 'Java' was a wreck, and could not be taken into port, and Bainbridge returned home. Two months later, February 24, 1813, the 'Hornet,' commanded by Lawrence, met the 'Peacock' off the Demerara, and reduced her in fifteen minutes to a sinking condition, while the 'Hornet's' hull was hardly scratched. The casualties, apart from those drowned, were 5 in the 'Hornet' and 38 in the 'Peacock.' . . . The moral effect in England of these defeats was very great. . . . In March, 1813, Admiral Sir John Warren assumed the command of the British squadron on the American coast. Although rather

past his prime, his defects were more than compensated by the activity of his second in command, Rear-Admiral Cockburn, who during this summer and the next kept the coasts of Chesapeake Bay in a continuous state of alarm by successful raids, in which much valuable property was destroyed. Among the more important of the actions of 1813 were the capture and destruction (in part) of Havre de Grace, Md., early in May, and an attack on the village of Hampton, Va., on the 25th of June. 'Acts of rapine and violence' on the part of the invading forces characterized the latter attack, which excited intense indignation throughout the country. . . . In the summer of 1813 occurred the first serious reverse of the navy during the war. On the 1st of June the frigate 'Chesapeake,' Captain James Lawrence, sailed from Boston to engage the 'Shannon,' which was lying outside, waiting for the battle. The two ships were nearly matched in guns and men, what slight difference there was being in favor of the 'Chesapeake'; but the crew of the latter had been recently shipped and was partly composed of disaffected men, and Lawrence had had no time to discipline them. The engagement was short and decisive. Ranging up alongside of the 'Shannon,' whose crew had been brought to the highest state of efficiency by Captain Broke their commander, the 'Chesapeake' at the first fire received a severe injury in the loss of several of her officers. Falling foul of the 'Shannon' she was effectually raked, and presently a boarding party, led by Captain Broke, got possession of her deck. The great mortality among the officers [including Captain Lawrence, who had received a mortal wound just before his ship was boarded, and whose dying appeal, 'Don't give up the ship,' became the battle cry of the American navy during the remainder of the war], and the want of discipline in the crew, resulted in a victory for the boarders. The battle lasted fifteen minutes only, and the 'Chesapeake' was carried as a prize to Halifax. During this summer the naval war on the ocean continued with varying fortunes, two important actions being fought. The brig 'Argus,' Captain Allen, after a successful voyage in the Irish Sea, in which many prizes were taken and destroyed, was captured by the English brig 'Pelican,' on the 14th of August. Early in September the brig 'Enterprise,' commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, captured the English brig 'Boxer,' near Portland, Me."—J. R. Soley, *The Wars of the U. S. (Narrative and Critical Hist. of the U. S., v. 7, ch. 6).*

ALSO IN: T. Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812*, ch. 2-5.—J. F. Cooper, *Hist. of the Navy of the U. S., v. 2, ch. 9-22.*—A. S. Mackenzie, *Life of Decatur*, ch. 10-12.—D. D. Porter, *Mem. of Com. David Porter.*

A. D. 1812-1813.—Harrison's northwestern campaign.—Winchester's defeat.—Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie.—The Battle of the Thames and death of Tecumseh.—Recovery of Detroit and Michigan.—"Great was the indignation of the West, great the mortification of our whole people, on learning that, instead of capturing Upper Canada at the first blow, we had lost our whole Michigan Territory. The task now was to retake Detroit under a competent commander. Ohio and Kentucky went on filling rapidly their quotas, while urging the administration to march

them under Harrison. The President hesitated, doubtful whether Harrison was a man of sufficient military experience. He proposed that Monroe should go to the scene, as a volunteer, if not to command; but Monroe restrained his first military ardor, as was prudent, and Winchester, of Tennessee, another of the recent brigadiers, and a revolutionary veteran, was selected. The selection, however, gave umbrage to the Kentuckians, whose State government had already made Harrison a brevet major-general of militia. The hero of Tippecanoe was finally assigned to the chief command of the Western army, Madison countermanding his first orders. Harrison's route for Detroit was by way of Fort Wayne and Fort Defiance to the falls of the Maumee. But it was late in the fall [October 1812] before the new military arrangements could be completed; and through a swampy wilderness, infested as it was with hostile Indians, the progress of the column was toilsome and discouraging; and, except for the destruction of a few Indian villages on the way, the deeds of prowess were reserved for a winter campaign. . . . The winter expedition of the Northwest army . . . [was] retarded by a disaster which overtook Winchester's command near the Maumee Rapids, at a little village on the River Raisin. By Harrison's orders Winchester had started for these Rapids, whence, having first concentrated troops as if for winter quarters, the design was that he should advance 50 miles farther, when weather permitted, cross the frozen Detroit, and fall suddenly upon Malden. Winchester not only pushed on incautiously to his first destination, but, with a design more humane than prudent, undertook to protect against a British and Indian raid the alarmed inhabitants of Frenchtown [now Monroe, Michigan], a place 30 miles nearer Malden. Here [January 22, 1813] he was overpowered by the enemy, which fell upon the American force suddenly at daybreak, with yells and a shower of bombshells and canister. Winchester having been taken prisoner, Colonel Proctor, the British commander, extorted from him the unconditional surrender of all his troops, some 700 in number, as the only means of saving them from the tomahawk and scalping-knife. . . . Our sick and wounded . . . the British commander shamefully abandoned to their fate. . . . Officers and men, many of them the flower of Kentucky, perished victims to barbarities . . . abhorrent to civilized warfare, of which the British Colonel Proctor and Captain Elliott were not innocent. Besides the American loss in prisoners at the sad affair of the Raisin, nearly 200 were killed and missing. Hearing at the Upper Sandusky of Winchester's intended movement, Harrison had pressed to his relief with reinforcements, but fugitives from Frenchtown brought the melancholy tidings of disaster; and Harrison fell back to the Rapids, there to strengthen the post known as Fort Meigs, and go into winter quarters. The terms of many of his troops having now expired, the Northwestern army was for many months too feeble to begin a forward movement. But Harrison possessed the unabated confidence of the West, and, promoted to be one of the new major-generals, he received, through the zealous co-operation of Ohio and Kentucky, whose people were inflamed to take vengeance, enough volunteer reinforce-

ments [May] to relieve Fort Meigs [which was twice besieged in 1813 by British and Indians] from Proctor's investment in the spring, and at length the quota requisite for resuming the offensive; other frontier plans of the War Department having long deranged his own in this quarter. The splendid co-operation of an American flotilla on Lake Erie opened the way to Detroit and victory. For that memorable service Commodore Chauncey had detailed an aspiring young naval officer, Captain Oliver H. Perry, of Rhode Island. Our little Lake squadron was tediously constructed at Presqu' Isle (now Erie). When all at last was ready [in August, 1813], Perry, who had long chafed in spirit while the British fleet hovered in sight like a hawk, sailed forth to dispute the supremacy of the broad inland waters. His heavier vessels were floated over the bar not without difficulty. After conferring at Sandusky upon the combined plan of operations with General Harrison, from whom he received a small detail of soldiers to act as marines and supply vacancies in his crews, he offered battle to Barclay, the British commander,—the latter a veteran in naval experience, who had served under Nelson at Trafalgar. Barclay had lain idly for several weeks at Malden, in hopes of procuring additional sailors, purposely avoiding an action meanwhile. But Proctor's army having now run short of provisions, longer delay was inexpedient. At sunrise on September 10th Perry despatched the approaching British fleet from his look-out, a group of islands off Sandusky. Ten miles to the north of this locality, which was known as Put-in-bay, the two squadrons at noon engaged one another,—Perry approaching at an acute angle, and keeping the weather-gage, while Barclay's vessels hove to in close order. In officers and men the fleets were about equally matched; there were 6 British vessels to the American 9, but the former carried more guns, and were greatly superior for action from a distance. With 30 long guns to Perry's 15, Barclay had the decided advantage at first, and our flag-ship, the *Lawrence*, exposed to the heaviest of the British cannonade, became terribly battered, her decks wet with carnage, her guns dismounted. Undismayed by this catastrophe, Perry dropped into a little boat with his broad pennant and banner, and crossed to his next largest vessel, the *Niagara*, the target for 15 minutes of a furious fire while being rowed over. Climbing the *Niagara's* deck, and hoisting once more the emblems of command, our brave captain now pierced the enemy's line with his new flag-ship, followed by his smaller vessels, and, gaining at last that advantage of a close engagement which for nearly three hours had eluded him, he won the fight in eight minutes. The colors of the Detroit, Barclay's flag-ship, struck first, three others followed the example, and two of the British squadron attempting to escape were overtaken and brought back triumphantly. 'We have met the enemy and they are ours,' was Perry's laconic dispatch to Harrison, written in pencil on the back of an old letter, with his navy-cap for a rest; 'two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop.' . . . Barclay lay dangerously wounded, and his next in command died that evening. . . . To Harrison's expectant army, augmented by 3,500 mounted Kentuckians, whom Governor Shelby led in per-



son, the word of advance was now given. . . . Perry's flotilla, aided by the captured vessels, presently landed the American troops on the Canada side. Proctor had already begun the retreat, having first dismantled the fort at Malden and burned the barracks. Harrison pursued him beyond Sandwich, covered by the flotilla, until near a Moravian town, up the river Thames [some 80 miles east of Lake St. Clair], the enemy was overtaken, with Tecumseh's braves. Here, upon well-chosen ground, the British made a final stand [October 5], but at the first impetuous charge of our cavalry their line broke, and only the Indians remained to engage in a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Among the slain was the famous Tecumseh, dispatched, as tradition asserts, by the pistol of Colonel Johnson, a Kentucky officer prominent in the battle. Proctor himself escaped in a carriage with a few followers, incurring afterwards the royal reprimand. . . . The baleful British and Indian alliance was broken up by these victories, while Detroit, Michigan, and all that Hull had lost, and a fair portion of Upper Canada besides, passed into American control. Among American generals in this war Harrison enjoyed the rare felicity of having fully accomplished his undertaking."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 8, sect. 2 and ch. 9, sect. 1 (v. 2).—"The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material results and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of all the upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the conquest of Upper Canada; in all these respects its importance has not been overrated. But the 'glory' acquired by it most certainly has been estimated at more than its worth. . . . The simple truth is, that, where on both sides the officers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side which possessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to two, could not well help winning. . . . Though we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as much metal again as those of our antagonist."—T. Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: C. D. Yonge, *Hist. of the British Navy*, ch. 36 (v. 3).—E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye, *Tecumseh*, ch. 26-34.—I. R. Jackson, *Life of W. H. Harrison*, ch. 7-9.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the War of 1812*, ch. 16-17, and 23-26.—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Battle of Lake Erie*.

A. D. 1813 (April-July).—The burning of Toronto.—The capture of Fort George.—"The American fleet on Lake Ontario had been increased, and in 1813 controlled the lake. General Sheaffe had succeeded Brock as Governor as well as commander of the forces. Some 600 troops were in York [now Toronto], the capital. York had about 1,000 inhabitants, and was not regarded as of strategic importance. The Americans, however, set sail from Sackett's Harbour with 16 sail and 2,500 men to attack it. The enemy landed [April 27] to the west of the town, and General Sheaffe evacuated the works, and retired down the Kingston Road. The Americans invested the town, and though skirmishing took place, had an easy victory. The land force was under General Pike, an officer well known as having, when a lieutenant, explored the sources of the Mississippi. Just as the Americans had

well filled the fort, the powder-magazine exploded with violence, killing and wounding about 250. General Pike, struck in the breast by a flying stone, died soon after. The Americans, contrary to the articles of surrender, shamefully burnt the town, and retired from York on the 2nd of May, 1813. While the squadron was absent, Sackett's Harbour was attacked by a strong force. The garrison seemed to be on the point of surrendering the fort, when Sir George Prevost, to the surprise of all, ordered a retreat. Little York taken, Commodore Chauncey then crossed the lake to Fort George at the mouth of the Niagara River. General Vincent commanded the fort. Twenty-four of Hull's guns frowned from its bastions. Its defender had 1,340 men. The American army on the Niagara frontier numbered 6,000. Chauncey had eleven war-vessels and 900 seamen. On the 27th of May the expected day came. Vincent drew his men out about a mile from the fort and awaited the attack. He was overpowered and retired, having lost nearly 450 soldiers. The Canadian force retired to a strong position, 'Beaver Dams,' twelve miles from Niagara on the heights, having given up Fort Erie and Chippewa and blown up Fort George. Vincent had now 1,600 men, and with these he retired to Burlington Heights, near the present city of Hamilton. An American army of 2,500 men followed General Vincent to Stoney Creek. On the night of the 8th of June, Colonel Harvey of the British force, with upwards of 750 men, fell stealthily on the sleeping American army, scattered the troops, killed many, captured the American generals Chandler and Winder, and about 100 men, along with guns and stores. The adventurers then retired to their camp. The scattered American soldiers reassembled in the morning and retired in a disorderly manner down the country to Fort George. Vincent now followed the retreating army and reoccupied Beaver Dams. One of his outposts was held by Lieutenant Fitzgibbon and 30 men. Smarting with defeat, the American general sought to surprise this station as a basis for future attacks. He secretly despatched Colonel Boerstler with nearly 700 men to capture it. A wounded militiaman, living within the lines at Queenston, heard by chance of the expedition. . . . The alarm was given [by the militiaman's wife, who travelled 20 miles through the forest, at night] and that night the men lay on their arms. Early next morning the American party came, but an ambuscade had been prepared for them, and after severe fighting 542 men surrendered into the hands of some 260. General Dearborn soon after retired from the command of the American army, to be succeeded by General Boyd. British parties captured Fort Schlosser and Black Rock on the Niagara River at this time, though at the latter place with the loss of Colonel Bishopp, the idol of his men. Colonel Scott, in command of troops on board Commodore Chauncey's fleet, again scoured Lake Ontario. Landing at Burlington Heights on the 31st of July, they did nothing more than reconnoitre the works and depart. Afterwards the second attack on York was made and the barracks burnt. After this a trial of strength took place between Sir James Yeo's fleet, now sent forth from Kingston Harbour, and Chauncey's squadron. The Americans lost two vessels in a squall, and two were cap-

tured by the British, but the result between the two fleets was indecisive."—G. Bryce, *Short Hist. of the Canadian People*, ch. 8, sect. 5.

ALSO IN: R. Johnson, *Hist. of the War of 1812–'15*, ch. 7.

A. D. 1813 (October—November).—The abortive expedition against Montreal.—“While Perry and Harrison were . . . reclaiming our lost ground on Lake Erie and in the northwest, Armstrong was preparing to carry out his favorite plan of a descent on Kingston and Montreal. When he accepted the post of Secretary of War, he transferred his department from Washington to Sackett's Harbor, so that he might superintend in person the progress of the campaign. . . . Although Wilkinson had superseded Dearborn, as commander-in-chief of this district in July, he did not issue his first orders to the army till the 23d of August. . . . General Wade Hampton, who had been recalled from the fifth military district to the northern frontier, encamped with his army, 4,000 strong, at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain. The plan finally adopted by the Secretary was, to have Wilkinson drop down the St. Lawrence, and without stopping to attack the English posts on the river, form a junction with General Hampton, when the two armies should march at once on Montreal. These two Generals were both Revolutionary officers, and consequently too advanced in years to carry such an expedition through with vigor and activity. Besides, a hostile feeling separated them, rendering each jealous of the other's command. . . . Chauncey, in the mean time, after an action with Yeo, in which both parties claimed the victory, forced his adversary to take refuge in Burlington Bay. He then wrote to Wilkinson that the lake was clear of the enemy, and reported himself ready to transport the troops down the St. Lawrence. The greatest expectations were formed of this expedition. The people knew nothing of the quarrel between Wilkinson and Hampton, and thought only of the strength of their united force. . . . While Wilkinson was preparing to fulfill his part of the campaign, Hampton made a bold push into Canada on his own responsibility. Advancing from Plattsburg, he marched directly for St. John, but finding water scarce for his draft cattle, owing to a severe drought, he moved to the left, and next day arrived at Chateaugay Four Corners, a few miles from the Canada line. Here he was overtaken by an order from Armstrong, commanding him to remain where he was, until the arrival of Wilkinson. But jealous of his rival, and wishing to achieve a victory in which the honor would not be divided, he resolved to take upon himself the responsibility of advancing alone. Several detachments of militia had augmented his force of 4,000, and he deemed himself sufficiently strong to attack Prevost, who he was told had only about 2,000 ill assorted troops under him. He therefore gave orders to march, and cutting a road for 24 miles through the wilderness, after five days great toil, reached the British position. Ignorant of its weakness, he dispatched Colonel Purdy at night by a circuitous route to gain the enemy's flank and rear and assail his works, while he attacked them in front. Bewildered by the darkness, and led astray by his guide, Colonel Purdy wandered through the forest, entirely ignorant of the whereabouts of the enemy

or of his own. General Hampton, however, supposing that he had succeeded in his attempt, ordered General Izard to advance with the main body of the army, and as soon as firing was heard in the rear to commence the attack in front. Izard marched up his men and a skirmish ensued, when Colonel De Salaberry, the British commander, who had but a handful of regulars under him, ordered the bugles, which had been placed at some distance apart on purpose to represent a large force, to sound the charge. The ruse succeeded admirably, and a halt was ordered. The bugles brought up the lost detachment of Purdy, but suddenly assailed by a concealed body of militia, his command was thrown into disorder and broke and fled. Disconcerted by the defeat of Purdy, Hampton ordered a retreat, without making any attempt to carry the British intrenchments. . . . Hampton, defeated by the blasts of a few bugles, took up his position again at the Four Corners, to wait further news from Wilkinson's division. The latter having concentrated his troops at Grenadier Island, embarked them again the same day that Hampton advanced, against orders, towards Montreal. Three hundred boats, covering the river for miles, carried the infantry and artillery, while the cavalry, 500 strong, marched along the bank. . . . They were two weeks in reaching the river. Wilkinson, who had been recalled from New Orleans, to take charge of this expedition, was prostrated by the lake fever, which, added to the infirmities of age, rendered him wholly unfit for the position he occupied. General Lewis, his second in command, was also sick. The season was already far advanced—the autumnal storms had set in earlier than usual—everything conspired to ensure defeat; and around this wreck of a commander, tossed an army, dispirited, disgusted, and doomed to disgrace. General Brown led the advance of this army of invasion, as it started for Montreal, 180 miles distant. . . . When it reached the head of the long rapids at Hamilton, 20 miles below Ogdensburg, Wilkinson ordered General Brown to advance by land and cover the passage of the boats through the narrow defiles, where the enemy had established block houses. In the mean time the cavalry had crossed over to the Canadian side and, with 1,500 men under General Boyd, been despatched against the enemy, which was constantly harassing his rear. General Boyd, accompanied by Generals Swartwout and Covington as volunteers, moved forward in three columns. Colonel Ripley advancing with the 21st Regiment, drove the enemy's sharp shooters from the woods, and emerged on an open space, called Chrystler's Field, and directly in front of two English regiments. Notwithstanding the disparity of numbers this gallant officer ordered a charge, which was executed with such firmness that the two regiments retired. Rallying and making a stand, they were again charged and driven back. . . . At length the British retired to their camp and the Americans maintained their position on the shore, so that the flotilla passed the Saut in safety. This action [called the battle of Chrystler's Farm, or Williamsburg] has never received the praise it deserves—the disgraceful failure of the campaign having cast a shadow upon it. The British, though inferior in numbers, had greatly the advantage in having possession of a stone house



in the midst of the field. . . . Nearly one-fifth of the entire force engaged were killed or wounded. . . . The army, however, still held its course for Montreal. Young Scott, who had joined the expedition at Ogdensburg, was 15 miles ahead, clearing, with a detachment of less than 800 men, the river banks as he went. Montreal was known to be feebly garrisoned, and Wilkinson had no doubt it would fall an easy conquest. He therefore sent forward to Hampton to join him at St. Regis, with provisions. Hampton, in reply, said, that his men could bring no more provisions than they wanted for their own use, and informed him, in short, that he should not co-operate with him at all, but make the best of his way back to Lake Champlain. On receiving this astounding news, Wilkinson called a council of war, which reprobated in strong terms the conduct of Hampton, and decided that in consideration of his failure, and the lateness of the season, the march should be suspended, and the army retire to winter quarters. This was carried into effect, and Wilkinson repaired to French Mills, on Salmon river, for the winter, and Hampton to Plattsburg."—J. T. Headley, *The Second War with England*, v. 1, ch. 13.

Also in: W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 4, ch. 8.—S. Perkins, *Hist. of the Late War*, ch. 12.—J. Armstrong, *Notices of the War of 1812*, v. 2, ch. 1.

**A. D. 1813 (December).—Retaliatory devastation of the Niagara frontier.—Fort Niagara surprised.—The burning of Buffalo.**—"The withdrawal of troops from the Niagara frontier to take part in Wilkinson's expedition left the defence of that line almost entirely to militia, and the term for which the militia had been called out expired on the 9th of December. The next day General George McClure, who had been left in command at Fort George, found himself at the head of but 60 effective men, while the British General Drummond had brought up to the peninsula 400 troops and 70 Indians—released by the failure of Wilkinson's expedition—and was preparing to attack him. McClure thereupon determined to evacuate the fort, as the only alternative from capture or destruction, and remove his men and stores across the river to Fort Niagara. He also determined to burn the village of Newark, that the enemy might find no shelter. The laudable part of this plan was but imperfectly carried out; he failed to destroy the barracks, and left unharmed tents for 1,500 men, several pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of ammunition, all of which fell into the hands of Drummond's men. But the inexcusable part—the burning of a village in midwinter, inhabited by noncombatants who had been guilty of no special offence—was only too faithfully executed. The inhabitants were given twelve hours in which to remove their goods, and then the torch was applied, and not a house was left standing. This needless cruelty produced its natural result; Drummond determined upon swift and ample retaliation. In the night of December 18th, just one week after the burning of Newark, he threw across the Niagara a force of 550 men. They landed at Five Mile Meadows, three miles above Fort Niagara, and marched upon it at once, arriving there at four o'clock in the morning. McClure, who had received an intimation of the enemy's intention to

devastate the American frontier, had gone to Buffalo to raise a force to oppose him. The garrison of the fort consisted of about 450 men, a large number of whom were in the hospital. The command had been left to a Captain Leonard, who at this time was three miles away, sleeping at a farm-house. The most elaborate preparations had been made for the capture of the fort, including scaling-ladders for mounting the bastions. But the Americans seemed to have studied to make the task as easy as possible. The sentries were seized and silenced before they could give any alarm, and the main gate was found standing wide open, so that the British had only to walk straight in and begin at once the stabbing which had been determined upon. The guard in the south-east block-house fired one volley, by which the British commander, Colonel Murray, was wounded, and a portion of the invalids made what resistance they could. A British lieutenant and five men were killed, and a surgeon and three men wounded. Sixty-five Americans, two-thirds of whom were invalids, were bayoneted in their beds; 15 others, who had taken refuge in the cellars, were despatched in the same manner, and 14 were wounded; 20 escaped, and all the others, about 340, were made prisoners. . . . On the same morning, General Riall, with a detachment of British troops and 500 Indians, crossed from Queens-town." Lewiston, Youngstown, Tuscarora and Manchester (now Niagara Falls) were plundered and burned, and the houses and barns of farmers along the river, within a belt of several miles, were destroyed. "The bridge over Tonawanda Creek had been destroyed by the Americans, and at this point the enemy turned back, and soon recrossed the Niagara to the Canada side. The alarm at Buffalo brought General Hall, of the New York militia, to that village, where he arrived the day after Christmas. He found collected there a body of 1,700 men, whom it would have been gross flattery to call a 'force.' They were poorly supplied with arms and cartridges, and had no discipline and almost no organization. Another regiment of 300 soon joined them, but without adding much to their efficiency. On the 28th of December, Drummond reconnoitred the American camp, and determined to attack it; for which purpose he sent over General Riall on the evening of the 29th with 1,450 men, largely regulars, and a body of Indians. One detachment landed two miles below Black Rock, crossed Canajohatie [or Scajaquada] Creek in the face of a slight resistance, and took possession of a battery. The remainder landed at a point between Buffalo and Black Rock [two villages then, now united in one city], under cover of a battery on the Canadian shore. Poor as Hall's troops were, they stood long enough to fire upon the invaders and inflict considerable loss. . . . Both sides had artillery, with which the action was opened. As it progressed, however, the American line was broken in the centre, and Hall was compelled to fall back. His subsequent attempts to rally his men were of no avail, and he himself seems to have lost heart, as Lieutenant Riddle, who had about 80 regulars, offered to place them in front for the encouragement of the militia to new exertion, but Hall declined. . . . Both Buffalo and Black Rock were sacked and burned, and no mercy was shown. With but two or three exceptions, those of the inhab-

itants who were not able to run away were massacred. . . . It is related that in Buffalo a widow named St. John 'had the address to appease the ferocity of the enemy so far as to remain in her house uninjured.' Her house and the stone jail were the only buildings not laid in ashes. In Black Rock every building was either burned or blown up, except one log house, in which a few women and children had taken refuge. . . . Five vessels lying at the wharves were also burned. In this expedition the British lost 108 men, killed, wounded or missing. More than 50 of the Americans were found dead on the field. Truly, an abundant revenge had been taken for the burning of Newark. . . . On New Year's day of 1814 the settlers along the whole length of the Niagara—those of them who survived—were shivering beside the smouldering embers of their homes."—R. Johnson, *Hist. of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 9.

ALSO IN: C. Johnson, *Centennial Hist. of Erie Co., N. Y.*, ch. 24-25.—W. Ketchum, *Hist. of Buffalo*, v. 2, ch. 15.—O. Turner, *Pioneer Hist. of the Holland Purchase*, pp. 589-606.—W. Dorshimer, *Buffalo during the war of 1812* (*Buffalo Hist. Soc. Pub.*, v. 1).

**A. D. 1813-1814.—British blockade of the Atlantic coast.**—"The blockade of the Atlantic coast was enforced by British vessels from the beginning of the year 1813. At first they were inclined to spare the coast of New England, which they supposed to be friendly to Great Britain, but this policy was soon abandoned, and the whole coast was treated alike. Groups of war-vessels were stationed before each of the principal sea-ports, and others were continually in motion along the coast, from Halifax on the north to the West Indies. Early in 1813, they took possession of the mouth of Chesapeake Bay as a naval station, and the American Government ordered all the lights to be put out in the neighboring light-houses. The Atlantic coast was thus kept in a state of almost constant alarm, for the British vessels were continually landing men at exposed points to burn, plunder, and destroy. . . . In 1813, the defenceless towns of Lewes, Havre de Grace, and Hampton (near Fortress Monroe) were bombarded, and Stonington, Conn., in 1814; and a number of smaller towns were burned or plundered. Attacks on New York and other larger cities were prevented only by fear of torpedoes, by means of which the Americans had nearly blown up one or two British ships which ventured too near New York. . . . Maine, as far as the Penobscot River, was seized by the British in 1814, and was held until the end of the war."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of the U. S. for Schools*, sect. 384-386.

**A. D. 1813-1814 (August—April).—The Creek War.—General Jackson's first campaign.**—"The great Indian chief Tecumseh had been trying for years to unite all the red men against the whites. There would have been an Indian war if there had been no war with England, but the latter war seemed to be Tecumseh's opportunity. Among the southwestern Indians he found acceptance only with the Creeks, who were already on the verge of civil war, because some wanted to adopt civilized life, and others refused. The latter became the war party, under Weatherford [Red Eagle], a very able half-breed chief. The first outbreak in the Southwest, although there had been some earlier hostilities,

was the massacre of the garrison and refugees at Fort Mims, at the junction of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers, August 30, 1813. There were 553 persons in the fort, of whom only 5 or 6 escaped. . . . The result of the massacre at Fort Mims was that Alabama was almost abandoned by whites. Terror and desire for revenge took possession of Georgia and Tennessee. September 25th the Tennessee Legislature voted to raise men and money to aid the people of Mississippi territory against the Creeks." Andrew Jackson, one of the two major-generals of the Tennessee militia, was then confined to his bed by a wound received in a recent fight with Thomas H. Benton and Benton's brother. "As soon as he possibly could, Jackson took the field. Georgia had a force in the field under General Floyd. General Claiborne was acting at the head of troops from Louisiana and Mississippi. This Indian war had a local character and was outside the federal operations, although in the end it had a great effect upon them. . . . The Creek war was remarkable for three things: (1) the quarrels between the generals, and the want of concert of action; (2) lack of provisions; (3) insubordination in the ranks. . . . On three occasions Jackson had to use one part of his army to prevent another part from marching home, he and they differing on the construction of the terms of enlistment. He showed very strong qualities under these trying circumstances. . . . In the conduct of the movements against the enemy his energy was very remarkable. So long as there was an enemy unsubdued Jackson could not rest, and could not give heed to anything else. . . . At the end of March [1814] Jackson destroyed a body of the Creeks at Tohopeka, or Horse-Shoe Bend, in the north-east corner of the present Tallapoosa County, Alabama. With the least possible delay he pushed on to the last refuge of the Creeks, the Hickory Ground, at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, and the Holy Ground a few miles distant. The medicine men, appealing to the superstition of the Indians, had taught them to believe that no white man could tread the latter ground and live. In April the remnant of the Creeks surrendered or fled to Florida, overcome as much by the impetuous and relentless character of the campaign against them as by actual blows. Fort Jackson was built on the Hickory Ground. The march down through Alabama was a great achievement, considering the circumstances of the country at the time. . . . The Creek campaign lasted only seven months. In itself considered, it was by no means an important Indian war, but in its connection with other military movements it was very important. Tecumseh had been killed at the battle of the Thames, in Canada, October 5, 1813. His scheme of a race war died with him. The Creek campaign put an end to any danger of hostilities from the southwestern Indians, in alliance either with other Indians or with the English. . . . This campaign . . . was the beginning of Jackson's fame and popularity, and from it dates his career. He was 47 years old. On the 31st of May he was appointed a major-general in the army of the United States, and was given command of the department of the South. He established his headquarters at Mobile in August, 1814."—W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man*, ch. 2.



ALSO IN: G. C. Eggleston, *Red Eagle*.—J. W. Monette, *Discovery and Settlement of the Valley of the Mississippi*, bk. 5, ch. 14 (v. 2).—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the War of 1812*, ch. 33-34.

**A. D. 1814 (July—September).—On the Niagara Frontier.—Chippewa.—Lundy's Lane.—Fort Erie.**—"After the desolation of the Niagara frontier in 1813, there appeared to be nothing for the parties to contend for in that quarter. No object could be obtained by a victory on either side, but the temporary occupation of a vacant territory; yet both parties seemed to have selected this as the principal theatre on which to display their military prowess in the year 1814. Lieutenant General Drummond, governor of Upper Canada, concentrated the forces of that province at fort George, and retained the possession of Niagara. The American Generals Smyth, Hampton, Dearborn, and Wilkinson, under whose auspices the campaigns of 1812 and 13, on the Canada border, were conducted, had retired from that field; and General Brown was appointed major general, and, with the assistance of Brigadiers Scott and Ripley, designated to the command of the Niagara frontier. He left Sackett's Harbour in May, with a large portion of the American troops. . . . On his arrival at Buffalo, calculating upon the co-operation of the Ontario fleet, he determined on an attempt to expel the British from the Niagara peninsula. With this view he crossed the river on the 3d of July. . . . On the same day he invested fort Erie, and summoned it to surrender, allowing the commandant two hours to answer the summons. At five in the afternoon the fort surrendered, and the prisoners, amounting to 137, were removed to Buffalo. On the morning of the fourth General Scott advanced with his brigade and corps of artillery, and took a position on the Chippewa plain, half a mile in front of the village, his right resting on the river, and his front protected by a ravine. The British were encamped in force at the village. In the evening General Brown joined him with the reserve under General Ripley, and the artillery commanded by Major Hindman. General Porter arrived the next morning, with the New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers, and a number of Indians of the six nations. . . . At four in the afternoon, General Porter advanced, taking the woods in order to conceal his approach, and . . . met the whole British force approaching in order of battle. General Scott, with his brigade and Towser's artillery, met them on the plain, in front of the American encampment, and was directly engaged in close action with the main body. General Porter's command gave way. . . . The reserve were now ordered up, and General Ripley passed to the woods in left of the line to gain the rear of the enemy; but before this was effected, General Scott had compelled the British to retire. Their whole line now fell back, and were eagerly pursued. . . . The British left 200 dead on the ground. . . . The American loss was 60 killed, and 268 wounded and missing. After the battle of Chippewa, the British retired to fort George; and General Brown took post at Queenston, where he remained some time, expecting reinforcements. . . . On the 20th, General Brown advanced with his army towards fort George, drove in the outposts, and encamped near the fort, in the expectation that the British would come out

and give him battle. On the 22d, he returned to his former position at Queenston; here he received a letter from General Gaines, informing him that the heavy guns, and the rifle regiment, which he had ordered from Sackett's harbour, together with the whole fleet, were blockaded in that port, and no assistance was to be expected from them. On the 24th, he fell back to Chippewa, and on the 25th received intelligence that the enemy, having received large reinforcements from Kingston, were advancing upon him. The first brigade under General Scott, Towser's artillery, all the dragoons and mounted men, were immediately put in motion on the Queenston road. On his arrival at the Niagara cataract, General Scott learned that the British were in force directly in his front, separated only by a narrow piece of wood. Having despatched this intelligence to General Brown, he advanced upon the enemy, and the action commenced at six o'clock in the afternoon. . . . The British artillery had taken post on a commanding eminence, at the head of Lundy's lane, supported by a line of infantry, out of the reach of the American batteries. This was the key of the whole position; from hence they poured a most deadly fire on the American ranks. It became necessary either to leave the ground, or to carry this post and seize the height. The latter desperate task was assigned to Colonel Miller. On receiving the order from General Brown, he calmly surveyed the position, and answered 'I will try, sir,' which expression was afterwards the motto of his regiment. . . . Colonel Miller advanced coolly and steadily to his object, amid a tremendous fire, and at the point of the bayonet, carried the artillery and the height. The guns were immediately turned upon the enemy; General Ripley now brought up the 23d regiment, to the support of Colonel Miller; the first regiment was rallied and brought into line, and the British were driven from the hill. . . . The British rallied under the hill, and made a desperate attempt to regain their artillery, and drive the Americans from their position, but without success; a second and third attempt was made with the like result. General Scott was engaged in repelling these attacks, and though with his shoulder fractured, and a severe wound in the side, continued at the head of his column, endeavouring to turn the enemy's right flank. The volunteers under General Porter, during the last charge of the British, precipitated themselves upon their lines, broke them, and took a large number of prisoners. General Brown . . . received a severe wound on the thigh, and in the side, and . . . consigned the command to General Ripley. At twelve o'clock, both parties retired from the field to their respective encampments, fatigued and satiated with slaughter. . . . The battle [called Lundy's Lane, or Bridgewater, or Niagara] was fought to the west of, and within half a mile of the Niagara cataract. . . . Considering the numbers engaged, few contests have ever been more sanguinary. . . . General Brown states his loss to be, killed, 171; wounded, 572; missing, 117; [total] 860. General Drummond acknowledges a loss of, killed, 84; wounded, 559; missing and prisoners, 235; [total] 878. . . . General Ripley, on the 26th, fell back to fort Erie. General Brown retired to Buffalo, and General Scott to Batavia, to recover from their wounds."—S. Perkins, *Hist.*

of the *Late War*, ch. 17.—“Fort Erie was a small work with two demi-bastions; one upon the north and the other upon the south front. It was built of stone, but was not of sufficient strength to resist ordnance heavier than the field artillery of that day. Ripley at once commenced to strengthen the position. Fortunately, General Drummond delayed his advance for two days, giving the Americans an opportunity of which they industriously availed themselves. . . . Fort Erie was changed into an entrenched camp, with its rear open toward the river. General Drummond appeared before the fort, on the 3d of August, with a force of 5,350 men. He established his camp two miles distant, back of Waterloo, and commenced a double line of entrenchments within 400 yards of the main work. The same morning he threw a force of about 1,000 men across the river, and landed them below Squaw Island, with the intention of seizing Buffalo, destroying the stores gathered there, and interrupting the communications of the American army. This soldierly plan was happily frustrated by Major Morgan with a battalion of the First Rifles, 250 strong. . . . During the following fortnight several skirmishes occurred in front of Fort Erie, in one of which the gallant Colonel Morgan was killed. General Drummond, having been still further reinforced, determined not to wait for the slow results of a siege, but to carry the place by assault. At two o'clock in the morning of the 3d of August, the British army moved to the attack in three columns. One was ordered to carry the Douglass battery, upon the extreme right of our position; another column was to engage the fort itself; but the main attack was directed against the Towson battery upon Snake Hill. Brigadier-General Gaines, who had lately arrived, was now in command of the American forces. . . . The evening before, a shell had exploded a small magazine in Fort Erie, and General Gaines was apprehensive that the enemy would take advantage of this disaster and attack him,—one-third of the troops were therefore kept at their post through the night, which was dark and rainy. His precautions were well taken. At half-past two the tramp of a heavy column was heard approaching Towson's redoubt. Instantly a sheet of fire flashed from our lines, lighting up the night, and revealing the enemy 1,500 strong. They had been ordered to attack with the bayonet; and, to insure obedience, the flints had been removed from their muskets. With complete courage they approached to within reach of the light abattis, between Snake Hill and the lake. But after a desperate struggle they fell back. Again they advanced, and this time succeeded in planting scaling ladders in the ditch in front of the redoubt. But their ladders were too short, and the assailants were driven off with severe loss. Meanwhile a detachment endeavored to turn our position by wading out into the river, and passing round our left. Ripley met them promptly. Numbers were killed or wounded, and were carried off by the current, and the remainder of the detachment were captured. Five times the obstinate English returned to the assault, but each time without success. . . . The other British columns waited until the engagement on the left was at its height. On our right the enemy advanced to within 50 yards of the Douglass battery, but were then driven back.

At the fort the contest was more severe. The assailants, led by Colonel Drummond, an officer of singular determination, advanced through a ravine north of the fort, and attacking simultaneously all the salient points, they swarmed over the parapet into the north bastion. . . . The garrison of the fort rallied, and after a severe contest succeeded in regaining possession of the bastion. A second and third time Drummond returned to the assault with no better success. But with invincible tenacity he clung to his purpose. Moving his troops, under cover of the night and the dense cloud of battle which hung along the ramparts, silently round the ditch, he suddenly repeated the charge. The English ran up their ladders so quickly that they gained the top of the glacis before the defenders could rally to resist them. . . . The garrison of the fort made repeated unsuccessful efforts to retake the bastion; but at day-break it was still in the enemy's possession. Powerful detachments were then brought up from the left and center, and a combined attempt was made from several different directions to drive the British from their position; but, after a desperate struggle, this likewise failed. The guns of the Douglass battery, and those under Captain Fanning, were turned upon the bastion, and Captain Bidle was placing a piece of artillery to enfilade it, while several hundred of the American reserve stood ready to rush upon it. At this moment a loud explosion shook the earth, and the whole bastion leaped into the air, carrying with it both its assailants and defenders. The cause of this explosion has never been accurately ascertained. It is generally supposed to have been accidental. . . . The shattered columns of the foe now retired to their encampment. The British report stated their loss at 905 killed, wounded and missing; of whom 222 were killed, including 14 officers; 174 wounded; and 186 prisoners remained in our hands. Our loss, including 11 prisoners, was 84 men. In the bombardment of the day before we had 45 killed and wounded; swelling our total loss to 129. A few days after this, Drummond was reinforced by two regiments, and reopened fire along his own line. The bombardment continued through the remainder of the month of August. On the 28th, General Gaines was wounded by a shell, which fell into his quarters, and General Ripley again assumed the command, but was soon superseded by General Brown, who had recovered from the wound received at Lundy's Lane. General Porter, by dint of superhuman efforts, gathered a considerable body of militia at Buffalo, to reinforce the fort. . . . Notwithstanding the victory I have just described, and the reinforcements brought by Porter, the American army at Fort Erie was in a very dangerous situation. Their foe was daily increasing in number, and three new batteries were thrown up, whose fire was rapidly making the position untenable. . . . Under the pressure of this great necessity, General Porter planned a sortie, which was submitted to General Brown; who approved it, and ordered it to be carried out. . . . By this enterprise, altogether the most brilliant military event which occurred on this frontier during the war, all of the enemy's guns in position were made useless, and their entrenchments destroyed. We took 385 prisoners, including 11 commissioned officers,



and killed or wounded 600 men. Our own loss was 510. . . . Four days after this, General Drummond raised the siege, and fell back to Fort George."—W. Dorsheimer, *Buffalo during the War of 1812* (*Buffalo Hist. Soc. Pub's*, v. 1).

ALSO IN: E. Cruikshank, *The Battle of Lundy's Lane* (*Lundy's Lane Hist. Soc.*).—Gen. W. Scott, *Memoirs by himself*, ch. 9-11 (v. 1).—C. Johnson, *Centennial Hist. of Erie Co., N. Y.*, ch. 26.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the War of 1812*, ch. 35-36.—*The Attack on Fort Erie* (*Portfolio*, Feb., 1816).

**A. D. 1814 (August—September).—Capture and destruction of the national Capital.—Attempt against Baltimore.**—Early in the "summer of 1814, rumors spread through the capital of a great British armament preparing at Bermuda, some said for an attack on New York, others on Baltimore and Annapolis, while others asserted quite as vehemently that the national capital was the chosen object of British vengeance. How easy it would be, they argued, for Admiral Sir George Cockburn, who had been a year with his fleet in Chesapeake Bay, when reinforced by the Bermuda armament to disembark a strong column at any point on the western shore of the Chesapeake—but forty miles distant—and by a forced march capture the city. But by some strange fatuity, the President and his cabinet treated these possibilities as unworthy of credence. 'The British come here!' a Cabinet officer is reported to have said, in answer to the representations of citizens. 'What should they come here for?' Sure enough: a provincial village of 6,000 inhabitants. But then there were the state papers and public buildings, the moral effect of capturing an enemy's capital, and the satisfaction of chastising the city where a British minister had been obliged to ask for his recall on the ground of ill-treatment. . . . Colonel James Monroe, a gallant soldier of the Revolution, was now Secretary of State; another Revolutionary soldier, General Armstrong, was Secretary of War, and acting on their advice, President Madison did substantially nothing for the defence of his capital. Fort Washington, commanding the Potomac, which Major L'Enfant had planned early in the war, was hurried forward to completion; but no defences on the landward side were erected, and no army was called out to defend it. What was done was this: The District of Columbia, Maryland, and that part of Virginia north of the Rappahannock, were created a tenth military district under command of General W. H. Winder, a brave officer, who had seen service in the Northwest, and who had recently returned from long detention in Canada as prisoner of war. General Winder on taking command (June 26, 1814) found for the defence of Washington detachments of the 36th and 38th regulars, amounting to a few hundred men, but nothing more—no forts, no guns, no army. A force of 13 regiments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania militia had been drafted, but were not to be called into active service until the enemy should appear—an arrangement against which General Winder protested in vain. . . . While these weak and ineffectual preparations are being made, the enemy has been marshalling his forces. Early in August Rear-Admiral Cockburn's blockading squadron had been joined in the Potomac by the

fleet of Vice-Admiral Cochrane, who as ranking officer at once took command." A few days later the expected Bermuda expedition arrived, bringing 4,000 troops—veterans from Wellington's army—under General Ross. A little flotilla of gunboats on the Chesapeake, commanded by Commodore Barney, was driven into Patuxent River and there abandoned and burned. Then the enemy landed in force at Benedict and marched on Washington, while the Secretary of War still insisted that Baltimore must be, in the nature of things, the place they would strike. At Bladensburg they were met (August 24th) by General Winder with some 5,000 hastily collected militia and volunteers and less than 1,000 regular troops, sailors, and marines—poor materials for an army with which to face 4,000 hardened veterans of the Peninsular War. The battle ended in the utter routing of the American forces and the abandonment of Washington to the British invaders.—C. B. Todd, *The Story of Washington*, ch. 8.—"This battle, by which the fate of the American capital was decided, began about one o'clock in the afternoon, and lasted till four. The loss on the part of the English was severe, since, out of two-thirds of the army, which were engaged, upwards of 500 men were killed and wounded; and what rendered it doubly severe was, that among these were numbered several officers of rank and distinction. . . . On the side of the Americans the slaughter was not so great. Being in possession of a strong position, they were of course less exposed in defending than the others in storming it; and had they conducted themselves with coolness and resolution, it is not conceivable how the battle could have been won. But the fact is that, with the exception of a party of sailors from the gun boats, under the command of Commodore Barney, no troops could behave worse than they did."—G. R. Gleig, *Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans*, ch. 9.—When Winder's troops abandoned Washington "fire was put at the navy yard to a new frigate on the stocks, to a new sloop-of-war lately launched, and to several magazines of stores and provisions, for the destruction of which ample preparations had been made. By the light of this fire, made lurid by a sudden thunder-gust, Ross, toward evening, advanced into Washington, at that time a straggling village of some 8,000 people, but, for the moment, almost deserted by the male part of the white inhabitants. From Gallatin's late residence, one of the first considerable houses which the column reached, a shot was fired which killed Ross's horse, and which was instantly revenged by putting fire to the house. After three or four volleys at the Capitol, the two detached wings were set on fire. The massive walls defied the flames, but all the interior was destroyed, with many valuable papers, and the library of Congress—a piece of Vandalism alleged to be in revenge for the burning of the Parliament House at York. [Chaplain Gleig, who was with the British forces under Ross, states in the narrative quoted from above that the party fired upon from Gallatin's house bore a flag of truce, and that Ross's destructive proceedings in Washington were consequent on that fact.] . . . The president's house, and the offices of the Treasury and State Departments near by, were set on fire. . . . The next morning the

War Office was burned. . . . Several private houses were burned, and some private warehouses broken open and plundered; but, in general, private property was respected." On the night of the 25th the British withdrew, returning as they came; but on the 29th their frigates, ascending the Potomac, arrived at Alexandria and plundered that city heavily. "Within less than a fortnight after the re-embarkation of Ross's army, the British fleet, spreading vast alarm as it ascended the Chesapeake, appeared off the Patapsco [September 12]. . . . A landing was effected the next day at North Point, on the northern shore of that estuary, some eight miles up which was Fort M'Henry, an open work only two miles from Baltimore, commanding the entrance into the harbor, which found, however, its most effectual protection in the shallowness of the water. The defense of the city rested with some 10,000 militia. . . . A corps 3,000 strong had been thrown forward toward North Point. As Ross and Cockburn, at the head of a reconnoitering party, approached the outposts of this advanced division, a skirmish ensued, in which Ross was killed. . . . The fleet, meanwhile, opened a tremendous cannonade on Fort M'Henry; but . . . at such a distance as to render their fire ineffectual. It was under the excitement of this cannonade that the popular song of the 'Star Spangled Banner' was composed, the author [Francis Scott Key] being then on board the British fleet, whither he had gone to solicit the release of certain prisoners, and where he was detained pending the attack. An attempt to land in boats also failed; and that same night, the bombardment being still kept up, the British army, covered by rain and darkness, retired silently to their ships and re-embarked."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 6, pp. 510–520.

ALSO IN: J. S. Williams, *Invasion and Capture of Washington*.

**A. D. 1814 (September).—Prevost's invasion of New York.—Macdonough's naval victory on Lake Champlain.**—Lake Champlain, "which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, was now to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. A British army of 11,000 men under Sir George Prevost undertook the invasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain. This advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strong British naval force to drive back the American squadron at the same time. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the *Confiance*, to be added to their already existing force, which consisted of a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gun-boats. The Americans already possessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun-boats or row-galleys; they now began to build a large brig, the *Eagle*, which was launched about the 16th of August. Nine days later, on the 25th, the *Confiance* was launched. The two squadrons were equally deficient in stores, etc.; the *Confiance* having locks to her guns, some of which could not be used, while the American schooner *Ticonderoga* had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at the touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downie were hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselves thoroughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose from the nature of the case,

which called for immediate action. The British army advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by General Macomb with less than 2,000 effective American troops. Captain Thomas Macdonough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two before his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg harbor. The British fleet, under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept. 8th, and on the morning of the 11th sailed into Plattsburg harbor." The American force consisted of the ship *Saratoga*, Captain Macdonough, the brig *Eagle*, the schooner *Ticonderoga*, the sloop *Preble*, and ten row-galleys, or gunboats mounting one or two guns each—"in all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns. The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately, as most of it was captured." It consisted of the frigate *Confiance*, the brig *Linnet*, the sloops *Chubb* and *Finch*, and twelve gunboats—"in all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 937 men, and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 from short pieces. . . . Young Macdonough (then but 23 years of age) calculated all . . . chances very coolly and decided to await the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line so far to the north that it could hardly be turned. . . . The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from the northeast. Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came down the lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloops swinging out to starboard. At half-past seven, the people in the ships could see their adversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending in Cumberland Head, before the British doubled the latter. . . . As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared his foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes of perfect quiet." The fierce battle which followed lasted about two hours and a half, with terribly destructive effects on both sides. The British commander, Downie, was killed early in the action. "On both sides the ships had been cut up in the most extraordinary manner; the *Saratoga* had 55 shot-holes in her hull, and the *Confiance* 105 in hers, and the *Eagle* and *Linnet* had suffered in proportion. The number of killed and wounded can not be exactly stated; it was probably about 200 on the American side, and over 300 on the British. . . . The effects of the victory were immediate and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army [which had arrived before Plattsburg on the 6th, and which, simultaneously with the naval advance, had made an unsuccessful attack on the American defensive works, at the mouth of the Saranac, held by General Alexander Macomb] at once fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving our northern frontier clear for the remainder of the war; while the victory had a very great effect on the negotiations for peace. In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery, and left nothing to be desired in this respect; but from their rawness they of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of the American and some of the British ocean cruisers. . . . Macdonough in this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war,



British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contend against, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a par in every respect; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource that we won the victory. He forced the British to engage at a disadvantage by his excellent choice of position, and he prepared beforehand for every possible contingency. . . . Before to the time of the Civil War he is the greatest figure in our naval history."—T. Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812*, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: R. Johnson, *Hist. of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 15.

**A. D. 1814 (December).—The Hartford Convention.**—"The commercial distress in New England, the possession by the enemy of a large part of the District of Maine, the fear of their advance along the coast, and the apparent neglect of the Federal Government to provide any adequate means of resistance, had led the Legislature of Massachusetts, in October, to invite the other New England States to send delegates to Hartford, Connecticut, 'to confer upon the subject of their public grievances.' Delegates [26 in number] from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and from parts of Vermont and New Hampshire, met at Hartford in December and remained in session for three weeks. In their report to their State Legislatures they reviewed the state of the country, the origin and management of the war, and the strong measures lately proposed in Congress, and recommended several Amendments to the Constitution, chiefly with intent to restrict the powers of Congress over commerce, and to prevent naturalized citizens from holding office. In default of the adoption of these Amendments, another convention was advised, 'in order to decide on the course which a crisis so momentous might seem to demand.' This was the famous Hartford Convention. The peace which closely followed its adjournment removed all necessity or even desire for another session of it. Its objects seem to have been legitimate. But the unfortunate secrecy of its proceedings, and its somewhat ambiguous language, roused a popular suspicion, sufficient for the political ruin of its members, that a dissolution of the Union had been proposed, perhaps resolved upon, in its meetings. Some years afterward those concerned in it were compelled in self-defense to publish its journal, in order to show that no treasonable design was officially proposed. It was then, however, too late, for the popular opinion had become fixed. Neither the Federal party which originated, nor the Federalist politicians who composed, the assembly, were ever freed from the stigma left by the mysterious Hartford Convention."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, 2d ed., ch. 8.—The language of the report of the Hartford Convention "was so skillfully selected that it cannot be said with certainty whether the convention deduced from the nature of the Union a positive right in the individual states to withdraw from the Union, or whether it claimed only a moral justification for revolution. It was prudent enough in the declaration of its position on the constitutional question not to venture beyond vague, double-meaning expressions, except so far as it could appeal to its opponents. But it went just far enough to repeat almost verbatim the declaration of faith laid down in the Ken-

tucky resolutions of 1798. If the members of the convention, and those in sympathy with them, were 'Maratists,' they could claim that they had become so in the school of Madison and Jefferson."—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, p. 268.

ALSO IN: T. Dwight, *Hist. of the Hartford Convention*.—H. C. Lodge, *Life and Letters of George Cabot*, ch. 11-13.

**A. D. 1814 (December).—The Treaty of Peace concluded at Ghent.**—"In September, 1812, Count Romanzoff suggested to Mr. [John Quincy] Adams the readiness of the Emperor [of Russia] to act as mediator in bringing about peace between the United States and England. The suggestion was promptly acted upon, but with no directly fortunate results. The American government acceded at once to the proposition, and, at the risk of an impolitic display of readiness, dispatched Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard to act as Commissioners jointly with Mr. Adams in the negotiations. These gentlemen, however, arrived in St. Petersburg only to find themselves in a very awkward position," since the offered mediation of the Czar was declined by England. The latter power preferred to negotiate directly with the United States, and presently made proposals to that effect, intimating her readiness "to send Commissioners to Göttingen, for which place Ghent was afterwards substituted, to meet American Commissioners and settle terms of pacification. The United States renewed the powers of Messrs. Adams, Bayard, and Gallatin, . . . and added Jonathan Russell, then Minister to Sweden, and Henry Clay. England deputed Lord Gambier, an Admiral, Dr. Adams, a publicist, and Mr. Goulbourn, a member of Parliament and Under Secretary of State. These eight gentlemen accordingly met in Ghent on August 7, 1814. It was upwards of four months before an agreement was reached. . . . The eight were certainly an odd assemblage of peacemakers. The ill-blood and wranglings between the opposing Commissions were bad enough, yet hardly equalled the intestine dissensions between the American Commissioners themselves. . . . The British first presented their demands, as follows: 1. That the United States should conclude a peace with the Indian allies of Great Britain, and that a species of neutral belt of Indian territory should be established between the dominions of the United States and Great Britain, so that these dominions should be nowhere conterminous, upon which belt or barrier neither power should be permitted to encroach even by purchase, and the boundaries of which should be settled in this treaty. 2. That the United States should keep no naval force upon the Great Lakes, and should neither maintain their existing forts nor build new ones upon their northern frontier; it was even required that the boundary line should run along the southern shore of the lakes; while no corresponding restriction was imposed upon Great Britain, because she was stated to have no projects of conquest as against her neighbor. 3. That a piece of the province of Maine should be ceded, in order to give the English a road from Halifax to Quebec. 4. That the stipulations of the treaty of 1783, conferring on English subjects the right of navigating the Mississippi, should be now formally renewed. The Americans were astounded; it seemed to them

hardly worth while to have come so far to listen to such propositions." But, after long and apparently hopeless wrangling, events in Europe rather than in America brought about a change of disposition on the part of the British government; instructions to the commissioners were modified on both sides, and, quite to their own surprise, they arrived at agreements which were formulated in a Treaty and signed, December 24, 1814. "Of the many subjects mooted between the negotiators scarcely any had survived the fierce contests which had been waged concerning them. The whole matter of the navigation of the Mississippi, access to that river, and a road through American territory, had been dropped by the British; while the Americans had been well content to say nothing of the Northeastern fisheries [see FISHERIES, NORTH AMERICAN: A. D. 1814-1818], which they regarded as still their own. The disarmament on the lakes and along the Canadian border, and the neutralization of a strip of Indian territory, were yielded by the English. The Americans were content to have nothing said about impressment; nor was any one of the many illegal rights exercised by England formally abandoned. The Americans satisfied themselves with the reflection that circumstances had rendered these points now only matters of abstract principle, since the pacification of Europe had removed all opportunities and temptations for England to persist in her previous objectionable courses. For the future it was hardly to be feared that she would again undertake to pursue a policy against which it was evident that the United States were willing to conduct a serious war. There was, however, no provision for indemnification. Upon a fair consideration, it must be admitted that, though the treaty was silent upon all the points which the United States had made war for the purpose of enforcing, yet the country had every reason to be gratified with the result of the negotiation."—J. T. Morse, *John Quincy Adams*, pp. 75-96.—"Instead of wearing themselves out over impracticable, perhaps impossible, questions, the commissioners turned their attention to the northern boundary between the two countries, and it was by them forever settled, and in such manner as to give the United States the foundation for its future greatness. . . . The victory of the American diplomats at Ghent was two-fold: first, they secured the benefits desired without enumerating them—even to a greater extent than if the benefits had been enumerated; and second, if they had insisted upon an enumeration of the benefits obtained, it is apparent they would have periled the entire treaty and lost all."—T. Wilson, *The Treaty of Ghent* (*Mag. of Am. Hist.*, Nov., 1888).

ALSO IN: C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 6 (v. 1).—J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs (Diary)* ch. 9 (v. 2-3). Following is the text of the treaty:

Article I. There shall be a firm and universal peace between His Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of places or persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease as soon as this treaty shall have been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever,

taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the war, may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this treaty. No disposition made by this treaty as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

Article II. Immediately after the ratification of this treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers, subjects and citizens of the two Powers to cease from all hostilities. And to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty-three degrees north to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far eastward in the Atlantic Ocean as the thirty-sixth degree of west longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side: that the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantic Ocean north of the equinoctial line or equator, and the same time for the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico, and all parts of the West Indies; forty days for the North Seas, for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean; sixty days for the Atlantic Ocean south of the equator, as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope; ninety days for every other part of the world south of the equator; and one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

Article III. All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this treaty, as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

Article IV. Whereas it was stipulated by the second article in the treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should



comprehend all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the Island of Grand Menan, in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States as being comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to His Britannic Majesty, as having been, at the time of and previous to the aforesaid treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, within the limits of the Province of Nova Scotia: In order, therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed in the following manner, viz: One Commissioner shall be appointed by His Britannic Majesty, and one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the said two Commissioners so appointed shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of His Britannic Majesty and of the United States respectively. The said Commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall, by a declaration or report under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And if the said Commissioners shall agree in their decision, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is further agreed that, in event of the two Commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said Commissioners refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting to act as such, they shall make, jointly or separately, a report or reports, as well to the Government of His Britannic Majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they, or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said Commissioners to some friendly sovereign or State, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one Commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other Commissioner shall have refused, declined or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the Commissioner so refusing, declining or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly sovereign or State, together with the report of such

other Commissioner, then such sovereign or State shall decide *ex parte* upon the said report alone. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States engage to consider the decision of such friendly sovereign or State to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

Article V. Whereas neither that point of the highlands lying due north from the source of the river St. Croix, and designated in the former treaty of peace between the two Powers as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, nor the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two Powers which extends from the source of the river St. Croix directly north to the above mentioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguay, has not yet been surveyed: it is agreed that for these several purposes two Commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in the present article. The said Commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points above mentioned, in conformity with the provisions of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, and shall cause the boundary aforesaid, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois or Cataraguay, to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions. The said Commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their hands and seals, certifying it to be the true map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, of the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Article VI. Whereas by the former treaty of peace that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguay to the Lake Superior, was declared to be "along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake, until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie, thence along the middle of

said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication into the Lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior;" and whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of the said river, lakes, and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of His Britannic Majesty or of the United States: In order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two Commissioners, to be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in this present article. The said Commissioners shall meet, in the first instance, at Albany, in the State of New York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall, by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said river, lakes and water communications, and decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said rivers, lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Article VII. It is further agreed that the said two last-mentioned Commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned to them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby, authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two Powers which extends from the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, to the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications, and rivers, forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three; and to cause such parts of the said boundary as require it to be surveyed and marked. The said Commissioners shall, by a report or declaration under their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize the latitude and longitude of the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, and of such other parts of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements

shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Article VIII. The several boards of two Commissioners mentioned in the four preceding articles shall respectively have power to appoint a Secretary, and to employ such surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements and decisions and of their accounts, and of the journal of their proceedings, shall be delivered by them to the agents of His Britannic Majesty and to the agents of the United States, who may be respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective Governments. The said Commissioners shall be respectively paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. And all other expenses attending the said Commissions shall be defrayed equally by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation or necessary absence, the place of every such Commissioner, respectively, shall be supplied in the same manner as such Commissioner was first appointed, and the new Commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation, and do the same duties. It is further agreed between the two contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the Boards of Commissioners aforesaid, or of the sovereign or State so referred to, as in the four next preceding articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the war, by the party having had such possession, shall be as valid as if such island or islands had, by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had such possession.

Article IX. The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages, on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or



nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

Article X. Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.

Article XI. This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable. In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals. Done, in triplicate, at Ghent, the twenty-fourth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

A. D. 1814.—The last fighting at Sea.—The exploits of "Old Ironsides."—"During the latter part of the war, as might have been foreseen, there was little opportunity for American frigates to show that they could keep up the fame they had so gloriously won. The British were determined that none of them that ventured out to sea should escape; and by stationing a squadron, which their great resources enabled them to do, before each port where a frigate lay, they succeeded in keeping it cooped up and inactive. . . . The 'Adams,' which had been a 28-gun frigate, but which was now a corvette, managed to slip out from Washington in January, 1814, under the command of Charles Morris. . . . Six months were passed in cruising, part of the time off the Irish coast, but with no great success." Returning home, the "Adams" went ashore at the mouth of the Penobscot, but was got off, much injured, and was taken up the river for repairs. An English expeditionary force pursued the crippled vessel, and her commander was forced to set her on fire. "At this time the 'Constitution' [Old Ironsides, as she was popularly called] was . . . lying at Boston, watched by a squadron of the enemy. She had proved a lucky ship, . . . and her present captain, Charles Stewart, who had been one of Preble's lieutenants at Tripoli, was certainly a man well fitted to make the most of any chance he had. The frigate had been in port since April, at first repairing, and later unable to get out owing to the presence of the enemy's squadron." In December, however, the "Constitution" contrived to give the blockaders the slip and made her way across the Atlantic to the neighborhood of Madeira, where she fought and captured, at one time, two British war vessels—the corvette "Cyana" of 22 guns, and the sloop "Levant," of 20 guns. A few days afterwards, as the "Constitution," with her two prizes, was lying at anchor in Port Praya, Cape de Verde Islands, Capt. Stewart sighted, outside, no less than three ships of the very blockading squadron which he had slipped away from at Boston, and which had pursued him across the ocean. He made his escape from the port, with both his prizes, in time to avoid being hemmed in, and

speedily outsailed his pursuers. The latter, giving up hope of the "Constitution," turned their attention to one of the prizes and succeeded in recovering her. "The only other frigate that left port in the last year of the war was less fortunate than the 'Constitution.' This was the 'President,' now under Commodore Decatur. She was at New York, and for some time had lain at anchor off Staten Island watching for an opportunity to pass the blockading squadron." On a stormy night in January, 1815 (after the treaty of peace had been actually signed at Ghent, but before news of it had reached America), he made the attempt, but was discovered and chased by four of the blockading ships. After a race which lasted from dawn until nearly midnight, and a running fight of two hours, Decatur found escape to be impossible and surrendered his ship.—J. R. Soley, *The Boys of 1812*, ch. 17.

Also in: T. Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812*, ch. 7-9.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the War of 1812*, ch. 41.

A. D. 1815 (January).—Jackson's victory at New Orleans.—In October of the last year "dispatches from the American envoys abroad announced that 12,000 to 15,000 British troops would leave Ireland early in September for New Orleans and Mobile. Intelligence reached Washington, December 9th, by way of Cuba, that the British Chesapeake force, under Admiral Cochrane, had united at Jamaica with these other troops, and all were ready to sail for the mouths of the Mississippi. 'Hasten your militia to New Orleans,' now urged Monroe upon the Executives of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia; 'do not wait for this government to arm them; put all the arms you can find into their hands; let every man bring his rifle or musket with him; we shall see you paid.' . . . Great results had been expected by Great Britain from the secret expedition fitted out against Louisiana. . . . Fifty British vessels, large and small, bore 7,000 British land troops—comprising the invading force from the Chesapeake and a veteran reinforcement from England—across the Gulf of Mexico from Jamaica to the ship channel near the entrance of Lake Borgne, thus approaching New Orleans midway between the Mississippi River and Mobile Bay. Here the fleet anchored; and, after dispersing a meagre flotilla of American gunboats, which opposed their progress in vain, the invaders took full possession of Lake Borgne, and, by means of lighter transports, landed troops upon a lonely island at the mouth of the Pearl River, which served as the military rendezvous. Crossing thence to the northwestern end of Lake Borgne, a sparsely-settled region, with plantations and sugar-works, half of this invading army, by the 23d [December], struck the Mississippi at a point within nine miles of New Orleans. Not a gun had been fired since the trifling engagement with the American flotilla. The British believed their near approach unknown, and even unsuspected, in the city; they meant to capture it by an assault both brilliant and sudden. . . . But Jackson had received his instructions in good season, and from the 2d of December New Orleans had been, under his vigilant direction, a camp in lively motion." Martial law was proclaimed; "free men of color were enrolled; convicts were released to become soldiers; the civic force was

increased to its utmost. Jackson inspected and strengthened the defences in the vicinity, erecting new batteries. . . . With his newly arrived volunteers from neighboring States, quite expert, many of them, in the use of the rifle and eager for fight, Jackson found himself presently at the head of 5,000 effective men, less than 1,000 of whom were regulars." With a portion of these, supported by one of the two armed vessels on the river, he boldly attacked the enemy, on the evening of the 23d, but accomplished little more than to demonstrate the energy of the defence he was prepared to make. On the 28th the English (having previously destroyed one of the troublesome vessels in the river, the *Carolina*, with hot shot) returned the attack, but did not break the American lines. Then General Pakenham, the English commander, brought up heavy guns from the fleet, and soon convinced General Jackson that cotton bales, which the latter had piled up before his men, were too light and too combustible for breastworks against artillery; but the lesson proved more useful than otherwise, and the British batteries were answered with fully equal effect by an American cannonade. "Pakenham's last and boldest experiment was to carry Jackson's lines by storm on both sides of the river; and this enterprise, fatal, indeed, to those who conceived it, gives immortal date to the 8th of January,—the day on which the battle of New Orleans was fought. Four days before this momentous battle, over 2,000 Kentucky militia, under General Adair, arrived at New Orleans, ready soldiers, but miserably equipped. Of their number 700 were marched to the front. Pakenham's army, swelled by a body of reinforcements, commanded by General Lambert, another of Wellington's officers, now consisted in all of 10,000 troops, the flower of British veterans. On the day of the battle Jackson had only half as many soldiers on the New Orleans side of the river, and of these the greater part were new recruits under inexperienced officers. On the opposite bank General Morgan, with about 1,500 men, among them detachments of Kentuckians and Louisiana militia, had intrenched himself in expectation of an assault. Jackson had penetrated the enemy's design, which was to make the main attack upon his lines, while a lesser force crossed the Mississippi to drive Morgan up the bank. Jackson's grand defences, extending for a mile and a half from the Mississippi, along his ditch or canal, to an impassable cypress swamp, consisted of earthworks, a redoubt next the river to enfilade the ditch, and eight batteries, all well mounted. The schooner *Louisiana* and Commander Patterson's marine battery across the river protected this line. Another intrenchment had been thrown up a mile and a half in the rear, as a rallying-point in case of need. There was a third line just below the city. . . . The morning fog rolled away on the 8th of January. Pakenham, under the fire of a battery he had erected during the night, advanced with the main body of British troops to storm Jackson's position." The Americans, behind their breastworks, withheld their fire until the storming columns were 200 yards away, and then poured volley on volley into the approaching mass of men. "This, with the steady fire from the American batteries all along the line, as the foe advanced over a large bare plain, made hideous

gaps in the British ranks, throwing them into utter confusion. It was a fearful slaughter. Dead bodies choked the ditch and strewed the plain. Gallant Highlanders flung themselves forward to scale the ramparts only to fall back lifeless. Soldiers who had served under Wellington in Spain broke, scattered, and ran. Of the four British generals commanding, Pakenham was killed, Gibbs mortally wounded, Keane disabled by a shot in the neck; only Lambert remained. Thornton, across the river, had driven Morgan from his lines meantime, and silenced Patterson's battery; but this enterprise might have cost him dearly, had he not in season received orders from Lambert to return instantly. In this battle the British lost not less than 2,600, all but 500 of whom were killed or wounded; while only 8 were killed and 13 wounded on the American side. Having buried his dead presently under a flag of truce, Lambert, whom this calamity had placed in command, retreated hastily under cover of the night, abandoning the expedition. Re-embarking at Lake Borgne, and rejoining the fleet, he next proceeded to invest Fort Bowyer, at the entrance of Mobile Bay, only to learn, after its little garrison had surrendered, that a treaty of peace [signed December 24, 1814, two weeks before the battle of New Orleans was fought] annulled the conquest. . . . Rude and illiterate as he was, Jackson showed at New Orleans the five prime attributes of military genius: decision, energy, forethought, dispatch, skill in employing resources."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S. of Am.*, ch. 9, sect. 1 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: A. Walker, *Jackson and New Orleans*.

—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 2, ch. 1-23.

—G. R. Gleig, *Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans*, ch. 18-23.

—M. Thompson, *The Story of Louisiana*, ch. 9.

—G. W. Cable, *The Creoles of Louisiana*, ch. 26-27.

A. D. 1815.—Final war with the Algerines and suppression of their piracies. See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1815.

A. D. 1816.—Incorporation of the second Bank of the United States. See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816; and 1817-1833.

A. D. 1816.—Admission of Indiana into the Union. See INDIANA: A. D. 1800-1818.

A. D. 1816.—The increased Tariff. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1816-1824.

A. D. 1816.—Organization of the American Colonization Society. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1816-1849.

A. D. 1816.—Eighth Presidential Election. —James Monroe, Democratic Republican, was elected over Rufus King, Federalist, receiving 183 out of 217 votes cast in the electoral college. Daniel D. Tompkins was chosen Vice President. "Opposition to the War of 1812 proved fatal to the Federal party, which ceased to exist as a national party with the close of Mr. Madison's administration. Not only did the odium of opposing the war tend to annihilate that party, but the questions upon which the two parties differed were, in a great measure, settled or disposed of by the war; others, relating to the general interests of the country, such as a tariff, internal improvements, the chartering of a national bank, erecting fortifications, etc., taking their place, and finding advocates and opponents in both the old parties. Candidates for President and Vice-President were then selected by



the respective parties by what was termed a Congressional caucus. Mr. Monroe was placed in nomination for President by a caucus of the Republican members of Congress, Daniel D. Tompkins, of New York, being nominated by the same caucus for Vice-President. Mr. Crawford, of Georgia, was Mr. Monroe's competitor, and fell but few votes behind him in the caucus. Rufus King was the candidate of the Federal party, or what there was left of it, against Mr. Monroe. The latter received 183 electoral votes, the former 34. No President ever encountered less opposition during his four or eight years' service than Mr. Monroe. Parties and the country seemed to be tired of contention, and desirous to enjoy repose. A most able cabinet was selected, consisting of Mr. J. Q. Adams as Secretary of State; William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury; John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War; Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy; and William Wirt, Attorney-General."—N. Sargent, *Public Men and Events*, 1817-1853, v. 1, ch. 1.—"Remembering only the almost unopposed election and second election of Mr. Monroe, we are apt to think of him as the natural and easy choice of the people. As a matter of fact he was not a great favorite with Republican politicians. He was first nominated by a narrow majority. . . . Numerous meetings were held in various parts of the country to protest against the caucus system, the most noteworthy of which, perhaps, was held in Baltimore, in which meeting Roger B. Taney, afterward Chief Justice, took a most prominent part. The nomination being made, the presidential election was practically decided. There was no canvass, worthy of the name."—E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 9.

A. D. 1816-1817.—The opening of the question of "Internal Improvements."—"The passage of the bank bill in 1816 was to give the United States a million and a half of dollars. Calhoun, therefore, came forward, Dec. 23, 1816, with a bill proposing that this sum be employed as a fund 'for constructing roads and canals and improving the navigation of water-courses.' 'We are,' said he, 'a rapidly—I was about to say a fearfully—growing country. . . . This is our pride and danger, our weakness and our strength.' The constitutional question he settled with a phrase: 'If we are restricted in the use of our money to the enumerated powers, on what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified?' The bill passed the House by 86 to 84; it was strongly supported by New York members, because it was expected that the general government would begin the construction of a canal from Albany to the Lakes; it had also large support in the South, especially in South Carolina. In the last hours of his administration Madison vetoed it. His message shows that he had selected this occasion to leave to the people a political testament; he was at last alarmed by the progress of his own party, and, like Jefferson, he insisted that internal improvements were desirable, but needed a constitutional amendment. The immediate effect of the veto was that New York, seeing no prospect of federal aid, at once herself began the construction of the Erie Canal, which was opened eight years later."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union (Epochs of Am. Hist.)*, sect. 121.—"Mr. Monroe came out, in his first message to Congress, coinciding, on this point, with Mr. Madison's veto. It is

due to both of them, however, to say that they were the advocates of internal improvement, and recommended an amendment of the constitution with that view. Nevertheless, Mr. Madison, by his veto, had dashed the cup from the lips to the ground, as he went out of office; and Mr. Monroe coming in, at least for four years, probably for eight—it proved to be eight—broke the cup in advance, so that it could not be used during his term of office, without an amendment of the constitution. . . . Three presidents successively, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe, had officially expressed their opinion adverse to a power vested in Congress by the constitution for projects of internal improvement, as contemplated by the measures proposed. Not satisfied with these decisions, Mr. Clay and his friends were instrumental in having a resolution brought forward, in the fifteenth Congress, declaring that Congress had power, under the constitution, to make appropriations for the construction of military roads, post-roads, and canals. . . . The resolution declaring the power to be vested in Congress by the constitution, to make appropriations for the construction of military roads, post-roads, and canals, was adopted by a vote of 90 to 75; and the principle involved has been practically applied by acts of Congress, from that time to the present."—C. Colton, *Life, Corr., and Speeches of Henry Clay*, v. 1, ch. 19.

ALSO IN: H. G. Wheeler, *Hist. of Congress, comprising a Hist. of Internal Improvements*, v. 2, p. 109, and after.

A. D. 1816-1818.—The First Seminole War.—Jackson's arbitrary conquest of Florida. See FLORIDA: A. D. 1816-1818.

A. D. 1817.—Admission of Mississippi into the Union. See MISSISSIPPI: A. D. 1817.

A. D. 1818.—Treaty with Great Britain relating to Fisheries. See FISHERIES: A. D. 1814-1818.

A. D. 1818.—Admission of Illinois into the Union. See ILLINOIS: A. D. 1800-1818.

A. D. 1818-1819.—The Dartmouth College Case. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1754-1769.

A. D. 1818-1821.—The first bitter Conflict concerning Slavery.—The Missouri Compromise, on the admission of Missouri to the Union.—"On March 6, 1818, a petition was presented in the House of Representatives praying that Missouri be admitted as a state. A bill authorizing the people of Missouri to form a state government was taken up in the House on February 13, 1819, and Tallmadge of New York moved, as an amendment, that the further introduction of slavery should be prohibited, and that all children born within the said state should be free at the age of twenty-five years. Thus began the struggle on the slavery question in connection with the admission of Missouri, which lasted, intermittently, until March, 1821. No sooner had the debate on Tallmadge's proposition begun than it became clear that the philosophical anti-slavery sentiment of the revolutionary period [see SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1776-1808] had entirely ceased to have any influence upon current thought in the South. The abolition of the foreign slave-trade had not, as had been hoped, prepared the way for the abolition of slavery or weakened the slave interest in any sense. On the contrary, slavery had been immensely strengthened by an economic devel-

opment making it more profitable than it ever had been before. The invention of the cotton-gin by Eli Whitney, in 1793 [see above: A. D. 1793], had made the culture of cotton a very productive source of wealth. In 1800 the exportation of cotton from the United States was 19,000,000 pounds, valued at \$5,700,000. In 1820 the value of the cotton export was nearly \$20,000,000, almost all of it the product of slave labor. The value of slaves may be said to have at least trebled in twenty years. The breeding of slaves became a profitable industry. Under such circumstances the slave-holders arrived at the conclusion that slavery was by no means so wicked and hurtful an institution as their revolutionary fathers had thought it to be. . . . On the other hand, in the Northern States there was no such change of feeling. Slavery was still, in the nature of things, believed to be a wrong and a sore. . . . The amendment to the Missouri bill, providing for a restriction with regard to slavery, came therefore in a perfectly natural way from that Northern sentiment which remained still faithful to the traditions of the revolutionary period. And it was a great surprise to most Northern people that so natural a proposition should be so fiercely resisted on the part of the South. It was the sudden revelation of a change of feeling in the South which the North had not observed in its progress. 'The discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed the secret of their souls,' wrote John Quincy Adams. The slave-holders watched with apprehension the steady growth of the Free States in population, wealth, and power. In 1790 the population of the two sections had been nearly even. In 1820 there was a difference of over 600,000 in favor of the North in a total of less than ten millions. In 1790 the representation of the two sections in Congress had been about evenly balanced. In 1820 the census promised to give the North a preponderance of more than 30 votes in the House of Representatives. As the slave-holders had no longer the ultimate extinction, but now the perpetuation, of slavery in view, the question of sectional power became one of first importance to them, and with it the necessity of having more Slave States for the purpose of maintaining the political equilibrium at least in the Senate. A struggle for more Slave States was to them a struggle for life. This was the true significance of the Missouri question. The debate was the prototype of all the slavery debates which followed in the forty years to the breaking out of the civil war. . . . The dissolution of the Union, civil war, and streams of blood were freely threatened by Southern men, while some anti-slavery men declared themselves ready to accept all these calamities rather than the spread of slavery over the territories yet free from it. . . . On February 16, 1819, the House of Representatives adopted the amendment restricting slavery, and thus passed the Missouri bill. But the Senate, eleven days afterwards, struck out the anti-slavery provision and sent the bill back to the House. A bill was then passed organizing the Territory of Arkansas, an amendment moved by Taylor of New York prohibiting the further introduction of slavery there having been voted down. . . . Thus slavery was virtually fastened on Arkansas. But the Missouri bill failed in the fifteenth Congress. The popular excitement steadily increased. The

sixteenth Congress met in December, 1819. In the Senate the admission of Missouri with slavery was coupled with the admission of Maine, on the balance-of-power principle that one free state and one slave state should always be admitted at the same time. An amendment was moved absolutely prohibiting slavery in Missouri, but it was voted down. Then Mr. Thomas, a Senator from Illinois, on January 18, 1820, proposed that no restriction as to slavery be imposed upon Missouri in framing a state constitution, but that in all the rest of the country ceded by France to the United States north of 36° 30', this being the southern boundary line of Missouri, there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude. This was the essence of the famous Missouri Compromise, and, after long and acrimonious debates and several more votes in the House for restriction and in the Senate against it, this compromise was adopted. By it the slave power obtained the present tangible object it contended for; free labor won a contingent advantage in the future. . . . Clay has been widely credited with being the 'father' of the Missouri Compromise. As to the main features of the measure this credit he did not deserve. So far he had taken a prominent but not an originating part in the transaction." But, at the next session of Congress, when the Missouri question was unexpectedly reopened, and as threateningly as ever, Clay assumed a more important part in connection with the final settlement of it. "The bill passed at the last session had authorized the people of Missouri to make a state constitution without any restriction as to slavery. The formal admission of the state was now to follow. But the Constitution with which Missouri presented herself to Congress not only recognized slavery as existing there; it provided also that it should be the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as would be necessary to prevent free negroes or mulattoes from coming into or settling in the state." This provoked a new revolt on the part of the Northern opponents of slavery, and it was only through Clay's exertions as a pacificator that Missouri was conditionally admitted to the Union at length [March 3, 1820], the condition being that "the said state shall never pass any law preventing any description of persons from coming to or settling in the said state who now are, or hereafter may become, citizens of any of the states of this Union." The legislature of Missouri gave its assent, as required, to this "fundamental condition," and the "compromise" became complete. "The public mind turned at once to things of more hopeful interest, and the Union seemed safer than ever. The American people have since become painfully aware that this was a delusion."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 8 (v. 1).—"The immediate contest was not over the question of the prohibition of slavery in the Territories. The great struggle lasted for nearly three years, but the final proposition which closed the controversy and which prohibited slavery in almost all the then Federal territory was probably not debated more than three hours. It was accepted without discussion by the great bulk of the advocates of Missouri's free admission. Very few slavery extensionists questioned the right and power of Congress to prevent the spread of slavery to the Territories. That question, in the minds of those who opposed restriction in



Missouri, was incidental to the question of the right of Congress to impose conditions upon a State. Incidentally the question of slavery in the Territories came up in the case of Arkansas, a country south of Missouri, in which slavery was already a fact. The restrictionists themselves recognized the fact that the plain, simple issue of limiting the area of human slavery would be strengthened by bringing it before the country unincumbered with the question of imposing conditions on a State, though most of them never wavered in their belief that conditions might be imposed. On the one hand it was only Southern zealots who denied to Congress the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories; on the other hand many in the North who opposed slavery believed that Congress might not impose conditions upon a State. In the cabinet of Monroe, in which sat Wirt, Crawford, and Calhoun, it was unanimously agreed that Congress had power to prohibit slavery in the Territories. But John Quincy Adams, also a member of that cabinet, who hated slavery with all the strength of his soul, thought it was unconstitutional to bind a State by conditions. . . . The struggle indicated a notable change in the southern mind on the slavery question, and that a slave power was forming which would attempt to control all legislation of the federal Union affecting slavery. . . . The struggle and the compromise afford the first clear demarcation between the sections. From this time the equilibrium of political power was a matter of first concern to a section of States and to a powerful political interest. Mason and Dixon's line is extended toward the west, and now marks a political division. The slave States were now, and for the first time, clearly separated from the free. A geographical line dividing the sections was established."—J. A. Woodburn, *Historical Significance of the Missouri Compromise* (Report of Am. Hist. Ass'n, 1893), pp. 289-294.

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 2, ch. 9.—J. Quincy, *Life of John Quincy Adams*, ch. 5.—H. Greeley, *The Am. Conflict*, v. 1, ch. 7.

A. D. 1819.—Admission of Alabama into the Union. See ALABAMA: A. D. 1817-1819.

A. D. 1819-1821.—Acquisition of Florida from Spain.—Definition of the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase. See FLORIDA: A. D. 1819-1821.

A. D. 1820.—Admission of Maine into the Union as a State. See MAINE: A. D. 1820; also, above: A. D. 1818-1821.

A. D. 1820.—Ninth Presidential Election.—"Monroe like Washington was re-chosen President by a vote practically unanimous. One, however, of the 232 electoral votes cast was wanting to consummate this exceptional honor; for a New Hampshire elector, with a boldness of discretion which, in our days and especially upon a close canvass, would have condemned him to infamy, threw away upon John Quincy Adams the vote which belonged like those of his colleagues to Monroe, determined, so it is said, that no later mortal should stand in Washington's shoes. Of America's Presidents elected by virtual acclamation history furnishes but these two examples; and as between the men honored by so unapproachable a tribute of confidence, Monroe entered upon his second term of office with less of real political opposition than

Washington."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 10, sect. 2 (v. 3).—Daniel D. Tompkins was re-elected Vice President.

A. D. 1820.—The Fourth Census.—Total population, 9,638,191 (an increase exceeding 33 per cent. over the enumeration of 1810), classed and distributed as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut.....	267,161	7,844	97
Illinois.....	53,788	457	917
Indiana.....	145,758	1,230	190
Maine.....	297,340	929	....
Massachusetts.....	516,419	6,740	....
Michigan.....	8,591	174	....
New Hampshire.....	243,236	786	....
New Jersey.....	257,409	12,460	7,557
New York.....	1,332,744	29,279	10,088
Ohio.....	576,572	4,723	....
Pennsylvania.....	1,017,094	30,202	211
Rhode Island.....	79,413	3,554	48
Vermont.....	234,846	903	....
	5,030,371	99,281	19,108
	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama.....	85,451	571	41,879
Arkansas.....	12,579	59	1,617
Delaware.....	55,282	12,958	4,509
District of Columbia.....	22,614	4,048	6,377
Georgia.....	189,566	1,763	149,654
Kentucky.....	434,644	2,759	126,732
Louisiana.....	73,383	10,476	69,064
Maryland.....	260,223	39,730	107,397
Mississippi.....	42,176	458	32,814
Missouri.....	55,988	347	10,222
North Carolina.....	419,200	14,612	205,017
South Carolina.....	237,440	6,826	258,475
Tennessee.....	339,927	2,727	80,107
Virginia.....	603,087	36,889	425,153
	2,831,560	134,223	1,519,017

A. D. 1821.—Beginning of emigration to Texas. See TEXAS: A. D. 1819-1835.

A. D. 1821-1824.—The Era of Good Feeling.—With the closing of the war of 1812-14, and the disappearance of the party of the Federalists, there came a period of remarkable quietude in the political world. "Then followed the second administration of Monroe, to which was given, perhaps by the President himself, a name which has secured for the whole period a kind of peaceful eminence. It was probably fixed and made permanent by two lines in Halleck's once famous poem of 'Aldwick Castle,' evidently written during the poet's residence in England in 1822-23. Speaking of the change from the feudal to the commercial spirit, he says: 'Tis what our President, Monroe, Has called 'the era of good feeling.' . . . It would seem from this verse that Monroe himself was credited with the authorship of the phrase; but I have been unable to find it in his published speeches or messages, and it is possible that it may be of newspaper origin, and that Halleck, writing in England, may have fathered it on the President himself."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger Hist. of the U. S.*, p. 394.

A. D. 1823.—The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.—One lasting mark of distinction was

given to the administration of President Monroe by the importance which came to be attached to his enunciation of the principle of policy since known as the "Monroe Doctrine." This was simply a formal and official statement of the national demand that foreign nations shall not interfere with the affairs of the two American continents. "There has been a good deal of dispute as to the real authorship of this announcement, Charles Francis Adams claiming it for his father, and Charles Sumner for the English statesman Canning. Mr. Gilman, however, in his late memoir of President Monroe, has shown with exhaustive research that this doctrine had grown up gradually into a national tradition before Monroe's time, and that he merely formulated it, and made it a matter of distinct record. The whole statement is contained in a few detached passages of his message of December 2, 1823. In this he announces that 'the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are not to be considered as subjects for colonization by European powers.' Further on he points out that the people of the United States have kept aloof from European dissensions, and ask only in return that North and South America should be equally let alone. 'We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety;' and while no objection is made to any existing colony or dependency of theirs, yet any further intrusion or interference would be regarded as 'the manifestation of an unfriendly spirit towards the United States.' This in brief, is the 'Monroe doctrine' as originally stated; and it will always remain a singular fact that this President—the least original or commanding of those who early held that office—should yet be the only one whose name is identified with what amounts to a wholly new axiom of international law."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 16.—"At a cabinet meeting May 13, 1818, President Monroe propounded several questions on the subject of foreign affairs, of which the fifth, as recorded by J. Q. Adams, was this: 'Whether the ministers of the United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South Americans, which should not be to promote the complete independence of those provinces; and whether measures shall be taken to ascertain if this be the policy of the British government, and if so to establish a concert with them for the support of this policy.' He adds that all these points were discussed, without much difference of opinion. On July 31, 1818, Rush had an important interview with Castlereagh in respect to a proposed mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her colonies. The coöperation of the United States was desired. Mr. Rush informed the British minister that 'the United States would decline taking part, if they took part at all, in any plan of pacification, except on the basis of the independence of the colonies.' 'This,' he added, 'was the determination to which his government had come on much deliberation.' . . . Gallatin writes to J. Q. Adams, June 24, 1823, that before leaving Paris he had said to M. Chateaubriand on May 13, 'The United States would undoubtedly preserve their

neutrality provided it were respected, and avoid every interference with the politics of Europe. . . . On the other hand, they would not suffer others to interfere against the emancipation of America.' . . . After Canning had proposed to Rush (September 19, 1823) that the United States should coöperate with England in preventing European interference with the Spanish-American colonies, Monroe consulted Jefferson as well as the cabinet, on the course which it was advisable to take, and with their approbation prepared his message. . . . Enough has been quoted to show that Mr. Sumner is not justified in saying that the 'Monroe doctrine proceeded from Canning,' and that he was 'its inventor, promoter, and champion, at least so far as it bears against European intervention in American affairs.' Nevertheless, Canning is entitled to high praise for the part which he took in the recognition of the Spanish republics, a part which almost justified his proud utterance, 'I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.'"—D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: C. Sumner, *Prophetic Voices concerning America*, p. 157.—G. F. Tucker, *The Monroe Doctrine*.—F. Wharton, *Digest of the International Law of the U. S.*, sect. 57 (v. 1).

A. D. 1824.—The Protective Tariff. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1816-1824.

A. D. 1824.—Tenth Presidential Election. —No choice by the People.—Election of John Quincy Adams by the House of Representatives.—"In 1823, as the Presidential election approached, the influences to control and secure the interests predominating in the different sections of the country became more active. Crawford of Georgia, Calhoun of South Carolina, Adams of Massachusetts, and Clay of Kentucky, were the most prominent candidates. In December, Barbour of Virginia was superseded, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, by Clay of Kentucky; an event ominous to the hopes of Crawford, and to that resistance to the tariff and to internal improvements which was regarded as dependent on his success. The question whether a Congressional caucus, by the instrumentality of which Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe had obtained the Presidency, should be again held to nominate a candidate for that office, was the next cause of political excitement. The Southern party, whose hopes rested on the success of Crawford, were clamorous for a caucus. The friends of the other candidates were either lukewarm or hostile to that expedient. Pennsylvania, whose general policy favored a protective tariff and public improvements, hesitated. . . . But the Democracy of that state . . . held meetings at Philadelphia, and elsewhere, recommending a Congressional caucus. This motion would have been probably adopted, had not the Legislature of Alabama, about this time, nominated Andrew Jackson for the Presidency, and accompanied their resolutions in his favor with a recommendation to their representatives to use their best exertions to prevent a Congressional nomination of a President. The popularity of Jackson, and the obvious importance to his success of the policy recommended by Alabama, fixed the wavering counsels of Pennsylvania, so that only three representatives from that state attended the Congressional caucus, which was soon after called, and which consisted of only 60 members, out of



261, the whole number of the House of Representatives; of which Virginia and New York, under the lead of Mr. Van Buren, constituted nearly one half. Notwithstanding this meagre assemblage, Mr. Crawford was nominated for the Presidency. . . . But the days of Congressional caucuses were now numbered. The people took the nomination of President into their own hands [and John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay were brought into the field]. . . . The result of this electioneering conflict was that, by the returns of the electoral colleges of the several states, it appeared that none of the candidates had the requisite constitutional majority; the whole number of votes being 261—of which Andrew Jackson had 99, John Quincy Adams 84, William H. Crawford 41, and Henry Clay 37. [The popular vote cast as nearly as can be determined, was: Jackson, 153,544; Adams, 108,740; Crawford, 46,618; Clay, 47,136.] For the office of Vice-President, John C. Calhoun had 180 votes, and was elected. . . . Of the 84 votes cast for Mr. Adams, not one was given by either of the three great Southern slaveholding states. Seventy-seven were given to him by New England and New York. The other seven were cast by the Middle or recently admitted states. The selection of President from the candidates now devolved on the House of Representatives, under the provisions of the constitution. But, again, Mr. Adams had the support of none of those slaveholding states, with the exception of Kentucky, and her delegates were equally divided between him and General Jackson. The decisive vote was, in effect, in the hands of Mr. Clay, then Speaker of the House, who cast it for Mr. Adams; a responsibility he did not hesitate to assume, notwithstanding the equal division of the Kentucky delegation, and in defiance of a resolution passed by the Legislature of that state, declaring their preference for General Jackson. On the final vote Andrew Jackson had 7 votes, William H. Crawford 4, and John Quincy Adams 13; who was, therefore, forthwith declared President of the United States for four years ensuing the 4th of March, 1825. . . . Immediately after his inauguration, Mr. Adams appointed Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Secretary of State. . . . General Jackson was deeply mortified and irritated by Mr. Clay's preference of Mr. Adams. . . . He immediately put into circulation among his friends and partisans an unqualified statement to the effect that Mr. Adams had obtained the Presidency by means of a corrupt bargain with Henry Clay, on the condition that he should be elevated to the office of Secretary of State. To this calumny Jackson gave his name and authority, asserting that he possessed evidence of its truth; and, although Mr. Clay and his friends publicly denied the charge, and challenged proof of it, two years elapsed before they could compel him to produce his evidence. This, when adduced, proved utterly groundless, and the charge false; the whole being but the creation of an irritated and disappointed mind. Though detected and exposed, the calumny had the effect for which it was calculated. Jackson's numerous partisans and friends made it the source of an uninterrupted stream of abuse upon Mr. Adams, through his whole administration."—J. Quincy, *Memoir of the Life of John Quincy Adams*, ch. 6-7.—The new administration "stood upon the same political basis as that of Mr. Monroe. It

was but a continuance of the same party ascendancy. It looked to no change of measures, and to no other change of men than became inevitably necessary to supply the vacancies which the accidents of political life had created. Mr. Clay was called to the State Department [and was maliciously accused of having bargained for it when he threw his influence at last in Mr. Adams' favor]. . . . The country . . . indulged the hope of a prosperous career in the track which had been opened by Mr. Madison, and so successfully pursued by Mr. Monroe. Less confidently, however, it indulged the hope of a continuance of that immunity from party contention and exasperation which had characterized the last eight years. The rising of an opposition was seen, at the very commencement of this administration, like a dark cloud upon the horizon, which gradually spread towards the zenith, not without much rumbling of distant thunder and angry flashes of fire. It was quite obvious to shrewd observers that the late election had disappointed many eager spirits, whose discontent was likely to make head against the predominant party, and, by uniting the scattered fragments of an opposition which had heretofore only slept, whilst the country had supposed it extinct, would present a very formidable antagonist to the new administration. The extraordinary popularity of General Jackson, the defeat of his friends by the vote of the House of Representatives, the neutrality of his political position, his avowed toleration towards political opponents, and what was thought to be his liberal views in regard to prominent political measures—for as yet nothing was developed in his opinions to set him in direct opposition to the policy or principles which governed the administration either of Madison or Monroe—all these considerations gave great strength to the position which he now occupied, and, in the same degree, emboldened the hopes of those who looked to him as the proper person to dispute the next election against the present incumbent. Many of those who had hoped to see the reign of good feeling and of abstinence from party strife prolonged, will remember with what surprise they saw this gathering of hostile elements, and heard it proclaimed by an authoritative political leader [Colonel Richard M. Johnson], in the first days of the new administration, that it should be and ought to be opposed, 'even if it were as pure as the angels at the right hand of the throne of God.' Such a declaration was not less ominous of what was to come than it was startling for its boldness and its novelty in the history of the government. . . . The opposition . . . took an organized form—became compact, eager, intolerant and even vindictive."—J. P. Kennedy, *Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt*, v. 2, ch. 10.—"Monroe was the last President of the Virginian line, John Quincy Adams the last from New England. The centre of power was passing from the east to the west. Adams was a genuine New Englander of the Puritan stock, austere moral, from his boyhood laboriously self-trained, not only staid but solemn in his teens, intensely self-conscious, ever engaged in self-examination, the punctual keeper of a voluminous diary, an invariably early riser, a daily reader of the Bible even in the White House, scrupulously methodical and strictly upright in all his ways; but testy, unconciliatory, unsympathetic, absolutely destitute of all the

arts by which popularity is won. His election does the highest credit to the respect of the electors for public virtue unadorned. The peculiar features of his father's character were so intensified in him that he may be deemed the typical figure rather than his father. In opinions he was a Federalist who having broken with his party on the question of foreign relations and the embargo had been put out of its pale but had retained its general mould. As he was about the last President chosen for merit not for availability, so he was about the last whose only rule was not party but the public service. So strictly did he observe the principle of permanency and purity in the Civil Service, that he refused to dismiss from office a Postmaster-General whom he knew to be intriguing against him. The demagogic era had come but he would not recognize its coming. He absolutely refused to go on the stump, to conciliate the press, to do anything for the purpose of courting popularity and making himself a party. His obstinacy was fatal to his ambition but is not dishonourable to his memory."—Goldwin Smith, *The United States*, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1824-1825.—The visit of Lafayette.**—One of the most deeply interesting events of the year 1824 was the arrival in the country of the honored Lafayette, companion of Washington and friend of the American Republic in its struggle for independence. He came on the invitation of the national Government and was entertained as its guest. "He arrived at Staten Island on Sunday, 15th of August, 1824, accompanied by his son, George Washington Lafayette, and his son-in-law, M. Le Vasseur. Here he remained until Monday, and was then met and welcomed by a distinguished committee from New York, who escorted him to that city. . . . The arrival of Lafayette was an event which stirred the whole country; everybody was anxious to see him, and every State and city in the Union extended an invitation to him to visit such State or city; and he did so, being everywhere received with the most enthusiastic manifestations of love and respect. . . . He spent a little over a year in the United States, traveling most of the time. . . . Having visited every portion of the United States and received the affectionate homage of the people, General Lafayette returned to Washington, where he became in fact 'the Nation's Guest' at the Presidential mansion. Soon after the meeting of Congress, in December, 1824, a bill was reported by a joint committee of the two Houses granting to him a township of land and the sum of \$200,000, which became a law."—N. Sargent, *Public Men and Events*, 1817-1853, v. 1, pp. 89-91.

ALSO IN: A. Levasseur, *Lafayette in America*, in 1824-1825.—B. Tuckerman, *Life of General Lafayette*, v. 2, ch. 7.

**A. D. 1824-1836.—Schemes of the Slave Power for acquiring Texas.** See TEXAS: A. D. 1824-1836.

**A. D. 1825-1828.—Opposition to the Administration.**—The question of Internal Improvements.—Reconstruction of Parties.—Democrats and National Republicans.—The inaugural address of President Adams "furnished a topic" against him, and "went to the reconstruction of parties on the old line of strict, or latitudinous, construction of the constitution.

It was the topic of internal national improvement by the federal government. The address extolled the value of such works, considered the constitutional objections as yielding to the force of argument, expressed the hope that every speculative (constitutional) scruple would be solved in a practical blessing; and declared the belief that, in the execution of such works, posterity would derive a fervent gratitude to the founders of our Union and most deeply feel and acknowledge the beneficent action of our government. The declaration of principles which would give so much power to the government . . . alarmed the old republicans, and gave a new ground of opposition to Mr. Adams's administration, in addition to the strong one growing out of the election in the House of Representatives. . . . This new ground of opposition was greatly strengthened at the delivery of the first annual message, in which the topic of internal improvement was again largely enforced, other subjects recommended which would require a liberal use of constructive powers, and Congress informed that the President had accepted an invitation from the American States of Spanish origin, to send ministers to their proposed Congress on the Isthmus of Panama [see COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1826]. It was, therefore, clear from the beginning that the new administration was to have a settled and strong opposition. . . . There was opposition in the Senate to the confirmation of Mr. Clay's nomination to the State department, growing out of his support of Mr. Adams in the election of the House of Representatives, and acceptance of office from him; but overruled by a majority of two to one."—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 21.—"From the very beginning of this Administration both factions of the Strict Constructionists united in an opposition to the President which became stronger through his whole term of office, until it overcame him. His ill-advised nomination of Clay to a post in his Cabinet gave color to the charge of a corrupt bargain between him and Clay, by which Adams was to receive the Clay vote in the House, and Clay was to be rewarded by the position of Secretary of State, which was then usually considered a stepping stone to the Presidency. Clay angrily denied any such bargain, and the renewal of charges and denials, each with its appropriate arguments, gave abundant material for debate. The Clay and Adams factions soon united and took the distinctive party name of National Republicans. Some years afterward this name was changed to that of Whigs. They maintained the loose constructionist principles of the Federalists, and, in addition, desired a Protective Tariff and a system of public improvements at national expense. . . . In October, 1825, the Tennessee Legislature nominated Jackson for the Presidency in 1828, and Jackson accepted the nomination. Crawford's continued ill-health compelled his adherents to look elsewhere for a candidate, and they gradually united upon Jackson. At first the resulting coalition was known as 'Jackson Men,' but, as they began to take the character of a national party, they assumed the name of Democrats, by which they have since been known. They maintained the strict constructionist principles of the Republican party, though the Crawford faction in the South went further, and held the extreme



ground of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, ch. 11.

**A. D. 1826.—Death of Adams and Jefferson.**—By an impressive coincidence John Adams and Thomas Jefferson died on the 4th of July, 1826,—the 50th Anniversary of Independence.

**A. D. 1828.—The Tariff "Bill of Abominations."** See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES: A. D. 1828).

**A. D. 1828.—Eleventh Presidential Election.—Triumph of Jackson and the new Democracy.**—Andrew Jackson was again put in nomination for the Presidency, while President Adams was supported for re-election by the National Republicans. "The campaign was conducted, on both sides, on very ruthless methods. Niles said it was worse than the campaign of 1798. Campaign extras of the 'Telegraph' were issued weekly, containing partisan material, refutations of charges against Jackson, and slanders on Adams and Clay. The Adams party also published a monthly of a similar character. The country was deluged with pamphlets on both sides. These pamphlets were very poor stuff, and contain nothing important on any of the issues. They all appeal to low tastes and motives, prejudices and jealousies. . . . In September, 1827, the Tammany General Committee and the Albany 'Argus' came out for Jackson, as it had been determined, in the programme, that they should do. A law was passed for casting the vote of New York in 1828 by districts. The days of voting throughout the country ranged from October 31st to November 19th. The votes were cast by the Legislature in Delaware and South Carolina; by districts in Maine, New York, Maryland, Tennessee; elsewhere, by general ticket. Jackson got 178 votes to 83 for Adams. The popular vote was 648,273 for Jackson; 508,064 for Adams. Jackson got only one vote in New England. . . . For Vice-President, Richard Rush got all the Adams votes; Calhoun [who was elected] got all the Jackson votes except 7 of Georgia, which were given to William Smith, of South Carolina. General Jackson was therefore triumphantly elected President of the United States, in the name of reform, and as the standard-bearer of the people, rising in their might to overthrow an extravagant, corrupt, aristocratic, federalist administration, which had encroached on the liberties of the people, and had aimed to corrupt elections by an abuse of federal patronage. Many people believed this picture of Adams's administration to be true. Andrew Jackson no doubt believed it. Many people believe it yet. Perhaps no administration, except that of the elder Adams, is under such odium. There is not, however, in our history any administration which, upon a severe and impartial scrutiny, appears more worthy of respectful and honorable memory. Its chief fault was that it was too good for the wicked world in which it found itself. In 1836 Adams said, in the House, that he had never removed one person from office for political causes, and that he thought that was one of the principal reasons why he was not reelected."—W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man*, ch. 5.—"In this election there was a circumstance to be known and remembered. Mr. Adams and Mr. Rush were both from the non-slaveholding, General Jackson and Mr. Calhoun from the slaveholding States, and both

large slave owners themselves, and both received a large vote (73 each) in the free States—and of which at least 40 were indispensable to their election. There was no jealousy, or hostile or aggressive spirit in the North at that time against the South!"—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 38.

**A. D. 1828-1833.—The Nullification doctrine and ordinance of South Carolina.—The Hayne and Webster debate.—President Jackson's proclamation.—The Compromise Tariff.**—"In May, 1828, a meeting of the South Carolina delegation in Congress was held in Washington, at the rooms of General Hayne, one of the Senators of that State, to concert measures against the tariff and the protective policy which it embodied. From the history of the times, and the disclosures subsequently made, it is apparent that some violent things were said at this meeting, but it broke up without any definite plan. In the course of the following summer, there were many popular meetings in South Carolina, largely attended, at which the tariff of 1824 was treated as an act of despotism and usurpation, which ought to be openly resisted. . . . They occasioned anxiety and regret among the friends of the Union throughout the country, though nothing more. But, in the autumn, the Legislature of South Carolina adopted an 'Exposition and Protest,' which gave form and substance to the doctrines which thenceforward became known as 'Nullification.' In order to understand them, however, as a theory of the Federal Constitution, it is necessary to state the theory to which they are opposed, and to overthrow which they were brought forward. The Government of the United States, under the Constitution, had hitherto been administered upon the principle that the extent of its powers is to be finally determined by its supreme judicial tribunal, not only when there is any conflict of authority between its several departments, but also when the authority of the whole Government is denied by one or more of the States. . . . Aside from the authority of [the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798]—an authority that was doubtful, because their interpretation was not clear—there had been no important assertion of the principle that a State can determine for its citizens whether they are to obey an act of Congress, by asserting its unconstitutional character, and that the right to do this is implied as a right inherent in a State, under the Constitution, and results from the nature of the Government. This, however, was what the advocates of nullification now undertook to establish. The remedy which they sought, against acts which they regarded as usurpations, was not revolution, and not the breaking up the Union, as they claimed; but it was a remedy which they held to exist within the Union, and to have been contemplated by the people of the States when they established the Constitution. How far they considered such a theory compatible with the continued existence of the Union, I am not aware that they undertook to explain. . . . Although the Legislature of South Carolina had thus propounded a theory of resistance, and held that there was then a case in the tariff which would justify a resort to it, no steps were yet taken toward the immediate exercise of the asserted power." In the great debate between General Hayne of South Carolina and Daniel Webster,

which occurred in the Senate, in January, 1830, the doctrine of nullification received for the first time a discussion which sank deep into the mind of the nation. The original subject-matter of the debate was a resolution relating to Western land-sales; but Hayne in his first speech made an attack on New England which drew out Webster in vindication, and then, when the South Carolinian replied, he boldly and broadly set forth the nullifying theory which his State had accepted from the sophistical brain of John C. Calhoun. It received its refutation then and there, in Webster's final speech. "The effect of this speech upon the country, that immediately followed its delivery, it is not easy for us at the present day to measure. . . . Vast numbers of Mr. Webster's speech were . . . published and circulated in pamphlet editions, after all the principal newspapers of the country had given it entire to their readers. The popular verdict, throughout the Northern and Western and many of the Southern States was decisive. A great majority of the people of the United States, of all parties, understood, appreciated, and accepted the view maintained by Mr. Webster of the nature of the Constitution, and the character of the government which it establishes."—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, ch. 16 (v. 1).—If Webster's speech had solidified the majority opinion of the country in resistance to nullification, it had not paralyzed the nullifying movement. In the summer of 1831, and again in August, 1832, Calhoun published addresses to the people of South Carolina, elaborating his doctrine, and "urging an immediate issue on account of the oppressive tariff legislation under which the South was then suffering. The Legislature of South Carolina was convened by the governor to meet on October 22, for the purpose of calling a convention 'to consider the character and extent of the usurpations of the general government.' The convention met on November 19, and adopted without delay an 'ordinance' declaring that the tariff act of 1828, and the amendments thereto passed in 1832, were null and void; that it should be held unlawful to enforce the payment of duties thereunder within the State of South Carolina; that it should be the duty of the legislature to make laws giving effect to the ordinance; . . . and that, if the general government should attempt to use force to maintain the authority of the federal law, the State of South Carolina would secede from the Union,—the ordinance to go into full effect on February 1, 1833. The legislature, which met again on November 19, passed the 'appropriate' laws. But these enactments were not very fierce; as Webster said, they 'limped far behind the ordinance.' Some preparation, although little, was made for a conflict of arms;" nor was there any certain show of readiness in other Southern States to stand by South Carolina in the position she had taken. "President Jackson's annual message, which went to Congress on December 4, 1832, was remarkably quiet in tone," and neither alarmed the nullifiers nor gave confidence to the friends of the Union; but "six days later, on December 10, came out Jackson's famous proclamation against the nullifiers, which spoke thus: 'The Constitution of the United States forms a government, not a league. . . . Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power

to resist them. To say that any state may at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the United States are not a nation.' He appealed to the people of South Carolina, in the tone of a father, to desist from their ruinous enterprise; but he gave them also clearly to understand that, if they resisted by force, the whole power of the Union would be exerted to maintain its authority. All over the North, even where Jackson had been least popular, the proclamation was hailed with unbounded enthusiasm. . . . The nullifiers in South Carolina received the presidential manifesto apparently with defiance. The governor of the state issued a counter-proclamation. Calhoun resigned the vice-presidency, and was immediately sent to the Senate to fight the battle for nullification there." The president, now thoroughly roused, called on Congress for extraordinary powers to meet the emergency, and a bill embodying his wishes—called the "Force Bill"—was introduced. But, at the same time, while they showed this bold front to the nullifiers, Congress and the executive began to prepare a retreat from the ground they had held on the tariff. Henry Clay took the field again, in the exercise of his peculiar talents for compromise, and the result was the nearly simultaneous passage (February 26 and 27, 1833) through Congress of the "Force bill" and of a compromise tariff bill, which latter provided for a graduated reduction of the duties year by year, until 1842, when they should stand at 20 per cent., as a horizontal rate, with a large free-list. "The first object of the measure was attained: South Carolina repealed her nullification ordinance. . . . But before long it became clear that, beyond the repeal of the nullification ordinance, the compromise had settled nothing. The nullifiers strenuously denied that they had in any sense given up their peculiar doctrine."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 14 (v. 2).—"The theory of nullification, as set forth by Calhoun, even now, after it has received the benefit of careful study and able expounding by historians, is not clear. He always avowed a loyalty to the Union, but the arguments by which he sought to demonstrate that nullification was compatible with the existence of the Union, and indeed a guarantee of its perpetuity, did not occasion much solicitude to the majority of his party. But no one at the North understood the fallacy of his reasoning or the real end and aim of his party more clearly than did the Union men of his state. They reasoned simply. Said the Camden, S. C. 'Gazette': 'We know of only two ways, under our government, to get rid of obnoxious legislation. We must convince a majority of the nation that a given enactment is wrong and have it repealed in the form prescribed by the constitution, or resist it extra-constitutionally by the sword. . . . But this everlasting cant of devotion to the Union, accompanied by a recommendation to do those acts that must necessarily destroy it, is beyond patient endurance from a people not absolutely confined in their own mad-houses.' . . . A fact . . . that historians have failed to lay any stress upon, and that nevertheless deserves some notice, is the holding of a state convention of the Union party of South Carolina immediately after the nullification convention had completed its work. It was the last important action of that party in the state. Randell Hunt, who



presented the first resolutions, epitomized the views of the convention and the question it should consider in three sentences: 'That the Union party acknowledges no allegiance to any government except that of the United States. That in referring this resolution to the general committee they be instructed to inquire whether it is not expedient to give a military organization to the Union party throughout the state. Whether it will not be necessary to call in the assistance of the general government for maintaining the laws of the United States against the arbitrary violence which is threatened by the late convention.' The resolutions which were adopted declared that the ordinance of nullification violated the constitution of the United States and had virtually destroyed the Union, since by preventing the general government from enforcing its laws within the boundaries of the state, it made the state a sovereignty paramount to the United States. They denounced the provisions of the ordinance as tyrannical and oppressive, and the test oath as especially incompatible with civil liberty, in that it disfranchised nearly half the citizens of the state. They pointed scornfully to the project of a standing army in the state. . . . They concluded by declaring the continued opposition of the signers to the tariff, and their determination to protect themselves against intolerable oppression. The resolutions were signed by all the members of the convention, about 180 in number. In point of fact, the Unionists were not disposed to favor any compromise measures, and looked rather with disfavor upon Mr. Clay's bill, as a measure which was being forced upon the country. Congress, they thought, ought not to modify the tariff until the nullification ordinance had been repealed. But the greater force was with the nullifiers, and the number of their opponents was dwindling. Caught by the enthusiasm and fighting spirit of their neighbors, some of the Unionists joined the nullification military companies that were being organized, and others, seeing the hopelessness of the struggle against a superior force, in sorrow and disgust shook the dust of South Carolina from their feet, preferring to begin life over again in other parts of the South, less charged with sentiments that they believed to be treasonable. . . . The Unionist party, crushed and helpless, was only too anxious to bury all feuds. It never was an active force in the state again, but the bold spirit which had actuated its members was manifested later, when the struggle for state sovereignty was more widespread; and some of the most intrepid Union men of the South in the civil war were those who had fled from South Carolina years before, when the nullification party had triumphed."—G. Hunt, *South Carolina during the Nullification Struggle* (Pol. Sci. Quarterly, June, 1891).

Also in: W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man*, ch. 10 and 13.—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 12.—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 3, ch. 32-34.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 78-89.—J. C. Calhoun, *Works*, v. 6 (*Rep'ts and Public Letters*).—O. L. Elliott, *The Tariff Controversy in the U. S.*, ch. 5.

The following is the text of the "Ordinance to nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws laying duties and imposts on the importation of foreign

commodities," adopted by the State Convention of South Carolina on the 24th of November, 1832:

"Whereas the Congress of the United States by various acts, purporting to be acts laying duties and imposts on foreign imports, but in reality intended for the protection of domestic manufactures, and the giving of bounties to classes and individuals engaged in particular employments, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of other classes and individuals, and by wholly exempting from taxation certain foreign commodities, such as are not produced or manufactured in the United States, to afford a pretext for imposing higher and excessive duties on articles similar to those intended to be protected, hath exceeded its just powers under the constitution, which confers on it no authority to afford such protection, and hath violated the true meaning and intent of the constitution, which provides for equality in imposing the burdens of taxation upon the several States and portions of the confederacy: And whereas the said Congress, exceeding its just power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose of effecting and accomplishing the specific objects and purposes which the constitution of the United States authorizes it to effect and accomplish, hath raised and collected unnecessary revenue for objects unauthorized by the constitution. We, therefore, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and, more especially, an act entitled 'An act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the nineteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, and also an act entitled 'An act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the fourteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, are unauthorized by the constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and obligations, made or entered into, or to be made or entered into, with purpose to secure the duties imposed by said acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance thereof, are and shall be held utterly null and void. And it is further ordained, that it shall not be lawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said acts within the limits of this State; but it shall be the duty of the legislature to adopt such measures and pass such acts as may be necessary to give full effect to this ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement and arrest the operation of the said acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States within the limits of this State, from and after the 1st day of February next, and the duty of all other constituted authorities, and of all persons residing or being within the limits of this State, and they are hereby required and enjoined to obey and give effect to this ordinance,

and such acts and measures of the legislature as may be passed or adopted in obedience thereto. And it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of this State, wherein shall be drawn in question the authority of this ordinance, or the validity of such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed for the purpose of giving effect thereto, or the validity of the aforesaid acts of Congress, imposing duties, shall any appeal be taken or allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and if any such appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the courts of this State shall proceed to execute and enforce their judgments according to the laws and usages of the State, without reference to such attempted appeal, and the person or persons attempting to take such appeal may be dealt with as for a contempt of the court. And it is further ordained, that all persons now holding any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military, under this State (members of the legislature excepted), shall, within such time, and in such manner as the legislature shall prescribe, take an oath well and truly to obey, execute, and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed in pursuance thereof, according to the true intent and meaning of the same; and on the neglect or omission of any such person or persons so to do, his or their office or offices shall be forthwith vacated, and shall be filled up as if such person or persons were dead or had resigned; and no person hereafter elected to any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military (members of the legislature excepted), shall, until the legislature shall otherwise provide and direct, enter on the execution of his office, or be in any respect competent to discharge the duties thereof until he shall, in like manner, have taken a similar oath; and no juror shall be empanelled in any of the courts of this State, in any cause in which shall be in question this ordinance, or any act of the legislature passed in pursuance thereof, unless he shall first, in addition to the usual oath, have taken an oath that he will well and truly obey, execute, and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed to carry the same into operation and effect, according to the true intent and meaning thereof. And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end that it may be fully understood by the government of the United States, and the people of the co-States, that we are determined to maintain this our ordinance and declaration, at every hazard, do further declare that we will not submit to the application of force on the part of the federal government, to reduce this State to obedience; but that we will consider the passage, by Congress, of any act authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State of South Carolina, her constitutional authorities or citizens; or any act abolishing or closing the ports of this State, or any of them, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress and egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act on the part of the federal government, to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby declared to be null and void, otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that

the people of this State will henceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States; and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do. Done in convention at Columbia, the twenty-fourth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and in the fifty-seventh year of the declaration of the independence of the United States of America."

A. D. 1829.—Introduction of the "Spoils System." See CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES.

A. D. 1829.—The Kitchen Cabinet of President Jackson.—Major Lewis, one of the Tennessee friends of General Jackson, who accompanied him to Washington and was persuaded to remain, with his residence at the White House; General Duff Green, editor of the "United States Telegraph"; Isaac Hill, editor of the "New Hampshire Patriot," and Amos Kendall, late the editor of a Jackson paper in Kentucky, but a native of Massachusetts:—"these were the gentlemen . . . who, at the beginning of the new administration, were supposed to have most of the President's ear and confidence, and were stigmatized by the opposition as the Kitchen Cabinet."—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 3, ch. 16.—After the breach between Jackson and Calhoun, Duff Green adhered to the latter. The "Globe" newspaper was then founded, to be the organ of the administration, and Francis P. Blair, called from Kentucky to undertake the editorship, acquired at the same time Duff Green's vacated seat in the Kitchen Cabinet.—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, p. 501.—"The establishment of the 'Globe,' the rupture with Calhoun, and the breaking up of the first cabinet had inaugurated a bitter war between the two rival papers, though really between the President and Mr. Calhoun, in consequence of which there were rich revelations made to the public."—N. Sargent, *Public Men and Events, 1817-1853*, v. 1, p. 186.

A. D. 1829-1832.—Rise of the Abolitionists.—"Between the years 1829 and 1832 took place a remarkable series of debates in Virginia on the subject of slavery, brought about by dissatisfaction with the State constitution and by the Nat Turner massacre, in which a number of slaves had risen against their masters. In these debates the evils of slavery were exposed as clearly as they were afterwards by the Abolitionists, and with an outspoken freedom which, when indulged in by Northern men, was soon to be denounced as treasonable and incendiary. These Southern speakers were silenced by the Slave Power. But there were men in the North who thought the same and who would not be silenced. Chief among these was William Lloyd Garrison. He had begun his memorable career by circulating petitions in Vermont in 1828 in favor of emancipation in the District of Columbia. Having joined Lundy in Baltimore in editing the 'Genius of Universal Emancipation,' he had suffered ignominy in the cause, in a Southern jail; drawing from persecution and hardship only new inspiration, he began the publication of the 'Liberator' at Boston in January, 1831. In the following year, under his leadership, was formed



the New England Anti-Slavery Society, which placed itself on the new ground that immediate, unconditional emancipation, without expatriation, was the right of every slave and could not be withheld by his master an hour without sin. In March, 1833, the 'Weekly Emancipator' was established in New York, with the assistance of Arthur and Lewis Tappan, and under the editorship of William Goodell. In the same year appeared at Haverhill, Mass., a vigorous pamphlet by John G. Whittier, entitled 'Justice and Expediency, or Slavery considered with a View to its Rightful and Effectual Remedy, Abolition.' Nearly simultaneously were published Mrs. Lydia Maria Child's 'Appeal in Behalf of that Class of Americans called Africans,' and a pamphlet by Elizur Wright, Jr., a professor in the Western Reserve College, on 'The Sin of Slavery and its Remedy.' These publications and the doctrines of the 'Liberator' produced great excitement throughout the country."—B. Tuckerman, *William Jay and the Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery*, ch. 3.—The "Liberator" "was a weekly journal, bearing the names of William Lloyd Garrison and Isaac Knapp as publishers. Its motto was, 'Our Country is the World, Our Countrymen are Mankind,' a direct challenge to those whose motto was the Jingo cry of those days, 'Our Country, right or wrong!' It was a modest folio, with a page of four columns, measuring fourteen inches by nine and a quarter. . . . The paper had not a dollar of capital. It was printed at first with borrowed type. Garrison and Knapp did all the work of every kind between them, Garrison of course doing the editorials. That he wrote them can hardly be said; his habit was often to set up without manuscript. . . . The publishers announced in their first issue their determination to go on as long as they had bread and water to live on. In fact, they lived on bread and milk, with a little fruit and a few cakes, which they bought in small shops below. Garrison apologizes for the meagreness of the editorials, which, he says, he has but six hours, and those at midnight, to compose, all the rest of his time and the whole of that of his companion being taken up by the mechanical work. . . . It was against nothing less than the world, or at least the world in which he lived, that this youth of twenty-six, with his humble partner, took up arms. Slavery was at the height of its power. . . . The salutatory of the 'Liberator' avowed that its editor meant to speak out without restraint. 'I will be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject I do not wish to think or speak or write with moderation. No! No! Tell a man whose house is on fire to give a moderate alarm; tell him to moderately rescue his wife from the hands of the ravisher; tell the mother to gradually extricate her babe from the fire into which it has fallen—but urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present. I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard.' This promise was amply kept. . . . In private and in his family he was all gentleness and affection. Let it be said, too, that he set a noble example to controversial editors in his fair treatment of his opponents. Not only did he always give insertion to their replies, but he copied their criticisms from other journals into his own.

Fighting for freedom of discussion, he was ever loyal to his own principle. What is certain is that the 'Liberator,' in spite of the smallness of its circulation, which was hardly enough to keep it alive, soon told. The South was moved to its centre. The editorials probably would not have caused much alarm, as the slaves could not read. What was likely to cause more alarm was the frontispiece, which spoke plainly enough to the slave's eye. It represented an auction at which 'slaves, horses and other cattle' were being offered for sale, and a whipping-post at which a slave was being flogged. In the background was the Capitol at Washington, with a flag inscribed 'Liberty' floating over the dome. . . . On seeing the 'Liberator' the realm of slavery bestirred itself. A Vigilance Association took the matter in hand. First came fiery and bloodthirsty editorials; then anonymous threats; then attempts by legal enactment to prevent the circulation of the 'Liberator' at the South. The Grand Jury of North Carolina found a true bill against Garrison for the circulation of a paper of seditious tendency, the penalty for which was whipping and imprisonment for the first offence, and death without benefit of clergy for the second. The General Assembly of Georgia offered a reward of five thousand dollars to any one who, under the laws of that State, should arrest the editor of the 'Liberator', bring him to trial, and prosecute him to conviction. The South reproached Boston with allowing a battery to be planted on her soil against the ramparts of Southern institutions. Boston felt the reproach, and showed that she would gladly have suppressed the incendiary print and perhaps have delivered up its editor; but the law was against her, and the mass of the people, though wavering in their allegiance to morality on the question of slavery, were still loyal to freedom of opinion. . . . It was just at this time that the South and its clientele at the North were thrown into a paroxysm of excitement by the Bloody Monday, as Nat Turner's rising at Southampton was called. The rising was easily suppressed, and Virginia saw, as Jamaica has since seen, how cruel is the panic of a dominant race. Not the slightest connection of the outbreak with Northern abolitionism was traced. That Garrison or any one connected with him ever incited the slaves to revolt, or said a word intentionally which could lead to servile war, seems to be utterly untrue. His preaching to the slaves, on the contrary, was always patience, submission, abstinence from violence, while in his own moral code he carried non-resistance to an extreme. Moreover, his championship held out hope, and what goads to insurrection is despair."—Goldwin Smith, *William Lloyd Garrison*, pp. 60-65.—"Mr. Emerson once said, 'Eloquence is dog-cheap in anti-slavery meetings.' . . . On the platform you would always see Garrison; with him was . . . Sam May. Stephen S. Foster was always there. . . . Parker Pillsbury, James Buffum, Arnold Buffum, Elizur Wright, Henry C. Wright, Abigail Kelley, Lucy Stone, Theo. D. Weld, the sisters Grimké, from South Carolina; John T. Sargent, Mrs. Chapman, Mrs. Lydia M. Child, Fred Douglas, Wm. W. Brown and Francis Jackson. The last was a stern Puritan, conscientious, upright, clear-minded, universally respected. Edmund Quincy also was there, and he never spoke without saying something that

had a touch of wit as well as of logic. Oliver Johnson . . . was one of the very first members of the Society. Theodore Parker, Samuel J. May, John Pierpont, Chas. L. Stearns, Chas. L. Redwood, Geo. Thompson (another wonderfully eloquent man), and, above all, Wendell Phillips." —J. F. Clarke, *Anti-Slavery Days*, ch. 3.—See, also, *SLAVERY, NEGRO*: A. D. 1828-1832.

**A. D. 1830.—The Fifth Census.**—Total population, 12,866,020 (being about 33½ per cent. more than in 1820), classed and distributed as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut.....	289,603	8,047	25
Illinois.....	155,061	1,637	747
Indiana.....	339,399	3,629	3
Maine.....	398,263	1,190	2
Massachusetts....	603,359	7,048	1
Michigan.....	31,346	261	32
New Hampshire..	268,721	604	3
New Jersey.....	300,266	18,303	2,254
New York.....	1,873,663	44,870	75
Ohio.....	928,329	9,568	6
Pennsylvania....	1,309,900	37,930	403
Rhode Island....	93,621	3,561	17
Vermont.....	279,771	881	....
	6,871,302	137,529	3,568
	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama.....	190,406	1,572	117,549
Arkansas.....	25,671	141	4,576
Delaware.....	57,601	15,855	3,292
District of Colum- bia.....	27,563	6,152	6,119
Florida.....	18,385	844	15,591
Georgia.....	296,806	2,486	217,531
Kentucky.....	517,787	4,917	165,213
Louisiana.....	89,441	16,710	109,588
Maryland.....	291,108	52,938	102,994
Mississippi.....	70,443	519	65,659
Missouri.....	114,795	569	25,091
North Carolina..	472,843	19,543	245,601
South Carolina..	257,863	7,921	315,401
Tennessee.....	535,746	4,555	141,603
Virginia.....	694,300	47,348	469,757
	3,660,758	182,070	2,005,475

In the decade between 1820 and 1830 the immigrant arrivals in the United States, as officially recorded, numbered 143,439, of which 75,803 were from the British Islands. Prior to 1821, there is no official record of immigration.

**A. D. 1830-1831.—The first railroads.** See *STEAM LOCOMOTION ON LAND*.

**A. D. 1832.—The Black Hawk War.** See *ILLINOIS*: A. D. 1832.

**A. D. 1832.—The prospective surplus and necessary tariff reduction.**—Clay's delusive measure. See *TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES)*: A. D. 1832.

**A. D. 1832.—Twelfth Presidential Election.**—Re-election of General Jackson.—General Jackson, renominated by his party almost without question, was re-elected over three competitors, the popular vote being as follows: Andrew Jackson, Democrat, 687,502; Henry Clay, National Republican, 530,189; William Wirt, Anti-Masonic, 33,108; John Floyd (voted for only in South Carolina, where electors were chosen by the legislature). The vote in the elec-

toral college stood: Jackson 219, Clay 49, Floyd 11, Wirt 7. Martin Van Buren was elected Vice President.—“This election is notable for several reasons. It marks the beginning of the system of national nominating conventions; it gave Jackson a second term of office, in which he was to display his peculiar qualities more conspicuously than ever; it compacted and gave distinct character to the new Democratic party; and it practically settled directly the fate of the Bank of the United States, and indirectly the question of nullification. Jackson was easily re-elected, for he had established a great popularity, and the opposition was divided. A new party came into the field, and marked its advent by originating the national nominating convention. This was the Anti-Masonic party” (see *NEW YORK*: A. D. 1826-1832). Both the Democratic and the National Republican parties adopted the invention of the Anti-Masons, and made their nominations for the first time by the agency of great national conventions.—W. Wilson, *Division and Reunion*, 1829-1839, p. 62.

**A. D. 1833-1836.—President Jackson's overthrow of the United States Bank.**—The removal of the Deposits.—“The torrents of paper-money issued during the revolutionary war, which sunk in value to nothing, converted the old prejudice against paper promises-to-pay into an aversion that had the force of an instinct. To this instinctive aversion, as much as to the constitutional objections urged by Mr. Jefferson and his disciples, was owing the difficulty experienced by Alexander Hamilton in getting his first United States bank chartered. Hence, also, the refusal of Congress to recharter that bank in 1811. Hence the unwillingness of Mr. Madison to sanction the charter of the second bank of the United States in 1816. But the bank was chartered in 1816, and went into existence with the approval of all the great republican leaders, opposed only by the extreme Jeffersonians and by the few federalists who were in public life. . . . But, long before General Jackson came into power, the bank appeared to have lived down all opposition. In the presidential campaign of 1824 it was not so much as mentioned, nor was it mentioned in that of 1828. . . . At the beginning of the administration of General Jackson, the Bank of the United States was a truly imposing institution. Its capital was thirty-five millions. The public money deposited in its vaults averaged six or seven millions; its private deposits, six millions more; its circulation, twelve millions; its discounts, more than forty millions a year; its annual profits, more than three millions. Besides the parent bank at Philadelphia, with its marble palace and hundred clerks, there were 25 branches in the towns and cities of the Union. . . . Its bank-notes were as good as gold in every part of the country. . . . The bank and its branches received and disbursed the entire revenue of the nation. . . . There is a tradition in Washington to this day, that General Jackson came up from Tennessee to Washington, in 1829, resolved on the destruction of the Bank of the United States, and that he was only dissuaded from aiming a paragraph at it in his inaugural address by the prudence of Mr. Van Buren. . . . General Jackson had no thought of the bank until he had been President two months. He came to Washington expecting to serve but a single term, during



which the question of re-chartering the bank was not expected to come up. The bank was chartered in 1816 for twenty years, which would not expire until 1836." But, in 1829, the influence of Isaac Hill, one of the so-called "Kitchen Cabinet" at Washington, involved the irascible President in an endeavor to bring about the removal of Jeremiah Mason, a political opponent, who had been appointed to the presidency of the branch of the United States Bank at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. "The correspondence began in June and ended in October. I believe myself warranted in the positive assertion, that this correspondence relating to the desired removal of Jeremiah Mason was the direct and real cause of the destruction of the bank."—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 3, ch. 20.—"As soon as the issue between him and the Bank of the United States was declared, Jackson resolved that the bank must be utterly destroyed. The method was suggested by Kendall and Blair, of the Kitchen Cabinet. It was to cripple the available means of the bank by withdrawing from it and its branches the deposits of public funds. In the message of December, 1832, Jackson had expressed his doubt as to the safety of the government deposits in the bank, and recommended an investigation. The House, after inquiry, resolved on March 2, by 109 to 46 votes, that the deposits were safe. The bank was at that period undoubtedly solvent, and there seemed to be no reason to fear for the safety of the public money in its custody. But Jackson had made up his mind that the bank was financially rotten; that it had been employing its means to defeat his reelection; that it was using the public funds in buying up members of Congress for the purposes of securing a renewal of its charter, and of breaking down the administration; and that thus it had become a dangerous agency of corruption and a public enemy. Therefore the public funds must be withdrawn, without regard to consequences. But the law provided that the public funds should be deposited in the Bank of the United States or its branches, unless the Secretary of the Treasury should otherwise 'order and direct,' and in that case the Secretary should report his reasons for such direction to Congress. A willing Secretary of the Treasury was therefore needed. In May, 1833, Jackson reconstructed his Cabinet for the second time. . . . For the Treasury Department Jackson selected William J. Duane of Philadelphia, who was known as an opponent of the bank. Jackson, no doubt, expected him to be ready for any measure necessary to destroy it. In this he was mistaken. Duane earnestly disapproved of the removal of the deposits as unnecessary, and highly dangerous to the business interests of the country. . . . A majority of the members of the Cabinet thought the removal of the deposits unwise. . . . In the business community there seemed to be but one voice about it. The mere rumor that the removal of the deposits was in contemplation greatly disturbed the money market. But all this failed to stagger Jackson's resolution. . . . The Cabinet, with the exception of the Secretary of the Treasury, bowed to Jackson's will. But Duane would not shelter himself behind the President's assumed responsibility to do an act which, under the law, was to be his act. He also refused to resign. If he had to obey or go, he insisted upon being removed.

Jackson then formally dismissed him, and transferred Roger B. Taney from the attorney generalship to the treasury. Benjamin F. Butler of New York, a friend of Van Buren, was made Attorney General. Taney forthwith ordered the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States; that is to say, the public funds then in the bank were to be drawn out as the government required them, and no new deposits to be made in that institution. The new deposits were to be distributed among a certain number of selected state banks, which became known as the 'pet banks.' . . . The money market became stringent. Many failures occurred. The general feeling in business circles approached a panic." But the very disturbance was charged upon the Bank, itself; the people rallied to the support of their favorite, "Old Hickory," and when the national charter of the Bank expired, in March, 1836, there was no hope of its renewal. It obtained a charter from the State of Pennsylvania, and continued business as a State institution until it went to pieces in the general commercial shipwreck of 1837-41.—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 15 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man*, ch. 11-14.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 1, ch. 49, 56, 64-67, 77, and 92-111.—M. St. C. Clarke and D. A. Hall, *Hist. of the Bank of the U. S.*—See, also, MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1817-1833.

A. D. 1834.—Organization of the Whig Party.—The largest section of the opposition to the Jacksonian Democracy "was organized in 1834 as the Whig party. According to the 'Whig Almanac' for 1838, the party as then constituted comprised: '(1) Most of those who, under the name of National Republicans, had previously been known as supporters of Adams and Clay, and advocates of the American system [of tariff-protection]; (2) Most of those who, acting in defence of what they deemed the assailed or threatened rights of the States, had been stigmatized as Nullifiers, or the less virulent State Rights' men, who were thrown into a position of armed neutrality towards the administration by the doctrines of the proclamation of 1832 against South Carolina; (3) A majority of those before known as Anti-Masons; (4) Many who had up to that time been known as Jackson men, but who united in condemning the high-handed conduct of the Executive, the immolation of Duane, and the subserviency of Taney; (5) Numbers who had not before taken any part in politics, but who were now awakened from their apathy by the palpable usurpations of the Executive and the imminent peril of our whole fabric of constitutional liberty and national prosperity.' It was not to be expected that a party composed of such various elements would be able to unite on one candidate with heartiness; and, as the event proved, it was necessary that some time should elapse before anything like homogeneity could be given to the organization. Nullification was not popular among the Whigs of the North, nor did the State Rights' people of South Carolina and other States care about the war on the bank and the removal of the deposits."—E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 14.—"It was now felt instinctively that, in the existing struggle between the parties actually arrayed against each other, and in the principles and doctrines of those who

were in power, there was a peculiar fitness in the revival of a term which, on both sides of the Atlantic, had been historically associated with the side of liberty against the side of power. The revival of the name of Whigs was sudden, and it was a spontaneous popular movement. In progress of time, it enabled the public men who were leading the opposition to the party of the Administration to consolidate an organization of distinct political principles, and to strengthen it by accessions from those who had found reason to be dissatisfied with the opinions prevailing among the friends of the President."—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, v. 1, p. 499.

**A. D. 1835.—First Petitions for the Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia.—Exclusion of Antislavery literature from the Mails.**—"It was during the Twenty-third Congress, 1835, that the abolition of slavery, especially in the District of Columbia, may be said to have begun to move the public mind at the North. The first petitions presented to Congress for the abolition of slavery, at least the first to attract attention, were presented by Mr. Dickson, from the Canandaigua district, New York, who addressed the House in support of the prayer of the petitioners. Perhaps his speech, more than the petition he presented, served to stir up a feeling on the part of Southern men, and to cause other and numerous similar petitions to be gotten up at the North and sent to Congress. . . . The labors of the enemies of slavery, or 'Abolitionists,' had commenced, and by indefatigable men who believed they were serving God and the cause of humanity, and consequently it was with them a labor of conscience and duty, with which nothing should be allowed to interfere. Instead of petitions to Congress, they now sent large boxes of tracts, pamphlets, and various publications which the Southern people denominated 'incendiary,' to the post-office at Charleston, South Carolina, and other cities, to be distributed, as directed, to various persons. This increased the complaints and inflammatory articles in the Southern papers. The publications thus sent were stopped in the post-office, and the postmasters addressed the head of the department, Amos Kendall, on the subject, who replied that though the law authorized the transmission of newspapers and pamphlets through the mail, yet the law was intended to promote the general good of the public, and not to injure any section; and intimated that, such being the effect of these publications at the South, postmasters would be justified in withholding them."—N. Sargent, *Public Men and Events*, 1817-1853, v. 1, pp. 294-295.

**A. D. 1835-1837.—The inflation of credits, and Speculation.—The great collapse.**—"When the United States Bank lost the government deposits, late in 1833, they amounted to a little less than \$10,000,000. On January 1, 1835, more than a year after the state banks took the deposits, they had increased to a little more than \$10,000,000. But the public debt being then paid and the outgo of money thus checked, the deposits had by January 1, 1836, reached \$25,000,000, and by June 1, 1836, \$41,500,000. This enormous advance represented the sudden increase in the sales of public lands, which were paid for in bank paper, which in turn formed the bulk of the government deposits. . . . The in-

crease in the sales of public lands was the result of all the organic causes and of all the long train of events which had seated the fever of speculation so profoundly in the American character of the day. . . . The increase of government deposits was only fuel added to the flames. The craze for banks and credits was unbounded before the removal of the deposits had taken place, and before their great increase could have had serious effect. . . . The insanity of speculation was in ample though unobserved control of the country while Nicholas Biddle [President of the United States Bank] still controlled the deposits, and was certain to reach a climax whether they stayed with him or went elsewhere. . . . The distribution of the surplus among the states by the law of 1836 was the last and in some respects the worst of the measures which aided and exaggerated the tendency to speculation. By this bill, all the money above \$5,000,000 in the treasury on January 1, 1837, was to be 'deposited' with the states in four quarterly installments commencing on that day. . . . From the passage of the deposit bill in June, 1836, until the crash in 1837, this superb donation of thirty-seven millions was before the enraptured and deluded vision of the country. Over nine millions and a quarter to be poured into 'improvements' or loaned to the needy,—what a luscious prospect! The lesson is striking and wholesome, and ought not to be forgotten, that, when the land was in the very midst of these largesses, the universal bankruptcy set in. During 1835 and 1836 there were omens of the coming storm. Some perceived the rabid character of the speculative fever. William L. Marcy, governor of New York, in his message of January, 1836, answering the dipsomaniac cry for more banks, declared that an unregulated spirit of speculation had taken capital out of the state; but that the amount so transferred bore no comparison to the enormous speculations in stocks and in real property within the state. . . . The warning was treated contemptuously; but before the year was out the federal administration also became anxious, and the increase in land sales no longer signified to Jackson an increasing prosperity. . . . So Jackson proceeded with his sound defense of the famous specie circular, long and even still denounced as the 'causa causans' of the crisis of 1837. By this circular, issued on July 11, 1836, the secretary of the treasury had required payment for public lands to be made in specie, with an exception until December 15, 1836, in favor of actual settlers and actual residents of the state in which the lands were sold. . . . Jackson's specie circular toppled over the house of cards, which at best could have stood but little longer. . . . An insignificant part of the sales had been lately made to settlers. They were chiefly made to speculators. . . . Of the real money necessary to make good the paper bubble promises of the speculators not one tenth part really existed. Banks could neither make their debtors pay in gold and silver, nor pay their own notes in gold and silver. So they suspended. The great and long concealed devastation of physical wealth and of the accumulation of legitimate labor by premature improvements and costly personal living, became now quickly apparent. Fancied wealth sank out of sight."—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 8.



ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, *Hist. of Am. Currency*, pp. 102-161.—F. A. Walker, *Money*, ch. 21.—C. Juglar, *Brief Hist. of Panics*, p. 58.

A. D. 1835-1843.—The Second Seminole War. See FLORIDA: A. D. 1835-1843.

A. D. 1836.—The Atherton Gag.—“At this time [1835-36], the Northern abolitionists sent petitions to Congress for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. They contended that as this territory was under the control of the United States' Government, the United States was responsible for slavery there; and that the Free States were bound to do what they could to have slavery brought to an end in that District. But the Slave States were not willing to have anything said on the subject, so they passed what was called a 'gag' law in the House of Representatives, and ruled that all petitions which had any relation to slavery should be laid on the table without being debated, printed or referred. John Quincy Adams opposed this rule resolutely, maintaining that it was wrong and unconstitutional. . . . He continued to present petitions, as before, for the abolition of slavery in the District. When the day came for petitions he was one of the first to be called upon; and he would sometimes occupy nearly the whole hour in presenting them, though each one was immediately laid on the table. One day he presented 511.”—J. F. Clarke, *Anti-Slavery Days*, p. 45.—The gag-law has sometimes taken the name of the Atherton gag from its New Hampshire author.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 4, p. 338.

ALSO IN: J. R. Gidding, *Hist. of the Rebellion*, pp. 104-124.—J. T. Morse, Jr., *John Quincy Adams*, pp. 246-280.

A. D. 1836.—Admission of Arkansas into the Union. See ARKANSAS: A. D. 1819-1836.

A. D. 1836.—Jackson's administration reviewed.—“What of the administration as a whole? Parton's view is as follows: ‘I must avow explicitly the belief that, notwithstanding the good done by General Jackson during his presidency, his elevation to power was a mistake on the part of the people of the United States. The good which he effected has not continued, while the evil which he began remains.’ Sumner, in commenting on ‘Jackson's modes of action in his second term,’ says: ‘We must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance without really appreciating it; leaving behind him disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to produce turmoil and disaster in the future.’ Later he adds: ‘Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse perversion of the American system of government conceivable than to regard the President as the tribune of the people.’ The view of von Holst may be inferred from the following passages: ‘In spite of the frightful influence, in the real sense of the expression, which he exercised during the eight years of his presidency, he neither pointed out nor opened new ways to his people by the superiority of his mind, but only dragged them more rapidly onward on the road they had long been travelling, by the demoniacal power of his will.’ The meaning of the bank struggle is thus defined: ‘Its significance lay in the elements

which made Jackson able actually and successfully to assert his claims, in conflict both with the constitution and with the idea of republicanism, to a position between Congress and the people as patriarchal ruler of the republic.’ Elsewhere he tells us that the ‘curse of Jackson's administration’ is that it weakened respect for law; that ‘the first clear symptom’ of ‘the decline of a healthy political spirit’ was the election and re-election of Jackson to the presidency; that his administration paved a ‘broad path for the demoralizing transformation of the American democracy’; and that ‘his “reign” receives the stamp which characterizes it precisely from the fact that the politicians knew how to make his character, with its texture of brass, the battering-ram with which to break down the last ramparts which opposed their will.’ According to Parton, Sumner, and von Holst, as I understand them, the net result of Jackson's influence upon the American people was to hasten their progress toward political ruin. I think this conclusion erroneous. The gravest accusation against Jackson is, that his influence undermined respect for law. It is plausibly argued that, since he himself was impatient of authority, his example must have stimulated lawlessness in his followers. It may be urged, in reply, that the history of the country does not support the charge. The worst exhibitions of general lawlessness which have disgraced the United States were the anti-abolitionist mobs of Jackson's own day—for which he was not responsible. Since then, the American people, in spite of the demoralizations of the war and reconstruction periods, have steadily grown in obedience to law. . . . It is a curious circumstance that the relation of Jackson to sectionalism has received very little attention; and yet the growth of sectionalism, i. e., the tendency to divide the Union into two portions, politically separate and independent, is the fact which, from the Missouri Compromise of 1820 to the ordinances of secession in 1860, gives our political history its distinctive character. The one important question concerning Jackson, as indeed concerning every public man during the forty years which precede the Civil War, is: What did he do towards saving the Union from sectionalism? . . . Jackson came before the country as a disciple of Jefferson, and therefore as a believer in state rights. There was, it is true, much in his temper and situation which favored centralization; nevertheless, he was an honest, though moderate and somewhat inconsistent Jeffersonian, and he won and retained the confidence of the state-rights element in the democratic party. Moreover, he identified himself with the newly enfranchised and poorer citizens just rising to political self-consciousness. In these ways, his following came to include a large majority of his fellow-citizens, and, what was of the utmost importance, by far the larger proportion of those whose political character and opinions were as yet plastic. . . . Jackson became, to a degree never realized by any other man in our history, the trusted leader and teacher of the masses. . . . This intimate relation to the people, and this unparalleled power over the people, Jackson used to impress upon them his own love of the Union and his own hatred of sectionalism. . . . His character was altogether national. It is easy to think of Calhoun as a southerner and a South Carolinian; but it would not be easy

to think of Jackson as belonging to Tennessee or to the border states. The distribution of his support in the election of 1832 is instructive. New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania, as well as Tennessee, Georgia, Missouri, were Jackson's states. He was not looked upon as the representative of any particular section. His policy as President showed no trace of sectionalism. Its aim was the welfare of the masses irrespective of section. To him state lines had little meaning; sectional lines, absolutely none. There is another way in which he rendered great though unconscious service to the cause of national unity: he made the government, hitherto an unmeaning abstraction, intelligible and attractive to the people. . . . The chief value, then, of Jackson's political career, was its educational effect. His strong conviction of the national character of the Union, his brave words and acts in behalf of the rights of the Union, sank deep into the hearts of followers and opponents."—A. D. Morse, *Political Influence of Andrew Jackson* (Pol. Sci. Quarterly, June, 1886).

**A. D. 1836.—Thirteenth Presidential Election.—Martin Van Buren chosen.**—"As Vice-president, Van Buren was at the side of Jackson during his second term as President. It was the period of the first experiment in producing panics; of reckless expansions of the currency; of extravagant speculation; of an accumulating surplus revenue; of the last struggles of the Bank of the United States for the continuance of its powers. There was not a difficult question on which Jackson did not open his mind to the Vice-president with complete and affectionate confidence. He has often been heard to narrate incidents illustrating the prompt decision and bold judgment of his younger friend; and in those days of vehement conflicts between the power of the people and interests embodied against that power, the daring energy of the one was well united with the more tranquil intrepidity of the other. How fully this was recognized by the people appears from the action of the Democratic party of the Union. In May, 1835, it assembled in convention at Baltimore, and by a unanimous vote placed Van Buren in nomination as their candidate for the Presidency. . . . The Democracy of the Union supported Van Buren with entire unanimity. Out of two hundred and eighty-six electoral votes he received one hundred and seventy; and, for the first time, the Democracy of the North saw itself represented in the Presidential chair. Electoral votes were given for Van Buren without regard to geographical divisions: New York and Alabama, Missouri and Maine, Virginia and Connecticut, were found standing together. His election seemed friendly to the harmony and the perpetuity of the Union."—G. Bancroft, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 5.—Mr. Van Buren received a clear majority of the popular vote cast at the election, namely, 762,678, against 735,651 cast in opposition, but divided between four Whig candidates, namely, William H. Harrison, who received 73 electoral votes, Hugh L. White, who received 26, Daniel Webster who received 14, and Willie P. Mangum, who received 11. Richard M. Johnson was chosen Vice President.

**A. D. 1837.—Admission of Michigan into the Union.** See MICHIGAN: A. D. 1837.

**A. D. 1837.—The introduction of the Sub-treasury system.**—"When the banks went

down, they had the government deposits: this was in May, 1837. Van Buren's administration was only two months old. The President was a warm admirer of Jackson, and had formally announced that he would continue his predecessor's policy with respect to the management of the deposits. But the 'experiment' had suddenly culminated. The government deposits were not in its control, and could not be regained; their transfer from one part of the country to another had ceased. . . . Once more, therefore, the government was confronted with a grave question touching its deposits and the circulating medium. It now essayed a brand-new experiment. This was nothing less than keeping the deposits itself, and transferring and paying them as occasion required; while the people were left to regulate the currency themselves. This was a very wide departure from any former policy. The mode proposed of keeping the public deposits may be briefly described. The treasury building at Washington was to constitute the treasury of the United States, and the public money was to be kept within its vaults. The mint at Philadelphia, the branch at New Orleans, the new custom-houses in New York and Boston, were also to contain branch treasury vaults. Places were also to be prepared at Charleston, St. Louis, and elsewhere. The treasurer of the United States at Washington, and the treasurers of the mints at Philadelphia and New Orleans, were to be 'receivers-general,' to keep the public money. . . . At the extra session of Congress in 1837, the Executive recommended the sub-treasury experiment. Congress refused to try it, although a majority in both Houses belonged to the same political party as the President. Nevertheless, the system was continued, without legislative sanction, until 1840, when Congress finally passed a bill legalizing the measure. At the presidential election in 1840 a party revolution occurred, and the sub-treasury system, which had formed a prominent issue in the campaign, was unqualifiedly condemned by the people. Congress repealed the law, and passed a bill creating another national bank," which President Tyler vetoed—see below, A. D. 1841. "Thus the keeping of the public money remained in the hands of the government officials, without legislative regulation, until the passage of the sub-treasury bill, in 1846. The system established at that time has been maintained ever since."—A. S. Bolles, *Financial History of the U. S.*, 1789-1860, bk. 3, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 2, ch. 29, 41, 64-65.—D. Kinley, *The Independent Treasury of the U. S.*

**A. D. 1837-1838.—Antislavery Petitions in the Senate.—Calhoun's Resolutions, forcing the issue.**—"The movements for and against slavery in the session of 1837-'38 deserve to be noted, as of disturbing effect at the time; and as having acquired new importance from subsequent events. Early in the session a memorial was presented in the Senate from the General Assembly of Vermont, remonstrating against the annexation of Texas to the United States, and praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia—followed by many petitions from citizens and societies in the Northern States to the same effect; and, further, for the abolition of slavery in the Territories—for the abolition of the slave trade between the States—



and for the exclusion of future slave States from the Union. . . . The question which occupied the Senate was as to the most judicious mode of treating these memorials, with a view to prevent their evil effects: and that was entirely a question of policy, on which senators disagreed who concurred in the main object. Some deemed it most advisable to receive and consider the petitions—to refer them to a committee—and subject them to the adverse report which they would be sure to receive; as had been done with the Quakers' petitions at the beginning of the government. Others deemed it preferable to refuse to receive them. The objection raised to this latter course was, that it would mix up a new question with the slavery agitation which would enlist the sympathies of many who did not co-operate with the Abolitionists—the question of the right of petition. . . . Mr. Clay, and many others were of this opinion; Mr. Calhoun and his friends thought otherwise; and the result was, so far as it concerned the petitions of individuals and societies, what it had previously been—a half-way measure between reception and rejection—a motion to lay the question of reception on the table. This motion, precluding all discussion, got rid of the petitions quietly, and kept debate out of the Senate. In the case of the memorial from the State of Vermont, the proceeding was slightly different in form, but the same in substance. As the act of a State, the memorial was received; but after reception was laid on the table. Thus all the memorials and petitions were disposed of by the Senate in a way to accomplish the two-fold object, first, of avoiding discussion; and, next, condemning the object of the petitioners. It was accomplishing all that the South asked; and if the subject had rested at that point, there would have been nothing in the history of this session, on the slavery agitation, to distinguish it from other sessions about that period: but the subject was revived; and in a way to force discussion, and to constitute a point for the retrospect of history. Every memorial and petition had been disposed of according to the wishes of the senators from the slaveholding States; but Mr. Calhoun deemed it due to those States to go further, and to obtain from the Senate declarations which should cover all the questions of federal power over the institution of slavery: although he had just said that paper reports would do no good. For that purpose, he submitted a series of resolves—six in number—which derive their importance from their comparison, or rather contrast, with others on the same subject presented by him in the Senate ten years later; and which have given birth to doctrines and proceedings which have greatly disturbed the harmony of the Union, and palpably endangered its stability. The six resolutions of this period ('37-'38) undertook to define the whole extent of the power delegated by the States to the federal government on the subject of slavery; to specify the acts which would exceed that power; and to show the consequences of doing anything not authorized to be done—always ending in a dissolution of the Union. The first four of these related to the States; about which, there being no dispute, there was no debate. The sixth, without naming Texas, was prospective, and looked forward to a case which might include her annexation; and was

laid upon the table to make way for an express resolution from Mr. Preston on the same subject. The fifth related to the territories, and to the District of Columbia, and was the only one which excited attention, or has left a surviving interest. It was in these words: 'Resolved that the intermeddling of any State, or States, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this District, or any of the territories, on the ground or under the pretext that it is immoral or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure of Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholding States.' The dogma of 'no power in Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in territories' had not been invented at that time; and, of course, was not asserted in this resolve, intended by its author to define the extent of the federal legislative power on the subject. The resolve went upon the existence of the power, and deprecated its abuse." Mr. Clay offered an amendment, in the nature of a substitute, consisting of two resolutions, the first of which was in these words: "'That the interference by the citizens of any of the States, with the view to the abolition of slavery in this District, is endangering the rights and security of the people of the District; and that any act or measure of Congress, designed to abolish slavery in this District, would be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the States of Virginia and Maryland—a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholding States—and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union.' The vote on the final adoption of the resolution was: [Yeas 37, Nays 8]. . . . The second resolution of Mr. Clay applied to slavery in a territory where it existed, and deprecated any attempt to abolish it in such territory, as alarming to the slave States, and as violation of faith towards its inhabitants, unless they asked it; and in derogation of its right to decide the question of slavery for itself when erected into a State. This resolution was intended to cover the case of Florida, and ran thus: 'Resolved that any attempt of Congress to abolish slavery in any territory of the United States in which it exists would create serious alarm and just apprehension in the States sustaining that domestic institution, and would be a violation of good faith towards the inhabitants of any such territory who have been permitted to settle with, and hold, slaves therein; because the people of any such territory have not asked for the abolition of slavery therein; and because, when any such territory shall be admitted into the Union as a State, the people thereof shall be entitled to decide that question exclusively for themselves.' And the vote upon it was—[Yeas 35, Nays 9]. . . . The general feeling of the Senate was that of entire repugnance to the whole movement—that of the petitions and memorials on the one hand, and Mr. Calhoun's resolutions on the other. The former were quietly got rid of, and in a way to rebuke, as well as to condemn their presentation; that is to say, by motions (sustained by the body) to lay them on the table. The resolutions could not so easily be disposed of, especially as their mover earnestly demanded discussion, spoke at large, and often himself; and 'desired to make the question, on their rejection or adoption, a test question.'"—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 2, ch. 33.

**A. D. 1840.—The Sixth Census.**—Total population, 17,069,453 (exceeding that of 1830 by nearly 33 per cent.), classed and distributed as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut .....	301,856	8,105	17
Illinois .....	472,254	3,598	331
Indiana .....	678,698	7,165	3
Iowa .....	42,924	172	16
Maine .....	500,438	1,355	....
Massachusetts .....	729,030	8,669	....
Michigan .....	211,560	707	....
New Hampshire .....	284,036	537	1
New Jersey .....	351,588	21,044	674
New York .....	2,378,890	50,037	4
Ohio .....	1,502,122	17,342	3
Pennsylvania .....	1,676,115	47,854	64
Rhode Island .....	105,587	3,238	5
Vermont .....	291,218	730	....
Wisconsin .....	30,749	185	11
	9,557,065	170,728	1,129
	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama .....	335,185	2,039	253,532
Arkansas .....	77,174	465	19,935
Delaware .....	58,561	16,919	2,605
District of Columbia .....	30,657	8,361	4,694
Florida .....	27,943	817	25,717
Georgia .....	407,695	2,753	280,944
Kentucky .....	590,253	7,317	182,258
Louisiana .....	158,457	25,502	168,452
Maryland .....	318,204	62,078	89,737
Mississippi .....	179,074	1,366	195,211
Missouri .....	323,888	1,574	58,240
North Carolina .....	484,870	22,732	245,817
South Carolina .....	259,084	8,276	327,038
Tennessee .....	640,627	5,524	183,059
Virginia .....	740,858	49,852	449,087
	4,632,530	215,575	2,486,326

The number of immigrants arriving in the United States between 1830 and 1840, according to official reports, was 599,125, of whom 283,191 were from the British Islands, and 212,497 from other parts of Europe.

**A. D. 1840.—Fourteenth Presidential Election.**—The Log-cabin and Hard-cider campaign.—William Henry Harrison, Whig, was elected President, over Martin Van Buren, Democrat, and James G. Birney, candidate of the "Liberty Party." The popular vote cast was: Harrison 1,275,016, Van Buren 1,129,102, Birney 7,069. The electoral vote stood: Harrison 234, Van Buren 60, Birney none. John Tyler was elected Vice President. In the early part of the campaign, a Baltimore newspaper, making a foolish attempt to cast ridicule on General Harrison, said that a pension of a few hundred dollars and a barrel of hard cider would content him in his log cabin for life. This fatuous remark gave the Whigs a popular cry which they used with immense effect, and "the log-cabin and hard-cider campaign," as it is known in American history, was memorable for its song-singing enthusiasm.—"If one could imagine a whole nation declaring a holiday or season of rollicking for a period of six or eight months, and giving themselves up during the whole time to the wildest freaks of fun and frolic, caring

nothing for business, singing, dancing, and carousing night and day, he might have some faint notion of the extraordinary scenes of 1840. It would be difficult, if not impossible, otherwise to form even a faint idea of the universal excitement, enthusiasm, activity, turmoil, and restlessness which pervaded the country during the spring, summer, and fall of that memorable year. Log cabins large enough to hold crowds of people were built in many places. Small ones, decorated with 'coon-skins, were mounted on wheels and used in processions. The use of the 'coon-skins soon led to the adoption of the 'coon (raccoon) itself as an emblem and adjunct of the log cabin, and its 'counterfeit presentment' was hoisted in all the Whig papers. Meetings were everywhere, and every day, held in neighborhoods, school-houses, villages, towns, counties, cities, States, varying in number from ten to one hundred thousand; and wherever there was a gathering there were also speaking and singing. Ladies attended these meetings, or conventions, in great numbers, and joined in the singing. Farmers, with big teams and wagons, would leave their fields and travel ten, twenty, or thirty miles, accompanied by their families and neighbors, to attend a convention or a barbecue and listen to distinguished orators. Crowds on the road, multitudes in big wagons drawn by four, six, or eight horses, made the welkin ring with their log-cabin songs. Nobody slept, nobody worked, nobody rested; at least so it seemed, for all were on the 'qui vive' and in motion. The entire population seemed to be absorbed in the great duty of electing General Harrison and thus changing the government. . . .

'What has caused this great commotion, motion, motion,

Our country through?

It is the ball a rolling on

For Tippecanoe and Tyler too,

For Tippecanoe and Tyler too.'

The original or special friends of General Harrison very naturally claimed that it was his popularity which produced such an unprecedented 'commotion' 'our country through.' But in this they were mistaken. The popularity of no one man could have produced such a universal outpouring of the people from day to day for weeks and months unceasingly, abandoning everything else, and giving time and money unstintedly to carry the election. General Harrison was but the figure-head,—the representative of the Whig party for the time being. Few had ever heard of him. The people knew from history and the campaign papers that he had been a general in the then late war with England; that he had won a victory at the battle of Tippecanoe over the British and Indians, and also at the battle of the Thames, in Canada, where Tecumseh, the noted Indian warrior, was killed. This was enough to make a hero of him by those who had a purpose to serve in doing so. As to his fitness for the Presidency, the people knew nothing and cared nothing. A change in the government was what they desired and were determined to have."—N. Sargent, *Public Men and Events*, v. 2, pp. 107-110.

**A. D. 1840-1841.—The McLeod case.** See CANADA: A. D. 1840-1841.

**A. D. 1841.—The Death of President Harrison.**—Breach between President Tyler and the Whig Party which elected him.—President



Harrison died suddenly on the 4th of April, 1841, and Vice President John Tyler became President. Tyler was a Calhoun Democrat in politics, although nominated and elected by the Whigs, and the financial measures favored by the latter were especially obnoxious to him. "Congress met May 31st, 1841. . . . A bill to abolish the Sub-Treasury of the previous Administration was passed by both Houses and signed by the President. A bill to incorporate 'The Fiscal Bank of the United States' was passed by both Houses. It was weeded of many of the objectionable features of the old United States Bank, but was hardly less odious to the Democrats. It was vetoed by the President. . . . An effort to pass the bill over the veto did not receive a two-thirds majority. The Whig leaders, anxious to prevent a party disaster, asked from the President an outline of a bill which he would sign. After consultation with the Cabinet, it was given, and passed by both Houses. September 9th the President vetoed this bill also, and an attempt to pass it over the veto did not receive a two-thirds majority. The action of the President, in vetoing a bill drawn according to his own suggestions, and thus apparently provoking a contest with the party which had elected him, roused the unconcealed indignation of the Whigs. The Cabinet, with one exception [Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, who remained in President Tyler's cabinet until May, 1843], at once resigned. The Whig members of Congress issued Addresses to the People, in which they detailed the reforms designed by the Whigs and impeded by the President, and declared that 'all political connection between them and John Tyler was at an end from that day forth.' . . . The President filled the vacancies in the Cabinet by appointing Whigs and Conservatives. His position was one of much difficulty. His strict constructionist opinions, which had prevented him from supporting Van Buren, would not allow him to approve a National Bank, and yet he had accepted the Vice-Presidency from a party pledged to establish one. The over hasty declaration of war by the Whigs put a stop to his vacillations, and compelled him to rely upon support from the Democrats. But only a few members of Congress, commonly known as 'the corporal's guard,' recognized Tyler as a leader."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, 2d ed., ch. 15, sect. 2-4.

ALSO IN: L. G. Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, v. 2, ch. 1-4.—C. Colton, *Life and Times of Henry Clay*, ch. 14-15.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 2, ch. 80-85.

A. D. 1842.—Victory of John Quincy Adams in defending the Right of Petition.—"Jan. 21, 1842, Mr. Adams presented a petition from 45 citizens of Haverhill, Mass., praying for the dissolution of the Union, and moved it be referred to a select committee, with instructions to report why the petition should not be granted. There was at once great excitement and members called out, 'Expel him,' 'Censure him.' After a good deal of fruitless endeavor to accomplish something, the House adjourned, and forty or fifty slaveholders met to decide what kind of resolutions should be presented to meet the case. Thomas F. Marshall of Kentucky was selected by this caucus from Congress to propose the resolutions, which were to the effect that for

presenting such a petition to a body each of whom had taken an oath to maintain the Constitution, Mr. Adams was virtually inviting them to perjure themselves, and that therefore he deserved the severest censure. Marshall supported this with a very violent speech. Mr. Wise followed in another. Then Mr. Adams arose and asked the clerk to read the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, being the one which recognizes the right of every people to alter or abolish their form of Government when it ceases to accomplish its ends. He said that those who believed that the present Government was oppressive had the right (according to the Declaration of Independence, on which the whole of our national unity reposes), to petition Congress to do what they believed was desirable; and all that Congress could properly do would be to explain to them why such an act could not be performed. He replied with great severity to Mr. Wise and said that Mr. Wise had come into that Hall a few years before with his hands dripping with the blood of one of his fellow beings. In this he alluded to the part which Mr. Wise had taken in the duel between Mr. Graves of Kentucky, and Cilley of Maine, in which the latter had been killed. As for Mr. Marshall, who had accused him of treason, he spoke of him with great scorn. 'I thank God!' said he 'that the Constitution of my country has defined treason, and has not left it to the puny intellect of this young man from Kentucky to say what it is. If I were the father of this gentleman from Kentucky, I should take him from this House and put him to school where he might study his profession for some years until he became a little better qualified to appear in this place.' Mr. Adams had on his desk a great many books and references prepared for his use by some anti-slavery gentlemen then in Washington; after he had gone on for some time with his speech he was asked how much more time he would probably occupy. He replied 'I believe Mr. Burke took three months for his speech on Warren Hastings' indictment. I think I may probably get through in ninety days, perhaps in less time.' Thereupon they thought it just as well to have the whole thing come to an end and it was moved that the matter should be laid on the table. Mr. Adams consented, and it was done."—J. F. Clarke, *Anti-Slavery Days*, pp. 57-59.

A. D. 1842.—The tariff act. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1842.

A. D. 1842.—The Ashburton Treaty with England.—Settlement of Northeastern boundary questions.—"It was arranged in December by the Peel ministry that Lord Ashburton should be sent to Washington as a special minister from Great Britain, with full powers to settle the boundary, and all other pending disputes with the United States. . . . Ashburton, formerly Alexander Baring, of the eminent banking firm of Baring Brothers, and a son of its original founder, was now an old man, who had retired on a princely fortune, and being indifferent to fame, aspired only to bring these two countries to more friendly terms. Like his father before him, he had tact and plain good sense, and understood well the American character, having married here during his youth. Lord Ashburton arrived early the next April, and on the 13th of June entered upon the duties

of his mission. Maine and Massachusetts, the States most interested in the disputed boundary, sent commissioners of their own to yield an assent in this branch of the business. The whole business as conducted at our capital had an easy and informal character. Webster and Lord Ashburton represented alone their respective governments; no protocols were used, nor formal records; and the correspondence and official interviews went on after a friendly fashion in the heat of summer, and while Congress was holding its long regular session. . . . This Washington or Ashburton treaty, as it is called to this day, bore date of the day [August 9] when it was formally signed. It passed by the Oregon or north-western boundary, a point on which harmony was impossible, and this was the most pregnant omission of all; it passed by the 'Caroline' affair; it ignored, too, the 'Creole' case, for Great Britain would not consent to recognize the American claim of property in human beings. Nor, on the other side, were the debts of delinquent States assumed by the United States, as many British creditors had desired. Mutual extradition in crimes under the law of nations, and the delivery of fugitives from justice, were stipulated. But the two chief features of this treaty were: a settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and the United States on the north-east, extending westward beyond the great lakes, and a cruising convention for the mutual suppression of the slave-trade. As to the north-east territory in dispute, which embraced some 12,000 square miles, seven-twelfths, or about as much as the King of the Netherlands had awarded, were set off to the United States; Great Britain taking the residue and securing the highlands she desired which frowned upon the Canadian Gibraltar, and a clear though circuitous route between Quebec and Halifax. Our government was permitted to carry timber down the St. John's River, and though becoming bound to pay Maine and Massachusetts \$300,000 for the strip of territory relinquished to Great Britain, gained in return Rouse's Point, on Lake Champlain, of which an exact survey would have deprived us. By the cruising convention clause, which the President himself bore a conspicuous part in arranging, the delicate point of 'right of search' was avoided; for instead of trusting Great Britain as the police of other nations for suppressing the African slave-trade, each nation bound itself to do its full duty by keeping up a sufficient squadron on the African coast. It so happened that Great Britain, by softening the old phrase 'right of search' into 'right of visitation,' had been inducing other nations to guarantee this police inspection of suspected slave vessels. In December, 1841, ambassadors of the five great European powers arranged in London a quintuple league of this character. But France, hesitating to confirm such an arrangement, rejected that league when the Ashburton treaty was promulgated, and hastened to negotiate in its place a cruising convention similar to ours on the slave-trade suppression; nor was the right of search, against which America had fought in the war of 1812, ever again invoked, even as a mutual principle, until by 1862 the United States had grown as sincere as Great Britain herself in wishing to crush out the last remnant of the African traffic. This cruising convention, however, left the

abstract question of search untouched, and in that light Sir Robert Peel defended himself in Parliament. The Ashburton treaty was honorable, on the whole, for each side; what it arranged was arranged fairly, and what it omitted was deferred without prejudice. . . . So satisfactory, in fine, was the treaty, despite all criticism, that the Senate ratified it by more than a three-fourths vote, and at a time, too, when the Whig Congress was strongly incensed against the administration, and Webster had made bitter enemies."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the United States*, v. 4, ch. 17, pp. 400–403.

ALSO IN: D. Webster, *Diplomatic and Official Papers*.—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Webster*, ch. 28–29 (v. 2).—*Treaties and Convs bet. the U. S. and other countries* (ed. of 1889), pp. 432–438.—I. Washburn, Jr., *The Northeastern Boundary* (*Maine Hist. Soc. Coll's*, v. 8).

**A. D. 1844.—Fifteenth Presidential Election.—Choice of James K. Polk.**—The Texas treaty of annexation had been held in committee in the Senate "till the national conventions of the two parties should declare themselves. Both conventions met in Baltimore, in May, to name candidates and avow policies. The Whigs were unanimous as to who should be their candidate: it could be no one but Henry Clay. Among the Democrats there was a very strong feeling in favor of the renomination of Van Buren. But both Clay and Van Buren had been asked their opinion about the annexation of Texas, both had declared themselves opposed to any immediate step in that direction, and Van Buren's declaration cost him the Democratic nomination. He could have commanded a very considerable majority in the Democratic convention, but he did not command the two-third's majority required by its rules, and James K. Polk of Tennessee became the nominee of his party." Polk had been Speaker of the House of Representatives, and was honorably though slightly known to the country. The only new issue presented in the party "platforms" was offered by the Democrats in their resolution demanding "the reoccupation of Oregon and the reannexation of Texas, at the earliest practicable period"; and this proved the makeweight in the campaign. . . . The 'Liberty Party,' the political organization of the Abolitionists, commanded now, as it turned out, more than 60,000 votes. . . . Had the 'Liberty' men in New York voted for Clay, he would have been elected."—W. Wilson, *Division and Reunion*, 1829–1889, sect. 73 (ch. 6).—Polk received of the popular votes, 1,337,243, against 1,299,062 cast for Henry Clay, Whig, and 62,300 cast for James G. Birney, candidate of the Liberty Party. Electoral vote: Polk, 170; Clay, 105; Birney, none. George M. Dallas was elected Vice President.

**A. D. 1844–1845.—The annexation of Texas and the agitation preceding it.** See TEXAS: A. D. 1836–1845.

**A. D. 1844–1846.—The Oregon boundary question and its settlement.** See OREGON: A. D. 1844–1846.

**A. D. 1845.—Preserving the equilibrium between Free and Slave States.—Admission of Iowa and Florida.**—"The slave-masters . . . had long pretended that the equilibrium between the free and slave States must be preserved at all hazards, and twice had they resorted to the violent device of arbitrarily linking two measures



that had nothing in common for that purpose,—in 1820 combining the bills for the admission of Missouri and Maine, and in 1836 those for the admission of Michigan and Arkansas. In pursuance of the same purpose and line of policy, they were now unwilling to receive without a consideration the free State of Iowa, which had framed a constitution in the autumn of 1844, and was asking for admission. Some makeweight must be found before this application could be complied with. This they managed to discover in an old constitution, framed by the Territory of Florida five years before. Though Florida was greatly deficient in numbers, and her constitution was very objectionable in some of its features, they seized this occasion to press its claims, and to make its admission a condition precedent to their consent that Iowa should be received. The House Committee on Territories reported in favor of the admission of the two in a single measure. In the closing hours of the XXVIIIth Congress the bill came up for consideration. . . . The constitution of Florida not only expressly denied to the legislature the power to emancipate slaves, but gave it the authority to prevent free colored persons from immigrating into the State, or from being discharged from vessels in her ports." All attempts to require an amendment of the Florida constitution in these particulars before recognizing that ill-populated territory as a State, were defeated, and the bill admitting Florida and Iowa became a law on the 3d of March, 1845.—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 2, ch. 1.

**A. D. 1845-1846.—The Slavery question in the Democratic Party.—Hunkers and Barnburners.—The Wilmot Proviso.**—"With Polk's accession and the Mexican war, the schism in the Democratic ranks over the extension of American slave territory became plainer. Even during the canvass of 1844 a circular had been issued by William Cullen Bryant, David Dudley Field, John W. Edmonds, and other Van Buren men, supporting Polk, but urging the choice of congressmen opposed to annexation. Early in the new administration the division of New York Democrats into 'Barnburners' and 'Old Hunkers' appeared. The former were the strong pro-Van Buren, anti-Texas men, or 'radical Democrats,' who were likened to the farmer who burned his barn to clear it of rats. The latter were the 'northern men with southern principles,' the supporters of annexation, and the respectable, dull men of easy consciences, who were said to hanker after the offices. The Barnburners were led by men of really eminent ability and exalted character: Silas Wright, then governor, Benjamin F. Butler, John A. Dix, chosen in 1845 to the United States senate, Azariah C. Flagg, the famous comptroller, and John Van Buren, the ex-president's son. . . . Daniel S. Dickinson and William L. Marcy were the chief figures in the Hunker ranks. Polk seemed inclined, at the beginning, to favor, or at least to placate, the Barnburners. . . . Jackson's death in June, 1845, deprived the Van Buren men of the tremendous moral weight which his name carried, and which might have daunted Polk. It perhaps also helped to loosen the weight of party ties on the Van Buren men. After this the schism rapidly grew. In the fall election of 1845 the Barnburners pretty thoroughly con-

trolled the Democratic party of the state [of New York] in hostility to the Mexican war, which the annexation of Texas had now brought. Samuel J. Tilden of Columbia county, and a profound admirer of Van Buren, became one of their younger leaders. Now arose the strife over the 'Wilmot proviso,' in which was embodied the opposition to the extension of slavery into new territories. Upon this proviso the modern Republican party was formed eight years later; upon it, fourteen years later, Abraham Lincoln was chosen president; and upon it began the war for the Union, out of whose throes came the vastly grander and unsought beneficence of complete emancipation. David Wilmot was a Democratic member of Congress from Pennsylvania; in New York he would have been a Barnburner. In 1846 a bill was pending to appropriate \$3,000,000 for use by the president in a purchase of territory from Mexico as part of a peace. Wilmot proposed an amendment that slavery should be excluded from any territory so acquired. All the Democratic members, as well as the Whigs from New York, and most strongly the Van Buren or Wright men, supported the proviso. The Democratic legislature [of New York] approved it by the votes of the Whigs with the Barnburners and the Soft Hunkers, the latter being Hunkers less friendly to slavery. It passed the house at Washington, but was rejected by the senate."—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 11.—In the slang nomenclature which New York politics have always produced with great fertility Hard-Shell and Soft-Shell were terms often used instead of Hunker and Barnburner.

**A. D. 1846.—The Walker Tariff.** See **TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1846-1861.**

**A. D. 1846-1847.—War with Mexico.—Conquest of California and New Mexico.** See **MEXICO: A. D. 1846; 1846-1847; and 1847; also, CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1846-1847; and NEW MEXICO: A. D. 1846.**

**A. D. 1847.—Calhoun's aggressive policy of agitation, forcing the Slavery issue upon the North.—His program of disunion.**—"On Friday, the 19th of February [1847], Mr. Calhoun introduced into the Senate his new slavery resolutions, prefaced by an elaborate speech, and requiring an immediate vote upon them. They were in these words: 'Resolved, That the territories of the United States belong to the several States composing this Union, and are held by them as their joint and common property. Resolved, That Congress, as the joint agent and representative of the States of this Union, has no right to make any law, or do any act whatever, that shall directly, or by its effects, make any discrimination between the States of this Union, by which any of them shall be deprived of its full and equal right in any territory of the United States acquired or to be acquired. Resolved, That the enactment of any law which should directly, or by its effects, deprive the citizens of any of the States of this Union from emigrating, with their property, into any of the territories of the United States, will make such discrimination, and would, therefore, be a violation of the constitution, and the rights of the States from which such citizens emigrated, and in derogation of that perfect equality which belongs to them as members of this Union, and would tend directly to subvert the Union itself. Resolved,

That it is a fundamental principle in our political creed, that a people, in forming a constitution, have the unconditional right to form and adopt the government which they may think best calculated to secure their liberty, prosperity, and happiness; and that, in conformity thereto, no other condition is imposed by the federal constitution on a State, in order to be admitted into this Union, except that its constitution shall be republican; and that the imposition of any other by Congress would not only be in violation of the constitution, but in direct conflict with the principle on which our political system rests.' These resolutions, although the sense is involved in circumlocutory phrases, are intelligible to the point, that Congress has no power to prohibit slavery in a territory, and that the exercise of such a power would be a breach of the constitution, and leading to the subversion of the Union. . . . Mr. Calhoun demanded the prompt consideration of his resolutions, giving notice that he would call them up the next day and press them to a speedy and final vote. He did call them up, but never called for the vote, nor was any ever had. . . . In the course of this year, and some months after the submission of his resolutions in the Senate denying the right of Congress to abolish slavery in a territory, Mr. Calhoun wrote a letter to a member of the Alabama Legislature, which furnishes the key to unlock his whole system of policy in relation to the slavery agitation, and its designs, from his first taking up the business in Congress in the year 1835, down to the date of the letter; and thereafter. The letter was in reply to one asking his opinion 'as to the steps which should be taken' to guard the rights of the South. . . . It opens with this paragraph: 'I am much gratified with the tone and views of your letter, and concur entirely in the opinion you express, that instead of shunning, we ought to court the issue with the North on the slavery question. I would even go one step further, and add that it is our duty—due to ourselves, to the Union, and our political institutions, to force the issue on the North. We are now stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally. Unless we bring on the issue, delay to us will be dangerous indeed. It is the true policy of those enemies who seek our destruction. Its effects are, and have been, and will be to weaken us politically and morally, and to strengthen them. Such has been my opinion from the first. Had the South, or even my own State backed me, I would have forced the issue on the North in 1835, when the spirit of abolitionism first developed itself to any considerable extent. It is a true maxim, to meet danger on the frontier, in politics as well as war. Thus thinking, I am of the impression, that if the South act as it ought, the Wilmot Proviso, instead of proving to be the means of successfully assailing us and our peculiar institution, may be made the occasion of successfully asserting our equality and rights, by enabling us to force the issue on the North. Something of the kind was indispensable to rouse and unite the South. On the contrary, if we should not meet it as we ought, I fear, greatly fear, our doom will be fixed. It would prove that we either have not the sense or spirit to defend ourselves and our institutions.' The phrase 'forcing the issue' is here used too often, and for a purpose too obvious, to need

remark. The reference to his movement in 1835 confirms all that was said of that movement at the time by senators from both sections of the Union. . . . At that time Mr. Calhoun characterized his movement as defensive—as done in a spirit of self-defence: it was then characterized by senators as aggressive and offensive: and it is now declared in this letter to have been so. He was then openly told that he was playing into the hands of the abolitionists, and giving them a champion to contend with, and the elevated theatre of the American Senate for the dissemination of their doctrines, and the production of agitation and sectional division. All that is now admitted, with a lamentation that the South, and not even his own State, would stand by him then in forcing the issue. So that chance was lost. Another was now presented. The Wilmot Proviso, so much deprecated in public, is privately saluted as a fortunate event, giving another chance for forcing the issue. The letter proceeds: 'But in making up the issue, we must look far beyond the proviso. It is but one of many acts of aggression, and, in my opinion, by no means the most dangerous or degrading, though more striking and palpable.' . . . So that, while this proviso was, publicly, the Pandora's box which filled the Union with evil, and while it was to Mr. Calhoun and his friends the theme of endless deprecation, it was secretly cherished as a means of keeping up discord, and forcing the issue between the North and the South. Mr. Calhoun then proceeds to the serious question of disunion, and of the manner in which the issue could be forced. 'This brings up the question, how can it be so met, without resorting to the dissolution of the Union? . . . There is, in my opinion, but one way in which it can be met; and that is . . . by retaliation.' . . . Then follows an argument to justify retaliation. . . . Retaliation by closing the ports of the State against the commerce of the offending State: and this called a constitutional remedy, and a remedy short of disunion. . . . The letter proceeds with further instructions upon the manner of executing the retaliation: 'My impression is, that it should be restricted to sea-going vessels, which would leave open the trade of the valley of the Mississippi to New Orleans by river, and to the other Southern cities by railroad; and tend thereby to detach the North-western from the North-eastern States.' . . . This confidential letter from Mr. Calhoun to a member of the Alabama legislature of 1847, has come to light, to furnish the key which unlocks his whole system of slavery agitation which he commenced in the year 1835. That system was to force issues upon the North under the pretext of self-defence, and to sectionalize the South, preparatory to disunion, through the instrumentality of sectional conventions, composed wholly of delegates from the slaveholding States.'—T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, v. 2, ch. 167-168.

A. D. 1848.—Peace with Mexico.—The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.—The acquisition of Territory. See MEXICO: A. D. 1848.

A. D. 1848.—Admission of Wisconsin into the Union. See WISCONSIN: A. D. 1805-1848.

A. D. 1848.—Increased reservation of public lands for School support. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1880.



**A. D. 1848.—The Free Soil Convention at Buffalo and its nominations.**—The “Barnburner” Democrats of New York, or Free Soilers as they began to be called, met in convention at Utica, February 16, 1848, and chose delegates to the approaching national Democratic Convention at Baltimore. In April the Barnburner members of the Legislature issued an elaborate address, setting forth the Free Soil principles of the Democratic fathers. The authors of the address were afterwards known to be Samuel J. Tilden and Martin and John Van Buren. The national Democratic Convention assembled in May, 1848. “It offered to admit the Barnburner and Hunker delegations together to cast the vote of the State. The Barnburners rejected the compromise as a simple nullification of the vote of the State, and then withdrew. Lewis Cass was nominated for president, the Wilmot proviso being thus emphatically condemned. For Cass had declared in favor of letting the new territories themselves decide upon slavery. The Barnburners, returning to a great meeting in the City Hall Park at New York, cried ‘The lash has resounded through the halls of the Capitol!’ and condemned the cowardice of northern senators who had voted with the South. . . . The delegates issued an address written by Tilden, fearlessly calling Democrats to independent action. In June a Barnburner convention met at Utica,” which named Van Buren for the Presidency and called a national convention of all Free Soilers to meet at Buffalo, August 9, 1848. “Charles Francis Adams, the son of John Quincy Adams, presided at the Buffalo convention; and in it Joshua R. Giddings, the famous abolitionist, and Salmon P. Chase, were conspicuous. To the unspeakable horror of every Hunker there participated in the deliberations a negro, the Rev. Mr. Ward. Butler [Benjamin F., of New York], reported the resolutions in words whose inspiration is still fresh and ringing. . . . At the close were the stirring and memorable words: ‘We inscribe on our banner, Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Men; and under it we will fight on and fight ever, until a triumphant victory shall reward our exertions.’ Joshua Leavitt of Massachusetts, one of the ‘blackest’ of abolitionists, reported to the convention the name of Martin Van Buren for president.” The nomination was acclaimed with enthusiasm, and Charles Francis Adams was nominated for vice-president. “In September, John A. Dix, then a Democratic senator, accepted the Free-soil nomination for governor of New York. The Democratic party was aghast. The schismatics had suddenly gained great dignity and importance. . . . The Whigs had in June nominated Taylor, one of the two heroes of the Mexican war. . . . The anti-slavery Whigs hesitated for a time; but Seward of New York and Horace Greeley in the New York Tribune finally led most of them to Taylor, rather than, as Seward said, engage in ‘guerrilla warfare’ under Van Buren. . . . This launching of the modern Republican party was, strangely enough, to include in New York few besides Democrats.”—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 11.—“The Buffalo Convention was one of the more important upheavals in the process of political disintegration which went steadily on between the years 1844, when the ‘Birneyites’ deprived Henry Clay of the electoral vote of

New York, and 1856, when the Whig party disappeared, and the pro-slavery Democracy found itself confronted by the anti-slavery Republican organization of the North. In 1848, though the Whig party was already doomed, its time had not yet come. The Free Soil movement of 1848 was, therefore, premature; and moreover, as the result afterwards showed, there was something almost ludicrous in a combination of ‘Conscience Whigs’ of Massachusetts, in revolt over the nomination of the slave-owning General Taylor, with the ‘Barnburning’ Democrats of New York, intent only upon avenging on Cass the defeat of Van Buren. None the less the Free Soil movement of 1848 clearly foreshadowed the Republican uprising of 1856, and of the men who took part in the Buffalo convention an unusually large proportion afterwards became prominent as political leaders.”—C. F. Adams, *Richard Henry Dana*, v. 1, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 2, ch. 13.—J. W. Schuckers, *Life of Salmon P. Chase*, ch. 11.—R. B. Warden, *Life of Salmon P. Chase*, ch. 21.

**A. D. 1848-1849.—Sixteenth Presidential Election.—Inauguration and death of General Taylor.**—In the Presidential election of 1848, the Democratic party put forward as its candidate Lewis Cass; the Whigs named General Zachary Taylor; and the Free Soil Party placed Martin Van Buren in nomination. That the Whig Party should again have set aside its distinguished leader, Henry Clay, caused great grief among his devoted followers and friends. “But there were those in it who had grown gray in waiting for office under the banner of Mr. Clay, and whose memories were refreshed with what was effected by the éclat of military glory under General Jackson. It was hard, and might seem ungrateful, to abandon a great and long-tried leader. But the military feather waved before their eyes, and they were tempted. . . . It needed a leader, or a few leaders to give the signal of defection; and they were not wanting. One after another of the great names of the party fell off from Mr. Clay and inclined to General Taylor; and when the national Whig Convention met at Philadelphia, in June, 1848, to nominate a candidate for the Presidency, the first ballot showed that seven out of twelve of the Kentucky delegation, against the expectations and wishes of their constituency, had deserted Mr. Clay, and gone over to General Taylor. The influence of this fact was great—perhaps decisive. For if Mr. Clay’s own State was against him, what could be expected of the other States? On the fourth ballot General Taylor had 52 majority, and was declared the nominee. . . . In November following, General Taylor was elected President of the United States, and Millard Fillmore Vice-President. As in the case of General Harrison, who died in thirty days after his inauguration, so in the case of General Taylor . . . he, too, died in sixteen months after he had entered on the duties of his office.”—C. Colton, *Life, Corr. and Speeches of Henry Clay*, v. 3, ch. 4.—The popular vote cast at the election was, for Taylor, 1,360,099; Cass, 1,220,544; for Van Buren, 291,263. The electoral vote was, for Taylor, 163; for Cass, 127; for Van Buren, none. Millard Fillmore, elected Vice President, succeeded to the Presidency on the death of General Taylor, July 9, 1850.—O. O. Howard, *General Taylor*, ch. 21-24.

**A. D. 1850.—The Seventh Census.**—Total population, 23,191,876, nearly 36 per cent. greater than in 1840. The remnant of slavery in the northern States which appears in this census, still lingering in New Jersey, was not quite extinguished in the succeeding decade. The classification and distribution of population was as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
California .....	91,635	962	....
Connecticut.....	363,099	7,693	....
Illinois .....	846,034	5,436	....
Indiana .....	977,154	11,262	....
Iowa.....	191,881	333	....
Maine.....	581,813	1,356	....
Massachusetts...	985,450	9,064	....
Michigan.....	395,071	2,583	....
Minnesota.....	6,038	39	....
New Hampshire..	317,456	520	....
New Jersey.....	465,509	23,810	236
New York.....	3,048,325	49,069	....
Ohio.....	1,955,050	25,279	....
Oregon.....	13,087	207	....
Pennsylvania...	2,258,160	53,626	....
Rhode Island....	143,875	3,670	....
Utah.....	11,354	....	26
Vermont.....	313,402	718	....
Wisconsin.....	304,756	635	....
	13,269,149	196,262	262
	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama.....	426,514	2,265	342,844
Arkansas.....	162,189	608	47,100
Delaware.....	71,169	18,073	2,290
District of Colum- bia.....	37,941	10,059	3,687
Florida.....	47,203	932	39,310
Georgia.....	521,572	2,931	381,682
Kentucky.....	761,413	10,011	210,981
Louisiana.....	255,491	17,462	244,809
Maryland.....	417,943	74,723	90,368
Mississippi.....	295,718	930	309,878
Missouri.....	592,004	2,618	87,422
New Mexico.....	61,547	....	....
North Carolina..	553,028	27,463	288,548
South Carolina..	274,563	8,960	384,984
Tennessee.....	756,836	6,422	239,459
Texas.....	154,034	397	58,161
Virginia.....	894,800	54,333	472,528
	6,283,965	238,187	3,204,051

The immigration in the decade preceding this census had risen to 1,713,251 in number of persons, 1,047,763 coming from the British Islands (mostly from Ireland), and 549,739 from other parts of Europe.

**A. D. 1850 (March).**—Henry Clay's last "Compromise."—California, and the Fugitive Slave Law.—Webster's 7th of March Speech and Seward's Declaration of the "Higher Law."—"In 1848 gold was discovered in California. The tide of adventurers poured in. They had no slaves to take with them and no desire to acquire any. In less than a year the newly gathered people outnumbered the population of some of the smaller states. They organized a state government with an anti-slavery constitution, and demanded admission into the Union. True, the greater part of the proposed state lies north of 36° 30' [the

dividing line of the Missouri Compromise], but its climate, tempered by the Pacific Ocean, is of rare mildness. If any part of the newly acquired territory should be opened to slavery, it seemed that California was the part best suited for it. If California repelled slavery, there was small hope that the remainder of the new territory would embrace it. Congress debated for ten months over the admission of California. The threatened inequality in numbers of the free and slave states was the central subject of contention, and the Union seemed again in danger of disruption."—J. S. Landon, *Const. Hist. and Gov't of the U. S.*, lect. 8.—"One day toward the close of January [January 29, 1850], Henry Clay rose from his chair in the Senate Chamber, and waving a roll of papers, with dramatic eloquence and deep feeling, announced to a hushed auditory that he held in his hand a series of resolutions proposing an amicable arrangement of all questions growing out of the subject of slavery. Read and explained by its author this plan of compromise was to admit California, and to establish territorial governments in New Mexico, and the other portions of the regions acquired from Mexico, without any provisions for or against slavery—to pay the debt of Texas and fix her western boundary—to declare that it was 'inexpedient' to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, but 'expedient' to put some restrictions on the slave trade there, to pass a new and more stringent fugitive slave law, and to formally deny that Congress had any power to obstruct the slave trade between the States. Upon this plan of compromise and the modifications afterward made in it, began that long debate, since become historic, which engrossed the attention of Congress and the country for eight weary months. At the outset, many of those who had threatened 'Disunion,' opposed 'Clay's Compromise,' because it did not go far enough, while the 'Wilmot Proviso' men were equally resolute in opposing it, because it went too far. Seward with many other Northern Whigs, adhered to the 'President's Plan' [which simply favored the admission of California and New Mexico under constitutions which he had invited their people to frame], as being a much more just and speedy way of solving the problem. Avowing himself untrifled by the threats of 'Disunion,' he insisted that neither 'Compromise' nor the 'Fugitive Slave Law' was necessary, and that it was both the right and the duty of Congress to admit the Territories as free States, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and the slave trade between the States. Southern feeling was predominant in the Senate Chamber, as it had been for many years. Neither of the two great parties was opposed to slavery, and the recognized leaders of both were men of Southern birth. . . . Mr. Clay's resolutions, unsatisfactory as they were, to anti-slavery men, at first met with objections from Southern members. One 'deeply regretted the admission that slavery did not exist in the territories.' Several would 'never assent to the doctrine that slaveholders could not go there, taking their property with them.' Some questioned the validity of the Mexican decree, abolishing slavery in New Spain, and doubted the constitutionality of any attempt on the part of Congress to exclude it. Prognostications and threats of 'disunion' were



freely made. On the other hand, there began to be signs of a growing disposition, on the part of many Northern men, to give up the 'Proviso' for the sake of peace; and to follow the lead of Mr. Clay. Conservative Southern Whigs were quite ready to meet these half way. Seward's position was regarded as 'ultra' by both classes; and it not unfrequently happened that, on questions in the Senate relating to slavery, only three Senators, Seward, Chase, and Hale, would be found voting together, on one side, while all the other Senators present were arrayed against them, on the other. Newspapers, received from all parts of the country, showed that elsewhere, as well as at the capital, the proposed compromise was an engrossing topic. Great meetings were held at the North in support of it. State Legislatures took ground, for and against it. Fresh fuel was added to the heated discussion by a new 'Fugitive Slave Law,' introduced by Senator Mason of Virginia, and by the talk of Southern Conventions, and 'Secret Southern Caucuses.' . . . March was an eventful month. Time enough had elapsed for each Senator to receive, from the press and people of his State, their response, in regard to Clay's proposed compromise. Resolutions pro and con had come from different Legislatures. . . . Each of the leaders in senatorial debate felt that the hour had come for him to declare whether he was for or against it. . . . Mr. Calhoun, though in failing health, obtained the floor for a speech. Everybody awaited it with great interest, regarding him as the acknowledged exponent of Southern opinion. . . . An expectant throng filled the Senate Chamber. His gaunt figure and attenuated features attested that he had risen from a sick bed; but his fiery eyes and unshaken voice showed he had no intention of abandoning the contest. In a few words he explained that his health would not permit him to deliver the speech he had prepared, but that 'his friend the Senator behind him (Mason) would read it for him.' Beginning by saying that he had 'believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in "disunion,"'—the speech opposed Clay's plan of adjustment; attacked the President's plan; adverted to the growing feeling that the South could not remain in Union 'with safety and honor'; pointed out the gradual snapping, one after another, of the links which held the Union together, and expressed the most gloomy forebodings for the future. Three days later a similar, or greater, throng gathered to listen to Webster's great '7th of March speech,' which has ever since been recorded as marking an era in his life. He rose from his seat near the middle of the chamber, wearing his customary blue coat with metal buttons, and with one hand thrust into the buff vest, stood during his opening remarks, as impassive as a statue; but growing slightly more animated as he proceeded. Calm, clear, and powerful, his sonorous utterances, while they disappointed thousands of his friends at the North, lent new vigor to the 'Compromisers,' with whom, it was seen, he would henceforth act."—F. W. Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 1846-1861, ch. 16.—The first and longer part of Mr. Webster's speech was an historical review of the slavery question, and an argument maintaining the proposition, as he afterwards

stated it in a few words, that there is "not a square rod of territory belonging to the United States the character of which, for slavery, or no slavery is not already fixed by some irrevocable law." The concluding part of his speech contained the passages which caused most grief among and gave most offense to his friends and admirers at the North. They are substantially comprised in the quotations following,—together with his eloquent declamation against the thought of secession: "Mr. President, in the excited times in which we live, there is found to exist a state of crimination and recrimination between the North and South. There are lists of grievances produced by each; and those grievances, real or supposed, alienate the minds of one portion of the country from the other, exasperate the feelings, and subdue the sense of fraternal affection, patriotic love, and mutual regard. I shall bestow a little attention, Sir, upon these various grievances existing on the one side and on the other. I begin with complaints of the South. I will not answer, further than I have, the general statements of the honorable Senator from South Carolina, that the North has prospered at the expense of the South in consequence of the manner of administering this government, in the collecting of its revenues, and so forth. These are disputed topics, and I have no inclination to enter into them. But I will allude to other complaints of the South, and especially to one which has in my opinion just foundation; and that is, that there has been found at the North, among individuals and among legislators, a disinclination to perform fully their constitutional duties in regard to the return of persons bound to service who have escaped into the free States. In that respect, the South, in my judgment, is right, and the North is wrong. Every member of every Northern legislature is bound by oath, like every other officer in the country, to support the Constitution of the United States; and the article of the Constitution which says to these States that they shall deliver up fugitives from service is as binding in honor and conscience as any other article. No man fulfils his duty in any legislature who sets himself to find excuses, evasions, escapes from this constitutional obligation. I have always thought that the Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures of the States or to the States themselves. It says that those persons escaping to other States 'shall be delivered up,' and I confess I have always been of the opinion that it was an injunction upon the States themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into another State, and coming therefore within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be delivered up, it seems to me the import of the clause is, that the State itself, in obedience to the Constitution, shall cause him to be delivered up. That is my judgment. I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now. But when the subject, some years ago, was before the Supreme Court of the United States, the majority of the judges held that the power to cause fugitives from service to be delivered up was a power to be exercised under the authority of this government. I do not know, on the whole, that it may not have been a fortunate decision. My habit is to respect the result of judicial deliberations and the solemnity of judicial decisions. As it now stands, the business of seeing

that these fugitives are delivered up resides in the power of Congress and the national judicature, and my friend at the head of the Judiciary Committee has a bill on the subject now before the Senate, which with some amendments to it, I propose to support, with all its provisions, to the fullest extent. And I desire to call the attention of all sober-minded men at the North, of all conscientious men, of all men who are not carried away by some fanatical idea or some false impression, to their constitutional obligations. I put it to all the sober and sound minds at the North as a question of morals and a question of conscience. What right have they, in their legislative capacity or any other capacity, to endeavor to get round this Constitution, or to embarrass the free exercise of the rights secured by the Constitution to the persons whose slaves escape from them? None at all; none at all. Neither in the forum of conscience, nor before the face of the Constitution, are they, in my opinion, justified in such an attempt. . . . I repeat, therefore, Sir, that here is a well-founded ground of complaint against the North, which ought to be removed, which it is now in the power of the different departments of this government to remove; which calls for the enactment of proper laws authorizing the judicature of this government, in the several States, to do all that is necessary for the recapture of fugitive slaves and for their restoration to those who claim them. . . . Complaint has been made against certain resolutions that emanate from legislatures at the North, and are sent here to us, not only on the subject of slavery in this District, but sometimes recommending Congress to consider the means of abolishing slavery in the States. I should be sorry to be called upon to present any resolutions here which could not be referable to any committee or any power in Congress; and therefore I should be unwilling to receive from the legislature of Massachusetts any instructions to present resolutions expressive of any opinion whatever on the subject of slavery, as it exists at the present moment in the States, for two reasons: first, because I do not consider that the legislature of Massachusetts has anything to do with it; and next, because I do not consider that I, as her representative here, have anything to do with it. It has become, in my opinion, quite too common; and if the legislatures of the States do not like that opinion, they have a great deal more power to put it down than I have to uphold it; it has become in my opinion quite too common a practice for the State legislatures to present resolutions here on all subjects and to instruct us on all subjects. There is no public man that requires instruction more than I do, or who requires information more than I do, or desires it more heartily; but I do not like to have it in too imperative a shape. . . . Then Sir, there are the Abolition societies, of which I am unwilling to speak, but in regard to which I have very clear notions and opinions. I do not think them useful. I think their operations for the last twenty years have produced nothing good or valuable. At the same time, I believe thousands of their members to be honest and good men, perfectly well-meaning men. They have excited feelings; they think they must do something for the cause of liberty; and, in their sphere of action, they do not see what else they can do than to contribute to an Abolition press, or an Abolition society,

or to pay an Abolition lecturer. I do not mean to impute gross motives even to the leaders of these societies, but I am not blind to the consequences of their proceedings. I cannot but see what mischiefs their interference with the South has produced. And is it not plain to every man? Let any gentleman who entertains doubts on this point recur to the debates in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1832, and he will see with what freedom a proposition made by Mr. Jefferson Randolph for the gradual abolition of slavery was discussed in that body. Every one spoke of slavery as he thought; very ignominious and disparaging names and epithets were applied to it. The debates in the House of Delegates on that occasion, I believe, were all published. They were read by every colored man who could read, and to those who could not read, those debates were read by others. At that time Virginia was not unwilling or afraid to discuss this question, and to let that part of her population know as much of the discussion as they could learn. That was in 1832. As has been said by the honorable member from South Carolina, these Abolition societies commenced their course of action in 1835. It is said, I do not know how true it may be, that they sent incendiary publications into the slave States; at any rate, they attempted to arouse, and did arouse, a very strong feeling; in other words they created great agitation in the North against Southern slavery. Well, what was the result? The bonds of the slaves were bound more firmly than before, their rivets were more strongly fastened. Public opinion, which in Virginia had begun to be exhibited against slavery, and was opening out for the discussion of the question, drew back and shut itself up in its castle. I wish to know whether any body in Virginia can now talk openly as Mr. Randolph, Governor McDowell, and others talked in 1832, and sent their remarks to the press? We all know the fact, and we all know the cause; and everything that these agitating people have done has been, not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind faster, the slave population of the South. Again, Sir, the violence of the Northern press is complained of. The press violent! Why, Sir, the press is violent everywhere. There are outrageous reproaches in the North against the South, and there are reproaches as vehement in the South against the North. Sir, the extremists of both parts of this country are violent; they mistake loud and violent talk for eloquence and for reason. They think that he who talks loudest reasons best. And this we must expect, when the press is free, as it is here, and I trust always will be. . . . Well, in all this I see no solid grievance, no grievance presented by the South, within the redress of the government, but the single one to which I have referred; and that is, the want of a proper regard to the injunction of the Constitution for the delivery of fugitive slaves. There are also complaints of the North against the South. I need not go over them particularly. The first and gravest is, that the North adopted the Constitution, recognizing the existence of slavery in the States, and recognizing the right, to a certain extent, of the representation of slaves in Congress, under a state of sentiment and expectation which does not now exist; and that, by events, by circumstances, by the eagerness of



the South to acquire territory and extend her slave population, the North finds itself, in regard to the relative influence of the South and the North, of the free States and the slave States, where it never did expect to find itself when they agreed to the compact of the Constitution. They complain, therefore, that, instead of slavery being regarded as an evil, as it was then, an evil which all hoped would be extinguished gradually, it is now regarded by the South as an institution to be cherished, and preserved, and extended; an institution which the South has already extended to the utmost of her power by the acquisition of new territory. Well, then, passing from that, every body in the North reads; and every body reads whatsoever the newspapers contain; and the newspapers, some of them, especially those presses to which I have alluded, are careful to spread about among the people every reproachful sentiment uttered by any Southern man bearing at all against the North; every thing that is calculated to exasperate and to alienate; and there are many such things, as every body will admit, from the South, or some portion of it, which are disseminated among the reading people; and they do exasperate, and alienate, and produce a most mischievous effect upon the public mind at the North. Sir, I would not notice things of this sort appearing in obscure quarters; but one thing has occurred in this debate which struck me very forcibly. An honorable member from Louisiana addressed us the other day on this subject. I suppose there is not a more amiable and worthy gentleman in this chamber, nor a gentleman who would be more slow to give offence to any body, and he did not mean in his remarks to give offence. But what did he say? Why, Sir, he took pains to run a contrast between the slaves of the South and the laboring people of the North, giving the preference, in all points of condition, and comfort, and happiness, to the slaves of the South. The honorable member, doubtless, did not suppose that he gave any offence, or did any injustice. He was merely expressing his opinion. But does he know how remarks of that sort will be received by the laboring people of the North? Why, who are the laboring people of the North? They are the whole North. They are the people who till their own farms with their own hands; freeholders, educated men, independent men. Let me say, Sir, that five sixths of the whole property of the North is in the hands of the laborers of the North; they cultivate their farms, they educate their children, they provide the means of independence. . . . There is a more tangible and irritating cause of grievance at the North. Free blacks are constantly employed in the vessels of the North, generally as cooks or stewards. When the vessel arrives at a Southern port, these free colored men are taken on shore, by the police or municipal authority, imprisoned, and kept in prison till the vessel is again ready to sail. This is not only irritating, but exceedingly unjustifiable and oppressive. Mr. Hoar's mission, some time ago, to South Carolina, was a well-intended effort to remove this cause of complaint. The North thinks such imprisonments illegal and unconstitutional; and as the cases occur constantly and frequently, they regard it as a great grievance. Now, Sir, so far as any of these grievances have their foundation

in matters of law, they can be redressed, and ought to be redressed; and so far as they have their foundation in matters of opinion, in sentiment, in mutual crimination and recrimination, all that we can do is to endeavor to allay the agitation, and cultivate a better feeling and more fraternal sentiments between the South and the North. Mr. President, I should much prefer to have heard from every member on this floor declarations of opinion that this Union could never be dissolved, than the declaration of opinion by any body, that, in any case, under the pressure of any circumstances, such a dissolution was possible. I hear with distress and anguish the word 'secession,' especially when it falls from the lips of those who are patriotic, and known to the country, and known all over the world, for their political services. Secession! Peaceable secession! Sir, your eyes and mine are never destined to see that miracle. The dismemberment of this vast country without convulsion! The breaking up of the fountains of the great deep without ruffling the surface! Who is so foolish, I beg every body's pardon, as to expect to see any such thing? Sir, he who sees these States, now revolving in harmony around a common centre, and expects to see them quit their places and fly off without convulsion, may look the next hour to see the heavenly bodies rush from their spheres, and jostle against each other in the realms of space, without causing the wreck of the universe. There can be no such thing as a peaceable secession. Peaceable secession is an utter impossibility. Is the great Constitution under which we live, covering this whole country, is it to be thawed and melted away by secession, as the snows on the mountain melt under the influence of a vernal sun, disappear almost unobserved, and run off? No, Sir! No, Sir! I will not state what might produce the disruption of the Union; but, Sir, I see as plainly as I see the sun in heaven what that disruption itself must produce; I see that it must produce war, and such a war as I will not describe, in its twofold character. Peaceable secession! Peaceable secession! The concurrent agreement of all the members of this great republic to separate! A voluntary separation, with alimony on one side and on the other. Why, what would be the result? Where is the line to be drawn? What States are to secede? What is to remain American? What am I to be? An American no longer? Am I to become a sectional man, a local man, a separatist, with no country in common with the gentlemen who sit around me here, or who fill the other house of Congress? Heaven forbid! Where is the flag of the republic to remain? Where is the eagle still to tower? or is he to cower, and shrink, and fall to the ground? Why, Sir, our ancestors, our fathers, and our grandfathers, those of them that are yet living amongst us with prolonged lives, would rebuke and reproach us; and our children and our grandchildren would cry out shame upon us, if we of this generation should dishonor these ensigns of the power of the government and the harmony of that Union which is every day felt among us with so much joy and gratitude. . . . Sir, nobody can look over the face of this country at the present moment, nobody can see where its population is the most dense and growing, without being ready to admit, and compelled to admit, that ere long the strength of America

will be in the Valley of the Mississippi. Well, now, Sir, I beg to inquire what the wildest enthusiast has to say on the possibility of cutting that river in two, and leaving free States at its source and on its branches, and slave States down near its mouth, each forming a separate government? . . . To break up this great government! to dismember this glorious country! To astonish Europe with an act of folly such as Europe for two centuries has never beheld in any government or any people! No, Sir! no, Sir! There will be no secession! Gentlemen are not serious when they talk of secession."—Daniel Webster, *Works*, v. 5, p. 324.—"The speech, if exactly defined, is, in reality, a powerful effort, not for compromise or for the Fugitive Slave Law, or any other one thing, but to arrest the whole anti-slavery movement, and in that way put an end to the dangers which threatened the Union and restore lasting harmony between the jarring sections. It was a mad project. Mr. Webster might as well have attempted to stay the incoming tide at Marshfield with a rampart of sand as to seek to check the anti-slavery movement by a speech. Nevertheless, he produced a great effect. . . . The blow fell with terrible force, and here . . . we come to the real mischief which was wrought. The 7th of March speech demoralized New England and the whole North. The abolitionists showed by bitter anger the pain, disappointment, and dismay which this speech brought. The Free-Soil party quivered and sank for the moment beneath the shock. The whole anti-slavery movement recoiled. The conservative reaction which Mr. Webster endeavored to produce came and triumphed. Chiefly by his exertions the compromise policy was accepted and sustained by the country. The conservative elements everywhere rallied to his support, and by his ability and eloquence it seemed as if he had prevailed and brought the people over to his opinions. It was a wonderful tribute to his power and influence, but the triumph was hollow and short-lived. He had attempted to compass an impossibility. Nothing could kill the principles of human liberty, not even a speech by Daniel Webster, backed by all his intellect and knowledge, his eloquence and his renown. The anti-slavery movement was checked for the time, and pro-slavery democracy, the only other positive political force, reigned supreme. But amid the falling ruins of the Whig party, and the evanescent success of the Native Americans, the party of human rights revived; and when it rose again, taught by the trials and misfortunes of 1850, it rose with a strength which Mr. Webster had never dreamed of."—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, ch. 9.—"A public meeting in Faneuil Hall condemned the action of Webster. Theodore Parker, who was one of the principal speakers, said: 'I know no deed in American history done by a son of New England to which I can compare this but the act of Benedict Arnold. . . . The only reasonable way in which we can estimate this speech is as a bid for the presidency.' In the main, the Northern Whig press condemned the salient points of the speech. . . . Whittier, in a song of plaintive vehemence called 'Ichabod,' mourned for the 'fallen' statesman whose faith was lost, and whose honor was dead. . . . This was the instant outburst of opinion; but friends for Webster and his cause

came with more deliberate reflections. . . . When the first excitement had subsided, the friends of Webster bestirred themselves, and soon testimonials poured in, approving the position which he had taken. The most significant of them was the one from eight hundred solid men of Boston, who thanked him for 'recalling us to our duties under the Constitution,' and for his 'broad national and patriotic views.' The tone of many of the Whig papers changed, some to positive support, others to more qualified censure. The whole political literature of the time is full of the discussion of this speech and its relation to the compromise. It is frequently said that a speech in Congress does not alter opinions; that the minds of men are determined by set political bias or sectional considerations. This was certainly not the case in 1850. Webster's influence was of the greatest weight in the passage of the compromise measures, and he is as closely associated with them as is their author. Clay's adroit parliamentary management was necessary to carry them through the various and tedious steps of legislation. But it was Webster who raised up for them a powerful and much-needed support from Northern public sentiment. At the South the speech was cordially received; the larger portion of the press commended it with undisguised admiration. . . . On the 11th of March, Seward spoke. . . . When Seward came to the territorial question, his words created a sensation. 'We hold,' he said, 'no arbitrary authority over anything, whether acquired lawfully or seized by usurpation. The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain (i. e. the territories not formed into States) to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the Universe. We are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust as to secure in the highest attainable degree their happiness.' This remark about 'a higher law,' while far inferior in rhetorical force to Webster's 'I would not take pains uselessly to reaffirm an ordinance of Nature, nor to re-enact the will of God,' was destined to have transcendent moral influence. A speech which can be condensed into an aphorism is sure to shape convictions. These, then, are the two maxims of this debate; the application of them shows the essential points of the controversy."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 1, ch. 2.—In the political controversies which accompanied and followed the introduction of the Compromise measures, the Whigs who supported the Compromise were called "Silver-Grays," or "Snuff-Takers," and those who opposed it were called "Woolly-Heads," or "Seward-Whigs."

A. D. 1850 (April–September).—Mr. Clay's last compromise.—The Fugitive Slave Law as passed.—On the 17th of April, "a select committee of the Senate, headed by Mr. Clay, reported a bill consisting of 39 sections, embodying most of the resolutions which had been discussed. From its all-comprehensive nature it was called the Omnibus Bill. The points comprehended in the omnibus bill were as



follows: 1st. When new states formed out of Texas present themselves, it shall be the duty of Congress to admit them; 2d. The immediate admission of California, with the boundaries which she has proposed; 3d. The establishment of territorial governments for Utah and New Mexico, without the Wilmot proviso; 4th. The combination of points 2 and 3 in one bill; 5th. The ex-cision from Texas of all New Mexico, rendering therefor a pecuniary equivalent; 6th. The enactment of a law for the effectual rendition of fugitive slaves escaping into the free states; 7th. No interference with slavery in the District of Columbia, but the slave trade therein should be abolished, under heavy penalties. This bill was discussed until the last of July, and then passed by the Senate, but it had been so pruned by successive amendments that it contained only a provision for the organization of a territorial government for Utah. In this condition it was sent to the House. There, as a whole, the bill was rejected, but its main heads were passed in August as separate bills, and were designated the compromise measures of 1850, and, in their accepted shape, required: (1) Utah and New Mexico to be organized into territories, without reference to slavery; (2) California to be admitted as a free state; (3) \$10,000,000 to be paid to Texas for her claim to New Mexico; (4) fugitive slaves to be returned to their masters; and (5) the slave trade to be abolished in the District of Columbia. The compromises were received by the leaders of the two great parties as a final settlement of the vexed questions which had so long troubled Congress and agitated the country, but the storm was only temporarily allayed. In accordance with these measures California became a state of the Union September 9, 1850. The most important feature of this bill, in its bearing upon future struggles and conflicts, was the fugitive slave law. . . . In the midst of the discussion of these topics occurred the death of the President, July 9, 1850, one year and four months after his inauguration. . . . Mr. Fillmore was inaugurated on the 10th of July, 1850. He departed from the policy of his predecessor, organized a new cabinet, used his influence in favor of the compromise measures," and gave his signature to the Fugitive Slave Law.—W. R. Houghton, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, ch. 15.—"It was apparent to every one who knew anything of the sentiments of the North that this law could not be executed to any extent. Seward had truly said that if the South wished their runaway negroes returned they must alleviate, not increase, the rigors of the law of 1793; and to give the alleged fugitive a jury trial, as Webster proposed, was the only possible way to effect the desired purpose. If we look below the surface we shall find a strong impelling motive of the Southern clamor for this harsh enactment other than the natural desire to recover lost property. Early in the session it took air that a part of the game of the disunionists was to press a stringent fugitive slave law, for which no Northern man could vote; and when it was defeated, the North would be charged with refusing to carry out a stipulation of the Constitution. Douglas stated in the Senate that while there was some ground for complaint on the subject of surrender of fugitives from service, it had been greatly exaggerated. The excitement and virulence were not along the

line bordering on the free and slave States, but between Vermont and South Carolina, New Hampshire and Alabama, Connecticut and Louisiana. Clay gave vent to his astonishment that Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina, States which very rarely lost a slave, demanded a stricter law than Kentucky, which lost many. After the act was passed Senator Butler, of South Carolina, said: 'I would just as soon have the law of 1793 as the present law, for any purpose, so far as regards the reclamation of fugitive slaves;' and another Southern ultra never thought it would be productive of much good to his section. Six months after the passage of the law, Seward expresses the matured opinion 'that political ends—merely political ends—and not real evils, resulting from the escape of slaves, constituted the prevailing motives to the enactment.'—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the U. S. from the Compromise of 1850*, ch. 2 (v. 1).—"The fugitive-slave law was to make the citizens of the Free States do for the slave-holders what not a few of the slave-holders were too proud to do for themselves. Such a law could not but fail. But then it would increase the exasperation of the slave-holders by its failure, while exasperating the people of the Free States by the attempts at enforcement. Thus the compromise of 1850, instead of securing peace and harmony, contained in the most important of its provisions the seeds of new and greater conflicts. One effect it produced which Calhoun had clearly predicted when he warned the slave-holding states against compromises as an invention of the enemy: it adjourned the decisive conflict until the superiority of the North over the South in population and material resources was overwhelming."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, ch. 26 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 3, ch. 15-16.—H. Clay, *Life, Corr., and Speeches*; ed. by Colton, v. 6.—W. H. Seward, *Works*, v. 1, pp. 51-131, and v. 4.—J. S. Pike, *First Blows of the Civil War*, pp. 1-98.—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 2, ch. 18-28.—J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U. S. from the Compromise of 1850*, ch. 2 (v. 1).—See, also, HIGHER LAW DOCTRINE.

The following is the complete text of the Fugitive Slave Law:

"An act to amend, and supplementary to, the Act entitled 'An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons escaping from the Service of their Masters,' approved February twelfth, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the persons who have been, or may hereafter be, appointed commissioners, in virtue of any act of Congress, by the Circuit Courts of the United States, and who, in consequence of such appointment, are authorized to exercise the powers that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of any of the United States, may exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offence against the United States, by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing the same under and by virtue of the thirty-third section of the act of the twenty-fourth of September seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, entitled 'An Act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,' shall be, and are hereby, authorized and

required to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Superior Court of each organized Territory of the United States shall have the same power to appoint commissioners to take acknowledgments of bail and affidavits, and to take depositions of witnesses in civil causes, which is now possessed by the Circuit Court of the United States; and all commissioners who shall hereafter be appointed for such purposes by the Superior Court of any organized Territory of the United States, shall possess all the powers, and exercise all the duties, conferred by law upon the commissioners appointed by the Circuit Courts of the United States for similar purposes, and shall moreover exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the Circuit Courts of the United States, and the Superior Courts of each organized Territory of the United States, shall from time to time enlarge the number of commissioners, with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor, and to the prompt discharge of the duties imposed by this act.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That the commissioners above named shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, in their respective circuits and districts within the several States, and the judges of the Superior Courts of the Territories, severally and collectively, in term-time and vacation; and shall grant certificates to such claimants, upon satisfactory proof being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from service or labor, under the restrictions herein contained, to the State or Territory from which such persons may have escaped or fled.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of all marshals and deputy marshals to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under the provisions of this act, when to them directed; and should any marshal or deputy marshal refuse to receive such warrant, or other process, when tendered, or to use all proper means diligently to execute the same, he shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one thousand dollars, to the use of such claimant, on the motion of such claimant by the Circuit or District Court for the district of such marshal; and after arrest of such fugitive, by such marshal or his deputy, or whilst at any time in his custody under the provisions of this act, should such fugitive escape, whether with or without the assent of such marshal or his deputy, such marshal shall be liable, on his official bond, to be prosecuted for the benefit of such claimant, for the full value of the service or labor of said fugitive in the State, Territory, or District whence he escaped: and the better to enable the said commissioners, when thus appointed, to execute their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and of this act, they are hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively, to appoint, in writing under their hands, any one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute all such warrants and other process as may be issued by them in the lawful performance of their respective duties; with authority to such commissioners, or the

persons to be appointed by them, to execute process as aforesaid, to summon and call to their aid the bystanders, or posse comitatus of the proper county, when necessary to insure a faithful observance of the clause of the Constitution referred to, in conformity with the provisions of this act; and all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law, whenever their services may be required, as aforesaid, for that purpose; and said warrants shall run, and be executed by said officers, anywhere in the State within which they are issued.

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That when a person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom such service or labor may be due, or his, her, or their agent or attorney, duly authorized, by power of attorney, in writing, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some legal officer or court of the State or Territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the courts, judges, or commissioners aforesaid, of the proper circuit, district, or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive, where the same can be done without process, and by taking, or causing such person to be taken, forthwith before such court, judge, or commissioner, whose duty it shall be to hear and determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner; and upon satisfactory proof being made, by deposition or affidavit, in writing, to be taken and certified by such court, judge, or commissioner, or by other satisfactory testimony, duly taken and certified by some court, magistrate, justice of the peace, or other legal officer authorized to administer an oath and take depositions under the laws of the State or Territory from which such person owing service or labor may have escaped, with a certificate of such magistracy or other authority, as aforesaid, with the seal of the proper court or officer thereto attached, which seal shall be sufficient to establish the competency of the proof, and with proof, also by affidavit, of the identity of the person whose service or labor is claimed to be due as aforesaid, that the person so arrested does in fact owe service or labor to the person or persons claiming him or her, in the State or Territory from which such fugitive may have escaped as aforesaid, and that said person escaped, to make out and deliver to such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, a certificate setting forth the substantial facts as to the service or labor due from such fugitive to the claimant, and of his or her escape from the State or Territory in which such service or labor was due, to the State or Territory in which he or she was arrested, with authority to such claimant, or his or her agent or attorney, to use such reasonable force and restraint as may be necessary, under the circumstances of the case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and the certificates in this and the first [fourth] section mentioned, shall be conclusive of the right of the person or persons in



whose favor granted, to remove such fugitive to the State or Territory from which he escaped, and shall prevent all molestation of such person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.

SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct, hinder, or prevent such claimant, his agent or attorney, or any person or persons lawfully assisting him, her, or them, from arresting such a fugitive from service or labor, either with or without process as aforesaid, or shall rescue, or attempt to rescue, such fugitive from service or labor, from the custody of such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or other person or persons lawfully assisting as aforesaid, when so arrested, pursuant to the authority herein given and declared; or shall aid, abet, or assist such person so owing service or labor as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to escape from such claimant, his agent or attorney, or other person or persons legally authorized as aforesaid; or shall harbor or conceal such fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such person, after notice or knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from service or labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of said offences, be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months, by indictment and conviction before the District Court of the United States for the district in which such offence may have been committed, or before the proper court of criminal jurisdiction, if committed within any one of the organized Territories of the United States; and shall moreover forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages to the party injured by such illegal conduct, the sum of one thousand dollars, for each fugitive so lost as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of debt, in any of the District or Territorial Courts aforesaid, within whose jurisdiction the said offence may have been committed.

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the marshals, their deputies, and the clerks of the said District and Territorial Courts, shall be paid, for their services, the like fees as may be allowed to them for similar services in other cases; and where such services are rendered exclusively in the arrest, custody, and delivery of the fugitive to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or where such supposed fugitive may be discharged out of custody for the want of sufficient proof as aforesaid, then such fees are to be paid in the whole by such claimant, his agent or attorney; and in all cases where the proceedings are before a commissioner, he shall be entitled to a fee of ten dollars in full for his services in each case, upon the delivery of the said certificate to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney; or a fee of five dollars in cases where the proof shall not, in the opinion of such commissioner, warrant such certificate and delivery, inclusive of all services incident to such arrest and examination, to be paid, in either case, by the claimant, his or her agent or attorney. The person or persons authorized to execute the process to be issued by such commissioners for the arrest and detention of fugitives from service or labor as aforesaid, shall also be entitled to a fee of five dollars each for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such commissioner as aforesaid, at the instance and request of such claimant, with such other

fees as may be deemed reasonable by such commissioner for such other additional services as may be necessarily performed by him or them; such as attending at the examination, keeping the fugitive in custody, and providing him with food and lodging during his detention, and until the final determination of such commissioner; and, in general, for performing such other duties as may be required by such claimant, his or her attorney or agent, or commissioner in the premises, such fees to be made up in conformity with the fees usually charged by the officers of the courts of justice within the proper district or county, as near as may be practicable, and paid by such claimants, their agents or attorneys, whether such supposed fugitives from service or labor be ordered to be delivered to such claimants by the final determination of such commissioners or not.

SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That, upon affidavit made by the claimant of such fugitive, his agent or attorney, after such certificate has been issued, that he has reason to apprehend that such fugitive will be rescued by force from his or their possession before he can be taken beyond the limits of the State in which the arrest is made, it shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest to retain such fugitive in his custody, and to remove him to the State whence he fled, and there to deliver him to said claimant, his agent, or attorney. And to this end, the officer aforesaid is hereby authorized and required to employ so many persons as he may deem necessary to overcome such force, and to retain them in his service so long as circumstances may require. The said officer and his assistants, while so employed, to receive the same compensation, and to be allowed the same expenses, as are now allowed by law for transportation of criminals, to be certified by the judge of the district within which the arrest is made, and paid out of the treasury of the United States.

SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That when any person held to service or labor in any State or Territory, or in the District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom, the party to whom such service or labor shall be due, his, her, or their agent or attorney, may apply to any court of record therein, or judge thereof in vacation, and make satisfactory proof to such court, or judge in vacation, of the escape aforesaid, and that the person escaping owed service or labor to such party. Whereupon the court shall cause a record to be made of the matters so proved, and also a general description of the person so escaping, with such convenient certainty as may be; and a transcript of such record, authenticated by the attestation of the clerk and of the seal of the said court, being produced in any other State, Territory, or district in which the person so escaping may be found, and being exhibited to any judge, commissioner, or other officer authorized by the law of the United States to cause persons escaping from service or labor to be delivered up, shall be held and taken to be full and conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that the service or labor of the person escaping is due to the party in such record mentioned. And upon the production by the said party of other and further evidence if necessary, either oral or by affidavit, in addition to what is contained in the said record of the identity of the person escaping, he or she shall be delivered up to the claimant.

And the said court, commissioner, judge, or other person authorized by this act to grant certificates to claimants of fugitives, shall, upon the production of the record and other evidences aforesaid, grant to such claimant a certificate of his right to take any such person identified and proved to be owing service or labor as aforesaid, which certificate shall authorize such claimant to seize or arrest and transport such person to the State or Territory from which he escaped: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as requiring the production of a transcript of such record as evidence as aforesaid. But in its absence the claim shall be heard and determined upon other satisfactory proofs, competent in law.

Approved, September 18, 1850."—*Statutes at Large*, ix. 462–465.

**A. D. 1850.—The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain.** See NICARAGUA: A. D. 1850.

**A. D. 1850–1851.—The Hülsemann Letter.**—Kossuth in America.—In July, 1850, Daniel Webster became Secretary of State in the cabinet of President Fillmore and retained that post until his death, in October, 1852. "The best-known incident of this period was that which gave rise to the famous 'Hülsemann letter.' President Taylor had sent an agent to Hungary to report upon the condition of the revolutionary government, with the intention of recognizing it if there were sufficient grounds for doing so. When the agent arrived, the revolution was crushed, and he reported to the President against recognition. These papers were transmitted to the Senate in March, 1850. Mr. Hülsemann, the Austrian Chargé, thereupon complained of the action of our administration, and Mr. Clayton, then Secretary of State, replied that the mission of the agent had been simply to gather information. On receiving further instructions from his government, Mr. Hülsemann rejoined to Mr. Clayton, and it fell to Mr. Webster to reply, which he did on December 21, 1850. The note of the Austrian Chargé was in a hectoring and highly offensive tone, and Mr. Webster felt the necessity of administering a sharp rebuke. 'The Hülsemann letter,' as it was called, was, accordingly dispatched. It set forth strongly the right of the United States and their intention to recognize any de facto revolutionary government, and to seek information in all proper ways in order to guide their action. . . . Mr. Webster had two objects. One was to awaken the people of Europe to a sense of the greatness of this country, the other to touch the national pride at home. He did both. . . . The affair did not, however, end here. Mr. Hülsemann became very mild, but he soon lost his temper again. Kossuth and the refugees in Turkey were brought to this country in a United States frigate. The Hungarian hero was received with a burst of enthusiasm that induced him to hope for substantial aid, which was, of course, wholly visionary. The popular excitement made it difficult for Mr. Webster to steer a proper course, but he succeeded, by great tact, in showing his own sympathy, and, so far as possible, that of the government, for the cause of Hungarian independence and for its leader, without going too far. . . . Mr. Webster's course, . . . although carefully guarded, aroused the ire of Mr. Hülsemann, who left the country, after writing a let-

ter of indignant farewell to the Secretary of State."—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: D. Webster, *Works*, v. 6, pp. 488–504.

**A. D. 1851.—The Lopez Filibustering expedition to Cuba.** See CUBA: A. D. 1845–1860.

**A. D. 1852.—Appearance of the Know Nothing or American Party.**—"A new party had by this time risen to active importance in American politics. It appeared in 1852, in the form of a secret, oath-bound organization, of whose name, nature, and objects nothing was told even to its members until they had reached its higher degrees. Their consequent declaration that they knew nothing about it gave the society its popular name of Know Nothings. It accepted the name of the American Party. Its design was to oppose the easy naturalization of foreigners, and to aid the election of native-born citizens to office. Its nominations were made by secret conventions of delegates from the various lodges, and were voted for by all members under penalty of expulsion in case of refusal. At first, by endorsing the nominations of one or other of the two great parties, it decided many elections. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the Know Nothing organization was adopted by many Southern Whigs who were unwilling to unite with the Democracy, and became, for a time, a national party. It carried nine of the State elections in 1855, and in 1856 nominated Presidential candidates. After that time its Southern members gradually united with the Democracy, and the Know Nothing party disappeared from politics."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, 2d ed., ch. 18, sect. 4.—The ritual, rules, etc., of the American, or Know Nothing party are given in the following work.—T. V. Cooper, *American Politics*, pp. 56–68.

ALSO IN: A. Holmes, *Parties and their Principles*, pp. 287–295.

**A. D. 1852.—Seventeenth Presidential Election.—Franklin Pierce.**—"The question of slavery, in its comprehensive bearings, formed the turning point in the presidential canvass of 1852. . . . The national democratic convention which nominated Mr. Pierce, unanimously adopted a platform approving the compromise of 1850 as the final decision of the slavery question. The whig party were widely divided on the question of acquiescence in the compromise measures, and still more at variance in regard to the claims of rival candidates for the presidency. Mr. Seward's friends in the free states united in the support of General Scott, who had, to a considerable extent, stood aloof from the agitations of the last few years. On the other hand, the exclusive supporters of the compromise, as a condition of party allegiance, were divided between Millard Fillmore, at that time acting president, and Daniel Webster, secretary of state. The whig convention met in Baltimore on the 17th of June, 1852, two weeks after the democratic convention, and nominated General Scott as their candidate for president. A large majority of the delegates from New York, and a considerable number from other states, maintained their opposition to the test resolutions which were proposed by the other branch of the party. These resolutions, however, were adopted, and a platform was thus established resembling, in its main features, that of the democrats. . . . Supported by several advocates



of this new platform on the ground of his personal popularity, General Scott received the nomination. He was, however, regarded with great suspicion by a large number of whigs in the slaveholding states. . . . Many ardent friends of the compromise . . . refused to rally around General Scott, distrusting his fidelity to the compromise platform; while a large number of the whigs of the free states, through aversion to the platform, assumed a neutral position or gave their support to a third candidate. Another portion of the whig party nominated Mr. Webster, who died [October 24, 1852], not only refusing to decline the nomination, but openly avowing his disgust with the action of the party."—G. E. Baker, *Memoir of Wm. H. Seward* (*Seward's Works*, v. 4).—"The Democratic convention was held, first, on June 1, 1852, at Baltimore. It was a protracted convention, for it did not adjourn until the 6th of the month, but it was not very interesting. . . . After a short contest, the two-thirds rule was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The struggle over the nomination was protracted. On the first ballot, General Cass had 116; James Buchanan, 93; William L. Marcy, 27; Stephen A. Douglas, 20; Joseph Lane, 13; Samuel Houston, 8; and there were 4 scattering. The number necessary to a choice was 188. . . . On the twenty-ninth trial, the votes were: for Cass, 27; for Buchanan, 93; for Douglas, 91; and no other candidate had more than 26. At this point Cass began to recover his strength, and reached his largest number on the thirty-fifth trial, namely, 131. On that same ballot, Virginia gave 15 votes to Franklin Pierce. Mr. Pierce gained 15 more votes on the thirty-sixth trial; but at that point his increase ceased, and was then slowly resumed, as the weary repetition of balloting without effect went on. The forty-eighth trial resulted as follows: for Cass, 73; for Buchanan, 28; for Douglas, 33; for Marcy, 90; for Pierce, 55; for all others, 8. The forty-ninth trial was the last. There was a 'stampede' for Pierce, and he received 282 votes to 6 for all others. Ten candidates were voted for as a candidate for the vice-presidency. . . . On the second ballot, William R. King of Alabama was unanimously nominated. . . . The anti-slavery organization, the Free Soil Democrats, though a much less important political factor than they had been four years earlier, held their convention in Pittsburg on August 11. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts presided. John P. Hale of New Hampshire was nominated for President, and George W. Julian of Indiana for Vice-President. . . . The canvass was not a very spirited one. All the early autumn elections were favorable to the Democrats, and the result in November was a crushing defeat of the Whigs in the popular vote and one still more decisive in the electoral vote. . . . The popular and electoral votes were as follows." Popular vote: Franklin Pierce, 1,601,274; Winfield Scott, 1,386,580; John P. Hale, 155,825. Electoral vote: Pierce, 254; Scott, 42.—E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 18.

A. D. 1852.—The appearance of Uncle Tom's Cabin, and its effect.—"Of the literary forces that aided in bringing about the immense revolution in public sentiment between 1852 and 1860, we may affirm with confidence that by far the most weighty was the influence spread by this book. This story, when published [1851-2]

as a serial in the 'National Era,' an anti-slavery newspaper at Washington, attracted little attention, but after it was given to the world in book form in March, 1852, it proved the most successful novel ever written. The author felt deeply that the Fugitive Slave law was unjust, and that there was cruelty in its execution; this inspired her to pour out her soul in a protest against slavery. She thought that if she could only make the world see slavery as she saw it, her object would be accomplished; she would then have induced people to think right on the subject. The book was composed under the most disheartening circumstances. Worn out with the care of many young children; overstrained by the domestic trials of a large household, worried because her husband's small income did not meet their frugal needs; eking out the poor professor's salary by her literary work in a house too small to afford a study for the author—under such conditions there came the inspiration of her life. . . . The effect produced by the book was immense. Whittier offered up 'thanks for the Fugitive Slave law; for it gave occasion for Uncle Tom's Cabin.' Longfellow thought it was one of the greatest triumphs in literary history, but its moral effect was a higher triumph still. Lowell described the impression which the book made as a 'whirl of excitement.' Choate is reported to have said: 'That book will make two millions of abolitionists.' Garrison wrote the author: 'All the defenders of slavery have let me alone and are abusing you.'—J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U. S. from 1850*, v. 1, pp. 278-280.—Writing only nine months after the publication of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," C. F. Briggs, in Putnam's Monthly Magazine, said: "Never since books were first printed has the success of Uncle Tom been equalled; the history of literature contains nothing parallel to it, nor approaching it; it is, in fact, the first real success in bookmaking, for all other successes in literature were failures when compared with the success of Uncle Tom. . . . There have been a good many books which were considered popular on their first appearance, which were widely read and more widely talked about. But what were they all, compared with Uncle Tom, whose honest countenance now overshadows the reading world, like the dark cloud with a silver lining. Don Quixote was a popular book on its first coming out, and so was Gil Blas, and Richardson's Pamela, and Fielding's Tom Jones, and Hannah More's Catechisms, and Gibbon's Decline and Fall; and so were the Vicar of Wakefield, and Rasselas, and the Tale of a Tub, and Evelina, the Lady of the Lake, Waverley, the Sorrows of Werter, Childe Harold, the Spy, Pelham, Vivian Grey, Pickwick, the Mysteries of Paris, and Macaulay's History. These are among the most famous books that rose suddenly in popular esteem on their first appearance, but the united sale of the whole of them, within the first nine months of their publication, would not equal the sale of Uncle Tom in the same time. . . . It is but nine months since this Iliad of the blacks, as an English reviewer calls Uncle Tom, made its appearance among books, and already its sale has exceeded a million of copies; author and publisher have made fortunes out of it, and Mrs. Stowe, who was before unknown, is as familiar a name in all parts of the civilized world as that of Homer or Shakspeare. Nearly 200,000 copies of the first edition of the

work have been sold in the United States, and the publishers say they are unable to meet the growing demand. The book was published on the 20th of last March, and on the 1st of December there had been sold 120,000 sets of the edition in two volumes, 50,000 copies of the cheaper edition in one, and 3,000 copies of the costly illustrated edition. . . . They [the publishers] have paid to the author \$20,300 as her share of the profits on the actual cash sales of the first nine months. But it is in England where *Uncle Tom* has made his deepest mark. Such has been the sensation produced by the book there, and so numerous have been the editions published, that it is extremely difficult to collect the statistics of its circulation with a tolerable degree of exactness. But we know of twenty rival editions in England and Scotland, and that millions of copies have been produced. . . . We have seen it stated that there were thirty different editions published in London, within six months of the publication of the work here, and one firm keeps 400 men employed in printing and binding it. . . . *Uncle Tom* was not long in making his way across the British Channel, and four rival editions are claiming the attention of the Parisians, one under the title of 'le Père Tom,' and another of 'la Case de l' Oncle Tom.'—*Uncle Tomitudes* (*Putnam's Monthly Mag.*, Jan., 1853).—"In May, 1852, Whittier wrote to Garrison: 'What a glorious work Harriet Beecher Stowe has wrought. Thanks for the Fugitive Slave Law. Better for slavery that that law had never been enacted, for it gave occasion for *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.' . . . Macaulay wrote, thanking her for the volume, assuring her of his high respect for the talents and for the benevolence of the writer. Four years later, the same illustrious author, essayist, and historian wrote to Mrs. Stowe: 'I have just returned from Italy, where your fame seems to throw that of all other writers into the shade. There is no place where *Uncle Tom*, transformed into *Il Zio Tom*, is not to be found.' From Lord Carlisle she received a long and earnest epistle, in which he says he felt that slavery was by far the 'topping' question of the world and age, and that he returned his 'deep and solemn thanks to Almighty God, who has led and enabled you to write such a book.' The Rev. Charles Kingsley, in the midst of illness and anxiety, sent his thanks, saying: 'Your book will do more to take away the reproach from your great and growing nation than many platform agitations and speechifyings.' Said Lord Palmerston, 'I have not read a novel for thirty years; but I have read that book three times, not only for the story, but for the statesmanship of it.' Lord Cockburn declared: 'She has done more for humanity than was ever before accomplished by any single book of fiction.' Within a year *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was scattered all over the world. Translations were made into all the principal languages, and into several obscure dialects, in number variously estimated from twenty to forty. The librarian of the British Museum, with an interest and enterprise which might well put our own countrymen to blush, has made a collection which is unique and very remarkable in the history of books. American visitors may see there thirty-five editions (*Uncle Tom's Cabin*) of the original English, and the complete text, and eight of abridgments and adaptations. Of translations into different languages there are nineteen, viz.:

Armenian, one; Bohemian, one; Danish, two distinct versions; Dutch, one; Flemish, one; French, eight distinct versions, and two dramas; German, five distinct versions, and four abridgments; Hungarian, one complete version, one for children, and one versified abridgment; Illyrian, two distinct versions; Italian, one; Polish, two distinct versions; Portuguese, one; Roman, or modern Greek, one; Russian, two distinct versions; Spanish, six distinct versions; Swedish, one; Wallachian, two distinct versions; Welsh, three distinct versions."—Mrs. F. T. McCray, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (*Mag. of Am. Hist.*, Jan., 1890).

A. D. 1852-1854.—The Perry Expedition.—Opening of intercourse with Japan. See JAPAN: A. D. 1852-1888.

A. D. 1853.—The Gadsden Purchase of Arizona. See ARIZONA: A. D. 1853.

A. D. 1854.—The Kansas-Nebraska Bill.—Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.—The doctrine of "Squatter Sovereignty."—"The slavery agitation apparently had died away both in congress and throughout the country. This calm, however, was doomed to a sudden interruption. The prospect of . . . beneficent legislation was destroyed by the introduction of a measure which at once supplanted all other subjects in congress and in the political interests of the people. This was the novel and astounding proposal of Mr. Douglas [Senator Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois], in relation to the Kansas and Nebraska territories. . . . The measure . . . alluded to . . . was a provision in the bill for the organization of a territory in Nebraska, declaring that the states which might at any future time be formed in the new territory should leave the question of slavery to be decided by the inhabitants thereof on the adoption of their constitution,—[this being in accordance with the doctrine which its advocates styled 'Popular Sovereignty,' but which took the commoner name of 'Squatter Sovereignty' from its opponents]. This provision was, as explained by the bill itself, the application of the compromise policy of 1850 to Nebraska, and, as was evident, virtually repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which guaranteed that slavery should be forever excluded from the territory in question. But, in order to bring the supporters of the bill and its opponents to a more decided test, an amendment was moved expressly annulling that portion of the Missouri Compromise which related to the subject. Mr. Douglas, after some deliberation, accepted the amendment, and modified his plan so far as to introduce a new bill for the organization of Nebraska and Kansas within the same limits, instead of the territory of Nebraska alone, according to the original programme. The administration lost no time in adopting this policy as their own. It was at first proposed to hasten the passage of the bill through both houses so rapidly as to prevent any remonstrance on the part of the people. But the opponents of the measure, including Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Truman Smith, Mr. Wade, Mr. Everett, Mr. Bell, Mr. Houston, and Mr. Fessenden, combined against it such an earnest and effective resistance that the attention of the country was aroused, and an indignant protest called forth from the people of the free states. The bill, however, passed the senate on the 4th day of March, 1854, after a discussion which had occu-



passed nearly every day of the session since the 23d of January. . . . On the 21st of March, Mr. Richardson of Illinois, in the house, moved to refer the bill, as it came from the senate, to the committee on territories, of which he was the chairman. Mr. Francis B. Cutting, of New York, moved that it be sent to the committee of the whole, where it could be freely discussed. His motion was carried, after a severe struggle, by a vote of 110 to 95. This was regarded as a triumph of the enemies of the bill and inspired hopes of its ultimate defeat in the house. On the 22d of May, after a most exciting contest, lasting nearly two months, in committee of the whole, Mr. Alex. H. Stephens of Georgia, by an extraordinary stratagem in parliamentary tactics, succeeded in closing the debate and bringing the bill to a vote in the house, where it finally passed, before adjournment, by a vote of 113 to 100." Returned to the senate, on account of amendments which had been made to it, it passed that body again "by vote of 35 to 13; and amid the firing of cannon and the shouting of its friends, it was sent to the president for his signature, at three o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1854. President Pierce promptly gave it his approval, and the odious measure became the law of the land. Thus was abrogated the Missouri Compromise—a law enacted thirty years before with all the solemnity of a compact between the free and the slave states—and a territory as large as the thirteen original states opened to slavery. The act was consummated by the coöperation of the north. Originating with a senator from a free state, it was passed by a congress containing in each branch a majority of members from the free states, and was sanctioned by the approval of a free state president. The friends of this legislation attempted to defend it on the pretence that it was not an original act, but only declaratory of the true intent and significance of the compromise measures of 1850."—G. E. Baker, *Memoir of William H. Seward* (v. 4 of *Seward's Works*), pp. 24–27.—Senator Douglas' explanation of the reasons on which he grounded his Kansas-Nebraska Bill is given in a report made by Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts, of conversations held by him with the Senator in 1859, and taken down in writing at the time, in the exact language of Mr. Douglas. "There was," said Senator Douglas, "a necessity for the organization of the Territory, which could no longer be denied or resisted. . . . Mr. Douglas, as early as the session of 1843, had introduced a bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska, for the purpose of opening the line of communication between the Mississippi Valley and our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, known as the Oregon country, and which was then under the operation of the treaty of joint occupation, or rather nonoccupation, with England, and was rapidly passing into the exclusive possession of the British Hudson's Bay Fur Company, who were establishing posts at every prominent and commanding point in the country. . . . Mr. Douglas renewed the introduction of his bill for the organization of Nebraska Territory, each session of Congress, from 1844 to 1854, a period of ten years, and while he had failed to secure the passage of the act, in consequence of the Mexican war intervening, and the slavery agitation which ensued, no one had objected to it upon the ground that there was no necessity for

the organization of the Territory. During the discussions upon our Territorial questions during this period, Mr. Douglas often called attention to the fact that a line of policy had been adopted many years ago, and was being executed each year, which was entirely incompatible with the growth and development of our country. It had originated as early as the administration of Mr. Monroe, and had been continued by Mr. Adams, General Jackson, Mr. Van Buren, Harrison, and by Tyler, by which treaties had been made with the Indians to the east of the Mississippi River, for their removal to the country bordering upon the States west of the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers, with guaranties in said treaties that the country within which these Indians were located should never be embraced within any Territory or State, or subjected to the jurisdiction of either, so long as grass should grow and water should run. These Indian settlements, thus secured by treaty, commenced upon the northern borders of Texas, or Red River, and were continued from year to year westward, until when, in 1844, Mr. Douglas introduced his first Nebraska Bill, they had reached the Nebraska or Platte River, and the Secretary of War was then engaged in the very act of removing Indians from Iowa, and settling them in the valley of the Platte River, with similar guaranties of perpetuity, by which the road to Oregon was forever to be closed. It was the avowed object of this Indian policy to form an Indian barrier on the western borders of Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa, by Indian settlements, secured in perpetuity by a compact that the white settlements should never extend westward of that line. This policy originated in the jealousy, on the part of the Atlantic States, of the growth and expansion of the Mississippi Valley, which threatened in a few years to become the controlling power of the nation. . . . This restrictive system received its first check in 1844, by the introduction of the Nebraska Bill, which was served on the Secretary of War, by its author, on the day of its introduction, with a notice that Congress was about to organize the Territory, and therefore he must not locate any more Indians there. In consequence of this notice, the Secretary (by courtesy) suspended his operations until Congress should have an opportunity of acting upon the bill; and inasmuch as Congress failed to act that session, Mr. Douglas renewed his bill and notice to the Secretary each year, and thus prevented action for ten years, and until he could procure action on the bill. . . . When Congress assembled at the session of 1853–'54, in view of this state of facts, Mr. Douglas renewed his Nebraska Act, which was modified, pending discussion, by dividing into two Territories, and became the Kansas-Nebraska Act. . . . The jealousies of the two great sections of the Union, North and South, had been fiercely excited by the slavery agitation. The Southern States would never consent to the opening of those Territories to settlement, so long as they were excluded by act of Congress from moving there and holding their slaves; and they had the power to prevent the opening of the country forever, inasmuch as it had been forever excluded by treaties with the Indians, which could not be changed or repealed except by a two-third vote in the Senate. But the South were willing to consent to remove the Indian restric-

tions, provided the North would at the same time remove the Missouri restriction, and thus throw the country open to settlement on equal terms by the people of the North and South, and leave the settlers at liberty to introduce or exclude slavery as they should think proper." The same report gives a distinction which Senator Douglas drew between "Popular Sovereignty" and "Squatter Sovereignty," as follows: "The name of Squatter Sovereignty was first applied by Mr. Calhoun, in a debate in the United States Senate in 1848, between himself and General Cass, in respect to the right of the people of California to institute a government for themselves after the Mexican jurisdiction had been withdrawn from them, and before the laws of the United States had been extended over them. General Cass contended that in such a case the people had a right, an inherent and inalienable right, to institute a government for themselves and for their own protection. Mr. Calhoun replied that, with the exception of the native Californians, the inhabitants of that country were mere squatters upon the public domain, who had gone there in vast crowds, without the authority of law, and were in fact trespassers as well as squatters upon the public lands, and to recognize their right to set up a government for themselves was to assert the doctrine of 'Squatter Sovereignty.' The term had no application to an organized Territory under the authority of Congress, or to the powers of such organized Territory, but was applied solely to an unorganized country whose existence was not recognized by law. On the other hand, what is called 'Popular Sovereignty' in the Territories, is a phrase used to designate the right of the people of an organized Territory, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to govern themselves in respect to their own internal polity and domestic affairs."—S. A. Douglas, *Brief Treatise upon Const. and Party Questions* (reported by J. M. Curtis), pp. 86-92, and 123-124.—"The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was the beginning of the end, the fatal step of the South on its road to destruction. Throughout the North the conviction grew that Union and slavery could not exist much longer together. On the 4th of July, 1854, Garrison publicly burned a copy of the Constitution of the United States with the words, 'The Union must be dissolved!' He represented only an extreme sentiment. But the people at large began to calculate the value of this Union for which so many sacrifices had been made. Slavery became odious to many persons hitherto indifferent to the subject, on the ground that it persistently and selfishly placed the Union in peril."—B. Tuckerman, *William Jay and the Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: M. Van Buren, *Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Pol. Parties*, ch. 8.—G. T. Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan*, ch. 9.—S. A. Douglas, *Popular Sovereignty in the Territories* (*Harper's Mag.*, Sept., 1859).—H. von Holst, *Const. and Pol. Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 4, ch. 6-8.—H. Greeley, *Hist. of the Struggle for Slavery Extension*, ch. 14.—J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U. S. from 1850*, ch. 5.

A. D. 1854.—The Ostend Manifesto. See CUBA: A. D. 1845-1860.

A. D. 1854-1855.—Solidification of Anti-slavery sentiment in the North.—The birth

of the new Republican Party.—"The determined purpose of the Slave Power to make slavery the predominating national interest was never more clearly revealed than by the proposed repeal of the Missouri compromise. This was a deliberate and direct assault upon freedom. Many, indeed, under the pleas of fraternity and loyalty to the Union, palliated and apologized for this breach of faith; but the numbers were increasing every hour, as the struggle progressed, who could no longer be deceived by these hollow pretences. . . . Pulpits and presses which had been dumb, or had spoken evasively and with slight fealty to truth, gave forth no uncertain sound. . . . To the utterances of the sacred desk were added the action of ecclesiastical bodies, contributions to the press, and petitions to State legislatures and to Congress. . . . These discussions from pulpit, platform, and press, all pointed to political action as the only adequate remedy. In the Northern States there were Abolitionists, Free-Soilers, anti-slavery Whigs, anti-Nebraska Democrats, and anti-slavery members of the American party, which had just come into existence. . . . As the conflict progressed, large and increasing numbers saw that no help could be reasonably hoped but through the formation of a new party that could act without the embarrassment of a Southern wing. But the formation of a national and successful party from materials afforded by the disintegration of hitherto hostile organizations was a work of great delicacy and difficulty. Such a party could not be made;—it must grow out of the elements already existing. It must be born of the nation's necessities and of its longings for relief from the weakness, or wickedness, of existing organizations. The mode of organizing this new party of freedom varied according to the varying circumstances of different localities and the convictions of different men. . . . One of the earliest, if not the earliest, of the movements that contemplated definite action and the formation of a new party, was made in Ripon, Fond du Lac County, Wisconsin, in the early months of 1854." A public meeting, held in one of the churches of the town, was followed by a second meeting, on the 20th of March, at which definite proceedings were taken. "By formal vote the town committees of the Whig and Free Soil parties were dissolved, and a committee of five, consisting of three Whigs, one Free-Soiler, and one Democrat, was chosen. 'The work done on that evening,' says Mr. Bovey [one of its originators], 'was fully accepted by the Whig and Free Soil parties of all this section immediately; and very soon—that is to say, in a few months—by those parties throughout the entire State.' A State convention was held in July, by which the organization of the party was perfected for the State, a majority of the delegation was secured for the next Congress, and a Free-Soiler, Charles Durkee, was elected to the Senate of the United States. At the meeting of the 20th of March, Mr. Bovey, though stating his belief that the party should and probably would take the name of 'Republican,' advised against such a christening at that time and by that small local body of men. He, however, wrote to the editor of the New York 'Tribune,' suggesting the name. . . . But that 'little eddy' on that far-off margin was only one of many similar demonstrations,—signs of a turn of the tide in the great sea of Ameri-



can politics. In Washington, on the morning after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, there was a meeting of some thirty members of the House at the rooms of Thomas D. Eliot and Edward Dickinson, of Massachusetts, called at the instance of Israel Washburn, Jr., of Maine, for consultation in regard to the course to be adopted in the exigencies of the case. The hopelessness of any further attempts through existing organizations was generally admitted; though a few still counselled adherence to the Whig party, in the expectation of securing its aid for freedom. But most present had become convinced that in a new party alone lay any reasonable hope of successful resistance to the continued aggressions of the arrogant and triumphant Slave Power. The name 'Republican' was suggested, discussed, and finally agreed upon as appropriate for the new organization. . . . But, whatever suggestions others may have made, or whatever action may have been taken elsewhere, to Michigan belongs the honor of being the first State to form and christen the Republican Party." A mass convention of Whigs and Free Soilers in that State was held on the 6th of July, at which the name was formally adopted, along with a "platform" of principles opposing the extension of slavery and demanding its abolition in the District of Columbia. "Though the Republican Party was not immediately organized in all the free States, its spirit inspired and its ideas largely pervaded the North. Within one year eleven Republican Senators were elected and fifteen States had secured anti-Nebraska majorities. Out of 142 Northern members of the House, 120 were opposed to the iniquitous measure. They were in sufficient numbers not only to control the election of Speaker, but they were able, by a majority of 15, to declare that 'in the opinion of this House, the repeal of the Missouri compromise of 1820, prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30', was an example of useless and factious agitation of the slavery question, unwise and unjust to the American people.' Several States which had failed to organize a Republican Party in 1854 did so in 1855."—H. Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 2, ch. 31.—"The refusal of the Whigs in many States to surrender their name and organization, and more especially the abrupt appearance of the Know-Nothings on the field of parties, retarded the general coalition between the Whigs and the Free-soilers which so many influences favored. As it turned out, a great variety of party names were retained or adopted in the Congressional and State campaigns of 1854, the designation of 'anti-Nebraska' being perhaps the most common, and certainly for the moment the most serviceable, since denunciation of the Nebraska bill was the one all-pervading bond of sympathy and agreement among men who differed very widely on almost all other political topics. This affiliation, however, was confined exclusively to the free States. In the slave States, the opposition to the Administration dared not raise the anti-Nebraska banner, nor could it have found followers; and it was not only inclined but forced to make its battle either under the old name of Whigs, or, as became more popular, under the new appellation of 'Americans,' which grew into a more dignified synonym for Know-Nothings. . . . While the measure was yet under discussion in the House in March, New

Hampshire led off by an election completely obliterating the eighty-nine Democratic majority in her Legislature. Connecticut followed in her footsteps early in April. Long before November it was evident that the political revolution among the people of the North was thorough, and that election day was anxiously awaited merely to record the popular verdict already decided. The influence of this result upon parties, old and new, is perhaps best illustrated in the organization of the Thirty-fourth Congress, chosen at these elections during the year 1854, which witnessed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Each Congress, in ordinary course, meets for the first time about one year after its members are elected by the people, and the influence of politics during the interim needs always to be taken into account. In this particular instance this effect had, if anything, been slightly reactionary, and the great contest for the Speakership during the winter of 1855-6 may therefore be taken as a fair manifestation of the spirit of politics in 1854. The strength of the preceding House of Representatives, which met in December, 1853, had been: Whigs, 71; Free-soilers, 4; Democrats, 159—a clear Democratic majority of 84. In the new Congress there were in the House, as nearly as the classification could be made, about 108 anti-Nebraska members, nearly 40 Know-Nothings, and about 75 Democrats; the remaining members were undecided. The proud Democratic majority of the Pierce election was annihilated."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: J. D. Long, ed., *The Republican Party: its Hist., etc.*—A. Holmes, *Parties and their Principles*, pp. 274-278.—J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U. S. from 1850*, ch. 7 (v. 2).

A. D. 1854-1856.—The beginning of the struggle for Kansas.—Free-state settlers against Missouri "Border-ruffians." See KANSAS: A. D. 1854-1859.

A. D. 1854-1866.—The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty and its abrogation. See TARIFF LEGISLATION, &c. (UNITED STATES AND CANADA): A. D. 1854-1866.

A. D. 1855-1856.—Long contest for the Speakership of the House.—Election of Mr. Banks, Republican.—Mr. Giddings' account.—"The free-soil party was now rapidly increasing in numbers and influence. The Whig organization had disbanded: Yet its leaders had too much pride of opinion to admit that the anti-slavery men were right in their policy or in their construction of the Constitution. Indeed, their prejudices were too strong to permit them to join any other existing organization. They therefore instituted a new party called the 'Know Nothings' or 'American party.' Their leading policy was the exclusion of foreigners from office. . . . It was a secret society, known to each other by signs, grips and passwords. It increased rapidly in numbers, and in the autumn of 1844 they elected a large majority of officers in all of the free States. . . . The effect of their success became apparent at the assembling of the thirty-fourth Congress. It had placed the democratic party in a very decided minority in the House of Representatives. . . . And the Free-soilers or Republicans were placed in a most critical position. Their difficulty arose from the determination of aspiring politicians to give all influence into the hands

of the organization which had recently sprung up. Members of this new party were at the city of Washington some weeks before the assembling of Congress, making such political arrangements as they regarded necessary to secure the success for the 'Know Nothings.' But all were conscious that neither they nor the Free-soilers could succeed except by uniting with each other." A partial combination of Know Nothings with the Republicans was effected at a meeting on Friday before the opening of the session of Congress. "Late in the day a resolution was introduced pledging the members to vote for any man on whom a majority of the members should unite, provided he stood pledged by his past life or present declarations so to arrange the committees of the House as to give respectful answers to petitions concerning slavery. This resolution was adopted by a unanimous vote of more than 70 members. But the leading members of the 'Know Nothings' did not appear at any of the caucuses. It was in this unorganized form that members opposed to the extension of slavery met their associates on Monday in the Hall of Representatives, to enter upon a contest unequalled in the previous history of our Government. The House consisted of 234 members—225 of whom answered to their names at the first calling of the roll. The first business in order was the election of Speaker: And the ballots being counted, it was found that William A. Richardson, the democratic candidate, had 74 votes; Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, the 'Know Nothing' candidate, had 53 votes; Humphrey Marshall, of Kentucky, the southern Know Nothing candidate, 30 votes; Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, was supported by those Free-soilers or Republicans who refused to support any man placed in nomination by the Know Nothings; and Hiram M. Fuller, of Pennsylvania, received the votes of 17 members of the Know Nothing party who refused to support any other candidate. There were several other ballots cast during the day, with little change. The voting continued on the second, third, fourth and fifth days, without material change, except that Mr. Campbell's vote rose on one occasion as high as 75. After the result of the twenty-third ballot was announced, Mr. Campbell withdrew his name from the list of candidates. On the withdrawal of Mr. Campbell, Mr. Banks' rose regularly until the 15th December, when it reached 107. . . . On the 19th December, the ballot showed Mr. Banks to have 106, and Mr. Richardson 75. Messrs. Marshall and Fuller, with their adherents, continuing to vote by themselves. During the debates the Republicans were constantly assailed, and as the writer [Joshua R. Giddings, of Ohio] was the oldest member of that party, he felt constrained to vindicate their cause. He assured the Democrats and 'Know Nothings' that the Republicans must soon come into power: And when once in power they would not permit southern members to dissolve the Union. This seemed to arouse much angry feeling. Mr. McMullen, of Virginia, replied with much spirit, declaring that whenever a northern President should be elected the South would dissolve the Union. This is believed to be the first distinct enunciation in Congress that the Union was to be dissolved upon the election of a northern President. Northern Democrats appeared mortified at the imprudence of Mr.

McMullen. Mr. Banks, in a public speech made some two years previously in Maine, had said, that if we were to extend slavery or dissolve the Union, he would say, 'Let the Union slide.' This saying was now seized upon by southern men as an insuperable objection to Mr. Banks' election: While, at the same time, Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, assured the House and the country that unless slavery were extended he desired to see the Union slide. Members appeared by common consent to enter upon a general debate, which was suspended on the 24th so long as to take a ballot, which showed no substantial change in the parties. On the 27th, four ballots were taken with a similar result. . . . On the 28th December the balloting was resumed, and continued through that and the following day without material change of parties, and debate was again renewed. . . . The President of the United States sent his annual message to the Senate on the 31st December, and his private secretary appeared at the entrance of the House of Representatives and announced that he had brought with him the annual message of the President, to be presented to that body. Aware that this was intended to exert an influence against the Republicans, the author at once objected to receiving it, as it was an attempt to introduce a new practice—for up to that time no President had ever presumed to thrust his message upon an unorganized body—and that it could not constitutionally be received by members until a Speaker were elected. But a majority voted to receive it. The next attempt was to read it to the House; but it was again objected that it was not addressed to members in their disorganized condition, but was addressed to the Senate and House of Representatives, which had not then been organized. This objection was sustained, and although they had received the message, they refused to read it. The new year found the House unorganized, with the President's message lying upon the Clerk's desk unopened and unread. One ballot was taken. A motion was next made to take up and read the President's message; but, after debate, the motion was laid on the table. Members now began to make arrangements for continuing the contest indefinitely. Most of them had expected to draw their mileage to defray their current expenses; but being unable to do that until the House were organized, found themselves out of funds. In many Republican districts the people met in public conventions and passed resolutions approving the action of their Representatives, made provisions for their members to draw on their local banks for such funds as they deemed necessary for defraying expenses at Washington. To meet these expenses, some State Legislatures made appropriations from their State funds. Soon as the republican party became consolidated, its members became more confident. Those of greatest experience assured their friends that as the President, officers of government, and the army and navy must go without pay until the House should be organized, the pressure would soon be so great upon the democratic party that they would be compelled to submit to the election of a republican Speaker. Some State Legislatures passed resolutions sustaining the action of their Representatives, declaring the issue involved to be the extension or non-extension of



slavery. . . . On the 29th January several propositions were made for an immediate organization. They were rejected, but by such small majorities as to indicate an organization at no very distant period; and the Republicans now felt one, and only one doubt in regard to success. The southern 'Know Nothings' had been Whigs, and bitterly hated the Democrats; and the question now presented was, whether they would unite with their old enemies rather than see a republican Speaker elected. On the 3d February a resolution was presented, declaring that three more ballots should be taken and if no election were had, the candidate having the highest number of votes on the 4th ballot should be declared Speaker. Soon after this vote was announced the House adjourned. Members now felt that the contest was drawing to a close. The next morning . . . Mr. Aiken, of South Carolina, was announced as the democratic candidate. And the first ballot, under the resolution, showed little change of parties. Banks received 102 votes; Aiken, 92; Fuller, 13; Campbell, 4; and Wells, 2. By this time the spacious galleries were filled with eager spectators, the lobbies and passages were crowded by men and ladies anxious for the result. The next ballot was taken without any change of parties. A motion was made to adjourn, but it was voted down by 159 to 52. Mr. Fuller announced that he was no longer a candidate. The result now appeared to be anticipated by all, and as the Clerk commenced calling the roll of members for the final vote, there appeared to be the most intense interest felt on all sides of the House. . . . When the roll had been called through there was so much confusion that it was difficult for any one to be heard. But the clerks and tellers proceeded in their duties, and when the count was completed, Mr. Benson, of Maine—one of the tellers—rose, and in a loud voice proclaimed that 'On the one hundred and thirty-third ballot Nathaniel P. Banks had received 103 votes; Mr. Aiken had received 100 votes; Mr. Fuller had received 6 votes; and Mr. Campbell had received 4 votes. That Mr. Banks having received the highest number of votes on this ballot, was declared duly elected Speaker of the thirty-fourth Congress.' At this announcement the spectators in the galleries broke forth in wild excitement. Cheer after cheer went up, amid the waving of handkerchiefs and demonstrations of unrestrained exultation, which were responded to by hisses from the Administration side of the House. . . . The effect of this victory was felt through the country. . . . Sixteen years before this occurrence Mr. Adams and the author of these sketches were the only representatives in Congress of the doctrines now supported by a majority of the House. The slaveholders and those who sympathized with them appeared to realize that political power was gradually escaping from their grasp, and that the day was rapidly approaching when the people would resume control of the Government."—J. R. Giddings, *Hist. of the Rebellion*, ch. 26.

A. D. 1855-1860.—Walker's Filibustering in Nicaragua. See NICARAGUA: A. D. 1855-1860.

A. D. 1856.—Refusal to sign the Declaration of Paris.—Proposed amendment. See DECLARATION OF PARIS.

A. D. 1856.—Senator Sumner's speech on 'The Crime against Kansas,' and the assault

upon him by Brooks of South Carolina.—"The most startling speech made during the debate [on affairs in Kansas], and which, from the events succeeding, became the most celebrated, was that of Charles Sumner. It was delivered on the 19th and 20th days of May and was published under the title of 'The Crime against Kansas.' . . . If there had been no more to Sumner's speech than the invective against the slave power, he would not have been assaulted by Preston Brooks. Nor is it probable that the bitter attack which the senator made on South Carolina would have provoked the violence, had it not been coupled with personal allusions to Senator Butler, who was a kinsman of Brooks. . . . It was said that Seward, who read the speech before delivery, advised Sumner to tone down its offensive remarks, and he and Wade regretted the personal attack. But Sumner was not fully 'conscious of the stinging force of his language.' To that, and because he was terribly in earnest, must be attributed the imperfections of the speech. He would annihilate the slave power, and he selected South Carolina and her senator as vulnerable points of attack. . . . Two days after this exciting debate (May 22d) when the Senate at the close of a short session adjourned, Sumner remained in the Chamber, occupied in writing letters. Becoming deeply engaged, he drew his arm-chair close to his desk, bent over his writing, and while in this position was approached by Brooks, a representative from South Carolina and a kinsman of Senator Butler. Brooks, standing before and directly over him, said: 'I have read your speech twice over carefully. It is a libel on South Carolina and Mr. Butler, who is a relative of mine.' As he pronounced the last word, he hit Sumner on the head with his cane with the force that a dragoon would give to a sabre-blow. Sumner was more than six feet in height and of powerful frame, but penned under the desk he could offer no resistance, and Brooks continued the blows on his defenceless head. The cane broke, but the South Carolinian went on beating his victim with the butt. The first blows stunned and blinded Sumner, but instinctively and with powerful effort he wrenched the desk from its fastenings, stood up, and with spasmodic and wildly directed efforts attempted unavailingly to protect himself. Brooks took hold of him, and, while he was reeling and staggering about, struck him again and again. The assailant did not desist until his arm was seized by one who rushed to the spot to stop the assault. At that moment Sumner, reeling, staggering backwards and sideways, fell to the floor bleeding profusely and covered with his blood. The injury received by Sumner was much more severe than was at first thought by his physicians and friends. Four days after the assault, he was able to give at his lodgings his relation of the affair to the committee of the House of Representatives. But, in truth, the blows would have killed most men. Sumner's iron constitution and perfect health warded off a fatal result; but it soon appeared that the injury had affected the spinal column. The next three years and a half was a search for cure. . . . At last he went to Paris and put himself under the care of Dr. Brown-Séquard, whose treatment of actual cauterization of the back eventually restored him to a fair degree of health; but he never regained his former physical vigor. He

was not able to enter regularly again on his senatorial career until December, 1859. . . . The different manner in which the North and the South regarded this deed is one of the many evidences of the deep gulf between these two people caused by slavery. . . . When Brooks returned to South Carolina he received an enthusiastic welcome. He was honored as a glorious son of the Palmetto State, and making him the present of a cane was a favorite testimonial. . . . At the North the assault of Brooks was considered brutal and cowardly; at the South, his name was never mentioned without calling him gallant or courageous, spirited or noble. . . . A committee was appointed by the House which took a large amount of evidence, and the majority reported a resolution in favor of the expulsion of Brooks. On this resolution, the vote was 121 to 95; but as it required two thirds, it was not carried. Only three Southern representatives publicly condemned the assault; only one voted to expel Brooks. After the decision by the House, Brooks made a speech, which he ended by resigning his place as representative. His district re-elected him almost unanimously: there were only six votes against him."—J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U. S. from 1850*, ch. 7 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: C. Sumner, *Works*, v. 4, pp. 125-342.

**A. D. 1856.—Eighteenth Presidential Election.—Buchanan made President.**—"The presidential campaign of . . . 1856, showed a striking disintegration and re-formation of political groups. Nominally there were four parties in the field: Democrats, Whigs, Native Americans or Know-Nothings, and Republicans. The Know-Nothings had lately won some State elections, but were of little account as a national organization, for they stood upon an issue hopelessly insignificant in comparison with slavery. Already many had gone over to the Republican camp; those who remained nominated as their candidates Millard Fillmore and Andrew J. Donelson. The Whigs were the feeble remnant of a really dead party, held together by affection for the old name; too few to do anything by themselves, they took by adoption the Know-Nothing candidates. The Republican party had been born only in 1854. Its members, differing on other matters, united upon the one doctrine, which they accepted as a test: opposition to the extension of slavery. They nominated John C. Fremont and William L. Dayton, and made a platform whereby they declared it to be 'both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery.' . . . In this Convention 110 votes were cast for Lincoln for the second place on the ticket. . . . In the Democratic party there were two factions. The favorite candidate of the South was Franklin Pierce, for reflection, with Stephen A. Douglas as a substitute or second choice; the North more generally preferred James Buchanan, who was understood to be displeased with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The struggle was sharp, but was won by the friends of Buchanan, with whom John C. Breckenridge was coupled. The campaign was eager, for the Republicans soon developed a strength beyond what had been expected and which put the Democrats to their best exertions. The result was: popular vote, Democrats [Buchanan] 1,838,169, Republicans [Fremont] 1,341,264, Know-Nothings and Whigs

[Fillmore] 874,534; electoral vote, Democrats 174, Republicans 114, Know-Nothings and Whigs, 8. Thus James Buchanan became President of the United States, March 4, 1857. . . . Yet, while the Democrats triumphed, the Republicans enjoyed the presage of the future; they had polled a total number of votes which surprised every one; on the other hand, the Democrats had lost ten States which they had carried in 1852 and had gained only two others, showing a net loss of eight States; and their electoral votes had dwindled from 254 to 174."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1856-1859.—The continued struggle in Kansas.—The Topeka vs. the Lecompton Constitution.** See KANSAS: A. D. 1854-1859.

**A. D. 1857.—The Dred Scott decision.**—"Dred Scott was a negro slave, the property of Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the army. In 1834, Dred was carried by his master from the slave state of Missouri, first, to the military post at Rock Island in the free state of Illinois, where he remained till April or May, 1836; and, thence, to Fort Snelling, in the territory known as Upper Louisiana, and lying north of the line of the Missouri Compromise, in both of which places he was held as a slave. At Fort Snelling, in the year 1836, he was married to Harriet, a negro slave, who had also been brought to Fort Snelling by her master, Major Taliaferro, and there sold to Dr. Emerson. In 1838, Dred, with his wife and a child which had been born to him, was carried back by his master to the state of Missouri. Subsequently, Dred, with his wife, his daughter Eliza, and another daughter, Lizzie, who was born after the return of her family to Missouri, was sold to John F. A. Sandford—the defendant in the present case. Dred commenced his efforts for the establishment of the freedom of himself and family in the state courts of Missouri. The suit was brought in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county. Before this court, the judgment was in his favor, but, on appeal by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the state, this judgment was reversed, and the case remanded to the court below,—where it remained, awaiting the decision of the suit which, in the meanwhile, Dred had brought in the United States courts. This second suit was brought before the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri, and thence carried, by writ of error, to the Supreme Court at Washington. It may be added that the first suit was brought against Dr. Emerson, but the second against Mr. Sandford, to whom Dred had been sold. The action, though brought to assert the title of Dred Scott and his family to freedom, was, in form, an action of trespass 'vi et armis,' which is the usual form employed in that state to try questions of this kind. The plaintiff, Scott, in his writ both makes a declaration of the acts of trespass—which of course are the acts of restraint necessarily implied in holding himself and family as slaves—and avers, what was necessary to give the court jurisdiction, that he and the defendant are citizens of different states; that is, that he is a citizen of Missouri, and the defendant a citizen of New York. At the April term of the court, in 1854, the defendant Sandford pleads, that the court has not jurisdiction, because the plaintiff is not a citizen of Missouri, but a negro of African descent, whose ancestors,



of pure African blood, were brought into this country and sold as slaves. To this plea the plaintiff demurs as insufficient; the demurrer is argued at the same term, and is sustained by the court, that is, the court asserts its jurisdiction over the case." It was on this plea that the case went finally to the Supreme Court of the United States and was decided in 1857. "The question of negro citizenship came up in the consideration of the question of jurisdiction. For the question of jurisdiction was the question, whether the plaintiff was a citizen of Missouri, as he had averred in his declaration; and the only fact pleaded to disprove his citizenship was the fact that Scott was a negro of African descent, whose ancestors had been sold as slaves in the United States. The court, however, decided that this fact did not exclude the possibility of his being a citizen; in other words, it decided that a negro of this description can be a citizen of the United States. The first question before the Supreme Court was, whether it could rejudge this determination of the circuit court."—W. A. Larned, *Negro Citizenship* (New Englander, Aug., 1857).—The decision of the Supreme Court, delivered by Chief Justice Taney, March 6, 1857, not only closed the door of freedom to Dred Scott, but shut the doors of the United States courts against him and all those of his race who were or had been slaves, or who sprang from an ancestry in the servile state. The opinion of Chief Justice Taney was concurred in by all the justices except Curtis and McLean—Justice Nelson dissenting on one point only. The arguments and the sentiments in the opinion which gave most offence to the conscience and the reason of the country were the following: "It becomes . . . our duty to decide whether the facts stated in the plea are or are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the United States. This is certainly a very serious question, and one that now for the first time has been brought for decision before this court. But it is brought here by those who have a right to bring it, and it is our duty to meet it and decide it. The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution. It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only, that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves. . . . The words 'people of the United

States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them. It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making power. . . . In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. . . . The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States, and endue him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? . . . The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts. It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other. . . . It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as the people or citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English

Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights by force of arms. In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race." Finally, having, with great elaboration, decided the question of citizenship adversely to Dred Scott and all his kind, the Court proceeded to obliterate the antislavery provision of the Missouri Compromise, which constituted one of the grounds on which Dred Scott claimed his freedom. "It is the opinion of the court," wrote Chief Justice Taney, "that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident. We have so far examined the case, as it stands under the Constitution of the United States, and the powers thereby delegated to the Federal Government. But there is another point in the case which depends on State power and State law. And it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that he is made free by being taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, independently of his residence in the territory of the United States; and being so made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slavery by being brought back to Missouri. Our notice of this part of the case will be very brief; for the principle on which it depends was decided in this court, upon much consideration, in the case of Strader et al. v. Graham, reported in 10th Howard, 82. In that case, the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio, with the consent of the owner, and afterwards brought back to Kentucky. And this court held that their status or condition, as free or slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when they were brought back into that State, and not of Ohio; and that this court had no jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State court upon its own laws. This was the

point directly before the court, and the decision that this court had not jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the report of the case. So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of Illinois. . . . Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."—*Report of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the U. S. in the case of Dred Scott vs. John F. A. Sandford (Howard's Reports, v. 19)*.—"By this presentation of the iniquity, naked and in its most repulsive form, Taney did no small harm to the party which he intended to aid. It has been said that slavery plucked ruin on its own head by its aggressive violence. It could not help showing its native temper, nor could it help feeding its hunger of land, insisting on the restoration of its runaways, or demanding a foreign policy such as would fend off the approach of emancipation. But Taney's judgment was a gratuitous aggression and an insult to humanity at the same time, for which, supposing that the Southern leaders inspired it, they paid dear. If the slave was mere property, his owner might be entitled to take him anywhere, and thus slavery might be made national. The boast of a daring partisan of slavery might be fulfilled, that the day would come when men might be bought and sold in Boston as freely as any other goods. The issue, which all the politicians had striven to keep out of sight, was presented in its most startling and shocking form."—Goldwin Smith, *The United States*, p. 235.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 2, ch. 39.—S. Tyler, *Memoirs of Roger B. Taney*, ch. 4-5.—A. Johnston, *The United States: Its Hist. and Const.*, sect. 249.

A. D. 1857.—Tariff reduction.—The financial collapse. See **TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES)**: A. D. 1846-1861.

A. D. 1857-1859.—The Mormon rebellion in Utah. See **UTAH**: A. D. 1857-1859.

A. D. 1858.—Treaty with China. See **CHINA**: A. D. 1857-1868.

A. D. 1858.—The Lincoln and Douglas debate in Illinois.—The senatorial term of Mr. Stephen A. Douglas being about to expire, the choice of his successor became an issue which controlled the election of members of the Illinois Legislature, in the fall of 1858. Mr. Douglas received an endorsement at the hands of the Democratic State Convention, in April, which virtually nominated him for re-election. Abraham Lincoln, who had come markedly to the front in his state during the Kansas discussions, "was the man already chosen in the hearts of the Republicans of Illinois for the same office, and therefore with singular appropriateness they passed, with great unanimity, at their convention in Springfield on the 16th of June, the characteristic resolution: 'That Hon. Abraham Lincoln is our first and only choice for United



States Senator to fill the vacancy about to be created by the expiration of Mr. Douglas' term of office.' There was of course no surprise in this for Mr. Lincoln. He had been all along led to expect it, and with that in view had been earnestly and quietly at work preparing a speech in acknowledgment of the honor about to be conferred on him. This speech he wrote on stray envelopes and scraps of paper, as ideas suggested themselves, putting them into that miscellaneous and convenient receptacle, his hat. As the convention drew near he copied the whole on connected sheets, carefully revising every line and sentence, and fastened them together, for reference during the delivery of the speech, and for publication. The former precaution, however, was unnecessary, for he had studied and read over what he had written so long and carefully that he was able to deliver it without the least hesitation or difficulty. . . . Before delivering his speech he invited a dozen or so of his friends over to the library of the State House, where he read and submitted it to them. After the reading he asked each man for his opinion. Some condemned and not one endorsed it. One man, more forcible than elegant, characterized it as a 'd—d fool utterance;' another said the doctrine was 'ahead of its time;' and still another contended that it would drive away a good many voters fresh from the Democratic ranks. Each man attacked it in his criticism. I was the last to respond. Although the doctrine announced was rather rank, yet it suited my views, and I said, 'Lincoln, deliver that speech as read and it will make you President.' At the time I hardly realized the force of my prophecy. Having patiently listened to these various criticisms from his friends—all of which with a single exception were adverse—he rose from his chair, and after alluding to the careful study and intense thought he had given the question, he answered all their objections substantially as follows: 'Friends, this thing has been retarded long enough. The time has come when these sentiments should be uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go down because of this speech, then let me go down linked to the truth—let me die in the advocacy of what is just and right.' The next day, the 17th, the speech was delivered just as we had heard it read. [The part of this famous speech which made the profoundest impression and gave rise to the most discussion was the opening part, contained in the following sentences: 'If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinc-

tion; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South. Have we no tendency to the latter condition? Let any one who doubts carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted; but also let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design and concert of action among its chief architects, from the beginning.']. . . . Lincoln had now created in reality a more profound impression than he or his friends anticipated. Many Republicans deprecated the advanced ground he had taken, the more so as the Democrats rejoiced that it afforded them an issue clear and well-defined. Numbers of his friends distant from Springfield, on reading his speech, wrote him censorious letters; and one well-informed co-worker predicted his defeat, charging it to the first ten lines of the speech. These complaints, coming apparently from every quarter, Lincoln bore with great patience. To one complainant who followed him into his office he said proudly, 'If I had to draw a pen across my record, and erase my whole life from sight, and I had one poor gift or choice left as to what I should save from the wreck, I should choose that speech and leave it to the world unerasable.' Meanwhile Douglas had returned from Washington to his home in Chicago. Here he rested for a few days until his friends and co-workers had arranged the details of a public reception on the 9th of July, when he delivered from the balcony of the Tremont House a speech intended as an answer to the one made by Lincoln in Springfield. Lincoln was present at this reception, but took no part in it. The next day, however, he replied. Both speeches were delivered at the same place. Leaving Chicago, Douglas passed on down to Bloomington and Springfield, where he spoke on the 16th and 17th of July respectively. On the evening of the latter day Lincoln responded again in a most effective and convincing effort. The contest now took on a different phase. Lincoln's Republican friends urged him to draw Douglas into a joint debate, and he accordingly sent him a challenge on the 24th of July. . . . On the 30th Douglas finally accepted the proposition to 'divide time, and address the same audiences,' naming seven different places, one in each Congressional district, outside of Chicago and Springfield, for joint meetings. The places and dates were, Ottawa, August 21; Freeport, August 27; Jonesboro, September 15; Charleston, September 18; Galesburg, October 7; Quincy, October 13; and Alton, October 15. . . . During the canvass Mr. Lincoln, in addition to the seven meetings with Douglas, filled thirty-one appointments made by the State Central Committee, besides speaking at many other times and places not previously advertised. . . . The election took place on the second of November, and while Lincoln received of the popular vote a majority of over 4,000, yet the returns from the legislative districts foreshadowed his defeat. In fact, when the Senatorial election took place in the Legislature, Douglas received 54 and Lincoln 46 votes—one of the results of the lamentable apportionment law then in operation."—W. H.

Herndon and J. W. Weik, *Lincoln, the True Story of a Great Life*, ch. 13 (p. 2).

**A. D. 1859.—Admission of Oregon into the Union, with a constitution excluding free colored People.** See OREGON: A. D. 1859.

**A. D. 1859.—John Brown's attack on Slavery in Virginia.—The tragedy at Harper's Ferry.**—"On the 17th of October, 1859, this country was bewildered and astounded while the fifteen Slave States were convulsed with fear, rage, and hate, by telegraphic dispatches from Baltimore and Washington, announcing the outbreak, at Harper's Ferry, of a conspiracy of Abolitionists and negroes, having for its object the devastation and ruin of the South, and the massacre of her white inhabitants. . . . As time wore on, further advices, with particulars and circumstances, left no room to doubt the substantial truth of the original report. An attempt had actually been made to excite a slave insurrection in Northern Virginia, and the one man in America to whom such an enterprise would not seem utter insanity and suicide, was at the head of it." This was John Brown, of Osawatomie, who had been fighting slavery and the border ruffians in Kansas (see KANSAS: A. D. 1854-1859) for five years, and had now changed his field. "A secret convention, called by Brown, and attended only by such whites and blacks as he believed in thorough sympathy with his views, had assembled in a negro church at Chatham, Canada West, May 8, 1858; at which Convention a 'Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the United States' had been adopted. It was, of course, drafted by Brown, and was essentially an embodiment of his political views. . . . John Brown was chosen Commander-in-Chief; J. H. Kagi, Secretary of War; Owen Brown (son of John), Treasurer; Richard Realf, Secretary of State. Brown returned to the States soon after his triumphal entry into Canada as a liberator. . . . He was in Hagerstown, Md., on the 30th [of June, 1859], where he registered his name as 'Smith, and two sons, from Western New York.' He told his landlord that they had been farming in Western New York, but had been discouraged by losing two or three years' crops by frost, and they were now looking for a milder climate, in a location adapted to wool-growing, etc. After looking about Harper's Ferry for several days, they found, five or six miles from that village, a large farm, with three unoccupied houses, the owner, Dr. Booth Kennedy, having died the last Spring. These houses they rented for a trifle until the next March, paying the rent in advance. . . . After they had lived there a few weeks, attracting no observation, others joined them from time to time, including two of Brown's young daughters; and one would go and another come, without exciting any particular remark. . . . Meantime, the greater number of the men kept out of sight during the day, so as not to attract attention, while their arms, munitions, etc., were being gradually brought from Chambersburg, in well-secured boxes. No meal was eaten on the farm, while old Brown was there, until a blessing had been asked upon it; and his Bible was in daily requisition. The night of the 24th of October was originally fixed upon by Brown for the first blow against Slavery in Virginia, by the capture of the Federal Arsenal at Harper's Ferry; and his biographer, Redpath, alleges that many

were on their way to be with him on that occasion, when they were paralyzed by the intelligence that the blow had already been struck, and had failed. The reason given for this, by one who was in his confidence, is, that Brown, who had been absent on a secret journey to the North, suspected that one of his party was a traitor, and that he must strike prematurely, or not at all. But the women who had been with them at the Kennedy farm—the wives or daughters of one or another of the party—had already been quietly sent away; and the singular complexion of their household had undoubtedly begun to excite curiosity, if not alarm, among their neighbors. . . . Harper's Ferry was then a village of some 5,000 inhabitants, lying on the Virginia side of the Potomac, and on either side of its principal tributary, the Shenandoah, which here enters it from the South. Its site is a mere nest or cup among high, steep mountains. . . . Here the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac. . . . Washington is 57 miles distant by turnpike; Baltimore 80 miles by railroad. . . . One of its very few streets was entirely occupied by the work-shops and offices of the National Armory, and had an iron railing across its entrance. In the old Arsenal building, there were usually stored from 100,000 to 200,000 stand of arms. The knowledge of this had doubtless determined the point at which the first blow of the liberators was to be struck. The forces with which Brown made his attack consisted of seventeen white and five colored men, though it is said that others who escaped assisted outside, by cutting the telegraph wires and tearing up the railroad track. The entrance of this petty army into Harper's Ferry on Sunday evening . . . seems to have been effected without creating alarm. They first rapidly extinguished the lights of the town, then took possession of the Armory buildings, which were only guarded by three watchmen, whom, without meeting resistance or exciting alarm, they seized and locked up in the guard-house. It is probable that they were aided, or, at least, guided, by friendly negroes belonging in the village. . . . At a quarter-past one, the western train arrived, and its conductor found the bridge guarded by armed men. . . . A little after midnight, the house of Col. Washington was visited by six of Brown's men under Capt. Stevens, who captured the Colonel, seized his arms, horses, etc., and liberated his slaves. On their return, Stevens and party visited the house of Mr. Alstadtt and his son, whom they captured, and freed their slaves. These, with each male citizen as he appeared in the street, were confined in the Armory until they numbered between forty and fifty. Brown informed his prisoners that they could be liberated on condition of writing to their friends to send a negro apiece as ransom. At daylight, the train proceeded, Brown walking over the bridge with the conductor. Whenever any one asked the object of their captors, the uniform answer was, 'To free the slaves;' and when one of the workmen, seeing an armed guard at the Arsenal gate, asked by what authority they had taken possession of the public property, he was answered, 'By the authority of God Almighty!' The passenger train that sped eastward from Harper's Ferry, by Brown's permission, in the early morning of Monday, October 17th, left that place



completely in the military possession of the insurrectionists. . . . But it was no longer entirely one-sided. The white Virginians, who had arms, and who remained unmolested in their houses, prepared to use them. . . . Several Virginians soon obtained possession of a room overlooking the Armory gates, and fired thence at the sentinels who guarded them, one of whom fell dead, and another — Brown's son Watson — was mortally wounded. Still, throughout the forenoon, the liberators remained masters of the town. . . . Had Brown chosen to fly to the mountains with his few followers, he might still have done so, though with a much slenderer chance of impunity than if he had, according to his original plan, decamped at midnight, with such arms and ammunition as he could bear away. Why he lingered, to brave inevitable destruction, is not certain; but it may fairly be presumed that he had private assurances that the negroes of the surrounding country would rise. . . . At all events, if his doom was already sealed, his delay at least hastened it. Half an hour after noon, a militia force, 100 strong, arrived from Charlestown, the county seat, and were rapidly disposed so as to command every available exit from the place. . . . Militia, continued to pour in; the telegraph and railroad having been completely repaired, so that the Government at Washington, Gov. Wise at Richmond, and the authorities at Baltimore, were in immediate communication with Harper's Ferry, and hurrying forward troops from all quarters. . . . Night found Brown's forces reduced to three unwounded whites beside himself, with perhaps half a dozen negroes from the vicinity. Eight of the insurgents were already dead; another lay dying beside the survivors; two were captives mortally wounded, and one other unhurt. Around the few survivors were 1,500 armed, infuriated foes. . . . During that night, Col. Lee, with 90 United States marines and two pieces of artillery, arrived, and took possession of the Armory guard, very close to the engine-house. . . . At seven in the morning, after a parley which resulted in nothing, the marines advanced to the assault, broke in the door of the engine-house by using a ladder as a battering-ram, and rushed into the building. One of the defenders was shot and two marines wounded; but the odds were too great; in an instant, all resistance was over. Brown was struck in the face with a saber and knocked down, after which the blow was several times repeated, while a soldier ran a bayonet twice into the old man's body."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 1, ch. 20. — "The Virginians demonstrated amply during the Civil War that they were not cowards. What made them shake in their shoes was not John Brown and his handful of men, but the shadows which their excited imagination saw standing behind them. . . . The best evidence of the frightful genuineness of the panic is the brazen impudence with which it was brought forward as the justifying motive for the many atrocities which marked the trial. The brutalizing influences of slavery came to light with terrible vividness. Kapp's statement that Brown 'enjoyed very careful treatment' is not mistaken, but it is true only of the later period of his imprisonment. Watson Brown, whose life was prolonged until the early morning of the 19th of October, complained of the hard bench he was forced to lie on. His

fellow-prisoner, Coppoc, begged for a mattress, or at least a blanket, for the dying man, but could obtain neither. Both Brown himself and Stevens, who was even more seriously wounded, had nothing furnished them but wretched straw. Redpath (p. 373) assures us that 'from October 19 till November 7 no clean clothing was given to Brown, but that he lay in his soiled and blood-stained garments just as he had fallen at Harper's Ferry.' On the 25th of October he was brought before the court; he was not at first carried there on a camp-bed, as was the case afterward, but compelled to walk, leaning on two men. Virginia could not wait till he could stand. . . . There was no such haste to carry out the sentence as there had been to bring the trial to a close. On the 2d of November, Brown was sentenced to suffer death by hanging on the 2d of December."—H. von Holst, *John Brown*, pp. 139–155. "Brown actually expected that the raid on Harper's Ferry would be the stroke with which Moses called forth water from the rock. The spring was to turn southward, and in its swift course to swell to a mighty river. He declared expressly to Governor Wise, and later still in his letters, that he had not intended simply to break the chains of a few dozen or a few hundred slaves, and to take them again to Canada. Emancipation was to be spread farther and farther, and the freedmen were to remain in the Southern States. Heaven itself could not have brought this about, unless it had sent the angel of judgment to cast down into the dust the whole white population from Florida to Maine." At the last, when John Brown, wounded and a prisoner, lay waiting his death, "he did not perceive that his undertaking could not have succeeded under any circumstances; but he did see that his failure and its consequences achieved much greater results than its most complete success could have done. . . . 'I can leave to God,' he writes, 'the time and manner of my death, for I believe now that the sealing of my testimony before God and man with my blood will do far more to further the cause to which I have earnestly devoted myself, than anything else I have done in my life.' And a few days later, 'My health improves slowly, and I am quite cheerful concerning my approaching end, since I am convinced that I am worth infinitely more on the gallows than I could be anywhere else.' . . . One year after the execution of Brown, on the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina declared its secession from the Union, and on May 11, 1861, the Second Massachusetts Regiment of infantry was raised, which was first to sing on its march South,—'John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave, His soul goes marching on.'"—H. von Holst, *John Brown*, pp. 139–155, 125–126, 167–175. — "Editors persevered for a good while in saying that Brown was crazy; but at last they said only that it was 'a crazy scheme,' and the only evidence brought to prove it was that it cost him his life. I have no doubt that if he had gone with 5,000 men, liberated 1,000 slaves, killed a hundred or two slaveholders, and had as many more killed on his own side, but not lost his own life, these same editors would have called it by a more respectable name. Yet he has been far more successful than that."—H. D. Thoreau, *The Last Days of John Brown (Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers)*.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 2, ch. 45.—F. B. Sanborn, *Life and Letters of John Brown*, ch. 15-17.—J. Redpath, *Public Life of Capt. John Brown*.

A. D. 1860.—The Eighth Census.—Total population, 31,443,322, being an increase exceeding 35½ per cent. over the population of 1850; classified and distributed as follows:

	North.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
California.....	361,353	4,086	...
Colorado.....	34,231	46	...
Connecticut.....	451,520	8,627	...
Dakota.....	2,576	...	...
Illinois.....	1,704,323	7,628	...
Indiana.....	1,339,000	11,428	...
Iowa.....	673,844	1,069	...
Kansas.....	106,579	625	2
Maine.....	626,952	1,327	...
Massachusetts....	1,221,464	9,602	...
Michigan.....	742,314	6,799	...
Minnesota.....	171,864	259	...
Nebraska.....	28,759	67	15
Nevada.....	6,812	45	...
New Hampshire....	325,579	494	...
New Jersey.....	646,699	3,318	18
New York.....	3,831,730	49,085	...
Ohio.....	2,302,838	36,673	...
Oregon.....	52,337	128	...
Pennsylvania.....	2,849,266	56,849	...
Rhode Island.....	170,668	3,952	...
Utah.....	40,214	30	29
Vermont.....	314,359	709	...
Washington.....	11,138	30	...
Wisconsin.....	774,710	1,171	...
	18,791,159	225,967	64
	South.		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama.....	526,431	2,690	435,080
Arkansas.....	324,191	144	111,115
Delaware.....	90,589	19,829	1,798
District of Colum- bia.....	60,764	11,131	3,185
Florida.....	77,748	932	61,745
Georgia.....	591,588	3,500	462,198
Kentucky.....	919,517	10,684	225,483
Louisiana.....	357,629	18,647	331,726
Maryland.....	515,918	83,942	87,189
Mississippi.....	353,901	773	436,631
Missouri.....	1,063,509	3,572	114,931
New Mexico.....	82,924	85	...
North Carolina....	631,100	30,463	331,059
South Carolina....	291,388	9,914	402,406
Tennessee.....	826,782	7,300	275,719
Texas.....	421,294	355	182,566
Virginia.....	1,047,411	58,042	490,865
	8,182,684	262,003	3,953,696

Immigration in the preceding decade added 2,598,214 to the population, being 1,338,093 from the British Islands, and 1,114,564 from other parts of Europe.

A. D. 1860.—The Southern view of Slavery.—The state of opinion and feeling on the subject of slavery to which the people of the southern states had arrived in 1860 is set forth with brevity and distinctness in Claiborne's *Life of General Quitman*, which was published that year: "In the early stages of African slavery in the South," says the writer, "it was by many

considered an evil, that had been inflicted upon the country by British and New England cupidity. The Africans were regarded as barbarians, and were governed by the lash. The very hatred of the 'evil' forced upon us was, in a measure, transferred to the unhappy victims. They were treated with severity, and no social relations subsisted between them and the whites. By degrees slavery began to be considered 'a necessary evil,' to be got rid of by gradual emancipation, or perhaps not at all, and the condition of the slave sensibly improved. The natural sense of justice in the human heart suggested that they had been brought here by compulsion, and that they should be regarded not as savages, but as captives, who were to be kindly treated while laboring for their ultimate redemption. The progress of anti-slavery sentiment in the Northern States (once regarded by the South as a harmless fanaticism), the excesses it has occasioned, and the unconstitutional power it claims, at length prompted a general and searching inquiry into the true status of the negro. The moment that the Southern mind became convinced, that slavery, as it exists among us, instead of being a moral, social, and political evil, is a moral, social, and political good, and is the natural condition of the negro, as ordained by Providence, and the only condition in which he can be civilized and instructed, the condition of the Southern slave underwent a thorough change. As a permanent fixture, as a hereditary heirloom, as a human being with an immortal soul, intrusted to us by God for his own wise purposes, his value increased, and his relation to his owner approximated to the relation of guardian and ward. Interest taught us that it would be wise to cherish what was to be the permanent means of production and profit, and religion exacted the humane and judicious employment of the 'talent' committed to our care. Thus the most powerful influences that sway the heart and the judgment are in operation for the benefit of the slave, and hence his present comfortable and constantly ameliorating condition. It is due, almost solely, to the moral convictions of the slaveholder. Our laws protect the slave in life and limb, and against cruel and inordinate punishment. Those laws are rigorously applied, though rarely necessary, for public opinion, more formidable than law, would condemn to execration and infamy the unjust and cruel master. Since these convictions in regard to slavery have been adopted almost unanimously in the South, the value of negroes has quadrupled. This, however, is in some measure an evil, because the tendency is to concentrate the slaves in the hands of the few, who are able to pay the extraordinary rates now demanded. It would be better for the commonwealth, and give additional solidity to our system of domestic servitude, if every family had an interest in it, secured, to a limited extent, against liability for debt. It should constitute in the South, if practicable, a part of every homestead, and then interest, and household tradition, and the friendly, confidential, and even affectionate relations that in the present state of public feeling prevail between master and slave, would unite all men in its defense. Neither land, nor slaves, which are here more valuable than land, should, by either direct or indirect legislation, be concentrated in few hands. Every citizen should have, if possible, that immediate interest in them



which would make him feel that, in defending the commonwealth and its institutions, he is defending his own inheritance."—J. F. H. Claiborne, *Life and Corr. of John A. Quitman*, v. 1, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1860 (April—November).—Nineteenth Presidential Election.—Division of the Democratic Party.—Four candidates in the field.—A victory for freedom in the choice of Abraham Lincoln.**—"Mr. J. W. Fell, a politician of Pennsylvania, says that after the debates of 1858 [with Douglas] he urged Lincoln to seek the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1860. Lincoln, however, replied curtly that men like Seward and Chase were entitled to take precedence, and that no such 'good luck' was in store for him. . . . In the winter of 1859-60 sundry 'intimate friends,' active politicians of Illinois, pressed him to consent to be mentioned as a candidate. He considered the matter over night and then gave them the desired permission, at the same time saying that he would not accept the vice-presidency. . . . With the opening of the spring of 1860 the several parties began the campaign in earnest. The Democratic Convention met first, at Charleston, April 23; and immediately the line of disruption opened. Upon the one side stood Douglas, with the moderate men and nearly all the Northern delegates, while against him were the advocates of extreme Southern doctrines, supported by the administration and by most of the delegates from the 'Cotton States.' The majority of the committee appointed to draft the platform were anti-Douglas men; but their report was rejected, and that offered by the pro-Douglas minority was substituted, 165 yeas to 138 nays. Thereupon the delegations of Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, and sundry delegates from other States, withdrew from the Convention, taking away 45 votes out of a total of 303. Those who remained declared the vote of two thirds of a full Convention, i. e., 202 votes, to be necessary for a choice. Then during three days 57 ballots were cast, Douglas being always far in the lead, but never polling more than 152½ votes. At last, on May 3, an adjournment was had until June 18, at Baltimore. At this second meeting contesting delegations appeared, and the decisions were uniformly in favor of the Douglas men, which provoked another secession of the extremist Southern men. A ballot showed 173½ votes for Douglas out of a total of 191½; the total was less than two thirds of the full number of the original Convention, and therefore it was decided that any person receiving two thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present should be deemed the nominee. The next ballot gave Douglas 181½. Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia was nominated for vice-president. On June 28, also at Baltimore [after a meeting and adjournment from Richmond, June 11], there came together a collection composed of original seceders at Charleston, and of some who had been rejected and others who had seceded at Baltimore. Very few Northern men were present, and the body in fact represented the Southern wing of the Democracy. Having, like its competitor, the merit of knowing its own mind, it promptly nominated John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon, and adopted the radical platform which had been reported at Charleston. These doings opened, so that it

could never be closed, that seam of which the thread had long been visible athwart the surface of the old Democratic party. . . . In May the Convention of the Constitutional Union party met, also at Baltimore. This organization was a sudden outgrowth designed only to meet the present emergency. . . . The party died, of necessity, upon the day when Lincoln was elected, and its members were then distributed between the Republicans, the Secessionists, and the Copperheads. John Bell, of Tennessee, the candidate for the presidency, joined the Confederacy; Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, the candidate for the vice-presidency, became a Republican. The party never had a hope of electing its men; but its existence increased the chance of throwing the election into Congress; and this hope inspired exertions far beyond what its own prospects warranted. On May 16 the Republican Convention came together at Chicago, where the great 'Wigwam' had been built to hold 10,000 persons. . . . Many candidates were named, chiefly Seward, Lincoln, Chase, Cameron, Edward Bates of Missouri, and William L. Dayton of New Jersey. Thurlow Weed was Seward's lieutenant. Horace Greeley, chiefly bent upon the defeat of Seward, would have liked to achieve it by the success of Bates. David Davis, aided by Judge Logan and a band of personal friends from Illinois, was manager for Lincoln. Primarily the contest lay between Seward and Lincoln. . . . Upon the third ballot . . . those who were keeping the tally saw that it stood:—Seward, 180; Lincoln, 231½; Chase, 24½; Bates, 22; Dayton, 1; McLean, 5; Scattering, 1. . . . Before the count could be announced, a delegate from Ohio transferred four votes to Lincoln. This settled the matter; and then other delegations followed, till Lincoln's score rose to 354. . . . Later in the day the convention nominated Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, on the second ballot, by 367 votes, for the vice-presidency. . . . Almost from the beginning it was highly probable that the Republicans would win, and it was substantially certain that none of their competitors could do so. The only contrary chance was that no election might be made by the people, and that it might be thrown into Congress."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 6.—At the popular election, the votes were: Lincoln, 1,866,452 (Free-States vote, 1,840,022, Slave States vote, 26,430); Douglas, 1,375,157 (Free States vote, 1,211,632, Slave States vote, 163,525); Breckenridge, 847,953 (Free States vote, 277,082, Slave States vote, 570,871); Bell, 590,631 (Free States vote, 74,658, Slave States vote, 515,973). In the Electoral College, the four candidates were voted for as follows: Lincoln, 180; Breckenridge, 72; Bell, 39; Douglas, 12.—E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: H. W. Raymond, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 4.—E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, p. 1.—J. G. Holland, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 15-16.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 2, ch. 13-16.—J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U. S. from 1850*, ch. 11 (v. 2).

**A. D. 1860 (November—December).—The plotting of the rebellion.—Secession of South Carolina.**—"The long-hoped-for opportunity of trying the experiment of secession was now at last presented. Abraham Lincoln had been

elevated to the presidency by a strictly sectional vote; and though the fact could not be denied that he had been elected in a perfectly constitutional manner, . . . yet, no sooner was it ascertained that it was almost certain that he would receive a majority of the electoral votes of the whole Union, than steps began to be taken for carrying into effect a revolutionary project which had engrossed the thoughts and sensibilities of a small class of extreme Southern politicians, mainly confined to the State of South Carolina, for some thirty years preceding. . . . So thoroughly matured was the project of secession in the minds of Southern extremists in South Carolina, that they are known actually to have commenced movements looking to this desired end before even the presidential election had taken place, and when the result which soon ensued was yet but a strong probability. Accordingly we find Governor Gist, as early as the 5th of November, 1860, addressing a message to the South Carolina Legislature, embodying the following bold and explicit declarations. . . . 'That an exposition of the will of the people may be obtained on a question involving such momentous consequences, I would earnestly recommend that, in the event of Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency, a Convention of the people of this state be immediately called, to consider and determine for themselves the mode and measure of redress. My own opinions of what the Convention should do are of little moment; but, believing that the time has arrived when every one, however humble he may be, should express his opinions in unmistakable language, I am constrained to say that the only alternative left, in my judgment, is the secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union. The indications from many of the Southern States justify the conclusion that the secession of South Carolina will be immediately followed, if not adopted simultaneously by them, and ultimately by the entire South. . . . I would also respectfully recommend a thorough reorganization of the militia, so as to place the whole military force of the state in a position to be used at the shortest notice and with the greatest efficiency. . . . In addition to this general preparation, I would recommend that the services of 10,000 volunteers be immediately accepted.' . . . I desire not to particularize on this painful subject to an extent which might now prove annoying, and therefore proceed briefly to state that the Legislature of South Carolina provided for the assemblage of a state Convention, the members of which were to be elected on the 6th of December, while the conventional body itself was to come together on the 19th of the same month; that the Convention did assemble on the last-mentioned day, and, after an excited debate of several days' continuance, adopted an Ordinance of Secession on the 20th of December. Commissioners were sent with a copy of the ordinance to each of the slave states, in order to quicken co-operative action, and notification was duly made as to these events to the Federal government in Washington City. The next secession movement it was expected would come off in the State of Georgia. A Convention for this purpose had been already called. It was known that Alexander H. Stephens, Herschel V. Johnson, and other public men, of elevated standing and of extended influence, would be members of

the Convention, and it was expected that they would exert themselves to the utmost to prevent the imitation by the State of Georgia of the rash example which had just been set by South Carolina; and it was likewise known that eminent personages from the State of South Carolina would attend the Convention of Georgia, in order to urge immediate co-operation. Under these circumstances, I took it upon myself to persuade the public men of most influence in the city of Nashville, where I was then residing, to send ten or fifteen delegates forthwith to Milledgeville, respectfully and earnestly to protest against extreme action on the part of Georgia. . . . I urged these views for several days most zealously, but, I regret to say, without success; some supposing that there was no serious danger of the Convention of Georgia adopting an Ordinance of Secession, and others that there was reason to fear, if we should send delegates to Milledgeville, it might result in fatally compromising our own attitude. The manly opposition made by Mr. Stephens to the attempt to draw Georgia into the Secession maelstrom is well known. This want of success is a circumstance which I shall ever deplore as the most unfortunate event of a public nature which has occurred within my recollection. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were now soon enrolled among the seceded States. Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware still stood firm, despite all the efforts essayed to shake their constancy. It is indeed true, as Mr. Greeley has deliberately recorded, that after the secession 'conspiracy had held complete possession of the Southern mind for three months, with the Southern members of the cabinet, nearly all the Federal officers, most of the governors and other state functionaries, and seven eighths of the prominent and active politicians pushing it on, and no force exerted against nor in any manner threatening to resist it, a majority of the slave states, with two thirds of the free population of the entire slaveholding region, was openly and positively adverse to it, either because they regarded the alleged grievances of the South as exaggerated if not unreal, or because they believed that those wrongs would rather be aggravated than cured by disunion.'—H. S. Foote, *War of the Rebellion*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay, *The Outbreak of Rebellion*, ch. 1.—S. W. Crawford, *The Genesis of the Civil War*, ch. 2-5.—F. Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record*, v. 1.

The following is the South Carolina Ordinance of Secession, adopted December 20, together with the Declaration of Causes which was promulgated by the Convention four days later:

"An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States united with her under the compact entitled 'The Constitution of the United States of America.'

We, the People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained. That the Ordinance adopted by us in Convention, on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also, all Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments of the said Con-



stitution, are hereby repealed; and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of 'The United States of America,' is hereby dissolved."

"Declaration of the immediate causes which induce and justify the secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union:

The People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, on the 26th day of April, A. D., 1853, declared that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States, by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified this State in then withdrawing from the Federal Union; but in deference to the opinions and wishes of the other slaveholding States, she forbore at that time to exercise this right. Since that time, these encroachments have continued to increase, and further forbearance ceases to be a virtue. And now the State of South Carolina having resumed her separate and equal place among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the nations of the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act. In the year 1765, that portion of the British Empire embracing Great Britain, undertook to make laws for the government of that portion composed of the thirteen American Colonies. A struggle for the right of self-government ensued, which resulted, on the 4th July, 1776, in a Declaration, by the Colonies, 'that they are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; and that, as free and independent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.' They further solemnly declared that whenever any 'form of government becomes destructive of the ends for which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government.' Deeming the Government of Great Britain to have become destructive of these ends, they declared that the Colonies 'are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.' In pursuance of this Declaration of Independence, each of the thirteen States proceeded to exercise its separate sovereignty; adopted for itself a Constitution, and appointed officers for the administration of government in all its departments—Legislative, Executive and Judicial. For purposes of defence, they united their arms and their counsels; and, in 1778, they entered into a League known as the Articles of Confederation, whereby they agreed to entrust the administration of their external relations to a common agent, known as the Congress of the United States, expressly declaring, in the first article, 'that each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which is not, by this Confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. Under this Confederation the War of the Revolution was carried on, and on the 3d September, 1783, the contest ended, and a definitive Treaty was signed by Great Britain, in which she acknowledged the Independence of the Colonies in the following terms: 'Article 1.—His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz: New

Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof.' Thus were established the two great principles asserted by the Colonies, namely: the right of a State to govern itself; and the right of a people to abolish a Government when it becomes destructive of the ends for which it was instituted. And concurrent with the establishment of these principles, was the fact, that each Colony became and was recognized by the mother Country as a free, sovereign and independent State. In 1787, Deputies were appointed by the States to revise the Articles of Confederation, and on 17th September, 1787, these Deputies recommended, for the adoption of the States, the Articles of Union, known as the Constitution of the United States. The parties to whom this Constitution was submitted, were the several sovereign States; they were to agree or disagree, and when nine of them agreed, the compact was to take effect among those concurring; and the General Government, as the common agent, was then to be invested with their authority. If only nine of the thirteen States had concurred, the other four would have remained as they were—separate sovereign States, independent of any of the provisions of the Constitution. In fact, two of the States did not accede to the Constitution until long after it had gone into operation among the other eleven; and during that interval, they each exercised the functions of an independent nation. By this Constitution, certain duties were imposed upon the several States, and the exercise of certain of their powers was restrained, which necessarily implied their continued existence as sovereign States. But, to remove all doubt, an amendment was added, which declared that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. On 23d May, 1788, South Carolina, by a Convention of her people, passed an Ordinance assenting to this Constitution, and afterwards altered her own Constitution, to conform herself to the obligations she had undertaken. Thus was established, by compact between the States, a Government, with defined objects and powers, limited to the express words of the grant. This limitation left the whole remaining mass of power subject to the clause reserving it to the States or to the people, and rendered unnecessary any specification of reserved rights. We hold that the Government thus established is subject to the two great principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence; and we hold further, that the mode of its formation subjects it to a third fundamental principle, namely: the law of compact. We maintain that in every compact between two or more parties, the obligation is mutual; that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement, entirely releases the obligation of the other; and that where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its consequences.

In the present case, that fact is established with certainty. We assert, that fourteen of the States have deliberately refused for years past to fulfil their constitutional obligations, and we refer to their own Statutes for the proof. The Constitution of the United States, in its 4th Article, provides as follows: 'No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.' This stipulation was so material to the compact, that without it that compact would not have been made. The greater number of the contracting parties held slaves, and they had previously evinced their estimate of the value of such a stipulation by making it a condition in the Ordinance for the government of the territory ceded by Virginia, which now composes the States north of the Ohio river. The same article of the Constitution stipulates also for rendition by the several States of fugitives from justice from the other States. The General Government, as the common agent, passed laws to carry into effect these stipulations of the States. For many years these laws were executed. But an increasing hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the Institution of Slavery has led to a disregard of their obligations, and the laws of the General Government have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution. The States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, have enacted laws which either nullify the Acts of Congress or render useless any attempt to execute them. In many of these States the fugitive is discharged from the service or labor claimed, and in none of them has the State Government complied with the stipulation made in the Constitution. The State of New Jersey, at an early day, passed a law in conformity with her constitutional obligation; but the current of anti-slavery feeling has led her more recently to enact laws which render inoperative the remedies provided by her own law and by the laws of Congress. In the State of New York even the right of transit for a slave has been denied by her tribunals; and the States of Ohio and Iowa have refused to surrender to justice fugitives charged with murder, and with inciting servile insurrection in the State of Virginia. Thus the constitutional compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation. The ends for which this Constitution was framed are declared by itself to be 'to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' These ends it endeavored to accomplish by a Federal Government, in which each State was recognized as an equal, and had separate control over its own institutions. The right of property in slaves was recognized by giving to free persons distinct political rights, by giving them the right to represent, and burthening them with direct taxes for three-fifths of their slaves; by authorizing the importation of slaves for

twenty years; and by stipulating for the rendition of fugitives from labor. We affirm that these ends for which this Government was instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding States. Those States have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen other States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of Slavery; they have permitted the open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to claim the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection. For twenty-five years this agitation has been steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the power of the Common Government. Observing the forms of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that article establishing the Executive Department, the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration of the Common Government, because he has declared that that 'Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free,' and that the public mind must rest in the belief that Slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. This sectional combination for the subversion of the Constitution, has been aided in some of the States by elevating to citizenship, persons, who, by the Supreme Law of the land, are incapable of becoming citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new policy, hostile to the South, and destructive of its peace and safety. On the 4th March next, this party will take possession of the Government. It has announced, that the South shall be excluded from the common Territory; that the Judicial Tribunals shall be made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States. The Guaranties of the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights of the States will be lost. The slaveholding States will no longer have the power of self-government, or self-protection, and the Federal Government will have become their enemy. Sectional interest and animosity will deepen the irritation, and all hope of remedy is rendered vain, by the fact that public opinion at the North has invested a great political error with the sanctions of a more erroneous religious belief. We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by our delegates, in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America, is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State; with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do."



**A. D. 1860 (December).—President Buchanan's surrender.**—His disunion message and its evil effects.—Congress met on the first Monday of December and received from President Buchanan "his mischievous and deplorable message . . . —a message whose evil effect can never be estimated, and whose evil character can hardly be exaggerated. The President informed Congress that 'the long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery in the Southern States has at last produced its natural effect.' . . . The President found that the chief grievance of the South was in the enactments of the Free States known as 'personal liberty laws' [designed to protect free citizens, black or white, in their right to trial by jury, which the fugitive slave law denied to a black man claimed as a slave]. . . . Very likely these enactments, inspired by an earnest spirit of liberty, went in many cases too far, and tended to produce conflicts between National and State authority. That was a question to be determined finally and exclusively by the Federal Judiciary. Unfortunately Mr. Buchanan carried his argument beyond that point. . . . After reciting the statutes which he regarded as objectionable and hostile to the constitutional rights of the South, and after urging their unconditional repeal upon the North, the President said: 'The Southern States, standing on the basis of the Constitution, have a right to demand this act of justice from the States of the North. Should it be refused, then the Constitution, to which all the States are parties, will have been willfully violated. . . . In that event, the injured States, after having used all peaceful and constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the government of the Union.' By this declaration the President justified, and in effect advised, an appeal from the constitutional tribunals of the country to a popular judgment in the aggrieved States, and recognized the right of those States, upon such popular judgment, to destroy the Constitution and the Union. . . . Mr. Buchanan proceeded to argue ably and earnestly against the assumption by any State of an inherent right to secede from the government at its own will and pleasure. But he utterly destroyed the force of his reasoning by declaring that, 'after much serious reflection' he had arrived at 'the conclusion that no power has been delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the Federal Government, to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn,' from the Union. . . . Under these doctrines the Government of the United States was shorn of all power to preserve its own existence, and the Union might crumble and fall while its constituted authorities stood paralyzed and impotent. This construction was all that the extremists of the South desired. With so much conceded, they had every thing in their own hands. . . . Men who, under the wholesome restraint of executive power, would have refrained from taking aggressive steps against the National Government, were by Mr. Buchanan's action forced into a position of hostility. Men in the South, who were disposed to avoid extreme measures, were by taunt and reproach driven into the ranks of Secession. . . . The evil effects of Mr. Buchanan's message were not confined to the slave States. It did incalculable

harm in the free States. It fixed in the minds of tens of thousands of Northern men who were opposed to the Republican party, the belief that the South was justified in taking steps to break up the government, if what they termed a war on Southern institutions should be continued. This feeling had in turn a most injurious influence in the South."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years in Congress*, v. 1, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: G. T. Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan*, v. 2, ch. 16-17.

**A. D. 1860 (December).—Vain concessions and humiliations of the North proposed.—The Crittenden compromise.**—"When, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Boteler, of Virginia, proposed to refer so much of the President's Message as related to the perilous condition of the country to a committee of thirty-three—one from each state—not less than 52 members from the Slave States refused to vote. 'I pay no attention to any action taken in this body,' said one. 'I am not sent here to patch up difficulties,' said another. The Democratic members from the Free States did their utmost to compose the dissension—some of them who subsequently became conspicuous in the war—suggesting concessions which doubtless they looked back upon with regret. It was proposed that persons of African blood should never be considered as citizens of the United States; that there should never be any interference with slavery in the Territories, nor with the interstate slave-trade; that the doctrine of state-rights should be admitted, and power of coercion denied to the government. Among the dissatisfied members, one would allow any state at pleasure to secede, and allot it a fair share of the public property and territory. Another would divide the Union into four republics; another would abolish the office of President, and have in its stead a council of three, each of whom should have a veto on every public act. Propositions such as these show to what length the allies of the slave power would have gone to preserve it and give it perpetuity. At this stage, Mr. Crittenden [Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky], proposed in the Senate certain amendments of the Constitution, and resolutions known subsequently as the Crittenden Compromise. The essential features of his plan were the re-establishing of the Missouri Compromise: that in all territory of the United States north of 36° 30' slavery should be prohibited; in all south of that line, not only permitted, but protected; that from such territory north or south states might be admitted with or without slavery, as the Constitution of each might determine; that Congress should have no power to abolish slavery in places under its jurisdiction in a slave state, nor in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the adjoining states, nor without compensation to the slaveholders, nor to prevent persons connected with the government bringing their slaves into the District; that Congress should have no power to hinder the interstate or territorial transport of slaves; that the national government should pay a full value to the owner of a fugitive slave who might have been rescued from the officers; that no amendments of the Constitution should ever be made which might affect these amendments, or other slave compromises already existing in the Constitution. He also recommended to the states that had enacted

laws in conflict with the existing fugitive slave acts, their repeal; and in four resolutions made provision for the more perfect execution of those acts. But the dissension was too deep to be closed by such a measure as Mr. Crittenden's, which contained nothing that could satisfy the North. The South was resolved not to be satisfied with any thing. It had taken what was plainly an irreversible step. Accordingly, Mr. Crittenden's proposition was eventually lost."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 31 (sect. 6, v. 1).

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *The Am. Conflict*, v. 1, ch. 24. — E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 48-90. — J. A. Logan, *The Great Conspiracy*, ch. 8.

**A. D. 1860 (December).—Major Anderson at Fort Sumter.**—Floyd's treachery in the War Department.—Cabinet rupture.—Loyalty re-instated in the national government.—"In November, 1860, the fortifications of Charleston Harbor consisted of three works—Castle Pinckney, an old-fashioned, circular brick fort, on Shute's Folly Island, and about one mile east of the city; Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, still farther to the east, and famous as being on the site of the old fort of palmetto logs, where, during the long bombardment by the British fleet in Revolutionary days, the gallant William Jasper leaped from the low rampart upon the beach below, and seizing the flag that had been shot down, rehoisted it above the fort; and lastly, Fort Sumter, an unfinished fortification, named after General Thomas Sumter, the famous partisan leader of the Revolution, and who was familiarly known as the 'gamecock of the Carolinas.' The armament of Castle Pinckney consisted of 22 cannon, 2 mortars, and 4 light pieces; that of Moultrie of 45 cannon and 7 light pieces; while Sumter mounted 78 heavy guns of various calibre. The entire force of United States troops in these fortifications was composed of two weak companies of artillery under command of Major Robert Anderson, and a few engineer employees under Captain John G. Foster. Of these a sergeant and squad of men were stationed at Castle Pinckney for the care of the quarters and the guns; a similar handful were at Sumter; while most of the little force were at Moultrie, where Anderson had his headquarters. Such was the military situation when South Carolina began to proclaim, without disguise, her purpose to secede and to possess herself of the fortifications on her coast. . . . Our Government paid no apparent heed, and yet the authorities at Washington were fully and betimes forewarned. . . . On the files of the Engineer Department I found a letter, which still remains there, dated as early as November 24, 1860, from Captain Foster to Colonel De Russy, then the chief of the engineer corps, in which the captain states that, at the request of Major Anderson, he has, in company with that officer, made a thorough inspection of the forts in the harbor; that, in the opinion of Anderson, one additional company of artillery should at once be sent to garrison Castle Pinckney, which in the terse language of the letter, 'commands the city of Charleston.' Upon the back of the letter is the simple but significant indorsement, in his own hand-writing, 'Return to Governor Floyd.' You may recall him as Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of War. On November 30, Captain Foster again writes to

Colonel De Russy, saying: 'I think that more troops should have been sent here to guard the forts, and I believe that no serious demonstration on the part of the populace would have met such a course.' On this is indorsed: 'Colonel Cooper says this has been shown to the Secretary of War. H. G. W.' The initials, placed there by himself, are those of the gallant Horatio G. Wright, who succeeded to the command of the Sixth Army Corps after the loved Sedgwick fell. On December 2, application was made by Captain Foster for the small supply of four boxes of muskets and sixty rounds of cartridge per man, to arm the few civilians or hired laborers who constituted the engineer corps. These arms and ammunition were in the United States arsenal at Charleston, a building which still had a Federal keeper, and over which still floated the Federal flag. On this application is the following indorsement, also in General Wright's handwriting: 'Handed to adjutant-general, and by him laid before the Secretary of War on the sixth of December. Returned by adjutant-general on the seventh. Action deferred for the present. See Captain Foster's letter of December 4.' . . . On December 17, Captain Foster, acting on his own patriotic judgment, but without orders, went to Charleston and took from the Federal arsenal forty muskets, with which to arm his laborers. Early on the morning of the 19th, he received a telegram from Secretary Floyd, directing him instantly to return the arms to the arsenal. On the next day, the 20th, the South Carolinians decided, in State convention, to secede, and proclaimed their State an independent sovereignty. . . . All alike were delirious with the epidemic madness of the hour, were hopeful, resolute, enthusiastic. Bells pealed and cannon boomed. . . . But few ventured to breast the storm. There was one, whose name should live honored in a nation's memory, a wise, true man, the greatest lawyer of his State, James L. Pettigrew, who, when his minister first dropped from the service the prayer for the President of the United States, rose in his pew in the middle aisle of Charleston's most fashionable church, and slowly and with distinct voice repeated: 'Most humbly and heartily we beseech Thee with Thy favor to behold and bless Thy servant, the President of these United States.' Then, placing his prayer-book in the rack, and drawing his wife's arm within his own, he left the church, nor entered it again until his body was borne there for burial. To their honor be it said, that even the Carolinians respected his sincerity and candor, and never molested him. . . . On the night of December 26, Major Anderson evacuated Fort Moultrie, which was untenable by his small force, spiked his guns, burned the gun-carriages, and transferred his small command in two schooners to Fort Sumter. This act was without orders and against the do-nothing and helpless policy which had thus far controlled the Government. But it showed the wisdom and prompt decision of the trained soldier and the spirit of the loyal citizen. . . . Let us recall the appearance of Sumter when Anderson transferred his feeble garrison to its protection. The fort was built on an artificial island, which had been constructed by dumping stone upon a shoal that lay on the south side of the principal ship channel to Charleston Harbor. Sumter was pentagonal in form, and its five sides of brick, made solid by



concrete, rose 60 feet above the water. It was pierced for an armament of 135 guns, which were to be placed in three tiers. Two tiers were to be in casemates, and one 'en barbette,' or on the top of the wall. The embrasures of the upper tier of casemates were never completed. They were filled up with brick during Major Anderson's occupation of the fort, and so remained during all the succeeding operations and siege. Seventy-eight guns of various calibre composed its then armament, the most efficient of which were placed 'en barbette.' On the east and west sides of the parade were barracks for the privates, and on the south side were the officers' quarters. These were all wooden structures. The wharf by which access was had to the fort was on the southern side against the gorge wall. Looking from the sea front, Sumter lay nearly midway between Sullivan's Island on the north and the low, sandy ridges of Morris on the south, and about 1,400 yards from either. The main ship channel was between Sumter and Sullivan's Island. The water between the fort and Morris Island was for the most part comparatively shallow. James Island lay to the west and southwest, while to the northwest, and at a distance of three and one-third miles, rose the steeples of Charleston. The city could have been barely reached by the heaviest guns of the barbette battery. Castle Pinckney lay in the direction of the city, and was distant about two and one-third miles. Sullivan's, Morris, and James Islands thus formed a segment of three-fourths of a circle around Sumter. They were so close under the guns of the fort that, with the then limited experience in the construction of earth-works, no batteries could have been erected under fire from Sumter sufficiently strong to prevent the re-enforcement and supplying of the fort, had Anderson been allowed to open fire at the first upon the rebel working parties. . . . At noon of December 27, the flag of the nation was raised over the defenders of the fort. Major Anderson knelt, holding the halliards, while Rev. Matthew Harris, an army chaplain, offered fervent prayer for that dear flag and for the loyal few who stood beneath its folds. . . . And then all wearily the days and weeks dragged on. New fortifications rose day by day on each sand-hill about the harbor; vessels of war, bearing the Confederate flag, steamed insultingly near, and the islands were white as harvest fields, with the tents of the fast-gathering rebel soldiery; and still, by positive orders, Anderson was bidden to stand in idle helplessness beside his silent indignant cannon."—Gen. Stewart L. Woodford, *The Story of Fort Sumter (Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, pp. 259-266)*.—On the 29th of December, three days after Anderson had transferred his command to Fort Sumter, Floyd gave up his work of treachery in the War Department, and resigned. Howell Cobb had resigned the Treasury Department previously, on the 10th. A few days later, January 8, Jacob Thompson withdrew from the Interior Department. Loyal men now replaced these secessionists in the Cabinet. Joseph Holt of Kentucky took the place of Floyd in the War Department; John A. Dix of New York succeeded Cobb in the Treasury, and the place of Thompson was not filled. Edwin M. Stanton entered the Cabinet as Attorney-General, taking the place of Jeremiah S. Black who became

Secretary of State. General Cass had held the State Department until December 12, when he, too, resigned, but for reasons opposite to those of Floyd and Cobb. He left the Government because it would not reinforce the Charleston forts.—E. McPherson, *Political Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, p. 28.

ALSO IN: S. W. Crawford, *Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter*, ch. 1, and 6-10.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 2, ch. 18-29, and v. 3, ch. 1-6.

**A. D. 1860-1861 (December—February).—**Seizure of arms, arsenals, forts, and other public property by the Southern insurgents.—Base surrender of an army by Twiggs.—"Directly after Major Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter, the Federal arsenal in Charleston, containing many thousand stand of arms and a considerable quantity of military stores, was seized by the volunteers, now flocking to that city by direction of the State authorities; Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, and Sullivan's Island were likewise occupied by them, and their defenses vigorously enlarged and improved. The Custom-House, Post-Office, etc., were likewise appropriated, without resistance or commotion. . . . Georgia having given [January 2, 1861] a large popular majority for Secession, her authorities immediately took military possession of the Federal arsenal at Augusta, as also of Forts Pulaski and Jackson, commanding the approaches by sea to Savannah. North Carolina had not voted to secede, yet Gov. Ellis simultaneously seized the U. S. Arsenal at Fayetteville, with Fort Macon, and other fortifications commanding the approaches to Beaufort and Wilmington. Having done so, Gov. E. coolly wrote to the War Department that he had taken the step to preserve the forts from seizure by mobs! In Alabama, the Federal arsenal at Mobile was seized on the 4th, by order of Gov. Moore. It contained large quantities of arms and munitions. Fort Morgan, commanding the approaches to Mobile, was likewise seized, and garrisoned by State troops. . . . In Louisiana, the Federal arsenal at Baton Rouge was seized by order of Gov. Moore on the 11th. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, commanding the passage up the Mississippi to New Orleans, and Fort Pike, at the entrance of Lake Pontchartrain, were likewise seized and garrisoned by State troops. The Federal Mint and Custom-House at New Orleans were left untouched until February 1st, when they, too, were taken possession of by the State authorities. . . . In Florida, Fort Barrancas and the Navy Yard at Pensacola were seized by Florida and Alabama forces on the 13th; Commander Armstrong surrendering them without a struggle. He ordered Lieut. Slemmer, likewise, to surrender Forts Pickens and McRae; but the intrepid subordinate defied the order, and, withdrawing his small force from Fort McRae to the stronger and less accessible Fort Pickens, announced his determination to hold out to the last. He was soon after besieged therein by a formidable volunteer force; and a dispatch from Pensacola announced that 'Fort McRae is being occupied and the guns manned by the allied forces of Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi'. . . . The revenue cutter Cass, stationed at Mobile, was turned over by Capt. J. J. Morrison to the authorities of Alabama at the end of January. The McClellan, Capt. Bresh-

wood, stationed on the Mississippi below New Orleans, was, in like manner, handed over to those of Louisiana. Gen. Dix had sent down a special agent to secure them, but he was too late. The telegraph dispatch whereby Gen. Dix directed him, 'If any person attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot,' sent an electric thrill through the loyal heart of the country. Finally, tidings reached Washington, about the end of February, that Brig.-Gen. Twiggs, commanding the department of Texas, had disgracefully betrayed his trust, and turned over his entire army, with all the posts and fortifications, arms, munitions, horses, equipments, etc., to Gen. Ben. M'Culloch, representing the authorities of Texas, now fully launched upon the rushing tide of treason. The Union lost by that single act at least half its military force, with the State of Texas, and the control of our Mexican frontier. . . . The defensive fortifications located within the seceding States were some 30 in number, mounting over 3,000 guns, and having cost at least \$20,000,000. Nearly all these had been seized and appropriated by the Confederates before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, with the exception of Fortress Monroe (Virginia), Fort Sumter (South Carolina), Fort Pickens (Florida), and the fortresses on Key West and the Tortugas, off the Florida coast."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 1, ch. 26.

ALSO IN: *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 1.

A. D. 1861 (January–February).—**Secession of Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas.—Opposition of Alexander H. Stephens, in Georgia.**—"On the 9th day of January, 1861, the State of Mississippi seceded from the Union. Alabama and Florida followed on the 11th day of the same month; Georgia on the 20th; Louisiana on the 26th; and Texas on the 1st of February. Thus, in less than three months after the announcement of Lincoln's election, all the Cotton States . . . had seceded from the Union, and had, besides, secured every Federal fort within their limits, except the forts in Charleston harbor, and Fort Pickens, below Pensacola, which were retained by United States troops."—E. A. Pollard, *The First Year of the War*, ch. 1.—The secession of Georgia was powerfully but vainly opposed by the foremost citizen of that state, Alexander H. Stephens, whose speech before the Legislature of Georgia, in protest against the disruption of the Union, had been one of the notable utterances of the time. "Shall the people of the South," asked Mr. Stephens, "secede from the Union in consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency of the United States? My countrymen, I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly, that I do not think that they ought. In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any State to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the constitution of the country. To make a point of resistance to the government, to withdraw from it because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in the wrong. We are pledged to maintain the constitution. Many of us have sworn to support it. Can we, therefore, for the mere election of a man to the presidency, and that, too, in accordance with the prescribed forms of the constitution, make a point

of resistance to the government, without becoming the breakers of that sacred instrument ourselves, by withdrawing ourselves from it? Would we not be in the wrong? Whatever fate is to befall this country, let it never be laid to the charge of the people of the South, and especially to the people of Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements. Let the fault and the wrong rest upon others. . . . Let the fanatics of the North break the constitution, if such is their fell purpose. Let the responsibility be upon them. . . . We went into the election with this people. The result was different from what we wished; but the election has been constitutionally held. Were we to make a point of resistance to the government and go out of the Union on that account, the record would be made up hereafter against us. But it is said Mr. Lincoln's policy and principles are against the constitution, and that, if he carries them out, it will be destructive of our rights. Let us not anticipate a threatened evil. If he violates the constitution, then will come our time to act. Do not let us break it because, forsooth, he may. If he does, that is the time for us to strike. I think it would be injudicious and unwise to do this sooner. I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln will do anything to jeopard our safety or security, whatever may be his spirit to do it; for he is bound by the constitutional checks which are thrown around him, which at this time render him powerless to do any great mischief. This shows the wisdom of our system. The President of the United States is no emperor, no dictator—he is clothed with no absolute power. He can do nothing unless he is backed by power in Congress. The House of Representatives is largely in a majority against him. In the very face and teeth of the heavy majority which he has obtained in the northern States, there have been large gains in the House of Representatives to the conservative constitutional party of the country, which here I will call the national democratic party, because that is the cognomen it has at the North. . . . Is this the time, then, to apprehend that Mr. Lincoln, with this large majority in the House of Representatives against him, can carry out any of his unconstitutional principles in that body? In the Senate he will also be powerless. There will be a majority of four against him. . . . Mr. Lincoln cannot appoint an officer without the consent of the Senate—he cannot form a cabinet without the same consent. He will be in the condition of George the Third (the embodiment of toryism), who had to ask the whigs to appoint his ministers, and was compelled to receive a cabinet utterly opposed to his views; and so Mr. Lincoln will be compelled to ask of the Senate to choose for him a cabinet, if the democracy of that party chose to put him on such terms. He will be compelled to do this, or let the government stop, if the national democratic men (for that is their name at the North), the conservative men in the Senate, should so determine. Then how can Mr. Lincoln obtain a cabinet which would aid him, or allow him to violate the constitution? Why then, I say, should we disrupt the ties of this Union when his hands are tied—when he can do nothing against us?"—A. H. Stephens, *Speech against Secession*, Nov. 14, 1860 (*in "Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private"; by H. Cleveland*).—But when



Georgia, despite his exertions, was drawn into the movement of rebellion, Mr. Stephens surrendered to it, and lent his voice to the undertaking which he had proved to be without excuse. See below: A. D. 1861 (MARCH).

**A. D. 1861 (February).—The Peace Convention.**—"The General Assembly of Virginia, on the 19th of January, adopted resolutions inviting representatives of the several States to assemble in a Peace Convention at Washington, which met on the 4th of February. It was composed of 133 Commissioners, many from the border States, and the object of these was to prevail upon their associates from the North to unite with them in such recommendations to Congress as would prevent their own States from seceding and enable them to bring back six of the cotton States which had already seceded." On the 15th of February a committee of the Convention reported certain proposed amendments to the Constitution which "were substantially the same with the Crittenden Compromise [see above: A. D. 1860 (DECEMBER) VAIN CONCESSIONS]; but on motion of Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, the general terms of the first and by far the most important section were restricted to the present Territories of the United States. On motion of Mr. Franklin, of Pennsylvania, this section was further amended, but not materially changed, by the adoption of the substitute offered by him. Nearly in this form it was afterwards adopted by the Convention. The following is a copy: 'In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to prevent the taking of such persons from any of the States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law. When any Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may provide.' . . . More than ten days were consumed in discussion and in voting upon various propositions offered by individual commissioners. The final vote was not reached until Tuesday, the 26th February, when it was taken on the first vitally important section, as amended. This section, on which all the rest depended, was negatived by a vote of eight States to eleven. Those which voted in its favor were Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. And those in the negative were Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia." A reconsideration of the vote was moved, however, and on the day following (February 27), "the first section was adopted, but only by a majority of nine to eight States, nine being less than a

majority of the States represented. . . . From the nature of this vote, it was manifestly impossible that two-thirds of both Houses of Congress should act favorably on the amendment, even if the delay had not already rendered such action impracticable before the close of the session. The remaining sections of the amendment were carried by small majorities," and the proposed amendment of the Constitution was reported to Congress, with a request that it be submitted to the Legislatures of the States, but no action upon it was taken.—T. V. Cooper, *American Politics*, pp. 106–108. — "Most of the Southerners thought these propositions worse than nothing. Hunter preferred the present position under the constitution, with the Dred Scott decision as its exposition. Mason, the other Senator from the state that had issued the call for the Peace Convention, said that he would consider himself a traitor if he should recommend such propositions. Wigfall of Texas, however, bore off the palm by saying: 'If those resolutions were adopted, and ratified by three-fourths of the states of this Union, and no other cause ever existed, I make the assertion that the seven states now out of the Union would go out upon that.' Many of the Republicans were equally strong in their opposition to them. Chandler of Michigan spoke the substance of the opinions of several on his side of the Senate when he expressed himself in the language of the 'stump' by saying: 'No concession, no compromise,—ay, give us strife, even to blood,—before a yielding to the demands of traitorous insolence.' . . . John Tyler, the president of the convention that passed them, and Seddon returned to their state and denounced the recommendations of the Peace Convention as a delusion, a sham and an insult to the South. . . . Hawkins of Florida told the House, when the question was first touched upon, that the day of compromise was past and that he and his state were opposed to all and every compromise. Pugh and Clopton of Alabama both spoke boldly for secession and against any temporizing policy. Congress had been in session but ten days, and neither of the committees on compromise had had time to report, when a large number of the members of Congress from the extreme Southern States issued a manifesto declaring that 'argument was exhausted' and that 'the sole and primary aim of each slaveholding state ought to be its speedy and absolute separation from an unnatural and hostile Union.' . . . The boldness of these facts is startling, even when viewed at this distance. They make it perfectly evident that it was not the constitution which the South was desirous of saving, but the institution of slavery which she was determined to preserve. Likewise on the Northern side we find that those who were courageous, logical, and intellectually vigorous in political speculation considered the constitution of less importance than the development of their ideas of freedom. These people were called Abolitionists. Although their political strength was not great, some one of their many ideas found sympathy in the mind of almost every Northerner of education or of clear moral intentions. This explains how John A. Andrew could be elected governor of Massachusetts, although known to have presided over a John Brown meeting. The purpose of the Abolitionists was 'the utter extermination of

slavery wheresoever it may exist.' Wendell Phillips surprised very few Abolitionists when, knowing that the Confederacy was forming, he rejoiced that 'the covenant with death' was annulled and 'the agreement with hell' was broken in pieces, and exclaimed: 'Union or no Union, constitution or no constitution, freedom for every man between the oceans, and from the hot Gulf to the frozen pole! You may as well dam up Niagara with bulrushes as bind our anti-slavery purpose with Congressional compromise.' Congress had to consider such facts as these, as well as the compromises which were proposed. Stephen A. Douglas felt compelled to say, as early as January, 1861, that there were Democrats in the Senate who did not want a settlement. And it was plain to all that most of the Republicans discouraged further concessions. Nor would a constitutional amendment have been possible unless the Northern members had first recognized the seven states as being out of the Union, for it would otherwise have required the support of all but one of the states that were still active. That the 'personal liberty' laws were a violation of the constitution, and that the execution of the fugitive slave law of 1850 had been unconstitutionally obstructed, were unquestioned facts, directly or indirectly recognized by many of the Republican leaders. Nevertheless, the North was much more inclined to continue in this unconstitutional position than to yield to the demands of the South."—F. Bancroft, *The Final Efforts at Compromise* (Pol. Sci. Quarterly, Sept., 1891).

ALSO IN: H. A. Wise, *Seven Decades of the Union*, ch. 15.—L. G. Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, v. 2, ch. 20.—L. E. Chittenden, *Rept. of Debates and Proceedings in Secret Session of the Conference Convention, Washington, 1861*.

A. D. 1861 (February). — Adoption of a Constitution for "The Confederate States of America." — Election of a President and Vice President. — "Early in February, 1861, a convention of six seceding states, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, was held at Montgomery, Alabama. They were represented by 42 persons. Measures were taken for the formation of a provisional government. After the vote on the provisional Constitution was taken, Jefferson Davis was elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens Vice-President of the Confederacy for the current year. The inauguration of Mr. Davis took place on February 18th. Both were shortly after re-elected permanently for six years. . . . The permanent Constitution adopted for 'The Confederate States of America,' the title now assumed, was modeled substantially on that of the United States. It was remarked that, after all, the old Constitution was the most suitable basis for the new Confederacy. Among points of difference must be noticed that the new instrument broadly recognized, even in its preamble, the contested doctrine of state-rights. . . . Inducements and threats were applied to draw Virginia and the other Border States into the Confederacy. . . . With an ominous monition, the second article reads, 'Congress shall . . . have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of this Confederacy.' At this time Virginia was receiving an annual income of \$12,000,000 from the

sale of slaves. In 1860 12,000 slaves were sent over her railroads to the South and Southwest. One thousand dollars for each was considered a low estimate. Notwithstanding this, the Ordinance of Secession did not pass the Virginia Convention until some weeks subsequently (April 17)." — J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 32 (v. 1). — The preamble of the Constitution declared that "the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God, ordained a Constitution to form a permanent Federal Government and for other purposes. The change in phraseology was obviously to assert the derivative character of the Federal Government and to exclude the conclusion which Webster and others had sought to draw from the phrase, 'We, the people of the United States.' In the Executive department, the Constitution provided, in accordance with the early agreement of the Convention of 1787, that the President should be elected for six years and be ineligible. A seat upon the floor of either House of Congress might be granted to the principal officer in each of the Executive departments with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his department. The President was empowered to remove at pleasure the principal officer in each of the Executive departments and all persons connected with the diplomatic service. To give entire control of Cabinet officers and of foreign ministers was considered to be necessary for the proper discharge of the President's duties and for the independence of his department. All other civil officers could be removed when their services were unnecessary, or for dishonesty, inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty, but the removals in such cases, with the reasons therefor, were to be reported to the Senate, and no person rejected by the Senate could be reappointed to the same office during the recess of the Senate. The President was empowered, while approving portions of an appropriation bill, to disapprove particular items, as in other like cases of veto, the object being to defeat log-rolling combinations against the Treasury. Admitting members of the Cabinet to seats upon the floor of Congress with right of discussion (which worked well during the brief life of the Confederacy), was intended to secure greater facility of communication betwixt the Executive and the Legislative departments and enforce upon the heads of the departments more direct personal responsibility. By ineligibility of the President and restriction of the power of removal, the Congress, acting as a convention, sought to secure greater devotion to public interests, freedom from the corrupting influences of Executive patronage, and to break up the iniquitous spoils system which is such a peril to the purity and perpetuity of our Government. The Judicial department was permitted to remain substantially as it was in the old Government. The only changes were to authorize a tribunal for the investigation of claims against the Government, the withholding from the Federal Courts jurisdiction of suits between citizens of different States, and the enactment of a wise provision that any judicial or other Federal officer, resident and acting solely within the limits of any State, might be impeached by a vote of two thirds of both branches of the Legislature thereof.



The provisions in reference to the election of Senators and Representatives and the powers and duties of each House were unaltered except that the electors of each State were required to be citizens, and the Senators were to be chosen by the Legislatures of the State at the session next immediately preceding the beginning of the term of service. In reference to the general powers of Congress, some of the changes were more vital. The general welfare clause was omitted from the taxing grant. Bounties from the Treasury and extra compensation to contractors, officers, and agents were prohibited. 'A Protective Tariff' was so far forbidden that no duties or taxes on importations could be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry. Export duties were allowed with the concurrence of two thirds of both Houses. Congress was forbidden to make internal improvements except to furnish lights, beacons, buoys, to improve harbors, and to remove obstructions in river navigation, and the cost of these was to be paid by duties levied on the navigation facilitated. That the objects might be better attained, States, with the consent of Congress and under certain other restrictions, were allowed to lay a duty on the sea-going tonnage participating in the trades of the river or harbor improved. States, divided by rivers, or through which rivers flowed, could enter into compacts for improving their navigation. Uniform laws of naturalization and bankruptcy were authorized, but bankruptcy could not affect debts contracted prior to the passage of the law. A two-thirds vote was made requisite to appropriate money unless asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of the departments. Every law must relate but to one subject, and that was to be expressed in the title. To admit new States required a vote of two thirds of each House, the Senate voting by States. Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several conventions, Congress could summon a convention to consider amendments to the Constitution, but the convention was confined in its action to propositions suggested by the States making the call. . . . 'The importation of negroes of the African race was forbidden, and Congress was required to pass laws effectually to prevent it.' The right of transit or sojourn with slaves in any State was secured and fugitive slaves — called 'slaves' without the euphemism of the old instrument — were to be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom they belonged. Congress could prohibit the introduction of slaves from States and Territories not included in the Confederacy, and laws impairing the right of property in negro slaves were prohibited. Slaves could be carried into any Territory of the Confederacy by citizens of the Confederate States and be protected as property. This clause was intended to forbid 'squatter sovereignty,' and to prevent adverse action against property in slaves, until the Territory should emerge from a condition of pupilage and dependence into the dignity, equality, and sovereignty of a State, when its right to define 'property' would be beyond the interference or control of Congress."—J. L. M. Curry, *The Southern States of the American Union*, ch. 13.—Alexander H. Stephens, in his "Constitutional view of the late War between the States," expresses the opinion that the selection of Jeffer-

son Davis for the Presidency of the Confederacy was due to a misunderstanding. He says that a majority of the states were looking to Georgia for the President, and the Georgia delegation had unanimously agreed to present Mr. Toombs, who would have been acceptable. But a rumor got currency that Georgia would put forward Howell Cobb, whereupon the other states took up Davis, and united upon him. It was generally understood, says Mr. Stephens, that Davis "did not desire the office of President. He preferred a military position, and the one he desired above all others was the chief command of the army."—A. H. Stephens, *Constitutional View of the War between the States*, v. 2, pp. 328–333.

ALSO IN: R. B. Rhett, *The Confederate Gov't at Montgomery (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War)*, v. 1, pp. 99–111.—J. Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Gov't*, pt. 3, ch. 5, and app. K (v. 1). The text of both the Provisional and the Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States is given in the appendix referred to.

A. D. 1861 (February).—Urgency of South Carolina for the reduction of Fort Sumter before the inauguration of President Lincoln.—"I am perfectly satisfied," wrote Governor Pickens of South Carolina to Howell Cobb, "President of the Provisional Congress" of the Confederacy, in a letter dated February 13, 1861,—"I am perfectly satisfied that the welfare of the new confederation and the necessities of the State require that Fort Sumter should be reduced before the close of the present administration at Washington. If an attack is delayed until after the inauguration of the incoming President of the United States, the troops now gathered in the capital may then be employed in attempting that which, previous to that time, they could not be spared to do. They dare not leave Washington now and do that which then will be a measure too inviting to be resisted. Mr. Lincoln cannot do more for this State than Mr. Buchanan has done. Mr. Lincoln will not concede what Mr. Buchanan has refused. Mr. Buchanan has placed his refusal upon grounds which determine his reply to six States, as completely as to the same demand if made by a single State. If peace can be secured, it will be by the prompt use of the occasion, when the forces of the United States are withheld from our harbor. If war can be averted, it will be by making the capture of Fort Sumter a fact accomplished during the continuance of the present administration, and leaving to the incoming administration the question of an open declaration of war. Such a declaration, separated, as it will be, from any present act of hostilities during Mr. Lincoln's administration, may become to him a matter requiring consideration. That consideration will not be expected of him, if the attack on the fort is made during his administration, and becomes, therefore, as to him, an act of present hostility. Mr. Buchanan cannot resist, because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of the quarrel will have been, or may be, considered by him as past. Upon this line of policy I have acted, and upon the adherence to it may be found, I think, the most rational expectation of seeing that fort, which is even now a source of danger to the State, restored to the possession of the State without those consequences which I should most deeply deplore."—*Official Records*, v. 1, p. 256.

**A. D. 1861 (February—March).—The inauguration and the inaugural address of President Lincoln.**—"On the 11th of February, with his family and some personal friends, Lincoln left his home at Springfield for Washington. . . . On his way to Washington, he passed through the great states of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and was everywhere received with demonstrations of loyalty, as the representative of the national government. He addressed the people at the capitals of these states, and at many of their chief towns and cities. The city of Washington was surrounded by slave territory, and was really within the lines of the insurgents. Baltimore was not only a slaveholding city, but nowhere was the spirit of rebellion more hot and ferocious than among a large class of its people. The lower classes, the material of which mobs are made, were reckless, and ready for any outrage. From the date of his election to the time of his start for Washington, there had often appeared in the press and elsewhere, vulgar threats and menaces that he should never be inaugurated, nor reach the capital alive. Little attention was paid to these threats, yet some of the President's personal friends, without his knowledge, employed a detective, who sent agents to Baltimore and Washington to investigate. . . . The detectives ascertained the existence of a plot to assassinate the President elect, as he passed through Baltimore. The first intelligence of this conspiracy was communicated to Lincoln at Philadelphia. On the facts being laid before him, he was urged to take the train that night (the 21st of February), by which he would reach Washington the next morning, passing through Baltimore earlier than the conspirators expected, and thus avoid the danger. Having already made appointments to meet the citizens of Philadelphia at, and raise the United States flag over, Independence Hall, on Washington's birthday, the 22nd, and also to meet the Legislature of Pennsylvania at Harrisburgh, he declined starting for Washington that night. Finally his friends persuaded him to allow the detectives and the officers of the railways to arrange for him to return from Harrisburgh, and, by special train, to go to Washington the night following the ceremonies at Harrisburgh. . . . He went to Harrisburgh according to arrangement, met the Legislature, and retired to his room. In the meanwhile, General Scott and Mr. Seward had learned, through other sources, of the existence of the plot to assassinate him, and had despatched Mr. F. W. Seward, a son of Senator Seward, to apprise him of the danger. Information coming to him from both of these sources, each independent of the other, induced him to yield to the wishes of his friends, and anticipate his journey to Washington. Besides, there had reached him from Baltimore no committee, either of the municipal authorities or of citizens, to tender him the hospitalities, and to extend to him the courtesies of that city, as had been done by every other city through which he had passed. He was persuaded to permit the detective to arrange for his going to Washington that night. The telegraph wires to Baltimore were cut, Harrisburgh was isolated, and, taking a special train, he reached Philadelphia, and driving to the Baltimore depot, found the Washington train waiting his arrival, stepped on board, and passed on

without interruption through Baltimore to the national capital. . . . He afterwards declared: 'I did not then, nor do I now believe I should have been assassinated, had I gone through Baltimore as first contemplated, but I thought it wise to run no risk where no risk was necessary.' . . . On the 4th of March, 1861, he was inaugurated President of the United States. . . . In the open air, and with a voice so clear and distinct that he could be heard by thrice ten thousand men, he read his inaugural address, and on the very verge of civil war, he made a most earnest appeal for peace."—I. N. Arnold, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 11-12.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 13.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 3, ch. 19-21.—H. J. Raymond, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 5-6.

The following is the full text of the inaugural address, from Lincoln's "Complete Works."

"Fellow-Citizens of the United States: In compliance with a custom as old as the government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President 'before he enters on the execution of his office.' I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the southern states, that, by the accession of a republican administration, their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches, when I declare that 'I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.' Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read: 'Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.' I now reiterate these sentiments; and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the states when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—as cheerfully to one section as to another. There is much



controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions: 'No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.' It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the law-giver is the law. All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution — to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause 'shall be delivered up,' their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath? There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by state authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done. And should any one, in any case, be content that this oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept? Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states'? I take the official oath today with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules. And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional. It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period, fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task, for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these states is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being

impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself. Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of states in the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it — break it, so to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen states expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation, in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was 'to form a more perfect Union.' But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the states be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no state, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence within any state or states against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances. I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the states. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego, for the time, the uses of such offices. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events

and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. That there are persons, in one section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to them. To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak? Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step, while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from—will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution—certainly would if such a right were a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by state authority? The Constitution does not expressly say. May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other. If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which, in turn, will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a new Confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the states to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only,

and prevent renewed secession? Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism, in some form, is all that is left. I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes. One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived, without restriction, in one section; while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other. Physically speaking, we cannot separate; we cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can



make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you. This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I cannot be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution—which amendment, however, I have not seen—has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the states, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable. The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the states. The people themselves can do this also if they choose, but the Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present government as it came to his hands, and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. By the frame of the Government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief; and have with equal wisdom provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years. My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object

will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty. In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect, and defend it.' I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

A. D. 1861 (March).—*President Lincoln and his Cabinet.*—*Secretary Seward.*—President Lincoln, "in selecting his cabinet, which he did substantially before he left Springfield for Washington, . . . thought it wise to call to his assistance the strong men of his party, especially those who had given evidence of the support they commanded as his competitors in the Chicago convention. . . . This was sound policy under the circumstances. It might indeed have been foreseen that among the members of a cabinet so composed, troublesome disagreements and rivalries would break out. But it was better for the President to have these strong and ambitious men near him as his coöperators than to have them as his critics in Congress, where their differences might have been composed in a common opposition to him. As members of his cabinet he could hope to control them, and to keep them busily employed in the service of a common purpose, if he had the strength to do so. Whether he did possess this strength was soon tested by a singularly rude trial. There can be no doubt that the foremost members of his cabinet, Seward and Chase, the most eminent Republican statesmen, had felt themselves wronged by their party when in its national convention it preferred to them for the presidency a man whom, not unnaturally, they thought greatly their inferior in ability and experience as well as in service. . . . Seward, who, as Secretary of State, considered himself next to the Chief Executive, and who quickly accustomed himself to giving orders and making arrangements upon his own motion, thought it necessary that he should rescue the direction of public affairs from hands so unskilled, and take full charge of them himself. At the end of the first month of the administration he submitted a 'memorandum' to President Lincoln, which has been first brought to light by Nicolay and Hay, and is one of their most valuable contributions to the history of those days.

In that paper Seward actually told the President that, at the end of a month's administration, the government was still without a policy, either domestic or foreign; that the slavery question should be eliminated from the struggle about the Union; that the matter of the maintenance of the forts and other possessions in the South should be decided with that view; that explanations should be demanded categorically from the governments of Spain and France, which were then preparing, one for the annexation of San Domingo, and both for the invasion of Mexico; that if no satisfactory explanations were received war should be declared against Spain and France by the United States; that explanations should also be sought from Russia and Great Britain, and a vigorous continental spirit of independence against European intervention be aroused all over the American continent; that this policy should be incessantly pursued and directed by somebody; that either the President should devote himself entirely to it, or devolve the direction on some member of his cabinet, whereupon all debate on this policy must end. This could be understood only as a formal demand that the President should acknowledge his own incompetency to perform his duties, content himself with the amusement of distributing post offices, and resign his power as to all important affairs into the hands of his Secretary of State. . . . Had Lincoln, as most Presidents would have done, instantly dismissed Seward, and published the true reason for that dismissal, it would inevitably have been the end of Seward's career. But Lincoln did what not many of the noblest and greatest men in history would have been noble and great enough to do. He considered that Seward was still capable of rendering great service to his country in the place in which he was, if rightly controlled. He ignored the insult, but firmly established his superiority. In his reply, which he forthwith dispatched, he told Seward that the administration had a domestic policy as laid down in the inaugural address with Seward's approval; that it had a foreign policy as traced in Seward's dispatches with the President's approval; that if any policy was to be maintained or changed, he, the President, was to direct that on his responsibility; and that in performing that duty the President had a right to the advice of his secretaries. Seward's fantastic schemes of foreign war and continental policies Lincoln brushed aside by passing them over in silence. Nothing more was said. Seward must have felt that he was at the mercy of a superior man."—Carl Schurz, *Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 67-73.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: a History*, v. 3, ch. 22 and 26.

**A. D. 1861 (March).—Surrender of Alexander H. Stephens to Secession.—His "Corner-stone" speech at Savannah.**—The following is from a speech made by Alexander H. Stephens at Savannah, on the evening after the secession of Georgia, which he had opposed, but to which he now yielded himself without reserve. It is a speech that became famous on account of its bold declaration that Slavery formed the "corner-stone" of the New Confederacy. "The new constitution," said Mr. Stephens, "has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the

negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the 'rock upon which the old Union would split.' He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the 'storm came and the wind blew.' Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science. It has been so even amongst us."—A. H. Stephens, *Speech in Savannah, March 21, 1861* (in "*Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private; by H. Cleveland*").

**A. D. 1861 (March–April).—The breaking of rebellion into open war by the attack on Fort Sumter.—President Lincoln's statement of the circumstances.—His first difficulties.—Attitude of the Border States.**—The circumstances under which the first blow of the civil war was struck by the rebels at Charleston were recited by President Lincoln, in his Message to Congress, at the special session convened July 4, 1861: "On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred



with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship 'Brooklyn' into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the 'Sabine,' to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the 'Brooklyn,' acting upon some quasi armistice of the late administration (and of the existence of which the present administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible—rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition. It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 56–57.—The President's delay of action in the case of Fort Sumter was mainly due, on the political side of the question, to the state of

things in the border states—especially in Virginia. "There were fifteen slave states, which those engaged in the rebellion hoped to lead or to force into secession. At the time of the inauguration, only seven of these fifteen—less than a majority—had revolted. The cotton states alone had followed the lead of South Carolina out of the Union. Several weeks had passed since a state had seceded; and unless other states could be dragged into the movement, the rebellion would be practically a failure from the start. Such a confederacy could not hope to live a year, and would be obliged to find its way back into the Union upon some terms. In the meantime, two or three conventions in the border states [Virginia, April 4, and Missouri, March], delegated freshly from the people, had voted distinctly and decidedly not to secede. [Kentucky and Tennessee had refused even the call of conventions; while North Carolina, Feb. 28, and Arkansas, March 18, of the states farther south, had voted secession down.] The affairs of the confederacy were really in a very precarious condition when Mr. Lincoln came into power. The rebel government was making very much more bluster than progress. It became Mr. Lincoln's policy so to conduct affairs as to strengthen the Union feeling in the border states, and to give utterance to no sentiment and to do no deed which should drive these states toward the confederacy. . . . The confederacy found that it must make progress or die. The rebel Congress passed a measure for the organization of an army, on the 9th of March, and on the 12th two confederate commissioners—Mr. Forsyth of Alabama and Mr. Crawford of Georgia—presented themselves at the State Department at Washington for the purpose of making a treaty with the United States. They knew, of course, that they could not be received officially, and that they ought to be arrested for treason. The President would not recognize them, but sent to them a copy of his Inaugural, as the embodiment of the views of the government. . . . In the meantime, Lieutenant Talbot, on behalf of Mr. Lincoln, was having interviews with Governor Pickens of South Carolina and with General Beauregard, in command of the confederate forces there, in which he informed them that provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably if possible,—otherwise by force. This was communicated to L. P. Walker, then rebel Secretary of War. Before Talbot had made his communication, Beauregard had informed Major Anderson, in command of Fort Sumter, that he must have no further intercourse with Charleston; and Talbot himself was refused permission to visit that gallant and faithful officer. . . . The wisdom of Mr. Lincoln's waiting became evident at a day not too long delayed. Fort Pickens, which the rebels had not taken, was quietly reinforced [April 12], and when the vessels which carried the relief [to Sumter] were dispatched, Mr. Lincoln gave official information to General Beauregard that provisions were to be sent to Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, by an unarmed vessel. He was determined that no hostile act on the part of the government should commence the war, for which both sides were preparing; although an act of open war had already transpired in Charleston harbor"—the rebel batteries having

fired upon and driven off the unarmed steamer *Star of the West*, which had been sent to convey troops and provisions to Fort Sumter on the 9th of January, two months before Lincoln's inauguration. "Beauregard laid this last intelligence before his Secretary of War, and, under special instructions, on the 12th of April, he demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. He was ready to make the demand, and to back it by force. The city of Charleston was full of troops, and, for months, batteries had been in course of construction, with the special purpose of compelling the surrender of the fort. Major Anderson had seen these batteries going up, day after day, without the liberty to fire a gun. He declined to surrender. He was called upon to state when he would evacuate the fort. He replied that on the 15th he would do so, should he not meantime receive controlling instructions from the government, or additional supplies. The response which he received was that the confederate batteries would open on Fort Sumter in one hour from the date of the message. The date of the message was 'April 12, 1861, 3:30 A. M.' Beauregard was true to his word. At half past four the batteries opened upon the Fort, which, after a long and terrible bombardment, and a gallant though comparatively feeble defense by a small and half-starved garrison, was surrendered the following day. . . . The fall of Sumter was the resurrection of patriotism. The North needed just this. Such a universal burst of patriotic indignation as ran over the North under the influence of this insult to the national flag has never been witnessed. It swept away all party lines as if it had been flame and they had been flax."—J. G. Holland, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: F. W. Seward, *Seward at Washington*, ch. 56.—S. W. Crawford, *Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter*, ch. 24-32.—A. Doubleday, *Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie*, ch. 8-11.—A. Roman, *Military Operations of Gen. Beauregard*, v. 1, ch. 2-4.—*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1, pp. 40-83.—S. L. Woodford, *The Story of Fort Sumter (Personal Recollections of the War: N. Y. Com. L. L. of the U. S.)*.

**A. D. 1861 (April).—President Lincoln's call to arms.**—The mighty uprising of the North.—The response of disloyal Governors.—"By the next morning (Sunday April 14) the news of the close of the bombardment and capitulation of Sumter was in Washington. In the forenoon, at the time Anderson and his garrison were evacuating the fort, Lincoln and his Cabinet, together with sundry military officers, were at the Executive Mansion, giving final shape to the details of the action the Government had decided to take. A proclamation, drafted by himself, copied on the spot by his secretary, was concurred in by his Cabinet, signed, and sent to the State Department to be sealed, filed, and copied for publication in the next morning's newspapers. The document bears date April 15 (Monday), but was made and signed on Sunday." It was as follows:

"Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by

the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government; and to redress wrongs already long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country. And I hereby command the persons composing the combination aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from date. Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers, at twelve o'clock noon, on Thursday the fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this 15th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, p. 34.

"In view of the subsequent gigantic expansion of the civil war, eleventh-hour critics continue to insist that a larger force should have been called at once. They forget that this was nearly five times the then existing regular army; that only very limited quantities of arms, equipments, and supplies were in the Northern arsenals; that the treasury was bankrupt; and that an insignificant eight million loan had not two weeks before been discounted nearly six per cent. by the New York bankers, some bids ranging as low as eighty-five. They forget that the shameful events of the past four months had elicited scarcely a spark of war feeling; that the loyal States had suffered the siege of Sumter and firing on the 'Star of the West' with a dangerous indifference. They forget the doubt and dismay, the panic of commerce, the division of counsels, the attacks from within, the sneers from without—that faith seemed gone and patriotism dead. Twenty-four hours later all this was measurably changed. . . . The guns of the Sumter bombardment woke the country



from the political nightmare which had so long tormented and paralyzed it. The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted, outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun-casting in the great foundries; cartridge-making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage-rolling, and lint-scraping in nearly every household. Before the lapse of forty-eight hours a Massachusetts regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington; within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 4, ch. 4-5.—"In intelligence no army, except perhaps the Athenian, can have ever equalled or approached that of the North. Most of the soldiers carried books and writing materials in their knapsacks, and mail bags heavily weighted with letters were sent from every cantonment. Such privates would sometimes reason instead of obeying, and they would see errors of their commanders to which they had better have been blind. But on the whole, in a war in which much was thrown upon the individual soldier, intelligence was likely to prevail. In wealth, in the means of providing the weapons and ammunitions of war, the North had an immense advantage, which, combined with that of numbers, could not fail, if, to use Lincoln's homely phrase, it 'pegged away,' to tell in the end. It was also vastly superior in mechanical invention; which was destined to play a great part, and in mechanical skill; almost every Yankee regiment was full of mechanics, some of whom could devise as well as execute. In artillery and engineering the North took the lead from the first, having many civil engineers, whose conversion into military civil engineers was easy. The South, to begin with, had the contents of Federal arsenals and armouries, which had been well stocked by the provident treason of Buchanan's Minister of War. . . . But when these resources were exhausted, replacement was difficult, the blockade having been established, though extraordinary efforts in the way of military manufacture were made. To the wealthy North, besides its own factories, were opened the markets of England and the world. Of the small regular army the Confederacy had carried off a share, with nearly half the regular officers. The South had the advantage of the defensive, which, with long-range muskets and in a difficult country, was reckoned in battle as five to two. The South had the superiority of the unity, force, and secrecy which autocracy lends to the operations of war. On the side of the North these were comparatively wanting."—Goldwin Smith, *The United States*, ch. 5.—In six of the eight Slave-labor States included in the call, the President's Proclamation and the requisition of the Secretary of War "were treated by the authorities with words of scorn and defi-

ance. The exceptions were Maryland and Delaware. In the other States, disloyal Governors held the reins of power. 'I have only to say,' replied Governor Letcher of Virginia, 'that the militia of this State will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not within the province of the Constitution or the Act of 1795—will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South.' Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, answered:—"Your dispatch is received, and if genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt, I have to say in reply, that I regard the levy of troops, made by the Administration for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina." Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:—"Your dispatch is received. I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." Governor Harris, of Tennessee, said:—"Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those of our Southern brethren." Governor Rector, of Arkansas, replied:—"In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury." . . . Governor Jackson, of Missouri, responded:—"There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that these men are intended to make war upon the seceded States. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade." . . . Governor Hicks, of Maryland, appalled by the presence of great dangers, and sorely pressed by the secessionists on every side, hastened, in a proclamation, to assure the people of his State that no troops would be sent from Maryland unless it might be for the defense of the National Capital, and that they (the people) would, in a short time, 'have the opportunity afforded them, in a special election for members of the Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up.' Governor Burton, of Delaware, made no response until the 26th, when he informed the President that he had no authority to comply with his requisition. At the same time he recommended the formation of volunteer companies for the protection of the citizens and property of Delaware, and not for the preservation of the Union. . . . In the seven excepted Slave-labor States in which insurrection prevailed, the proclamation and the requisition produced hot indignation, and were assailed with the bitterest scorn. . . . Even in the Free-labor States, there were vehement opposers of the war policy of the Government from its inception." But, speaking generally, "the uprising of the people of the Free-labor States in defense

of Nationality was a sublime spectacle. Nothing like it had been seen on the earth since the preaching of Peter the Hermit and of Pope Urban the Second filled all Christian Europe with religious zeal, and sent armed hosts, with the cry of 'God wills it! God wills it!' to rescue the sepulcher of Jesus from the hands of the infidel."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record*, v. 1.  
—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval Hist. of the Rebellion*, ch. 4-6.

**A. D. 1861 (April).—The Morrill Tariff Act.**  
See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).

**A. D. 1861 (April).—Secession of Virginia.**  
See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—JUNE).

**A. D. 1861 (April).—Activity of Rebellion in Virginia and Maryland.—Peril of the national capital.—Attack on Massachusetts volunteers in Baltimore.**—"Massachusetts, always the most zealous, was the first in the field [with troops in response to the President's call], and on the 17th [April] she forwarded a regiment of volunteers from Boston to Washington. Pennsylvania, although nearly one-half of her votes had been given for Mr. Breckinridge, followed this example; and, owing to her geographical position, her volunteers reached the shores of the Potomac in advance of all the others. After passing through the great city of Baltimore in the midst of an incipient insurrection, they encamped around the Capitol, on the 18th of April. The seceders, on their side, had not lost a moment in Virginia. They were in possession of Richmond, where the convention was in session. . . . The workshops and arsenal of Harper's Ferry, situated at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah, on a spot which was destined to play an important part during the war, were only guarded by a detachment of 64 dismounted dragoons; and the Virginia volunteers, assembled in the valleys of the Blue Ridge, were ready to take possession of them as soon as the ordinance for the secession of Virginia should furnish them a pretext. They were then to cross the Potomac and join the insurgents of Maryland, for the purpose of attempting the capture of Washington, where their accomplices were expecting them. On the morning of the 18th [April], a portion of them were on their march, in the hope of seizing the prey which was to be of so much value to the future armies of the Confederacy. But Lieutenant Jones, who was in command at Harper's Ferry, had been informed of the approach of the Confederate troops under the lead of Ashby—a chief well known since; notwithstanding their despatch, they only arrived in sight of Harper's Ferry in time to see from a distance a large conflagration that was consuming the workshops, store-houses, and the enormous piles of muskets heaped in the yards, while the Federal soldiers who had just kindled it were crossing the Potomac on their way to Washington. The Confederates found nothing but smoking ruins, and some machinery, which they sent to Richmond; their allies from Maryland had not made their appearance, and they did not feel strong enough to venture alone to the other side of the Potomac. During the last few days the authorities of Virginia had been making preparations for capturing the Norfolk [or Gosport] arsenal (navy-yard). That estab-

lishment possessed a magnificent granite basin, construction docks, and a dépôt of artillery with more than 2,000 guns; a two-decked vessel was on the stocks, two others, with a three-decker, three frigates, a steam sloop, and a brig, lay dismantled in the port; the steam frigate Merrimac was there undergoing repairs; the steam sloop Germantown was in the harbor ready to go to sea, while the sailing sloop Cumberland was lying to at the entrance of the port. . . . Commodore McCauley, the Federal commandant, was surrounded by traitors," and, being deficient in energy and capability, he allowed himself to be put in a position where he thought it necessary to sink all the vessels in the harbor except the Cumberland. As they were sinking, reinforcements arrived from Washington, under Captain Paulding, who superseded McCauley in command. But they came too late. Captain Paulding could do nothing except hastily destroy as far as possible the sinking ships and the arsenal buildings, and then retreat. "The Confederates found abundant resources in artillery and 'matériel' of every description in Norfolk; the fire was soon extinguished, the docks repaired, and they succeeded in raising the Merrimac, which we shall see at work the following year. Fort Monroe had just been occupied by a small Federal garrison. Its loss would have been even more disastrous to the Federal cause than that of the Norfolk navy-yard and arsenal, because the Confederates, instead of having to cover Richmond, would have been able to blockade Washington by sea and besiege it by land. . . . The example of Virginia fired the enthusiasm of the secessionists everywhere, and they applied themselves to the task of drawing into the conflict those slave States which were still hesitating. . . . The sight of the Pennsylvania volunteers had caused a great irritation in Baltimore. That city, the largest in the slave States, . . . warmly sympathized with the South. Her location on the railway line which connects Washington with the great cities of the North imparted to her a peculiar importance. Consequently, the accomplices of the South, who were numerous in Baltimore, determined to seize the first opportunity that might offer to drag that city into the rebellion. . . . The looked-for opportunity occurred . . . April 19. When the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, with a few battalions of Pennsylvania volunteers, arrived at the northern station, an immense crowd bore down upon them. A line of rails, laid in the centre of the streets, connected this with the southern station, and enabled the cars, drawn by horses, to pass through the city. The crowd surround the soldiers of the Sixth Massachusetts, who occupy these cars. The last cars are stopped, and the occupants, being obliged to get out, endeavor to make their way through the crowd. But, being hemmed in on all sides, they are soon attacked by a shower of stones, which wound many of them, and injure a few mortally. The soldiers have to defend themselves, and the first discharge of musketry, which has considerable effect, opens them a passage. But the aggressors, being armed, rally, and a regular battle ensues. . . . The ground is strewn with the wounded of both parties. At last, the Massachusetts soldiers rejoin their comrades at the southern station," and are conveyed to Washington. "Baltimore was thenceforth in possession of the secessionists,



who were fully determined to take advantage of the situation of that city to intercept all communications between Washington and the North. Accordingly, they hastened to burn the railroad bridges which had been constructed over large estuaries north of Baltimore, and to cut the telegraph wires. Deprived of all sources of information from the North, the capital of the Union was soon wrapped in mournful silence. For some days the occupant of the White House was unable to forward any instructions to the people who had remained faithful to the Union; but their zeal did not abate on that account. Patriotism extinguished all party animosities in the hearts of most of the Democrats who had opposed the election of Mr. Lincoln. In the presence of the national peril they loyally tendered their assistance to the President; and breaking loose from their former accomplices of the South, they assumed the name of War Democrats in opposition to that of Peace Democrats."—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: J. W. Hanson, *Hist. of the Sixth Mass. Vols.*, pp. 21–57.—G. W. Brown, *Baltimore and the 29th of April, 1861* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, extra v. 3).—*Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 2.

A. D. 1861 (April: South Carolina).—**Monarchical cravings.**—Intensity of the Carolinian hatred of New England and the North.—Mr. Russell, who was famous in his day as a correspondent of "The Times" (London), spent some time in South Carolina at the beginning of the war, and described the state of feeling there in a letter from Charleston, written at the end of April: "Nothing I could say," he wrote, "can be worth one fact which has forced itself upon my mind in reference to the sentiments which prevail among the gentlemen of this State. I have been among them for several days. I have visited their plantations, I have conversed with them freely and fully, and I have enjoyed that frank, courteous and graceful intercourse which constitutes an irresistible charm of their society. From all quarters have come to my ears the echoes of the same voice. . . . That voice says, 'If we could only get one of the royal race of England to rule over us, we should be content.' Let there be no misconception on this point. That sentiment, varied in a hundred ways, has been repeated to me over and over again. There is a general admission that the means to such an end are wanting, and that the desire cannot be gratified. But the admiration for monarchical institutions on the English model, for privileged classes, and for a landed aristocracy and gentry, is undisguised and apparently genuine. With the pride of having achieved their independence is mingled in the South Carolinians' hearts a strange regret at the result and consequences, and many are they who 'would go back tomorrow if we could.' An intense affection for the British connection, a love of British habits and customs, a respect for British sentiment, law, authority, order, civilization, and literature, preëminently distinguish the inhabitants of this State, who, glorying in their descent from ancient families on the three islands, whose fortunes they still follow, and with whose members they maintain not unfrequently familiar relations, regard with an aversion of which it is impossible to give an idea to one who has not seen

its manifestations, the people of New England and the populations of the Northern States, whom they regard as tainted beyond cure by the venom of 'Puritanism.' Whatever may be the cause, this is the fact and the effect. 'The State of South Carolina was,' I am told, 'founded by gentlemen.' It was not established by witch-burning Puritans, by cruel persecuting fanatics, who implanted in the North the standard of Torquemada, and breathed into the nostrils of their newly-born colonies all the ferocity, blood-thirstiness, and rabid intolerance of the Inquisition. . . . 'We could have got on with these fanatics if they had been either Christians or gentlemen,' says [one], 'for in the first case they would have acted with common charity, and in the second they would have fought when they insulted us; but there are neither Christians nor gentlemen among them!' 'Any thing on earth!' exclaims [another], 'any form of government, any tyranny or despotism you will; but'—and here is an appeal more terrible than the adjuration of all the Gods—'nothing on earth shall ever induce us to submit to any union with the brutal, bigoted blackguards of the New England States, who neither comprehend nor regard the feelings of gentlemen! Man, woman and child, we'll die first.' . . . The hatred of the Italian for the Tedesco, of the Greek for the Turk, of the Turk for the Russ, is warm and fierce enough to satisfy the prince of darkness, not to speak of a few little pet aversions among allied powers and the atoms of composite empires; but they are all mere indifference and neutrality of feeling compared to the animosity evinced by the 'gentry' of South Carolina for the 'rabble of the North.' The contests of Cavalier and Roundhead, of Vendean and Republican, even of Orangeman and Croppy, have been elegant joustings, regulated by the finest rules of chivalry, compared with those which North and South will carry on if their deeds support their words. 'Immortal hate, the study of revenge' will actuate every blow, and never in the history of the world, perhaps, will go forth such a 'væ victis' as that which may be heard before the fight has begun. There is nothing in all the dark caves of human passion so cruel and deadly as the hatred the South Carolinians profess for the Yankees. That hatred has been swelling for years, till it is the very life-blood of the state. . . . Believe a southern man as he believes himself, and you must regard New England and the kindred States as the birthplace of impurity of mind among men and of unchastity in women—the home of free love, of Fourierism, of infidelity, of abolitionism, of false teachings in political economy and in social life; a land saturated with the drippings of rotten philosophy, with the poisonous infections of a fanatic press; without honor or modesty; whose wisdom is paltry cunning, whose valor and manhood have been swallowed up in a corrupt, howling demagoguery, and in the marts of a dishonest commerce."—W. H. Russell, *Letter to the Times* (London), April 30, 1861.

A. D. 1861 (April–May).—**Proclamation by the Confederate President.**—President Lincoln's proclamation of a Blockade of Southern ports.—The Queen's proclamation of British neutrality.—On the 17th of April, two days after President Lincoln's call for troops, Jefferson Davis, the chief of the rebellious Con-

federacy, published a counter-proclamation, giving notice of the intention of the government at Montgomery to issue letters of marque to privateers, for the destruction of American commerce. It was as follows:

"Whereas, Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States has, by proclamation announced the intention of invading this Confederacy with an armed force, for the purpose of capturing its fortresses, and thereby subverting its independence, and subjecting the free people thereof to the dominion of a foreign power; and whereas it has thus become the duty of this Government to repel the threatened invasion, and to defend the rights and liberties of the people by all the means which the laws of nations and the usages of civilized warfare place at its disposal; Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, do issue this my Proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this Government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal, to be issued under the Seal of these Confederate States. And I do further notify all persons applying for Letters of Marque, to make a statement in writing, giving the name and a suitable description of the character, tonnage, and force of the vessel, and the name and place of residence of each owner concerned therein, and the intended number of the crew, and to sign said statement and deliver the same to the Secretary of State, or to the Collector of any port of entry of these Confederate States, to be by him transmitted to the Secretary of State. And I do further notify all applicants aforesaid that before any commission or Letter of Marque is issued to any vessel, the owner or owners thereof, and the commander for the time being, will be required to give bond to the Confederate States, with at least two responsible sureties, not interested in such vessel, in the penal sum of five thousand dollars; or if such vessel be provided with more than one hundred and fifty men, then in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, with condition that the owners, officers, and crew who shall be employed on board such commissioned vessel, shall observe the laws of these Confederate States and the instructions given to them for the regulation of their conduct. That they shall satisfy all damages done contrary to the tenor thereof by such vessel during her commission, and deliver up the same when revoked by the President of the Confederate States. And I do further specially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil and military, under the authority of the Confederate States, that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties incident thereto; and I do, moreover, solemnly exhort the good people of these Confederate States as they love their country, as they prize the blessings of free government, as they feel the wrongs of the past and these now threatened in aggravated form by those whose enmity is more implacable because unprovoked, that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority and efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted for the common defence, and by which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, we may hope for a speedy, just, and honorable peace. In testimony where-

of, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal of the Confederate States to be affixed, this seventeenth day of April 1861. By the President, (Signed) Jefferson Davis. R. Toombs, Secretary of State."

The response to this menace was a second proclamation by President Lincoln, announcing a blockade of the ports of the Confederacy, and warning all persons who should accept and act under the proposed letters of marque that they would be held amenable to the laws against piracy. This proclamation was in the following language:

"Whereas an insurrection against the government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed therein conformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States: And whereas a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United States: And whereas an executive proclamation has been already issued requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of representing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session to deliberate and determine thereon: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall have ceased, have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the law of nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable. And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and



sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 35–36.

Apparently on unofficial information of these announcements, indicating a state of civil war in the United States, the Government of Great Britain made haste—unfriendly haste, as the United States complained—to declare neutrality between the belligerents, thus placing the insurgent Confederacy on an exactly equal footing with the United States so far as a foreign recognition might do so. The Queen's Proclamation was as follows:

"Whereas, We are happily at peace with all Sovereigns, Powers, and States; And whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves 'the Confederate States of America'; And whereas we, being at peace with the Government of the United States, have declared our Royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between the said contending parties; We, therefore, have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to issue this our Royal Proclamation: And we do hereby strictly charge and command all our loving subjects to observe a strict neutrality in and during the aforesaid hostilities, and to abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the law of nations in relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary at their peril." After reciting the language of certain statutes which forbid the subjects of Her Majesty to engage, without leave and license from the Crown, in any foreign military or naval service, or to furnish or equip any ship or vessel for service against any state with which Her Majesty is not at war, the Proclamation proceeds as follows: "Now, in order that none of our subjects may unwarily render themselves liable to the penalties imposed by said statute, we do hereby strictly command, that no person or persons whatsoever do commit any act, matter or thing whatsoever, contrary to the provisions of the said statute, upon pain of the several penalties by the said statute imposed, and of our high displeasure. And we do hereby further warn all our loving subjects, and all persons whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them shall presume, in contempt of this Royal Proclamation, and of our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign, in the said contest, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf—as, for example and more especially, by entering into the military service of either of the said contending parties as commissioned or non-commissioned officers or soldiers; or by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any ship or vessel of war or transport of or in the service of either of the said contending parties; or by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any privateer bearing letters of marque of or from either of the said contending parties; or by engaging to go or going to any place beyond the seas with intent to enlist or engage in any such service, or by procuring or attempting to procure, within Her Majesty's dominions, at home or abroad, others to do so; or

by fitting out, arming, or equipping, any ship or vessel to be employed as a ship-of-war, or privateer, or transport, by either of the said contending parties; or by breaking, or endeavoring to break, any blockade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of either of the said contending parties; or by carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, military stores or materials, or any article or articles considered and deemed to be contraband of war according to the law of modern usage of nations, for the use or service of either of the said contending parties, all persons so offending will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences by the said statute, or by the law of nations, in that behalf imposed or denounced. And we do hereby declare that all our subjects and persons entitled to our protection who may misconduct themselves in the premises will do so at their peril and of their own wrong, and that they will in no wise obtain any protection from us against any liability or penal consequences, but will, on the contrary, incur our high displeasure by such misconduct. Given at our Court at the White Lodge, Richmond Park, this 13th day of May, in the year of our Lord 1861, and in the 24th year of our reign. God save the Queen."

In the complaint of the United States subsequently submitted to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, the facts attending this remarkably hastened Proclamation of Neutrality were set forth as follows: "Before any armed collision had taken place, there existed an understanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French, with a view to securing a simultaneous and identical course of action of the two Governments on American questions. . . . The fact that it had been agreed to by the two Governments was communicated to Mr. Dallas, by Lord John Russell, on the first day of May, 1861. There was nothing in the previous relations between Great Britain and the United States which made it necessary for Her Majesty's Government to seek the advice or to invite the support of the Emperor of the French in the crisis which was threatened. . . . When the news of the bloodless attack upon Fort Sumter became known in Europe, Her Majesty's Government apparently assumed that the time had come for the joint action which had been previously agreed upon; and, without waiting to learn the purposes of the United States, it announced its intention to take the first step by recognizing the insurgents as belligerents. The President's Proclamation, which has since been made the ostensible reason for this determination, was issued on the 19th of April, and was made public in the Washington newspapers of the morning of the 20th. An imperfect copy of it was also telegraphed to New York, and from thence to Boston, in each of which cities it appeared in the newspapers of the morning of the 20th. The New York papers of the 20th gave the substance of the Proclamation, without the official commencement and close, and with several errors of more or less importance. The Boston papers of the same date, in addition to the errors in the New York copy, omitted the very important statement in regard to the collection of the revenue, which appears in the Proclamation as the main cause of its issue. During the morning of the 19th of April,

a riot took place in Baltimore, which ended in severing direct communication, by rail or telegraph, between Washington and New York. Telegraphic communication was not restored until the 30th of the month. The regular passage of the mails and trains was resumed about the same time. . . . It is absolutely certain that no full copy of the text of the Proclamation could have left Washington by the mails of the 19th, and equally certain that no copy could have reached New York from Washington after the 19th for several days. On the 20th the steamer Canadian sailed from Portland, taking the Boston papers of that day, with the imperfect copy of the Proclamation, in which the clause in regard to the collection of the revenue was suppressed. This steamer arrived at Londonderry on the 1st of May, and the 'Daily News' of London, of the 2d of May, published the following telegraphic items of news: 'President Lincoln has issued a Proclamation, declaring a blockade of all the ports in the seceded States. The Federal Government will condemn as pirates all privateer-vessels which may be seized by Federal ships.' The Canadian arrived at Liverpool on the 2d of May, and the 'Daily News,' of the 3d, and the 'Times,' of the 4th of May, published the imperfect Boston copy of the Proclamation. . . . No other than the Boston copy of the Proclamation appears to have been published in the London newspapers. It is not likely that a copy was received in London before the 10th, by the Fulton from New York. It was on this meager and incorrect information that the advice of the British Law Officers was based, upon which that Government acted. . . . On the 5th of May the steamship Persia arrived at Liverpool with advices from New York to the 25th of April. Lord John Russell stated on Monday, the 6th of May, in a communication to Lord Cowley, 'that Her Majesty's Government received no dispatches from Lord Lyons by the mail which has just arrived, [the Persia,] the communication between Washington and New York being interrupted.' In the same dispatch Lord Cowley is informed 'that Her Majesty's Government cannot hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and as such invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent,' and he is instructed to invite the French Government to a joint action, and a line of joint policy with the British Government, toward the United States."—*The Case of the United States before the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva* [42d cong., 2d sess., Senate ex. doc. 31], pp. 24-27.—"The British government is accustomed to preserve an attitude of neutrality towards contending nations; but it would seem that neutrality does not so far interfere with the sympathies and freedom of its subjects as to compel it to issue proclamations against Irishmen enlisting with Francis Joseph, or Englishmen fighting for Victor Emanuel and Garibaldi. . . . In the case of the United States, the laws of England and its treaty stipulations with our Government already forbade its subjects from engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow our institutions. The proclamation, therefore, in forbidding English subjects to fight in the service of the rebels against the United States, simply declared the law as it was already understood; while in forbidding Englishmen to fight for the United States against the rebels, it intervened to change the existing

practice, to revive the almost obsolete act of Geo. III. forbidding English subjects from engaging in foreign service without the royal consent, which had slumbered in regard to Austria and Italy, for the purpose of forbidding Englishmen from assisting to maintain in the United States constitutional order against conspiracy and rebellion, and the cause of freedom against chattel slavery. The first effect of the proclamation, therefore, was to change the position in which England and Englishmen stood to the United States, to the disadvantage of the latter. Before the proclamation, for an Englishman to serve the United States Government in maintaining its integrity was regarded honorable; after the proclamation such service became a crime. The proclamation makes it an offence now for an Englishman to fight for the Government at Washington as great as it was for Englishmen before the proclamation to fight for the rebels of Montgomery. It thus, in a moral view, lowered the American Government to the level of the rebel confederacy, and in the next place, it proceeded, in an international view, to place the rebel confederacy on a par with the American Government. . . . No ingenuity can blind us to these facts:—Before the proclamation, to support our Government was an honorable office for the subjects of Great Britain, and the rebels were insurgents, with no rights save under the American Constitution. After the proclamation, for an Englishman to serve the United States is a crime, and the rebels are elevated into a belligerent power—and this intervention of England, depriving us of a support which her practice permitted, and giving the rebels a status and right they did not possess, we are coolly told is neutrality. . . . What would England have said to such a proclamation of neutrality from us in her domestic troubles in Canada, in Ireland, or in India? What would the English people have thought of a state paper from Washington, declaring it the sovereign will of the people of the United States to remain perfectly neutral in the contest being waged in Hindostan between the British government on the one side and the Mogul dynasty on the other, and forbidding American citizens to enter the services of either of the said belligerents? What would they have thought of the American President intimating with cold etiquette that it was a matter of profound indifference to this Government which of the belligerents should be victorious, the King of Oude and Nana Sahib, or Lord Canning and the immortal Havelock?"—John Jay, *The Great Conspiracy: Address at Mount Kisco, July 4, 1861*.

ALSO IN: J. R. Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, ch. 2.—W. H. Seward, *Works*, v. 5 (*Diplomatic Hist. of the War*).—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 4, ch. 15.—M. Bernard, *Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the Am. Civil War*, ch. 4-10.—See, also, ALABAMA CLAIMS.

A. D. 1861 (April—May: Maryland).—The ending of rebellious trouble in Baltimore and the state.—General Butler in the field.—The Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Monroe, arrived at Philadelphia on the 20th of April, the day following the passage of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment through Baltimore, and its battle with the rebel mob of that city. The Eighth was accompanied by General Benjamin



F. Butler, who had been appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts to command the first brigade from that state. At Philadelphia General Butler "first heard of the attack on the Sixth, in Baltimore. His orders commanded him to march through that city. It was now impossible to do so with less than 10,000 armed men. He counselled with Major-General Robert Patterson, who had just been appointed commander of the 'Department of Washington,' which embraced the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia, and whose head-quarters were at Philadelphia. Commodore Dupont, commandant of the Navy Yard there, was also consulted, and it was agreed that the troops should go by water from Perryville, at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, to Annapolis, and thence across Maryland to Washington." This route was accordingly taken by General Butler. Colonel Lefferts, who had reached Philadelphia with the New York Seventh Regiment, preferred to attempt going directly to Washington by a steamer which he secured for the purpose; but a report of rebel batteries on the Potomac turned him back, and his regiment, likewise, proceeded to Annapolis, arriving there some hours after the Eighth Massachusetts. Despite the protests and remonstrances of the Governor of Maryland—who was striving hard to put his state in an attitude of "neutrality," and to persuade the national government to respect it by passing no armed troops across Maryland soil—both regiments were landed, and took possession of the town, where the secessionists were making ready to capture the Naval Academy and the training ship Constitution. The track of the railroad from Annapolis had been torn up and the locomotives disabled. The mechanics of the Massachusetts Eighth proceeded quickly to repair both, and the two regiments moved forward. "The troops reached Annapolis Junction on the morning of the 25th, when the co-operation of the two regiments ceased, the Seventh New York going on to Washington, and the Eighth Massachusetts remaining to hold the road they had just opened. Before their departure from Annapolis, the Baltic, a large steamship transport, had arrived there with troops, and others speedily followed. General Scott ordered General Butler to remain there, hold the town and the road, and superintend the forwarding of troops to the Capital. The 'Department of Annapolis,' which embraced the country twenty miles on each side of the railway, as far as Bladensburg, was created, and General Butler was placed in command of it, with ample discretionary powers to make him a sort of military dictator. . . . At the close of April, General Butler had full 10,000 men under his command at Annapolis, and an equal number were guarding the seat of Government [Washington]." "Meantime, Baltimore had been given up to the control of the Secessionists, though the Maryland Unionists were numerous and strong and were gathering courage to assert themselves. But the rebellious and riotous city was now brought to its senses. On the 5th of May General Butler sent two regiments to occupy the Relay House, within nine miles of Baltimore. On the 9th, a force of 1,200 Pennsylvania troops and regulars, ordered forward by General Patterson from Philadelphia, were landed near Fort McHenry, under the guns of a United States vessel, and

marched through the city. On the night of the 13th, General Butler, in person, with about 1,000 men, including the Massachusetts Sixth, entered the place and took a commanding position on Federal Hill, which was afterwards permanently fortified. From that day the disloyalty in Baltimore gave no trouble to the Government.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 2.—J. Parton, *Gen. Butler in New Orleans*, ch. 4-5.—T. Winthrop, *New York Seventh Regt: Our March to Washington (Life in the Open Air)*.

**A. D. 1861 (May).—Call for additional volunteers.**—On the 3d of May the President issued a call for forty additional regiments of volunteers; directed an increase of the regular army by ten regiments, and ordered the enlistment of 18,000 seamen—acts subsequently legalized by Congress.

**A. D. 1861 (May).—Exportation of cotton from the Confederacy, excepting through its seaports, prohibited.**—On the 21st of May, 1861, the Congress of the Confederate States passed an act declaring that "from and after the 1st day of June next, and during the existence of the blockade of any of the ports of the Confederate States of America by the Government of the United States, it shall not be lawful for any person to export any raw cotton or cotton yarn from the Confederate States of America except through the seaports of the said Confederate States."

**A. D. 1861 (May).—Secession of North Carolina.** See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—MAY).

**A. D. 1861 (May).—General Butler at Fortress Monroe and his "Contrabands."**—**The first military thrust at Slavery.**—General Butler was commissioned as Major-General of Volunteers on the 16th of May, and on the 20th he was ordered to the command at Fortress Monroe. He arrived at the Fortress on the 22d and assumed the command. "On the evening of the second day after his arrival at the post, the event occurred which will for ever connect the name of General Butler with the history of the abolition of slavery in America. Colonel Phelps's visit to Hampton [the previous day] had thrown the white inhabitants into such alarm that most of them prepared for flight, and many left their homes that night, never to see them again. In the confusion three negroes escaped, and, making their way across the bridges, gave themselves up to a Union picket, saying that their master, Colonel Mallory, was about to remove them to North Carolina to work upon rebel fortifications there, far away from their wives and children, who were to be left in Hampton. They were brought to the fortress, and the circumstance was reported to the general in the morning. . . . He needed laborers. He was aware that the rebel batteries that were rising around him were the work chiefly of slaves, without whose assistance they could not have been erected in time to give him trouble. He wished to keep these men. The garrison wished them kept. The country would have deplored or resented the sending of them away. If they had been Colonel Mallory's horses, or Colonel Mallory's spades, or Colonel Mallory's percussion caps, he would have seized them and

used them without hesitation. Why not property more valuable for the purposes of the rebellion than any other? He pronounced the electric words, 'These men are Contraband of War; set them at work.' 'An epigram,' as Winthrop remarks, 'abolished slavery in the United States.' The word took; for it gave the country an excuse for doing what it was longing to do. . . . By the time the three negroes were comfortably at work upon the new bake-house, General Butler received the following brief epistle, signed 'J. B. Carey, major-acting, Virginia volunteers': 'Be pleased to designate some time and place when it will be agreeable to you to accord to me a personal interview.' The general complied with the request." The interview occurred that afternoon, and was not between strangers; for General Butler and Major Carey were old political allies—hard-shell democrats both. The essential part of the conversation which ensued was as follows: "Major Carey: 'I am informed that three negroes, belonging to Colonel Mallory, have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel Mallory's agent and have charge of his property. What do you intend to do with regard to those negroes?' General Butler: 'I propose to retain them.' Major Carey: 'Do you mean, then, to set aside your constitutional obligations?' General Butler: 'I mean to abide by the decision of Virginia, as expressed in her ordinance of secession, passed the day before yesterday. I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia now claims to be.' Major Carey: 'But you say, we can't secede, and so you cannot consistently detain the negroes.' General Butler: 'But you say, you have seceded, and so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall detain the negroes as contraband of war. You are using them upon your batteries. It is merely a question whether they shall be used for or against the government. Nevertheless, though I greatly need the labor which has providentially fallen into my hands, if Colonel Mallory will come into the fort, and take the oath of allegiance to the United States, he shall have his negroes, and I will endeavor to hire them from him.' Major Carey: 'Colonel Mallory is absent.' The interview here terminated, and each party, with polite farewell, went its way. This was on Friday, May 24. On Sunday morning, eight more negroes came in. . . . They continued to come in daily, in tens, twenties, thirties, till the number of contrabands in the various camps numbered more than 900. A commissioner of negro affairs was appointed, who taught, fed and governed them." General Butler reported his action to the Government, and on the 30th of May the Secretary of War wrote to him: "Your action in respect to the negroes who came within your lines, from the service of the rebels, is approved. . . . While . . . you will permit no interference, by persons under your command, with the relations of persons held to service under the laws of any state, you will, on the other hand, so long as any state within which your military operations are conducted remain under the control of . . . armed combinations, refrain from surrendering to alleged masters any persons who come within your lines." "So the matter rested for two months, at the expiration of which events revived the question."—J. Par-ton, *General Butler in New Orleans*, ch. 6.

**A. D. 1861 (May: Virginia).—First Advance of Union Troops across the Potomac.—Death of Ellsworth at Alexandria.**—"Already 'Confederate' pickets were occupying Arlington Heights and the Virginia shore of the Long Bridge, which spans the Potomac at Washington City; and engineers had been seen on those heights selecting eligible positions for batteries. A crisis was evidently at hand, and the General-in-chief was now persuaded to allow an immediate invasion of Virginia. Orders were at once issued [May 23] for the occupation of the shores of the Potomac opposite, and also the city of Alexandria, nine miles below, by National troops. General Mansfield was in command of about 13,000 men at the Capital. Toward midnight, these forces in and around Washington were put in motion for the passage of the river, at three different points. One column was to cross at the Aqueduct Bridge, at Georgetown; another at the Long Bridge, at Washington; and a third was to proceed in vessels, and seize the city of Alexandria. The three invading columns moved almost simultaneously. . . . The troops moving by land and water reached Alexandria at about the same time. The National frigate Pawnee was lying off the town, and her commander had already been in negotiation for the evacuation of Alexandria by the insurgents. A detachment of her crew, bearing a flag of truce, now hastened to the shore in boats, and leaped eagerly upon the wharf just before the zouaves [the New York Fire Zouave Regiment, under Colonel Ellsworth] reached it. They were fired upon by some Virginia sentries, who instantly fled from the town. Ellsworth, ignorant of any negotiations, advanced to the center of the city, and took possession of it in the name of his Government, while the column under Wilcox marched through different streets to the Station of the Orange and Alexandria Railway, and seized it, with much rolling stock. They there captured a small company (thirty-five men) of Virginia cavalry, under Captain Ball. Other Virginians, who had heard the firing of the insurgent pickets, escaped by way of the railroad. Alexandria was now in quiet possession of the National troops, but there were many violent secessionists there who would not submit. Among them was a man named Jackson, the proprietor of an inn called the Marshall House. The Confederate flag had been flying over his premises for many days, and had been plainly seen from the President's house in Washington. It was still there, and Ellsworth went in person to take it down. When descending an upper staircase with it, he was shot by Jackson, who was waiting for him in a dark passage, with a double-barreled gun, loaded with buckshot. Ellsworth fell dead, and his murderer met the same fate an instant afterward, at the hands of Francis E. Brownell, of Troy, who, with six others, had accompanied his commander to the roof of the house. He shot Jackson through the head with a bullet, and pierced his body several times with his saber-bayonet. . . . Ellsworth was a very young and extremely handsome man, and was greatly beloved for his generosity, and admired for his bravery and patriotism. His death produced great excitement throughout the country. It was the first of note that had occurred in consequence of the National troubles, and the very first since the campaign had actually begun, a few hours before. It



Intensified the hatred of rebellion and its abettors; and a regiment was raised in his native State (New York) called the Ellsworth Avengers. Intrenching tools were sent over the Potomac early on the morning of the 24th, and the troops immediately commenced casting up intrenchments and redoubts, extending from Roach's Spring, on the Washington and Alexandria Road, across Arlington Heights, almost to the Chain Bridge."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, *Anecdotes, Poetry and Incidents of the War*, p. 391.—J. T. Headley, *The Great Rebellion*, ch. 5.

A. D. 1861 (May—June).—Tennessee dragged into the rebel Confederacy.—Loyal resistance of East Tennessee. See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—MAY) and (JUNE).

A. D. 1861 (May—July: Missouri).—The baffling of the Secessionists in Missouri.—Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson.—The Battle of Boonville. See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY—JULY).

A. D. 1861 (May—September: Kentucky).—The struggle for the state.—Secession and Neutrality overcome. See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1861 (June: Virginia).—The fight at Big Bethel.—"Major-General Butler and staff arrived at Fortress Monroe Wednesday afternoon, May 22d. . . . Colonel Magruder—late Colonel in the U. S. service, and an officer of much distinction as an obstinate combatant—was placed in command (rebel) of the Peninsula. . . . Troops rapidly poured into Butler's department, and he soon found himself in a condition to act on the offensive. Magruder's scouts and cavalry greatly annoyed the two camps mentioned. They had, also, seized several Union men. These raids became so frequent and annoying that a night attack was concerted upon their positions at Little Bethel and Big Bethel—the latter, near the north branch of Back River, where it was understood Magruder's outposts were throwing up strong works. Brigadier-General Pierce, of the Massachusetts troops, was detailed to command the expedition. . . . Approaching the enemy's position at Big Bethel, it was found that their guns commanded all points of approach. The road leading up to the bridge over the creek was swept by their artillery. A thick woods to the left of the road afforded some protection to the Federal left. An open field on the right of the approach only offered a house and out-buildings as a cover. The enemy occupied a hill, beyond the creek, which almost completely secured their front. At their rear was a dense wood. This gave them the advantage of ground, greatly. A reconnaissance would have demonstrated the futility of a front attack except by artillery. The only hope for the Federals was in a flank movement, higher up the creek, by which, the stream being passed, the enemy could be assaulted in their works, at the point of the bayonet, if necessary. This movement was only attempted partially at a late hour in the day. The rebels were well prepared, and only awaited the appearance of the head of the Federal advance to open a sharp fire. . . . The fight was, from the first, extremely unequal. A front attack was sheer folly. But, the flank movement was not ordered. . . . The fortunes of the day needed but

a master-hand to direct them, to have turned in favor of the Union troops. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Washburne had . . . arranged for a flank movement which, with a combined attack from the front, must have ended the struggle; but the order for retreat was given before the movement could be executed. . . . The Federal loss was 14 killed, 49 wounded and five missing. Among the killed were two of the most gallant and noble men in the service—Major Theodore Winthrop, Secretary and Aid to General Butler, and first-Lieutenant John T. Greble, of the United States regular artillery, Second regiment. The rebels pronounced their loss to have been but one killed and four wounded. The retreat was accomplished in good order—the enemy not pursuing."—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 2, div. 4, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 4, ch. 17.—*Life and Poems of Theodore Winthrop*, ch. 9.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 2.

A. D. 1861 (June—July: West Virginia).—General McClellan's campaign in the mountains.—Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford.—"Although some thousands of West Virginians had volunteered to fight for the Union, none of them were encamped on the soil of their State until after the election held [May 23] to ratify or reject the Ordinance of Secession [see VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—JUNE)] . . . The Virginians who volunteered were mustered in and organized at Camp Carlile, in Ohio, opposite Wheeling, under the command of Col. Kelly, himself a Virginian. George B. McClellan, who had been appointed a Major-General and assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio, remained at Cincinnati, his home. Three days after the election aforesaid, he issued from that city a spirited address 'To the Union men of Western Virginia.' . . . A brief and stirring address to his soldiers was issued simultaneously with the above; and, both being read to those in Camp Carlile that evening, the 1st Virginia, 1,100 strong, Col. Kelly, crossed to Wheeling early next morning, closely followed by the 16th Ohio, Col. Irvine. The 14th Ohio, Col. Steedman, crossed simultaneously, and quietly occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the Northwestern branch of the Baltimore and Ohio road. A Rebel force, then holding Grafton, which connected the branch aforesaid with the main or Wheeling division of the railroad, had meditated a descent on Wheeling; but, finding themselves anticipated and outnumbered, they obstructed and destroyed the railroad west of them," and fell back to Philippi, some fifteen miles southward. "General McClellan having ordered that Philippi be captured by surprise, the attempt was made on the night of June 2d. Two brigades of two regiments each approached the Rebel camp by different roads" and dispersed it completely, with some loss on both sides, capturing the tents, provisions and munitions. The Rebel commander, Colonel Porterfield, "gathering up such portion of his forces as he could find, retreated hastily to Beverly, and thence to Huttonsville; where the Rebel array was rapidly increased by conscription, and Gov. Wise placed in command. Gen. McClellan arrived at Grafton on the 23d. . . . His forces were rapidly augmented, till they amounted, by the 4th of July, to over 30,000 men; while the

Rebels in his front could hardly muster 10,000 in all. He therefore resolved to advance. The Rebel main force, several thousand strong, under Gen. Robert S. Garnett, was strongly intrenched on Laurel Hill, a few miles north of Beverly, . . . while a smaller detachment, under Col. John Pegram was intrenched upon the summit and at either base of Rich Mountain . . . three or four miles distant from the Rebel main body." General Rosecrans, sent by a detour of eight miles through the mountains to Pegram's rear, drove the rebels (July 11) from their position, at the point of the bayonet; and the following day their commander, with about 600 men, was forced to surrender. "Gen. McClellan pushed on to Beverly, which he entered early next morning, flanking Gen. Garnett's position at Laurel Hill and compelling him to a precipitate flight northward. Six cannon, 200 tents, 60 wagons and over 100 prisoners, were the trophies of this success. The Rebel loss in killed and wounded was about 150; the Union about 50. Gen. Garnett, completely flanked, thoroughly worsted, and fearfully outnumbered, abandoned his camp at Laurel Hill without a struggle, crossing the Laurel Mountains eastward, by a by-road, into the narrow valley of Cheat river. . . . At length, having crossed the Cheat at a point known as Carrick's Ford, which proffered an admirable position for defense, Garnett turned [July 14] to fight." But the Union force which pursued him was overpowering; Garnett himself was killed in the battle at the Ford and his command fled in confusion. Gen. McClellan telegraphed to Washington, next day, from Huttonsville: "We have completely annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia. Our loss is about 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded; while the enemy's loss is not far from 200 killed; and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least 1,000. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns in all. A portion of Garnett's forces retreated; but I look for their capture by Gen. Hill, who is in hot pursuit." "This expectation was not realized. The pursuit was only continued two miles beyond the ford; when our weary soldiers halted, and the residue of the Rebels, under Col. Ramsey, turning sharply to the right, made their way across the mountains, and joined Gen. Jackson at Monterey." Meantime, simultaneously with General McClellan's advance on Beverly, another strong Union force, under General Cox, had moved from Guyandotte to the Kanawha, and up that river to Charleston, which it reached on the 25th of July. Governor Wise, who commanded the rebels in the Kanawha Valley, retreated, General Cox pursuing, until the pursuit was checked on the 29th by Wise's destruction of Gauley bridge. The rebels then made good their flight to Lewisburg, in Greenbrier county, where Wise was reinforced and superseded by General John B. Floyd. —H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 1, ch. 32. —"The war in Western Virginia seemed to have ended with the dispersion of Garnett's forces, and there was much rejoicing over the result. It was premature. The 'Confederates' were not disposed to surrender to their enemy the granaries that would be needed to supply the troops in Eastern Virginia, without a severer struggle. General Robert E. Lee succeeded Garnett, and more important men than Wise

and Floyd took the places of these incompetents. Rosecrans succeeded McClellan, who was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and the war in the mountain region of Virginia was soon renewed."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 2, pp. 193-293.—V. A. Lewis, *Hist. of W. Va.*, ch. 28.—J. D. Cox, *McClellan in W. Va. (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1).

A. D. 1861 (July).—First depredations of the Confederate cruiser Sumter. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1861-1862.

A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia).—The seat of the rebel government transferred to Richmond. See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).

A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia).—On to Richmond.—The First Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.—"The Southern Government having inclined to the defensive policy as that upon which they should act, their first object was to prevent an advance of any Federal force into Virginia. Early in the month of May troops were assembled in Richmond, and pushed forward toward the northeastern boundary of the State, to a position known as Manassas Junction. . . . It is here that a railroad from Alexandria, another from Staunton up the valley and through Manassas Gap, and another from Gordonsville unite. At Gordonsville the railroad from Richmond and the line from East Tennessee unite. As a point for concentration none more eligible exists in northeastern Virginia. The advantages for fortification are naturally such that the place can be rendered impregnable. Here the centre of the northern force of the Southern army was posted, with the left wing pushed forward to Winchester [under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, with the Union General Patterson opposed to him] and the right extended to the Potomac, and sustained by heavy batteries which served to blockade the river. The Federal force, the advance of which was assembled at Washington for the defence of that city against any attack by the Southern troops, was posted on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on Arlington Heights, which were strongly fortified. Their right was pushed some distance up the Potomac, and chiefly on the Maryland side, while their left occupied Alexandria. The armies of both sides consisted of raw militia hastily brought together, and of volunteers who for the first time had put on the uniform, and taken up the weapons of the soldier. On both sides the forces were constantly accumulating. On the morning of June 27th, the consolidated report of Gen. Mansfield, commanding the Department of Washington, gives the number of troops in that city and vicinity. The privates, including regulars and volunteers present for duty, numbered 22,846 men. The grand aggregate of the force, including officers, etc., present and absent, was 34,160 men. The force of Gen. Patterson, commanding in Maryland above Washington, and also on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on the 28th of June, was returned, embracing officers and men enlisted and present for duty, 15,923. Of these about 550 were reported as sick."—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval History of the Rebellion*, p. 67.—"The return of Johnston's [Confederate] army for June 30th showed his total force present for duty to have




been 10,654; but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his army, did not join him till after July 3d. . . . A prime object of Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June 2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry, Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in their views of the importance of mutual support. . . . As soon as Johnston ascertained . . . that McClellan [from West Virginia] was not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive just long enough before the impending battle to take part in it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a corresponding transfer of Patterson. . . . It was for the purpose of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position. Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had commenced."—R. M. Hughes, *General Johnston*, pp. 47–51.—The advance from Washington, which began on the 16th of July, and which resulted in the grievous defeat of the Union forces at Bull Run, or Manassas, on Sunday, the 21st, was undertaken to appease the impatient, ignorant clamor of Northern newspapers, and in opposition to the judgment and the plans of General Scott, who was then at the head of the National army. The cry "On to Richmond" was taken up by Congressmen and Senators, and the pressure on the government became too strong to be resisted. Instead of keeping the raw troops, hurriedly gathered at Washington, in camps of instruction, until they were properly drilled and until their officers had acquired some experience in handling them, they were hurriedly pushed into a serious campaign movement, against an enemy likewise untrained, to be sure, but who was far better prepared to receive an attack than the assailants were to make one. General Irwin McDowell had been recently placed in command of the army intended for the field, with General Mansfield commanding the troops in Washington. The former had "entered on his new and responsible duties with great alacrity, working night and day to prepare his command for the approaching conflict. . . . McDowell was laboring at a great disadvantage—drilling and preparing his troops as best he could—under the heavy pressure from the North to deliver battle to the enemy in his front. Secretary Chase was the champion, in the Cabinet, of the intense feeling in the North that the war should be pushed at once, with a vigor that would end it soon. . . . There is no doubt that General Scott was weakened with the administration, for the reason that he did not believe in the prevailing opinion that a few days would crush the rebellion; and the more the old hero insisted, or faithfully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the opinion of those who hoped and said it would end speedily. At the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamilton says: 'General Montgomery Blair said he would march to Richmond with 10,000 men,

armed with lathes.' 'Yes,' said General Scott, 'as prisoners of war.' Continuing General Hamilton's statement of the events which occurred prior to the battle and during its progress, he says: 'On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull Run, Scott directed me, his military secretary, to say to McDowell that he wished him to dine with him without fail. At the dinner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell from fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then existing condition of public affairs. . . . He then begged General McDowell to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, and aid him (General Scott) in preventing a forward movement at that moment; one of the arguments used by General Scott being that the Union sentiment of the South had been surprised by the suddenness and promptitude of the movement in favor of secession; that he (General Scott) was well advised that the Union sentiment was recovering itself, and gaining head in the South; that from the moment blood was shed the South would be made a unit. General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. . . . In the course of the succeeding week General McDowell reported to General Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon the wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions indicated by General McDowell as those he intended the forces under his command should occupy. After General McDowell had gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had finished, General Scott remarked, "General McDowell, that is as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper." General McDowell said in reply: "General Scott, the success of this whole plan depends upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check at Winchester." General Scott remarked that General Johnston was a very able soldier, that he had a railroad at his command with which to move his troops, and if General McDowell's plan of battle, which had just been presented to him, depended upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check, his plan was not worth the paper it was drawn upon.' That ended that interview."—J. H. Stine, *Hist. of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 7–10.—Says General McDowell, in his subsequent report of the movement and the disastrous battle: "When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday). Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than







a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only come from Vienna, about 6 miles, and it was not more than  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of 'light marching order.'—Brig. Gen. I. McDowell, *Report* (*Official Records, series 1, v. 2, pp. 323-324*).—The advance of the Union Army was made "in five divisions, commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the line of communication with Washington, and the number that actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns and a battalion of cavalry. So little did strict military discipline as yet enter into the policy of the Government that a large number of civilians, including several members of Congress, obtained passes enabling them to ride out in carriages, close in the rear of the army, to witness the expected battle. . . . The troops marched by the Warrenton turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. . . . The enemy's outposts had fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford," where some sharp fighting occurred between Tyler's division and the Confederate troops under Longstreet. "McDowell, finding that Beauregard was very strongly entrenched on his right, and that the roads in that direction were not good, changed his plan and determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold Johnston. . . . The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances and searching for a suitable ford

on the upper part of the stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded Patterson and with two fifths of his forces joined Beauregard on Saturday. . . . The Confederate commanders had actually ordered a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. . . . The battleground was a plateau, wooded and broken."—R. Johnson, *Short Hist. of the War of Rebellion, ch. 4*.—In the Report of the Confederate General Beauregard, the plateau which now became the principal battle ground of the conflict is described as follows: "It is inclosed on three sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the level of the enclosing streams in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses . . . [mentioned below] are small open fields of irregular outline, not exceeding 150 acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions."—Gen. G. T. Beauregard, *Report* (*Official Records, series 1, v. 2, pp. 493-494*).—At an early hour in the afternoon, the Union forces had driven the enemy from this plateau and seemed to be in a position which promised victory to them. Says General McDowell in his official report: "The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than  $9\frac{1}{2}$  miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the



regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks. It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost."—Brig. Gen. I. McDowell, *Report (Official Records, series 1, v. 2, p. 320)*.—"The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace, to the Federal arms; but the reports of losses on both sides prove that it was bravely disputed. . . . The rout—or, in other words, the panic— . . . was one of those accidents to which even victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses sustained by the two contending parties. . . . Its immediate effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates. Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was threatened anew. . . . But it was chiefly through its moral effect that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day, but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal to the Union in the Southern States. . . . This disaster, which might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a salutary lesson."—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 2.—"Those only can realize the condition of our Army, at that time, who can recall the incidents of this memorable campaign and the battle

with which it closed. The crowds of curious and impertinent spectators who accompanied and often rode through our ranks; the long and fatal delay of Hunter's column, on the morning of the battle—a delay occasioned by a few baggage-waggons, which should have been miles in rear—the many ludicrous, yet sad, scenes on the field; the heroic, but fruitless, gallantry of separate regiments, each attempting, in detail, the accomplishment of a work which required the combined effort of all; the dread, on the part of our men, of those terrible 'masked batteries' and 'the fierce Black-horse Cavalry,' neither of which ever had an existence except in the imaginative brains of our newspaper reporters, all help to fill up the picture. . . . I believe the plan of this battle to have been well-conceived, notwithstanding its disastrous result. We were compelled to take the offensive against troops in position, and upon a field, the topography of which was unknown to nearly all our officers. Notwithstanding these facts, successes would have been achieved but for the impatient spirit which hurried us on, without the slightest preparation. Of the march, the battle, the rout, and the disorderly retreat to Washington, the description given by William H. Russell was not greatly exaggerated. It was far more truthful than many of the descriptions given by the reporters of our own papers. Who has forgotten the newspaper accounts of the conduct of the celebrated Fire Zouaves—of the prodigies of valor performed by them—of their bayonet charges—of their heroic assaults—of the fearful destruction inflicted by them upon the enemy—and, finally, when the order to retreat came, of the great difficulty experienced by the officers in forcing 'these gallant, but bloodthirsty lambs,' as they were called, to cease fighting and commence retreating? We all remember these accounts, and many others of a similar character; and yet, every intelligent officer who was on the field knows that this regiment dispersed at the first fire, and so thoroughly was it dispersed that it was from that day never again known as a military organization. This campaign, and every subsequent one, of the War, taught us that the rough element of our cities—the prize-fighter, the veteran of a score of street-fights—does not necessarily make the most valuable soldier. On the contrary, many a pale-faced boy, who, from a sense of duty, has left school or counting-room to join our Army, has exhibited a degree of endurance on the march and of bravery on the field, seldom equalled by the rough element of our cities."—Gen. H. W. Slocum, *Military Lessons taught by the War (Historical Mag., Feb. 1871)*.—"The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances. . . . The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy. But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire strength was considerably under 2,000 men, and a large proportion of these were not in call. Many of those

within reach had been fighting for hours, and were in little better condition than the infantry. All who were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in their retreat by large bodies of troops that had not been engaged. This was all that could be accomplished. . . . The fact that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active pursuit out of the question is established by the official reports. General Johnston's report says: 'Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be.' . . . The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes; for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was the lack of necessary transportation. . . . Even if the Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing. They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side, even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner. They had no sufficient supply of ammunition."—R. M. Hughes, *General Johnston*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 8. —J. G. Nicolay, *Outbreak of the Rebellion*, ch. 13-16. —J. B. Fry and others, *Campaign of the First Bull Run (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1). —J. E. Cook, *Stonewall Jackson*, pt. 1, ch. 12. —A. Roman, *Military Operations of Gen. Beauregard*, v. 1, ch. 9.

**A. D. 1861 (July).—Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.**—The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by Acts of Congress passed July 22 and 25.

**A. D. 1861 (July—September: Missouri).—Sigel's well-conducted retreat from Carthage.**—**Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek.**—**Siege of Lexington.**—**Fremont in command.**—The flight of Governor Jackson and his followers from Booneville—see **MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY)**—was westward, to Warsaw, on the Osage, first, and thence into Vernon County, where they were joined, July 3, by General Sterling Price. "Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day, halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by a Union force 1,500 strong, under Col. Franz Sigel, who had been dispatched from St. Louis by the Southwestern Pacific road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent a junction between Jackson and some forces which his Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. Each army appears to have started that morning with intent to find and fight the other; and such mutual intentions are seldom

frustrated. Sigel found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This compelled Sigel to fall back. . . . The retreat was made in perfect order. . . . to Carthage, and through that town to Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. It was well, indeed, that he did so; for Jackson's force was augmented, during that night and next morning, by the arrival of Price from the southward, bringing to his aid several thousand Arkansas and Texas troops, under Gens. Ben McCulloch and Pearce. Our loss in the affair of Carthage was 13 killed and 31 wounded—not one of them abandoned to the enemy; while the Rebels reported their loss at 40 to 50 killed and 125 to 150 wounded. Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to Springfield; where Gen. Lyon, who had been delayed by lack of transportation, joined and outranked him on the 10th." —H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 1, ch. 35. —"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at Springfield, hoping to receive reinforcements; but the battle of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed [July 9] to the command of the Western Department, and had reached St. Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed 5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. A skirmish occurred at Dug Spring (August 1st), in which he had the advantage; but he could not prevent the junction of the two columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. His position had now become one of great difficulty. Political as well as military considerations rendered it almost impossible for him to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving out of Springfield on a very dark night (August 9-10), and having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day broke, to make an attack on their front [on Wilson's Creek]. But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him; he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant about nine miles, was resolved on. It was



executed without difficulty. In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 721 wounded, 292 missing, on the national side; and, as may be inferred from the determined character of the assault, the loss of the Confederates was very great. They had been so severely handled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the retreat was continued by the national troops, who, on the 19th, had fallen back to Rolla. After this action, the Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national force of about three thousand (2,780) under Colonel Mulligan. Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan, but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached 28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They made repeated assaults without success until [September] 20th, when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price, but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch and his Confederate troops."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 47 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: T. L. Sneed, *The Fight for Missouri*, ch. 11-14.—J. Peckham, *Gen. Lyon and Missouri in 1861*, bk. 4.—J. C. Fremont, F. Sigel and others, *Wilson's Creek, Lexington and Pea Ridge (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1).

A. D. 1861 (July—November).—McClellan's rise to the chief command.—Creation of the Army of the Potomac.—Reorganization of the western armies.—"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command—a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' . . . General McClellan at once commenced the organization of the great army authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and appropriate military conduct were, for the most part, accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength of . . . 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed be-

yond the 25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list. . . . His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the President. This change in his position at once produced a change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West. He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. . . . In preparation for this, the Department of the West was reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mexico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter; (3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was magnificent, the roads excellent. . . . Winter at last came, and nothing had been done. . . . Considering the military condition of the nation when General McClellan undertook the formation and organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition was far from being too long. . . . From the resources furnished without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not use it on the battlefield. . . . There probably never was an army in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with what we waste.'"—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 44 and 49 (v. 2).—"Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than myself that, with the means at my command, that would have been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time. What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that orders could be reasonably well carried out. . . . In spite of all the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of it was wasted. The fortifications then erected, both directly and

indirectly, saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and enabled the army to manoeuvre freely and independently. . . . No other army we possessed could have met and defeated the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac, it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in the camps around Washington."—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: The same, *Rep't on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*.—Prince de Joinville, *The Army of the Potomac*.—*Rep't of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War*, 37th Cong., 3d sess., H. R., pt. 1.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 3.

**A. D. 1861 (August).—Act of Congress freeing Slaves employed in the service of the Rebellion.**—In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person held to labor or service under the law of any State shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is due to take up arms against the United States, or to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory, intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever against the Government of the United States, the person to whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been employed in the military or naval service against the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, p. 342.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 1, pp. 568-570.—E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Rebellion*, p. 195.

**A. D. 1861 (August: North Carolina).—The Hatteras expedition.**—"General Wool relieved General Butler Aug. 16th, 1861, of the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler—Commodore S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took its departure. . . . Not until the vessels were at sea were any but the directors of the enterprise aware of the point of attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great rendezvous for traders running the blockade. . . . Fort Hatteras was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous and narrow neck of land. . . . The secrecy and rapidity of preparation by the Federals caught the rebels

somewhat unprepared for the attack. . . . The bombardment opened Wednesday morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. . . . A heavy surf rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor, and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was suspended for the day. Those already on shore—315 in number—were safe under the guns of the fleet. . . . The bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor, but with little avail. . . . On the morning of the 29th, the cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a transport heavily laden with troops reinforced the fort, running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was occupied by the Federal forces, and refused its aid to assist its late confederate. The conflict soon raged with extreme vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag fluttered uneasily a moment—then ran down the halyards and a white flag was slowly run to the peak. . . . Articles of capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota. Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615, who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they were in New York harbor. . . . The first design, it would appear, was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old hulks, and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 2, div. 5, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: D. Ammen, *The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast*, ch. 8.

**A. D. 1861 (August—October: Missouri).—Fremont's premature proclamation of freedom to slaves of rebels and Lincoln's modification of it.—The change of command.**—"On the 31st of August, General Fremont [commanding in the West] issued a proclamation declaring martial law, defining the lines of the army of occupation, and threatening with death by the bullet all who should be found within those lines with arms in their hands. Furthermore, the real and personal property of all persons in the state [Missouri] who should take up arms against the United States was declared confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had any, were declared free men. This proclamation produced a strong effect upon the public mind. The proclaiming of freedom to the slaves of rebels struck the popular chord, particularly among thoroughly loyal men in the free states. Of course, it maddened all the sympathizers with the rebellion, infuriated the rebels themselves, and perplexed those loyal men who had upon their hands the task of so conducting affairs as to hold to their allegiance the border slave states which had not seceded. Mr. Lincoln did not approve some features of General Fremont's proclamation. As soon as he read it, he wrote, under date of September 2d, to the General, that there were two points in it which gave him anxiety. The first was, that, if he should shoot a man according to his proclamation, 'the confederates would certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation, and so,



man for man, indefinitely.' He therefore ordered him to allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having his (the President's) approbation or consent. The second cause of anxiety was that the paragraph relating to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves of traitorous owners would alarm Unionists at the South, and perhaps ruin the fair prospect of saving Kentucky to the Union. He, therefore, wished General Fremont, as of his own motion, so to modify his proclamation as to make it conformable to the confiscation act just passed by the extra session of Congress, which only freed such slaves as were engaged in the rebel service. . . . General Fremont received the President's letter respectfully, and replied to it September 8th, stating the difficulties under which he labored, with communication with the government so difficult, and the development of perplexing events so rapid in the department under his command. As to the part of his proclamation concerning the slaves, he wished the President openly to order the change desired, as, if he should do it of his own motion, it would imply that he thought himself wrong, and that he had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. This the President did, in a dispatch under date of September 11th, in the words: 'It is therefore ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and constructed, as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6, 1861; and that such act be published at length with this order.' Before this order had been received, or on the day following its date, General Fremont, though acquainted with the President's wishes, manumitted two slaves of Thomas L. Snead of St. Louis, in accordance with the terms of his proclamation. Although Mr. Lincoln desired General Fremont so to modify his proclamation as to make it accordant with the act of Congress approved August 6th, it is hardly to be supposed that he did it solely out of respect to that act. . . . If he had believed that the time had come for the measure of liberating the slaves of rebels by proclamation, the act of Congress would not have stood in his way. This act was an embodiment of his policy at that time, and he used it for his immediate purpose. . . . Complications in the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P. Blair, under whose personal and family influence General Fremont had received his position, occurred at an early day. Colonel Blair doubtless thought that he had not sufficient weight in the General's counsels, and the General, doubtless, exercised his right in choosing his own counselors. . . . It was a very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom and justice. . . . Mr. Lincoln always gave to each the credit due to his motives, and so far refused to mingle in the general quarrel that grew out of the difficulty, that he kept the good-will of both sides, and compelled them to settle their own differences. . . . General Fremont at length took the field in person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated, until it

was widely reported that he would give battle to the national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at an early day to General Halleck. General Fremont was relieved of his command by the President not because of his proclamation, not because he hated slavery, and not because he believed him corrupt or vindictive or disloyal. He relieved him simply because he believed that the interests of the country, all things considered, would be subserved by relieving him and putting another man in his place. The matter was the cause of great excitement in Missouri, and of much complaint among the radical anti-slavery men of the country: but the imputations sought to be cast upon the President were not fastened to him; and did not, four years later, when Fremont himself became a candidate for the presidency, prevent the warmest anti-slavery men from giving Mr. Lincoln their support. The federal army under General Hunter retreated without a battle; and thus the campaign, inaugurated with great show and immense expense, was a flat failure."—J. G. Holland, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: J. C. Fremont, *In Command in Missouri (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1), pp. 278-288.—W. Dorsheimer, *Fremont's Hundred Days in Missouri (Atlantic Monthly*, v. 9, 1862).—*Official Record*, series 1, v. 3, pp. 466-564.

A. D. 1861 (August—December: West Virginia).—Rosecrans against Lee.—*Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit*.—"When General McClellan was called [July 22] to take General McDowell's place at the head of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier-General William S. Rosecrans was left in command of the troops in West Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, the Confederate commander, who had gathered together the forces which had been defeated under Garnett and Pegram, and some others, found himself in August at the head of about 16,000 men. Lee made his headquarters at Huntersville, while General John B. Floyd . . . took up a position on the Gauley River for the purpose of cutting off General Cox of Ohio, who, with a brigade of Rosecrans's army, had just driven a Confederate force under ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia out of the Kanawha Valley. Floyd surprised and routed the Seventh Ohio under Colonel Tyler, and then moved to a place on the Gauley River called Carnifex Ferry, hoping to cut off Cox from Rosecrans. But early in September Rosecrans, leaving part of his army under General Joseph J. Reynolds to watch Lee, marched southward with about 10,000 men and [September 10] attacked Floyd, who had strongly fortified himself with about 2,000 men on the banks of the river. After a severe fight of three or four hours, in which the Union troops lost heavily, Rosecrans, finding the position much stronger than he expected, gave orders at twilight to stop the assault until morning; but when morning came no enemy was to be seen; Floyd, finding his enemy much superior in numbers, had crossed the river in the night over a bridge hastily built of logs, and retreated to the mountains 30 miles away. Rosecrans followed, but finally fell back again to

the Gauley. When Rosecrans marched against Floyd, Reynolds took up a strong position on Cheat Mountain."—J. D. Champlin, *Young Folks' Hist. of the War for the Union*, ch. 10.—"General Lee proposed first to win a victory, if possible, over Reynolds. He was combative, anxious to strike, but many difficulties confronted him. He fully realized he had been sent to West Virginia to retrieve Confederate disasters, and that he had a most difficult task to perform. The Federal commander [his main force at Elk Water] held the center summit of Cheat Mountain pass, the mountain having three well-defined summits. . . . It was necessary first to carry this well-selected position of the Federal troops. A citizen surveyor, in sympathy with the South and familiar with the mountain paths, had made a trip to an elevated point where he could clearly see the Federal position, and reported his observations to General Lee. Afterward he made a second reconnoissance, accompanied by Colonel Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas Regiment, who was anxious to see the nature of the ground and the strength of the position for himself. They reported to General Lee that in their opinion the enemy's position could be assailed with success with troops which could be guided to the point they had reached. General Lee decided to make the attack, and gave to Rust a column of 1,200 infantry. . . . The movement was to begin at night, which happened to be a very rainy one. All the troops, however, got in the positions assigned to them without the knowledge of the enemy, where they waited, every moment expecting to hear the rattle of Rust's muskets, who had been charged with the capture of the pass on Cheat Mountain; but hour after hour passed, and no sounds were heard. After a delay of many hours, and the enemy had divined the nature of the attack, the troops were ordered back to their former position. There had been only a small conflict between cavalry, in which Colonel John A. Washington, General Lee's aide-de-camp, who had been sent with Major W. H. F. Lee to reconnoiter the enemy, was killed from an ambuscade. . . . Rust claims in his reports that spies had communicated the movements of the Confederate troops to the enemy. This officer evidently did not attack, because he found, on getting close to the Federal position, that it was much stronger than he had thought it was from the preliminary reconnoissances he had made. As the attack of the whole depended on the assault of this force, the failure to attack caused a corresponding failure of the whole movement. . . . This movement having failed, and knowing that the enemy would be prepared for any second attempt which, from the nature of the country, would have to be similar to the one already tried, General Lee decided to turn his attention to the commands of Wise and Floyd in front of Rosecrans, leaving General H. R. Jackson in Reynolds's front. He proceeded at once to Floyd's command, which he reached on September 20th, and then to Wise's camp, closely inspecting both. He at once perceived that Wise's position was the strongest and offered the best means for successful defense, and promptly concentrated his forces at that point. . . . Rosecrans had advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain and had placed his army in a strong position. General Lee, with the troops of Wise,

Floyd, and Loring—about 8,000 men—occupied a position on a parallel range. The two armies were now in close proximity to each other, both occupying strong defensive positions. Lee and Rosecrans, having been officers of the engineers, were fully aware of the great disadvantage an attacking army would have, and each waited, hoping the other would attack. After occupying these positions for twelve days, Rosecrans, on the night of October 6th, retreated. The condition of the roads, the mud, the swollen streams, the large numbers of men with typhoid fever and measles, the condition of the horses, of the artillery, and transportation, were such that Lee decided not to pursue. . . . The rapid approach of winter and the rainy season terminated the campaign in this section. . . . At the termination of this campaign of General Lee's the Confederate Government did not bestow much attention upon this section. The majority of the people seemed inclined to support the Federal side. . . . It must be admitted that General Lee retired from West Virginia with diminished military reputation. Great results had been expected from his presence there. Garnett's defeat and death were to be avenged, and the whole of that portion of Virginia speedily wrested from the Federal arms. The public did not understand the difficulties of the situation, or comprehend why he did not defeat Reynolds, or the failure to attack Rosecrans."—F. Lee, *General Lee*, ch. 6.—After Lee left General H. R. Jackson in front of Reynolds' position, the former established himself in a fortified camp on Buffalo Hill, and was unsuccessfully attacked there by Reynolds, October 3. Two months later, on the 13th of December, the attack was repeated by Reynolds' successor in command, General Milroy, and again without success. Meantime, Floyd had been driven into the mountains, with little fighting, by Rosecrans, and military operations, for the time, were at an end.—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in America*, v. 1, bk. 4, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: V. A. Lewis, *Hist. of West Va.*, ch. 28.

A. D. 1861 (September—November: On the Mississippi).—General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.—In August, General Ulysses S. Grant, who had been serving for a few weeks in Missouri, first as Colonel of the 21st Illinois Regiment, and later as a brigadier-general, was assigned by General Fremont to "the command of the district of south-east Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois." On the 4th of September he established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois, and the next day, having learned from a scout that the rebels were preparing to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, he placed a couple of regiments of troops and a light battery on board of steamers; and occupied the place on the 6th,—telegraphing meanwhile for orders, but not waiting for them. His movement anticipated the enemy by a few hours, only, and secured a command of the Tennessee, the importance of which was afterward demonstrated by Grant, himself, when he moved on Forts Henry and Donelson. In his "Memoirs" General Grant says: "From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November, nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. I was reinforced



from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men. . . . About the 1st of November I was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels within their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west, or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White River, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to prevent this movement if possible." To carry out these orders, General Grant directed a demonstration to be made from Paducah towards Columbus, while, at the same time, he conveyed some 3,000 troops down the river, in steamers, and attacked a camp of rebels at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus. The battle was a severe one. "The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the first time. Veterans," says General Grant, "could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. . . . The moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the achievements of the command." The result was a rallying of the defeated rebels and a reinforcement from Columbus which forced the Unionists to retire with haste. "Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of Belmont. The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. . . . If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been culpable indeed."—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 19–20 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of U. S. Grant*, ch. 1.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 24.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 3.

A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).—Confederate project for the invasion of the North vetoed by Jefferson Davis.—"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than 110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising

at least 100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the immense resources at the disposal of the United States Government, that there was every reason to expect in the spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. . . . It was easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have learned 'the trade of the soldier,'—should have acquired familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust in their officers and superiors, discipline,—the Federal general would enter on the next campaign with all those chances of success which attend largely superior numbers, better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E. Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard . . . and G. W. Smith, . . . entirely concurred. They saw that something must be done to break up this constantly increasing Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The Confederate generals determined to urge their views upon the President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30, 1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the enemy's country. Johnston and Beauregard fixed the strength of an army adequate to these tasks at 60,000 men. Smith was content with a force of 50,000. Additional transportation and supplies of ammunition were also demanded. The army then at Manassas numbered about 40,000 men. With the quality of the soldiers the generals seemed to be perfectly content. They only asked that the additional troops sent should be of an equal degree of efficiency,—'seasoned soldiers' as distinguished from 'fresh volunteers.' But President Davis decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. . . . It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many important respects. It had the prestige of victory. . . . We may fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North, undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair

promise of a successful result for the Confederate arms."—J. C. Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War*, ch. 10.

**A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).—The affair at Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.**—"The true story of the affair of Ball's Bluff, is, in brief, as follows: One of Gen. Stone's officers, Capt. Philbrick, of the 15th Mass., thought that he had discovered a camp of the enemy about one mile beyond Harrison's island in the direction of Leesburg. Having completed the feint of crossing made in the course of the 20th, Gen. Stone at 10.30 p. m. of the same day issued his orders for the surprise of the supposed camp at daybreak of the 21st. Col. Devens, of the 15th Mass., was entrusted with the duty, with four companies of his regiment. Col. Lee, of the 20th Mass., was directed to replace Col. Devens in Harrison's island with four companies of his own regiment, one of which was to pass over to the Virginia shore and hold the heights there to cover Col. Devens's return. Colonel Devens was directed to 'attack the camp at daybreak, and, having routed, to pursue them as far as he deems prudent, and to destroy the camp, if practicable, before returning.' . . . 'Having accomplished this duty, Col. Devens will return to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In which case he will hold on and report.' In obedience to these orders Col. Devens crossed about midnight with five companies (instead of four), numbering about 300 men, and halted until daybreak in an open field near the bluffs bordering the shore. While there he was joined by Col. Lee with 100 men of the 20th Mass., who halted here to cover his return. At daybreak he advanced about a mile towards Leesburg, and then discovered that the supposed camp did not exist. After examining the vicinity and discovering no traces of the enemy, he determined not to return at once, but at about half-past six A. M. sent a non-commissioned officer to report to Gen. Stone that he thought he could remain where he was until reinforced. At about seven o'clock a company of hostile riflemen were observed on the right, and a slight skirmish ensued. A company of cavalry being soon observed on the left, the skirmishers were drawn back to the woods, and, after waiting half an hour for attack, the command was withdrawn to the position held by Col. Lee; but, after again scouting the woods, Col. Devens returned to his advanced position. About eight o'clock the messenger returned from Gen. Stone with orders for Col. Devens to remain where he was, and that he would be reinforced. The messenger was again sent back to report the skirmish that had taken place. Col. Devens then threw out skirmishers and awaited reinforcements. At about ten o'clock the messenger again returned with the information that Col. Baker [Senator Edward D. Baker, of California] would soon arrive with his brigade and take command. Between nine and eleven Col. Devens was joined by Lieut.-Col. Learned with the remainder of the 15th, bringing up his command to 28 officers and 625 men. About midday Col. Devens learned that the enemy were gathering on his left, and about half-past twelve or one he was strongly attacked; and as he was in great

danger of being outflanked, and no reinforcements had arrived, at about a quarter-past two he fell back to the bluff, where he found Col. Baker, who directed him to take the right of the position he proposed to occupy. . . . At about three o'clock the enemy attacked in force, the weight of his attack being on our centre and left. At about four our artillery was silenced, and Col. Devens was ordered to send two of his companies to support the left of our line; shortly after he learned that Col. Baker had been killed. Col. Cogswell then assumed command, and, after a vain attempt to cut his way through to Edward's Ferry, was obliged to give the order to retreat to the river-bank and direct the men to save themselves as best they could. I have gone thus much into detail because at the time I was much criticised and blamed for this unfortunate affair, while I was in no sense responsible for it."—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story*, ch. 11.—In connection with the disaster at Ball's Bluff (called the battle of Leesburg by the Confederates) a great wrong seems to have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He went abroad and for many years was Chief of the General Staff to the Khedive of Egypt.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 17.

ALSO IN: R. B. Irwin, *Ball's Bluff and the arrest of General Stone (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 2, pp. 123-134).—*Report of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War*, 37th Cong., 3d sess., H. R., pt. 2.

**A. D. 1861 (October—December: South Carolina—Georgia).—The Port Royal Expedition.—Capture of Hilton Head.—Extensive occupation of the coast.—Savannah threatened.**—"On the the 29th of October, another and far stronger naval and military expedition [than that against the Hatteras forts] set forth from Hampton Roads, and, clearing the capes of Virginia, moved majestically southward. General T. W. Sherman [not to be confused with General William T. Sherman of the Western armies] commanded the land forces, consisting of 18 volunteer regiments, forming three brigades, and numbering not less than 10,000 men; while the fleet—commanded by Com. Samuel F. Du Pont—embraced the steam-frigate Wabash, 14 gunboats, 22 first-class and 12 smaller steamers, with 26 sailing vessels. After a stormy passage, in which several transports were disabled and four absolutely lost, Com. Du Pont, in his flag-ship, came to off Port Royal, S. C., during the night of November 3d and 4th; and, after proper soundings and reconnoissances, which developed the existence of a new fort on either side of the entrance, the commodore brought his most effective vessels into action at 9 A. M., on Thursday, November 7th, taking the lead in his flag-ship, the Wabash—the gunboats to follow at intervals in due order. Thus the fighting portion of the fleet steamed slowly up the bay by the forts, receiving and returning the fire of the batteries on Bay Point as they passed up, and exchanging like compliments with the stronger fort on Hilton Head as they came down. Thus no vessel remained stationary under fire; so that the enemy were at no time enabled to gain, by experiment and observation, a perfect aim. The day was lovely; the spectacle magnificent; the



fight spirited, but most unequal. Despite the general presumption that batteries, well manned and served, are superior to ships when not iron-clad, the terrible rain of shot and shell upon the gunners in the Rebel forts soon proved beyond human endurance. . . . The battle . . . raged nearly five hours, with fearful carnage and devastation on the part of the Rebels, and very little on ours, when the overmatched Confederates, finding themselves slaughtered to no purpose, suddenly and unanimously took to flight. . . . The Rebel forts were fully manned by 1,700 South Carolinians, with a field battery of 500 more stationed not far distant. The negroes, save those who had been driven off by their masters, or shot while attempting to evade them, had stubbornly remained on the isles."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, ch. 36.—"The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into South Carolina. . . . Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston, or Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture. . . . The occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St. Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah. At a distance of about 600 feet from its borders, on an islet in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski. . . . A few days after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south," occupying the channel between the Tybee Island group and the Warsaw Islands, "and thus opening a passage for future operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by turning Fort Pulaski. . . . At the end of the year, Dupont's fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena, Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those bays."—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, bk. 4, ch. 3 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: C. B. Boynton, *Hist. of the Navy during the Rebellion*, v. 1, ch. 26.—D. Ammen, *The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast*, ch. 2.

A. D. 1861 (November).—The Trent affair.—Arrest of Mason and Slidell.—"On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the U. S. Steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H. B. M. mail packet boat Trent, having on board four rebel emissaries bound for England. Having boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto, with an armed guard, arrested the rebels Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis,

and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his captives to Boston, where they were consigned to Fort Warren, then a receptacle for political prisoners. When this transaction became known to the British government, immediate preparations were made for war. In the United States, the act was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief responsibility in the matter rested, saw, more clearly than others, that a breach of international law had been committed by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the rebel captives to the protection of the British flag."—G. E. Baker, *Biographical Memoir of William H. Seward* (v. 5 of *Seward's Works*, pp. 40–11).—In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War," Secretary Seward wrote: "November 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us. . . . January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same power in 1812." In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British Minister, Mr. Seward had written: "If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us. . . . By the adjustment of the present case upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly settled between them, which, heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two

countries from each other."—W. H. Seward, *To Lord Lyons, Dec. 26, 1861 (Works, v. 5, Diplomatic Hist. of the War, pp. 308-309).*

ALSO IN: M. Bernard, *Hist. Acc't of the Neutrality of Great Britain, ch. 9.*—D. M. Fairfax, *Capt. Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Stidell (Battles and Leaders, v. 2, pp. 135-142).*

**A. D. 1861-1862 (December — March : Virginia).—Protracted inaction of McClellan.—His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by the rebel evacuation of Centreville.**—"When Congress assembled . . . in the beginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report. The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. As month after month passed without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the people became more and more anxious for the announcement that the work of preparation had been completed and active operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of discipline by the last of September or the first of October. The men were ready and eager to commence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so. . . . Your committee endeavored to obtain as accurate information as possible in relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. . . . Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain what number of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, as-

suming that the works of the enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions at other points. . . . The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration of your committee. . . . As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that co-operation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. . . . The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge. . . . It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it might bring on a general engagement. . . . Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one result of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: . . . 'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 23d day of February next. Abraham Lin-



coln.' To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, (the Occoquan,) and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would be required to provide the necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed, while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the enemy) at Manassas.' . . . Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by General McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as your committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was composed of twelve generals. . . . To them was submitted the question whether they would indorse the line of operations which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the country to Richmond. The four generals who voted against the proposed movement were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard. General Keyes voted for it with the qualification that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac. . . . Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of the whole army in the direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it. . . . On the 13th of March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of the York and James rivers."—*Rep't of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 37th Cong., 3d sess., H. R. Rep., pt. 1, pp. 6-12.*—The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of Representatives Gooch, Covode,

Julian, and Odell, was appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory schoolboys. . . . It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments, but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. . . . General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. . . . December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. . . . McClellan reported to the Secretary of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of 240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men. . . . Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 5, ch. 9.*—McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in Nov., 1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent years proved that no large operations could be advantageously conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been followed up and a victory would have given us the barren possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General Scott as general in command of the armies."—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story, pp. 199-200.*

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations, ch. 3-4.*—A. S. Webb, *The Peninsula (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 3) ch. 2.*—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am., bk. 5, ch. 4 (v. 1).*—G. B. McClellan, *The Peninsular Campaign (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, v. 2, pp. 160-187).*—The same, *Complete Report.*

—J. G. Barnard, *The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents*.—J. C. Ropes, *Gen. McClellan's Plans* (*Mass. Military Hist. Soc. Papers*, v. 1).

**A. D. 1861-1862 (December—April: Virginia).**—Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.—**Battle of Kernstown.**—"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes." In November, Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. . . . In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men on the Peninsula. . . . Jackson's little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000 to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jackson concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government and General Johnston that it was decided to reinforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."

—J. D. Imboden, *Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah* (*Battles and Leaders*, v. 2, pp. 282-285).—"The losses at Kernstown were: Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing=590; Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."—N. Kimball, *Fighting Jackson at Kernstown* (*Battles and Leaders*, v. 2, p. 307, footnote).

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, ch. 3.

**A. D. 1861-1863.**—President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.—On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United

States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July, another order was issued in exactly the same language, except that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or in the vicinity of any military line . . . between the city of New York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously, had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the 24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States"; and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority of the President to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the 15th of September in that year another general proclamation was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval service by authority of the President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval service."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406.—"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. . . . The case of John Merryman . . . was the first to come up for judicial interpretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and appears to have



been suspected of being captain of a secession troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington, and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to notice it. . . . The writ of habeas corpus was . . . not suspended by Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words, Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and without authority from any one; for two years he made arrests without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased. . . . There are few things in American history more worthy of discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution. Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself. That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless, injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always their master's nature."—S. G. Fisher, *The Suspension of Habeas Corpus during the War of the Rebellion* (Pol. Sci. Quarterly, Sept., 1888).—The view which President Lincoln himself entertained, and under which he assumed and exercised authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, was submitted to Congress in his first Message, when it convened in special session, July 4, 1861. He said: "Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been per-

fectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion. . . . Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 59-60.—Congress gave tacit approval to this view of the President's powers by passing no act on the subject until nearly two years afterwards, as shown above.

**A. D. 1862 (January—February: Kentucky—Tennessee).—**The first breaking of the Confederate line.—Grant's capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.—"At the beginning of the new year the Union armies were over 660,000 strong, backed by a fleet of 212 vessels. McClellan lay quiet upon the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing, disciplining the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe Johnston, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. The Western generals were more active. Albert Sidney Johnston, perhaps the most promising Southern officer, was in command in the West, with headquarters at Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's front, having superseded Sherman, whose 'crazy' suggestion that 250,000 men would be required for operations on the Western field had lost him the confidence of his superiors. There was abundant method in his madness, as time all too fully showed. In [Eastern] Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey Marshall had been creating more or less political trouble, and General Garfield was sent against him with some 2,000 men. Marshall somewhat outnumbered Garfield; but in a vigorous January campaign [beginning at Paintsville, January 7, and] culminating at Prestonburg [January 10], Garfield quite dispersed his forces, and drove him into the moun-

tains. About the same time, Zollicoffer, with some 12,000 men, had retreated from his post in advance of Cumberland Gap, where he held the extreme right of the Southern line, to Mill Spring, in Central Kentucky. General George H. Thomas was charged with the duty of disposing of him. With about an equal force Thomas promptly moved upon his enemy, and in a sharp action at Mill Spring [January 19] utterly broke up his army. He thus early showed the rare vigor he afterwards so fully developed. Zollicoffer was killed. This first of our substantial western victories (called 'Fishing Creek' by the enemy) [and also called the battle of Logan Cross Roads by some Union writers] was a great encouragement to our arms. Crittenden, who succeeded to the command, withdrew his troops across the Cumberland, abandoning his artillery and trains. Eastern Kentucky was thus freed from the Confederates. Halleck's first task as commander of the Western armies was to penetrate the Confederate line of defense. This could be done by breaking its centre or by turning one of its flanks. The former appeared most feasible to Grant, and Commodore Foote, who commanded the naval forces. Under instructions from Halleck, seven of the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's 17,000 men in reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to attack Fort Henry and essay the value of gun-boats in amphibious warfare. Grant landed below the fort, and Foote then opened fire upon it. Tilghman, in command, foreseeing its capture, was shrewd enough to send off the bulk of his force to Fort Donelson. He himself made a mock defense with a handful of men, surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way. Without the twin citadel of Donelson [distant about eleven miles, southeastwardly, on the Cumberland River], however, Fort Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could advance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threatened its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first laurels as a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn fight, the surrender of this second fortress with its entire garrison. Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the place. He must here fight for the possession of Nashville. Fort Donelson was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Grant moved against it from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, 5,000 less than the enemy. The ground is difficult; the troops are green. But reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's assistance. The fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily there is not much ability in the defense. Floyd, the senior officer, determines to cut his way out. He falls heavily upon Grant's right, held by McClernand and backed by Wallace, thinking to thrust them aside from the river and to escape over the road so won. A stubborn resistance defeats this sortie, though but narrowly. A general assault is ordered, which effects a lodgment in the works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd, Buckner, and Pillow weaken the defense so as to operate a surrender. Our loss was 2,300. The Confederates captured were over 15,000 men. These successes broke through the centre of the Confederate line, established with so much pains, and compromised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to a new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowling Green on receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Henry, and was forced thereby to cede to Buell possession of Nashville, and practically of Kentucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi at Columbus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some forty miles below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon a very substantial gain."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 21-23.—J. M. Hoppin, *Life of Rear Admiral Foote*, ch. 16-18.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 26-28.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 7.—*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1.

A. D. 1862 (January—March: Missouri—Arkansas).—Expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri.—Battle of Pea Ridge.—"Late in December General Samuel R. Curtis took command of 12,000 National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price, who retreated before him to the northwestern corner of Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General McCulloch, and together they took up a position in the Boston Mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains, intrenched, and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between Price and McCulloch, General Earl Van Dorn, who ranked them both, was sent to take command of the Confederate force, arriving late in January. There is no authentic statement as to the size of his army. He himself declared that he had but 14,000 men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that number. Among them was a large body of Cherokee Indians, recruited for the Confederate service by Albert Pike, who thirty years before had won reputation as a poet. On March 5, 1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who knew of his coming and formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing southward. His divisions were commanded by Generals Franz Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than 10,000 men in line, with 48 guns. The Confederates, finding the position too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr's division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, and Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though reinforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch, was more successful; that General was killed and his troops were driven from the field. In the night Curtis reformed and strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and characteristic manoeuvres. To bring his division into its place on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it was firing rapidly its infantry supports were brought up to it by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again, till



the whole division had come into line, pressing back the enemy's right. Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis's whole line made a curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated artillery fire the Confederates were soon driven to the shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National loss in this action [called the battle of Elk Horn by the Confederates]—killed, wounded, and missing—was over 1,300, Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss is unknown. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the ground, any effective pursuit of Van Dorn's broken forces was impracticable."—R. Johnson, *Short Hist. of the War of Secession*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. Baxter, *Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove*.—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 3, pp. 56-71.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 8, pp. 189-330.

**A. D. 1862 (January—April: North Carolina).—Burnside's expedition to Roanoke and capture of Newbern and Beaufort.**—"Roanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand-bar that shuts off Upper North Carolina from the Atlantic Ocean, offers some of the most interesting souvenirs of early American history. . . . As stated by General Wise, to whom its defense was intrusted by the Confederate government, it was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two railroads. It guarded more than four fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure of it endangered the subsistence of the Confederate army there, threatened the navy yard, interrupted the communication between Norfolk and Richmond, and intervened between both and the South. . . . After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August, 1861, light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon commerce. . . . An expedition for operating on this part of the North Carolina coast was placed under command of General Burnside, who was ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fortress Monroe, capture Newbern, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort Macon. The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of them carrying heavy guns; 11,500 troops, conveyed in 47 transports; a fleet of small vessels for the transportation of sixty days' supplies. It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th, and arrived off Hatteras in two days, as a storm was coming on. The commander found with dismay that the draught of several of his ships was too great to permit them to enter. . . . Some dishonest ship-sellers in New York had, by misrepresentation, palmed off on the government unsuitable transport vessels, of which several were lost in that tempestuous sea. . . . It was only by the greatest exertion and perseverance, and not until a whole fortnight had elapsed, that the entrance to Pamlico Sound was completed. The villainy that led to this delay gave the Confederates ample time for preparation. Not until the end of another week (February 7th) had the reorganized expedition gained the entrance to Croatan Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy passes. The weather was beautiful by day; there was a bright moonshine at night. The gun-boats

found a Confederate fleet drawn up behind the obstructions, across the channel, near Pork Point. They opened fire on the fort at that point. It was returned both from the works and the shipping. Meantime troops were being landed at Ashby's, a small force, which was attempting to resist them, being driven off by the fire of the ships. The debarkation went on, though it was raining heavily and night had set in. It was continued until 10,000 men had been landed on the marsh. Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had been silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's Point. . . . When day broke, Burnside commenced forcing his way up the island. He moved in three columns, the central one, preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, the right and left through the woods. The battery that obstructed this road was soon carried, though not without resistance. The men had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that protected it. . . . Toward Nag's Head the Confederate force, expelled from the captured work, attempted to retreat. They were, however, overtaken, and the rest of the command on the north of the island, 2,500 strong, was compelled to surrender. The Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, whither it had fled, and there destroyed. A large part of the town was burned. A portion of the national fleet went into the harbor of Edenton and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan River, shared the same fate. Burnside next made an attack (March 14th) on Newbern, one of the most important sea-ports of North Carolina. As the troops advanced from the place of landing, the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and thereby cleared the way. A march of 18 miles in a rain-storm, and over execrable roads, did not damp the energy of the soldiers. . . . Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy guns, 3 batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores. Burnside's losses were 90 killed and 466 wounded. Preparations were next made for the reduction of Fort Macon, which commands the entrance of Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries; the former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, were compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing their attack, silenced the guns of the garrison, and, in the course of the afternoon, compelled the surrender of the fort. In connection with this expedition some operations of minor importance occurred. . . . The chief result, however, was the closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part, withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army of General Pope."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 59 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: D. Ammen, *The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast*, ch. 8-9.—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 1, ch. 3-5.—B. P. Poore, *Life of Burnside*, ch. 12-14.

**A. D. 1862 (February—April: Georgia—Florida).—Siege and capture of Fort Pulaski. —Temporary occupation of Florida. —Discouragement of Unionists.**—The blockade of Fort Pulaski may be dated from the 22d of February. Preparations were then made on Tybee

Island to bombard it. The most of the work had to be done in the night. The work was carried on under the supervision of General Gillmore, who was in chief command, and on the 9th of April eleven batteries, containing an aggregate of 36 guns, were in readiness to open fire. General David Hunter, who had just succeeded General Sherman in command of the Department, arrived at Tybee on the evening of the 8th. At sunrise, on the morning of the 10th, Hunter sent Lieutenant J. H. Wilson to the fort, with a summons to the commander of the garrison to surrender. The latter refused, saying: "I am here to defend this fort, not to surrender it." At a few minutes after eight o'clock the batteries opened fire, and at the end of thirty hours the garrison surrendered. In reporting the capture, General Hunter wrote: "At the end of eighteen hours' firing the fort was breached in the southeast angle, and at the moment of surrender, 2 p. m. on the 11th instant, we had commenced preparations for storming. The whole armament of the fort—47 guns, a great supply of fixed ammunition, 40,000 pounds of powder, and large quantities of commissary stores, have fallen into our hands; also 360 prisoners, of whom the officers will be sent North by the first opportunity that offers. The result of this bombardment must cause, I am convinced, a change in the construction of fortifications as radical as that foreshadowed in naval architecture by the conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac. No works of stone or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy caliber." General Benham, immediately commanding the operations, remarked in his report: "This siege is . . . the first trial, at least on our side of the Atlantic, of the modern heavy and rifled projectiles against forts erected and supposed to be sufficiently strong prior to these inventions, almost equaling, as it would appear, the revolution accomplished in naval warfare by the iron-clad vessels recently constructed." Captain (acting Brigadier-General) Q. A. Gillmore, the officer immediately in charge of the works on Tybee Island, has given, in a report made in 1865 to the Adjutant-General of the U. S. A., an account of the difficulties under which the batteries which performed the chief part in the siege were erected: "Tybee Island is mostly a mud marsh, like other marsh islands on this coast. Several ridges and hummocks of firm ground, however, exist upon it, and the shore of Tybee Roads, where the batteries were located, is partially skirted by low sand banks, formed by the gradual and protracted action of the wind and tides. The distance along this shore from the landing place to the advanced batteries is about 2½ miles. The last mile of this route, on which the seven most advanced batteries were placed, is low and marshy, lies in full view of Fort Pulaski, and is within effective range of its guns. The construction of a causeway resting on fascines and brush-wood over this swampy portion of the line; the erection of the several batteries, with the magazines, gun platforms, and splinter-proof shelters; the transportation of the heaviest ordnance in our service by the labor of men alone; the hauling of ordnance stores and engineer supplies, and the mounting of the guns and mortars on their carriages and beds had to be done almost exclusively at night, alike regardless of the inclemency of the weather and of

the miasma from the swamps. No one except an eye-witness can form any but a faint conception of the herculean labor by which mortars of 8½ tons' weight and columbiads but a trifle lighter were moved in the dead of night over a narrow causeway, bordered by swamps on either side, and liable at any moment to be overturned and buried in the mud beyond reach. The stratum of mud is about 12 feet deep, and on several occasions the heaviest pieces, particularly the mortars, became detached from the sling-carts, and were with great difficulty, by the use of planks and skids, kept from sinking to the bottom. Two hundred and fifty men were barely sufficient to move a single piece on sling-carts. The men were not allowed to speak above a whisper, and were guided by the notes of a whistle. The positions selected for the five most advanced batteries were artificially screened from view from the fort by a gradual and almost imperceptible change, made little by little every night, in the condition and appearance of the brush-wood and bushes in front of them. No sudden alteration of the outline of the landscape was permitted. After the concealment was once perfected to such a degree as to afford a good and safe parapet behind it less care was taken, and some of the work in the batteries requiring mechanical skill was done in the daytime, the fatigue parties going to their labor before break of day and returning in the evening after dark. . . . The three breaching batteries—Sigel, Scott, and McClellan—were established at a mean distance of 1,700 yards from the scarp walls of Fort Pulaski. The circumstance, altogether new in the annals of sieges, that a practicable breach, which compelled the surrender of the work, was made at that distance in a wall 7½ feet thick, standing obliquely to the line of fire and backed by heavy casemate piers and arches, cannot be ignored by a simple reference to the time-honored military maxims that 'Forts cannot sustain a vigorous land attack,' and that 'All masonry should be covered from land batteries.'—*Official Records, series 1, v. 6, pp. 134-135, 155, 161.*—"By this victory, won on the first anniversary of the fall of Fort Sumter [April 12], the port of Savannah was sealed against blockade-runners. The capture of Fort Jackson above, and of the city, would have been of little advantage to the Nationals then, for the forces necessary to hold them were needed in more important work farther down the coast. While Gillmore and Viele were besieging Fort Pulaski, Commodore Dupont and General Wright were making easy conquests on the coast of Florida." Fort Clinch, on Amelia Island, Fernandina, Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other places, were abandoned by the Rebels on the approach of the National forces. But these conquests proved rather unfortunate than otherwise. "At first, the hopes they inspired in the breasts of the Union people developed quite a widespread loyalty. A Union convention was called to assemble at Jacksonville on the 10th of April, to organize a loyal State Government, when, to the dismay of those engaged in the matter, General Wright prepared to withdraw his forces, two days before the time when the convention was to meet. . . . In consequence, . . . very little Union feeling was manifested in Florida during the remainder of the war."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War, v. 2, ch. 12.*



**A. D. 1862 (February—April : Tennessee).—The advance up River.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.**—"By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded all the armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his headquarters in St. Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio, Major-General Buell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Grant, at Forts Henry and Donelson; the Army of the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R. Curtis, in Southwest Missouri. He posted his chief of staff, General Cullum, at Cairo, and me [General Sherman] at Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important operations then in progress up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. . . . General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville, a city of so much importance to the South that it was at one time proposed as its capital. Both Generals Grant and Buell looked to its capture as an event of great importance. On the 21st General Grant sent General Smith with his division to Clarksville, 50 miles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on the 27th went himself to Nashville to meet and confer with General Buell, but returned to Donelson the next day." Orders sent by General Halleck to Grant did not reach the latter, and a supposed disobedience occurred which caused him to be hastily relieved from his command, which was transferred to General C. F. Smith, on the 4th of March. Halleck's purpose "was evidently to operate up the Tennessee River, to break up Bear Creek Bridge and the railroad communications between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, and no doubt he was provoked that Generals Grant and Smith had turned aside to Nashville. In the mean time several of the gunboats, under Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the Tennessee as far as Florence, and on their return had reported a strong Union feeling among the people along the river. On the 10th of March, having received the necessary orders from General Halleck, I embarked my division at Paducah. . . . I . . . steamed up the Tennessee River, following the two gunboats, and, in passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain Gwin that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place for the people about Corinth, distant 30 miles. I sent word back to General Smith that, if we were detained up the river, he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing. We went on up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw, both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small rebel force of infantry. We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of Yellow River, a few miles below," where the troops were landed and an attempt made to push out and destroy the Memphis and Charleston railroad; but heavy rains had so swollen all the streams that the expedition was foiled and returned. "Once more embarked, I concluded to drop down to Pittsburg Landing, and to make the attempt from there. During the night of the 14th, we dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where I found Hurlbut's division in boats. Leaving my command there, I steamed down to Savannah, and reported to General Smith in person, who saw in the flooded Tennessee the full truth of my

report; and he then instructed me to disembark my own division, and that of General Hurlbut, at Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad, contemplated by General Halleck's orders. . . . Within a few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my left, and afterward McClelland's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions, which formed a line to our rear. Lew Wallace's division remained on the north side of Snake Creek, on a road leading from Savannah or Crump's Landing to Purdy. General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and I was only responsible for my own division. I kept pickets well out on the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside and outside my lines. . . . We were all conscious that the enemy was collecting at Corinth, but in what force we could not know, nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th of March, General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up the Tennessee River, by reason of General Smith's extreme illness, and because he had explained to General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct after Donelson; and he too made his headquarters at Savannah, but frequently visited our camps. . . . From about the 1st of April we were conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolder and more saucy. . . . On Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there was a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode out along my lines, . . . and saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach. All my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was favorable to us. . . . In a few minutes the battle of 'Shiloh' began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. . . . Probably no single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging reports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army was taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in our tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant was drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were in a measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the steamboat-landing from the east, just before nightfall of the 6th, when there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that our army was all destroyed and beaten. Personally I saw General Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were desperately engaged. But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy, and then held our ground. This gave him great satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as well over on the left. . . . He came again just before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win. General

Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me. About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I was. . . . Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittenden's divisions of his army, containing 18,000 men, had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued that with these reinforcements we could sweep the field. Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster. . . . Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence. . . . Beauregard [who took the rebel command after General Albert Sidney Johnston fell in the first day's battle] afterward reported his entire loss as 10,699. Our aggregate loss, made up from official statements, shows 1,700 killed, 7,495 wounded, 3,022 prisoners; aggregate, 12,217, of which 2,167 were in Buell's army, leaving for that of Grant 10,050. This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done by each army. . . . The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of McClelland, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about 32,000 men. We had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions, 45,000 strong."—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, 4th ed., ch. 10 (v. 1); or 1st ed., ch. 9 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 23–25.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 30–35.—U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and others, *Shiloh (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, v. 1)*.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 10.

A. D. 1862 (March). — President Lincoln's proposal of Compensated Emancipation approved by Congress.—On the 6th of March President Lincoln addressed to Congress the following Special Message: "Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives: I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows: Resolved, That the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system. If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it.

The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave States north of such part will then say, 'The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is not that all the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say 'initiation' because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all. In the mere financial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census tables and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named State. Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them. In the annual message, last December, I thought fit to say, 'The Union must be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed.' I said this not hastily, but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency, toward ending the struggle, must and will come. The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the institution and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs? While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject. Abraham Lincoln, Washington, March 6, 1862."—*Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 129–130.—"Mr. Stevens, of Pa., having moved and carried a reference of this Message by the House to a Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, and Mr. R. Conkling, of N. Y., having moved the resolve above recommended, a debate sprung up thereon; which is notable only as developing the repugnance of



the Unionists of the Border Slave States, with that of the Democrats of all the States, to compensated or any other Emancipation. . . . It passed the House by 89 Yeas (Republicans, West Virginians, and a few others not strictly partisans) to 31 Nays." On the 2d of April, the resolution passed the Senate, by 32 Yeas to 10 Nays. "The President of course approved the measure; but no single Slave State ever claimed its benefits; and its only use inhered in its demonstration of the willingness of the Unionists to increase their already heavy burdens to pay for the slaves of the Border States—a willingness which the infatuation of the ruling class in those States rendered abortive."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 12.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 3, ch. 23.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 5, ch. 12.

**A. D. 1862 (March).—The Battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac.**—"In August 1861 the Northern States had determined to obtain ironclad steam vessels, and at the end of that month Ericsson offered to construct in a few months a vessel which would destroy the rebel squadron. A board of officers was appointed to consider plans proposed, and in September it recommended that a vessel on Ericsson's design should be built. She was commenced in October, launched on January 30th, 1862, and completed on February 15th, 1862. The design provided for a hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with a flat bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft. The sides, to a short distance below the water line, were protected with 4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck was built a circular turret, revolving on a central spindle, and protected with 8 in. of iron. Inside the turret were mounted two 11-in. smooth bore guns, pointing through port holes. They could thus fire in any direction without turning the vessel, an obvious advantage not only on the open sea but especially in narrow waters, for which she was more intended. Such was the famous 'Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to be also a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in England, suggesting to them doubts as to the propriety of their building four broadside ironclads at three and a half million dollars each."—S. Eardley-Wilmot, *The Development of Navies*, ch. 4.—"While the Secretary of the Navy was urging forward the construction of the first iron-clads, it was known that the rebel government was making great exertions in the same direction. Iron-clad vessels were under way at New Orleans, Charleston, and at some other points, while at Norfolk the Merrimack [the old frigate of that name, roofed slopingly with railroad iron,—see above: 1861 (APRIL) ACTIVITY OF REBELLION] was very near completion in the winter of 1861–62. The formidable character of this mailed frigate constrained the Government to make every effort to complete the Monitor [the first of the turreted iron-clads, invented by John C. Ericsson] in season to meet her whenever she should come out; and it is stated that information obtained by a rebel spy of the state of forwardness in which the Monitor was, induced the rebels to put a double force upon their frigate, so that she might be able to attack our fleet in Hampton Roads before the Monitor's arrival, and,

if possible, also to make a raid upon Washington or the Northern cities. This extra labor, it is said, gained the one day in which the Merrimack destroyed the Cumberland and Congress. . . . The Monitor, commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, reached the scene of late disaster to our cause, and of her coming triumph, on the 8th of March, at 9 o'clock P. M., and Lieutenant Worden reported for orders to Captain Marston, the commander of the Roanoke. The Minnesota, one of our noblest frigates, the Roanoke of the same class, but partially disabled, the frigate Congress, and the sloop Cumberland, had been stationed at the mouth of the James River to watch for, to engage, and, if possible, destroy, capture, or stop the expected rebel iron-clad frigate then ready for sea at Norfolk. These vessels carried very heavy batteries, and it was hoped that they would be able to cope with the Merrimack. How vain such an expectation was, her first day's operations fully and sadly demonstrated. It is probably no exaggeration to say that she would have destroyed easily, and without any material damage to herself, every wooden ship then in our Navy, had they been within her reach, and with none but themselves to oppose her."—C. B. Boynton, *Hist. of the Navy during the Rebellion*, ch. 21.—"Such was the state of affairs when the Monitor arrived at Hampton Roads, that the sturdy commanders trembled in face of the coming day, and all was silence and gloom. The sloop-of-war Cumberland, having a crew of 300 men, and mounting 24 guns, now lay on the bottom with only her top-gallant masts and pennant above the water, marking the spot where 117 mangled bodies lay buried beneath the waves. The Congress, a 50-gun frigate, had also met her destruction, and now lay on shore with the flames kindled by hot shot of the Merrimac sweeping out her hull. The Roanoke and Minnesota, steam frigates of 40 guns each, the pride of the navy and the most perfect of any men-of-war of the period, laid hard and fast on shore, with broken machinery and as powerless as if they had been unarmed. The capture or entire destruction of the Federal fleet at Hampton Roads and the escape of the Merrimac and the rebel cruisers seemed inevitable." Arriving in the evening of the 8th, the Monitor anchored near the frigate Minnesota at Newport News. "At half-past five in the morning all hands were called, and the ship was immediately cleared of her sea-rig and got ready for battle. . . . At half-past seven o'clock a long line of black smoke was seen, preceded by the steamers Jamestown, Patrick Henry and Teazer. It was the signal for battle. The crews of the different vessels stood by their guns, fuzes in hands. The Monitor steamed slowly from beneath the bows of the Minnesota, where she had been partly concealed, to meet the challenger in an open field. It was alike an astonishment to the rebels and our own people; neither had seen her when she arrived, and many were the conjectures of what it could be. Some said a huge water tank; others an infernal machine; none that she had guns, and not till they saw steam rise from her deck did they think she had power to move herself. . . . The Merrimac stopped her engines, as if to survey and wonder at the audacity of the nondescript. The Monitor was approaching on her starboard bow. Then, as if seized with impulsive rage, and as if a huge breath would waft

her enemy away, the Merrimac poured a broadside of solid shot at her. For an instant she was enveloped in smoke, and people who were looking on held their breath in doubt of seeing the Monitor again. It was a moment of great suspense. Then as a gentle breeze swept over the scene the Monitor appeared. At this instant the flash of her own guns was seen, and then their report, louder than any cannon that had ever been heard, thundered across the sea. It seemed to jar the very earth, and the iron scales of the invincible crumbled and cracked from their fastenings. One on board the Merrimac at this time has told me that, though at first entirely confident of victory, consternation took hold of them all. 'D—n it!' said one, 'the thing is full of guns!' The enthusiasm at this moment among the thousand of civilians and soldiers, who lined the shore to witness the fight, was beyond description and their own control. Such a spontaneous burst of cheers was never before heard. Men were frantic with joy. The Monitor continued her approach, reserving fire that every shot might take effect, until she came parallel with the Merrimac, but heading in the opposite direction. In this way they passed slowly within a few yards of each other, both delivering and receiving the other's fire. . . . Captain Worden headed again towards the Merrimac with renewed confidence and engaged her at close quarters. Again they joined in close combat, the Monitor lying bow on, at times touching, both delivering their fire as rapidly as possible. At the same time the marines on the Merrimac poured an incessant fire of musketry at the peek-holes about the pilot-house and turret. The speed of the two vessels was about equal, but the light draught of the Monitor gave her an advantage. The rebels finding that they could make nothing of the invulnerable cheese-box, as they called her, and foiled and maddened at the loss of their coveted prize, turned towards the Minnesota, determined, if possible, to destroy her. The Merrimac went head on and received a full broadside of the Minnesota. Fifty solid nine-inch shot struck square. Any wooden vessel that ever floated would have gone to pieces under such a fire. The Merrimac was unharmed. She returned the fire with her forward rifle guns. One shell passed through four rooms, tearing away partitions and setting the ship on fire. Another passed through the boiler of the steamer Dragon which lay alongside, blowing her up and killing and wounding 17 men. Before a third was fired the Monitor interposed, compelling the Merrimac to change her position. The two combatants then made a complete circle in their endeavors to get a favorable position, each seeking to discharge a broadside into some vital part. The Merrimac then turned sharp and made a plunge towards the Minnesota, but Worden was vigilant, and crossed the stern of the Merrimac, sending two solid shot into her. To get back again between her and the Minnesota, the Monitor had almost to cross her bow. The Merrimac steamed up quickly, and finding that the Monitor would be struck with her prow Worden sheered towards the enemy's stern, avoiding a direct blow, and, as they came into collision, each vessel delivered a broadside into the other. At this point a shell from the Merrimac struck the pilot-house exactly over the peek-hole through which Captain Worden was looking. The shell exploding, filled his

face and eyes with powder and fragments of iron, utterly blinding and for a time rendering him unconscious. Lieutenant Greene, who had been in charge of the turret division, immediately left the guns and spent full thirty minutes nursing the wounded commander, during which time the gunners shot the guns, and, as the Merrimac was turning away, discharged them at close range into her stern, a blow that made her whole frame shudder and seemed at once to be fatal. There was no officer to direct the movements of the vessel except the pilot Howard. As the two combatants parted from the struggle they were headed in opposite directions, both away from their goal. Presuming that the fight would be continued, Pilot Howard ran the vessel a short distance down the channel and turning brought her again close to the protection of the Minnesota, when Lieutenant Greene stepped into the pilot-house and assumed command. It was then observed that the Merrimac had taken the channel and was heading towards Norfolk. She was soon joined by her consorts, and taken up to their refuge under the batteries of Craney Island, the Merrimac apparently sagging down astern. Thus ended the greatest naval battle of the world. . . . The only perceptible danger to those on board the Monitor, after the first round from the Merrimac, was to those in the turret, who were in great danger from the flying of bolt-heads driven with great force across the turret, and from the concussion, which would for a time paralyze a man if he should in any way be in contact with the turret when struck by a shot."—F. B. Butts, *The Monitor and the Merrimac (Soldiers' and Sailors' Hist. Soc. of E. I., Fourth series, No. 6)*.—"The engagement in Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862, between the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, or the Merrimac, as she is known at the North, and the United States wooden fleet, and that on the 9th, between the Virginia and the Monitor, was, in its results, in some respects the most momentous naval conflict ever witnessed. No battle was ever more widely discussed or produced a greater sensation. It revolutionized the navies of the world. . . . Rams and iron-clads were in future to decide all naval warfare. In this battle old things passed away, and the experience of a thousand years of battle and breeze was forgotten. The naval supremacy of England vanished in the smoke of this fight, only to reappear some years later more commanding than ever. The effect of the news was best described by the London 'Times,' which said: 'Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149 first-class war-ships: we have now two, these two being the Warrior and her sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in the English navy apart from these two that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor.' The Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct the navy. . . . The same results were produced in France, which had but one sea-going iron-clad, La Gloire, and this one, like the Warrior, was only protected amidships. . . . And so with all the maritime powers. In this race the United States took the lead, and at the close of the war led all the others in the numbers and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. . . . Our loss [that is, the Confederate loss on the Virginia, or Merrimac, in the first day's battle, with the wooden ships] in killed and wounded was 21. The armor was hardly damaged, though at one



time our ship was the focus on which were directed at least 100 heavy guns afloat and ashore. But nothing outside escaped. . . . We slept at our guns, dreaming of other victories in the morning. But at daybreak we discovered, lying between us and the Minnesota, a strange-looking craft, which we knew at once to be Ericsson's Monitor, which had long been expected in Hampton Roads, and of which, from different sources, we had a good idea. She could not possibly have made her appearance at a more inopportune time for us, changing our plans, which were to destroy the Minnesota, and then the remainder of the fleet below Fortress Monroe. She appeared but a pigmy compared with the lofty frigate which she guarded. But in her size was one great element of her success. . . . After an early breakfast, we got under way and steamed out toward the enemy, opening fire from our bow pivot, and closing in to deliver our starboard broadside at short range, which was returned promptly from her 11-inch guns. Both vessels then turned and passed again still closer. The Monitor was firing every seven or eight minutes, and nearly every shot struck. Our ship was working worse and worse, and after the loss of the smoke-stack, Mr. Ramsay, chief engineer, reported that the draught was so poor that it was with great difficulty he could keep up steam. Once or twice the ship was on the bottom. Drawing 22 feet of water, we were confined to a narrow channel, while the Monitor, with only 12 feet immersion, could take any position, and always have us in range of her guns. . . . Several times the Monitor ceased firing, and we were in hopes she was disabled, but the revolution again of her turret and the heavy blows of her 11-inch shot on our sides soon undeceived us. . . . Lieutenant Jones now determined to run her down or board her. For nearly an hour we manoeuvred for a position. . . . The ship was as unwieldy as Noah's Ark. . . . And so, for six or more hours, the struggle was kept up. At length, the Monitor withdrew over the middle ground where we could not follow. . . . The battle was a drawn one, so far as the two vessels engaged were concerned. But in its general results the advantage was with the Monitor." —J. T. Wood, *The First Fight of Iron Clads (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, v. 1, pp. 692-711)*.

ALSO IN: J. Ericsson, *The Building of the Monitor (Battles and Leaders, v. 1, pp. 730-744)*. — W. C. Church, *Life of John Ericsson, ch. 15-18 (v. 1)*. — Gideon Welles, *The First Iron-Clad Monitor (Annals of the War by leading Participants), p. 17*. — C. B. Boynton, *Hist. of the Navy during the Rebellion, ch. 21*. — On the evacuation of Norfolk by the Confederates, in May, 1862, the Merrimac was destroyed. The following December the Monitor went down in a storm at sea, while on her way to Charleston, and only a few of her crew were saved.

A. D. 1862 (March).—Amendment of the Military Code.—Officers forbidden to surrender fugitive Slaves.—“As the formal orders of the government regarding the treatment of slaves who sought refuge near the armies were not always executed, Congress determined to give them a legal sanction; and on the 25th of February and the 13th of March both the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced a new article in the military code, prohibiting officers, at the risk of dismissal, from interfering to re-

store fugitive slaves to their masters. Notwithstanding the powers with which the government was thus armed, great difficulty was experienced in applying this law in those regiments whose commanders openly professed their sympathies in favor of slavery.”—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am., v. 2, p. 733*.

A. D. 1862 (March—April: On the Mississippi).—New Madrid and Island No. 10.—On the surrender of Fort Donelson to General Grant, Columbus, on the Mississippi, was hastily abandoned by the rebels, who fell back to Island Number Ten, thirty miles below, where strong works had been erected. These it was hoped would command the passage of the river. “Following the course of the Mississippi, this island is about ten miles above New Madrid, Missouri, which is 79 miles below Cairo; but on account of a long bend in the river . . . the island is really further south than New Madrid. New Madrid is at the most northerly part of the bend, and its guns were so placed as to be able to fire at vessels coming either way. Besides Fort Thompson, named after Jeff Thompson, it was defended by several batteries and by six gunboats, mounting heavy guns, which had come up the river from New Orleans and were under the command of Commodore Hollins. . . . As the land around New Madrid is very flat, these gunboats could fire upon troops approaching the place by land. On the same day when the flag of the Union was hoisted over the deserted works of the Confederates at Columbus [March 4], a Union army under General John Pope, who had been commanding in eastern Missouri, appeared before New Madrid. Seeing that he could do but little with his field artillery, he sent to Cairo for heavy guns; and while waiting for these he built a battery at Point Pleasant, about ten miles below New Madrid, so as to blockade the river at that place and prevent supplies from being sent up to the town. Meanwhile the Confederates strengthened their works and reinforced the garrison with men from Island Number Ten, while their fleet of gunboats was increased to nine. Four heavy guns were sent from Bird's Point to General Pope by the Cairo and Fulton Railway, which brought them within 20 miles of where they were wanted. . . . On the night of March 13 a thousand spades were at work within half a mile of Fort Thompson, and at daylight the guns were in position ready for action. Pope opened a cannonade at once on the gunboats and on Fort Thompson, both of which replied vigorously. The fight raged all day long; several of the gunboats were disabled and the Union army was gradually shutting in the Confederates on the land side, when their commander, General McCown, seeing the danger of capture, left the place in the night, during a heavy thunder-storm, and removed all his troops to Island Number Ten. . . . General Pope lost 51 men in killed and wounded during the day's bombardment; the loss of the Confederates is not known, but is thought to have been more than a hundred. About the time of the capture of New Madrid, Commodore Foote sailed from Cairo with a fleet of seven iron-clad gunboats, one wooden gunboat, and ten mortar-boats, for the purpose of aiding General Pope in the attack on Island Number Ten. He came in sight of the island on Saturday, March 15, and on the next morning opened the bombardment with the

rified guns of the Benton, his flag-ship. The mortar-boats, moored at convenient places along the shore, soon took part in the firing, and rained bombs into the Confederate works. . . . Commodore Foote kept up the bombardment for many days, without doing much damage to the Confederate works. But while he kept the enemy busy, General Pope had been engaged in digging a canal across the swampy peninsula formed by the bend of the river, so that vessels could go through to New Madrid without having to pass Island Number Ten. . . . A large number of men were employed, and after nineteen days of hard labor a channel deep enough for light-draught vessels was cut through. In the night of April 1 a few men from the gunboats, aided by some of Pope's soldiers, landed on the Kentucky shore, opposite Island Number Ten, took one of the batteries by surprise and spiked its six guns. . . . A few nights afterward the Carondelet [gunboat] ran safely by all the batteries at midnight, during a heavy thunderstorm. . . . Two nights afterward the Pitts-burgh, another gunboat, performed the same feat, with the same good fortune; and a few days later the Confederates were astonished to see a fleet of transports laden with troops and several floating batteries join the gunboats at New Madrid. . . . The gunboats soon silenced the one-gun batteries on the opposite side of the river below New Madrid," and the Confederates, attempting to escape, were intercepted and captured (April 7), both those on the mainland and those on the Island.—J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young Folks' Hist. of the War for the Union*, ch. 16.—Said General Pope in his report: "It is almost impossible to give a correct account of the immense quantity of artillery, ammunition, and supplies of every description which fell into our hands. Three generals, 273 field and company officers, 6,700 privates, 123 pieces of heavy artillery, 35 pieces of field artillery (all of the very best character and latest patterns), 7,000 stand of small-arms, tents for 12,000 men, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons and harness, &c., are among the spoils. Very few, if any, of the enemy escaped, and only by wading and swimming through the swamps. The conduct of the troops was splendid throughout, as the results of this operation and its whole progress very plainly indicate. We have crossed this great river, the banks of which were lined with batteries and defended by 7,000 men. We have pursued and captured the whole force of the enemy and all his supplies and material of war, and have again recrossed and reoccupied the camps at New Madrid, without losing a man or meeting with any accident. Such results bespeak efficiency, good conduct, high discipline, and soldierly deportment of the best character far more conclusively than they can be exhibited in pitched battle or the storming of fortified places."—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 8.—"In the years since 1862, Island No. 10 . . . has disappeared. The river, constantly wearing at its upper end, has little by little swept away the whole. . . . On the other shore a new No. 10 has risen."—A. T. Mahan, *The Navy in the Civil War: The Gulf and Inland Waters*, ch. 2.

A. D. 1862 (March—May: Virginia).—The Peninsular Campaign.—McClellan before

Yorktown.—"When Manassas had been abandoned by the enemy [see above: A. D. 1861-1862 (December—March: Virginia)] and he had withdrawn behind the Rapidan, the Urbana movement lost much of its promise, as the enemy was now in position to reach Richmond before we could do so. The alternative remained of making Fort Monroe and its vicinity the base of operations. The plan first adopted was to commence the movement with the First Corps as a unit, to land north of Gloucester and move thence on West Point; or, should circumstances render it advisable, to land a little below Yorktown to turn the defenses between that place and Fort Monroe. The Navy Department were confident that we could rely upon their vessels to neutralize the Merrimac and aid materially in reducing the batteries on the York River. . . . As transports arrived very slowly, especially those for horses, and the great impatience of the Government grew apace, it became necessary to embark divisions as fast as vessels arrived, and I decided to land them at Fort Monroe, holding the First Corps to the last, still intending to move it in mass to turn Gloucester. On the 17th of March the leading division embarked at Alexandria. The campaign was undertaken with the intention of taking some 145,000 troops, to be increased by a division of 10,000 drawn from the troops in the vicinity of Fort Monroe. . . . On the 12th of March I learned that there had appeared in the daily papers the order relieving me from the general command of all the armies and confining my authority to the Department of the Potomac. I had received no previous intimation of the intention of the Government in this respect. . . . On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found five divisions of infantry, Sykes's brigade of regulars, two regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve artillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part of a fourth had arrived, but were still on ship-board; comparatively few wagons had come. . . . The best information obtainable represented the Confederate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least 15,000, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and it was clear that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly near Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to the Peninsula. . . . On my arrival at Fort Monroe I learned, in an interview with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the James as a line of supply, and that he could furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction of the batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. He could only aid in the final attack after our land batteries had essentially silenced their fire. I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced by the conditions of the problem just stated. Information was received that Yorktown was already being reinforced from Norfolk, and it was apprehended that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the same course. I therefore determined to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point—near the Halfway House—between Yorktown and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the arrival of reinforcements. The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April, and was arranged to turn successively the intrench-



ments on the two roads; the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps was engaged with the enemy's outposts in front of Yorktown and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth Corps came upon Lee's Mills and found it covered by the unfordable line of the Warwick, and reported the position so strong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault. Thus all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intended movement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the 4th, informing me that the First Corps [McDowell's] was withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed to recede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000 . . . diminished my paper force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of the campaign had been founded, . . . which reduced the numbers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 68,000. The order withdrawing the First Corps also broke up the Department of the Potomac, forming out of it the Department of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, and the Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, the latter including Washington. . . . In our front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by land or water. . . . Whatever may have been said afterward, no one at the time—so far as my knowledge extended—thought an assault practicable without certain preliminary siege operations. . . . We were thus obliged to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy's artillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May; . . . but during the night of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions. . . . Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin's division of McDowell's corps had joined me by water, in consequence of my urgent calls for reinforcements . . . [and, May 7th] disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover the landing of reinforcements."—G. B. McClellan, *The Peninsular Campaign (Battles and Leaders, v. 2, pp. 160-187)*.—General Joseph E. Johnston, who assumed command of the Confederate forces on the Peninsula, April 17, says in his "Narrative": "I went to the Peninsula as soon as possible, reaching General Magruder's headquarters early in the morning. . . . That officer had estimated the importance of at least delaying the invaders until an army capable of coping with them could be formed; and opposed them with about a tenth of their number, on a line of which Yorktown, intrenched, made the left flank. This boldness imposed upon the Federal general, and made him halt to besiege instead of assailing the Confederate position. This resolute and judicious course on the part of General Magruder was of incalculable value. It saved Richmond, and gave the Confederate Government time to swell that officer's handful to an army. . . . The arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions increased the army on the Peninsula to about 53,000 men, including 3,000 sick. . . . I could see no other object in holding the position than that of delaying the enemy's progress, to gain time."—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations, ch. 4-5*.

ALSO IN: J. C. Palfrey, *The Siege of Yorktown (Mass. Military Hist. Soc. Papers, v. 1, pp. 31-92)*.—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am., v. 2, bk. 1, ch. 1*.

A. D. 1862 (March—June).—Appointment of Military Governors in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Louisiana.—"By the Union victories in the spring of 1862 very considerable areas of territory in States in rebellion came under the control and occupation of the Union armies. . . . The sudden change from Confederate to Federal authority involved everywhere either a serious derangement or total cessation of the ordinary administration of local civil law, and the displacement from the occupied territory of State governments and State officials who claimed to be exercising functions under ordinances of secession, and yielding obedience to the self-styled Confederate States. A similar displacement had occurred in Virginia and in Missouri during the year 1861, but in those States prompt remedies were available," by means of popular movements, through delegated conventions, which abrogated the rebellious and reinstated loyal State governments in operation. The courses pursued in Virginia and Missouri were not practicable, however, in other cases, and "a substitute was found in the appointment of military governors to represent and exert such State and local authority as the anomalous conditions made practicable, and as the supreme military necessities might allow. The first of these appointments occurred in Tennessee. Nashville, the capital, having been evacuated about February 23, 1862, President Lincoln nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Andrew Johnson (March 4, 1862) as military governor with the rank of brigadier-general. . . . Conforming to this precedent, Mr. Lincoln, through the Secretary of War, appointed Edward Stanley military governor of North Carolina, 'with authority to exercise and perform, within the limits of that State, all and singular the powers, duties, and functions pertaining to the office of military governor (including the power to establish all necessary offices and tribunals, and suspend the writ of habeas corpus) during the pleasure of the President, or until the loyal inhabitants of that State shall organize a civil government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States.' . . . In like manner, soon after news was received of the successes in the Gulf, Colonel G. F. Shepley (of the 12th Maine Infantry) of Butler's army was appointed military governor of Louisiana, this selection being made because General Butler had already designated him to act as mayor of the city of New Orleans, and it was thought best to combine both functions in the same individual."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 6, ch. 16*.

A. D. 1862 (April: On the Mississippi).—Farragut's passage of the lower forts and capture of New Orleans.—"About the close of the gloomy and disastrous year 1861, the Government of the United States determined to regain control of the Mississippi. . . . After long consideration, Farragut was chosen as the naval officer to command in the Gulf. The story of his southern birth, and of his steadfast loyalty to his flag, is too well known to be here repeated. His formal orders put him in command of the 'Western Gulf Blockading Squadron,' and these were issued in January, 1862. But confidential

instructions were also given him, by which he was especially charged with the 'reduction of the defences guarding the approaches to New Orleans, and the taking possession of that city.' He was to be assisted by a mortar-fleet of schooners, under commander D. D. Porter. . . . On February 2d, 1862, Farragut sailed for the Gulf, in the sloop-of-war Hartford, which was so long to bear his flag, successfully, through manifold dangers. The Hartford was a wooden screw-steamer, full ship-rigged, and of 1,900 tons burthen. She was of comparatively light draught, and, therefore, well suited to the service she was called upon to perform. . . . The Hartford arrived at her rendezvous, Ship Island, 100 miles north-northeast of the mouths of the Mississippi, on February 20th. A military force, to co-operate with Farragut's fleet, was sent out, under General B. F. Butler, and arrived at Ship Island on March 25th."—E. Shippen, *Naval Battles*, ch. 41.—"At a point about 30 miles above the head of the passes, where the river makes its last great bend—the lowest favorable locality for defense before reaching the Gulf—the United States Government had erected two forts, St. Philip on the left or north bank, and Jackson a little farther down stream on the right. . . . The Confederate Government had early taken possession of these forts, and put them in complete order. When Farragut's fleet appeared before them, Fort Jackson, with its water battery, mounted 75 guns, and St. Philip about 40. . . . Just above the forts lay a rebel fleet of 15 vessels, under Commodore J. K. Mitchell, including the iron-clad ram Manassas and an immense floating battery covered with railroad iron, called the Louisiana. Just below Fort Jackson the Confederates had obstructed the river with a heavy chain, brought from Pensacola. . . . The task that lay before Farragut was, to break through the obstructions, pass between the forts, conquer the rebel fleet, and then steam up to New Orleans, lay the city under his guns, and demand its surrender. For its accomplishment he had 6 sloops-of-war, 16 gunboats, 21 schooners, each carrying a 13-inch mortar, and 5 other vessels. The fleet carried over 200 guns. . . . The schooners sailed up partly, or were towed by steamers, and on the morning of the 18th of April they had all reached their positions, ready to open fire. . . . For six days and nights the mortars kept up an unremitting fire, mainly on Fort Jackson, throwing nearly 6,000 shells. The Confederates acknowledged a loss of 14 killed and 39 wounded by the bombardment. . . . Farragut's patience was sorely tried by this delay. He had never had much faith in the mortars, and now it was evident, as he had anticipated, that almost the only practical effect of the bombardment was, to give the enemy long warning of the attack by the ships. . . . Having decided to run by the forts, he confided to his trusted Fleet Captain, Bell, the dangerous mission of proceeding with the gunboats Pinola and Itasca to make a passage for his fleet through the chain obstructions. . . . A sufficient opening was made for the fleet to pass through, in spite of the heavy fire to which the party were subjected. . . . Farragut had made up his mind to run by the forts at the close of the fifth day's bombardment; but the necessity of repairing damages to two of his vessels delayed him twenty-four hours longer. He had intended to

lead the column in his flag-ship Hartford; but in the final disposition he gave that post to Captain Theodorus Bailey, at his own earnest request, who hoisted his red flag on the gunboat Cayuga. . . . The attempt to pass was to be made in the night, April 23–24; and, as the moon would rise about half past 3 o'clock in the morning, the fleet were warned to expect the signal for sailing at about 2 o'clock. . . . Lieutenant Commanding Caldwell sent up in the Itasca to examine the obstructions and find whether the passage was still open. At 11 o'clock he gave the signal that it was, and about the same time the enemy opened fire on him, sent down burning rafts, and lighted the immense piles of wood which they had prepared on the shore near the ends of the chain. . . . It was half past 3, the hour of moonrise, before all was ready. In the light of the blazing rafts and bonfires, moon or no moon made little difference now. . . . Captain Bailey led off with his division of 8 vessels, whose objective was Fort St. Philip, and all of them passed through the opening in the cable. Both forts opened fire upon his flag-ship, the Cayuga, soon after she had passed the hulks. Five minutes later she was pouring grape and canister into St. Philip, and in ten minutes more she had passed beyond range of that work, to find herself surrounded by 11 rebel gun-boats. Three of them attempted to board her at once. An 11-inch shot was sent through one of them at the close range of 30 yards, and she immediately ran aground and burned up. The Parrott gun on the fore-castle drove off another; and Bailey was preparing to close with the third, when the Oneida and Varuna, which had run in close to St. Philip, thus avoiding the elevated guns of the fort, while they swept its bastions with grape and scrapnel, came up to the assistance of the Cayuga. The Oneida ran under full steam into one of the rebel ships, cut her nearly in two, and left her to float down stream a helpless wreck. She fired right and left into the others, and then went to the assistance of the Varuna, which was ashore on the left bank, hard pressed by the Governor Moore and another, said to be the Manassas. The Varuna was rammed by them both, and sank at the end of 15 minutes; but in that time it is claimed that she put three 8-inch shells into the Governor Moore, and so crippled her with solid shot that she surrendered to the Oneida, and drove five 8-inch shells into another, which sent her ashore. Still another of her shells exploded the boiler of a rebel steamer. The Pensacola steamed steadily but slowly by, firing with great deliberation and regularity. . . . The Mississippi was fought regularly in line, like the Pensacola, but escaped with light losses. She encountered the ram Manassas, which gave her a severe cut on the port quarter below the water-line, and disabled her machinery. But she riddled the ram with shot, boarded her, and set her on fire, so that she drifted below the forts and blew up. The Katahdin ran close to the forts, steamed by rapidly, and got near the head of the line, where she put a few good shots into the iron-clad Louisiana. The Kineo ran by close under St. Philip, and then assisted the Mississippi in handling the ram Manassas; but she was afterward attacked by three rebel gun-boats at once, and, her pivot-gun carriage becoming injured, she withdrew and continued on up stream. The Wissahickon ran ashore before



she reached the forts, got off, passed them, and above ran ashore again. Most of these operations were carried on in the darkness occasioned by the thick smoke, lighted, however, by the lurid flashes of more than 200 guns. The Hartford, bearing Flag-Officer Farragut, led the second division of the fleet. . . . In attempting to avoid a fire-raft, she grounded on a shoal near St. Philip. At the same time the ram Manassas pushed a raft upon her port quarter, and in an instant she was on fire. A part of the crew went to 'fire quarters' and soon subdued the flames, while the working of her guns was steadily continued, and she was then backed off into deep water. This movement turned the ship's head down stream, and it was with some difficulty that she was turned around against the current; but this was finally accomplished, and she continued to steam up the river, firing into several of the enemy's vessels as she passed. Among these was a steamer full of men, apparently a boarding-party. She was making straight for the Hartford when Captain Broome's gun, manned by marines, planted a shell in her, which exploded, and she disappeared. . . . The Brooklyn got out of her course, ran over one of the hulks, and became entangled in the raft, where she suffered a raking fire from Fort Jackson, and a pretty severe one from St. Philip. Scarcely was she disentangled and on her way up stream when she was buttied by the Manassas, which, however, had not headway enough to damage her much, and slid off in the darkness. Then she was attacked by a large rebel steamer, but gave her the port broadside at fifty yards and set her on fire. Groping along through a black cloud of smoke from a fire-raft, she came close abreast of St. Philip, into which she poured such tremendous broadsides that by the flashes the gunners were seen running to shelter, and for the time the fort was silenced. The Brooklyn then passed on, and engaged several of the enemy's gunboats at short range. One of these, the Warrior, came under the port broadside, when eleven 5-second shells were instantly planted in her, all of which exploded, setting her on fire, and she was run ashore. The Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a half, and her losses were almost as severe as those of the Pensacola. The Richmond, a slow ship, brought up the rear of the second division, steaming steadily and working her guns with great regularity. . . . The Sciota, carrying Fleet-Captain Bell, led the third division. She steamed by the forts, firing as she passed, and above them burned two steamboats. . . . The Iroquois passed within 50 yards of Fort Jackson without injury, but was subjected to a terrible raking cross-fire from St. Philip, and was also raked by the McCrea. . . . Her losses were heavy. The Pinola passed up in line, firing her 11-inch pivot-gun and Parrott rifles at the flashes of Fort Jackson's guns, which at first were all that could be seen; then she emerged from the cloud of smoke, stood over toward St. Philip, and in the light of the blazing rafts received the discharges of its 40 guns. She was the last vessel that passed the forts, and got up in time to put one or two shells into the gunboats of the enemy. The Kennebec got out of her course, became entangled in the rafts, and did not get free till it was broad daylight and too late to attempt a passage. The Itasca, arriving in front of Fort Jackson, received a shot in

her boiler, which made it impossible for her to proceed, and was turned down stream. The Winona got astray among the hulks, and lost so much time that when she came within range of Fort Jackson it was daylight, and the fleet had passed on. The first three or four shots from the fort swept away the entire crew of her rifled gun, save one man. Still she kept on, until the lower battery of St. Philip opened on her at less than point-blank range; this was too much for her, and she prudently headed down stream and ran out of the fire. Thus was accomplished a feat in naval warfare which had no precedent, and which is still without a parallel except the one furnished by Farragut himself, two years later, at Mobile. Starting with 17 wooden vessels, he had passed with all but 3 of them, against the swift current of a river but half a mile wide, between two powerful earthworks which had long been prepared for him, his course impeded by blazing rafts, and immediately thereafter had met the enemy's fleet of 15 vessels, two of them iron-clad, and either captured or destroyed every one of them. And all this with a loss of but one ship from his own squadron."—L. Farragut, *Life of Farragut*, ch. 18-19.—Commander Porter, who kept up the mortar fire while Farragut was forcing his way, says of the battle: "No grander or more beautiful sight could have been realized than the scenes of that night. From silence, disturbed now and then only by the slow fire of the mortars,—the phantom-like movements of the vessels giving no sound—an increased roar of heavy guns began, while the mortars burst forth into rapid bombardment, as the fleet drew near the enemy's works. Vessel after vessel added her guns to those already at work, until the very earth seemed to shake from their reverberations. A burning raft added its lurid glare to the scene, and the fiery tracks of the mortar-shells, as they passed through the darkness aloft, and sometimes burst in mid-air, gave the impression that heaven itself had joined in the general strife. The succeeding silence was almost as sudden. From the weighing of the anchors, one hour and ten minutes saw the vessels by the forts, and Farragut on his way to New Orleans, the prize stacked upon the fierce game of war just ended."—D. D. Porter, *Naval Hist. of the Civil War*, p. 185."—"General Lovell, who was in command at New Orleans, had come down the river in a steamboat to observe the operations and was very nearly captured; he hastened back to the city to withdraw his forces. When the news spread through the streets that the Federal fleet had passed the forts and had destroyed the Confederate flotilla, a strange scene followed; a scene impossible, perhaps, in any other American city under parallel circumstances. The brave, active, fighting men of New Orleans were far away in the armies of the South; but they had left behind a slinking swarm of human vermin. . . . These, when they saw a hopeless panic seize the good people of the city, poured forth from their dens and began an indiscriminate pillaging of houses, shops, and storage-sheds. Thus while the better class of citizens were frantically setting fire to the cotton (some 12,000 bales) the cut-throats and ruffians, the hardened women and even the lawless children, were raging from place to place, back and forth, here and there, wildly plundering and aimlessly destroying. . . . All the pub-

He materials, consisting of army supplies, were heaped up in the middle of the streets and burned. General Lovell withdrew his soldiers on the evening of the 24th, leaving the city at the mercy of the Federal fleet, which at 1 o'clock on the following day steamed up the river and anchored in the middle of the stream not far from the foot of Canal Street. . . . The mob which lately had been committing such foul deeds, now swayed back and forth in the streets, hooting, yelling and cursing, urging the people to resist the landing of the Federals. Commodore Farragut demanded the formal surrender of the city, but the mayor was powerless. He could not surrender the city while the people were controlled by an unreasoning mob. Consequently, on the 29th, a detachment under command of Fleet Captain H. H. Bell was sent ashore to take possession of the public buildings."—M. Thompson, *The Story of Louisiana*, ch. 11.—"The success was almost beyond price to the Union Government from its moral importance on both sides of the Atlantic. As to the material advantage won, it may be best judged of by the statement of the well-known Confederate writer, Mr. Pollard: . . . 'It was a heavy blow to the Confederacy. It annihilated us in Louisiana; separated us from Texas and Arkansas; diminished our resources and supplies by the loss of one of the greatest grain and cattle countries within the limits of the Confederacy; gave to the enemy the Mississippi River, with all its means of navigation, for a base of operations.' . . . In calling the capture of New Orleans 'one of the most remarkable triumphs in the whole history of naval operations' he [Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy] is fully justified."—C. C. Chesney, *Essays in Military Bio.*, pp. 167-168.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, J. R. Bartlett and others, *The Capture of N. Orleans (Battles and Leaders*, v. 2).—A. T. Mahan, *Admiral Farragut*, ch. 7.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 6.

**A. D. 1862 (April—May: Alabama).—General Mitchell's expedition.**—The division of Buell's army commanded by General Ormsby M. Mitchell left Nashville with the other divisions of that army, late in March, but took the road to Murfreesboro, while the latter marched toward Pittsburg Landing. On the 4th of April General Mitchell marched from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville, 26 miles distant. "On the 7th he advanced to Fayetteville, 27 miles farther, and the next forenoon, the 8th, 15 miles beyond, he crossed the State line of Alabama. Continuing his march six miles farther, and being within ten miles of Huntsville, Ala., he halted for the artillery and infantry to come up." At an early hour the next morning he entered the town, taking it completely by surprise. "Before the close of the day 100 miles of the Memphis and Charleston railroad were in his possession, stretching in one direction as far as Stevenson, and in the other as far as Decatur. . . . From Decatur he pushed on at once to Tuscumbia. Thus, without the loss of a single life, Gen. Mitchell placed his army midway between Corinth and Chattanooga, prevented the destruction of a fine bridge at Decatur, opened communication with Gen. Buell, and also the navigation of the Tennessee. The occupation of Huntsville also cut off all communication between the east and west by the Memphis and Charleston

railroad. . . . This extension of Gen. Mitchell's lines to hold the railroad rendered his situation precarious. Soon the enemy began to gather in force and threaten him. . . . He was raised to the rank of a major-general, and ordered to report directly to the [war] department, and his force was constituted an independent corps. But he got no reinforcements. He was left in such a condition that he at first hardly had anything to report but that he had been gradually driven from those positions, the gaining of which had made him a major-general." Subsequently he advanced upon Chattanooga; but that important position was not secured. A little later General Mitchell was transferred to Port Royal, South Carolina.—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval Hist. of the Rebellion*, ch. 15.—It was in connection with General Mitchell's expedition that the thrilling episode of the railroad raid in Georgia occurred, narratives of which have been published by one of the participants, Rev. William Pittenger, first under the title of "Capturing a Locomotive," and afterwards with the title "Daring and Suffering," and also as "The Great Locomotive Chase." Volume Two of "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" also contains the story, entitled "The Locomotive Chase in Georgia," preceded by General Buell's critical account of Mitchell's entire operations.

**A. D. 1862 (April—May: Tennessee—Mississippi).—The bloodless and bootless conquest of Corinth.**—"General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and immediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of Island Number Ten in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburg landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: the Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre, and left wing. . . . I [General Grant] was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. . . . Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on Corinth. . . . Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburg landing and about 19 miles away as the bird would fly, but probably 22 by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four miles south of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, and at the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga Railroad with the Mobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile. . . . Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. We ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay, on the concentration of troops at Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact, the arrival of Pope should not have been awaited. There was no time from the battle of Shiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. . . . On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh upon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the close.



The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, 'not to bring on an engagement.' . . . For myself, I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. My position was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the siege to be relieved. . . . On the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command was then on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days, and that if allowed he could go into Corinth with his brigade. . . . Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the 26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. Corinth had already been evacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession without opposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. The Confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train, to create the impression among the Yankees that reinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or wounded man left by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had been blown up—not removed—but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. . . . General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole National army to do it. . . . They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. . . . These fortifications were never used. . . . After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. But the work of depletion commenced."—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 26 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: M. F. Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 2)*, ch. 8. —A. Roman, *Military operations of Gen. Beauregard*, ch. 24 (v. 1).—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 10.

A. D. 1862 (April–June).—Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia and in the Territories.—On the 16th of December, 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced in the Senate of the United States a bill for the immediate emancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia; "for the payment to their loyal owners of an average sum of \$300; for the appointment of a commission to assess the sum to be paid; and the appropriation of \$1,000,000. This bill was reported back on the 13th of February, 1862, with amendments. On the 24th he

introduced a bill which, he said, was supplementary to that already before the Senate, to repeal the act extending the laws of Maryland over the District, and to annul all those statutes which gave the cities of Washington and Georgetown authority to pass ordinances discriminating against persons on account of color. On the 12th of March it came up for debate in committee of the whole. The debate on these resolutions, the bill, and other cognate measures exhibit elements of interest hardly found in any other session of the American Congress on record. It was emphatically a new departure. . . . No important change was made, and on the 3d of April, 1862, the bill introduced by Mr. Wilson more than three months before was passed by a vote of 29 to 14. The bill was taken up in the House the next week, and gave rise to a brief but brilliant debate. . . . The bill . . . passed the House by a vote of 92 to 38, and received the approval of the President on the 16th day of April, 1862. The President, in his message accompanying his approval of the bill, had stated some objections to it. These objections were that certain classes, such as married women, minors, and persons absent from the District, were not sufficiently protected and provided for; and he suggested that these defects should be remedied by additional legislation"—which was done. "On the 24th of March, 1862, Mr. Arnold, of Illinois, introduced a bill into the House of Representatives to render freedom national and slavery sectional. It was referred to the Committee on Territories, was reported on the 1st of May, with an amendment, and made the order of the day for the 8th. It provided that freedom should be the fundamental law of the land, and that slavery should no longer exist in all places under the direct and exclusive control of the Federal government. It prohibited slavery in all Territories, then or thereafter existing; in all places purchased by the government, with the consent of the legislatures of the several States, for forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; in all vessels on the high seas, and on all national highways, beyond the territory and jurisdiction of the several States. . . . The difficulties, . . . real or seeming, constitutional or other, were too great to secure the united action of the friends of the underlying principle of the bill as reported by the committee. Mr. Lovejoy, therefore, moved a substitute restricting its action entirely to the Territories. The substitute was accepted, and the bill as thus amended was carried by a vote of 85 to 50. The preamble was so amended as to read, 'An act to secure freedom to all persons within the Territories of the United States.' In the Senate, on the 15th of May, Mr. Browning, reported the bill from the Committee on Territories with an amendment that, from and after the passage of the act, there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any existing Territory, or in any Territory thereafter formed or acquired. It was, substantially, the application of the principle of the ordinance of 1787 to all the territory then possessed or thereafter to be acquired. On the 9th of June the Senate proceeded to its consideration, adopted the amendment, and passed the bill by a vote of 28 to 10. The House agreed to the Senate amendment, and the bill thus amended was passed on the 17th, and approved by the President on the 19th of

June."—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 3, ch. 21 and 24.

ALSO IN: M. Tremain, *Slavery in the Dist. of Columbia* (Univ. of Nebraska: Seminary Papers No. 2).

**A. D. 1862 (May).—Passage of the Homestead Act.**—"The homestead bill, or the granting of free homes from and on the public domain, became a national question in 1852. The Free Soil Democracy, at Pittsburg, Pa., August 11, 1852, in National Convention, nominated John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, and George W. Julian, of Indiana, for President and Vice-President, and adopted the following as the 12th plank or resolution in their platform: 'That the public lands of the United States belong to the people, and should not be sold to individuals, nor granted to corporations, but should be held as a sacred trust for the benefit of the people, and should be granted in limited quantities, free of cost, to landless settlers.' Thereafter it became a national question until its passage in 1862, and was in the platforms of political parties. It was petitioned for and against. Public sentiment was aroused. It was a serious innovation and would cause an almost entire change in the settlement laws. Instead of the public lands being sold for cash, for profit, or being taken, first, under the pre-emption system, which eventuated in cash purchases, they were to be given to actual settlers who would occupy, improve, and cultivate them for a term of years, and then receive a patent free of acreage charges, with fees paid by the homesteader sufficient to cover cost of survey and transfer of title. . . . The rich and fertile lands of the Mississippi Valley were fast filling up with settlers. Agricultural lands in the Middle States, which, after the year 1824, were bought for \$1.25 per acre, now sold at from \$50 to \$80 per acre. Former purchasers of these Government lands in the Middle, Western, and Southern States, were selling their early purchases for this great advance, and moving west, to Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri, and there again taking cheap Government lands under the pre-emption laws. The western emigration caused a rush—a migration of neighborhoods in many localities of the older Western States. Following the sun, their pillar of fire, these State founders moved westward, a resistless army of agents of American civilization, and there was a demand for homes on the public lands, and a strong pressure for the enactment of a law which should confine locators to small tracts, and require actual occupation, improvement, and cultivation. A fierce political battle now ensued, beginning in 1854, and continuing until 1862, the year of the passage of the law. The demand of the settlers was incessant and constant." Mr. Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, made himself the special champion of the measure in Congress. On the 1st of February, 1859, a bill embodying its principles was carried in the House, but was not permitted to reach a vote in the Senate. The slaveholding interest was almost solidly against it. In March, 1860, a similar bill was again passed by the House. The Senate substituted a bill granting homesteads to actual settlers at twenty-five cents per acre, instead of free of cost. After protracted conferences, the House was forced to accept the Senate bill, with slight amendments. But if the enemies of the measure had so nearly lost their

control of Congress, they still owned the President—Buchanan—and he killed it by a veto. Then came the rebellion and civil war, absorbing all minor questions, and nearly two years went by before the law which opened the public lands freely to all actual settlers was adopted. It became a law by the signature of President Lincoln on the 20th of May, 1862. The following are the essential provisions of the Act: "That any person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who shall have filed his declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws of the United States, and who has never borne arms against the United States Government or given aid and comfort to its enemies, shall, from and after the first January, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, be entitled to enter one quarter-section or a less quantity of unappropriated public lands, upon which said person may have filed a pre-emption claim, or which may, at the time the application is made, be subject to pre-emption at one dollar and twenty-five cents, or less, per acre; or eighty acres or less of such unappropriated lands, at two dollars and fifty cents per acre, to be located in a body, in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the public lands, and after the same shall have been surveyed: Provided, That any person owning or residing on land may, under the provisions of this act, enter other land lying contiguous to his or her said land, which shall not, with the land so already owned and occupied, exceed in the aggregate one hundred and sixty acres. . . . That the person applying for the benefit of this act shall, upon application to the register of the land office in which he or she is about to make such entry, make affidavit before the said register or receiver that he or she is the head of a family, or is twenty-one or more years of age, or shall have performed service in the Army or Navy of the United States, and that he has never borne arms against the Government of the United States or given aid and comfort to its enemies, and that such application is made for his or her exclusive use and benefit, and that said entry is made for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not, either directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of any other person or persons whomsoever; and upon filing the said affidavit with the said register or receiver, and on payment of ten dollars, he or she shall thereupon be permitted to enter the quantity of land specified: Provided, however, That no certificate shall be given or patent issued therefor until the expiration of five years from the date of such entry; and if, at the expiration of such time, or at any time within two years thereafter, the person making such entry—or if he be dead, his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs or devisee; or in case of a widow making such entry, her heirs or devisee, in case of her death—shall prove by two credible witnesses that he, or she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the affidavit aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated, and that he has borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States; then, in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time a citizen of the United States, shall be entitled to a patent, as in other



cases provided for by law: And provided, further, That in case of the death of both father and mother, leaving an infant child or children under twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall inure to the benefit of said infant child or children; and the executor, administrator, or guardian may, at any time within two years after the death of the surviving parent, and in accordance with the laws of the State in which such children for the time being have their domicile, sell said land for the benefit of said infants, but for no other purpose; and the purchaser shall acquire the absolute title by the purchase, and be entitled to a patent from the United States, on payment of the office fees and sum of money herein specified. . . . That if, at any time after the filing of the affidavit, . . . and before the expiration of the five years aforesaid, it shall be proven, after due notice to the settler, to the satisfaction of the register of the land office, that the person having filed such affidavit shall have actually changed his or her residence, or abandoned the said land for more than six months at any time, then and in that event the land so entered shall revert to the Government.' . . . This original homestead act has been amended several times. . . . The principal amendments were in the nature of extension of its privileges, and the limit of 80 acres of land of the double minimum class, \$2.50 per acre, within certain road limits, has since been done away with by acts of March 3, 1879, July 1, 1879, and June 15, 1880; there now being but one class of agricultural lands, so far as regards the minimum quantity in homestead entries. The act of June 8, 1872, was known as the soldiers' and sailors' homestead act. It gave honorably discharged soldiers and sailors from the Army and Navy of the United States lands under the homestead act in any locality, and deducted from the five years' residence which was required to make title their term of service in the Army and Navy during the war of the Rebellion. One year's residence and cultivation, however, were necessary. . . . The soldiers' additional homestead provision was to give those soldiers who had had the benefit of the homestead act, to the extent of a quantity under 160 acres, an additional amount, so as to make their allowance 160 acres."—T. Donaldson, *The Public Domain*, ch. 27.

**A. D. 1862 (May).—General Hunter's Emancipation Order, rescinded by President Lincoln.**—Major General David Hunter, having lately succeeded to the command at Hilton Head, South Carolina, issued, on the 9th of May, 1862, a General Order (No. 11), declaring martial law in Georgia, Florida and South Carolina, and adding: "Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible; the persons in these States . . . heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free." This order was rescinded by President Lincoln in a Proclamation, dated May 19, in which he used the following language: "Whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free; and whether at any time, or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government, to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in

the field."—E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 250-251.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 5.

**A. D. 1862 (May: South Carolina).—Employment of the freed Negroes as armed soldiers.**—The negroes within the Union lines in South Carolina, at Hilton Head and elsewhere, were placed under the charge, at first, of agents appointed by the Treasury Department; but disagreements arose between these agents and the military authorities, and the former were recalled. "These several agents had been replaced by a superior officer of the staff, General Saxton, who was himself placed under the orders of General Hunter with the rank of a military commander. By this action the government at Washington sustained Hunter in his conflict with the agents of the Treasury Department—a conflict originating in very serious causes, for it affected the question of slavery in its most vital points. . . . Mr. Cameron [Secretary of the Treasury] had authorized General Sherman to organize the negroes into squads and companies. The latter had at first only been employed in manual labor, such as the construction of forts, roads and wharves; but Hunter, on taking Sherman's place, saw that he could give a much wider interpretation to the Secretary's instructions. He substituted muskets for the pick-axes used by the detachments of negro laborers organized by his predecessor; and, instead of making them dig the earth, he had them taught military exercises. Nor did he stop here; but wishing to increase the number of these new soldiers, he gathered all the adult negroes residing on the adjoining islands at Hilton Head on the 12th of May, in order to induce them to enter the military service. . . . The civil agents complained bitterly of the trouble this measure had created among the people entrusted to their charge, and thence sprung the quarrel which Mr. Lincoln cut short by deciding in favor of Hunter. The protection granted to fugitive slaves was the first logical consequence of the war, their enrolment in the Federal armies was the second. As untimely and impolitic as was the proclamation by which Hunter had taken upon himself to free the slaves outside of his jurisdiction, the creation of the first negro regiment was an act skilfully conceived. It was essentially a military act; it raised and ennobled the freedman by entrusting him with arms; its legality was unquestionable from the moment that the President approved of it, for there was no law to prevent him from enlisting colored volunteers. In short, it showed to the Confederates that the Washington government was determined not to allow itself to be any longer paralyzed by the vain hope of reconciliation. . . . But notwithstanding the success of this first experiment, considerable time elapsed before the Federal government concluded to follow Hunter in this direction."—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 2, bk. 7, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: G. W. Williams, *Hist. of Negro troops in the War of the Rebellion*, ch. 5.

**A. D. 1862 (May: Virginia).—The Peninsular Campaign: The Battle of Williamsburg and the slow advance to the Chickahominy.**—On the evacuation of the rebel works at Yorktown, "our columns followed on in pursuit, McClellan remaining in Yorktown, busy with

questions of transportation. The enemy under Longstreet had awaited our approach at Williamsburg. Hooker first attacked, having been brought to a stand by a work known as Fort Magruder, and kept up a heavy pounding all the forenoon [May 5]. Kearny came to his rescue when Hooker's men were all but spent. Hancock moved around the enemy's left, seized some abandoned redoubts, and made a brilliant diversion. But there was no coöperation in our attack; no one on the field was in supreme command, and the day was fruitlessly spent in partial blows. The enemy retreated at night. Our loss was 2,200; theirs in all probability less."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of our Civil War*, ch. 11.—"Gen. Johnston says ['Narrative,' p. 124]: 'We fought for no other purpose than to hold the ground long enough to enable our baggage-trains to get out of the way of the troops. This object was accomplished without difficulty. There was no time during the day when the slightest uncertainty appeared.' He also says that Longstreet's and Hill's divisions slept on the field; that what deserves to be called fighting ceased two hours before dark, yet the Confederates held the field until the next morning, when they resumed their march. . . . There may be a little rose-color about these statements, but the substantial facts seem to be accurately stated. . . . Gen. McClellan made no pursuit after Williamsburg, for reasons which he who will may find stated in his Report; and we may pass on with the single additional remark that the battle of Williamsburg was unnecessary, for the position might have been turned by a movement by our right. This was actually accomplished by Hancock, after Hooker had met with all his heavy loss; and it might as well have been done before as after. . . . The three weeks which followed the battle of Williamsburg were so devoid of incident that it seems to be sufficient to say that the Confederates moved up the Peninsula in two columns. The right column, composed of the divisions of Smith and Magruder, followed the road by New Kent Court House, and in three marches reached the Baltimore Cross Roads, 19 miles from Barhamsville. The left column, composed of the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, reached in the same number of marches the Long Bridges. The army remained five days in this position, facing to the east. . . . The iron-clad Virginia [better known as the Merrimac] was destroyed on, or just before, the 14th of May. This event opened the James River to our navy; and, to be ready to meet an advance up that river as well as from the direction of West Point, the Confederate forces were ordered to cross the Chickahominy on the 15th May. On the 17th their army encamped about three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of redoubts constructed in 1861. . . . During this period the weather was generally fine, cool and breezy, but gradually tending towards heat. . . . McClellan sent out cavalry reconnaissances from Williamsburg on the 5th and 7th May. . . . The advance of the main body began on the 8th; and on the 10th headquarters were at Roper's Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, with all the troops which had arrived by land, except Hooker's, in the vicinity of that place. . . . By the 15th, headquarters, and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith, reached Cumberland

on the Pamunkey. . . . On the 19th of May, headquarters and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's Station on the railroad, five miles from White House. On the 20th, Casey's division forded the Chickahominy, where Bottom's Bridge had been, and occupied the opposite heights. Bottom's Bridge was immediately rebuilt. . . . On the 22d, headquarters moved to Cold Harbor. On the 24th, we carried the village of Mechanicsville, but the enemy destroyed the bridge on which the Mechanicsville Turnpike crossed the river. On the same day our left advance secured a position at Seven Pines, the point of junction of the Nine-Mile Road with the Williamsburg road, which last road crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. . . . It is difficult to account for, or justify, the slowness of McClellan's march. The distance from Williamsburg to the middle of a line drawn from Bottom's Bridge to Cold Harbor, measuring by the road, is about 40 miles. That from West Point to the same point, measuring in the same way, is considerably less. One might almost say that, in the three weeks which McClellan took to accomplish this distance, he might have marched his army all the way in order of battle, bridging streams, felling trees, making roads, and supplying his army as he advanced. 'I had hoped,' he says, 'by rapid movements to drive before me, or capture, the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond, before he should be materially re-enforced.' What was there to hinder his making the attempt? Instead of that he followed him at the average rate of rather less than two miles a day."—F. W. Palfrey, *After the fall of Yorktown* (Mass. Military Hist. Soc. Papers, v. 1, pp. 95–114).

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, ch. 5.—*Report of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War*, 38th Cong. 2d sess., v. 1.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 11, pt. 1.

A. D. 1862 (May: Virginia).—**Evacuation of Norfolk by the Rebels.**—**Destruction of the Merrimac.**—"The movement of our grand army up the Peninsula, in connection with Burnside's successes and captures in North Carolina, had rendered the possession of Norfolk by the Rebels no longer tenable. . . . Gen. Wool, commanding at Fortress Monroe, having organized an expedition designed to reduce that important city, led it thither on the 10th; finding the bridge over Tanner's Creek on fire, but no enemy to dispute possession of Norfolk, which was quietly surrendered by its Mayor. The Navy Yard and Portsmouth were in like manner repossessed; the Rebels, ere they left, destroying every thing that would burn, partially blowing up the Dry Dock, and completely destroying their famous iron-clad known to us as the Merrimac. They left about 200 cannon. . . . Two unfinished iron-clads were among the vessels fired by the Rebels ere they left."—H. Greeley, *The Am. Conflict*, v. 2, p. 127.

A. D. 1862 (May: Virginia).—**The Peninsular Campaign: Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines.**—"On the 25th of May Gen. McClellan issued a general order, which was read throughout the camps, directing the troops, as they advanced beyond the Chickahominy, to be prepared for battle at a moment's notice, and to be entirely unencumbered, with the exception of ambulances; to carry three days rations in their haver-



sacks, leaving their knapsacks with their wagons, which were on the eastern side of the river, carefully parked. . . . The divisions from the corps of Gens. Heintzelman and Keyes were among the first to cross the Chickahominy. They took a position on the right bank somewhat advanced therefrom. The right wing rested near New Bridge, the centre at Seven Pines, and the left flank on the White Oak Swamp. Gen. Sumner's corps remained on the east side of the river. On the 30th the Confederate Gen. Johnston made arrangements for an attack upon the Federal army, for the purpose of cutting off, if possible, the corps of Gens. Heintzelman and Keyes before they could be joined by Gen. Sumner. He selected the divisions of Gens. Longstreet, Huger, G. W. Smith, D. H. Hill, and Whiting. His plan was that Gens. Hill and Longstreet should advance by the road to Williamsburg and make the attack in front, and that Gen. Huger should move on the road to Charles City and attack in flank the troops assailed by Gens. Hill and Longstreet. Gen. Smith was ordered to the junction of the New Bridge Road and the Nine Mile Road, and to be in readiness to fall on the right flank of Gen. Keyes and to cover the left of Gen. Longstreet. The forces of Gens. Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in position early on the morning of Saturday, May 31, and waited until afternoon for Gen. Huger to get into position. Prince de Joinville, who was a competent spectator, thus describes [*'Campagne de l'Armée du Potomac, Mars-Juillet, 1862'*] the scenes which followed this attack: 'At the moment it was thus attacked the Federal army occupied a position having the form of a V. The base of the V is at Bottom's Bridge, where the railroad crosses the Chickahominy. The left arm stretches toward Richmond, with this railroad and the road from that city to Williamsburg. There stood the left wing, composed of four divisions echeloned, one behind the other, between Fair Oaks and Savage stations, and encamped in the woods on both sides of the road. The other arm of the V, the right, follows the left bank of the river; that is the right wing. There are these five divisions and the reserve. Should one desire to communicate from one extremity to the other of those two wings, going by Bottom's Bridge, the way is very long, not less than 12 or 15 miles. In an air line the distance, on the contrary, is very trifling, but between the two arms of the V flows the Chickahominy. It was to connect both arms, in the space between them, that the construction of 3 or 4 bridges had been undertaken, only one of which was serviceable on the 31st of May. It had been built by Gen. Sumner, nearly half way between Bottom's Bridge and the most advanced point of the Federal lines. It saved the army that day from a disaster.' The other bridges were not ready. They were structures of logs, and time was required to build them. The approaches were always bad, and the tedious labor of corduroying long distances was necessary. 'It was against the left wing of the army that every effort of the enemy was directed. That wing had its outposts at Fair Oaks station, on the York river railroad, and at a place called Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg road. There the Federals had thrown up a redoubt in a clearing, where a few houses were to be seen, and constructed abatis, to increase the field for sharpshooting of

the troops posted there. The rest of the country was completely covered with woods. The previous day there had been a frightful storm, with torrents of rain, and the roads were frightful. All at once, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the weather being dark and gloomy, a very spirited fusillade is heard. The pickets and sentries are violently driven in; the woods which surround Fair Oaks and Seven Pines are filled with clouds of the enemy's sharpshooters. The troops rush to arms and fight in desperation; but their adversaries' forces constantly increase, and their losses do not stop them. The redoubt of the Seven Pines is surrounded, and its defenders die bravely. . . . Meanwhile Heintzelman rushes to the rescue with his two divisions. As at Williamsburg, Kearney arrives in good time to reestablish the fight. Berry's brigade, of this division, composed of Michigan regiments and an Irish battalion, advances firm as a wall into the midst of the disordered mass which wanders over the battle field, and does more by its example than the most powerful reinforcements. About a mile of ground has been lost, 15 pieces of cannon, the camp of the division of the advance guard, that of Gen. Casey; but now we hold our own. A sort of line of battle is formed across the woods, perpendicularly to the road and the railroad, and there the repeated assaults of the enemy's masses are resisted. The left cannot be turned, where is the White Oak Swamp, an impassable morass; but the right may be surrounded. At this very moment, in fact, a strong column of Confederates has been directed against that side. If it succeeds in interposing between Bottom's Bridge and the Federal troops, which hold beyond Savage's Station, the entire left wing is lost. It will have no retreat, and is doomed to yield to numbers; but precisely at this moment—that is to say, at 6 o'clock in the evening—new actors appear on the scene. Gen. Sumner, who has succeeded in passing the Chickahominy, with Sedgwick's division, over the bridge constructed by his troops, and who, like a brave soldier, has marched straight through the woods to the sound of the cannon, arrived suddenly on the left flank of the column with which the enemy is endeavoring to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes. He plants in the clearing a battery which he has succeeded in bringing with him. . . . In vain Johnston sends against this battery his best troops, those of South Carolina—the Hampton Legion among others. In vain he rushes on it himself; nothing can shake the Federals, who, at nightfall, valiantly led by Gen. Sumner in person, throw themselves upon the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and drive him furiously, with frightful slaughter and fear, back as far as Fair Oaks Station. Night put an end to the combat. On both sides nothing was known of the result of the battle but what each one had seen with his own eyes. . . . Evidently Johnston had flattered himself, in throwing all his forces on the four divisions of the left wing, that he could annihilate them before any aid could come to them from the main body of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. For the moment he had recoiled before the energetic resistance of those four divisions, and also before the furious and unforeseen attack of Sumner's troops. No doubt he had counted on the terrible storm of the previous day to have swelled the Chickahominy

so as to render the establishment of a bridge impossible, or to sweep away in its overflowing waters those already established; but the capricious river baffled his plans, as it did some hours later those of his adversaries. The effect of the deluge was not immediate; the rise in the water delayed its appearance 24 hours. Was this unhoped-for delay turned to account with all desirable activity on the part of the Federals? That is a question which will remain always in dispute. . . . It was not until 7 o'clock in the evening that the idea of securing all the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross at daybreak to the right bank of the Chickahominy, was entertained. It was now too late. Four hours had been lost, and the opportunity—that moment so fleeting, in war as in other circumstances—had gone. The rise, on which Johnston had vainly counted, and which had not hindered Sumner from crossing, came on during the night. The river rose suddenly from two feet, and continued to swell with rapidity, carrying away the new bridges, tearing up and sweeping off the trees which formed the plank-ing of Sumner's bridges, and covering the entire valley with its overflowing waters. Nothing could cross. At the earliest dawn of day the combat was resumed with great fury on the left bank. The enemy came on in a body, but without order or method, and rushed upon the Federals, who, knowing that they were inferior in numbers and without hope of being supported, did not attempt to do more than resist and hold their ground. They fought with fierce determination on both sides, without any noise, without any cries, and whenever they were too hardly pressed they made a charge with the bayonet. . . . Toward midday the fire gradually diminished, then ceased. The enemy retreated; but the Federals were not in a position to pursue them. No one then knew what a loss the Southerners had just suffered in the person of their commander, Gen. Johnston, who was severely wounded. It was to his absence that was owing, in a great measure, the unskilful attacks against the Federal army in the morning. . . . Who can say what would have been the result if at this moment the 35,000 fresh troops left on the other side of the Chickahominy had appeared on the flank of this disordered mass after having successfully crossed the bridges?"

—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval Hist. of the Rebellion*, ch. 19 (quoting and translating from Prince de Joinville's "*Campagne de l'Armée du Potomac*").—"After this battle of Seven Pines—or Fair Oaks, as the Northern people prefer to call it—General McClellan made no step forward, but employed his troops industriously in intrenching themselves."—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, p. 142.

ALSO IN: G. W. Smith, *Two days of Battle at Seven Pines (Battles and Leaders, v. 2, pp. 220-263)*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 11, pt. 1*.—W. Allan, *The Army of Northern Va. in 1862, ch. 7-8*.

**A. D. 1862 (May—June: Virginia).—Stonewall Jackson's second campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.—Winchester.—Cross Keys.—Port Republic.**—"At the time the Army of the Potomac was toiling painfully up the Peninsula towards Richmond, the remaining forces in Northern Virginia presented the extraordinary spectacle of three distinct armies, planted on three separate lines of operations, under three

independent commanders. The highland region of West Virginia had been formed into the 'Mountain Department' under command of General Fremont; the Valley of the Shenandoah constituted the 'Department of the Shenandoah' under General Banks; and the region covered by the direct lines of approach to Washington had been erected into the 'Department of the Rapahannock,' and assigned to General McDowell. . . . The Administration, growing more easy touching the safety of the capital, determined, in response to General McClellan's oft-repeated appeals for re-enforcements, to send forward McDowell's corps,—not, indeed, as he desired, to re-enforce him by water, but to advance overland to attack Richmond in co-operation with the Army of the Potomac. . . . After numerous delays, the time of advance of this column was at length fixed for the 26th of May, a date closely coincident with the arrival of the Army of the Potomac on the Chickahominy. The head of McDowell's column had already been pushed eight miles south of Fredericksburg; and McClellan, to clear all opposition from his path, sent forward Porter's corps to Hanover Junction, where he had a sharp encounter with a force of the enemy under General Branch, whom he repulsed with a loss of 200 killed and 700 prisoners, and established the right of the Army of the Potomac within fifteen miles, or one march, of McDowell's van. McDowell was eager to advance, and McClellan was equally anxious for his arrival, when there happened an event which frustrated this plan and all the hopes that had been based thereon. This event was the irruption of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. The keen-eyed soldier at the head of the main Confederate army, discerning the intended junction between McDowell and McClellan, quickly seized his opportunity, and intrusted the execution of a bold 'coup' to that vigorous lieutenant who had already made the Valley ring with his exploits." Jackson, who had been resting for a time in a position between the south fork of the Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap, was joined, on the 30th of April, by Ewell's division from Gordonsville, and by other re-enforcements, which "raised his force to about 15,000 men. Banks' force, reduced by the detachment of Shields' division, sent to General McDowell, to about 5,000 men, was posted at Harrisonburg. Fremont was at Franklin, across the mountains; but one of his brigades, under Milroy, had burst beyond the limits of the Mountain Department, and seemed to be moving to make a junction with Banks, with the design, as Jackson thought, of advancing on Staunton. Jackson determined to attack these forces in detail. Accordingly, he posted Ewell so as to hold Banks in check, whilst he himself moved to Staunton. From here he threw forward five brigades, under General Edward Johnson (May 7), to attack Milroy. The latter retreated to his mountain fastness, and took position at a point named McDowell, where, re-enforced by the brigade of Schenck, he engaged Johnson, but was forced to retire on Fremont's main body at Franklin. Having thus thrown off Milroy eccentrically from communication with Banks, Jackson returned (May 14) to destroy the force under that officer." Banks retreated down the Valley, followed by Jackson, who diverged a little to capture a garrison of 700 men at Front Royal. On the 24th, Banks



made a stand on the heights of Winchester and gave fight, "till, being assailed on both flanks, he retired hastily to the north bank of the Potomac (May 25), making a march of 53 miles in 48 hours. Jackson continued the pursuit as far as Hallsboro, within two miles of Harper's Ferry, where he remained till the 30th, when, finding heavy forces converging on his rear, he began a retrograde movement up the Valley. The tidings of Jackson's apparition at Winchester on the 24th, and his subsequent advance to Harper's Ferry, fell like a thunderbolt on the war-council at Washington. The order for McDowell's advance from Fredericksburg, to unite with McClellan, was instantly countermanded; and he was directed to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah Valley, by the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. . . . In vain he pointed out that it was impossible for him either to succor Banks or co-operate with Fremont; . . . that it would take him a week or ten days to reach the Valley, and that by this time the occasion for his services would have passed by. In vain General McClellan urged the real motive of the raid—to prevent re-enforcements from reaching him." McDowell moved from the east and Fremont from the west, converging on Strasburg. "The two columns moved rapidly; they had almost effected a junction on the 31st; but that very day Jackson, falling back from Harper's Ferry, slipped between the two, and made good his retreat up the Valley. . . . The pursuers did their best: they pushed on, Fremont following in the path of Jackson up the Valley of the Shenandoah; while McDowell sent forward Shields' division by the lateral Luray Valley, with a view to head him off when he should attempt to break through the gaps of the Blue Ridge." On the 8th of June Ewell's division of Jackson's army "repulsed Fremont, while Jackson held Shields in check. Early next morning, drawing in Ewell and concentrating his forces, Jackson threw himself across the river, burned the bridge to prevent Fremont from following; fell upon Shields' advance, consisting of two brigades under General Tyler, and repulsed him, capturing his artillery. The former of these affairs figures in history as the battle of Cross Keys, and the latter as the battle of Port Republic. In this exciting month's campaign, Jackson made great captures of stores and prisoners; but this was not its chief result. Without gaining a single tactical victory he had yet achieved a great strategic victory; for by skilfully manœuvring 15,000 men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of 60,000. It is perhaps not too much to say that he saved Richmond."—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 122–128.

ALSO IN: J. D. Imboden, *Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah (Battles and Leaders, v. 2, pp. 282–301)*.—J. E. Cooke, *Stonewall Jackson: a Military Biography*, pt. 2, ch. 8–17.

A. D. 1862 (May—July: On the Mississippi).—The first undertakings against Vicksburg.—"New Orleans once secured and handed over to General Butler, Farragut pushed up the Mississippi, and in the course of the next two months the Union flag was hoisted at Baton Rouge, Natchez, and every town of importance as high as Vicksburg. This city, strong by its natural position on high bluffs sloping gently landward, and already partly converted into a fortress

by intrenchments heavily armed, was now (since the surrender of Memphis on the 6th of June) the only point of importance held by the Confederates on the banks of the great river. It at once, therefore, assumed an importance well warranted by its later history. Summoned on the 18th of May to evacuate the place, General M. L. Smith, who held it, gave a decided refusal; and Farragut found it necessary to await once more the arrival of Porter's flotilla, which was not brought up and reported ready until the 27th of June. On the 28th a general attack took place, Farragut succeeding in taking two of his three frigates and six gun-boats above the batteries, but producing no effect on the defences. 'The enemy leave their guns for the moment,' says his hasty report, 'but return to them as soon as we have passed, and rake us.' About 50 men were killed and wounded on board, and the Brooklyn frigate, with two gun-boats, forced to retreat below the place. The bombardment continued at intervals, pending an application to General Halleck at Corinth for a corps of his army to aid the fleet, and the result of an experiment (the first of three) made to cut a ship canal through the isthmus opposite Vicksburg, and leave the Federal ships an independent passage. On the 15th of July their possession of the river was suddenly challenged by a large ram, the Arkansas, which the Confederates had been fitting on the Yazoo, a considerable stream entering the Mississippi just above Vicksburg. . . . Her plating, however, proved to be weak, and her machinery very defective." The career of the Arkansas was brief and harmless. In August she was knocked to pieces by the shells of the Essex, "whose commander had taken charge of the Lower Mississippi on the departure of Farragut. The latter officer, in compliance with orders from Mr. Welles, had abandoned his contest with the Vicksburg works on the 20th of July, and made down stream for New Orleans, whence he proceeded with his squadron to carry on operations along the coast of Texas, where the chief posts were (for the time) recovered to the Union by his detachments in the course of a few weeks. 'All we want,' he wrote on the 15th of October, 'is a few soldiers to hold the places, and we will soon have the whole coast. It is a more effectual blockade to have the vessels inside instead of outside.'"—C. C. Chesney, *Essays in Military Biog.*, pp. 169–171.

ALSO IN: L. Farragut, *Life of David G. Farragut*, ch. 20.—D. D. Porter, *Naval Hist. of the Civil War*, ch. 21.—R. B. Irwin, *Hist. of the 19th Army Corps*, ch. 2–3.

A. D. 1862 (May—December: Louisiana).—New Orleans under General Butler.—The army which accompanied Farragut's naval expedition against New Orleans, to assist its operations and to occupy the city and the lower Mississippi region when taken, was placed under the command of General Benjamin F. Butler. It consisted nominally of 18,000 men, but is said to have actually mustered less than 14,000. It was composed of regiments which had been raised by Butler in New England especially for the enterprise, his preparations having commenced as early as September, 1861. These troops were partly gathered at Ship Island, in the Gulf, some time before Farragut made ready his fleet; the remainder were at the rendezvous in good time, and the whole were in waiting, on board

transports, at the passes, when Farragut carried his fleet past Forts Jackson and St. Philip. "General Butler . . . now proceeded to execute his part of the duty. He brought his forces into the rear of St. Philip, Porter keeping up a bombardment. On the 27th of April the garrison had become so demoralized as to refuse to fight any longer. The forts were therefore surrendered on the next day. . . . On the 1st of May New Orleans was formally occupied by United States troops. The loss on the national side in achieving this great victory was 40 killed and 177 wounded. . . . General Butler now entered on the difficult task of governing New Orleans. Its population, though greatly diminished to strengthen the Confederate armies in the Border States—a cause of bitter complaint to the inhabitants—still numbered about 140,000. Almost one half of it was of foreign birth. Perhaps no city in the world had in its lower classes a more dangerous and desperate population. There was a wide-spread hope that a French force would soon come to their help. By firmness, strict yet considerate, he controlled the municipal authorities; by severity he put down the mob. He was a terror to tricky tradesmen, a benefactor to the starving poor. He cleaned the streets, enforced sanitary regulations, and kept out yellow fever. He put an effectual stop to the operations of Confederate agents, who were illicitly obtaining supplies for their cause. . . . He arrested Mumford, the person who had hauled down the national flag at the Mint [where it had been raised by one of Farragut's officers before the arrival of the troops], brought him before a military commission, convicted and executed him." This execution of Mumford (by hanging) drew from the Confederate President, Davis, a proclamation denouncing Butler as "an outlaw and common enemy of mankind"; directing that, if captured, he should be immediately hung; declaring the commissioned officers of his command "not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals"; and ordering that "no commissioned officer of the United States taken captive shall be released on parole before exchange until the said Butler shall have met with due punishment for his crimes." "Some women of New Orleans, relying on the immunity of their sex, gratified their animosity by insulting national officers in public places. One of them ventured so far as to spit in the face of an officer who was quietly walking in the street. Hereupon was issued 'General Order No. 28' [known as 'the Woman Order,' which gave notice that] . . . 'hereafter, when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her vocation.' . . . The feeling of personal hatred to Butler grew daily more and more intense. He was accused of improper tampering with the banks, speculating in sequestered property, and, through the agency of his brother, carrying on illegal but profitable transactions in sugar and cotton. In South Carolina a reward of \$10,000 had been offered for his assassination. Throughout the Confederacy he received an ignominious surname, and was known as 'Butler the Beast.' The government felt constrained to send a commission to New

Orleans to investigate his transactions. Its conclusion was that he had evidently acted 'under a misapprehension, to be referred to the patriotic zeal which governs him.'" In December General Butler was recalled and General Banks was sent to take his place.—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 52 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 13.—J. Parton, *General Butler in New Orleans*, ch. 11–32.

A. D. 1862 (June: On the Mississippi).—**The capture of Memphis.**—The naval fight before the city.—After the evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, "Fort Pillow, 40 miles above Memphis, was no longer of any account, for the Union army could take it from the rear. The Confederates, therefore, spiked the guns, burned their barracks and what supplies they could not take away; and the Confederate gunboats went down the river to Memphis, where several of the boats had been built. Commodore Montgomery commanded the fleet. He had eight vessels. . . . Fort Pillow evacuated! It was astounding news to the people of Memphis. They learned it at noon, June 5th. The merchants closed their stores. Some of them began to pack their goods. Some of the citizens jumped on board the cars and fled from the city. The Confederate fleet made its appearance. 'I shall retreat no farther,' said Commodore Montgomery; 'I shall fight a battle in front of the city, and to-morrow morning you will see Lincoln's gunboats sent to the bottom.' The dawn is breaking when I step from the Benton, the flag-ship of Commodore Davis [commanding the Union river fleet], to the tugboat Jessie Benton.

. . . The Union fleet is at anchor three miles above the city. 'Drop down below the city and see if you can discover the Confederate fleet,' is the order to the captain of the Jessie Benton. We sweep around the majestic bend of the river and behold the city. The first rays of the sun are gilding the spires of the churches. A crowd of people is upon the levee—men, women, and children—who have come out to see the Union fleet sent to the bottom. . . . Suddenly a vessel with a black cloud of smoke rolling from the chimneys shoots into the stream. It is the Little Rebel, Commodore Montgomery's flag-ship. One by one the other vessels follow, forming in two lines of battle. In the front line, nearest the city, is the Beauregard, next the Little Rebel, then the Price and Sumter. In the second line, behind the Beauregard, is the Lovell, then the Thompson, Bragg, and Van Dorn. . . . There are five gunboats in the Union fleet. The Benton is nearest the Tennessee shore, then the Carondelet, Louisville, St. Louis, and Cairo. There are also two rams—the Queen City and Monarch. The rams are river steamers, with thick oak sides; they carry no cannon, but on each boat are 100 riflemen. 'Round to; head down stream; keep in line with the flag-ship,' was the order which we on board the Jessie Benton carried to each boat of the line." In the fight which followed, and which is graphically described by the eye-witness here quoted, the Price and the Beauregard were run down by the rams; the Little Rebel, the Lovell, the Thompson and the Bragg were destroyed by shot and shell; the Sumter driven ashore, and the Van Dorn alone escaped. On the Union side, only the ram Queen City was disabled. "In an hour's time the Confederate



fleet was annihilated. . . . It is not known how many men were lost on the Confederate side, but probably from 80 to 100. Colonel Ellet was the only one injured on board the Union fleet. . . . The victory opens the Upper Mississippi from Cairo to Vicksburg."—C. C. Coffin, *Drumbeat of the Nation*, ch. 10.

**A. D. 1862 (June: Virginia).—The Peninsular Campaign: McClellan fortifying and Lee preparing for a bold attack.**—"When McClellan crossed the Chickahominy it was thought he would advance immediately upon Richmond. This expectation was disappointed, however, for instead of advancing he began to fortify his position. The right wing rested on the Chickahominy a little below New Bridge, and the left extended to the White Oak Swamp, embracing a front of about four miles, nearly parallel with that of the Confederates. The opposing lines were separated by an interval but little exceeding a mile, but each was obscured from the other's view by the intervening forest. The picket-lines were often within close musket-range of each other. . . . The strength of the Confederate force was always greatly overestimated by McClellan, and his frequent and urgent calls for reinforcements exposed his want of confidence in his own strength. General Lee [who took command of the Confederate army June 1, General Johnston being disabled], knowing this uneasy, insecure feeling of his antagonist, and McDowell's force, which had always been a thorn in his side, being about this time withdrawn from Fredericksburg for the support of Banks and Shields in the Valley, prepared . . . to assume the offensive. He conceived the bold plan of crossing the Chickahominy, and, attacking the Federal right wing, to force it back and seize McClellan's line of communication with his base of operations. This plan being successfully executed, the Federal general would be compelled to save his army as best he could by retreat. Preparatory to the execution of this plan General J. E. B. Stuart was ordered to make a reconnoissance in the rear of the Federal position. This officer, with a force of about 1,000 cavalry, executed his instructions with great boldness and success. He made the entire circuit of the Federal army and gained much important information, . . . captured many prisoners and destroyed Federal stores to the value of \$7,000,000. . . . His design being confirmed by Stuart's successful reconnoissance, Lee proceeded to organize a force requisite for the accomplishment of his proposed enterprise. The troops that could be conveniently spared from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia were ordered to Richmond. . . . At the same time General Jackson was ordered to withdraw secretly from the Valley and proceed with such expedition as would enable him to reach Hanover Junction by the afternoon of the 25th of June. In order to mask his designs from the Federals, Lee directed Whiting's division and Lawton's brigade to proceed to Staunton, apparently with the view of reinforcing Jackson, but really under orders to return immediately and join that general on the 25th at Hanover Junction. This movement further strengthened McClellan in his opinion of Lee's vastly superior force, and completely blinded him in regard to the real intentions of that general. General Lee determined to attack the Federal right wing on the morning of the 26th of

June."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, p. 169.

**A. D. 1862 (June—July: Virginia).—The Peninsular Campaign: The Seven Days Battle and Retreat.—Mechanicsville.—Gaines' Mill.—Savage Station.—Glendale.—Malvern Hill.**—"Since the battle of Fair Oaks the Second Corps (Sumner) had remained on the right bank of the Chickahominy, where it had been followed in the month of June by the Sixth Corps (Franklin). So that only the Fifth Corps (Porter) remained on the left bank, recently reinforced by McCall's division. All the efforts of the enemy were made there, and there the great seven days' contest commenced. On the 26th of June, A. P. Hill, preceding Jackson by twenty-four hours, endeavored to force the passage of Beaver Dam Creek, defended by the Pennsylvanians under McCall. He was repulsed with considerable loss on the Mechanicsville road. But, during the night, Porter was compelled to fall back to a position more tenable against a force become much superior to his own, Jackson and Longstreet having united against his lines. On the 27th, then, the Fifth Corps, with about 25,000 men, was assailed by 70,000 Confederates on Gaines' Mill Heights, and defended itself there obstinately, until our own cavalry came fatally to the enemy's aid. Unskillfully handled and roughly repulsed, it fell back in disorder on our lines, where it put everything into confusion, artillery and infantry. The Confederates, coming on at the charge, finished the overthrow, and the Fifth Corps would have been destroyed if the coming of the night had not enabled our decimated troops to cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy, destroying the bridges behind them. [This battle, called Gaines' Mill by the Federals, was named Cold Harbor, or Chickahominy, by the Rebels.] . . . As soon as Porter had crossed safely on the 28th, the general retreat commenced. Keyes crossed White Oak swamp first, and took position to protect the passage of the immense army trains and the great herds of cattle. Then, on the 29th, after having repulsed a cavalry attack, he continued his way towards the James, where he arrived on the 30th, at the same time that Porter reached Haxall's Landing. Much less favored, the three other corps suspended their march only to fight and ceased to fight only to march. But all this was done without any general system, in the absence of superior supervision, and of orders in accordance with circumstances. On the 29th the enemy crossed the Chickahominy to unite all his force on the right bank; Franklin advised Sumner, and the two, acting together, fell back on Savage Station, where they took up position, with the intention, aided by Heintzelman, of repelling the dangerous attack which menaced them. But Heintzelman, adhering to his general instructions, after destroying the material of the railroad, the provisions, munitions of war, arms and baggage that there was neither time nor means of carrying away, hastened to cross White Oak swamp, uncovering Sumner's left. The latter learned of the retreat of the Third Corps only from a furious attack by the enemy on the very side which he believed protected by Heintzelman. He did not the less sustain the shock with an unshakable solidity, and fought all the afternoon with four divisions without being broken at any point. The enemy, worn out by

the useless attacks, retired at nightfall. Then only did he receive any news from McClellan, under the form of an order to Sumner to fall back, along with Franklin, to the other side of White Oak swamp, abandoning our general hospitals at Savage Station, and the 2,500 sick and wounded in them. On the morning of the 30th, Jackson presented himself, to cross the swamp after us. He found the bridge destroyed, and endeavored to force a passage at several points. He was everywhere repulsed and kept in check the whole day by the obstinate resistance of Franklin, while farther on, towards the James, Longstreet was held by Heintzelman and McCall, who prevented him from cutting our army in two at Glendale. This was not done without hard fighting. The Confederates, arriving by the New Market road at a right angle to the Quaker road, which was our line of march, struck, in the first place, the Pennsylvania reserves, broke their line, outflanking it on the right and on the left, captured a battery of artillery, and pushed resolutely on through that dangerous breach. They then struck Hooker's division, which threw them obliquely on Sumner's Corps. Soon afterward, Kearney occupied the vacant space, and, as on the evening before, the sun set with the rebels unsuccessful. [This day's battle is variously named after Glendale, New Market, Frazier's Farm, and Nelson's Farm.] But, the same evening, Franklin, left without orders, and seeing his position was becoming more and more dangerous, abandoned White Oak swamp and fell back towards the James. At that news, which was promptly sent to him from several directions, Heintzelman sent in vain to headquarters to ask for instructions. Left to his own devices, he concluded that the wisest course was to follow the retrograde movement, and retreated with his corps. Sumner still remained, and, seeing himself left alone and without support, he decided, in his turn, to do as the others had done. On the morning of the 31st, he arrived on the Malvern Heights, where the three corps, the Second, Third, and Sixth, found themselves united, not, as has been benevolently said, by the wise combinations of General McClellan, but by the fortunate inspiration of the commanders, who had received no orders to that effect. 'At daylight,' said General Sumner, in his testimony before the Congressional committee, 'I called on General McClellan, on the banks of the James. He told me that he had intended that the army should hold the position it had the night before, and that no order for retreat had been sent; but that, since the rest of the army had fallen back, he was glad that I had done the same.' It was found that the plateau of Malvern Hill was admirably formed for a defensive position. General Humphreys, of the corps of topographical engineers, was ordered to examine the position, and he traced a formidable line with the left resting at Haxall's Landing on the James, where it was protected by the gunboats, while the right was thrown back on some fields covered with thick woods, and cut up by marshy streams. The summits and slopes of the plateau were bristling with cannon, sweeping the plain over the heads of our infantry deployed in front of them. In that position, the army awaited a last attack. The enemy played there his last card, and lost the game. . . . He tried his fortune and gave battle July 1. On every

point his columns were thrown back in disorder, crushed in every attack by the double fire of artillery and infantry. Dash was not enough now. On this occasion, the enemy was compelled to acknowledge himself beaten and incapable of pursuing us any further. But our men were slow to believe in success. On receiving the order, a few hours later, after night had put an end to the contest, to retire to Harrison's Landing, they naturally concluded that we were not strong enough to hold out long against the enemy. . . . Worn out by fatigue and fighting, exhausted by privations and by vigils, discouraged, and suspecting that it was not fortune alone that had betrayed them, they dragged themselves along without order . . . during that last night march, which had all the character of a rout."—R. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 13.—"If McClellan deserves sharp criticism for not having sooner made up his mind, and still more for his failure to discover and use the absence of the Confederates in his front, where his advance in mass, according to General Magruder's officially expressed opinion, 'would have insured his success, and the occupation of the works about Richmond, and consequently the city,' his character as a commander never shone so brightly as in the hour of disaster and danger, when Porter's wing was driven in upon his centre. The ill-success of his campaign as a whole has caused his conduct at this crisis to be done scant justice to. But there is no military reputation in the world which would not be increased by the manner in which that retreat to the James was conducted from the moment it began."—C. C. Chesney, *Essays in Military Biog.*, p. 114.

ALSO IN: W. Allan, *The Army of Northern Va. in 1862*, ch. 12-17.—A. S. Webb, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 3: *The Peninsula*, ch. 9.—F. J. Porter, W. B. Franklin, D. H. Hill, and others, *The Seven Days' Fighting (Battles and Leaders*, v. 2).—G. B. McClellan, *Complete Rep't*, pt. 2.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 11, pt. 1-2.—*Rep't of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War (Senate Rep'ts, 37th Cong., 3d sess., v. 2, pt. 1)*.

A. D. 1862 (June—October: Tennessee—Kentucky).—Ineffective dispersion of Western armies.—Failure to secure Chattanooga and Vicksburg.—Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.—The race for Louisville.—Battle of Perryville.—End of Buell's campaign.—"We left the Federals in possession of Corinth and Memphis, the army of Beauregard disappearing in the depths of semi-tropical forests where the Tombigbee takes its source, and Montgomery's ships lying at the bottom of the Mississippi [see, above, A. D. 1862 (APRIL—MAY: TENNESSEE—MISSISSIPPI) and (JUNE: ON THE MISSISSIPPI)]. The part to be played by the Federal fleets was fully laid out; Farragut, by ascending the river, and Davis, by descending it, were to endeavor to join hands and destroy all the obstacles which still obstructed its course. What, in the mean time, was the large army encamped at Corinth going to do? It had allowed Beauregard to escape at the very moment when it felt sure of crushing him; but it could yet strike some decisive blows either to eastward or westward, the Confederates being nowhere sufficiently numerous to make any strong opposition. Eastward, Mitchell had forced open the way to Chattanooga and approached the gap which opens south-east



of that town, before which, at a subsequent period, so much blood was shed at the battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge. He was master of the passes of the Tennessee, and the Federals, stationed at Corinth, could reach Chattanooga much more speedily than their adversary encamped at Tupelo. They might probably conquer by the same stroke the whole upper course of the river which waters this town. Westward, the Federals could sweep both sides of the Mississippi, cause all the Confederate works which defended them to fall, and perhaps prevent the enemy from erecting the formidable citadels of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the capture of which, at a later period, cost so dear. . . . Everything . . . was in favor of prompt and vigorous action. But Halleck divided his army, and, notwithstanding the resources he had at his disposal, allowed his adversaries to forestall him everywhere. . . . The army of the Ohio left Corinth on the 10th of June, and Buell was ordered to proceed with it in the direction of Chattanooga, where Mitchell was beginning to be sorely pressed; but this movement was slowly executed. Sherman, at the head of his own division and that of Hurlbut, proceeded toward Memphis, dropping detachments of troops as far as Holly Springs to cover his left flank. The rebuilding of the Mobile Railway, which had been completely destroyed by the enemy, was a considerable undertaking. Begun on the 9th of June, it was only finished on the 26th. The Confederates had profited by this delay. The new general-in-chief, Braxton Bragg [who had superseded Beauregard], had boldly divided his army and abandoned the position of Tupelo, which Halleck still believed him to occupy. He had determined to cover at once the two points we have already indicated as being of the greatest importance for the future of the war, Chattanooga and Vicksburg. He proceeded toward the first with all the old army of Johnston, consisting of the corps of Hardee and Polk, as rapidly as the difficulties of communication in that portion of the Southern States allowed. He had the merit and good fortune to reach Chattanooga before Buell. It was not too soon, for a few days previous, the 7th of June, the Federal General Negley, with his single brigade and some cannon, had nearly taken possession of this city by surprise. Bragg found it of great advantage to transfer the war to the vicinity of Chattanooga. Master of this position, indeed, he could menace either Tennessee or Kentucky, Nashville or Louisville and wrest from the Federals all the conquests they had achieved during the last few months by taking them in rear. He was also drawing near Virginia."—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 3.—"Halleck soon leaves for Washington to assume supreme control of the Union forces from the War Department. Grant is left in command of the Army of the Tennessee, Buell of the Army of the Ohio, Pope of the Army of the Mississippi. Every one is without definite instructions; there is no one head; and the Western armies are practically put upon the defensive. Rosecrans succeeds Pope, who is transferred to Virginia, and to Grant's lot now fall the armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee, 42,000 effectives, with which to keep open his communications with Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur. While Grant

and Sherman devote their energies to the line of the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennessee, where the loyal population is in extreme suffering. Mitchell's [General O. M. Mitchell] capture of Huntsville [in Alabama, which he surprised, by a remarkable forced march, from Nashville, in April], and some hundred miles of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which he had held, together with all territory north of the Tennessee river, had been full of possibilities. Had he but received the authority, he might readily have anticipated Bragg in taking possession of Chattanooga, and have saved much subsequent blood and treasure. For this town is the key to that entire strategic field. . . . Buell supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his right in order to obtain possession of Nashville. He therefore concentrated the bulk of his force at Murfreesboro'. Thomas, then commanding a wing of the Army of the Ohio, whose military intuitions were as keen as his judgment was reliable, . . . was shrewd enough to recognize Bragg's crossing of the Tennessee river as a threat to invade Kentucky. Not so Buell, to his sorrow. By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around Buell's left, through the Sequatchie Valley [August 28], and marches straight toward Louisville, while Kirby Smith turns Cumberland Gap, defeats Nelson at Richmond, and makes for Cincinnati. . . . Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country, Buell at once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, while he endeavors to retain his grasp on Nashville with his right. Bragg has the shorter line and the start. But he is delayed a day or two [September 16-17] by the capture of Mumfordsville, and by scattering his forces instead of pushing home. This is a serious fault on Bragg's part. He fairly holds success in his hand, but forfeits it by this delay. After some rapid marching and manœuvring, Buell enters Louisville just ahead of his opponent. The authorities in Washington have lost all confidence in Buell. He is summarily relieved from command and Thomas appointed to succeed him. But this magnanimous soldier, though far from always agreeing with the methods of his chief, declines the proffered honor, and, at his earnest solicitation, Buell is reinstated. The Army of the Ohio marches out to meet Bragg, with Thomas second in command. Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and Duck rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith near Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon Bragg's communications. After some cautious feeling, Buell comes upon Hardee with only 15,000 men, at Perryville, where, had he at once attacked, he could have punished Bragg severely for this division. But, owing to lack of water, one-half of Buell's army is distant from the field, and he in turn pays the penalty of lack of concentration. Polk joins Hardee, and the latter [October 8] falls heavily upon McCook, who holds Buell's left, and bears him back. But he cannot break the Union centre; and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires, leaving to our forces the field. Our left has not been engaged. The loss is nearly 5,000 men on either side, a quarter of the numbers actually engaged. On being followed up, Bragg retreats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves Kentucky and Tennessee once more in our possession. His retreat ends only at Chattanooga. What Bragg expected to obtain

in Kentucky was a vast accession of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland. Both fell short of their calculations, though Bragg carried off a goodly train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had really done, the South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's failure to hold Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. . . . Halleck now insists that Buell shall undertake a campaign in East Tennessee, still occupied by the enemy. But Buell alleges the utter impossibility of subsisting his troops so far from the railroad; and again concentrates at Nashville. Here he is relieved [October 30] and Gen. Rosecrans is appointed to the command."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: D. C. Buell, J. Wheeler, and others, *The Perryville Campaign (Battles and Leaders, v. 3)*.—T. B. Van Horne, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, ch. 12-15 (v. 1).—J. B. Fry, *Operations of the Army under Buell*.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 16.

A. D. 1862 (July).—Three hundred thousand more.—On the 2d of July, 1862, the President issued his proclamation calling for 300,000 volunteers.

A. D. 1862 (July).—Land-grant for agricultural and mechanical Colleges. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1862.

A. D. 1862 (July).—Prescription of the Iron-clad Oath. See IRONCLAD OATH.

A. D. 1862 (July).—The fitting out of the Rebel cruiser, Alabama, at Liverpool. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

A. D. 1862 (July).—Confiscation of the property of rebels, giving freedom to their slaves.—Immediately on the assembling of Congress at its regular session in December, 1861, "Mr. Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill, providing that the slaves of all who had taken up arms against the United States should 'become forever thereafter free, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.' . . . On the 25th of February it came up for general debate, which was very extended. . . . Divergences of views, even among those who had been most prominent and pronounced in their antislavery action, and the general drift of the discussion, seemed to preclude any reasonable hope of agreement upon any motion or measure then before the Senate. It was therefore moved by Mr. Clark of New Hampshire to refer the whole matter, the original bill, and all motions, amendments, and substitutes, to a select committee. This, too, gave rise to a sharp debate. . . . The motion was carried by a vote of 24 to 14; and the committee, consisting of Clark, Collamer, Trumbull, Cowan, Wilson, Harris, Sherman, Henderson, and Willey, was appointed. Mr. Trumbull declining, Mr. Harlan was appointed in his place. The committee reported 'a bill to suppress insurrection, and punish treason and rebellion'; and on the 16th of May it came up for consideration. Its main provision was that at any time after the passage of the act, the President might issue his proclamation that the slaves of persons found, 30 days after the issuing of the proclamation, in arms against the government, will be free, any law or custom to the contrary; that no slave escaping from his master shall be given up, unless the claimant proves he has not given aid or comfort to the Rebellion; and that the President shall be authorized to employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the Rebellion. . . . The bill

was further debated, but did not reach a vote. In the House a substantially similar course was pursued. On the first day of the regular session Mr. Eliot of Massachusetts introduced a resolution confiscating the property and freeing the slaves of those engaged in the Rebellion. It did not, however, come up for consideration till the close of the following week. . . . A motion was finally made and carried to refer the whole subject to a select committee of seven, consisting of Olin, Eliot, Noell, Hutchins, Mallory, Beaman, and Cobb. Mr. Olin was excused, and Mr. Sedgwick of New York was appointed in his place. On the 14th of May Mr. Eliot from the committee reported two bills,—the one confiscating Rebel property, and the other freeing the slaves of Rebels,—and opened the debate on 'the twin measures of confiscation and emancipation.' . . . On the 26th of May Mr. Eliot closed the debate, and the two bills he had reported from the special committee were brought to a vote. The first, or that providing for the confiscation of Rebel property, was passed by a strong majority. The second, or that freeing the slaves of Rebels, coming up for action, the first business was the disposal of the several amendments that had been offered. The amendments having all been voted down, the original bill was lost by a vote of 74 to 78. That vote was, however, reconsidered and the bill was recommitted. On the 18th of June Mr. Eliot moved a substitute for the bill reported by the committee, which was accepted by the House, and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by a vote of 82 to 54. The gist of this bill consisted in the provision, that all slaves of persons found in rebellion 60 days after the President shall issue his proclamation should be free; and the President should appoint commissioners to carry its provisions into effect. The House confiscation bill was taken up in the Senate on the 23d of June. An amendment was moved by Mr. Clark combining confiscation and emancipation. The amendment was sharply debated, but was adopted on the 28th. The bill as amended was adopted by a vote of 28 to 13. The bill as thus amended was taken up in the House on the 3d of July, and the House non-concurred in the Senate's amendment. . . . A committee of conference was appointed, which reported, on the 11th, in substance the Senate amendment. The report was accepted by both bodies, . . . and the President gave it his approval on the 17th. It provided that all slaves of Rebels coming into the possession or under the protection of the government should be deemed captives of war, and made free; that fugitive slaves should not be surrendered; that no person engaged in the military or naval service should render fugitives on pain of being dismissed from the service; and that the President might employ persons of the African race for the suppression of the Rebellion in such manner as he might deem best."—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America*, v. 3, ch. 25.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, pp. 373-377.—E. McPherson, *Political Hist. of the U. S. during the Rebellion*, pp. 196-203.

A. D. 1862 (July—August: Virginia).—The end of the Peninsular Campaign.—The army at Harrison's Landing.—Results of the Seven Days fighting.—Withdrawal from the Peninsula.—"On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely 50,000 men in the ranks, but on the



4th of July, when the corps commanders made their reports, it was found that the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to 15,249 men, of whom 1,582 had been killed, 7,700 wounded, and 5,958 missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this number may be added, without exaggeration, 6,000 sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore found himself with about 84,000 men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him. The losses of Lee's army during the seven days amounted to 20,000 men, to which number must also be added at least 5,000 rendered unfit for active service by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of 25,000 men. This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June. An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the environs of Richmond. . . . In the estimation of those who did not allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far from bad. . . . Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water communication. Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted under those grave circumstances. . . . On the occasion of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that position that [the President] went back fully determined to allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of action. But General Halleck . . . claimed for himself, as commander-in-chief [lately so appointed], the exclusive direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln, conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new authority." Measures taken during July for placing the army of the Potomac again upon the offensive were altered on the 3d of August, when Halleck gave orders to McClellan to transfer his army with all possible expedition to Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, for the support of General Pope and the Army of Virginia. — *Comte de Paris, Hist. of the Civil War in Am., v. 2, bk. 1, ch. 4 and bk. 3, ch. 1.*

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 5, ch. 24.

A. D. 1862 (July—August: Virginia).—The beginning of Pope's campaign: Cedar Mountain, or Cedar Run.—"While Lee and McClellan were resting, important events were taking place at Washington and in Northern Virginia. The Federal administration, satisfied of the im-

policy of the separate departments and independent commands which they had organized in that region, had determined to unite under one leader the three armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which Jackson had beaten or baffled in succession. . . . Their united armies were henceforth to be styled the Army of Virginia, while McClellan's forces continued to be known as the Army of the Potomac. General John Pope, whose deeds and still more his dispatches in the West, had given him some reputation, was called to Washington and placed at the head of the new army. General Pope was assigned to command on the 26th of June. . . . The unification of these commands under Pope was followed by another and still more important change of the same kind. The dissatisfaction of the Federal administration with General McClellan had been steadily growing for many months. This officer's caution often exposed him, and sometimes not unjustly, to the charge of timidity. . . . No doubt other causes, such as his moderation and his conservative political views, rendered him distasteful to the progressive radicals who at this time predominated in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet; but it must be confessed that McClellan's military conduct was not such as to inspire confidence or diminish antagonisms, and it, alone, is sufficient to account for the manner in which he was treated by his government. . . . After the Seven Days' Battles, the Federal government called General Halleck from the West . . . and placed him in chief command of the armies of the United States, the position from which McClellan had been deposed in March. The order assigning General Halleck was dated July 11, but the latter did not arrive in Washington and enter upon his duties until July 23. By this appointment it was designed to give a common head to the two armies in Virginia, and insure the coöperation of McClellan and Pope. The first great question that presented itself to Halleck was, what to do with McClellan's forces, and on the day after assuming command he left Washington to visit this army. The visit seems to have satisfied him of the propriety of withdrawing the Army of the Potomac at once from the Peninsula, and of placing it on the line of the Rappahannock. . . . During the month of July, while McClellan was resting at Westover, General Pope, though in Washington, was not idle. Having devoted some days to the reorganization and equipment of his command, he directed the concentration of the mass of his forces at the eastern base of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, from which position he could cover the approach to Washington, or threaten the flank of any columns going toward the Shenandoah Valley, while he prepared for an aggressive campaign. . . . General Lee on July 13 ordered Jackson with the veteran troops of his own and Ewell's division to Gordonsville to oppose Pope's advance. The force thus sent numbered about 11,000 men. Robertson's brigade of cavalry, which was already in Pope's front, added 1,000 or 1,200 more. General Lee remained with some 65,000 men between McClellan and Richmond. General Jackson reached the vicinity of Gordonsville on July 19. His arrival was opportune. The Federal reconnoitring parties had already advanced through Culpeper to the Rapidan, and on July 14 Banks had been ordered to send

forward all his cavalry under Hatch to seize Gordonsville."—Wm. Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*, ch. 20.—"After ascertaining that the enemy were in large force under General Pope . . . Jackson applied to General Lee for reinforcements. The division of A. P. Hill was immediately sent to him, and, with this accession to his small army, Jackson had no intention of remaining idle or of awaiting an attack from so powerful a foe, but determined to strike a blow himself before the enemy had time to concentrate all their forces. He therefore advanced towards them on the 7th of August. Before taking this step, it was observed that he was much in prayer, but this was his custom previous to every battle. . . . Pope's army was gathering in all its strength at Culpepper Court-House, and on the 9th of August Jackson's little army came in contact with his advance-guard about six miles from the Court-House, on the borders of a little stream called Cedar Run. Here hostilities began by a furious cannonade on both sides, lasting two hours, when, about five o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry of both armies became hotly engaged. The conflict was fierce and stubborn, but the overwhelming numbers of the enemy swept down with such impetuosity that the weaker party were forced to yield, and it looked as if it were doomed to destruction. Ewell, Early, A. P. Hill, Winder, and other commanders all fought their bravest and best—the gallant Winder receiving a mortal wound—and still they were pressed back. 'It was at this fearful moment,' says his late chief-of-staff, Dr. Dabney, 'that the genius of the storm reared his head, and in an instant the tide was turned. Jackson appeared in the mid-torrent of the highway, . . . he drew his own sword (the first time in the war), and shouted to the broken troops with a voice which pealed higher than the roar of battle: "Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your general will lead you! Jackson will lead you! Follow me!" This appeal was not in vain, and the Federals, startled by this unexpected rally, were driven from the field. They afterwards made an attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day, which they had so nearly won, by an assault from a magnificent body of cavalry, but even this was repelled, and the troopers driven in full retreat.' . . . This battle of Cedar Run [called Cedar Mountain by the Unionists] Jackson himself pronounced the most successful of his exploits. . . . In this battle the Confederates had between eighteen and twenty thousand men engaged, while the Federals, according to their own returns, had thirty-two thousand. Jackson, however, had one incalculable advantage over the enemy, which he gained by his promptitude in seizing and holding Slaughter's Mountain—an elevation which commanded all the surrounding plains, and enabled him to overlook the whole scene of action. . . . It was to the advantage of this position as well as the bravery of his troops that he was indebted for his complete success. By this victory Pope received such a blow that he was deterred from making another advance until he could gather reinforcements. Burnside's corps was withdrawn from North Carolina and sent on to Culpepper Court-House, and it was believed that McClellan's remaining forces would be recalled from James River and sent also to swell the ranks of the grand 'Army of Virginia,' as the command of

Pope was called. At all events, General Lee was convinced that McClellan was incapable of further aggression, and that the most effective way to dislodge him from the Peninsula was to threaten Washington! He therefore determined to move his army from Richmond to Gordonsville. He began his march on the 13th, and four days after, on the 17th, McClellan evacuated the Peninsula and removed his troops to the Potomac." Pope's army was withdrawn behind the Rappahannock. "General Lee now ordered Jackson to cross the Rappahannock high up, and by a forced march go to Manassas and get in Pope's rear. Other divisions were sent to Pope's front, and the two hostile armies marched along on either side of the stream, opening fire upon each other whenever the opportunity offered. Jackson continued his march up stream until he reached Warrenton Springs, on the 22d, where he found the bridge destroyed, but he passed Early's brigade over on a mill-dam, and took possession of the Springs. Before other troops could be crossed to his support, a sudden and heavy rainfall swelled the river so as to render it impassable, and Early was thus cut off from his friends and surrounded by the enemy. His situation was one of extreme peril, but he managed to conceal his troops in the woods, and hold his foes at bay with artillery, until Jackson had constructed a temporary bridge, and by the dawn of the morning of the 24th the gallant Early, with his command, had recrossed the river without the loss of a man. While a fierce artillery duel was going on across the river between A. P. Hill and the enemy, Jackson left the river-bank a few miles, and marched to the village of Jefferson. He was thus lost sight of by the Federals, and to Longstreet was given the task of amusing Pope by the appearance of a crossing at Warrenton Springs. Jackson was now preparing to obey Lee's order to separate himself from the rest of the army, pass around Pope to the westward, and place his corps between him and Washington at Manassas Junction."—Mrs. M. A. Jackson, *Life and letters of General Thomas J. Jackson*, ch. 17.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, *Hist. of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia*, ch. 1-3.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 4, ch. 19.

A. D. 1862 (July—September: Missouri—Arkansas).—Warfare with the Rebel Guerrillas.—"Since the autumn of 1861, General J. M. Schofield, Lyon's second at the battle of Wilson's Creek, had been in command of the militia of Missouri, and in June, 1862, that State was erected into a separate military district, with Schofield at its head. He was vigilant and active; but when Curtis withdrew to the Mississippi, and left Arkansas and Southern Missouri open to the operations of guerrilla bands, then numerous in the western part of the former State, he found his forces inadequate to keep down the secessionists in his district. When Price crossed the Mississippi, early in May, he sent back large numbers of Missourians to recruit guerrilla bands for active service during the summer, and these, at the middle of July, were very numerous in the interior, and were preparing to seize important points in the State. To meet the danger, Schofield obtained authority from the Governor to organize all the militia of the State. This drew a sharp dividing line



between the loyal and disloyal inhabitants. He soon had 50,000 names on his rolls, of whom nearly 20,000 were ready for effective service at the close of July, when the failure of the campaign against Richmond so encouraged the secessionists in Missouri that it was very difficult to keep them in check. Schofield's army of volunteers and militia was scattered over Missouri in six divisions, and for two months a desperate and sanguinary guerrilla warfare was carried on in the bosom of that Commonwealth, the chief theater being northward of the Missouri River, in McNeill's division, where insurgent bands under leaders like Poindexter, Porter, Cobb, and others, about 5,000 strong, were very active." They were also aided by incursions from Arkansas, under Hughes, Coffey and other leaders. The encounters were many and fierce. At Kirksville, August 6, and Chariton River, four days later, the loyal forces achieved considerable victories; at Independence (which was captured) August 11, and at Lone Jack, about the same time, they suffered defeat. These were the principal engagements of the month. With the co-operation of General Blunt, commanding in Kansas, the Arkansas invasion was driven back. "Missouri was now somewhat relieved, but the Confederates were gathering in force in Arkansas, where they were joined by conscripts from Southern Missouri and a large number of troops from Texas. Their entire number was estimated to be 50,000 at the middle of September, with General T. C. Hindman in chief command. . . . So threatening was this gathering that Schofield took the field in person, and General Curtis succeeded him in command of the District of Missouri." Schofield's vanguard, under General Salomon, encountered the enemy at Newtonia, September 30, and was defeated; but the Confederates retreated before the united forces of Schofield and Blunt and "were chased about 30 miles into Arkansas."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 2, bk. 4, ch. 3.

**A. D. 1862 (August).—Draft of Militia for nine months.**—By proclamation, August 4, the President ordered a draft of 300,000 militia, for nine months service unless sooner discharged.

**A. D. 1862 (August).—President Lincoln's "policy" explained to Horace Greeley.**—"Executive Mansion, Washington, August 22, 1862. Hon. Horace Greeley. Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York 'Tribune.' If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they

could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free. Yours, A. Lincoln."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 227-228.

**A. D. 1862 (August: Virginia).—General Pope's campaign: Stonewall Jackson's movement into the rear of the Federal Army.**—"By the capture of Pope's papers [effected in a raid of Stuart's cavalry to the Federal rear] Lee gained an accurate knowledge of the situation of the Federal army. Acting on it, he ordered Jackson to advance his corps to Jeffersonson and secure the bridge over the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs. . . . Jackson, on arriving at Jeffersonson in the afternoon of the 22d, found that the bridge on the Warrenton turnpike had been destroyed by the Federals. . . . On the 23d Lee ordered Longstreet's corps to follow Jackson and mass in the vicinity of Jeffersonson. The headquarters of the army was also moved to that place. . . . General Longstreet made a feint on the position of Warrenton on the morning of the 24th, under cover of which Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the front to the vicinity of the road from Jeffersonson to the upper fords of the Rappahannock. Jackson was then directed to make preparations to turn the Federal position and seize their communications about Manassas Junction. Longstreet continued his cannonade at intervals throughout the day, to which the Federals replied with increasing vigor, showing that Pope was massing his army in Lee's front. It was the object of Lee to hold Pope in his present position by deluding him with the belief that it was his intention to force a passage of the river at that point, until Jackson by a flank movement could gain his rear. Longstreet, on the morning of the 25th, resumed his cannonade with increased energy, and at the same time made a display of infantry above and below the bridge. Jackson then moved up the river to a ford eight miles above; crossing at that point and turning eastward, by a rapid march he reached the vicinity of Salem. Having made a march of 25 miles, he bivouacked for the night. Stuart's cavalry covered his right flank, the movement being masked by the natural features of the country. The next morning at dawn the march was resumed by the route through Thoroughfare Gap. The cavalry, moving well to the right, passed around the west end of Bull Run Mountain and joined the infantry at the village of Gainesville, a few miles from

the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Pressing forward, still keeping the cavalry well to the right, Jackson struck the railroad at Bristoe Station late in the afternoon, where he captured two empty trains going east. After dark he sent a detachment under Stuart to secure Manassas Junction, the main dépôt of supplies of the Federal army. The cavalry moved upon the flanks of this position, while the infantry, commanded by Trimble, assaulted the works in front and carried them with insignificant loss, capturing two batteries of light artillery with their horses and a detachment of 300 men, besides an immense amount of army supplies. The next morning, after effectually destroying the railroad at Bristoe, Jackson . . . moved his main body to Manassas, where he allowed his troops a few hours to refresh themselves upon the abundant stores that had been captured. About 12 o'clock the sound of artillery in the direction of Bristoe announced the Federal advance. Not having transportation to remove the captured supplies, Jackson directed his men to take what they could carry off, and ordered the rest to be destroyed. General Ewell, having repulsed the advance of two Federal columns [at Bristoe Station], rejoined Jackson at Manassas. The destruction of the captured stores having been completed, Jackson retired with his whole force to Bull Run, and took a position for the night, a part of his troops resting on the battle-field of the previous year. Pope, . . . upon learning that Jackson was in his rear, . . . immediately abandoned his position on the Rappahannock and proceeded with all despatch to intercept him before he could be reinforced by Lee. His advance having been arrested on the 27th by Ewell, he did not proceed beyond Bristoe that day. Lee on the 26th withdrew Longstreet's corps from its position in front of Warrenton Springs, covering the withdrawal by a small rear-guard and artillery, and directed it to follow Jackson by the route he had taken the day before. . . . The corps bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Salem. On the morning of the succeeding day, the 27th, a messenger appeared bringing the important and cheering news of the success of Jackson at Bristoe and Manassas. . . . Thoroughfare Gap was reached about noon of the 28th. It was quickly found to be occupied by a Federal force. Some slight attempt was made to dislodge the enemy, but without success, as their position proved too strong, and it seemed as if the movement of the Confederate army in that direction was destined to be seriously interfered with. Meanwhile, nothing further had been heard from Jackson, and there was a natural anxiety in regard to his position and possible peril. . . . Under these critical circumstances General Lee made every effort to find some available route over the mountains, and had already succeeded in doing so when his adversary saved him further trouble. "Pope . . . had ordered McDowell to retire from the Gap and join him to aid in the anticipated crushing of Jackson. McDowell did so, leaving Rickett's division to hold the Gap. In evident ignorance of the vicinity of Longstreet's corps, this force was also withdrawn during the night, and on the morning of the 29th Lee found the Gap unoccupied, and at once marched through at the head of Longstreet's column. . . . Pope had unknowingly favored the ad-

vance of the Confederate commander. His removal of McDowell from his position had been a tactical error of such magnitude that it could not well be retrieved. . . . The cannonade at the Gap on the 28th had informed Jackson of Lee's proximity. He at once took a position north of the Warrenton turnpike, his left resting on Bull Run. . . . About three o'clock the Federals bore down in heavy force upon Ewell and Taliaferro, who maintained their positions with admirable firmness, repelling attack after attack until night. The loss on both sides was considerable. . . . Jackson, with barely 20,000 men, now found himself confronted by the greater part of the Federal army. Any commander with less firmness would have sought safety in retreat. But having heard the Confederate guns at Thoroughfare Gap, he knew that Lee would join him the next day. Therefore he determined to hold his position at all hazards. By the morning of the 29th . . . Hood's division had reached the south side of the mountain, and early in the day was joined by the remainder of Longstreet's corps, by way of the open Gap. While these important movements were in progress, Pope had resumed his attack upon Jackson. . . . On the arrival of Lee, Pope discontinued his attack, and retired to the position which the year before had been the scene of the famous battle of Bull Run, or Manassas."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 11.

Also in: R. L. Dabney, *Life and Campaigns of Gen. Thos. J. Jackson*.—G. H. Gordon, *Hist. of the Campaign of the Army of Va.*, ch. 4-10.—W. B. Taliaferro, *Jackson's Raid around Pope (Battles and Leaders*, v. 2, pp. 501-511).

A. D. 1862 (August)—September: Virginia. —The end of General Pope's campaign: Groveton.—Second Bull Run.—Chantilly.—"By contradictory orders and the useless marches and counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too, with his forces very much out of position, and he himself ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy. When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville, reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike; Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very little success for a direct attack, and especially for a partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that officer remonstrated against it; but the order being imperative, he made a very determined attack with his division," and was driven back. "Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's



assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor, especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left, where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left [right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is, however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted from its execution. . . . Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter] had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then between Washington and Centreville. . . . With untimely obstinacy, Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle. To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. . . . Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. . . . Pope . . . telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was 'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat' of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and 'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check, Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back. "Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat of the Union

forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled, and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had not yet given up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse, to intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington. Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime, fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September, Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but severe action which then occurred (called the battle of Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was, by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of Washington."—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 184–193.—"The Second Battle of Bull Run . . . was a severe defeat for General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor anything like a rout. . . . Lee claims to have captured in these engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded prisoners."—J. C. Ropes, *The Army under Pope (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 4)*, ch. 8–11.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, *Hist. of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia*, ch. 11–13.—*The Virginia Campaign of Gen. Pope (Mass. Military Hist. Soc. Papers, v. 2)*.—J. Pope, *The Second Battle of Bull Run (Battles and Leaders, v. 2, pp. 449–494)*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 12, pt. 2*.

**A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).—Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.**—"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from Richmond. . . . He accordingly determined to advance into Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army, which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has been the subject of much discussion. . . . It can only be said that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words. His object was

to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. . . . The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says, 'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the Shenandoah Valley. . . . The Southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on the next day General Lee issued an address to the people of Maryland. . . . This address, couched in terms of such dignity, had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in the condition of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings. A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral. . . . Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his own men for success in his future movements. He faced that conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of Pennsylvania."—J. E. Cooke, *Life of Robert E. Lee*, pt. 5, ch. 1-2.

Also in: A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 12.

A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).—Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry.—South Mountain.—Antietam.—"On the 2d of September the President went to General McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its ad-

dition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to that accorded to the army that had left the town two days before. . . . But this flattering reception was not the best fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out. . . . General Lee had taken it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws, the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation, with 73 guns. . . . Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the surrender to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about 1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering 600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to look out for Crampton's. . . . There was stubborn and bloody fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South



Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the Confederates. At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side, and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap, the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with 400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took up a position on high ground between that stream and the village of Sharpsburg. . . . Lee now had his army together and strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000 combatants. . . . McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. . . . The ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges. McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the 16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with his left and centre. . . . All day long an artillery duel was kept up. . . . It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men. Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on, and the lines rested for the night where they were." At sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his centre and left, under Porter and Burnside, did not make any movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front, cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But, though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had been so severely punished that neither was inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of McClellan's. . . . The reason why the Confederate army was not annihilated or captured must be plain to

any intelligent reader. . . . General McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399 wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. . . . Nothing was done on the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000 prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the field . . . and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory was his."—R. Johnson, *Short Hist. of the War of Secession*, ch. 12.

ALSO IN: F. W. Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 5)*.—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 2, bk. 3, ch. 4.—F. A. Walker, *Hist. of the Second Army Corps*, ch. 4.—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 2, ch. 2-3.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 19.—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story*, ch. 33-38.—D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others, *Lee's Invasion of Maryland (Battles and Leaders, v. 2)*.—W. Allan, *The Army of Northern Va. in 1862*, ch. 37-48.

A. D. 1862 (September).—President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.—Abraham Lincoln "believed that without the Union permanent liberty for either race on this continent would be impossible. And because of this belief, he was reluctant, perhaps more reluctant than most of his associates, to strike slavery with the sword. For many months, the passionate appeals of millions of his associates seemed not to move him. He listened to all the phases of the discussion, and stated in language clearer and stronger than any opponent had used, the dangers, the difficulties, and the possible futility of the act. In reference to its practical wisdom, Congress, the Cabinet, and the country were divided. Several of his generals had proclaimed the freedom of slaves within the limits of their commands. The President revoked their proclamations. His first Secretary of War had inserted a paragraph in his annual report advocating a similar policy. The President suppressed it. On the 19th of August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter addressed to the President, entitled 'The Prayer of Twenty Millions,' in which he said, 'On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile.' To this the President responded in that ever-memorable reply of August 22, in which he said:—'If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to

destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it,—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause.' Thus, against all importunities on the one hand and remonstrances on the other, he took the mighty question to his own heart, and, during the long months of that terrible battle-summer, wrestled with it alone. But at length he realized the saving truth, that great unsettled questions have no pity for the repose of nations. On the 22d of September, he summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments came in, one by one, they found the President reading a favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit. He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote, from the published Journal of the late Chief Justice, an entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript of Lincoln's words: 'The President then took a graver tone and said: "Gentlemen I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and (hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other observation I will make I know very well that many others might, in

this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in all the lights under which it had been presented to him.' The Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was signed and published that day."—J. A. Garfield, *Works*, v. 2, pp. 538-540.—"I was alone with Mr. Lincoln more than two hours of the Sunday next after Pope's defeat in August, 1862. That was the darkest day of the sad years of the war. . . . When the business to which I had been summoned by the President was over—strange business for the time: the appointment of assessors and collectors of internal revenue—he was kind enough to ask my opinion as to the command of the army. The way was thus opened for conversation, and for me to say at the end that I thought our success depended upon the emancipation of the slaves. To this he said: 'You would not have it done now, would you? Must we not wait for something like a victory?' This was the second and most explicit intimation to me of his purpose in regard to slavery. In the preceding July or early in August, at an interview upon business connected with my official duties, he said, 'Let me read two letters,' and taking them from a pigeon-hole over his table he proceeded at once to do what he had proposed. I have not seen the letters in print. His correspondent was a gentleman in Louisiana, who claimed to be a Union man. He tendered his advice to the President in regard to the reorganization of that State, and he labored zealously to impress upon him the dangers and evils of emancipation. The reply of the President is only important from the fact that when he came to that part of his correspondent's letter he used this expression: 'You must not expect me to give up this government without playing my last card.' Emancipation was his last card. He waited for the time when two facts or events should coincide. Mr. Lincoln was as devoted to the Constitution as was ever Mr. Webster. In his view, a military necessity was the only ground on which the overthrow of slavery in the States could be justified. Next, he waited for a public sentiment in the loyal States not only demanding emancipation but giving full assurance that the act would be sustained to the end. As for himself, I cannot doubt that he had contemplated the policy of emancipation for many months, and anticipated the time when he should adopt it."—G. S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by Distinguished Men of his Time*, pp. 123-125.—"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national treasury,



had failed [that the President determined to decree emancipation in the rebellious states by a military order]. To Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose, and asked our views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with the representatives in Congress from the border slave states, at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, he said, had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element should be for or against us. Mr. Seward . . . was appalled and not prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a proposition, he informed the President that the consequences of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to advise on the subject without further reflection. . . . While Mr. Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation, which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an original emancipationist, and committed to the principle, thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of the colored race should be coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades of difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."—G. Welles, *Lincoln and Seward*, pp. 210–212.—The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation, issued on the 22d of September, 1862, was as follows:

"I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval author-

ities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then, after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9 and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and the people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.'"—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 6 and 8.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 20.

A. D. 1862 (September–October: Mississippi).—Union successes under Grant.—Iuka and Corinth.—"In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of that month Halleck was assigned to the command of all the armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more independent than while Halleck had been immediately present in the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point, but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. . . . He remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and threatened him continually.

During this time, he directed the strengthening and remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. . . . New works, closer to the town, were . . . erected. . . . Van Dorn at last determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and reinforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his intention to prevent it. . . . On the 13th [of September], Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of Corinth. . . . Grant had called in his forces some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to move by way of Rienzi, along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord had 8,000 men, and Rosecrans reported 9,000, a greater force combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate." Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked (September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men, killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka, over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did not. "By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same state of affairs continued which had annoyed Grant for so many weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at Bolivar, and on the 23d of September removed his own headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate more readily with all points of his district, including Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and Ripley. . . . At last it was rendered certain . . . that Corinth was to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops." He also "hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, 44 miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear, as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they could not get into the town. On the 2d of October the rebel array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust, appeared in front of Corinth. . . . On the 3d the fighting began in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to determine the possession of northern Missis-

siippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth, and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before, assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they advanced to the works, but each time were received with a determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans. The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at 1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. . . . The repulse was complete, by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river, about ten miles from Corinth. . . . A battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance was dispersed or drowned. . . . Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile [six miles up the stream, where Van Dorn finally made his crossing]. In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete. . . . These two fights relieved the command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."—A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 1, ch. 4.—"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early next morning for the pursuit."—W. S. Rosecrans, *The Battle of Corinth (Battles and Leaders*, v. 2), p. 753.

A. D. 1862 (September—December: Missouri—Arkansas).—Social demoralizations of the Civil War.—Battle of Prairie Grove.—"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the license of war to settle personal grudges by all the violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination; and



parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. . . . A rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory should constitute a new department to be called the Department of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R. Curtis. . . . This new arrangement served to change the relative positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his headquarters and assume the general administration of the new Department of the Missouri. . . . The difficulties in the military situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck . . . in postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union campaigns on both sides of the great river. . . . From the midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general significance. . . . The only action of importance which marks the military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who, finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman. The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of the same place. . . . So effectually did this engagement serve to scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31, 1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas.'—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: W. Baxter, *Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove*.—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, div. 10, ch. 4 (v. 3).—W. Britton, *Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border*, ch. 1.

A. D. 1862 (October—December: Virginia).—The final removal of McClellan.—Burnside at Fredericksburg.—'Both armies . . . felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be freed from each other's presence, they rested on their arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the scene of its late

exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its purpose, though it assumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and during this period no military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable government stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasanton with 800 cavalry. . . . On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan hastened to seize the débouché of the Shenandoah Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. . . . At first McClellan contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton. Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm, General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington, reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to General McClellan: . . . 'By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' . . . It chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in his tent. Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of countenance or of voice,

McClellan passed over the paper to his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as head of the Army of the Potomac. . . . The moment chosen was an inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan acted with such vigor and rapidity—never had he shown so much confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and file as well as officers—enthusiastic in their affection for his person, but that the very general appointed as his successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 6, sect. 2-3. —"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates"; it is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing . . . the new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards Fredericksburg. . . . Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords, for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement, by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. . . . Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000 troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attacking party for a long period under fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front. . . . To turn them above was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the first. Preparations for crossing were begun. The better part of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he

obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter pen. . . . All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river. Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000 men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of ours."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War*, ch. 21.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps*, pt. 2, ch. 4-8.—F. A. Walker, *Hist. of the Second Army Corps*, ch. 5-6.—B. P. Poore, *Life of Burnside*, ch. 18-19.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 21.—J. Longstreet, D. N. Couch, and others, *Burnside at Fredericksburg (Battles and Leaders*, v. 3).—F. W. Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 5), pp. 129-135.

A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi). —The second attempt against Vicksburg.—General Sherman and Admiral Porter.—Mis-  
carriage of Grant's plans.—"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron in October, 1862. . . . Up to this time the gun-boats had, strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all the other naval forces, was brought directly under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. . . . The new arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy Department. . . . Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was informed by the President that General McClellan had been ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Ill., to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with General McClellan in the operations to be carried on. But as Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on General McClellan's raising an Army sufficient for the purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo, sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs, Miss., informing him of McClellan's intention; that he, Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena, Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada, until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of the defences of Vicksburg. General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be ready to move at short



notice, and having sent orders to Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly Springs to carry out his part of the programme. . . . The expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862, Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with [three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] . . . to clear the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and perilous service was well performed," but one of the iron-clads engaged in it, the *Cairo*, was sunk by a torpedo. "General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being covered in every direction by the gun-boats. Sherman first made a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. . . . Sherman and his Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the Army. . . . Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his attack on that place. . . . Grant moved towards Granada, and everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points between that place and Jackson. . . . Due precautions had been taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving, the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in Sherman's repulse. . . . Sherman made all his arrangements to attack the enemy's works on the 29th of December, 1862, and the assault took place early on that day. One division succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but the division that was to follow the advance was behind time and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive back the small force that had gained the hills. . . . The enemy did not

follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but to get his Army safely back to the transports."—D. D. Porter, *Naval Hist. of the Civil War*, ch. 24.

ALSO IN: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his Campaigns*, ch. 7.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 11.

A. D. 1862-1863 (December—January: Tennessee).—Bragg and Rosecrans.—The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.—"The Confederate government was greatly disappointed with the issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on assuming command of Buell's army, . . . concentrated his forces at Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. . . . Bragg had already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. As it was about the season of Christmas, Murfreesborough was the scene of much gayety . . . and the giddy Confederates danced on floors carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of December, Rosecrans moved. His march commenced in a heavy rain. The Confederate outposts retired before his advance, the pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which was 43,000 strong on the evening of that day, was on the west side of Stone River, a sluggish stream fringed with cedar brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four miles in length. Crittenden was on its left, with three divisions, Wood, Vanleve, Palmer; Thomas in the centre, with two divisions, Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve; McCook on the right with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The left wing touched the river. . . . Bragg's army, 62,000, stood between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough. . . . Breckinridge's division formed his right, in his centre, under Polk, were two divisions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, under Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confederate army. Rosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on his left. His intention was that his right wing, standing on the defensive, should simply hold its ground; but his extreme left, the divisions of Wood and Vanleve, crossing Stone River, should assail Breckinridge's division, exposed there, and seize the heights. . . . On his part, also, Bragg had determined to take the offensive. . . . Both intended to strike with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that wing. . . . In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while Rosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone River to make its expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the battle-field, he fell

furiously upon Johnson's division, and so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a gun could be fired. The Confederate success was decisive. Johnson's division, which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the shock was too great; he was compelled to give way, with the loss of many guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also coming into play, rushed upon the next division—but that was commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was already paralyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. He had to withdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and defending his communications. He must establish a new line. The possibility of doing this—the fate of the battle—rested on Sheridan." He held his ground for an hour, until "the cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he had steel. The fixed bayonets of his reserve brigade covered him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. In this memorable and most glorious resistance he had lost 1,630 men. 'Here's all that are left,' he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was nothing for Negley but to follow. . . . Meantime, on a knoll in the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the army would face south-westwardly, with the Nashville turnpike on its rear." Against this new line the Confederates dashed themselves, desperately but vainly, four times that day, and were repelled with horrible slaughter. "Bragg, unwilling to be foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on Rosecrans's left flank with 7,000 fresh men. His first attack was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate. So stood affairs when night came, . . . the closing night of 1862. On New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. On January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank. Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position, ordering him to drive the enemy across the river—a task which that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished, for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to pieces. In twenty minutes he lost 2,000 men. A violent storm prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough, retreating to Tullahoma. . . . In these dreadful battles the Confederates lost 14,700 men. On the national side there were killed 1,553, wounded more than 7,000, prisoners more than 3,000; more than one third of its artillery and a large portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all thought of crossing the Ohio

River."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 53 (v. 2).—"The enemy in retreating did not fall back very far—only behind Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the outset of the campaign. . . . The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro'. . . . Had Bragg followed up with the spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and demoralized."—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 12-14.

ALSO IN: A. F. Stevenson, *Battle of Stone's River*.—T. B. Van Horne, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, ch. 16-17 (v. 1).—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 20.

**A. D. 1863 (January).—The final Proclamation of Emancipation.**—The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on the 22d of September, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue, a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation. But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly free." It was in the following words:

"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: 'That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and main-



tain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate, as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun-

dred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many months before its happy influences became manifest. Its tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give dignity and consistency to the conflict. . . . It strengthened, too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if it did not entirely remove, the danger of foreign intervention."—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 28.—"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under his guidance as to render the conception practical and the decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force, leaguely liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision, the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 19.

ALSO IN: O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, div. 10, ch. 9 (v. 3).—W. P. and F. J. Garrison, *William Lloyd Garrison*, v. 4, ch. 3-4.

**A. D. 1863 (January: Arkansas).—The capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.**—Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg on the 2d of January, and on the 4th he relinquished the command to General McClernand, who had come down the river with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition sailed on the same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas River, 50 miles from its mouth and 117 below Little Rock. . . . The expedition moved up the White River through the cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort Hindman. . . . By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest the post. . . . The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded, 881; and in missing, 17; total, 977. . . . By the surrender there fell into our hands 5,000 men. . . . After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th . . . they returned to Milliken's Bend."—S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his Campaigns*, ch. 7-8.


**A. D. 1863 (January—April: Virginia).—**Command given to Hooker.—President Lincoln's Letter to him.—Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac, and its improvement.—“General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. . . . His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a representative man. . . . Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than the odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his appointment: . . . ‘I have placed you [wrote the President] at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward, and give us victories!’ . . . Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest words, took leave of the army. The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the power of

organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the rate of 200 a day. . . . Hooker states that he found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls of the army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of the ranks. . . . The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in command prior to Chancellorsville. . . . On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about 130,000 men under the colors,—‘for duty equipped,’ according to the morning report. . . . While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow flies. . . . Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty.”—T. A. Dodge, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, ch. 3-4.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, *Hist. of the 2d Army Corps*, ch. 7.—R. De Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 20.

**A. D. 1863 (January—April: On the Mississippi).—**Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.—Futile operations of the first four months.—“General Grant took personal command of the movement against Vicksburg on the 30th of January, 1863. . . . The first plan made was to dig a canal across the neck of land, or peninsula in front of Vicksburg,—below the city,—at a point where the isthmus was only a mile and a fifth in width. This had been begun before General Grant's arrival. If a canal could have been made large enough for large steamboats, then no matter how strong were the fortifications of Vicksburg, the boats would pass through, far away from their fire. So a canal ten feet wide and six deep was made here, in the hope that the freshets of the river would widen it, and so make it large enough for large steamers. But very little came of the canal. When the river did rise, it would not flow where it was meant to do. It flooded the camps of the workmen. Meanwhile the Rebels had made new batteries below it. Thus ended plan number one. Another similar plan, to open a route by Lake Providence and Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Washita and Red River, did not succeed better. The canals attempted here were both on the west of the river. A very bold attempt was made on the east side, by what was known as the Yazoo Pass, into the Tallahatchee and Yazoo River. The expeditions sent out by this route would come out above Vicksburg; but it was hoped that thus the Rebel gunboats on the Yazoo River might be destroyed. If a practicable route were made here, the whole army could be moved to Haine's Bluff,—above Vicksburg,





—an upland region very desirable for occupation. But nothing came of this movement, though some hard work and some hard fighting were done in it. What resulted of importance was, that the troops found their way into the granary from which Vicksburg had been fed; and in the resistance, many of the Rebels were destroyed. In such attempts February and March passed away. Meanwhile Admiral Farragut, of the navy, ran by the Rebel batteries at Port Hudson, so that he communicated with Grant below Vicksburg,—and Grant could communicate with General Banks, who was trying to do at Port Hudson what Grant was trying to do above. The distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson is about 120 miles in a straight line, and more than twice that by the crooked river. Grant now determined to pass the city of Vicksburg on the west side of the river by marching his army by land—with the help of boats on some bayous if possible—from Milliken's Bend, which is twenty miles above Vicksburg, to New Carthage, which is about as far below. At his request Admiral Porter sent seven of his iron-clads, with three steamers and ten barges, down the river, past the Rebel batteries. They were well laden with forage and supplies. The crews of all but one refused to go. But volunteers from the army offered, enough to man a hundred vessels had they been needed. On a dark night of the 16th of April, led by Admiral Porter, they steamed down, with the barges in tow. They turned the bend without being noticed. Then the first batteries opened on them. The Rebels set fire to houses so as to light up the scene; and from the ships the crews could see the men at the batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg. Though every vessel was hit, all got by, except the Henry Clay steamer. Finding she was sinking, her commander cut off the barge he was towing, which drifted safely down, and, soon after, the vessel herself took fire. The crew escaped in their boats,—the vessel blazed up and lighted up all around. At last, however, after the boats had been under fire two hours and forty minutes, the whole fleet except the Henry Clay arrived safely below the batteries. Grant had thus secured, not only forage and stores, but the means of transportation. On the 26th of April five more vessels passed successfully, one being lost as before. Grant was now strong enough to cross the Mississippi River. His army had to march seventy miles on the west side by muddy roads, scarcely above the river line. He feared he might have to go as far down as a little town called Rodney for a good landing-place on the east side. But a friendly negro man, who knew the country, brought in information that there was a good road inland from Bruinsburg,—and so it proved. Grand Gulf, on the river, where the Rebels had a post, was still between Grant and Bruinsburg. Porter attacked it with his gunboats, and Grant was ready to land 10,000 troops to storm the place if the batteries were silenced. But Porter did not succeed. Grant therefore marched his troops down on the west side of the river. Porter ran by Grand Gulf with transports in the night, and, on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed the river with 10,000 men. They did not carry a tent nor a wagon. General Grant and his staff went without their horses. It was said afterwards

that his whole baggage was a toothbrush! Other divisions followed, and on the 3d of May he left the river, and marched, not directly on Vicksburg, but more inland, to cut off all communication with that city. His army took three days' rations with them, and relied principally for provisions on the stores in the rich country through which they marched."—E. E. Hale, *Stories of War told by Soldiers*, ch. 7.

Also IN: F. V. Greene, *The Mississippi Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 8, ch. 4.—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 31–32.—G. W. Brown, *The Mississippi Squadron and the Siege of Vicksburg* (*Personal Recollections of the War*: N. Y. Com. L. L. of the U. S.).

A. D. 1863 (February—April: Tennessee).—Engagements at Dover and Franklin.—“In February [on the 3d], General Wheeler, Bragg's chief of Cavalry, tried to capture Fort Donaldson, so as to stop the navigation of the Cumberland River, by which some of Rosecrans's supplies came in steamboats to Nashville. The fort had not been repaired after its capture by Grant, but the Village of Dover near it had been fortified, and it was then held by Colonel A. C. Harding with about 600 men. The Union men fought bravely, and in the evening the gunboat Fair Play came up and opened a fire on the Confederates which drove them away in confusion, with a loss of more than 500 men. Harding's loss was 126. Early in March, General Van Dorn appeared near Franklin [a little below Nashville] with a large force of mounted men. Colonel Colburn, of the 33d Indiana, moved Southward from Franklin with 2,700 men. Van Dorn and Forrest met him, and after a fight of several hours [March 5] Colburn had to surrender with 1,300 of his men.”—J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young Folks' Hist. of the War for the Union*, ch. 31.—“Sheridan, with his division, and about 1,800 cavalry, under Colonel Minty, first swept down toward Shelbyville, and then around toward Franklin, skirmishing in several places with detachments of Van Dorn's and Forrest's men. In a sharp fight at Thompson's Station, he captured some of the force which encountered Colburn. He finally drove Van Dorn beyond the Duck River, and then returned to Murfreesboro', with a loss during his ten days' ride and skirmishing of only five men killed and five wounded. His gain was nearly 100 prisoners. On the 18th of March, Col. A. S. Hall, with a little over 1,400 men, moved eastward from Murfreesboro' to surprise a Confederate camp at Gainesville. He was unexpectedly met by some of Morgan's cavalry, when he fell back to Milton, twelve miles northeast of Murfreesboro' and took a strong position on Vaught's Hill. There he was attacked by 2,000 men, led by Morgan in person. With the aid of Harris's Battery skillfully worked, Hall repulsed the foe after a struggle of about three hours. Morgan lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded. Among the latter was himself. Hall's loss was 55 men, of whom only 6 were killed. Early in April, General Granger, then in command at Franklin, with nearly 5,000 troops, was satisfied that a heavy force under Van Dorn was about to attack him. He was then constructing a fort (which afterwards bore his name), but only two siege-guns and two rifled cannon, belonging to an Ohio battery, were mounted upon it. The fort . . . completely commanded



the approaches to Franklin. . . . On the 10th, Van Dorn, with an estimated force of 9,000 mounted men and two regiments of foot, pressed rapidly forward along the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell upon Granger's front. The guns from the fort opened destructively upon the assailants, and their attack was manfully met by Granger's troops. Van Dorn soon found himself in a perilous situation, for Stanley [commanding cavalry] came up and struck him a heavy blow on the flank. Smith [with cavalry] was ordered forward to support Stanley, and Baird's troops were thrown across the river to engage in the fight. The Confederates were routed at all points on Granger's front, with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and about 500 prisoners. Van Dorn then turned his whole force upon Stanley before Smith reached him, and with his overwhelming numbers pushed him back and recovered most of the captured men. By this means Van Dorn extricated himself from his perilous position, and, abandoning his attempt to capture Franklin, he retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about three hundred men in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about 37 killed, wounded and missing."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, ch. 18, (v. 1).—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 23.

**A. D. 1863 (March).—The Conscription Act.**—"The Rebel Congress having long since passed [April 16, 1862] a conscription act whereby all the White males in the Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through the war, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, [after] our heavy losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The act providing 'for the enrollment of the National forces' was among the last passed [March 3, 1863] by the XXXVIIth Congress prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by Federal provost-marshal and enrolling officers, of all able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens who had declared their intention to become naturalized, between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to constitute the first class; all others the second class—from which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the National armies for not more than three years; any one drafted and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as a deserter. A commutation of \$300 was to be received in lieu of such service; and there were exemptions provided of certain heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the residue of a family which has already two members in the service, &c., &c. The passage and execution of this act inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of opposi-

tion to the War. Those who detested every form of 'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels, with those who especially detested the National effort under its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the division being so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the Senate a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely postponed was supported by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays: consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs. McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith of Oregon. The bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 21.

**A. D. 1863 (April: South Carolina).—The naval attack on Charleston.—Repulse of the Monitors.**—"The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned had given to the government and the public a high opinion of their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its surrender. . . . On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the Monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. At noon on that day the signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a Monitor, took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through its interference with her movements. On her way up she exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did no damage. At 2.10 P. M. she encountered obstructions extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter; beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P. M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and subsequently other Monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., were obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled with the Monitors, and could not bring her batteries to bear upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore, on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into collision with two of the Monitors. The plan of the Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this the 'first circle,' as it was termed. Two other still more powerful

circles of fire must be passed before the city could be reached. While in the centre of the first circle, it was apparent that the Monitors were at a fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes, yet in that brief period five of the iron-clads were wholly or partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off and struck him on the head. Many of the bolts of both turret and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across it. All the other Monitors had received damages more or less severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command.' . . . The iron-clad fleet had therefore been unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired 2,209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of which 40 were filled with melted cast-iron, others with incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used by the forts was 21,093 pounds. The government, thus satisfied that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral effect."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 72 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, *Naval Hist. of the War*, ch. 33.—C. B. Boynton, *Hist. of the Navy during the Rebellion*, v. 2, ch. 33.—W. C. Church, *Life of Ericsson*, ch. 21 (v. 2).—A. Roman, *Military Operations of Gen. Beauregard*, ch. 30 (v. 2).—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 14.

A. D. 1863 (April—May: Virginia).—Hooker's disastrous movement.—Chancellorsville.—Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.—"Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations, Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a force of 10,000 cavalry

under General Stoneman to operate upon Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement. Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th, and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken, Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.' . . . General Lee was fully aware of the preparations that were being made by his adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. . . . On the 28th . . . Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for information from the direction of Chancellorsville. . . . Very soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to follow with three of his divisions, leaving . . . a force of about 9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively skirmish was in progress, in which he im-



mediately participated. When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. . . . It was obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. . . . The execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. . . . At dawn on the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. . . . After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a point on the Orange Court-house road three miles in the rear of Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry equal in spirit to the 'Virginia horse-men' under W. H. F. Lee that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him to a position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which disclosed the following scene: 'Below and but a few hundred yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of stacked arms in rear. . . . The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering beeves.' Returning from this point of observation, Jackson proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six o'clock were completed. . . . Howard's corps was first assailed. This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed, routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day. The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by three bullets, and

died from the effects eight days afterward. "Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his position; his troops regained courage and contested the field with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at every point and rapidly retreated . . . within the strong line of defences which had been previously constructed to cover the road to the United States Ford. . . . While the operations above described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early, by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance, forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was communicated to General Lee during the forenoon. Wilcox's brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance, and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give the 'coup de grâce' to Hooker, but that general, under cover of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the Rappahannock at the United States Ford."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 14.—The Federal loss at Chancellorsville, in killed and wounded, was 12,197; missing 5,000; total, 17,197. Confederate loss, killed and wounded, 10,266; missing 2,753; total, 13,019.—A. Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 6), ch. 8.

ALSO IN: T. A. Dodge, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 8.—D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard, and others, *Chancellorsville (Battles and Leaders*, v. 3).—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 7, ch. 4.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 25.

A. D. 1863 (April—May: Mississippi).—*Grierson's Raid*.—Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on the 5th of May, 1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said: "As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi, cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from Tusculum down into Alabama and Georgia. This did not interfere

with my plan, but simply required extra force to be developed from Corinth. Delays incident to combined movements, especially from separate commands, kept his expeditionary column back for six days. I commenced the movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. . . . On the 17th, Col. B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry 1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery, and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. I considered that the effect of these movements would be to puzzle the enemy and withdraw his force from the central line, which has proven to be correct. . . . Grierson, on the 19th, detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded, without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges." Col. Grierson, in his own full report of the remarkable expedition thus set on foot, after narrating the proceedings of his command until it struck Newton Station, on the 24th of April, continues: "From captured mails and information obtained by my scouts, I knew that large forces had been sent out to intercept our return, and having instructions from Major-General Hurlbut and Brigadier-General Smith to move in any direction from this point which, in my judgment, would be best for the safety of my command and the success of the expedition, I at once decided to move south, in order to secure the necessary rest and food for men and horses, and then return to La Grange through Alabama, or make for Baton Rouge, as I might hereafter deem best. . . . After resting about three hours, we moved south to Garlandville. At this point we found the citizens, many of them venerable with age, armed with shot-guns and organized to resist our approach. As the advance entered the town, these citizens fired upon them and wounded one of our men. We charged upon them and captured several. After disarming them, we showed them the folly of their actions, and released them. Without an exception they acknowledged their mistake, and declared that they had been grossly deceived as to our real character. One volunteered his services as guide, and upon leaving us declared that hereafter his prayers should be for the Union Army. I mention this as a sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which our presence produced among the people in the country through which we passed. Hundreds who are skulking and hiding out to avoid conscription, only await the presence of our arms to sustain them, when they will rise up and declare their principles; and thousands who have been deceived, upon the vindication of our cause would immediately return to loyalty."

It was not until the 2d of May that Grierson and his small force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important revelation it made of the condition of things in that region of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as follows: "During the expedition we killed and wounded about 100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000 stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules. Our loss during the entire journey was 3 killed, 7 wounded, 5 left on the route sick; the sergeant-major and surgeon of the Seventh Illinois left with Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, and 9 men missing, supposed to have straggled. We marched over 600 miles in less than sixteen days. The last twenty-eight hours we marched 76 miles, had four engagements with the enemy, and forded the Comite River, which was deep enough to swim many of the horses. During this time the men and horses were without food or rest. Much of the country through which we passed was almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the necessities of life, which have reached most fabulous prices."—*Official Records, series 1, v. 24, pt. 1, pp. 520-529.*

**A. D. 1863 (April—July: On the Mississippi).—Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.—The final operations.—His personal account of the siege and capture.**—"April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river [to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson, where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and, after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. . . . Here I [General Grant] . . . received a letter from Banks stating that he could not be at Port Hudson [which Grant had intended to join Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did not regard this force of as much value as the time which would be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the 7th to the 13th, when our



position was near Fourteen Mile creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the Big Black. To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek. As the army under Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th the troops were faced to the west and marched towards Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the 16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy intrenched. After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and about 1,200 men. . . . We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army taking position in their front. On the 19th there was continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better positions. . . . At two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. . . . Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food, however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. . . . By the night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops. . . . I now determined on a second assault. . . . The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy . . . but at no place were we able to enter. . . . As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege was now determined upon. . . . The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000 men. . . . The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. . . . My line was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson in our

rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man this. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. . . . Johnston . . . abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston." The siege was of six weeks' duration, ending on the memorable 4th of July with the surrender of Pemberton and 31,000 men, who were released on parole. "Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. We had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom they had so recently been engaged in starving out."—U. S. Grant, *The Siege of Vicksburg* (Century Magazine, Sept., 1885).

ALSO IN: The same, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 31-39.—*The Vicksburg Year* (Battles and Leaders, v. 3).—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, ch. 6-8.—F. V. Greene, *The Mississippi* (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 8), ch. 5-6.—W. Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles of the War*, ch. 7.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 12.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 24.

A. D. 1863 (May—June).—**The arrest of Vallandigham.—President Lincoln to the Copperheads.**—"The man whose name became unfortunately pre-eminent for disloyalty at this time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democrat, of Ohio. General Burnside was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the moment no Confederates to deal with, he turned his attention to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greater animosity. His Order No. 33, issued on April 13, . . . warned persons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep that little member in order, they might expect either to suffer death as traitors, or to be sent southward within the lines of 'their friends.' Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a member of Congress since 1856; . . . he was the popular and rising leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Such was his position that it would have been ignominious for him to allow any Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did he. On the contrary he made speeches which at that time might well have made Unionists mad with rage, and which still seem to have gone far beyond the limit of disloyalty which any government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was arrested by a company of soldiers, brought to Cincinnati, and thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and a riot was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside, he was tried by a military commission. He was charged with 'publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Gov-

ernment in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion.' . . . The evidence conclusively sustained the indictment, and the officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. . . . The Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too inconsiderately given them. The country rang with plausible outcries and high sounding oratory concerning military usurpation, violation of the Constitution, and stifling freedom of speech. . . . Mr. Lincoln only showed that he felt the pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commuting the sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released from confinement and sent within the Confederate lines,—which was, indeed, a very shrewd and clever move, and much better than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was tendered to and accepted by a Confederate picket, on May 25. He protested vehemently, declared his loyalty, and insisted that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiar methods of demonstrating 'loyalty' to their opponents, insisted upon treating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy common to themselves and him; and instead of exchanging him as a prisoner, they facilitated his passage through the blockade on his way to Canada. There he arrived in safety, and thence issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. On June 11 the Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as their candidate for governor, and it seems that for a while they really expected to elect him. . . . On May 16 a monster meeting of 'the Democrats of New York' was told by Governor Seymour that the question was: 'whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North.' Excited by such instigation, the audience passed sundry damnable resolutions and sent them to the President. Upon receiving these Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into the arena, without regard to official conventionality. On June 12 he replied by a full presentation of the case, from his point of view. He had once more to do the same thing in response to another address of like character which was sent to him on June 11 by the Democratic State Convention of Ohio."—J. T. Morse, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 2, ch. 6.*—To the New York Democrats, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is asserted in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the administration or the personal interests of the commanding general,

but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American citizens.' In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform, because I am sure that from such more elevated position



we could do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none such."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 349-350.—To the Ohio Democrats, the President wrote as follows: "You claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man. These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his special friends and adherents. With perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which as yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. With all this before their eyes, the

convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter in order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing else: 1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion; 2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and 3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported. And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect that on his returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as hereto-

fore, do so much as the public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be respectfully yours."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 362-363.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 7, ch. 12.

**A. D. 1863 (May—July: On the Mississippi).—Siege and Capture of Port Hudson.**—The clear opening of the great River.—“About the middle of May all the available force near the river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack on Port Hudson. Thence Gens. Augur and Sherman moved to the south and east of that position, to cooperate with Gen. Banks. From Simmesport Gen. Banks moved his army to invest Port Hudson. . . . It was on the 21st of May that Gen. Banks landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the advance of Maj.-Gen. Augur and Brig.-Gen. Sherman. . . . On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first line of works. On the next day Gen. Weitzel's brigade, which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria, arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was made on the fortifications. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing, as it was called some years ago, is situated on a bend in the Mississippi river, about 22 miles above Baton Rouge, and 147 above New Orleans.” It was strongly fortified and well defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o'clock the same day an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it were heavy. “A bombardment of the position had been made by the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another assault on Port Hudson was made. . . . All the assaulting columns were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the morning. The loss of Gen. Banks was nearly 700 in killed and wounded. . . . After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the purpose to make another was given up by Gen. Banks, until he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender was sent to Gen. Banks, and it was made the occasion for firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender was communicated. Gen. Gardner, upon receiving the information, sent by flag of truce, about midnight of the 7th, the following note to Gen. Banks: . . . ‘Having received information from your troops that Vicksburg has been surrendered, I make this communication to request you to give me the official assurance whether this is true or not, and if true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the consideration of terms

for surrendering this position.’”—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval Hist. of the Rebellion*, ch. 29.

ALSO IN: F. V. Greene, *The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 8)*, ch. 7.—R. B. Irwin, *Port Hudson (Battles and Leaders, v. 3)*.—The same, *Hist. of the 19th Army Corps*, ch. 15-18.—*Official Records, Series 1*, v. 26.

**A. D. 1863 (June).—Call for Six-Months Men.**—A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and Ohio, was issued June 15.

**A. D. 1863 (June: Virginia).—Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it.—Northern invitation and Southern clamor.—The Southern view.**—“The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union; and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North, who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was disappearing. This combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. . . . On all sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard raising their importunate voices. . . . The plan of moving the Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal territory, seems to have been the result of many circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. . . . Another important consideration was the question of supplies. . . . More than ever before, these supplies were now needed; and when Gen-



eral Lee sent, in May or June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper, 'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania.' The considerations here stated were the main inducements for that great movement northward which followed the battle of Chancellorsville. . . . Throughout the month of May, Lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet remained at the head of his former corps, Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two others. . . . On the last day of May, General Lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly 10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. . . . Lee began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one month after the battle of Chancellorsville. . . . Pursuing his design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to arrest his own movements. . . . He continued the withdrawal of his troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of 'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of the whole war, followed. . . . This reconnoissance in force . . . had no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had infantry in Culpepper. . . . This attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee. On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position of the Southern army now

exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldier-ship in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100 miles. . . . When intelligence now reached Washington that the head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere—could you not break him?' . . . It would seem that nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper, and Ewell from the Valley. But . . . instead of reinforcing the corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill, General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall back toward Manassas."—J. E. Cooke, *Life of Gen. Robert E. Lee*, pt. 6, ch. 9-12.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 21.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 9.

**A. D. 1863 (June—July: Pennsylvania).—Lee's Invasion.—The Battle of Gettysburg.**—"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction. Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New York and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and ammunition for them were inadequate. "On June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army." He was accordingly





relieved and the command was given to Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime (June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and advanced to Frederick, Md. "On June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. . . . In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what Meade did do. . . . Under the impression that Lee's army was spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that direction. . . . The Union corps were marching on and getting farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the support of Buford with the nearest division of the First Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard succeeded to the command of the field, but did not issue any orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the meantime General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate front of all enemies. Before the Eleventh Corps came up the enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry [which, not crossing the Potomac to follow Lee until the 27th, had undertaken a long raid around the Union forces, and did not succeed in joining the main body of the Confederates until July 2d] they had not been kept informed as to the movements Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. . . . Ewell's attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front with great force. . . . General Meade, when he heard of Reynolds's death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field. Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive battle, determined to hold it if possible. This was not an easy thing to do, for the enemy were in overwhelming force, and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps were not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. . . . Hancock directed Doubleday to

send a force to Culp's Hill on the right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been heavily reinforced. As the losses on both sides had been tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance, particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to Gettysburg. By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close at hand. . . . Most of the troops, though worn out with hard marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34 miles to march and came later in the afternoon. . . . The attack as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reinforcements going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting; but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. . . . The enemy. . . failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the fact that he had made a lodgement there, Ewell determined to hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reinforcements during the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning. . . . So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3] General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his position on the right. . . . Lee having failed in his attacks both on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt to force the Union line. As he had been reinforced by Stuart's cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was available, he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from sending reinforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135 guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. . . . Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked and he was forced to retreat. . . . Pickett formed his great column of attack and came for-

ward as soon as the fire from the Union batteries slackened." Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically met by Gibbon's division of the Second Corps and by part of the First Corps, under the personal direction of General Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict. Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains, the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade) was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick, however, got in front of the main body on the direct route and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of Ewell's trains. . . . Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge, and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee and were about—under orders from President Lincoln—to make an attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5,434 missing=Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 missing=Total, 20,451."—A. Doubleday, *Gettysburg made plain (with 29 maps)*.

ALSO IN: The same, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 6, pt. 2)*.—J. Longstreet, H. J. Hunt and others, *Gettysburg (Battles and Leaders, v. 3)*.—F. A. Walker, *Hist. of the Second Army Corps, ch. 8*.—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, ch. 15*.—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War, v. 3, bk. 3, ch. 4*.—D. X. Junkin and F. H. Norton, *Life of General Hancock, ch. 11-13*.—*Official Records, Series 1, v. 27*.

A. D. 1863 (June—July: Tennessee).—The Tullahoma campaign.—"During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of the Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was comparatively inactive. The troops were employed in the construction of elaborate fortifications and in divers minor operations with defensive or tentative objects. . . . Late in June the Army of the Cumberland advanced against its old enemy, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, then holding the line of Duck River. In this movement the Fourteenth Corps [General Thomas] was in the centre, its appropriate place, and drove the enemy from Hoover's Gap and from several positions in front of that gap. General McCook [Twentieth Corps] on the right had a severe combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed the enemy from the hills. General Crittenden [Twenty-first Corps] on the left did not

meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven from its defensive line on Duck River, Gen. Rosecrans moved his army towards Manchester, and regarding this movement as indicating either an attack upon his position at Tullahoma, or the interruption of his communications, Bragg fell back from that place. He did not consider himself strong enough to meet Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently retreated first to the Cumberland Mountains, and, soon after, across the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tullahoma campaign was begun on the 23d of June and terminated on the 4th of July. The enemy fought at the gaps of the mountains, but the defense on the whole was feeble. The result was the possession by the Army of the Cumberland of the region from Murfreesboro' to Bridgeport, Alabama. At the close of the campaign the army advanced to the northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and there halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the Tennessee River."—T. B. Van Horne, *Life of General Geo. H. Thomas, ch. 5*.

ALSO IN: The same, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland, ch. 19 (v. 1)*.—H. M. Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 7)*.—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs, v. 1, ch. 14*.—D. S. Stanley, *The Tullahoma Campaign (Sketches of War Hist., Ohio Commandery L. L. of the U. S., v. 3)*.

A. D. 1863 (July: On the Mississippi).—The Defence of Helena.—"One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the Mississippi, on the 4th of July. General Holmes [Confederate] had asked and received permission to take that place, in the middle of June, and had mustered for that purpose an army of nearly 10,000 men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry numbering in all 4000 men, commanded by Major-General B. M. Prentiss. Holmes felt so sure of victory that he doubtless selected the 4th of July for his attack in a mere spirit of bravado. He assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was singularly skilful and energetic, and, after a few hours of fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most humiliating repulse."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 7, ch. 11*.

A. D. 1863 (July: Mississippi).—The capture and destruction of Jackson.—When Vicksburg surrendered, Johnston was hovering in the rear of Grant's army, and Sherman was watching his movements. On the very day the surrender was completed the latter marched rapidly upon Jackson, with 50,000 men, Johnston retreating before him. The city was invested on the 10th, and defended by the Confederates until the night of the 16th when they evacuated with haste. General Sherman, writing to Admiral Porter on the 19th of July, said: "We . . . have 500 prisoners, are still pursuing and breaking railroads, so that the good folks



of Jackson will not soon again hear the favorite locomotive whistle. The enemy burned nearly all the handsome dwellings round about the town because they gave us shelter or to light up the ground to prevent night attacks. He also set fire to a chief block of stores in which were commissary supplies, and our men, in spite of guards, have widened the circle of fire, so that Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now a ruined town. State-house, Governor's mansion, and some fine dwellings, well within the lines of intrenchments, remain untouched. I have been and am yet employed in breaking up the railroad 40 miles north and 60 south; also 10 miles east. My 10-miles break west, of last May, is still untouched, so that Jackson ceases to be a place for the enemy to collect stores and men."—*Official Records, series 1, v. 24, pt. 3, p. 531.*

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military operations, ch. 8.*

**A. D. 1863 (July: Kentucky).—John Morgan's Raid into Ohio and Indiana.**—"The most famous raid of this time was that made in July by John Morgan across the Ohio River. General Buckner was then in East Tennessee, near the borders of Kentucky, getting ready to make another dash toward Louisville, and Morgan went ahead to prepare the way. He crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky with about 3,000 mounted men, sacked Columbia, captured Lebanon with 400 prisoners, and rode on through Bardstown to Brandenburg on the Ohio River, plundering and destroying as he went. Many Kentuckians had joined him on the way, and he then had 4,000 men and ten pieces of artillery. The advance of Rosecrans's army just at that time prevented Buckner from joining him, and Morgan determined to cross into Indiana. There were two gunboats in the river, but he kept them off with his artillery while his men crossed on two captured steamboats. Morgan then rode through Indiana toward Cincinnati fighting home guards, tearing up railroads, burning bridges and mills and capturing much property. The whole State was aroused by the danger, and thousands of armed men started after the bold riders. Morgan became alarmed, and after passing around Cincinnati, almost within sight of its steeples, turned toward the Ohio to cross again into Kentucky. A large Union force was following, others were advancing on his flanks, and gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men were moving up the river to cut him off. The people aided the pursuers all they could by cutting down trees and barricading the roads to stop Morgan's march. He was so delayed by these and other things that he did not reach the Ohio until July 19th. He hoped to cross at a place called Buffington Ford, but the Union men were upon him and he had to turn and fight. After a severe battle, in which the Union troops were helped by gunboats which cut off the raiders from crossing the ford, about 800 of Morgan's men surrendered, and the rest, with Morgan himself, fled up the river fourteen miles to Bellville, where they tried to cross by swimming their horses. About 300 men had succeeded in getting over when the gunboats came up and opened fire on them. A fearful scene ensued, for it was a struggle of life and death. . . . Some got across, some were shot and some drowned. Morgan was not among the fortunate ones who escaped. With about 200 men he fled

further up the river to New Lisbon, where he was surrounded and forced to surrender. This was a wonderful raid, but it did not do the Confederate cause any good. A large part of the property destroyed was private property, and this roused the anger of all the people of the Border States. . . . Morgan and some of his officers were sent to Columbus and confined in the penitentiary, from which he and six others escaped in the following November by making a hole through the bottom of their cell and digging a tunnel under the foundations of the building."—J. D. Champlin Jr., *Young Folk's Hist. of the War for the Union, ch. 31.*

ALSO IN: B. W. Duke, *Hist. of Morgan's Cavalry, ch. 14-15.*—*Official Records, Series 1, v. 23.*

**A. D. 1863 (July: New York).—The Draft Riots.** See NEW YORK (CITY): A. D. 1863.

**A. D. 1863 (July: South Carolina).—The lodgement on Morris Island, and the assault on Fort Wagner.**—After Du Pont's attack upon the forts in Charleston harbor—see above: A. D. 1863 (APRIL: S. CAROLINA)—"the Confederates enjoyed two months of undisturbed leisure for the construction and strengthening of their works, though all this time the matter of a new essay at the reduction of Sumter occupied more than its proper share of the attention of the Government. The forces in the Department of the South were not sufficient to undertake a siege of Charleston by land, and the exigencies of the more important campaigns going forward in Virginia, Tennessee and Mississippi prevented their being reinforced. It was resolved, therefore, to restrict operations to the harbor and the islands immediately adjoining, and Admiral John A. Dahlgren—after the death of Admiral Foote, who had been designated for the purpose—and General Q. A. Gillmore were charged with the command of the military and naval forces engaged. . . . Admiral Dahlgren . . . assumed command on the 6th of July. Gillmore had already been on the ground some three weeks, and had nearly completed his preparations for a descent upon Morris Island, when Dahlgren arrived. The admiral, without a moment's delay, entered into the plans of the general, and within forty-eight hours collected his scattered monitors and steamed away to the harbor of Charleston. Morris Island is a low strip of sandy beach, which lies to the south of Charleston and, with Sullivan's Island to the north, guards the entrance to the harbor, the two stretching out to sea like the open jaws of an alligator. They are each about three and a half miles long, separated from the mainland on the north, and from the high ground of James Island on the south, by miry and impracticable marshes stretching a distance of two or three miles. Their inner ends are a little less than four miles from the Charleston wharves, with Fort Sumter lying midway. Gillmore resolved to make his attack from Folly Island, which lies on the coast directly south of Morris, which it greatly resembles in conformation, and from which it is separated by Light House Inlet. It was occupied by a brigade under General Israel Vogdes, who had fortified the southern end of it, controlling the waters of Stono harbor and the approaches of James Island. There was a heavy growth of underbrush at both ends of the island; taking advantage of this, Vogdes, under

Gillmore's direction, constructed ten powerful batteries near its southern extremity, completely masked from the enemy's view; their purpose being to operate against the enemy's guns near the landing place, to protect the debarkation of the troops, and to cover their retreat in case of necessity. Most of this work was done at night, and all of it as silently as possible. . . . Alfred H. Terry's division of 4,000 and George C. Strong's brigade of 2,500 were quietly brought together on Folly Island, and on the afternoon of the 8th of July the former force was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against James Island, while Strong's brigade was ordered to descend upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Colonel T. W. Higginson of the First South Carolina Volunteers, colored, was ordered at the same time to cut the railroad between Charleston and Savannah; a duty in which General Gillmore says he 'signally failed.' The others punctually performed the tasks assigned them. Terry's feint against Stono was so imposing as to be taken for the real attack, by Beauregard, who hastily gathered together a considerable force to resist him, and paid little attention to the serious movement on the beach." The Confederate troops on Morris Island, taken by surprise, were "speedily driven out of all their batteries south of Wagner, and abandoned to Gillmore three-fourths of the island, with 11 pieces of heavy ordnance. The next day he ordered Strong's brigade to assault Fort Wagner, an attempt which failed, with slight loss on each side. On the 16th Terry was attacked by a superior force on James Island, and although he repulsed the enemy with the assistance of the gunboats which accompanied him, he was recalled to Folly Island, the purpose of his demonstration having been accomplished. Although General Gillmore had as yet no conception of the enormous strength of Fort Wagner, the assault and repulse of the 11th of July convinced him that it could not be carried off-hand. He therefore determined, on consultation with Admiral Dahlgren, to establish counter-batteries against it, hoping with the combined fire of these and the gunboats to dismount the guns of the work and so shake its defense as to carry it by a determined assault. The preparations were made with great energy, and by the morning of the 18th, exactly one week after the first assault, General Gillmore was ready for the second." The batteries and the fleet opened fire on the fort at noon of July 18th; its defenders were soon driven from the parapets, and "in the course of the afternoon the whole work seemed to be beaten out of shape"; but, being constructed of fine quartz sand, it had suffered damage only in appearance. At twilight, the storming party, headed by Colonel Robert G. Shaw and his Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment of colored troops, made a most brave and resolute assault, actually climbing the parapet of the fort, but only to leave 1500 dead, dying and wounded upon its treacherous sands. The heroic young Colonel Shaw fell dead among the foremost men; General Strong, Colonel Chatfield and Colonel Putnam were killed or mortally wounded; General Truman Seymour was wounded severely, and many other excellent officers were in the lists of the slain or the sadly disabled. "The death of Colonel Shaw was widely lamented, not only because of his personal

worth, but because he had become in a certain sense the representative of the best strain of New England anti-slavery sentiment. The Confederates recognized this representative character by their treatment of his corpse, replying to a request of his friends for his remains, that they 'had buried him under a layer of his niggers.'"—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 7, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: T. W. Higginson, *Army Life in a Black Regt.*—G. W. Williams, *Hist. of the Negro Troops*, ch. 9.—M. V. Dahlgren, *Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren*, ch. 14.—A. Roman, *Military Operations of Gen. Beauregard*, ch. 31 (v. 2).—D. Ammen, *The Navy in the Civil War*, v. 2: *The Atlantic Coast*, ch. 7.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 28.—L. F. Emilio, *Hist. of the 54th Regt. Mass. Vols.*, ch. 4-5.

A. D. 1863 (July—November: Virginia).—Meade and Lee on the Rapidan.—Bristoe Station.—Rappahannock Station.—Kelly's Ford.—Mine Run.—The 18th of July found the whole army of General Meade once more on the Virginia side of the Potomac. "His plan for the pursuit of Lee was not unlike that of McClellan a year before, but although he displayed much greater expedition and energy in the execution of it than were shown by his predecessor, the results, through no fault of his own, were unimportant. General French, who had taken no part in the battle of Gettysburg, had been placed in command of the Third Corps; he was an old officer of the regular army, excellent in drill, in routine, and all the every-day details of the service, but utterly unfit for an enterprise requiring great audacity and celerity. He was assigned upon this expedition to the duty of throwing his corps through Manassas Gap and attacking the flank of the enemy as he moved southward by Front Royal. Meade succeeded in getting French into the Gap in time to have broken the rebel army in two; but when he attacked, it was in so inefficient a manner, and with so small a portion of his force, that the day was wasted and the enemy made their way down the Valley to the lower gaps. This failure was a source of deep mortification to General Meade. . . . The pursuit of the enemy was not continued further. . . . The months of August and September were a period of repose for the Army of the Potomac. It was in fact in no condition to undertake active operations; a considerable body of troops had been taken from Meade for service in South Carolina, and a strong detachment had been sent to the City of New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft there. General Lee had retired behind the Rapidan for several weeks of rest; neither army was ready at that time to attack the other." Early in September Longstreet's Corps was detached from Lee's army and sent west to strengthen Bragg at Chattanooga, and in the latter part of the same month about 13,000 men (Eleventh and Twelfth Corps) were taken from Meade and sent, under Hooker's command, to the same scene of pending conflict. "But, even with this reduction of his command, after the return of the troops detached to the North, Meade found himself with an army of about 68,000 men; and, knowing this force to be somewhat superior to that of the enemy, he resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack him; but again, as so often happened in the history of the contending armies in Virginia, Lee had formed



the project of a similar enterprise, and began its execution a day or two in advance. He had learned of the departure of two corps for the West." On the 9th of October "he began a flanking movement to the right of the Union line."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 9.—"Conceiving that the Confederates would move by the Warrenton pike, in order to cross Bull Run and get possession of Centreville—thus to interpose between the Federal army and Washington—Meade retired as speedily as possible. He had, in reality, the start in the race, notwithstanding the day's loss in the return movement. . . . On the morning of the 14th, Lee advanced from Warrenton in two columns, but not by the 'pike.' The left, under Hill, moving by the turnpike to New Baltimore, was ordered to strike the railroad at Bristoe Station; the right column, under Ewell, taking a more easterly route, was directed to effect a junction at the same point. When Hill approached Bristoe, Meade's army, with the exception of Warren's corps, had passed that point. As the head of this column came up, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, had just crossed Broad Run. Hill at once formed a line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when Warren came up, and, by a bold onset, drove the enemy back, securing 450 prisoners and 5 guns. The National army, having won the race for position, and obtained possession of the heights of Centreville, Lee's movement was at an end, and he had but to retire to his old line again . . . and, on the 18th, began his retrograde movement. The following day Meade commenced pursuit, with the intention of attacking the enemy on his retreat, but did not overtake him, being detained by a heavy rain storm, which so raised Bull Run as to render it unfordable. . . . On the 7th of November the whole army was put in motion toward the Rappahannock, along which river the enemy was in position at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford. In two columns Meade advanced toward these points. Gen'l French, commanding the left wing—composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps—was directed to cross at Kelly's Ford, while the right wing—comprising the 5th and 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick—marched upon Rappahannock Station. The 3d Corps, under Birney, led the advance on Kelly's Ford. Reaching that point, without waiting for pontoons, Birney crossed his own division by wading, carried the rifle-pits, captured 500 prisoners and prevented the enemy re-enforcing their troops at the Ford, by means of batteries which he planted on the hills that commanded the crossing. At the same time the right wing was contending against more formidable obstacles at Rappahannock Station. Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied a series of works on the north side of the river. . . . Gaining a good position, commanding the fort from the rear, Sedgwick planted his guns and opened a fierce cannonade upon the enemy's several batteries. Under cover of this fire, the temporary works were assaulted and carried at the bayonet's point. Over 1,500 prisoners, 4 guns and 8 standards were captured. Sedgwick's loss was about 300 in killed and wounded. The right column now crossed the river without opposition, and, uniting with French's forces, advanced to Brandy Station. November 8th was lost in getting forward the trains, and in re-

connoitering. Under cover of that night Lee withdrew across the Rapidan. Taking position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, Meade remained quietly and undisturbed for two weeks. Finding Lee indisposed for action, the Federal leader resolved once more to try and bring on a general engagement. . . . The Confederate army having gone into winter quarters, was located over a wide extent of country. . . . This separation of the enemy's corps, led Meade to hope, that, by crossing the lower fords of the Rapidan, and advancing rapidly on the plank and turnpike roads to Orange, C. H., he could concentrate his army against Ewell's corps, cripple or destroy it, and then be able to turn upon Hill, and in this way break Lee's army in detail." But delays occurred which "frustrated the object of the movement; . . . disclosed Meade's intention to the enemy, who at once concentrated his entire force behind Mine Run, having also time given for additional entrenchments along the menaced points. The enemy's position was found to be exceedingly strong by nature, and further perfected by the skill of busy hands. . . . In front was Mine Run, a shallow stream, but difficult to cross on account of its steep banks, the marshy nature of the ground, and the dense undergrowth with which it was flanked. . . . 'In view of the season of the year [said General Meade in his subsequent report], the impossibility of moving from that place if there came on even a couple of days of rain; having failed in my first plan, which was to attack the enemy before they could concentrate; and then having failed in my plan to attack them after they had concentrated, in the manner which I have related, I concluded that, under the circumstances, it was impossible for me to do anything more.' And this was the end of a movement, which, like Hooker's advance to flank Fredericksburg, opened with fair promise of success, and, like that advance, was a failure from incidents which the situation permitted rather than asserted."—O. J. Victor, *Hist. of the Southern Rebellion*, div. 12, ch. 1 (v. 4).

ALSO IN: W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 10.—J. E. Cooke, *Life of Gen. Robt. E. Lee*, pt. 7.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 29.—A. A. Humphreys, *From Gettysburg to the Rapidan*.

A. D. 1863 (August: Missouri—Kansas).—Quantrell's guerrilla raid.—The sacking and burning of Lawrence.—"Since the fall of Vicksburg many rebel soldiers had returned from Arkansas to their homes in Western Missouri, and under the secret orders so frequently sent from commanders in the South into that State, the guerrilla bands along the Kansas border suddenly grew in numbers and audacity. Though the whole region was patrolled almost day and night by Union detachments and scouts, a daring leader named Quantrell, who had been for some weeks threatening various Kansas towns, assembled a band of 300 picked and well-mounted followers at a place of rendezvous near the line, about sunset of August 20. His object being divined, half a dozen Union detachments from different points started in chase of him; but skilfully eluding all of them by an eccentric march, Quantrell crossed the State line, and, reaching the open prairie country, where roads were unnecessary, pushed directly for Lawrence, Kansas. . . . This town was 40 miles in the interior,

and had no reason to apprehend an attack, and though it could have assembled several hundred men under arms in half an hour, its inhabitants had no dream of danger when the marauders entered the place at sunrise of August 21. Quantrell stationed detachments to prevent any assembling or concentration of the citizens, and then began a scene of pillage, arson and massacre too horrible to relate. Stores and banks were robbed, 185 buildings burned, and from 150 to 200 inhabitants murdered with a cold-blooded fiendishness which seems impossible to believe of Americans. The direful work occupied but three or four hours, when the perpetrators remounted their horses and departed. Though they managed their retreat with such skill as to avoid a general encounter, the pursuit was so hot that in several skirmishes, and by cutting off stragglers and laggards, 100 or more of the band were killed. The sudden calamity raised excitement on the Kansas border to almost a frenzy."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, p. 211.

**A. D. 1863 (August—September: Tennessee).—Burnside's deliverance of East Tennessee.—The Union Army in Knoxville.**—"Ever since the Federals had become masters of Kentucky they had projected an expedition into East Tennessee. . . . Early in the year 1862 the Federals had taken the defile of Cumberland Gap, the principal door to East Tennessee; but drawn into the pursuit of their adversaries in other directions, they had very wisely renounced proceeding beyond the gap, and shortly thereafter the Confederates had retaken the defile. In 1863 the rôle of liberator of East Tennessee was reserved for General Burnside: it was an honorable compensation accorded to the unfortunate but gallant soldier vanquished at Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the Ninth Corps designated to undertake this campaign having been, on June 4th, sent to the aid of Grant, it became necessary to commence new preparations. The scattered troops in Kentucky, several regiments recruited in that State or composed of refugees from East Tennessee, and a part of the fresh levies made in Ohio and Indiana, formed the Twenty-third Corps, under the orders of General Hartsuff. At the end of June . . . this little army was in readiness to move, when Morgan started on his raid [and Burnside's troops were sent in the pursuit]. Six weeks were lost. It was the beginning of August. The Ninth Corps was coming back from Vicksburg. But the men, worn out by the climate, had need of rest. Burnside could not wait for them." He set out upon his movement into East Tennessee with about 20,000 men, leaving Camp Nelson, near Lexington, on the 16th of August. The Confederate General Buckner opposed him with an equal number, including 3000 under General Fraser at Cumberland Gap. Instead of attempting to force the passage of the gap, Burnside "determined to make a flank movement around the defile, by traversing more to the south, in the State of Tennessee, the high table-land which on that side bears the designation of Cumberland plateau. The roads which Burnside would have to cross were long and difficult to travel, and that portion of the country was little known, besides being bare of resources; but the very difficult character of the roads warranted the belief that the Confederates would be illy

prepared for defence in that region. No precaution was neglected to ensure the success of this laborious and perilous march," and the success achieved was perfect. "One can understand with what joy the Federals, after eleven days of toilsome march, entered the rich valley, a kind of promised land, which stretched out before them. Public rumor had greatly exaggerated their numbers. . . . Bragg, fearing with reason lest by its flanking movements it [the division which Burnside led in person] should separate him from Buckner and then fall upon Chattanooga, had sent his lieutenant an order to evacuate Knoxville." Buckner withdrew and Burnside made a triumphal entry into Knoxville on the 3d of September. "According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the joy of the people was beyond description. Innumerable Federal flags which had been preserved in secret were displayed at the windows." Frazer, who had not been withdrawn from Cumberland Gap, found himself entrapped, when, on the 9th of September, Burnside appeared before his works, and he surrendered without a shot.—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 4, bk. 1, ch. 2.

**ALSO IN:** A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 3, ch. 4-5.—T. W. Humes, *The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee*, ch. 13.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 30, pt. 2.

**A. D. 1863 (August—September: Tennessee).—Rosecrans's advance to Chattanooga.—Evacuation of the place by the Confederates.—Battle of Chickamauga.**—"The seizure and occupation of the strategic point Chattanooga was an essential part of the campaign by the national forces against the Confederates. The Atlantic portion of the Southern States is separated from the Mississippi Valley by majestic folds of the earth's surface, constituting the Appalachian Ranges. These folds run, in a general manner, parallel to each other, and at intervals are crossed by transverse depressions or gaps. Such passages or gateways are therefore of great commercial, political and military importance. Chattanooga, which in the Cherokee language means 'The Hawk's Nest,' is a little town seated in one of these transverse depressions, through which the Tennessee River and a system of railroads pass. . . . From the region of Chattanooga the earth-folds range in a southwesterly direction. Enumerating such of them as are of interest on the present occasion, they are from west to east as follows: Raccoon or Sand Mountain, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, Chickamauga Hills. . . . Chattanooga Valley . . . through which runs a stream of the same name, is formed on the west by Lookout Mountain, here about 2,400 feet high, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so called because Catholic Missionaries had established, many years ago, churches and schools upon it among the Cherokee Indians. From the summit of Lookout Mountain portions of not fewer than six States may be seen." In his Tullahoma campaign—See above: 1863 (June—July: Tennessee)—Rosecrans, in July, had compelled Bragg and the Confederate army, by skilful flanking movements, to fall back to Chattanooga. He had ever since been urged from Washington to pursue his attack and dislodge the enemy from the mountains. But he delayed further movements for a month, repair-



ing his railroad communications, asking for reinforcements, and waiting for corn to ripen for food and forage. When he advanced, it was to turn the left of Bragg's position at Chattanooga, and "reach his rear between Dalton and Atlanta. To do this, he had to cross the Tennessee River below Chattanooga, and then pass the three or four successive mountain ridges. . . . Rosecrans reached the Tennessee River on the evening of the 20th of August, and shelled Chattanooga from the heights on the north bank on the 21st. Bridges were thrown over the river at Caperton's Ferry, mouth of Battle Creek, and Shell Mound, and the army, except the cavalry, safely crossed in face of the enemy. By the 8th of September" the several movements planned for Thomas, McCook and Crittenden were successfully accomplished, and Chattanooga was abandoned by the Confederates. "Thus the first object of Rosecrans's campaign was accomplished: the important strategic point Chattanooga was obtained. . . . Rosecrans, believing himself perfectly secure in Chattanooga, and being convinced that Bragg was fleeing southward, did nothing to fortify himself. Taking measures to pursue his antagonist, he directed Crittenden to leave one brigade at Chattanooga as a garrison, and with the rest move forward to Ringgold. Thomas was to march to Lafayette, and McCook upon Alpine and Summer Creek. But Bragg, so far from continuing, had stopped his retreat—he was concentrating at Lafayette. He had received, or was on the point of receiving, the powerful re-enforcements directed to join him. He was strictly ordered to check the farther advance of the Army of the Cumberland. . . . Rosecrans had separated three corps of his army by mountain ridges and by distances greater than those intervening between each of them and the enemy. Bragg had concentrated opposite his centre, and was holding such a position that he could attack any of them with overwhelming numbers. He had caused deserters and citizens to go into Rosecrans's lines to confirm him in the impression that the Confederates were in rapid retreat. . . . On the 11th of September, Crittenden, not stopping to fortify Chattanooga, pushed on toward Ringgold to cut off Buckner, who he had heard was coming from East Tennessee to the support of Bragg. Finding that Buckner had already passed, he turned toward Lafayette to follow him, going up the east side of the Chickamauga, but meeting a steadily increasing resistance he took alarm, and fell back across that stream at Lee and Gordon's Mills. The forces he had encountered were Cheatham's and Walker's divisions. Thomas, who had now discovered Bragg's position, directed McCook, who was advancing on Rome, to fall back instantly and connect with him. Rosecrans's troops had thus become scattered along an extended line from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a space of about forty miles. By the 17th they were brought more within supporting distance, and on the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Spring, but it was slowly executed. At this time the two armies were confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Chickamauga, a stream which, rising at the junction of Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain . . . empties into the beautiful Tennessee River above Chattanooga. In the Indian tongue

Chickamauga means 'The Stagnant Stream,' 'The River of Death'—a name, as we shall soon find, of ominous import. Rosecrans was on the west bank of the Chickamauga. . . . On the 18th his right was . . . at Gordon's Mills, his left near the road across from Rossville. Bragg's intention was to flank this left and interpose between it and Chattanooga. . . . On the 18th Longstreet's troops were arriving from Virginia, and Bragg was ready. . . . The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the morning of the 19th." Bragg's flanking movement, executed under General Polk, and directed against the left of Rosecrans's line, where Thomas had command, did not succeed. "The centre was then assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far indecisive. . . . The night was spent in preparation. Thomas constructed abatis and breastworks before his lines. . . . Bragg was still determined to flank the national left, and intervene between it and Chattanooga. He had ordered Polk to begin the battle as soon as it was light enough to see," but Polk delayed and it was not until 10 o'clock that "Breckenridge's division, followed by Cleburne's, advanced against the breastworks of Thomas, which were mostly in Cleburne's front. Cleburne moved directly upon them, Breckenridge swinging round to flank them. With so much energy were these attacks made, that Thomas had to send repeatedly to Rosecrans for help. The Confederates had been gaining ground, but with these re-enforcements Thomas succeeded in driving back Cleburne with very great loss, and even in advancing on the right of Breckenridge." But, presently, by some blunder in the giving or construing of an order, one division—that of General Wood—was withdrawn from Rosecrans line and posted uselessly in the rear. "By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which Hindman, of Longstreet's corps, took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear, threw his whole division into confusion. . . . That break in the line was never repaired. Longstreet's masses charged with such terrible energy that it was impossible to check them. The national right and centre were dispersed, flying toward Rossville and Chattanooga. Sheridan, however, at length succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his division, and managed to reach Thomas. On Thomas, who, in allusion to these events, is often called 'The Rock of Chickamauga,' the weight of the battle now fell. Everything depended on his firmness. . . . In the flight of the right and part of the centre from the field, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were enveloped and carried away. . . . Rosecrans . . . went to Chattanooga, and thence telegraphed to Washington that his army had been beaten. Thomas still remained immovable in his position," and at a critical moment he was saved from a movement into his rear, by General Gordon Granger, who pushed to the front with some reserves. "Night came, and the Confederates were still unable to shake him. But, as most of the army had retreated to Chattanooga, he now deliberately fell back to Rossville. . . . The dead and wounded he left in the hands of the enemy. On the 21st he offered battle again, and that night withdrew into the defences of Chattanooga."—J. W.

Draper, *Hist of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 67, v. 3. —“During the heavy fighting of the 20th, Thomas was the only general officer on the field of rank above a division commander. . . . Well was he called the ‘Rock of Chickamauga,’ . . . There is nothing finer in history than Thomas at Chickamauga. All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga, for the forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest battle of the Rebellion. . . . The largest number of troops Rosecrans had of all arms on the field during the two days’ fighting was 55,000 effective men. . . . Rosecrans’s losses aggregated killed, 1,687; wounded, 9,394; missing, 5,255. Total loss, 16,336. Bragg, during the battle, when his entire five corps were engaged, had about 70,000 effective troops in line. . . . His losses, in part estimated, were 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A full report of the rebel losses was never made.”—H. M. Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 7), ch. 11-12.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 4, bk. 1, ch. 2-6.—T. B. Van Horne, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 1, ch. 20.—The same, *Life of Major-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas*, ch. 6-7.—W. B. Hazen, *Narrative of Military Service*, ch. 8-9.—D. H. Hill, E. Opdycke, and others, *Chickamauga (Battles and Leaders*, v. 3).—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 30.—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 15.

**A. D. 1863 (August—October: Arkansas—Missouri).**—The breaking of Confederate authority in Arkansas.—Occupation of Little Rock by national forces.—Rebel raids into Missouri.—“After the surrender of Vicksburg, the Federal Gen. Steele was sent to Helena, with a considerable force, and instructed to form a junction with Gen. Davidson, who was moving south from Missouri, by way of Crowley’s Ridge, west of the St. Francis, and with the combined force drive the Confederates south of the Arkansas River. Having effected this junction and established his depot and hospitals at Duvall’s Bluff, on the White River, Gen. Steele, on the 1st of August, advanced against the Confederate army, which fell back toward Little Rock. After several successful skirmishes, he reached the Arkansas River, and threw part of his force upon the south side, to threaten the Confederate communications with Arkadelphia, their depot of supplies, and flank their position at Little Rock. Gen. Marmaduke was sent out with a cavalry force to beat the Federals back, but was completely routed. Seeing what must be the inevitable result of this movement of Gen. Steele, the Confederate Gen. Holmes destroyed what property he could, and after a slight resistance retreated with his army in great disorder, pursued by the Federal cavalry, and on the 10th of September Gen. Steele, with the Federal army, entered the capital of Arkansas. His entire losses in killed, wounded and missing, in this whole movement, did not exceed 100. He captured 1,000 prisoners, and such public property as the Confederates had not time to destroy. The Federal cavalry continued to press the retreating Confederates southward; but a small force, which had eluded pursuit and moved eastward, attacked the Federal garrison at Pine Bluff, on the Arkansas, south of Little Rock, hoping to recapture it and thus cripple the Federals and break their communications. The at-

tempt, which was made on the 28th of October, was repulsed with decided loss on the part of the confederates, and the same day the Federal cavalry occupied Arkadelphia, and the Confederates retreated toward the Red River. This completely restored Arkansas to the Federal authority, except a small district in the extreme southwest, and the region of Northwest Arkansas, over which the guerrilla and other irregular troops of the Confederates continued to roam, in their plundering excursions into Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Territory. Some of these were conducted on a large scale. . . . The Confederate Gen. Cabell, collecting together as many of the guerrillas and Indians as possible, and some of the routed troops driven from Little Rock and its vicinity, started with a force variously estimated at from 4,000 to 10,000, in the latter part of September, from the Choctaw settlements of the Indian Territory, crossed the Arkansas River east of Fort Smith, and, on the 1st of October, a detachment of his troops, under Gen. Shelby, joined Coffee at Crooked Prairie, Mo., intending to make a raid into Southwestern Missouri. This combined force, numbering 2,000 or 2,500 men, penetrated as far as the Missouri River at Booneville, but were pursued by the Missouri militia, and finally brought to a stand about eight miles southwest of Arrow Rock, on the evening of the 12th of October. Gen. E. B. Brown, who commanded the Federal troops, fought them till dark that evening, and during the night, having detached a small force to attack them in the rear, renewed the battle the next morning at eight A. M. After a sharp contest they fled, completely routed and broken up, with a loss of several hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. They were pursued to the Arkansas line and prisoners gleaned all the way. . . . With these last convulsive throes, the active existence of the Confederate authority in Arkansas died out. On the 12th of November a meeting was held at Little Rock, to consult on measures for the restoration of the State to the Union, and was succeeded by others in different parts of the State.”—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval Hist. of the Rebellion*, ch. 36.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 4, bk. 3, ch. 3.—W. Britton, *Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border*, ch. 21-22.

**A. D. 1863 (August—December: South Carolina).**—Siege and Reduction of Fort Wagner.—Bombardment of Fort Sumter and Charleston.—After the unsuccessful assault and bloody repulse of July 18th—See above: A. D. 1863 (JULY: SOUTH CAROLINA)—General Gillmore began against Fort Wagner the operations of a regular siege. “Trenches were dug, and by the middle of August the batteries were within a quarter-mile of Wagner and within two and a half miles of Sumter. The work on these batteries had to be done mostly by night, for the forts kept up a heavy fire. Another battery was also begun in the marsh on the west side of Morris Island. The black mud there was so soft that it would not bear the weight of a man, and was at least 16 feet deep. After the site was chosen, a lieutenant was ordered to superintend the work, and told to call for whatever materials he wanted. Being something of a wag, he sent to the quartermaster for 100 men 13 feet high, to work in mud 16 feet deep; but as men of that height could not be had, he had to be satis-



fied with workmen of common stature. All the work had to be done in the dark, for it was within range of the guns of the forts. During fourteen nights piles were driven through the mud into the solid ground beneath, and on them were piled 15,000 bags of sand to form a parapet. After breaking down several trucks, a monster eight-inch Parrott gun, a 200-pounder, was dragged across the swamp and mounted, and about the middle of August the Swamp Angel, as the soldiers named it, was ready to throw shells into Charleston, nearly five miles away. On the 17th of August twelve land-batteries and the monitors opened fire on Sumter, Wagner, and Gregg. The heaviest of the fire was aimed at Sumter, as General Gillmore wished to silence it before he made another assault on Wagner. The bombardment was kept up for seven days, when Gillmore sent a dispatch to General Halleck, saying: 'Fort Sumter is to-day (Aug. 24) a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.' On the 21st of August, General Gillmore wrote to General Beauregard, who was in command in Charleston, demanding the evacuation of Fort Sumter and of Morris Island, threatening, in case of refusal, to bombard Charleston. Not hearing from him, he ordered a few shells to be thrown into the city from the Swamp Angel. Some of them fell in the streets and frightened the people, but did little damage. Beauregard then wrote him a letter in which he accused him of barbarity in 'turning his guns against the old men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city,' and called the act 'unworthy of any soldier.' General Gillmore replied that it was the duty of the commander of an attacked place to 'see to it that the non-combatants were removed,' and that he (Beauregard) had had forty days' time in which to do it. But the Swamp Angel was fired only a few times. At the thirty-sixth shot it burst and blew out the whole of its breech, and no other gun was mounted in its place. Gillmore then turned his attention once more to Fort Wagner, which he determined to assault again. To do this it was necessary to silence its guns and drive its defenders into the bomb-proofs; so a heavy fire was opened on it by the batteries, while the armored frigate New Ironsides poured eleven-inch shells into it from the sea side. The bombardment was kept up day and night, strong calcium lights being used by night to blind the Confederates and to show all parts of their works. The Confederates, driven from their guns, were obliged to fly for safety to their bomb-proofs. In the morning of September 7, the troops, under General Terry, were about ready to make the assault, when it was reported that the fort was empty. The garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg had fled during the night, and the whole of Morris Island was at last in possession of the Union troops. The next night an attack was made on Sumter by thirty boat-loads of men from the fleet. They reached the base of the walls and began to go up, thinking that the garrison was asleep; but before they reached the top a fire of musketry and hand-grenades was opened on them by the Confederates within, aided by some gun boats outside, and the assailants were driven off with a loss of about 200. But little more was done against Charleston during the rest of the year. General Gillmore thought that, as Sumter's guns were silenced, the fleet might easily


pass into the harbor and capture Charleston. But Admiral Dahlgren did not care to run the risk of the torpedoes and powder-mines over which he knew he would have to pass. Besides, General Beauregard had taken advantage of the long delay in taking Wagner to strengthen the inner forts. Fort Johnson had been made into a powerful earthwork, and the fleet, even if Sumter were passed, would meet with as hot a fire as had been experienced outside. General Gillmore therefore contented himself with repairing Wagner and Gregg and turning their guns on Charleston and the forts defending it. As they were a mile nearer the city than the Swamp Angel battery, a slow bombardment was kept up until near the end of the year. About half of Charleston was reached by the shells, and many buildings were greatly injured. As the wharfs and most of the harbor were under fire, blockade-runners could no longer run in, and the business of the city was thus wholly destroyed."—J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young Folk's Hist. of the War for the Union*, ch. 32.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 4, bk. 3, ch. 2.—A. Roman, *Military Operations of Gen. Beauregard*, v. 2, ch. 32–34.—C. B. Boynton, *Hist. of the Navy during the Rebellion*, v. 2, ch. 35.—L. F. Emilio, *Hist. of the 54th Regt. Mass. Vols.*, ch. 6–7.


A. D. 1863 (October–November: Tennessee).—The raising of the siege of Chattanooga.—"Battle above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain.—Assault of Missionary Ridge.—The Rout of Bragg's army.—After its defeat at Chickamauga the National Army was practically besieged on Chattanooga. Bragg acquired strong positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and was able to cut off all of Rosecrans's routes of supply, except one long and difficult wagon-road. On the 17th of October an important reorganization of the Union armies in the West was effected. "The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, were united under the title of Military Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker, with two corps, was sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. It was impossible to supply the troops properly by the one wagon-road, and they had been on short rations for some time, while large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's first care was to open a new and better line of supply. Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry, which was done within five days, the 'cracker line,' as the soldiers called it, was opened, and thenceforth they had full rations and abundance of everything. The enemy attempted to interrupt the work on the road; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of Lookout Mountain, and after a three-hours' action drove them off [with a loss of 416 killed and wounded, the Confederate loss being unknown]. Chattanooga was now no longer in a state of siege; but it was still seriously menaced by Bragg's army, which held a most singular position. Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and Mission

# Map of the Battle-Field OF CHATTANOOGA 1863.

FROM THE "ATLAS TO ACCOMPANY THE OFFICIAL RECORDS  
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES"



THE MATTHEWS-NORZBURG CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.



--- Union Forces  
--- Confederate Forces  
--- Lines of Movement



Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley. This line was twelve miles long, and most of it was well intrenched. Grant ordered Sherman [coming from Memphis] to join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been detached from Bragg's army and sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men."—R. Johnson, *Short Hist. of the War of Secession*, ch. 20.—"My orders for battle," writes General Grant, "were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Ross-ville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge." Remaining in this concealed position until the time of attack, Sherman's army was then, under cover of night, to be rapidly brought back to the south side of the Tennessee, at a point where Missionary Ridge prolonged would touch the river, this being done by pontoons ready provided at a spot also concealed. The execution of the plan was delayed by heavy rains until November 23, when Burnside's distress at Knoxville forced Grant to begin his attack on Bragg by an advance of Thomas's army, at the center, before the flanking preparations were completed. "This movement [General Grant's narrative continues] secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about 1,100 killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing

of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. . . . By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move," and by daylight two divisions of his command were on the south side of the river, "well covered by the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. . . . By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga . . . and all the infantry and artillery were on the south side of the Tennessee. Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. . . . By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. . . . Artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. . . . While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. He had three divisions . . . all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and entrenched. . . . The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms. . . . Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. . . . This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over 40 men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. . . . By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. . . . The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at the moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce

him. . . . The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view. . . . Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base . . . and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured." The fighting was severe for hours, and Bragg moved heavy masses of troops to resist Sherman's advance, while a division from Thomas was sent to reinforce the latter. "It had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. . . . But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once." In this splendid charge the Union troops drove the Confederates from the first line of their works and then pushed on, with no further orders, to the second line, with the same success. "The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. . . . To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms that day. . . . The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. . . . Hooker [pushing on to Rossville as soon as he had succeeded in getting across Chattanooga Creek] . . . came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. . . . The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position."—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 42-44 (v. 2).—"Grant's losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing; total 5,616. The enemy's losses were fewer in killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was protected by intrenchments, while the national soldiers were without cover. Grant captured 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000 stand of small arms; by far the greatest capture, in the open field, which had

then been made during the war. The battle of Chattanooga was the grandest ever fought west of the Alleghanies. It covered an extent of 13 miles, and Grant had over 60,000 men engaged. The rebels numbered only 45,000 men, but they enjoyed immense advantages of position in every part of the field." Pursuit of the retreating Confederates began early in the morning of the 26th, and considerable fighting occurred on that day and the next. At Ringgold, Hooker was checked by Cleburne's division, which held an easily defended gap while the main column with its trains were moved beyond reach. In this battle at Ringgold Hooker lost 65 killed and 377 wounded. He took three pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners.—A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 11-12 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 5.—H. M. Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 7), ch. 13-14.—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 4, bk. 2.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, ch. 13 (v. 1).—P. H. Sheridan, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 16.—T. B. Van Horne, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, ch. 21-22 (v. 1).—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 31.—B. F. Taylor, *Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain*.

A. D. 1863 (October—December: Tennessee).—The Siege of Knoxville.—"The Army of the Cumberland remaining quiet at Chattanooga, Bragg (or his superiors) conceived the idea of improving his leisure by a movement on Burnside, which Longstreet was assigned to lead. Burnside had by this time spread his force very widely, holding innumerable points and places southward and eastward of Knoxville by brigades and detachments; and Longstreet advancing silently and rapidly, was enabled to strike heavily [October 20] at the little outpost of Philadelphia, held by Col. F. T. Wolford, with the 1st, 11th, and 12th Kentucky cavalry and 45th Ohio mounted infantry—in all about 2,000 men. Wolford . . . withstood several hours, hoping that the sound of guns would bring him assistance from Loudon in his rear; but none arrived; and he was at length obliged to cut his way out; losing his battery and 32 wagons, but bringing off most of his command, with 51 prisoners. . . . Our total loss in prisoners to Longstreet southward of Loudon is stated by Halleck at 650. The enemy advancing resolutely yet cautiously, our troops were withdrawn before them from Lenoir and from Loudon, concentrating at Campbell's Station—Gen. Burnside, who had hastened from Knoxville at the tidings of danger, being personally in command. Having been joined by his old (9th) corps, he was now probably as strong as Longstreet; but a large portion of his force was still dispersed far to the eastward, and he apprehended being flanked by an advance from Kingston on his left. He found himself so closely pressed, however, that he must either fight or sacrifice his trains; so he chose an advantageous position and suddenly faced the foe: his batteries being all at hand, while those of his pursuers were behind; so that he had decidedly the advantage in the fighting till late in the afternoon, when they brought up three batteries and opened, while their infantry were extended on either hand, as if to outflank him. He then fell back to the next ridge, and again faced about; holding his position firmly till after nightfall; when—his



trains having meantime obtained a fair start—he resumed his retreat, and continued it unmolested until safe within the sheltering intrenchments of Knoxville. Our loss in this affair was about 300; that of the enemy was probably greater. . . . Longstreet continued his pursuit and in due time beleaguered the city [November 17], though he can hardly be said to have invested it. . . . The defenses were engineered by Capt. Poe, and were signally effective. Directly on getting into position, a smart assault was delivered on our right, held by the 12th Illinois, 45th Ohio, 3d Michigan, and 12th Kentucky, and a hill carried; but it was not essential to the defenses. Our loss this day was about 100; among them was Gen. W. P. Sanders, of Kentucky, killed. Shelling and skirmishing barely served to break the monotony for ten weary days, when—having been reinforced by Sam Jones, and one or two others small commands from Virginia—Longstreet delivered an assault, by a picked storming party of three brigades, on an unfinished but important work known as Fort Sanders, on our left, but was bloodily repelled by Gen. Ferrero, who held it—the loss of the assailants being some 800, . . . while on our side the entire loss that night was about 100; only 15 of these in the fort. And now—Bragg having been defeated by Grant before Chattanooga, and a relieving force under Sherman being close at hand—Longstreet necessarily abandoned the siege, and moved rapidly eastward unassailed to Russellville, Virginia: our entire loss in the defense having been less than 1,000; while his must have been twice or thrice that number. Sherman's advance reached the city, and Burnside officially announced the raising of the siege, Dec. 5th.”—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps*, pt. 3, ch. 6.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 31, pt. 1.—T. W. Humes, *The Loyal Mountaineers of E. Tennessee*, ch. 14-16.

**A. D. 1863 (November).—President Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg.**—“By the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg and the immediate pursuit by Meade, the burial of the dead and care of the wounded on that great battlefield were left largely to the military and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania. Governor Andrew G. Curtin gave the humane and patriotic duty his thoughtful attention; and during its execution the appropriate design of changing a portion of the field into a permanent cemetery, where the remains of the fallen heroes might be brought together, and their last resting-place suitably protected and embellished, was conceived and begun. The citizen soldiery from seventeen of the loyal States had taken part in the conflict on the Union side, and the several Governors of these States heartily coöperated in the project, which thus acquired a National character. This circumstance made it natural that the dedication ceremonies should be of more than usual interest and impressiveness. Accordingly, at the beginning of November, 1863, when the work was approaching its completion, Mr. David Wills, the special agent of Governor Curtin, and also acting for the several States, who had not only originated, but mainly superintended, the enterprise, wrote the following letter of invitation to President Lincoln: ‘The several States having soldiers in the Army of the Potomac, who were killed at the battle of Gettys-

burg, or have since died at the various hospitals which were established in the vicinity, have procured grounds on a prominent part of the battlefield for a cemetery, and are having the dead removed to them and properly buried. These grounds will be consecrated and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Hon. Edward Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the Governors of the different States to invite you to be present and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks. It will be a source of great gratification to the many widows and orphans that have been made almost friendless by the great battle here, to have you here personally; and it will kindle anew in the breasts of the comrades of these brave dead, who are now in the tented field or nobly meeting the foe in the front, a confidence that they who sleep in death on the battlefield are not forgotten by those highest in authority; and they will feel that, should their fate be the same, their remains will not be uncared-for. We hope you will be able to be present to perform this last solemn act to the soldier dead on this battlefield.’ President Lincoln expressed his willingness to perform the duty requested of him. . . . At the appointed hour on the 19th a vast procession, with military music, moved to the cemetery grounds where, in the midst of a distinguished auditory, the orator of the day, Edward Everett, made an address worthy alike of his own fame and the extraordinary occasion. . . . Mr. Everett ended in a brilliant peroration, the echoes of which were lost in the long and hearty plaudits of the great multitude, and then President Lincoln arose to fill the part assigned him in the programme. It was a trying ordeal to fittingly crown with a few brief sentences the ceremonies of such a day, and such an achievement in oratory; finished, erudite, apparently exhaustive of the theme, replete with all the strength of scholastic method and the highest graces of literary culture. If there arose in the mind of any discriminating listener on the platform a passing doubt whether Mr. Lincoln would or could properly honor the unique occasion, that doubt vanished with his opening sentence; for then and there the President pronounced an address of dedication so pertinent, so brief yet so comprehensive, so terse yet so eloquent, linking the deeds of the present to the thoughts of the future, with simple words, in such living, original, yet exquisitely molded, maxim-like phrases that the best critics have awarded it an unquestioned rank as one of the world's masterpieces in rhetorical art. He said: ‘Four-score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense,

we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 7.

**A. D. 1863 (December).**—The President's Message to Congress, at the opening of its session, December 8, was accompanied by the following Proclamation of Amnesty, which made known the terms of political reconstruction and rehabilitation that would be favored by the Executive, in dealing with rebellious citizens who might return to their allegiance:

“Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that the President ‘shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;’ and Whereas a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State governments of several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have committed and are now guilty of treason against the United States; and Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been enacted by Congress declaring forfeitures and confiscation of property and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated, and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare; and Whereas the congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon accords with well established judicial exposition of the pardoning power; and Whereas, with reference to said rebellion, the President of the United States has issued several proclamations, with provisions in regard to the liberation of slaves; and Whereas it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to reinaugurate loyal State governments within and for their respective States: Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare and make known to all persons who have directly, or by implication, participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath in-

violate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to wit: ‘I, ———, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God.’ The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have been, military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate Government above the rank of colonel in the Army, or of lieutenant in the Navy; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States, and afterwards aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity. And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, [Virginia?], Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at the presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of the State existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision which declares that ‘the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.’ And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that any provision which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the national Executive. And it is suggested as not improper, that, in constructing a loyal State government in any



State, the name of the State, the boundary, the subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws, as before the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by those framing the new State government. To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say that this proclamation, so far as it relates to State governments, has no reference to States wherein loyal State governments have all the while been maintained. And for the same reason, it may be proper to further say, that whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal State governments may be re-established within said States, or in any of them; and, while the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable. Given under my hand, at the City of Washington, the eighth day of December, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-eighth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

In the Message Mr. Lincoln gave his reasons for the Proclamation, and explained the grounds on which he rested the policy declared in it, as follows: "On examination of this proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution. True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities. It is also proffered that if, in any of the States named, a State government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under it the State shall, on the constitutional conditions, be protected against invasion and domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is explicit and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only to a State government set up in this particular way? This section of the Constitution contemplates a case wherein the element within a State, favorable to republican government, in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which we are now dealing. An attempt to guarantee and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements

so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness. But if it be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and proclamations in regard to slavery? Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may add at this point, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. For these and other reasons it is thought best that support of these measures shall be included in the oath; and it is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, which he has clear constitutional power to withhold altogether, or grant upon the terms which he shall deem wisest for the public interest. It should be observed, also, that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision. The proposed acquiescence of the national Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must at best attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no power of the national Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition. The suggestion in the proclamation as to maintaining the political frame-work of the States on what is called reconstruction, is made in the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor, and avoid great confusion. But why any proclamation now upon this subject? This question is beset with the conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or be taken too soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for action, but remain inactive, apparently for want of a rallying-point—a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the plan of B, rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how can they know but that the General Government here will reject their plan? By the proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as a rallying-point, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would. The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the national Executive consists in the danger of commitments on points which could be more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassments from this source. Say-

ing that, on certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other classes, or other terms, will never be included. Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way. The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the States, not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation. In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power alone we can look, yet for a time, to give confidence to the people in the contested regions, that the insurgent power will not again overrun them. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be directed to the army and navy, who have thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated. Abraham Lincoln."—A. Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 442-456.

A. D. 1863-1864 (December—April: Tennessee—Mississippi).—Winter operations.—**Sherman's Meridian Expedition.**—**Longstreet's withdrawal from East Tennessee.**—"Sherman was at Vicksburg. On a line with Vicksburg, but almost on the eastern boundary of the State, was the town of Meridian. Here two railroads crossed, one running north and south, extending from Mobile into the heart of Tennessee, and the other extending to the eastward into Alabama and Georgia. Railroads were few in the South at that time and the junction had made Meridian an important point. Here the Confederates had erected great warehouses for the storage of provisions and munitions of war. A considerable body of troops, too, was maintained at this point, whence they could be sent speedily by rail north or south, east or west, as the necessity might arise. General Sherman determined to fall upon Meridian, drive away the Confederate garrison, burn the arsenal and tear up the railroads so as to isolate the different parts of the Confederacy thenceforth. But in addition to accomplishing this he desired to effect the defeat and dispersal of the Confederate cavalry force under General Forrest, which was operating in Northern Mississippi and Southern Tennessee. Forrest was a brave and dashing leader. His men were hardy troopers, used to quick marches and reckless of danger. To crush him and annihilate his command would be a notable victory for the Union cause. Full of this project, Sherman boarded a steamer at Vicksburg and set out for Memphis, where were the headquarters of General W. Sooy Smith, then chief of cavalry in the division of the Mississippi. The river was full of great cakes of floating ice that bumped against the prow of the boat and ground against

her sides until those on board feared that she might be sent to the bottom. But Memphis was reached without accident, and Sherman and the chief of cavalry were soon in earnest consultation. General Smith was ordered to take the field against Forrest with a force of 7,000 men. . . . It was agreed that General Smith should start from Memphis on February 1 and march southeast, while Sherman should leave Vicksburg February 3, and march due east. Thus they would effect a junction in the vicinity of Meridian. Sherman then re-embarked on the icy river and made his way back to Vicksburg. Promptly on the appointed day the head of Sherman's column passed out through the chain of earthworks that girdled the landward side of Vicksburg. It was to be an expedition of destruction—a raid. His force of 25,000 men was in light marching order and advanced with such rapidity that the Confederates were driven from the very first, without having time to rally and oppose the advance of the invaders. Jackson was reached without any fighting, other than slight skirmishing with Polk's cavalry. The ministerial general had but 9,000 men in all, so he dared not make a determined stand against Sherman, but fled, without even destroying his pontoon bridge across the Pearl River, whereby the Federal advance was much expedited. From Jackson eastward the path of Sherman's army was marked by a broad belt of ashes and desolation. No public property was spared, nor anything which could be applied to public uses. Mills, railway stations, and rolling stock were burned. Railway tracks were torn up, the ties heaped on roaring fires and the rails heated red-hot and twisted out of shape. Sometimes the soldiers would twine a hot rail about a young tree, making what they facetiously termed 'Jeff Davis's neck-ties.' To Sherman's lines came escaping slaves in droves, old and young men, women and pickaninies. . . . The slaves still further impoverished their masters by taking horses and mules with them when they fled, so that after Sherman's army had passed, most of the plantations in its track were stripped of their live-stock, both cattle and human. When Meridian was reached its defenders were nowhere to be seen. Sherman took possession and waited for Smith. Days passed without any word coming from the cavalry column. After a week in Meridian, Sherman set the torch to the public buildings and retraced his steps toward Vicksburg. He had taken 400 prisoners, destroyed 150 miles of track, 67 bridges, 20 locomotives and 28 cars; had burned several thousand bales of cotton, a number of steam mills, and over 2,000,000 bushels of corn. Over 1,000 Union white refugees and 8,000 negroes followed in his wake. In 1866, the historian Lossing, passing through Meridian, asked the Mayor of the town if Sherman had done the place much injury. 'Injury' was the emphatic reply, 'Why, he took it away with him.'"—W. J. Abbot, *Battle Fields and Victory*, ch. 1.—General Smith, in his report to General Sherman, gave the reasons for the falling back of the cavalry expedition, as follows: "We advanced to West Point and felt of the enemy, who was posted back of the Sakatonchee on our right and the Oktibbeha in our front, in force fully equal to my own that was available for service, encumbered as we were with our pack-mules and the captured stock, which by this time must have



numbered full 3,000 horses and mules. The force consisted of mounted infantry, which was dismounted and in strong position under good cover, and beyond obstacles which could only be passed by defiles. To attempt to force my way through under such circumstances would have been the height of folly. I could not cross the Tombigbee, as there were no bridges and the stream could not be forded. To have attempted to turn the position by our right would have carried me all the way round to Houston again, and Forrest could again check me at the Houlika Swamp. I was ten days behind time; could get no communication through to you; did not know but what you were returning, and so determined to make a push at Forrest in front while I retired all my incumbrances and my main body rapidly toward Okolona, just in time to prevent a rebel brigade from getting in my rear, which had been thrown back for that purpose. We then retired, fighting for over 60 miles day and night."—*Official Records, Series 1, v. 32, pt. 1, p. 252.*—In East Tennessee, during the winter little was done by either army. A slight encounter occurred at Dandridge, in January, between Longstreet's forces and those of the Union General Parke. In April Longstreet was recalled by Lee, and the Ninth Corps, with Burnside again in command, went back to the army of the Potomac.—J. D. Cox, *Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 9), ch. 1-2.*

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant, v. 1, ch. 13.*—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am., v. 4, bk. 4, ch. 1.*—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, v. 1, ch. 14.*—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval Hist., ch. 38.*

**A. D. 1863-1864 (December—July).—President Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, and its application to Louisiana.—The opposing Congressional plan.**—"The proclamation which accompanied the Annual Message of the President for 1864 embodied the first suggestions of the Administration on the important subject of reconstructing the Governments of those States which had joined in the secession movement. The matter had been canvassed somewhat extensively by the public press, and by prominent politicians, in anticipation of the overthrow of the rebellion. . . . A considerable number of the friends of the Government, in both houses, maintained that, by the act of secession, the revolted States had put themselves outside the pale of the Constitution, and were henceforth to be regarded and treated, not as members of the Union, but as alien enemies:—that their State organizations and State boundaries had been expunged by their own act; and that they were to be readmitted to the jurisdiction of the Constitution, and to the privileges of the Union, only upon such terms and conditions as the Federal Government of the loyal States might prescribe. . . . After the appearance of the President's proclamation, the movement towards reconstruction in Louisiana assumed greater consistency, and was carried forward with greater steadiness and strength. On the 8th of January a very large Free State Convention was held at New Orleans, at which resolutions were adopted indorsing all the acts and proclamations of the President, and urging the immediate adoption of measures for the restoration of the State to its old place in the Union. On the 11th, General Banks issued a proclamation, appointing

an election for State officers on the 22d of February, who were to be installed on the 4th of March, and another election for delegates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the State on the first Monday in April. The old Constitution and laws of Louisiana were to be observed, except so far as they relate to slavery. . . . Under this order, parties were organized for the election of State officers. The friends of the National Government were divided, and two candidates were put in nomination for Governor, Hon. Michael Hahn being the regular nominee, and representing the supporters of the policy of the President, and Hon. B. F. Flanders being put in nomination by those who desired a more radical policy than the President had proposed. Both took very decided ground against the continued existence of slavery within the State. . . . The election resulted in the election of Mr. Hahn. . . . Mr. Hahn was inaugurated as Governor on the 4th of March. On the 15th he was clothed with the powers previously exercised by General Banks, as military governor. . . . On March 16th, Governor Hahn issued a proclamation, notifying the electors of the State of the election for delegates to the convention previously ordered by General Banks. The party which elected Governor Hahn succeeded also in electing a large majority of the delegates to the convention, which met in New Orleans on the 6th of April. On the 11th of May it adopted, by a vote of 70 to 16, a clause of the new Constitution, by which slavery was forever abolished in the State. The Constitution was adopted on the 5th of September, by a vote of 6,836 to 1,566. Great umbrage was taken at these proceedings by some of the best friends of the cause, as if there had been an unauthorized and unjustifiable interference on the part of the President. . . . In Arkansas, where a decided Union feeling had existed from the outbreak of the rebellion, the appearance of the proclamation was the signal for a movement to bring the State back into the Union. On the 20th of January, a delegation of citizens from that State had an interview with the President, in which they urged the adoption of certain measures for the re-establishment of a legal State Government, and especially the ordering of an election for Governor. . . . Meantime, a convention had assembled at Little Rock, composed of delegates elected without any formality, and not under the authority of the General Government, and proceeded to form a new State Constitution, and to fix a day for an election. . . . The convention framed a constitution abolishing slavery, which was subsequently adopted by a large majority of the people. It also provided for the election of State officers on the day appointed for the vote upon the constitution; and the legislature chosen at that election elected two gentlemen, Messrs. Fishback and Baxter, as United States Senators, and also Representatives. These gentlemen presented their credentials at Washington. . . . The whole matter was referred to the Judiciary Committee, who . . . reported on the 27th of June that on the facts it did not appear that the rebellion was so far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle the State to representation in Congress, and that therefore Messrs. Fishback and Baxter were not entitled to seats as Senators from the State of Arkansas. And the Senate on the next day adopted their report by a vote of 27 to 6. In the House, meanwhile,

the Committee on Elections, to whom the application of the Arkansas members had been referred, reported to postpone their admission until a commission could be sent to inquire into and report the facts of the election, and to create a commission for the examination of all such cases. This proposition was, however, laid on the table, and the members were not admitted. . . . The cause of the rejection of these Senators and Representatives was, that a majority in Congress had not agreed with the President in reference to the plan of reconstruction which he proposed. A bill for the reconstruction of the States was introduced into the Senate, and finally passed both Houses on the last day of the session. It provided that the President should appoint, for each of the States declared in rebellion, a Provisional Governor, who should be charged with the civil administration of the State until a State Government should be organized and such other civil officers as were necessary for the civil administration of the State; that as soon as military resistance to the United States should be suppressed and the people had sufficiently returned to their obedience, the Governor should make an enrolment of the white male citizens, specifying which of them had taken the oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and if those who had taken it were a majority of the persons enrolled, he should order an election for delegates to a Constitutional Convention, to be elected by the loyal white male citizens of the United States aged twenty-one years. . . . The bill further provided that when a constitution containing . . . provisions [excluding rebels from office, prohibiting slavery, and repudiating Confederate debts] should have been framed by the convention and adopted by the popular vote, the Governor should certify that fact to the President, who, after obtaining the assent of Congress, should recognize this government so established as the Government of the State, and from that date senators and representatives and electors for President and Vice-President should be elected in the State. . . . This bill thus passed by Congress was presented to the President just before the close of the session, but was not signed by him."—H. J. Raymond, *Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 16.—The President's reasons for not signing the bill were given to the public as well as to Congress in the following Proclamation:

"Whereas, at the late session, Congress passed a bill to 'guarantee to certain States, whose governments have been usurped or overthrown, a republican form of government,' a copy of which is hereunto annexed; And whereas the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than one hour before the sine die adjournment of said session, and was not signed by him; And whereas the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known, that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared, by a formal approval of this bill, to be inflexibly committed to any

single plan of restoration; and, while I am also unprepared to declare that the free-State constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-ninth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."—A. Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, p. 545.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 3.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 16-17.

A. D. 1864 (January—February : Florida).—Unsuccessful Operations.—Battle of Olustee.—"Early in the winter of 1863-64, General Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, . . . resolved upon an expedition into Florida to take possession of such portions of the Eastern and Northern sections of the State as could be easily held by small garrisons. . . . He afterwards added another detail to his plan: to assist in bringing Florida back into the Union, in accordance with the President's Proclamation of December 8, 1863. This came in time to be regarded by the opponents of the Administration as the sole purpose of the expedition, and Mr. Lincoln has received a great deal of unjust censure for having made a useless sacrifice of life for a political end. . . . The expedition to Florida was under the immediate charge of General Truman Seymour, an accomplished and gallant officer of the regular army. He landed at Jacksonville and pushed forward his mounted force 20 miles to Baldwin. . . . Gillmore himself arrived at Baldwin on the 9th of February, and after a full conference and, as he thought, understanding with Seymour, returned to Jacksonville. . . . On the 18th he was surprised at receiving a letter from Seymour, dated the day before, announcing his intention of moving at once to the Suwannee River without supplies, and asking for a strong demonstration of the army and navy in the Savannah River to assist his movement. . . . Gillmore wrote a peremptory letter, ordering him to restrict himself to holding Baldwin and the south prong of the St. Mary's River and occupying Palatka and Magnolia, and dispatched a staff officer to Florida with it. He arrived too late. Seymour had made up his mind that there was



less risk in going forward than in staying at Baldwin, and like the brave and devoted soldier that he was had resolved to take the responsibility. He marched rapidly out towards Olustee, where the enemy under General Joseph Finegan was supposed to be, but came upon them unexpectedly about two miles east of that place. The forces were equal in numbers, about 5,500 on each side; the advantage to the Confederates was that they were in a strong position selected by themselves and ready for the fight. General J. R. Hawley, who commanded a brigade of infantry in the battle, says: 'We rushed in, not waiting for the proper full formation, and were fought in detail.' . . . Seymour's attack was constantly repulsed with heavy loss, until at nightfall he fell back to a new line. He was not pursued, and retired in good order and unmolested to Jacksonville. The Union loss was 1861; the Confederate, 940. This misadventure put an end for the moment to the attempt to occupy Florida."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: S. Jones and J. R. Hawley, *Olustee (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).—L. F. Emilio, *Hist. of the 54th Regt. Mass. Vols.*, ch. 8.

A. D. 1864 (February—March: Virginia).—Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's Raid to Richmond.—"Public feeling throughout the North had been greatly excited by the deplorable condition of the prisoners of war held at Richmond. Early in the year, before the opening of the great campaign, some expeditions had been undertaken both from the Army of the Potomac and from Fortress Monroe, with the intention of relieving them. On February 27th, Custer, with 1500 horse, had crossed the Rapidan on a feint to the west of the Confederate army, while Kilpatrick, starting on the following day, moved down on its opposite flank, by Spottsylvania Court House, to within 3½ miles of Richmond, passing its first and second lines of defenses [March], but being obliged to fall back from its third. Pursued by a force of the enemy, he was compelled to cross the White House Railroad and move down the peninsula. A detachment of Kilpatrick's force, 400 strong, under Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, leaving the main body at Spottsylvania, had gone to the right through Louisa and Goochland Counties, intending to cross the James River and enter Richmond from the south, while Kilpatrick attacked it on the north. But the river was found to be too deep to be forded. Dahlgren passed down the north bank to the fortifications of Richmond, forcing his way through the outer works, but being repulsed from the inner. Finding that Kilpatrick's attempt had miscarried, he moved toward King and Queen Court House; but after crossing the Mattaponi at Dabney's Ferry, he fell into an ambuscade [March 3], his command being scattered, and himself killed. Under a false pretense that papers were found upon him showing an intention to set fire to Richmond, and take the lives of Davis and his cabinet, his corpse was insulted and the place of its interment concealed. At the time of his death he was but 21 years of age."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 82 (v. 3).—"The document alleged to have been found upon the person of Colonel Dahlgren is utterly discredited by the fact that the signature attached to it cannot possibly be his own, because it is not his name,—a letter is misplaced, and the real name Dahlgren

is spelled 'Dahlgren'; hence it is undeniable that the paper is not only spurious, but is a forgery. . . . It is entirely certain that no such orders were ever issued by Colonel Dahlgren."—Admiral J. A. Dahlgren, *Memoir of Ulric Dahlgren*, pp. 233-234.

ALSO IN: C. C. Chesney, *Essays in Military Biog.*, p. 185.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 10.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 33.

A. D. 1864 (March—April).—General Grant in chief command of the whole army.—His plans of campaign.—"Immediately after the victories at Chattanooga Mr. Washburne of Illinois, the devoted friend and firm supporter of General Grant through good and evil report, introduced a bill in Congress to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the army. The measure occasioned a good deal of discussion. This high rank had never been conferred on any citizen of the republic except Washington, who held it for a short time before his death. It was discontinued for more than half a century and then conferred by brevet only upon General Scott. There were those who feared, or affected to fear, that so high a military rank was threatening to the liberties of the republic. The great majority of Congress, however, considered the liberties of the republic more robust than this fear would indicate, and the bill was finally passed on the 26th of February, and received the approval of the President on the 29th of February. . . . Immediately upon signing the bill the President nominated Grant to the Senate for the office created by it. . . . The Senate immediately confirmed his nomination, and on the 3d of March the Secretary of War directed him to report in person to the War Department as early as practicable. . . . He started for Washington the next day, but in the midst of his hurried preparations for departure he found time to write a letter of the most warm and generous friendship to Sherman." Grant's commission as Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States was formally presented to him by President Lincoln on the 9th of March. "After the presentation of the commission a brief conversation took place. General Grant inquired what special service was expected of him. The President replied that our country wanted him to take Richmond; he said our generals had not been fortunate in their efforts in that direction and asked if the Lieutenant-General could do it. Grant, without hesitation, answered that he could if he had the troops. These the President assured him he should have. There was not one word said as to what route to Richmond should be chosen. The next day Grant visited General Meade at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station. . . . Meade said that it was possible Grant might want an officer to command the Army of the Potomac who had been with him in the West, and made especial mention of Sherman. He begged him if that was the case not to hesitate about making the change. . . . Grant assured him that he had no thought of making any change; and that Sherman could not be spared from the West. He returned to Washington on the 11th. The next day he was placed in command of all the armies by orders from the War Department; but without waiting for a single day to accept the lavish proffers of hospitality which were showered upon

him, he started West again on the evening of the 11th of March. In that short time he had utterly changed his views and plans for the future conduct of the war. He had relinquished the purpose he had hitherto firmly held of leading the Western armies on the great campaign to Atlanta and the sea, and had decided to take the field with the Army of the Potomac. . . . Sherman at his request was promoted to command the Military Division of the Mississippi, McPherson succeeded to Sherman's command of the Department of the Tennessee, and Logan was promoted to the command of McPherson's corps." The necessary arrangements were quickly made. General Sherman assumed his enlarged command on the 18th of March, and General Grant a few days later was with the Army of the Potomac. He "established his headquarters at Culpeper Court House near the end of March, and spent a month in preparations for the great campaign which he, in common with the entire North, hoped would end the war. . . . The plan of the Lieutenant-General, as set forth in his report, was extremely simple. So far as practicable, the armies were to move together, and towards one common center. Banks was to finish his operations in Louisiana, and, leaving a small garrison on the Rio Grande, was to concentrate an army of some 25,000 men, and move on Mobile. Sherman was to move simultaneously with the other armies, General Johnston's army being his objective, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. Sigel, who was in command in the Shenandoah, was to move to the front in two columns, one to threaten the enemy in the Valley, the other to cut the railroads connecting Richmond with the Southwest. Gillmore was to be brought north with his corps, and in company with another corps, under W. F. Smith, was to form an army under General B. F. Butler to operate against Richmond south of the James. Lee's army was to be the objective point of Meade, reinforced by Burnside. As to the route by which the Army of the Potomac was to advance, Grant reserved his decision until just before he started upon his march. . . . The two armies lay in their intrenchments on both sides of the Rapidan. The headquarters . . . of Lee [were] at Orange Court House; the Army of Northern Virginia guarded the south bank of the river for 18 or 20 miles, Ewell commanding the right half, A. P. Hill the left. The formidable works on Mine Run secured the Confederate right wing, which was further protected by the tangled and gloomy thickets of the Wilderness. Longstreet had arrived from Tennessee with two fine divisions, and was held in reserve at Gordonsville. The two armies were not so unequally matched as Confederate writers insist. The strength of the Army of the Potomac, present for duty equipped, on the 30th of April, was 122,146; this includes the 22,708 of Burnside's Ninth Corps. The Army of Northern Virginia numbered at the opening of this campaign not less than 61,953. While this seems like a great disparity of strength, it must not be forgotten that the Confederate general had an enormous advantage of position. The dense woods and the thickly timbered swamps . . . were as well known to him as the lines of his own hand, and were absolutely unknown to his antagonist."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 13-14.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 46-47 (v. 2).

A. D. 1864 (March—May: Louisiana).—The Red River Expedition.—"As the third year began, Gen. Banks conceived the idea that the trade of Western Louisiana could be opened by the medium of the Red river, and projected an expedition to take possession of the country adjacent to its course. This river is open for navigation by larger vessels, only during the high water of March and April. Porter was to command the fleet of twenty of the finest vessels on the Mississippi, and Sherman was persuaded to lend some of his troops for the purpose. A. J. Smith was to start from Vicksburg with 10,000 men, while Banks would proceed up river from New Orleans, with Franklin's division. Steele from Little Rock was to operate towards Shreveport to join the main army. General Taylor was in command of the enemy's forces at Shreveport. The fleet started up the Red river in company with the transports carrying A. J. Smith's column. Fort De Russey was captured [March 14], the enemy retiring before our troops, and Alexandria and Natchitoches fell into our hands as the joint force advanced. Banks put in an appearance a week later. There was more or less skirmishing with the enemy's horse and outposts along the entire route; and near Mansfield, at Sabine Cross-Roads, the vanguard met the enemy in force. Sufficient care had not been taken to keep the several bodies concentrated. It was on Smith that the attack fell [April 8], and though this general's record for endurance is of the best, he was nevertheless badly worsted with a loss of 2,000 men out of 8,000 engaged, and some twenty guns. Retiring to Pleasant Hill, another stand was made for the possession of what had been so far gained. . . . The fleet had meanwhile reached Grand Ecore. High water was coming to an end, and Porter was obliged to return down river, to Alexandria. Here it was found that most of the vessels were of too heavy draught to pass the falls below the town; and the loss of most of them would have been certain, but for a dam and waterway ably constructed by Colonel Bailey, an engineer remarkably fertile in expedients. By means of this device the fleet was safely floated over. On the retreat, Alexandria was burned [May 15] by accident, traceable to no particular cause, though, naturally enough laid by the Confederates to our spirit of revenge."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War*, ch. 31.—"We prefer not to enter into the bitter discussions to which this disastrous campaign gave rise on both sides of the line. A life-long quarrel sprang up between Kirby Smith and Taylor, between Banks and Porter, while Franklin, Charles P. Stone (Banks's chief-of-staff), and Albert L. Lee, all of whom relinquished their commands, added their quota of misunderstanding and resentment. . . . The Committee on the Conduct of the War made an investigation of the matter in the year 1865, at the time when the antagonism between Mr. Lincoln and the Radicals in relation to the subject of reconstruction had assumed an acute form. . . . The charge was made by the committee against Banks, that what he had in view was to carry out measures for the establishment of a State government in Louisiana, and to afford an egress for cotton and other products of that region, and that the attention directed to the accomplishment of these



objects exerted an unfavorable influence on the expedition. . . . The honorable poverty in which General Banks has passed his subsequent life is the best answer to the reckless charges of his enemies."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 11.

Also in: D. D. Porter, *Naval Hist. of the Civil War*, ch. 41-42.—*Rept. of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War*, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 2.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 34.—R. B. Irwin, *Hist. of the 19th Army Corps*, ch. 23-28.

**A. D. 1864 (March—October: Arkansas—Missouri).—Last important operations in the West.—Price's raid.**—"During the winter of 1863-64 the forces of Generals Steele and Blunt held the Arkansas River as a Federal line of advance. . . . During this period of inactivity, however, Steele was making preparations for a vigorous spring campaign. It was decided that the column under General Banks and the columns under General Steele from Little Rock and Fort Smith should converge toward Shreveport, Louisiana. The Federal columns under Steele left Little Rock and Fort Smith the latter part of March, moved toward the Southern part of the State, and after some fighting and manoeuvring drove General Price's forces from Camden, Arkadelphia and Washington. In the midst of these successful operations, Steele received information that Banks' army had been defeated and was retreating [See above (MARCH—MAY: LOUISIANA)], and that Price had received reinforcements from Kirby Smith of 5000 infantry and a complement of artillery, and would at once assume the offensive. Not feeling strong enough to fight the combined Confederate forces, Steele determined to fall back upon Little Rock. He had scarcely commenced his retrograde movement when Smith and Price began to press him vigorously. A retreating fight was kept up for several days, until the Federal army reached Jenkins's Ferry on the Saline River," where Smith and Price made an energetic attack on the Federal army (April 30) and were repulsed with heavy loss. "After the battle of Jenkins's Ferry, instead of making preparations to attack the Federal forces at Little Rock and Fort Smith, Price commenced organizing his forces for an expedition into Missouri. . . . Price's army for the invasion of Missouri numbered some 15,000 men and 20 pieces of artillery before crossing the Arkansas River, and consisted of three divisions, commanded by Generals Fagan, Marmaduke and Shelby. . . . About the 1st of September, while strong demonstrations were being made against Fort Smith and Little Rock, Price, with his army, crossed the Arkansas River about half-way between those points, at Dardanelle, and marched to the northern part of the State without opposition, and, in fact, without his movements being definitely known to General Rosecrans, who then commanded the Department of the Missouri at St. Louis," to which he had been appointed in January. At Pilot Knob, where they arrived September 26th, the Confederates were opposed by General Thomas Ewing, Jr., with a small force of 1051 men. The fortifications at Pilot Knob were strong and Ewing held them against the vigorous attacks of Price throughout the 27th, but evacuated that night, blowing up the magazine and retreating safely. The Confederate invaders then marched on St. Louis and attacked the outer defences of

the city, some miles to the south of it, but found themselves opposed by the veterans of General A. J. Smith's division, which had been opportunely stopped on its way down the Mississippi River to join Sherman. Foiled at St. Louis, Price then moved upon Jefferson City, the State capital, but was closely pursued and driven off. Advancing westward, he was met at Lexington, October 20th, by forces from Kansas, under General Blunt, but forced the latter to retire from the town, after severe fighting. Thence to Independence his progress was steadily resisted by Generals Blunt and Curtis, with volunteers and militia from Kansas. At Independence, on the 22d, Pleasanton's cavalry, of Rosecrans's army, came up and formed a junction with the forces of Curtis, and the next day they engaged Price in battle near Westport. "The opposing armies fought over an area of five or six square miles, and at some points the fighting was furious. . . . About the middle of the afternoon Price's lines began to give way, and by sundown the entire Confederate army was in full retreat southward along the State line, closely pursued by the victorious Federal forces." At the crossing of the Marais des Cygnes River he lost ten pieces of his artillery and a large number of prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. "At Newtonia in south-west Missouri, on the 28th of October, Price made another stand, and was attacked by the pursuing forces. . . . and finally driven from the field with heavy loss. This was next to the severest battle of the campaign. Blunt, and some of the Missouri troops, continued the pursuit to the Arkansas River, but Price did not again attempt to make a stand. His line of march from Westport to Newtonia was strewn with the debris of a routed army. He crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Smith with a few pieces of artillery, with his army demoralized and reduced by captures and dispersion to perhaps less than 5,000 men. Most of the noted guerrilla bands followed him from the State. The 'Price raid,' as it was called in the West, was the last military operation of much consequence that took place in Missouri and Arkansas. It is certain that Price lost more than he gained in war material and that the raid did not tend to strengthen the Confederate cause in the West."—W. Britton, *Résumé of Military Operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 1864-65 (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).—"In General Price's report occurs the following summary of the campaign: 'I marched 1,434 miles, fought 43 battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men, captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors. . . . and destroyed property to the cost of \$10,000,000. I lost ten pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners. . . . I brought with me at least 5,000 recruits.'"—*Editor's note to above.*

**A. D. 1864 (April: Tennessee).—The Massacre at Fort Pillow.**—After General Sherman's return from his raid to Meridian, and General William Sooy Smith's return to Memphis, the Confederate cavalry leader Forrest advanced into Tennessee, devastating the country. "He captured Jackson in that State, on the 23d of March, and moving northward, appeared before Paducah, held by Colonel Hicks with 650 men. His demand for a surrender was

accompanied with a threat: 'If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter:' he made three assaults, and then retired, having lost 1,500 men. On the 12th of April he was at Fort Pillow, which was garrisoned by 19 officers and 538 men, of whom 262 were negroes. This force was not a part of the army, but a nondescript body in process of formation, placed there to cover a trading-post for the convenience of families supposed to be friendly, or at least not hostile; it had been left in violation of Sherman's peremptory orders. The attack was made before sunrise; and after some severe fighting, Major Booth, the commanding officer of the garrison, was killed. Major Bradford, who succeeded him, drew the troops from the outer line of intrenchments into the fort, and continued the contest until afternoon. A gun-boat which had been co-operating in the defense, withdrew to cool or clean her guns, and, the fire slackening, Forrest sent a summons to surrender, and shortly after a second, demanding that the surrender should be made in twenty minutes. These terms were declined by Bradford. But while the negotiations were in progress, the assailants were stealthily advancing, and gaining such positions that they could rush upon the fort. Accordingly, as soon as Bradford's answer was received, they sprang forward. The fort was instantly carried."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 74 (v. 3).—The following is Gen. Forrest's report of what occurred on the taking of the fort, made to General Polk on the 15th: "General: I attacked Fort Pillow on the morning of the 12th inst. with a part of Bell's and McCulloch's brigades, numbering 1,500, under Brig.-Gen. James R. Chalmers. After a short fight drove the enemy, 700 strong, into the fort under the cover of their gun-boats. Demanded a surrender, which was declined by Maj. L. F. Booth, commanding U. S. forces. I stormed the fort, and after a contest of thirty minutes captured the entire garrison, killing 500 and taking 200 horses and a large amount of quartermaster's stores. The officers in the fort were killed, including Major Booth. I sustained a loss of 20 killed and 60 wounded. Among the wounded is the gallant Lieut.-Col. Wiley M. Reed while leading the Fifth Mississippi. Over 100 citizens who had fled to the fort to escape conscription ran into the river and were drowned. The Confederate flag now floats over the fort.—N. B. Forrest."—On the same day, Gen. Forrest dispatched a longer report to Ass't.-Adj. Gen. Jack, in which he states: "Have dispatched by telegraph of the capture of Fort Pillow. Arrived there on the morning of the 12th and attacked the place with the portion of McCulloch's and Bell's brigades, numbering about 1,500 men, and after a sharp contest captured the garrison and all of its stores. A demand was made for the surrender, which was refused. The victory was complete, and the loss of the enemy will never be known from the fact that large numbers ran into the river and were shot and drowned. The force was composed of about 500 negroes and 200 white soldiers (Tennessee Tories). The river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards. There was in the fort a large number of citizens who had fled there to escape the conscript law. Most of these ran into

the river and were drowned. The approximate loss was upward of 500 killed, but few of the officers escaping. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners."—From the Union side, the following is the report of the first Federal officer who reached the scene: "I arrived off the fort at 6 A. M. on the morning of the 13th inst. [April]. . . . About 8 A. M. the enemy sent in a flag of truce with a proposal from General Forrest that he would put me in possession of the fort and the country around until 5 P. M. for the purpose of burying our dead and removing our wounded, whom he had no means of attending to. I agreed to the terms proposed. . . . We found about 70 wounded men in the fort and around it, and buried, I should think, 150 bodies. . . . All the wounded who had strength enough to speak agreed that after the fort was taken an indiscriminate slaughter of our troops was carried on by the enemy with a furious and vindictive savageness which was never equalled by the most merciless of the Indian tribes. Around on every side horrible testimony to the truth of this statement could be seen. . . . Strewn from the fort to the river bank, in the ravines and hollows, behind logs and under the brush where they had crept for protection from the assassins who pursued them, we found bodies bayoneted, beaten, and shot to death, showing how cold blooded and persistent was the slaughter of our unfortunate troops."—*Rept. of Acting-Master W. Ferguson, U. S. Steamer Silver Cloud (Official Records, Series 1, v. 32, pt. 1, p. 571, 609-10).*

ALSO IN: *Rept. of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War (30th Cong., 1st Sess., II. R. Rept. No. 65).*—Comte de Paris, *Hist. of the Civil War in Am.*, v. 4., bk. 4, ch. 1.

A. D. 1864 (April—May: North Carolina).—**Exploits of the ram Albemarle.—Surrender of Plymouth.**—"In the squadron [of the Confederates] we were gladdened by the success of our iron-clad ram Albemarle, which vessel, under Captain James B. Cooke, had (after overcoming innumerable difficulties) succeeded in descending the Roanoke river, April 19th [1864], and dispersing the Federal squadron off Plymouth, N. C. She sunk the steamer Southfield, and drove the other vessels off; and her presence led to the recapture of Plymouth by the Confederates. On the 5th of May the Albemarle started from Plymouth with the small steamer Bombshell in company, on what was called a secret expedition. I think it probable the intention was to destroy the wooden men-of-war in the sounds, and then tow troops in barges to Hatteras and retake it. If this could have been done the Albemarle would have had it all her own way, and Roanoke island, Newbern and other places would again have fallen into the hands of the Confederates. Shortly after leaving Plymouth the Albemarle fell in with the Federal squadron, consisting of the steamers Mattabesett, Sassacus, Wyalusing, Whitehead, Miami, Ceres, Commodore Hull and Seymour—all under the command of Captain Melancton Smith, and after a desperate combat was forced to return to Plymouth."—W. H. Parker, *Recollections of a Naval Officer*, p. 339.

ALSO IN: J. R. Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers (The Navy in the Civil War, v. 1), ch. 4.*—D. Ammen, *The Atlantic Coast (same Series, v. 2), ch. 9.*—C. B. Boynton, *Hist. of the Navy, v. 2, ch. 36.*



**A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).—Grant's movement on Richmond.**—The Battle of the Wilderness.—“The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Mead, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan—the Fifth and Sixth Corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corps at United States' (Ely's) Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,—with the greater part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about 12 miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the Fifth, Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren commanding), met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest [See above: A. D. 1863 (April—May: Virginia)], and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By 6 o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over 30 miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. Considering that a large proportion (probably two-thirds), of his command was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accouterments of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th reconnaissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would await an attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond, and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced

toward Spottsylvania Court House, the Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.”—Gen. U. S. Grant, *Official Report (Official Records. Series 1, v. 36, pt. 1, p. 18)*.—The casualties of the Army of the Potomac and Burnside's Ninth Corps (then not incorporated with it) in the battle of the Wilderness were “2,265 killed, 10,220 wounded, and 2,902 missing. Total, 15,387. Killed and wounded, 12,485. . . . The woods took fire in many places, and it is estimated that 200 of our wounded perished in the flames and smoke. According to the tabular statement, Part First, ‘Medical and Surgical History of the War,’ the casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia were 2,000 killed, 6,000 wounded, and 3,400 missing. The authority for this statement is not given, and I do not find anywhere records of the loss of that army in the Wilderness. . . . Both sides lost many valuable officers in this battle, [including, on the Union side, General Wadsworth]. . . . So far as I know, no great battle ever took place before on such ground. But little of the combatants could be seen, and its progress was known to the senses chiefly by the rising and falling sounds of a vast musketry that continually swept along the lines of battle many miles in length, sounds which at times approached to the sublime.”—A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65 (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 12), ch. 2*.—“All the peculiar advantages of the Army of the Potomac were sacrificed in the jungle-fighting into which they were thus called to engage. Of what use here were the tactical skill and the perfection of form, acquired through long and patient exercise; of what use here the example and the personal influence of a Hays or a Hancock, a Brooke or a Barlow? How can a battle be fitly ordered in such a tangle of wood and brush, where troops can neither be sent straight to their destination nor seen and watched over, when, after repeatedly losing direction and becoming broken into fragments in their advance through thickets and jungles, they at last make their way up to the line of battle, perhaps at the point they were designed to reinforce, perhaps far from it? . . . It will never cease to be an object of amazement to me that, with such a tract in prospect, the character of it being known, in general, to army headquarters through the Chancellorsville campaign . . . a supreme effort was not made . . . to carry the Army of the Potomac either through these jungles toward Mine Run, or past it, toward Spottsylvania.”—F. A. Walker, *Hist. of the Second Army Corps, ch. 13*.

Also in: E. M. Law, A. S. Webb, and others, *The Wilderness Campaign (Battles and Leaders, v. 4)*.—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs, ch. 50-51 (v. 2)*.—W. Swinton, *The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, ch. 9*.—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robt. E. Lee, ch. 17*.

**A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).—Sheridan's raid to Richmond.**—“When the Army of the Potomac emerged from the Wilderness, Sheridan was sent to cut Lee's communications. This was the first of the remarkable raids of that remarkable leader, in Virginia, and, though short, was a destructive one. He took with him a greater portion of the cavalry led by Merritt, Gregg and Wilson, and, cutting loose from the

army, he swept over the Po and the Ta, crossed the North Anna on the 9th, and struck the Virginia Central railway at Beaver Dam Station, which he captured. He destroyed ten miles of the railway; also its rolling stock, with a million and a half of rations, and released 400 Union prisoners, on their way to Richmond from the Wilderness. There he was attacked in flank and rear by General J. E. B. Stuart and his cavalry, who had pursued him from the Rapid Anna [Rapidan], but was not much impeded thereby. He pushed on, crossed the South Anna at Ground-squirrel Bridge, and at daylight on the morning of the 11th, captured Ashland Station, on the Fredericksburg road, where he destroyed the railway property, a large quantity of stores, and the road itself for six miles. Being charged with the duty of not only destroying these roads, but of menacing Richmond and communicating with the army of the James, . . . Sheridan pressed on in the direction of the Confederate capital, when he was confronted by Stuart at Yellow Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, where that able leader, having made a swift circuitous march, had concentrated all of his available cavalry. Sheridan attacked him at once, and, after a sharp engagement, drove the Confederates toward Ashland, on the north fork of the Chickahominy, with a loss of their gallant leader, who, with General Gordon, was mortally wounded. Inspired by this success, Sheridan pushed along the now open turnpike toward Richmond, and made a spirited dash upon the outer works. Custer's brigade carried them at that point and made 100 prisoners. As in the case of Kilpatrick's raid, so now, the second line of works were too strong to be carried by cavalry. The troops in and around the city had rallied for their defense, and in an attack the Nationals were repulsed. Then Sheridan led his command across the Chickahominy, at Meadow Bridge, where he beat off a considerable force of infantry sent out from Richmond, and who attacked him in the rear, while another force assailed his front. He also drove the foe on his front, when he destroyed the railway bridge there, and then pushed on southward to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he rested three days and procured supplies. Then, by way of White House and Hanover Court House, he leisurely returned to the Army of the Potomac, which he rejoined on the 25th of May."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 18-19.—H. B. McClellan, *Life and Campaigns of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart*, ch. 20.—J. B. Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, v. 2, pp. 202-208.

A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).—Grant's movement upon Richmond: Spottsylvania Court House.—The Bloody Angle.—"Throughout the entire day succeeding this first great conflict [in the Wilderness], General Lee remained quiet, watching for some movement of his adversary. His success in the preliminary struggle had been gratifying, considering the great disproportion of numbers, but he indulged no expectation of a retrograde movement across the Rapidan, on the part of General Grant. He expected him rather to advance, and anxiously awaited some development of this intention. There were no indications of such a design up to the night of the 7th,

but at that time, to use the words of a confidential member of Lee's staff, 'he all at once seemed to conceive the idea that his enemy was preparing to forsake his position, and move toward Hanover Junction via the Spottsylvania Court-House, and, believing this, he at once detailed Anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the court-house. General Anderson commenced his march about nine o'clock at night, when the Federal column was already upon its way. A race now began for the coveted position, and General Stuart, with his dismounted sharpshooters behind improvised breastworks, harassed and impeded the Federal advance, at every step, throughout the night. This greatly delayed their march, and their head of column did not reach the vicinity of Spottsylvania Court-House until past sunrise. General Warren, leading the Federal advance, then hurried forward, followed by General Hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. Lee had succeeded in interposing himself between General Grant and Richmond. On the same evening the bulk of the two armies were facing each other on the line of the Po. . . . General Lee had taken up his position on the south bank of one of the four tributaries of the Mattaponi. These four streams are known as the Mat, Ta, Po, and Nye Rivers, and bear the same relation to the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do to the wrist. General Lee was behind the Po, which is next to the Nye, the northernmost of these water-courses. Both were difficult to cross, and their banks heavily wooded. It was now to be seen whether, either by a front attack or a turning movement, General Grant could oust his adversary, and whether General Lee would stand on the defensive or attack. All day, during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks along their entire fronts, and these works, from the Rapidan to the banks of the Chickahominy, remain yet [1871] in existence. On the evening of this day a Federal force was thrown across the Po, on the Confederate left, but soon withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took place near the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody conflict, during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting troops perished miserably in the flames. The force was then recalled, and, during that night and the succeeding day, nothing of importance occurred, although heavy skirmishing and an artillery-fire took place along the lines. On the morning of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, General Grant made a more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken in the campaign. This was directed at a salient on General Lee's right centre, occupied by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and was one of the bloodiest and most terrible incidents of the war. For this assault [made by three divisions of Hancock's corps] General Grant is said to have selected his best troops. These advanced in a heavy charging column, through the half-darkness of dawn, passed silently over the Confederate skirmishers, scarcely firing a shot, and, just as the first streak of daylight touched the eastern woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point of the bayonet. The attack was a complete surprise, and carried everything before it. The Southern troops, asleep in the trenches, woke to have the bayonet thrust



into them, to be felled with clubbed muskets, and to find the works apparently in secure possession of the enemy before they could fire a shot. Such was the excellent success of the Federal movement, and the Southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. Nearly the whole of Johnson's division were taken prisoners—the number amounting to more than 3,000—and 18 pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the assaulting column. The position of affairs was now exceedingly critical; and, unless General Lee could reform his line at the point, it seemed that nothing was left him but an abandonment of his whole position. The Federal army had broken his line; was pouring into the opening; and, to prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain possession of the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy on his right and left wings. It is probable that at no time during the war was the Southern army in greater danger of a bloody and decisive disaster. At this critical moment General Lee acted with the nerve and coolness of a soldier whom no adverse event can shake. . . . Line of battle was promptly formed a short distance in rear of the salient then in the enemy's possession, and a fierce charge was made by the Southerners, under the eye of Lee, to regain it. . . . The word ferocious best describes the struggle which followed. It continued throughout the entire day, Lee making not less than five distinct assaults in heavy force to recover the works. The fight involved the troops on both flanks, and was desperate and unyielding. The opposing flags were at times within only a few yards of each other, and so incessant and concentrated was the fire of musketry that a tree of about 18 inches in diameter was cut down by bullets, and is still preserved, it is said, in the city of Washington, as a memorial of this bloody struggle. The fighting only ceased several hours after dark. Lee had not regained his advanced line of works, but he was firmly rooted in an interior and straighter line, from which the Federal troops had found it impossible to dislodge him.—*J. E. Cooke, Life of Gen. Robert E. Lee, pt. 8, ch. 4.*—"For the distance of nearly a mile, amid a cold, drenching rain, the combatants [on the 12th, at the salient] were literally struggling across the breastworks. They fired directly into each other's faces, bayonet thrusts were given over the intrenchments; men even grappled their antagonists across the piles of logs and pulled them over, to be stabbed or carried to the rear as prisoners. . . . Never before, since the discovery of gunpowder, had such a mass of lead been hurled into a space so narrow as that which now embraced the scene of combat. Large standing trees were literally cut off and brought to the ground by infantry fire alone; their great limbs whipped into basket stuff that could be woven by the hand of a girl. . . . If any comparisons can be made between the sections involved in that desperate contest, the fiercest and deadliest fighting took place at the west angle, ever afterwards known as 'The Bloody Angle.' . . . All day the bloody work went on. . . . The trenches had more than once to be cleared of the dead, to give the living a place to stand. All day long, and even into the night, the battle lasted, for it was not till twelve o'clock, nearly twenty hours after the command 'Forward' had been given to the column at the Brown House, that the firing died down, and the

Confederates, relinquishing their purpose to retake the captured works, began in the darkness to construct a new line to cut off the salient."—*F. A. Walker, Hist. of the Second Army Corps, ch. 15.*—General Humphreys estimates Grant's losses in killed and wounded on the 12th at 6,020; missing 800. Lee's losses that day in killed, wounded and prisoners he concludes to have been between 9,000 and 10,000. His estimate of losses on the 10th is 4,100 (killed and wounded) on the Union side, and 2,000 on the Confederateside. Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army Corps, was killed in the skirmishing of the 9th.—*A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65, ch. 3.*

ALSO IN: *C. N. Galloway, Hand to Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania (Battles and Leaders, v. 4).*—*Official Records, Series 1, v. 36.*

**A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).**—Grant's movement upon Richmond: from Spotsylvania to the Chickahominy.—"The lines of Spotsylvania remained still intact, and General Grant, who might easily have turned the position and manœuvred his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying it by direct attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding week [after the battle of the 12th], various movements of corps were made from flank to flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines could be broken. These attempts were skilfully met at every point—the Confederates extending their line to correspond with the shiftings of the army; so that wherever attack was essayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant continued to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and breaking in the Confederate right flank: so that from occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extending four or five miles to the northwest of Spotsylvania Courthouse, it had at the end of ten days assumed a position almost due east of that place, the left resting at a distance of four miles at Massaponax Church. After twelve days of effort, the carrying of the position was seen to be hopeless; and General Grant, abandoning the attempt, resolved by a turning operation to disengage Lee from a position seen to be unassailable. Preparations for this movement were begun on the afternoon of the 19th; but the enemy, observing these, retarded its execution by a bold demonstration against the Union right. . . . This attack somewhat disconcerted the contemplated movement, and delayed it till the following night, May 20th, when the army, moving by the left, once more took up its march towards Richmond. Before the lines of Spotsylvania the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in which it had done all that valor may do to carry a position by nature and art impregnable. . . . Language is inadequate to convey an impression of the labors, fatigues, and sufferings of the troops. . . . Above 40,000 men had already fallen in the bloody encounters of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania [Gen. Humphreys—in 'Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65,' p. 117—makes the total of killed and wounded from May 5 to 21, to be 28,207, and the entire losses of the army, including the missing and the sick sent back to Washington, 37,385]. . . . The exhausted army began to lose its spirit. It was with joy, therefore, that it at length turned its back upon the lines of Spotsylvania. . . . The

two armies once fairly on the march . . . neither . . . seems to have sought to deal the other a blow . . . and both headed, as for a common goal, towards the North Anna. . . . The advances of the 21st and 22d brought the different corps [of the Army of the Potomac], which had moved on parallel roads at supporting distance, within a few miles of the North Anna River. Resuming the march on the morning of Monday, May 23d, the army in a few hours reached the northern bank of that stream. But it was only to desecrify its old enemy planted on the opposite side." Warren's corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford without resistance, but was furiously assailed late in the afternoon and held its ground, taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. The left column, under Hancock, forced a passage in the face of the enemy, carrying a bridge by storm. But nothing was gained by these successes. "While Lee, after the passage of Hancock on the left, threw his right wing back from the North Anna, and on the passage of Warren on the right threw back his left wing, he continued to cling with his centre to the river; so that . . . his army took up a very remarkable line in the form of an obtuse-angled triangle. . . . The game of war seldom presents a more effectual checkmate than was here given by Lee; for after Grant had made the brilliantly successful passage of the North Anna, the Confederate commander, thrusting his centre between the two wings of the Army of the Potomac, put his antagonist at enormous disadvantage, and compelled him, for the reinforcement of one or the other wing, to make a double passage of the river. The more the position of Lee was examined, the more unpromising attack was seen to be; and after passing the two following days in reconnoissances, and destroying some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, General Grant determined to withdraw across the North Anna and take up a new line of advance. The withdrawal from the North Anna was begun at dark of the 26th of May, when the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps retired by different bridges to the north bank. . . . The Second Corps held position till the morning of the 27th, when it covered the rear. From the North Anna the line of march of the army made a wide circuit eastward and then southward to pass the Pamunkey. This river is formed by the confluence of the North and South Anna; and the Pamunkey in turn uniting with the Mattaponi forms the York River, emptying into Chesapeake Bay. Thus the successful passage of the Pamunkey would not only dislodge Lee from the lines of the North and South Anna, but would bring the army in communication with a new and excellent water-base." The crossing of the Pamunkey, at and near Hanover town, was accomplished without difficulty on the 27th and 28th, "and the routes to White House, at the head of York River, being opened up, the army was put in communication with the ample supplies floated by the waters of Chesapeake Bay. Grant's new turning movement was met by a corresponding retrograde movement on the part of Lee, and as he fell back on a direct line less than half the distance of the great detour made by the Army of the Potomac, it was not remarkable that, on crossing the Pamunkey, the Confederate force was again encountered, ready to accept the gage of battle. Lee assumed a position in advance of the Chickahominy. . . . The

region in which the army was now operating revived many reminiscences in the minds of those who had made the Peninsular Campaign under McClellan. . . . Gaines' Mill and Mechanicsville were within an hour's ride; Fair Oaks could be reached in a two hours' trot; Richmond was ten miles off. . . . Reconnoissances showed Lee to be in a very strong position covering the approaches to the Chickahominy, the forcing of which it was now clear must cost a great battle." —W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pt. 11, ch. 3-5.

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 18-19 (v. 2).

A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).—The Co-operative movement of the Army of the James.—In the plan and arrangement of General Grant's campaign, General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was instructed "to collect all the forces of his command that could be spared from garrison duty estimated at not less than 20,000, and operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being his objective. To his force 10,000 men from South Carolina, under Gillmore, were to be added. He was ordered to take City Point as soon as notification of movement was given, and fortify it. By this common advance from the Rapidan and Fortress Monroe the two armies would be brought into co-operation. . . . As arranged, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe on May 4th, Gillmore having joined him with the 10th Corps. The next day he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the night of the 9th he received dispatches from Washington informing him that Lee was retreating to Richmond and Grant in pursuit. He had, therefore, to act with caution, fearing that he might have Lee's whole army on his hands. On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling. The time thus consumed from the 6th left no possibility of surprising and capturing Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defense of these places. On the 16th the Confederates attacked Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff, forced him back into his entrenchments between the forks of James and Appomattox Rivers [in the district called Bermuda Hundred], and, intrenching strongly in his front, not only covered the railroads and city, but completely neutralized his forces. . . . Butler's army being confined at Bermuda Hundred, most of the re-enforcements from the South were now brought against the Potomac Army. In addition to this, probably not less than 15,000 men, under Breckenridge, arrived from the Western part of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred being easy to defend, Grant, leaving only enough to secure what had been gained, took from it all available forces under W. F. Smith, and joined them to the Army of the Potomac."—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, v. 3, pp. 368 and 382-385.

ALSO IN: A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 5.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 36, pt. 2.



**A. D. 1864 (May: Georgia).—Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: Johnston's Retreat.**—Sherman now held command of the three armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, having McPherson, Thomas and Schofield for their subordinate commanders, respectively. The main army of the rebellion in the West, Joe Johnston commanding, was at Dalton, northern Georgia, confronting Thomas at Chattanooga. "Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in concert. While the former should thrust Lee back upon Richmond, his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards Atlanta. And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans to Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the Western armies. Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the question of transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced to the lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example. Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to be carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past; comforts to be forgotten. War's stern reality was to be each one's lot. Probably no officer in such high command ever lived so entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his military family during the succeeding campaigns. The entire equipment of his army head-quarters would have shamed the shabbiest regimental outfit of 1861. Spring was to open with a general advance. It was agreed to put and keep the Confederates on the defensive by a policy of constant hammering. Bragg had been removed to satisfy public opinion in the South, but was nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. Davis' chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the Department, had personally undertaken to hold head against Sherman. But the fact that he possessed neither the President's good will nor that of his new adviser, militated much against a happy conduct of the campaign. Sherman's forces occupied a front sixteen miles in advance of Ringgold, just south of Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee was on his right with 25,000 men and 100 guns. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland held the centre with 60,000 men and 130 guns. Schofield and the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing. His command was 15,000 men and 30 guns. This grand total of 100,000 men and 260 guns formed an army of as good stuff as ever bore arms, and the confidence of the leader in his men and of the men in their leader was unbounded. Johnston himself foresaw the necessity of a strictly defensive campaign, to which his far from sanguine character, as well as his judgment as to what the existing conditions demanded, made him peculiarly suited. Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's army, Johnston had some 75,000 men. . . . He intrenched every step he took; he fought only when attacked; he invited battle only when the conditions were largely in his favor. Subsequent events showed how wise beyond his critics he could be. Sherman took the measure of the intrenchments at Dalton with care, and, though he outnumbered his antagonist, preferred not to hazard an engagement at such odds when he might force one on better ground. This conduct shows in strong contrast with Grant's, when the latter first met his opponent at this same moment in Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards Resaca, on the railroad in Johnston's

rear, with instructions to capture the town if possible. Combined with this flanking movement, a general advance was made upon the Confederate lines, and after tactical manœuvring of several days in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston concluded to retire from his stronghold. McPherson had strangely failed to seize Resaca, though an excellent chance had offered, and at this place the Confederate army took up its new stand. . . . Sherman faced his antagonist on the line of Camp Creek in front of Resaca, with his right flank resting on the Oostanaula. From this position he operated by unintermitted tapping upon Johnston's defences at constantly varying points, without, however, bringing on a general engagement [though the losses were 2,747 Union and 2,800 Confederate]. . . . Sherman's uniform tactics during this campaign, varied indefinitely in details, consisted, as will be seen, in forcing the centre of the army upon Johnston's lines, while with the right and left he operated upon either flank as chance or ground best offered. Johnston did not propose to hazard an engagement unless all conditions were in his favor. He attempted a stand at Adairsville, twenty miles south of Resaca, but shortly withdrew to Kingston and Cassville. Each captain manœuvred for a chance to fight the other at a disadvantage. . . . From Cassville, Johnston retired across the Etowah. So far this campaign had been one of manœuvres. Neither combatant had suffered material loss. Like two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each other's strength or quickness, they were sparring for a hold. . . . The Union army was growing skillful. Local difficulties multiplied many fold by bad maps and hostile population were overcome in considerable measure by an able corps of topographical engineers. . . . Bridges were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the retreating Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far as possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose as by magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always followed hard upon the heels of the army."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War*, ch. 42-43.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, ch. 15 (v. 2). —T. B. Van Horn, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, ch. 25-28 (v. 2). —*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 38, pt. 1.

**A. D. 1864 (May—June: Virginia).—Grant's Movement upon Richmond: The Battle of Cold Harbor.**—"The passage of [the Pamunkey] had been completed on May 28, and then, after three days of marching, interspersed with the usual amount of fighting, the army found itself again confronted by Lee's main line on the Totopotomoy. The operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st, Sheridan, who was on the left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position near the old well and cross roads known as Old Cold Harbor, and, with his men dismounted behind rough breast-works, held it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, during the night, marched the vanguard of the Army of the Potomac. . . . About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was

withdrawn. The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan, withdrew from our immediate front within their lines and awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines' Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The attack was made vigorously and with no reserves. The outer line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. . . . This left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear, and brought us in front of the most formidable position yet held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country, interspersed with clearings here and there, sparsely populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our confronting line, on which the burden of the day must necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not confronting the enemy. . . . No reconnoissance had been made other than the bloody one of the evening before. Every one felt that this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches were possible. Richmond was dead in front. No further wheeling of corps from right to left by the rear; no further dusty marches possible on that line, even 'if it took all summer.' The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and all preparations had been made, when the order was countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits, thrown up during the night, with steady, determined advance, and there rang out suddenly on the summer air such a crash of artillery and musketry as is seldom heard in war. No great portion of the advance could be seen from any particular point, but those of the three corps that passed through the clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of this battle was that as the three gal-

lant corps moved on [necessarily diverging, the enemy's line forming an arc of a circle, with its concave side toward them] each was enfiladed while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in front. . . . At some points the slashings and obstructions in the enemy's front were reached. Barlow, of Hancock's corps, drove the enemy from an advanced position, but was himself driven out by the fire of their second line. R. O. Tyler's brigade (the Corcoran Legion) of the same corps swept over an advance work, capturing several hundred prisoners. One officer alone, the colonel of the 164th New York [James P. McMahon], seizing the colors of his regiment from the dying color-bearer as he fell, succeeded in reaching the parapet of the enemy's main works, where he planted his colors and fell dead near the ditch, bleeding from many wounds. Seven other colonels of Hancock's command died within those few minutes. No troops could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was given all along the line. At points where no shelter was afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at least, was over. . . . Shortly after midday came the order to suspend for the present all further operations, and directing corps commanders to intrench, 'including their advanced positions,' and directing also that reconnoissances be made, 'with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches'. . . . When night came on the groans and moaning of the wounded, all our own, who were lying between the lines, were heart-rending. Some were brought in by volunteers from our intrenchments, but remained for three days uncared for beneath the hot summer suns and the unrefreshing dews of the sultry summer nights. . . . An impression prevails in the popular mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring in his wounded, has lost the field of battle. Hence the reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it was done at last on the evening of the third day after the battle, when, for the most part, the wounded needed no further care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell."—M. T. McMahon, *Cold Harbor (Battles and Leaders, v. 4)*.—"According to the report of the Medical Director, Surgeon McParlin, the wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of the 3d of June numbered 4,517. The killed were at least 1,100. The wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of the 1st of June were 2,125; the killed were not less than 500. The wounded on the 1st and 3d of June were, therefore, 6,642, and the killed not less than 1,600; but, adopting the number of killed and missing furnished General Badeau from the Adjutant General's office, 1,769 killed, 1,537 missing (many—most, indeed—of them, no doubt, killed), we have 8,411 for the killed and wounded, and for the total casualties, 9,948."—A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65 (Campaigns of the Civil War)*, p. 191.—"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. . . . At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. . . . This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily;




but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared."—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 55 (v. 2).—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 36.

**A. D. 1864 (May—June: Virginia).—The Campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, and Sheridan's raid to Trevillian Station.**—"In the spring of 1864, the Department of West Virginia, which included the Shenandoah Valley, was under the command of Major-General Franz Sigel. A large portion of his forces was in the Kanawha region, under Brigadier-General George Crook. . . . In opening his Virginia campaign, Lieutenant-General Grant directed Sigel to form two columns, whereof one, under Crook, should break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at the New River bridge, and should also, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville; while the other column, under Sigel himself, proceeding up the Shenandoah Valley, was to distract attention from Crook by menacing the Virginia Central Railroad at Staunton."—G. E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 11), ch. 2.*—"Early in May, General Sigel entered the Valley with a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men [6,000 or 7,000, according to Pond, as above], and proceeded to advance toward Staunton. The Valley at that time was occupied only by a small force under General Imboden, which was wholly inadequate for its defence. General Breckenridge was therefore withdrawn from South-Western Virginia to oppose Sigel. On the 15th of May, Breckenridge with a force of 3,000 men [4,600 to 5,000—Pond] encountered Sigel at Newmarket and defeated him and compelled him to retire behind Cedar Creek. The cadets of the Virginia Military Institute formed a portion of Breckenridge's division, and behaved with distinguished gallantry. . . . After the battle of Newmarket Breckenridge was withdrawn from the Valley to reinforce Lee . . . in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. In the meantime Crook and Averill had reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, where they inflicted some damage, but were compelled to retire by a force sent against them by General Sam. Jones. They then proceeded to join the main column operating in the Valley. After the battle of Newmarket, Sigel was relieved by General David Hunter, who was instructed by General Grant to advance upon Staunton, thence to Charlottesville, and on to Lynchburg if circumstances favored that movement. Breckenridge having been withdrawn, General W. E. Jones was ordered to the Valley to oppose Hunter, who slowly advanced, opposed by Imboden with an almost nominal force. About the 4th of June, Imboden was joined by General Jones in the neighborhood of Harrisonburg with a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he had hastily collected in Southwestern Virginia. . . . Although greatly outnumbered, he [Jones] engaged Hunter near Port Republic [at the village of Piedmont, which gives its name to the battle], where he was defeated and killed. . . . After the fall of Jones, McCauslin opposed Hunter with gallantry and vigor, but his small force was no match for the greatly superior force against which he contended. The affairs in the Valley now began to attract the attention of the commanding generals of both armies. It was

evident that if Hunter could succeed in taking Lynchburg and breaking up the canal and Central Railroad, it would only be necessary to tap the Richmond and Danville and the Petersburg and Weldon railroads to complete a line of circumvallation around Richmond and Petersburg. On the 7th of June General Grant detached General Sheridan, with a large cavalry force, with instructions to break up the Central Railroad between Richmond and Gordonsville, then proceed to the James River and Kanawha Canal, break that line of communication with Richmond, and then to co-operate with Hunter in his operations against Lynchburg. About the same time General Lee sent General Breckenridge with his division, 2,500 strong, to occupy Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge to deflect Hunter from Charlottesville and protect the Central Railroad as far as practicable. A few days later General Early was detached by General Lee to oppose Hunter, and take such other steps as in his judgment would tend to create a diversion in favor of Richmond. General Sheridan, in compliance with his instructions, proceeded by a circuitous route to strike the railroad somewhere in the neighborhood of Gordonsville. This movement was, however, discovered by General Hampton, who, with a considerable force of cavalry encountered Sheridan on the 12th of June at Travillians [or Trevillian's] Station. After much severe and varied fighting Sheridan was defeated, and in order to escape was obliged to make a night-retreat. [In his 'Memoirs,' Sheridan claims the victory, having forced Hampton back and taken 500 prisoners; but learning that Hunter would not meet him, as expected, at Charlottesville, he turned back to rejoin Grant south of Richmond]. . . . This was one of the most masterly and spirited cavalry engagements of the war. Hunter, finding Rockfish Gap occupied in force, was unable to comply with that part of his instructions which directed him to Charlottesville. He therefore continued his march up the Valley, with the view of reaching Lynchburg by way of some one of the passes of the Blue Ridge south of the James River. In the neighborhood of Staunton he was joined by Crook and Averill, increasing his force to about 20,000 men, including cavalry and artillery. From Staunton he advanced by way of Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely witnessed in the course of civilized warfare." Before Hunter's arrival at Lynchburg, General Early, who withdrew his corps (formerly Stonewall Jackson's, and lately commanded by Ewell), from Richmond on the 13th of June, had reached that city and was prepared to defend it. "Hunter, finding himself unexpectedly confronted by Early, relinquished his intended attack upon the city and sought safety in a rapid night-retreat."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 21.

**A. D. 1864 (May—September: Georgia).—Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: New Hope Church.—Kenesaw.—Peach Tree Creek.—The siege and capture of the city.**—From Cassville, for reasons given in his memoirs, Johnston continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona. "Pausing for a few days," writes General Sherman, "to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of





which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3,000 to the Confederates and 2,400 to us. The country was almost in a state of nature—with few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reinforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his center and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full coöperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3,000 men to the Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. . . . We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city, opening the interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go. . . . We feigned to the right, but crossed the Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek, prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army [July 18]. Hood was known to us to be a 'fighter' . . . and I confess I was pleased at this change. . . . I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the Con-

federates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4,796 men, to our loss of 1,710. We followed up and Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank 'in air,' a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee—skilled veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8,499 to ours of 3,641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach if possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when, on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4,632 men to our 700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor, General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive. Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies, because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro') on the railroad 26 miles below Atlanta, not fortified. This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864. The result had a large effect on the whole country, at the time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings of the best masters of the 'science of war' of which I had knowledge. . . . But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief 'objective,' had escaped. Then began the real trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, 30 miles south-east, on the Savannah Railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads."—W. T. Sherman and others, *Atlanta (Battles and Leaders, v. 4)*.

ALSO IN: The same, *Memoirs, ch. 15-18 (v. 2)*.—J. D. Cox, *Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 9), ch. 7-16*.—C. C. Chesney, *The Atlanta Campaign (Fort. Rev., Nov. 1895)*.—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative, ch. 9-11*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 38*.—J. B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat, ch. 12-13*.

A. D. 1864 (May—November).—The Twentieth Presidential Election.—Renomination and Re-election of Abraham Lincoln.—"Preparations for the nomination of candidates

had begun to be made, as usual, early in the spring of 1864. Some who saw most clearly the necessities of the future, had for some months before expressed themselves strongly in favor of the renomination of President Lincoln. But this step was contested with great warmth and activity by prominent members of the political party by which he had been nominated and elected four years before. Nearly all the original Abolitionists and many of the more decidedly anti-slavery members of the Republican party were dissatisfied, that Mr. Lincoln had not more rapidly and more sweepingly enforced their extreme opinions. Many distinguished public men resented his rejection of their advice, and many more had been alienated by his inability to recognize their claims to office. The most violent opposition came from those who had been most persistent and most clamorous in their exactions. And as it was unavoidable that, in wielding so terrible and so absolute a power in so terrible a crisis, vast multitudes of active and ambitious men should be disappointed in their expectations of position and personal gain, the renomination of Mr. Lincoln was sure to be contested by a powerful and organized effort. At the very outset this movement acquired consistency and strength by bringing forward the Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, a man of great political boldness and experience, and who had prepared the way for such a step by a careful dispensation of the vast patronage of his department, as the rival candidate. But it was instinctively felt that this effort lacked the sympathy and support of the great mass of the people, and it ended in the withdrawal of his name as a candidate by Mr. Chase himself. The National Committee of the Union Republican party had called their convention, to be held at Baltimore, on the 8th of June." Those who opposed Mr. Lincoln's nomination issued a call for a convention to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May. The Cleveland Convention, attended by about 150 persons, put in nomination General John C. Fremont, for President, and General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice President. "General Fremont's letter of acceptance was dated June 4th. Its main scope was an attack upon Mr. Lincoln for unfaithfulness to the principles he was elected to defend, and upon his administration for incapacity and selfishness. . . . He intimated that if the Baltimore convention would nominate any one but Mr. Lincoln he would not stand in the way of a union of all upon the nominee. . . . The Convention, the nomination and the letter of acceptance, fell dead upon the popular feeling [and Fremont withdrew his candidacy in September]. . . . The next form which the effort to prevent Mr. Lincoln's nomination and election took was an effort to bring forward General Grant as a candidate." But this was decisively checked by General Grant, himself. The Convention at Baltimore, when it assembled on the 8th of June, showed no hesitation in nominating Abraham Lincoln for reelection, and it associated with him, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, as its candidate for Vice President. The National Convention of the Democratic party was held at Chicago, beginning August 29th. The second resolution which it adopted in its platform declared that, "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare

demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." On this issue, having nominated General George B. McClellan for President, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for Vice President, the opponents of the war went to the country in the election, in November, and were overwhelmingly defeated. "Of all the States which voted on that day, General McClellan carried but three—New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky."—H. J. Raymond, *Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 18.—The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan 21. The popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan, 1,802,237. Many of the States had made provision for taking the votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was 116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.—E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 21.

A. D. 1864 (June).—**Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws.**—At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the 6th, by a vote of 82 to 57, and by the Senate on the 22d by 27 to 12. The President approved it on the 28th, and it became a law.—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 29.

A. D. 1864 (June).—**Revenue Measures.—The War Tariff and Internal Taxes.** See **TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861–1864 (UNITED STATES).**

A. D. 1864 (June).—**The destruction of the Alabama by the Kearsarge.** See **ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862–1864.**

A. D. 1864 (June: Virginia).—**Grant's movement to the south of James River.—The Siege of Petersburg.**—"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness was becoming general among the people, which the government in vain pretended not to notice. . . . Public opinion, shaken in its confidence, already began to listen to the sinister interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last half of June, it learned that the lieutenant-general had boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. . . . This passage of the James was . . . a very fine movement, as ably executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new phase in the campaign. . . . Henceforth, the battering not having produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the resources of military science, and give precedence to strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that the latter did not recognize the character of the movement until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.) reembarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers collected at



Wilcox Landing for that purpose. At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad. The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W. F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his first success. Proceeding methodically and cautiously, where it was, above all, necessary to act with vigor and promptness, he put off the serious work until the next morning. Hancock, in his turn, debarked on the right bank, did not receive the order to march on Petersburg until he had been delayed to wait for rations which were behind-hand, and went astray in his march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was too late; Lee's troops had arrived. Nevertheless, the intrenchments thrown up hastily by the enemy were not so formidable that they might not be carried. In the morning, a fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon, the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown, after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning, a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance. In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side, amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates defended the ground step by step, with such determination, only to gain the time necessary to finish a stronger and better selected line, on the hills immediately around the city. They retired to these lines in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on the right bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where the new base of supplies of the army was naturally established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves across a part of the enemy's communications with the South, and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem and Boynton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these, the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the west, and the Danville railroad, to the south. The latter did not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources. If, then, we suc-

ceeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point towards which all the operations of the siege were directed for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded, Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."—R. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 28.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, *Hist. of the Second Army Corps*, ch. 19-23.—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 56 (v. 2).—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 40.

A. D. 1864 (July).—The Greeley and the Jaques-Gilmore Peace Missions.—"Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one of whom wrote [July 5, 1864] to the author of this work [Horace Greeley], averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders (the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise confidentially assured that the two former had full powers from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and suggesting certain terms of reunion and peace which he judged might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they should be accepted or rejected. . . . The 'Plan of Adjustment,' which he suggested that the President might advantageously offer," contemplated the restoration of the Union, abolition of slavery, with \$400,000,000 paid in compensation to the slave states, and complete amnesty for all political offenses. "The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the regret of his correspondent—to depute him to proceed to Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question. He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment . . . it was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was, in effect, to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of adjustment and peace. . . . The whole matter thus terminated in failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the opposition. . . . Happily, another negotiation—even more irregular and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Col. James F. Jaques, 73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies for the purpose. Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of

State, requesting an interview with President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar, earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief presented his ultimatum in these terms: . . . 'The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will have'. . . Thus it was not only incontestably settled but proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens, that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be recognized as an independent power, or till it should be utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was worth more than a victory to the National cause."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 30.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 301-307.

A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia—Maryland).—Early in the Shenandoah Valley.—His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.—"When Early had forced Hunter into the Kanawha region [See above: A. D. 1864 (MAY—JUNE: VIRGINIA)], far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not again be threatened from that direction, he united to his own corps General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson, and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. . . . By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarm

and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume the offensive, he attacked Crook at Kerstown, and succeeded in administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without shelter or food. . . . This second irruption of Early and his ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. . . . Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander. . . . On the evening of August 1, I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corps organization. I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day received instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grant at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, in consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President indicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder and helplessness prevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant's presence there was necessary."—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 23.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, ch. 4-6.—F. Sigel, *Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).

A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia).—The siege of Petersburg: The Mine.—"Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front.



Under this fort a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defences by the explosion. . . . The explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of them should go in—or rather which two of them should stay out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brig.-Gen. Ledlie—and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three. . . . Several minutes passed—precious, fatal minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path—went forward into the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but once in the crater, Ledlie's men barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together, losing their formation and becoming mixed up; General Potter finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest; but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while the Rebels recovering their self-possession, were planting batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. . . . A first Rebel

assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands of course took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000.<sup>5</sup>—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, pp. 590–591.

ALSO IN: W. H. Powell and others, *The Battle of the Petersburg Crater (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 4, ch. 5.—A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 9.—*Rept. of Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War*, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 1.

A. D. 1864 (August: Virginia).—The Siege of Petersburg: Fighting for the Weldon Road.—Battle of Reams's Station.—The Dutch Gap Canal.—“Taking advantage of the absence of many of Lee's troops from Petersburg, Grant made a vigorous movement for securing possession of the Weldon road, not more than three miles from the left flank of his lines on the Jerusalem plank road. This movement was made by Warren, with the Fifth Corps, on the morning of the 18th of August, and at noon he reached the coveted railway without opposition, where he left Griffin to hold the point seized, while with the divisions of Ayres and Crawford he moved toward Petersburg. He had marched but a short distance when a division of Confederates suddenly and heavily fell upon his flank. . . . Warren held the ground he had gained at a cost of 1,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners.” The next day (August 19), Lee sent Hill with a heavy force to drive Warren from the road, and the attempt, desperately made, was nearly successful, but not quite. Two days later it was repeated, and the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of 1,200 men. “In his entire movement for the possession of the road Warren lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 4,450 men. He now rendered his position almost impregnable, and General Lee was compelled to see one of his most important lines of communication wrested from him. On the day of Warren's Victory [August 21], Hancock, who . . . had been called from the north bank of the James [where an unsuccessful demonstration towards Richmond had been made from Deep Bottom], and who had moved with part of his corps rapidly toward the Weldon road, in the rear of Warren, struck that highway north of Reams's Station, and destroyed the track to that point and some miles south of it. He formed an intrenched camp at Reams's,” and was attacked there on the 25th by Hill with such determination that he was forced back to a rear line, “where the troops had been rallied, and when night fell Hancock withdrew from Reams's Station. He had lost in the fight 2,400 of his 8,000 men, and five guns; 1,700 of the men were made prisoners. Hill's loss was but little less, and he, too, withdrew from Reams's. But this disaster did not loosen Warren's hold upon the Weldon road. . . . For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing armies. . . . A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a peninsula

formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's Island. By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the National war vessels, by which they might flank several important works of the Confederates." The Dutch Gap Canal, as it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth of water never being secured during the war, though the canal has been brought into use since.—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: P. S. Michie, *Dutch Gap Canal (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4, p. 575).—O. B. Willcox, *Actions on the Weldon Railroad (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4, p. 568).

**A. D. 1864 (August: Alabama).—The Battle of Mobile Bay.—Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.**—"After the capitulation of Vicksburg the vessels of the so-called Gulf Squadron which had been cruising on the lower Mississippi and its tributaries were in part joined to the Upper Squadron, under the command of Admiral Porter. The remainder were recalled to their duties on the outside blockade. Admiral Farragut was now free to turn his whole attention to the coast of the Gulf, whither he returned in January, 1864, after a well-earned rest at the North. Mobile was now the principal port in the possession of the Confederates in this quarter, and earnestly did the Admiral desire to attack and reduce the forts at the entrance of the bay. But troops were required to invest the forts after the fleet had passed them, and at this moment it seemed that there were no troops to be spared. It was also much to be desired that at least a few monitors should be added to the fleet, but neither were these as yet available. So the time wore on; winter passed into spring and spring into summer, but still the attack was not made. This delay was of incalculable advantage to the enemy, enabling him to complete his preparations. The Confederate force afloat in Mobile Bay was commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan. . . . This force consisted of only four vessels, but they nevertheless made an important addition to the defences of the place. Three of them were only paddle-wheel gunboats . . . while the fourth was the iron-clad ram Tennessee . . . the most formidable vessel that the Confederates had ever built. . . . The City of Mobile lies at the head of a long bay, which is about 20 miles wide at its lower end. The greater portion of the bay is very shallow, too shallow even for vessels of moderate draft. The entrance lies between a long sandspit . . . and a shoal. . . . The ship-channel between the shoals, five miles in length, is perhaps half a mile wide at its narrowest point. Two forts guarded the passage,—on the right hand Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and on the left Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island. . . . In addition to the land and naval defences, additional protection had been given by obstructions in the water. A line of piles ran out from Fort Gaines, which was continued nearly across the main ship-channel by a triple line of torpedoes. The eastern end of the row of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the buoy and Fort Morgan the channel had been left open for blockade runners. The open space, only 100 yards wide, lay directly under the guns of the fort, and it was through this narrow passage that Admiral Farragut intended to carry his fleet. The ships

were gradually assembled toward the latter part of July. The Admiral's plan of action was simple, but in the highest degree effective. His fleet consisted of four monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, seven of the latter large and seven small. The wooden vessels were arranged in pairs, as at Port Hudson, each of the larger vessels having a smaller one lashed to her port side, so that if one was disabled the engines of the other would carry both past the forts. The four monitors were placed in a flanking column inshore, between the fleet and Fort Morgan. . . . At six o'clock on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main rigging of the Hartford, so that he might have a good post of observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were on board the Hartford, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging, after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. . . . Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the Confederate ram Tennessee and her three attendant gunboats. . . . Soon after half-past six the Tecumseh [the leading monitor] fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of vessels was hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going well with the fleet. The Tecumseh, though all the while advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the Tennessee, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and altering his course, he headed straight for the Tennessee, passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; the huge mass of iron gave a lurch first to one side, then to the other; her bow made one downward plunge, her screw was seen for a moment revolving high in air, and she sank to the bottom of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. . . . From the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now descried in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and the sloop, with the Octorara lashed to her side, suddenly stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The Hartford, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with the Metacomet toward the two vessels ahead, and the Richmond and Port Royal were close upon them, followed by the others. At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest height. . . . 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jovett, full speed!' came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's place in the rigging. In a moment the Hartford had turned, and dash-



ing with the Metacomet past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier. Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no explosion followed, and the Hartford passed safely into the waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain Jenkins of the Richmond, an officer of cool head and splendid courage, backed away from the others, and began a furious cannonade on the fort with his whole broadside, driving the enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead, followed by the Richmond and the rest of the fleet. . . . No sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle began with the Tennessee. The moment that the ships had fairly entered the bay, the Confederate ram . . . came charging down the whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had lagged behind, "the Tennessee took refuge under the guns of the fort, and the fleet rejoined the Hartford, now four miles up the bay." Meantime the Hartford and the Metacomet had disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the Selma, which surrendered, and the Gaines, which had been run ashore and set on fire. The third, the Morgan, took shelter with the Tennessee, near the fort. "The Hartford had by this time come to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the Tennessee was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the Monongahela, the Lackawanna, the Hartford and the Ossipee, and pounded by the terrible guns of the monitor Chickasaw, until, with her commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame, she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to exist. The fall of the city did not come about until some time afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay served every purpose of the Federal Government."—J. R. Soley, *The Sailor Boys of '61*, ch. 13.—"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. . . . The losses in the rebel fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to the Tennessee and Selma—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in the forts is unknown."—L. Farragut, *Life of David Glasgow Farragut*, ch. 27.

ALSO IN: J. C. Kinney and J. D. Johnston, *Farragut at Mobile Bay*, and *The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay (Battles and Leaders*, v. 3).—A. T. Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters (The Navy in the Civil War*, v. 3), ch. 8.—The same, *Admiral Farragut*, ch. 10.—*Official Records*, Series 1, v. 39.

A. D. 1864 (August–October: Virginia).—*Sheridan's Victories in the Shenandoah Valley*.—Winchester.—Fisher's Hill.—Cedar Creek.—The famous Ride.—"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August, consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the Susquehanna,

West Virginia and the Middle Department] into one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was appointed to the command on the 7th of August, and took the field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His operations during that month and the fore part of September were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that officer expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened the communications of the other, and either could bring on a battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the morning of September 19th, and a battle ensued—known as the battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of Opequan Creek—which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It is due to state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and 3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M., made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified heights: the Confederates . . . broke in confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle-flags. . . . After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack, while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts to

force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the right. Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. . . . Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad, returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The desolation of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. . . . The army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack, and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during the night of the 18-19th of October." A flanking column, "favored by a heavy fog . . . attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps . . . and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery (18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned. The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was, however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. . . . At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact line, and prepare either to resist further attack or himself resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten A. M., that General Sheridan

arrived upon the field from Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very inspiring effect. General Wright had already brought order out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. . . . A counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. . . . A large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The reflux wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. . . . The retreat soon became a rout. . . . In the pursuit all the captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition. The captures included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. . . . With this defeat of Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever ended," and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to the main field of operations, at Petersburg.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 12, pt. 8.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 1-4.—G. E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, ch. 7-13.—M. M. Granger, *The Battle of Cedar Creek (Sketches of War Hist., Ohio Commandery, L. L. of the U. S., v. 3)*.—W. Merritt, *Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley*; J. A. Early, *Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek (Battles and Leaders, v. 4)*.—R. B. Irwin, *Hist. of the 19th Army Corps*, ch. 33-34.—H. C. King, *The Battle of Cedar Creek (Personal Recollections of the War: N. Y. Com. L. L. of the U. S.)*.

A. D. 1864 (September—October: Georgia) Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants.—Sherman's Preparations for the March to the Sea.—Hood's Raid to the rear.—"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained grouped about Atlanta. . . . The Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. . . . Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government.' . . . This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city, he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses. . . . My military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. . . . War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. . . . You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against



these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was arranged, during which "446 families were moved south, comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 79 servants, with an average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of all kinds to each family."—S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his Campaigns*, ch. 18.—"Gen. Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia; and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Gov. Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. . . . To allow their principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not however the intention of the rebel authorities. . . . Something must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably lost. . . . The whole army of Gen. Hood, it was decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee River at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated from Nashville, and Gen. Sherman, cut off from his primary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful attacks of the Georgia militia. In connection with this movement, Gen. Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee. . . . A week sufficed to complete Gen. Hood's arrangements, and by the 2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth, effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two places. He also sent a division under Gen. French to capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to replenish his commissariat. . . . Gen. Sherman, . . . immediately upon hearing that Gen. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, . . . despatched Gen. Corse with reinforcements to Rome, which he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week he had sent Gen. Thomas with troops to Nashville to look after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in the direction of Marietta, with 15 days' rations. The 20th corps, Gen. Slocum, was left to garri-

son Atlanta. Learning that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity of holding the latter place, Gen. Sherman at once communicated by signals instruction to Gen. Corse at Rome to reinforce the small garrison and hold the defences until the main body of the Federal army could come to his assistance. Upon receiving the message Gen. Corse placed 900 men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men, with six guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, Gen. French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned the Federal commander, 'in order to save the unnecessary effusion of blood,' to make an immediate surrender; to which the latter replied: 'I shall not surrender, and you can commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you please.' The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort, until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the enemy. . . . During the heat of the contest Gen. Sherman reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly signalled to Gen. Corse to hold out to the last. The announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's (4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy left 700 to 800 killed, wounded and prisoners in the hands of the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000. The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced to a mere wreck by the severe fire of the enemy, and all the Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Allatoona, which Gen. Sherman immediately commenced to repair. For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona, Gen. Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome, and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. . . . Gen. Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held by Col. Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery. . . . No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton than wasting their time or strength upon the reduction of a post, the possession of which they wisely considered would be of no particular advantage to them. . . . Meanwhile the rebel army, pursuing its devastating march north, reached Dalton on the 14th. . . . The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel Hill. . . . The approach of the Federal columns now warned Gen. Hood

to move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat for Lafayette, followed by Gen. Sherman. . . . From Lafayette the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens, on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused for several days, receiving a few reinforcements brought up by Gen. Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the Confederate military division of the West. . . . Gen. Hood still retained his special command, subject to the supervision or direction of Gen. Beauregard, and his army, after remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles distant. Gen. Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville, which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the enemy's movements. . . . Whatever . . . might be the final result of Hood's flanking movement, it had entirely failed to interrupt the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. . . . In the light of subsequent events it would now appear that Gen. Sherman, making only a show of following his adversary, deliberately lured him into Northern Alabama, for the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted march with his own army through the heart of Georgia. The ill-advised plan of Gen. Hood had given him the very opportunity which he desired, and he prepared at once to avail himself of it."—W. J. Tenney, *Military and Naval History in the United States*, ch. 45.

ALSO IN: J. D. Cox, *Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil war, v. 9), ch. 17*.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, ch. 19 (v. 2).—T. B. Van Horne, *Life of Major-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas*, v. 2, ch. 12.—J. B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, ch. 15.—*Official Records*, 1st Ser., v. 39.

A. D. 1864 (October).—Admission of Nevada into the Union. See NEVADA: A. D. 1848–1864.

A. D. 1864 (October).—Report on secret disloyal associations in the North.—Knights of the Golden Circle, etc.—“During more than a year past [this report bears date October 8, 1864], it has been generally known to our military authorities that a secret and treasonable organization, affiliated with the Southern Rebellion, and chiefly military in its character, has been rapidly extending itself throughout the West. A variety of agencies . . . have been employed, and successfully, to ascertain its nature and extent, as well as its aims and its results; and, as this investigation has led to the arrest, in several States, of a number of its prominent members, as dangerous public enemies, it has been deemed proper to set forth in full the acts and purposes of this organization. . . . This secret association first developed itself in the West in the year 1862, about the period [August] of the first conscription of troops, which it aimed to obstruct and resist. Originally known in certain localities as the ‘Mutual Protection Society,’ the ‘Circle of Honor,’ or the ‘Circle’ or ‘Knights of the Mighty Host,’ but more widely as the ‘Knights of the Golden Circle,’ it was simply an inspiration of the Rebellion, being little other than an extension, among the disloyal and disaffected at

the North, of the association of the latter name, which had existed for some years at the South [see GOLDEN CIRCLE, KNIGHTS OF], and from which it derived all the chief features of its organization. During the Summer and Fall of 1863, the Order, both at the North and South, underwent some modifications as well as a change of name. In consequence of a partial exposure which had been made of the signs and ritual of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sterling Price had instituted, as its successor in Missouri, a secret political association, which he called the Corps de Belgique, or Southern League, his principal coadjutor being Charles L. Hunt, of St. Louis, then Belgian Consul at that city. . . . Meanwhile, also, there had been instituted at the North, in the autumn of 1863, by sundry disloyal persons, prominent among whom were Vallandigham and P. C. Wright, of New York, a secret, Order intended to be general throughout the country . . . and which was termed, and has since been widely known as the O. A. K., or ‘Order of American Knights.’ . . . The secret signs and character of the Order having become known to our military authorities, further modifications in the ritual and forms were introduced, and its name was finally changed to that of the O. S. L., or ‘Order of the Sons of Liberty,’ or the ‘Knights of the Order of the Sons of Liberty.’ These later changes are represented to have been first instituted . . . in May last [1864], but the new name was at once generally adopted throughout the West, though in some localities the association is still better known as the ‘Order of American Knights.’ Meanwhile, also, the Order has received certain local designations. In parts of Illinois it has been called at times the ‘Peace Organization,’ in Kentucky the ‘Star Organization,’ and in Missouri the ‘American Organization;’ these, however, being apparently names used outside of the lodges of the Order. Its members have also been familiarly designated as ‘Butternuts’ by the country people of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. . . . The ‘Temples’ or ‘Lodges’ of the Order are numerous scattered through the States of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Kentucky. They are also officially reported as established, to a less extent, in Michigan and the other Western States, as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Tennessee. . . . It has been asserted by delegates to the Supreme Council of February last, that the number was there represented to be from 800,000 to 1,000,000; but Vallandigham, in his speech last summer at Dayton, Ohio, placed it at 500,000, which is probably much nearer the true total. . . . Although the Order has, from the outset, partaken of the military character, it was not till the summer or fall of 1863 that it began to be generally organized as an armed body. . . . In March last the entire armed force of the Order capable of being mobilized for effective service was represented to be 340,000 men.”—J. Holt, *Judge Advocate General's Rept. on Secret Associations and Conspiracies against the Government*.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, app., pp. 445–454.—J. A. Logan, *The Great Conspiracy*, p. 499, and app. ch. B.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 1.—See, also, COPPER-HEADS.



**A. D. 1864 (October).—The St. Albans Raid.**—"Along the Northern border . . . the rebel agents, sent thither on 'detached service' by the Rebel Government, were active in movements intended to terrify and harass the people. On the 19th of October, a party of them made a raid into St. Albans, Vermont, robbing the banks there, and making their escape across the lines into Canada with their plunder, having killed one of the citizens in their attack. Pursuit was made, and several of the marauders were arrested in Canada. Proceedings were commenced to procure their extradition [which were protracted until after the close of the war]. . . . The Government received information that this affair was but one of a projected series, and that similar attempts would be made all along the frontier. More than this, there were threats, followed by actual attempts, to set fire to the principal Northern cities."—H. J. Raymond, *Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln*, p. 611.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 1.—*Cor. relating to the Fenian Invasion and the Rebellion of the Southern States* (Ottawa, 1869), pp. 117-138.

**A. D. 1864 (October: North Carolina).—The destruction of the ram *Albemarle*.**—The ram *Albemarle*, which had proved in the spring so dangerous an antagonist to the blockading vessels in the North Carolina Sounds [see above: A. D. 1864 (APRIL—MAY: NORTH CAROLINA)], was still lying at Plymouth, in the Roanoke River, and another attack from her was feared by the fleet. "She was finally destroyed by a brave young lieutenant, William B. Cushing, who blew her up with a torpedo. Though only twenty years old, he was one of the most daring officers in the navy, and he had become noted for his fearlessness in the expeditions in the sounds and rivers of North Carolina. One dark night (Oct. 27) he set out from the fleet in a steam launch—a long open boat used by naval vessels—with a crew of thirteen officers and men. The launch was fitted with a torpedo which could be run out forward on the end of a long boom so as to be thrust under the vessel to be attacked. Cushing got within sixty feet of the *Albemarle* before his boat was seen. The guards then shouted the alarm, rang the boat's bell, and began firing their muskets at the launch. There was a raft of logs thirty feet wide around the *Albemarle* to protect her from just such attacks, but Cushing ran the bow of the launch upon the logs, lowered the boom so that the torpedo came right under the side of the vessel, and fired it. At the same moment a shot from one of the great guns of the ram crashed through the launch, and it was overwhelmed by a flood of water thrown up by the explosion of the torpedo. The Confederates called out to Cushing to surrender, but he refused, and ordering his men to save themselves as they best could, he sprang into the water amid a shower of musket balls and swam down the river. He succeeded in reaching the shore, almost exhausted, and hid himself during the next day in a swamp, where he was cared for by some negroes. From them he heard that the *Albemarle* had been sunk by his torpedo. The next night he found a small boat in a creek, paddled in it down the river, and before midnight was safe on board one of the vessels of the fleet. Only one other

man of the party escaped, all the rest being either drowned or captured. The *Albemarle* being thus put out of the way, Plymouth was recaptured a few days afterward."—J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young Folks' Hist. of the War for the Union*, ch. 33.

ALSO IN: W. B. Cushing, E. Holden, and others, *The Confederate Ram *Albemarle* (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).

**A. D. 1864 (November: Tennessee).—Hood's advance Northward.—The Battle of Franklin.**—When General Sherman started on his march to the sea General Thomas was left to oppose Hood. "The force Thomas had for this purpose was curiously small, considering how formidable Hood's army had been in the Atlanta Campaign, and still was. All Thomas had for immediate field service were the Fourth and Twenty-Third Corps, numbering together about 22,000 infantry, and also about 3,000 cavalry. These troops were sent to Pulaski, Tennessee, in command of General Schofield, Thomas, himself remaining at Nashville. A little after the middle of November, 1864, Hood crossed the Tennessee River and inaugurated his campaign by a flank movement. He made a rapid march upon Columbia, with the view of getting in behind Schofield, who was at Pulaski. But Schofield retired to Columbia in time to frustrate Hood's plans. The two armies remained in close proximity to each other at Columbia until November 28th, when Hood made another skillfully-planned flank movement . . . to Spring Hill, in rear of Schofield. Again Hood was foiled. . . . General Thomas at Nashville wanted the Confederates held back as long as possible, in order that he might have time to receive there his expected reinforcement of A. J. Smith's corps. It was, therefore, Schofield's duty to check Hood's advance as long as he could. . . . He started General Stanley, with a division of 5,000 men, and a great part of his artillery, to Spring Hill (12 miles north of Columbia) early in the morning. He put two other divisions on the road. He held one division in front of Columbia, and prevented the enemy from crossing the river during the entire day, and also that night. Stanley reached Spring Hill in time to prevent Hood from occupying that place. He skirmished and fought with Hood's advance troops at Spring Hill during the afternoon of November 29th. . . . Schofield . . . accomplished exactly what he believed he could accomplish. He held back his enemy at Columbia with one hand and fended off the blow at Spring Hill with the other. . . . The beneficial result of all this bold management of Schofield, November 29th, was apparent the next day in the battle of Franklin. Hood fought that great battle practically without his artillery. He only had the two batteries which he took with him on his detour to Spring Hill. Those two he used. . . . But his vast supply of artillery had all been detained at Columbia too long to be of any service at the time and place it was most needed. . . . The Federal troops left Spring Hill in the night for Franklin, ten miles distant. Early in the morning of November 30th they began to arrive at Franklin, and were placed in position covering the town. Early the same morning the Confederates moved up from Spring Hill, following hard upon the rearmost of the Federals. . . . General Stanley says, in his

official report: 'From one o'clock until four in the evening, the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack. Yet, in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during the campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault.'" The assault was made, however, with a terrible persistency which proved the ruin of Hood's army, for it failed. "The Confederate loss in this dreadful battle can be estimated from data given. There is good authority for stating the killed at 1,750. The usual proportion of killed and wounded is four or five to one. This would make the killed and wounded not less than 7,000 or 8,000. The attacking force numbered full 20,000. . . . Hood's loss was, indeed, more than one-third of the attacking force. The Federal loss was much smaller, being 1,222 killed and wounded. . . . One of the features of this battle was the enormous expenditure of ammunition [100 wagon loads] in the short time of its duration. . . . The expenditure of so much ammunition produced a dense smoke, which hung over the field, and brought on sudden darkness, like an eclipse. So noticeable was this phenomenon, it is mentioned in all the official reports. . . . In the darkness of the night the battle ended. The Confederates desisted, and the Federal line became quiet. . . . In their front, and so near that the outstretched hand could almost reach them, were thousands of men in the agonies of death. The wail that went up from that field as the thunder of the battle ceased can never be forgotten by those who heard it. . . . The [Federal] troops were quietly withdrawn before midnight. A silent rapid march brought them to Nashville the next morning, and weary with fighting and marching they bivouacked in the blue grass pastures under the guns of Fort Negley."—T. Speed, *The Battle of Franklin (Sketches of War Hist., Ohio Commandery L. L. of the U. S., v. 3)*.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, *Life of General Geo. H. Thomas*, ch. 13.—J. B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, ch. 16-17.

A. D. 1864 (November—December: Georgia).—*Sherman's March to the Sea*.—"It was at Alatoona [see above: (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER)], probably, that Sherman first realized that, with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communications with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. . . . Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself [writes General Grant] was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. . . . Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. Before

starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. . . . The army was expected to live on the country. . . . Each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. . . . The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army 'bummers,' in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous."—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 59 (v. 2).—All preparations being completed, General Sherman caused the foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome to be destroyed on the 10th of November, and "started on the 12th with his full staff from Kingston to Atlanta. . . . As Sherman rode towards Atlanta that night he met railroad trains going to the rear with furious speed. He was profoundly impressed with the strange aspect of affairs: two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in the great war. 'I was strongly inspired,' he writes, 'with a feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened; and that for better or worse it would end the war.' The result was a magnificent vindication of this soldierly intuition. His army consisted in round numbers of 60,000 men, the most perfect in strength, health, and intelligence that ever went to war. He had thoroughly purged it of all inefficient material, sending to the rear all organizations and even all individuals that he thought would be a drag upon his celerity or strength. His right wing, under Howard, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by Osterhaus, in the absence of John A. Logan; and the Seventeenth Corps, commanded by Frank P. Blair, Jr. The left wing, commanded by Slocum, comprised the Fourteenth Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under A. S. Williams. In his general orders he had not intimated to the army the object of their march. 'It is sufficient for you to know,' he said, 'that it involves a departure from our present base and a long, difficult march to a new one.' His special field orders are a model of clearness and conciseness. The habitual order of march was to be, wherever practicable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points to be indicated from time to time. There was to be no general train of supplies; behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; a due proportion of wagons for ammunition and provision behind each brigade; the separate columns were to start at seven in the morning and make about fifteen miles a day. The army was to subsist liberally on the country; forage parties, under the command of discreet officers, were to gather near the routes traveled whatever was needed by the command, aiming to keep in the wagons a reserve of at least ten days' provisions; soldiers were strictly forbidden to enter dwellings of inhabitants or commit trespasses; the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., was intrusted to corps commanders alone. No destruction of property was to be permitted in districts where the army was unmolested; but relentless devastation was ordered in case of the



manifestation of local hostility by the shooting of soldiers or the burning of bridges. . . . Precisely at seven o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November the great army started on its march. A band struck up the anthem of 'John Brown's body lies a-moldering in the grave'; the soldiers caught up the refrain, and, to the swelling chorus of 'Glory, Hallelujah,' the great march was begun. The month that followed will always remain to those 60,000 men the most romantic and inspiring memory of their lives. The weather was favorable all the way; to veterans the marches were of reasonable length; the work of destroying the Southern railroads was so easy to their experienced hands that it hardly delayed the day's march. With the exception of the affair on the 22d of November, when P. J. Phillips with a division of Smith's Georgia troops attacked C. C. Walcutt's Brigade, which was marching as the rear-guard of the right wing at Griswoldville, and met with a severe repulse, and a series of cavalry fights between Wheeler and Kilpatrick near Waynesboro', there was no fighting to do between Atlanta and Savannah. A swarm of militia and irregular cavalry hung, it is true, about the front and flank of the marching army, but were hardly a source of more annoyance than so many mosquitoes would have been. The foragers brought in every evening their heterogeneous supplies from the outlying plantations, and although they had to defend themselves every day from scattered forces of the enemy, the casualties which they reported each evening were insignificant. The utmost efforts of Sherman and his officers to induce the negroes to remain quietly at home were not entirely successful. The promise of freedom which was to come to them from the victory of the Union cause was too vague and indefinite to content them. . . . The simple-hearted freedmen gathered in an ever-increasing cloud in rear of the army; and when the campaign was over they peopled the sea-islands of Georgia and furnished, after the war, the principal employment of the Freedmen's Commission. The march produced an extraordinary effervescence throughout the Confederacy. If words could avail anything against heavy battalions, Sherman would have been annihilated in his first day's march. . . . As Sherman drew near to Milledgeville on the 23d of November the Georgia Legislature passed an act to levy the population en masse; but this act of desperate legislation had no effect in checking the march of the 'Yankees,' and the Governor, State officers, and Legislature fled in the utmost confusion as Sherman entered the place. The Union general occupied the Executive Mansion for a day; some of the soldiers went to the State House, organized themselves into a constituent assembly, and after a spirited mock-serious debate, repealed the ordinance of secession. Sherman took the greatest possible pains to prevent any damage to the city and marched out on the 24th on the way to Millen. . . . Finding it impossible to stop him, the Georgia State troops by sharp marching had made their way directly to the vicinity of Savannah, where Sherman himself arrived and invested the city from the Savannah to the little Ogeechee River, on the 10th of December."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 9, ch. 20.—On the 13th, Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee River, was stormed and taken by Hazen's division, and

communication was opened with Admiral Dahlgren, and with General Foster, the Union commander at Port Royal. On the 17th, General Hardee, the Confederate commander at Savannah, refused a demand for the surrender of the city, but on the night of the 20th he escaped, with his forces, and on the 22d General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln: "I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

ALSO IN: J. D. Cox, *The March to the Sea (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 10), ch. 3.*—O. O. Howard, and others, *Sherman's March (Battles and Leaders, v. 4).*—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, ch. 20 (v. 2).*—G. W. Nichols, *The Story of the Great March.*—W. B. Hazen, *Narrative of Military Service, ch. 21–22.*

**A. D. 1864 (December: Tennessee).—The Battle of Nashville and the destruction of Hood's army.**—After the battle of Franklin—see above: (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE)—Hood went forward to Nashville, with his badly shaken army, and invested that place. Thomas was strongly fortified, and quietly took his time to make ready before striking his audacious antagonist, unmoved by repeated demands for an advance, from the War Office, the President, and General Grant. "With all just confidence in Thomas' ability, the entire North insisted on instant action, and Grant finally ordered Thomas either to move upon Hood at once or else turn over the command to Schofield. Thomas quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the latter, if directed, but would not attack Hood until he was satisfied that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable weather and to increase his force of mounted men. But the enemy was devastating a considerable part of Tennessee and was forcing all the young men into their ranks; and every one was fearful of a repetition of Bragg's march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan was finally ordered to Nashville to supplant Thomas. But before he could reach the ground, Thomas had struck his blow. His preparations had been two weeks before substantially completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesboro', Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had been, however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. A heavy storm of sleet and ice had made the country almost impassable and would render the operations of the attacking party uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind to wait for clearing weather. Finally came sunshine and with it Thomas' advance. Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in the centre and Cheatham on the right, while a portion of Forrest's cavalry was operating out upon his left. He had some 44,000 men, but his check and heavy losses at Franklin had seriously impaired the 'morale' of his army as well as thinned his ranks. Hood could, however, not retreat. He was committed to a death-struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a soldier. The Union general had placed A. J. Smith on his right, the Fourth corps in the centre, and Schofield on the left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his right, while sharply demonstrating with his left. The position of the Confederate Army had placed A. J. Smith's corps obliquely to their general line of battle, an advantage not to be neglected. Smith pushed

in, later supported by Schofield, and successively capturing the field-works erected by the enemy's main line and reserves, disastrously crushed Hood's left flank. Meanwhile Wood was making all but equal headway against Hood's right, and the first day closed with remarkable success for the amount of loss sustained. Still this was not victory. The morrow might bring reverse. Hood's fight promised to be with clenched teeth. Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he had detached on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry his flanks were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay intrenched upon the hills back of his former line, with either flank somewhat refused. Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work his way unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown back. At 4 P. M. a general assault was made all along the line. Upon our left, Wood's advance did not meet with success. On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated at the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough to break down the Confederate defense. Sharply following up his successes, allowing no breathing time to the exultant troops, Smith pushed well home, and overcoming all resistance, drove the enemy in wild confusion from the field. Meanwhile Wilson's troopers, dismounted, fell upon the Confederate flank and rear and increased the wreck tenfold. This advantage again enabled Wood to make some headway, and with renewed joint effort the rout of the enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country towards Franklin. Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though seriously harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tennessee river with the remnants of his army. Thomas' losses were 3,000 men, Hood's were never officially given, but our trophies included 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns. Thomas had settled all adverse speculation upon his slowness in attacking Hood by the next to annihilation he wrought when he actually moved upon him. No army was so completely overthrown during our war."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War*, ch. 58.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, *Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland*, ch. 35 (v. 2).—W. Swinton, *The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War*, ch. 11.—J. D. Cox, *The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 10), ch. 6-7.—H. Stone, *Repelling Hood's Invasion (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).—H. Coppée, *General Thomas*, ch. 11-12.

A. D. 1864-1865 (December—January: North Carolina).—The Capture of Fort Fisher.—"In the latter part of 1864 two ports only, Wilmington and Charleston, remained to the Confederates. . . . The northward march of Sherman would cut off Charleston, too, so that the Confederates would have to abandon it. The National government now desired to complete its work by capturing Fort Fisher, and thus finally shutting off the Confederacy from all communication with the foreign world. The accomplishment of this task was in no wise easy. . . . The army and navy co-operated in the attempts to reduce Fort Fisher. There were more than 50 men-of-war tossing on the waves before the lowering sea-front of the work. Six thou-

sand five hundred men were in the military force. They were in command of General B. F. Butler, whom we saw last in New Orleans. The General's active and ingenious mind conceived a plan for destroying the fort without sacrificing a single Federal soldier. He procured an old gun-boat, painted it white and otherwise disguised it, so as to look like a blockade-runner, stored 250 tons of gunpowder in its hold with fuses penetrating every part, ran the craft in within 1,500 feet of the works and exploded it. Butler expected that the shock would demolish the seaward face of the fort altogether, and perhaps bury the guns under great masses of sand, but in this he was mistaken, for the heavy bastions were not in the least disturbed by the shock. . . . The navy then took its turn, and for some hours the heavy vessels of Admiral Porter's fleet poured so rapid and well aimed a fire upon the work, that the garrison were driven from their guns, and only the occasional report of a heavy cannon told that the fort was still tenanted. But secure in their heavy bomb-proofs, the garrison minded the storm of shells and solid shot no more than the well-housed farmer heeds a hail-storm. It was very clear that Fort Fisher could not be taken at long range. . . . The original plan had contemplated an assault as soon as the fire of the fleet should have silenced the guns of the fort, and in pursuance of this 700 men had been landed from the army transports. But the weather was too rough to permit of landing more troops that day, and the next morning General Butler concluded that Fort Fisher was impregnable, withdrew his men already landed, and sailed away, greatly to the disgust of the navy. This was on the 25th of December, 1864. The chagrin of the whole North over the failure of the expedition was so great that it was speedily determined to renew the attempt. January 13th saw a new Federal force, this time under command of General A. H. Terry, landing on the shore of the sandy neck of land above the fort. . . . At early dawn of the 15th the attack was begun. The ships arranged in a great semicircle poured their fire upon the fort, dismantling guns, driving the garrison to the bomb-proofs, and mowing down the stockade. A line of sharpshooters, each carrying a shovel in one hand and a gun in the other, spring out from Terry's most advanced lines, rush forward to within 175 yards of the fort and dig pits for their protection before the Confederates can attack them. Then the sharpshooters and the navy occupy the attention of the enemy, while Curtis's brigade dashes forward and digs a trench within 500 yards of the fort. By this time too a party of 2,000 sailors and marines has been landed from the fleet. They are to storm the sea-wall of the fort while the army attacks its landward face. Suddenly the thunder of the naval artillery is stilled. There is a moment of silence, and then the shrill scream of the whistles rises from every steamer in the fleet. It is the signal for the assault. The sailors on the beach spring to their feet and dash forward at a rapid run; they fire no shot, for they carry no guns. Cutlasses and pistols, the blue-jackets' traditional weapons, are their only arms. Toward the other side of the fort came Terry's troops. . . . The fate of the naval column is quickly determined. Upon it is concentrated the fire of the heaviest Confederate batteries, Napoleon guns, Columbiads, and



rifles shotted with grape and cannister. The blue-jackets, unable to reply to this murderous fire, and seeing their companions falling fast around them, waver, halt, and fall back to the beach, throwing themselves upon the ground to escape the enemy's missiles. But though repulsed they have contributed largely to the capture of the fort. While the chief attention of Confederates has been directed toward them, the troops have been carrying all before them on the other front. Colonel Lamb turns from his direction of the defense against the naval column to see three Union flags waving over other portions of the work. . . . The Confederates were determined, even desperate. Long after the fort was virtually in the hands of its captors they stubbornly clung to a bomb-proof. Finally they retreated to Battery Buchanan and there maintained themselves stoutly until late at night when, all hope being at an end, they surrendered themselves, and the National victory was complete."—W. J. Abbot, *Battle-Fields and Victory*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, *Naval Hist. of the Civil War*, ch. 49-51.—W. Lamb and T. O. Selfridge, Jr., *The Capture of Fort Fisher (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).

**A. D. 1865 (January).—Congressional adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.**—"On the last day of [January, 1865] . . . one of the grandest events of the century was witnessed in the House of Representatives in the final passage of the Constitutional Amendment [the Thirteenth] forever prohibiting slavery. Numerous propositions on the subject had been submitted, but the honor of drafting the one adopted belongs to Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced it early in the first session of this Congress. It passed the Senate on the 8th of April, 1864, only six members voting against it, . . . but failed in the House on the 15th of June following. It now came up on the motion of Mr. Ashley to reconsider this vote. Congress had abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibited it in all the Territories. It had repealed the Fugitive Slave law, and declared free all negro soldiers in the Union armies and their families; and the President had played his grand part in the Proclamation of Emancipation. But the question now to be decided completely overshadowed all others. The debate on the subject had been protracted and very spirited. . . . The time for the momentous vote had now come, and no language could describe the solemnity and impressiveness of the spectacle pending the roll-call. The success of the measure had been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain negotiations, the result of which was not fully assured, and the particulars of which never reached the public. The anxiety and suspense during the balloting produced a deathly stillness, but when it became certainly known that the measure had prevailed the cheering in the densely-packed hall and galleries surpassed all precedent and beggared all description. Members joined in the general shouting, which was kept up for several minutes, many embracing each other, and others completely surrendering themselves to their tears of joy. It seemed to me I had been born into a new life."—G. W. Julian, *Political Recollections*, ch. 11.—"The Joint Resolution passed [the House of Representatives, on the 31st of January], 119 to 56, 8 not voting, 10 Democrats voting aye. . . . It was

the greatest day the House had ever seen, nor is it likely ever to see a greater."—O. J. Hollister, *Life of Schuyler Colfax*, p. 245.—The Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified before the close of the year by three-fourths of the States, and its embodiment in the Constitution of the United States proclaimed by the Secretary of State on the 18th of December, 1865, is as follows: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

**A. D. 1865 (February).—The Hampton Roads Peace Conference.**—"Several informal attempts at opening negotiations for the termination of hostilities were made in the course of this Winter—Hon. Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, visiting Richmond twice on the subject, with the consent, though not by the request, of President Lincoln. At length, upon their direct application, Messrs. Alex. H. Stephens, John A. Campbell, and Robert M. T. Hunter, were permitted to pass Gen. Grant's lines before Petersburg, and proceed to Fortress Monroe; where [on board a steamer in Hampton Roads] they were met by Gov. Seward, followed by President Lincoln; and a free, full conference was had."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 30.—Secretary Seward first went to meet the three Confederate Commissioners, with the following letter of instructions from President Lincoln, dated January 31, 1865: "Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State: You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: 1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. 2. No receding by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything. Yours, etc., Abraham Lincoln." Two days later, the President followed him, persuaded by a telegram from General Grant to meet the Commissioners personally. In a subsequent message to the Senate, Mr. Lincoln reported the results of the conference as follows: "On the morning of the 3d, the three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself, of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely. On our part the whole substance of the instructions to the Secretary of State, hereinbe-

fore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while, by the other party, it was not said that in any event or on any condition, they ever would consent to reunion; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first which, as some of them seemed to argue, might or might not lead to reunion; but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result."—A. Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 644-649.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 20.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 6.

**A. D. 1865 (February: South Carolina).—Evacuation of Charleston by the Confederates.**—**Federal occupation of the City.**—While General Hardee, with 14,000 men, waited at Charleston for the expected coming of General Sherman to attack that city, the latter pursued a movement which made Charleston untenable and shook it like a ripened apple into the hands of General Gillmore, who was waiting at the gates. The Confederates evacuated the city in haste and with reckless disorder, and it was occupied by the Federal troops on the morning of the 18th of February. The following is the report of Colonel A. G. Bennett, who was the first to enter the city: "On the morning of February the 18th I received information that led me to believe the defences and lines guarding the city of Charleston had been deserted by the enemy. I immediately proceeded to Cummings Point, from whence I sent a small boat in the direction of Fort Moultrie, which boat, when 40 yards east from Fort Sumter, was met by a boat from Sullivan's Island, containing a full corps of band musicians abandoned by the enemy. These confirmed my belief of an evacuation. I had no troops that could be available under two hours, as, except in a few pontoon boats, there were no means whatever of landing troops near the enemy's works or into the city. I directed Major Hennessy to proceed to Fort Sumter and there replace our flag. The flag was replaced over the southeast angle of Fort Sumter at 9 o'clock A. M. I now pushed for the city, stopping at Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney, from which works Rebel flags were hauled down and the American flag substituted. . . . I landed at Mill's wharf, Charleston, at 10 o'clock A. M. where I learned that a part of the enemy's troops yet remained in the city, while mounted patrols were out in every direction applying the torch and driving the inhabitants before them. I at once addressed to the Mayor of the city [a communication demanding its surrender]. . . . My whole force consisted of five officers and the armed crews of two small boats, comprising in all 22 men. Both officers and men volunteered to advance from the wharf into the city; but no reinforcements being in sight, I did not deem it expedient to move on. Public buildings, stores, warehouses, private dwellings, shipping, etc., were burning and being fired by armed Rebels, but with the force at my disposal it was impossible to save the cotton and other property. While awaiting the arrival of my troops at Mill's wharf, a number of explosions took place. The Rebel commissary depot was blown up, and with it is estim-

ated that not less than 200 human beings—most of whom were women and children—were blown to atoms. These people were engaged in procuring food for themselves and their families by permission from the Rebel military authorities. . . . Observing a small boat sailing toward the bay under a flag of truce, I put off to it, and received from a member of the common council a letter [from the Mayor, announcing the evacuation of the city by the Confederate military authorities]. . . . The deputation sent to convey the above letter represented to me that the city was in the hands of either the Rebel soldiery or the mob. They entreated of me in the name of humanity to interpose my military authority and save the city from utter destruction. . . . Two companies of the 52d Pennsylvania regiment and about 30 men of the 3d Rhode Island volunteer heavy artillery having landed, I proceeded with them to the citadel. I here established my headquarters, and sent small parties in all directions with instructions to impress negroes wherever found, and to make them work the fire apparatus, until all fires were extinguished."—A. G. Bennett, *Report*, Feb. 24, 1865 (*quoted in Tenney's Military and Naval History of the Rebellion*, ch. 49).—At noon on the 14th of April, 1865, the fourth anniversary of the lowering of the flag of the United States at Fort Sumter, it was formally raised by General Anderson over the ruins of the fort, with impressive ceremonies, in which many visitors from the North took part. An address was delivered on the occasion by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.

**A. D. 1865 (February—March: The Carolinas).**—**Sherman's march from Savannah to Goldsboro.**—**The burning of Columbia.**—**The Battle of Bentonville.**—"By the middle of January, a lodgment had been effected in South Carolina [at Pocotaligo, on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston], and Sherman had his whole army once more in hand as a moving column. He had no idea of wasting time on either Charleston or Augusta, but he determined to play upon the fears of the rebels, and compel them to retain a force to protect those places. . . . Accordingly he gave out with some ostentation that he was moving upon either Charleston or Augusta. Early in January the heavy winter rains set in, rendering the roads almost impassable. . . . This flood delayed the departure of the column for quite two weeks. . . . On the 1st of February, the army designed for the active campaign from Savannah northward was again 60,000 strong; and, as before, was composed of two wings, the right under Howard and the left under Slocum. Kilpatrick was once more chief of cavalry. Sixty-eight guns accompanied the command. The wagons were 2,500 in number, and carried an ample supply of ammunition for one great battle, forage for a week, and provisions for twenty days. For fresh meat Sherman depended on beeves driven on the hoof, and such cattle, hogs, and poultry as might be gathered on the march. . . . Sherman . . . started on his northward march on the 1st of February. On that day his right wing was south of the Salkehatchie river, and his left still struggling in the swamps of the Savannah, at Sister's Ferry. . . . The division generals led their columns through the swamps, the water up to their shoulders, crossed over to the pine land beyond, and then, turning upon the rebels who



had opposed the passage, drove them off in utter disorder. All the roads northward had been held for weeks by Wheeler's cavalry, and details of negro laborers had been compelled to fell trees and burn bridges to impede the national march. Sherman's pioneers, however, removed the trees, and the heads of columns rebuilt the bridges before the rear could close up, and the rebels retreated behind the Edisto river at Branchville. . . . Sherman determined to waste no time on Branchville, which the enemy could no longer hold, and turned his columns directly north upon Columbia, where it was supposed the rebels would concentrate. Attempts were made to delay him at the crossings of the rivers; there were numerous bridge-heads with earth or cotton parapets to carry, and cypress swamps to cross; but nothing stayed his course. On the 13th, he learned that there was no enemy in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry. Hardee, at Charleston, took it for granted that Sherman was moving upon that place, and the rebels in Augusta supposed that they were Sherman's object; so Charleston and Augusta were protected, while Columbia was abandoned to the care of the cavalry." With little or no resistance, Sherman entered the capital of South Carolina on the 17th of February. "Hampton had ordered all cotton, public and private, to be moved into the streets and fired. Bales were piled up everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and the tufts of cotton blown about by the wind, or lodged in the trees and against the houses, presented the appearance of a snow-storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning in the heart of the town. Sherman, meanwhile, had given orders to destroy the arsenals and public property not needed by his army, as well as railroad stations and machines, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and 'harmless private property'; and the fires lighted by Hampton were partially subdued by the national soldiers. But before the torch had been put to a single building by Sherman's order, the smouldering fires set by Hampton were rekindled by the wind and communicated to the buildings around. About dark the flames began to spread, and were soon beyond the control of the brigade on duty in the town. An entire division was now brought in, but it was found impossible to check the conflagration, which by midnight had become quite unmanageable. It raged till about four A. M. on the 18th, when the wind subsided, and the flames were got under control. . . . Beauregard, meanwhile, and the rebel cavalry, had retreated upon Charlotte, in North Carolina, due north from Columbia; and on the 20th and 21st Sherman followed as far as Winnsboro. . . . At Winnsboro, however, Sherman turned his principal columns northeastward towards Goldsboro, still 200 miles away. Heavy rains again impeded his movements . . . and it was not till the 3d of March that the army arrived at Cheraw. At this point large quantities of guns and ammunition were captured, brought from Charleston under the supposition that here, at least, they would be secure. Hardee had moved due north from Charleston by his only remaining railroad, through Florence, but only reached Cheraw in time to escape with his troops across the Pedee river, just before Sherman arrived. . . . Having secured the passage of the Pedee . . . Sherman had but little uneasiness about the future. . . .

On the 11th of March, Fayetteville was reached, and Sherman had traversed the entire extent of South Carolina. On the 12th, he sent a dispatch to Grant, the first since leaving the Savannah. . . . On the 15th of March, the command began its march for Goldsboro." The scattered Confederate forces were now getting together and General Johnston had been put in command of them. "Sherman estimated the entire rebel force at 37,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry; but only Hardee, with 10,000 infantry and one division of cavalry, was in the immediate front." On the 15th Hardee was encountered at Averysboro, where he attempted to check Sherman's advance while Johnston concentrated in the rear. Some sharp fighting occurred, in which Sherman lost 77 men killed and 477 wounded. Hardee reported his loss at 500. In the morning he had disappeared. "From Averysboro both wings turned eastward by different roads, and on the night of the 18th of March the army was within 27 miles of Goldsboro, and only five from Bentonsville. The columns were now about ten miles apart." At Bentonsville, on the 19th, Slocum's wing was attacked by Johnston, who had marched his whole command with great rapidity, hoping to "overwhelm Sherman's left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating column." But Slocum held his ground that day against six distinct assaults, and the next day Sherman brought his whole army into position. He did not push the enemy, however, either on the 20th or on the 21st, being uncertain as to Johnston's strength. During the night of the 21st the latter retreated. "The total national loss was 191 killed, and 1,455 wounded and missing. Johnston states his losses to have been 223 killed, 1,467 wounded, and 653 missing; but Sherman captured 1,621 prisoners. Sherman admits that he committed an error in not overwhelming his enemy. Few soldiers, however, are great enough to accuse themselves of an error, and fewer still but might accuse themselves of greater ones than can ever be laid at Sherman's door. At daybreak on the 22d . . . the army moved to Goldsboro, where Schofield had already arrived [see below: 1865 (FEBRUARY—MARCH: NORTH CAROLINA)]. . . . Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army in civilized war."—A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 31 (v. 3).—At Columbia, "I observed, as I passed along the street, that many shops had been gutted, and that paper, rags, and litter of all kinds lay scattered on the floors, in the open doorways, and on the ground outside. I was told on good authority that this had been done by the Confederate troops before our arrival. It was a windy day, and a great deal of loose cotton had been blown about and caught on the fences and in the branches of the shade trees along the street. It has been said that this had something to do with spreading the fire which afterward took place. I think this very doubtful. . . . I have never doubted that Columbia was deliberately set on fire in more than a hundred places. No one ordered it, and no one could stop it. The officers of high rank would have saved the city if possible; but the army was deeply imbued with the feeling that as South Carolina had begun the war she must suffer a stern retribution."—W. B. Hazen, *Narrative of Military Service*, ch. 23-25.—"I dis-

claim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed."—*Sherman's Official Report (Rebellion Record, v. 11).*

ALSO IN: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his Campaigns*, ch. 26-29.—H. W. Slocum and W. Hampton, *Sherman's March and The Battle of Bentonville (Battles and Leaders, v. 4).*

**A. D. 1865 (February—March: North Carolina).—Occupation of Wilmington.—Battle of Kinston.—Junction with Sherman at Goldsboro.**—On the 9th of February, General Schofield, transferred from the west, arrived at Fort Fisher with Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps, and took command of the newly created Department of North Carolina. Advancing on Wilmington, the Confederates, under Hoke, retreating before him, he occupied that city on the 22d. This accomplished, General Cox was sent to Newberne to take command of forces ordered there, and to open communication thence by railroad with Goldsboro, preparatory to the arrival of General Sherman at that point. In the prosecution of this undertaking, he fought the battle of Kinston, March 10, repelling a fierce attack by Bragg with the forces which were being collected against Sherman. "After Bragg's retreat, Schofield steadily pressed the work of rebuilding the railway. Kinston was occupied on March 14th." On the 21st Schofield entered Goldsboro, "and there, in a couple of days more, was reassembled the grand army under Sherman, whose march from Savannah had been quite as remarkable as the former one from Atlanta to the sea."—J. D. Cox, *The March to the Sea (Campaigns of the Civil War)*, ch. 9.

**A. D. 1865 (February—March: Virginia).—Sheridan's destroying march through Central Virginia.—Battle of Waynesborough.**—"The last campaign against Lee may be said to have been inaugurated when General Sheridan started with his cavalry from Winchester, Virginia, on the 27th of February, 1865, with a sort of carte blanche of destruction as to the enemy's supply depots and communications. The general's instructions looked to his crossing the James River above Richmond, and his possible junction with the command of General Sherman somewhere in North Carolina; but the swollen condition of the James and the destruction of the bridges prevented his crossing. . . . General Sheridan's command on this expedition consisted of the first cavalry division, under Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, and the third cavalry division, under Brevet Major-General Geo. A. Custer, to whose division was added one brigade of the cavalry of the old army of West Virginia, under Colonel Capehart. . . . They left Winchester on a damp, disagreeable morning. . . . But the spirits of the bold dragons were not dampened, and they felt lively enough to push on to Waynesborough to the camp of General Jubal Early, late of the Confederacy, upon whom the brilliant Custer fell with his division, and soon had his guns, and men, and 'matériel,' and would have had him but that he had sufficient presence of mind to absent his person when he found how things were going. This was General Early's last appearance in public life. . . . Early's command

at Waynesborough being now dispersed or captured, . . . General Sheridan proceeded to occupy Charlottesville. . . . Then on again toward Lynchburg and the James River. . . . When it was found impossible to cross the James River, attention was for a while directed to the demolition of the James River and Kanawha Canal. . . . When the ingenious destruction corps could devise no further damage here, the command turned off to try its hand upon a railroad or two. All the time the rains had descended—the flood-gates of the clouds were up and the water kept pouring through. . . . Although nothing short of a flotilla seemed likely to ride out the storm, the cavalry rode on hopefully, and came safely to harbor at the White House, on the Pamunkey, where supplies were furnished them, and where the March winds blew them dry again. . . . Immediately upon his arrival at this depot, General Sheridan reported to General Grant, at City Point, for orders."—*With General Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign; by a Staff Officer*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, ch. 14.—A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 31 (v. 3).—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1865 (March).—Emancipation of the families of colored soldiers.**—"The President in his annual message, December, 1863, had estimated the colored soldiers in the service at 'nearly 100,000.' They were mostly from the border States, and the slaves of loyal masters. While they were fighting the battles of the country, their masters, who were generally opposed to their enlistment, could sell into perpetual slavery their wives and children. To deter slaves from enlisting, or to punish them when they did enlist, slave-masters made merchandise of the wives and children of colored soldiers, and often sold them into a harsher bondage. To put an end to a practice so cruel, unjust, injurious, and dishonorable to the country, Mr. Wilson introduced into the Senate on the 8th of January [1864], in his bill to promote enlistments, a provision declaring that when any man or boy of African descent, owing service or labor in any State, under its laws, should be mustered into the military or naval service of the United States, he, and his mother, wife, and children, should be forever free." The bill was warmly debated and its supporters did not succeed in bringing it to a vote during that session of Congress. At the next session, on the 13th of December, 1864, Mr. Wilson introduced a joint resolution "to make free the wives and children of persons who had been, or might be, mustered into the service of the United States." This passed the Senate a few days later, by a vote of 27 to 10; was passed, by the House on the 22d of February, 1865, and signed by the President on the 3d of March.—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 30.

**A. D. 1865 (March).—President Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address.**—"The days of the Confederacy were evidently numbered. Only the last blow remained to be struck. Then Lincoln's second inauguration came [March 4, 1865], and with it his second inaugural address. Lincoln's famous 'Gettysburg speech' has been much and justly admired. But far greater, as well as far more characteristic, was that inaugural in which



he poured out the whole devotion and tenderness of his great soul. It had all the solemnity of a father's last admonition and blessing to his children before he lay down to die. . . . No American President had ever spoken words like these to the American people. America never had a President who found such words in the depth of his heart."—C. Schurz, *Abraham Lincoln: an Essay*, pp. 103-104.

The following is the text of the Inaugural Address:

"Fellow-countrymen: At this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured. On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it—all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war—seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered—that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.' If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to

both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope—fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's 250 years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said 3,000 years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.' With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."—A. Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 656-657.

A. D. 1865 (March—April: Virginia).—The Flanking of Lee's lines.—Battle of Five Forks.—Final assault at Petersburg and Confederate retreat.—"One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion," wrote General Grant, "was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. . . . I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly believed would close the war. . . . Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, [Sheridan] having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans. . . . It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about Richmond and Petersburg, and they both agreed that these places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the Danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg." The assault was made by General Gordon early in the morning of March 25th, and Fort Stedman, with three contiguous batteries, were taken by surprise. The captured fort and batteries were soon recovered, however, and the Confederate troops who entered them were made prisoners. "This

effort of Lee's cost him about 4,000 men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about 2,000 of ours. . . . The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River, and take his place on our extreme left, 30 miles away. . . . Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad. There was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. This was what was known as the battle of White Oak Road. . . . The 29th of March came, and fortunately, there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. On that day I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again, however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. . . . It became necessary . . . to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line. . . . The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and Five Forks. My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right, so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success. . . . Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading northwest to Five Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops, besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send

Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright's corps . . . and that I would send Warren. Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court-House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. . . . Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. . . . Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. . . . It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. . . . It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some 6,000 prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. . . . Pursuit continued until about 9 o'clock at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned. . . . This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d." The assault was successfully made, and the outer works of Petersburg were soon in the hands of the National troops. Early in the morning of the 3d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Grant and Meade took possession of the city. The following day they were visited there by President Lincoln, who had been at City Point for a week, or more, watching the course of events.—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 63–65 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 5–6.—A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 12–13.—H. Porter, *Five Forks and the Pursuit of Lee (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).—R. de Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 34.

A. D. 1865 (April 11).—President Lincoln's last public address.—His view of Reconstruction in Louisiana.—On the evening of the 11th of April, a great multitude of people gathered about the White House, to convey their congratulations to the President and to signify their joy at the sure prospect of peace. Mr. Lincoln came out and spoke to them, expressing first his participation in their gladness, and then turning to discuss briefly the criticism which had opened upon his policy of reconstruction, as practically



illustrated in Louisiana. He spoke of his message and proclamation of December, 1863 (quoted above); of the approval given to them by every member of his cabinet; of the entire silence at the time of all who had become critics and objectors since action under the plan had been taken in Louisiana. He then went on as follows: "When the message of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans, General Banks wrote me that he was confident that the people, with his military coöperation, would reconstruct substantially on that plan. I wrote to him and some of them to try it. They tried it, and the result is known. Such has been my only agency in getting up the Louisiana government. As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest; but I have not yet been so convinced. I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed on the question whether the seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it. It would perhaps add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I have found professed Union men endeavoring to make that question, I have purposely forbore any public expression upon it. As appears to me, that question has not been, nor yet is, a practically material one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, whatever it may hereafter become, that question is bad as the basis of a controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded States, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the government, civil and military, in regard to those States is to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without deciding or even considering whether these States have ever been out of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper practical relations between these States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether in doing the acts he brought the States from without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. The amount of constituency, so to speak, on which the new Louisiana government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained 50,000, or 30,000, or even 20,000, instead of only about 12,000, as it does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as soldiers. Still, the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State

government? Some 12,000 voters in the heretofore slave State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized a State government, adopted a free-State constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the nation. These 12,000 persons are thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetual freedom in the State—committed to the very things, and nearly all the things, the nation wants—and they ask the nation's recognition and its assistance to make good their committal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse them. We, in effect, say to the white man: You are worthless or worse; we will neither help you, nor be helped by you. To the blacks we say: This cup of liberty which these, your old masters, hold to your lips we will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some vague and undefined when, where, and how. If this course, discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of the 12,000 to adhere to their work, and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring, to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps toward it than by running backward over them? Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. Again, if we reject Louisiana we also reject one vote in favor of the proposed amendment to the national Constitution. To meet this proposition it has been argued that no more than three-fourths of those States which have not attempted secession are necessary to validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit myself against this further than to say that such a ratification would be questionable, and sure to be persistently questioned, while a ratification by three-fourths of all the States would be unquestioned and unquestionable. I repeat the question: Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State government? What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and withal so new and unprecedented is the whole case that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. In the present situation, as

the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper."—A. Lincoln, *Complete Works*, v. 2, pp. 673–675.

**A. D. 1865 (April: Virginia).—The abandonment of Richmond and retreat of Lee.—Battle of Sailor's Creek.—Surrender at Appomattox Court House.**—"The success of the Federal army in breaking the lines of Petersburg had rendered the retreat of the Confederate force imperative. An effort to hold Richmond with every line of communication with the South broken or in imminent danger would have been madness. But by abandoning his works and concentrating his army, which still amounted to about 30,000 men, General Lee might retire to some natural stronghold in the interior, where the defensible features of the country would enable him to oppose Grant's formidable host until he could rally strength to strike an effective blow. This course was at once decided upon, and early on the morning of the 2d of April, Lee sent a despatch to the Government authorities at Richmond informing them of the disastrous situation of affairs and of the necessity of his evacuating Petersburg that night. Orders were also sent to the forces north of the James to move at once and join him, while all the preparations necessary for the evacuation of Richmond, both as the seat of government and as a military post, were expeditiously made. There was, indeed, no time to be lost. . . . By midnight the evacuation was completed. . . . As the troops moved noiselessly onward in the darkness that just precedes the dawn, a bright light like a broad flash of lightning illumined the heavens for an instant; then followed a tremendous explosion. 'The magazine at Fort Drewry is blown up,' ran in whispers through the ranks, and again silence reigned. Once more the sky was over-spread by a lurid light, but not so fleeting as before. It was now the conflagration of Richmond that lighted the night-march of the soldiers, and many a stout heart was wrung with anguish at the fate of the city and its defenceless inhabitants. The burning of public property of little value had given rise to a destructive fire that laid in ashes nearly one-third of the devoted city. . . . The retreat of Lee's army did not long remain unknown to the Federals. The explosion of the magazine at Fort Drewry and the conflagration of Richmond apprised them of the fact, and they lost no time in taking possession of the abandoned works and entering the defenceless cities. On the morning of the 3d of April the mayor of Richmond surrendered the city to the Federal commander in its vicinity, and General Weitzel took immediate possession. He at once proceeded to enforce order and took measures to arrest the conflagration, while with great humanity he endeavored to relieve the distressed citizens. . . . As soon as Grant became aware of Lee's line of retreat he pushed forward his whole available force, numbering 70,000 or 80,000 men, in order to intercept him on the line of the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Sheridan's cavalry formed the van of the pursuing column, and was closely followed by the artillery and infantry. Lee pressed on as rapidly as possible to Amelia Court-house, where he had ordered supplies to be deposited for the use of his troops on their arrival. . . . The hope of

finding a supply of food at this point, which had done much to buoy up the spirits of the men, was destined to be cruelly dispelled. Through an unfortunate error or misapprehension of orders the provision-train had been taken on to Richmond without unloading its stores at Amelia Court-house. . . . It was a terrible blow alike to the men and to their general. . . . The only chance remaining to the Army of Northern Virginia was to reach the hill-country without delay. Yet here it was detained by the error of a railroad official, while the precious minutes and hours moved remorselessly by. . . . Yet no murmur came from the lips of the men to the ear of their commander, and on the evening of that unfortunate day [April 5th] they resumed their weary march in silence and composure. Some small amount of food had been brought in by the foragers, greatly inadequate for the wants of the soldiers, yet aiding them to somewhat alleviate the pangs of hunger. A handful of corn was now a feast to the weary veterans as they trudged onward through the April night. . . . Sheridan's cavalry was already upon the flank of the Confederate army, and the infantry was following with all speed. . . . During the forenoon of [the 6th] the pursuing columns thickened and frequent skirmishes delayed the march. These delays enabled the Federals to accumulate in such force that it became necessary for Lee to halt his advance in order to arrest their attack till his column could close up, and the trains and such artillery as was not needed for action could reach a point of safety. This object was accomplished early in the afternoon. Ewell's, the rearmost corps in the army, closed upon those in front at a position on Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox River. . . . His corps was surrounded by the pursuing columns and captured with but little opposition. About the same time the divisions of Anderson, Pickett, and Bushrod Johnson were almost broken up, about 10,000 men in all being captured. The remainder of the army continued its retreat during the night of the 6th, and reached Farmville early on the morning of the 7th, where the troops obtained two days' rations, the first regular supplies they had received during the retreat. At Farmville a short halt was made to allow the men to rest and cook their provisions. The effective portion of the Army of Northern Virginia did not now exceed 10,000 men. This great reduction had been caused by the disaster of the previous day at Sailor's Creek, by desertions on the retreat, and by an exhaustion which obliged many to leave the ranks. Those who still remained by their colors were veterans whose courage never failed, and who were yet ready to face any odds. The heads of the Federal columns beginning to appear about eleven o'clock, the Confederates resumed their retreat." On the afternoon of the 7th, Lee received a note from Grant calling upon him to surrender, and replied to it, asking what terms would be offered. Further notes were exchanged between the two commanders the following day, while the retreat continued. Lee hoped to reach Appomattox Court House and secure supplies that were there, which might enable him to "push on to the Staunton River and maintain himself behind that stream until a junction could be made with Johnston." But when, in the afternoon of April 8th, he reached the neighborhood of Appomat-



tox Court House, "he was met by the intelligence of the capture of the stores placed for his army at the station two miles beyond. Notwithstanding this overwhelming news, he determined to make one more effort to force himself through the Federal toils that encompassed him." This attempt was made at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th of April, General Gordon leading the attack, which failed. Lee then yielded to his fate, and sent a flag of truce, asking for an interview with Grant to arrange terms of surrender. "Grant had not yet come up, and while waiting for his arrival General Lee seated himself upon some rails which Colonel Talcott of the Engineers had fixed at the foot of an apple tree for his convenience. This tree was half a mile distant from the point where the meeting of Lee and Grant took place, yet wide-spread currency has been given to the story that the surrender took place under its shade, and 'apple-tree' jewelry has been profusely distributed from the orchard in which it grew. About 11 o'clock General Lee, accompanied only by Colonel Marshall of his staff, proceeded to the village to meet General Grant, who had now arrived. The meeting between the two renowned generals took place at the house of a Mr. McLean at Appomattox Court-house, to which mansion, after exchanging courteous salutations, they repaired to settle the terms on which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia should be concluded. . . . The written instrument of surrender covered the following points: Duplicate rolls of all the officers and men were to be made, and the officers to sign paroles for themselves and their men, all agreeing not to bear arms against the United States unless regularly exchanged. The arms, artillery, and public property were to be turned over to an officer appointed to receive them, the officers retaining their side-arms and private horses and baggage. In addition to this, General Grant permitted every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule to retain it for farming purposes, General Lee remarking that this would have a happy effect. . . . After completion of these measures General Lee remarked that his men were badly in need of food, that they had been living for several days on parched corn exclusively, and requested rations and forage for 25,000 men. These rations were granted out of the car-loads of Confederate provisions which had been stopped by the Federal cavalry. . . . Three days after the surrender the Army of Northern Virginia had dispersed in every direction, and three weeks later the veterans of a hundred battles had changed the musket and the sword for the implements of husbandry. . . . Thousands of soldiers were set adrift on the world without a penny in their pockets to enable them to reach their homes. Yet none of the scenes of riot that often follow the disbanding of armies marked their course."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 21.—"General Grant's behavior at Appomattox was marked by a desire to spare the feelings of his great opponent. There was no theatrical display; his troops were not paraded with bands playing and banners flying, before whose lines the Confederates must march and stack arms. He did not demand Lee's sword, as is customary, but actually apologized to him for not having his own, saying it

had been left behind in the wagon; promptly stopped salutes from being fired to mark the event, and the terms granted were liberal and generous. 'No man could have behaved better than General Grant did under the circumstances,' said Lee to a friend in Richmond. 'He did not touch my sword; the usual custom is for the sword to be received when tendered, and then handed back, but he did not touch mine.' Neither did the Union chief enter the Southern lines to show himself or to parade his victory, or go to Richmond or Petersburg to exult over a fallen people, but mounted his horse and with his staff started for Washington. Washington, at Yorktown, was not as considerate and thoughtful of the feelings of Cornwallis or his men. Charges were now withdrawn from the guns, flags furled, and the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia turned their backs upon each other for the first time in four long, bloody years."—F. Lee, *General Lee*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 65-67.—H. Porter, *The Surrender at Appomattox Court House (Battles and Leaders*, v. 4).—A. Badeau, *Military Hist. of Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 33-34 (v. 3).—J. W. Keifer, *The Battle of Sailor's Creek (Sketches of War Hist., Ohio Commandery L. L. of the U. S., v. 3)*.

A. D. 1865 (April: Virginia).—President Lincoln at Richmond.—The assembling and dispersing of "the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia."—Virtual Proclamations of the end of the war.—"President Lincoln had been at City Point and vicinity for several days before the fall of Richmond, in constant communication with the General-in-chief, at the front, receiving dispatches from him and transmitting them instantly to the Secretary of War, whence they were diffused over the country, by the telegraph. On the day after Richmond was evacuated, he went up to that city in Admiral Porter's flag-ship, the *Malvern*, Captain Ralph Chandler, with the *Sangamon*, several tugs, and 30 small boats, with about 300 men, had already cleared the channel of the river of torpedoes, and made the navigation comparatively safe. When near Rocketts, the President and the Admiral left the *Malvern*, and proceeded to the city in the commander's gig. With its crew, armed with carbines, they landed and walked to Weitzel's quarters, in the late residence of Davis, cheered on the way by the huzzas and grateful ejaculations of a vast concourse of emancipated slaves, who had been told that the tall man was their Liberator. They crowded around him so thickly, in their eagerness to see him, and to grasp his hand, that a file of soldiers were needed to clear the way. After a brief rest at Weitzel's, the President rode rapidly through the principal streets of Richmond, in an open carriage, and, at near sunset, departed for City Point. Two days afterward, the President went to Richmond again, accompanied by his wife, the Vice-President, and several Senators, when he was called upon by leading Confederates, several of them members of the rebel Virginia Legislature, whose chief business was to endeavor to arrange a compromise whereby the equivalent for submission should be the security to the Virginia insurgents, as far as possible, of their political power and worldly possessions. The President was assured by Judge Campbell,

a member of the Confederate 'Government' (who, for two years, had been satisfied, he said, that success was impossible), that the so-called Virginia Legislature, if allowed to reassemble, with the Governor, would work for the reconstruction of the Union, their first step being the withdrawal of the Virginia troops from the field, on condition that the confiscation of property in Virginia should not be allowed. Anxious to end the war without further bloodshed, if possible, and satisfied that the withdrawal of the Virginia troops—in other words, nearly all of Lee's army—would accomplish it, he left with General Weitzel, on his departure from Richmond [April 6], authority to allow 'the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia, in support of the rebellion, to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government.' A safeguard was given. The fugitives returned, with the Governor, but instead of performing in good faith what had been promised in their name, they began legislating generally, as if they were the legal representatives of the people of Virginia. So soon as notice of this perfidy was given to the President after his return to Washington, he directed Weitzel to revoke the safeguard, and allow 'the gentlemen who had acted as the Legislature of Virginia' to return to private life. The surrender of Lee had, meanwhile, made the contemplated action unnecessary. The President was blamed by the loyal people for allowing these men to assemble with acknowledged powers; and the Confederates abused him for dissolving the assembly. The President returned to Washington City on the day of Lee's surrender, where he was the recipient of a multitude of congratulations because of the dawn of peace. On the 11th he issued proclamations, one declaring the closing, until further notice, of certain ports in the Southern States, whereof the blockade had been raised by their capture, respectively; and the other, demanding, henceforth, for our vessels in foreign ports, on penalty of retaliation, those privileges and immunities which had hitherto been denied them on the plea of according equal belligerent rights to the Republic and its internal enemies. . . . On the following day an order was issued from the War Department, which had been approved by General Grant, putting an end to all drafting and recruiting for the National army, and the purchase of munitions of war and supplies; and declaring that the number of general and staff officers would be speedily reduced, and all military restrictions on trade and commerce be removed forthwith. This virtual proclamation of the end of the war went over the land on the anniversary of the evacuation of Fort Sumter [April 14], while General Anderson was replacing the old flag over the ruins of that fortress."—B. J. Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 21.

ALSO IN: H. J. Raymond, *Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 20.—C. C. Coffin, *Late Scenes in Richmond* (*Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1865).

A. D. 1865 (April 14th).—The Assassination of President Lincoln.—"From the very beginning of his Presidency, Mr. Lincoln had been constantly subject to the threats of his enemies and the warnings of his friends. . . . Although he freely discussed with the officials about him

the possibilities of danger, he always considered them remote, as is the habit of men constitutionally brave, and positively refused to torment himself with precautions for his own safety. He would sum the matter up by saying that both friends and strangers must have daily access to him in all manner of ways and places; his life was therefore in reach of any one, sane or mad, who was ready to murder and be hanged for it; that he could not possibly guard against all danger unless he were to shut himself up in an iron box, in which condition he could scarcely perform the duties of a President; by the hand of a murderer he could die only once; to go continually in fear would be to die over and over. He therefore went in and out before the people, always unarmed, generally unattended. . . . Four years of threats and boastings, of alarms that were unfounded, and of plots that came to nothing thus passed away; but precisely at the time when the triumph of the nation over the long insurrection seemed assured, and a feeling of peace and security was diffused over the country, one of the conspiracies, not seemingly more important than the many abortive ones, ripened in the sudden heat of hatred and despair. A little band of malignant secessionists, consisting of John Wilkes Booth, an actor, of a family of famous players, Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a disbanded rebel soldier from Florida, George Atzerodt, formerly a coachmaker, but more recently a spy and blockade runner of the Potomac, David E. Herold, a young druggist's clerk, Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, Maryland secessionists and Confederate soldiers, and John H. Surratt, had their ordinary rendezvous at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, the widowed mother of the last named, formerly a woman of some property in Maryland, but reduced by reverses to keeping a small boarding-house in Washington. Booth was the leader of the little coterie. He was a young man of twenty-six. . . . He was a fanatical secessionist; had assisted at the capture and execution of John Brown, and had imbibed at Richmond and other Southern cities where he had played, a furious spirit of partisanship against Lincoln and the Union party. After the reflection of Mr. Lincoln, which rang the knell of the insurrection, Booth, like many of the secessionists North and South, was stung to the quick by disappointment. He visited Canada, consorted with the rebel emissaries there, and at last—whether or not at their instigation cannot certainly be said—conceived a scheme to capture the President and take him to Richmond. He spent a great part of the autumn and winter inducing a small number of loose fish of secession sympathies to join him in this fantastic enterprise. . . . There are indications in the evidence given on the trial of the conspirators that they suffered some great disappointment in their schemes in the latter part of March, and a letter from Arnold to Booth, dated March 27, showed that some of them had grown timid of the consequences of their contemplated enterprise and were ready to give it up. He advised Booth, before going further, 'to go and see how it will be taken in R—d.' But timid as they might be by nature, the whole group was so completely under the ascendancy of Booth that they did not dare disobey him when in his presence; and after the surrender of Lee, in an access of malice and rage which was akin



to madness, he called them together and assigned each his part in the new crime, the purpose of which had arisen suddenly in his mind out of the ruins of the abandoned abduction scheme. This plan was as brief and simple as it was horrible. Powell, alias Payne, the stalwart, brutal, simple-minded boy from Florida, was to murder Seward; Atzerodt, the comic villain of the drama, was assigned to remove Andrew Johnson; Booth reserved for himself the most difficult and most conspicuous rôle of the tragedy; it was Herold's duty to attend him as a page and aid in his escape. Minor parts were assigned to stage carpenters and other hangers-on, who probably did not understand what it all meant. Herold, Atzerodt, and Surratt had previously deposited at a tavern at Surrattsville, Maryland, owned by Mrs. Surratt, but kept by a man named Lloyd, a quantity of ropes, carbines, ammunition, and whisky, which were to be used in the abduction scheme. On the 11th of April Mrs. Surratt, being at the tavern, told Lloyd to have the shooting irons in readiness, and on Friday, the 14th, again visited the place and told him they would probably be called for that night. The preparations for the final blow were made with feverish haste; it was only about noon of the 14th that Booth learned the President was to go to Ford's Theater that night. It has always been a matter of surprise in Europe that he should have been at a place of amusement on Good Friday; but the day was not kept sacred in America, except by the members of certain churches. It was not, throughout the country, a day of religious observance. The President was fond of the theater; it was one of his few means of recreation. It was natural enough that, on this day of profound national thanksgiving, he should take advantage of a few hours' relaxation to see a comedy. Besides, the town was thronged with soldiers and officers, all eager to see him; it was represented to him that appearing occasionally in public would gratify many people whom he could not otherwise meet. . . . From the moment Booth ascertained the President's intention to attend the theater in the evening his every action was alert and energetic. He and his confederates, Herold, Surratt and Atzerodt, were seen on horseback in every part of the city. He had a hurried conference with Mrs. Surratt before she started for Lloyd's tavern. . . . Booth was perfectly at home in Ford's Theater, where he was greatly liked by all the employees, without other reason than the sufficient one of his youth and good looks. Either by himself or with the aid of his friends he arranged his whole plan of attack and escape during the afternoon. He counted upon address and audacity to gain access to the small passage behind the President's box; once there, he guarded against interference by an arrangement of a wooden bar to be fastened by a simple mortice in the angle of the wall and the door by which he entered, so that the door could not be opened from without. He even provided for the contingency of not gaining entrance to the box by boring a hole in its door, through which he might either observe the occupants or take aim and shoot. He hired at a livery stable a small, fleet horse, which he showed with pride during the day to barkeepers and loafers among his friends. The moon rose that night at ten o'clock. A few minutes before that hour he called one of

the underlings of the theater to the back door and left him there holding his horse. He then went to a saloon near by, took a drink of brandy, and, entering the theater, passed rapidly through the crowd in rear of the dress circle and made his way to the passage leading to the President's box. He showed a card to a servant in attendance and was allowed to pass in. He entered noiselessly, and, turning, fastened the door with the bar he had previously made ready, without disturbing any of the occupants of the box, between whom and himself there yet remained the slight partition and the door through which he had bored the hole. . . . Holding a pistol in one hand and a knife in the other, he opened the box door, put the pistol to the President's head, and fired; dropping the weapon, he took the knife in his right hand, and when Major Rathbone sprang to seize him he struck savagely at him. Major Rathbone received the blow on his left arm, suffering a wide and deep wound. Booth, rushing forward, then placed his left hand on the railing of the box and vaulted lightly over to the stage. It was a high leap, but nothing to such a trained athlete. . . . He would have got safely away but for his spur catching in the folds of the Union flag with which the front of the box was draped. He fell on the stage, the torn flag trailing on his spur, but instantly rose as if he had received no hurt, though in fact the fall had broken his leg; he turned to the audience, brandishing his dripping knife, and shouting the State motto of Virginia, 'Sic Semper Tyrannis,' and fled rapidly across the stage and out of sight. Major Rathbone had shouted, 'Stop him!' The cry went out, 'He has shot the President.' From the audience, at first stupid with surprise, and afterwards wild with excitement and horror, two or three men jumped upon the stage in pursuit of the flying assassin; but he ran through the familiar passages, leaped upon his horse, which was in waiting in the alley behind, rewarded with a kick and a curse the call-boy who had held him, and rode rapidly away in the light of the just risen moon. The President scarcely moved; his head drooped forward slightly, his eyes closed. . . . It was afterward ascertained that a large derringer bullet had entered the back of the head on the left side, and, passing through the brain, had lodged just behind the left eye. By direction of Rathbone and Crawford, the President was carried to a house across the street and laid upon a bed in a small room at the rear of the hall, on the ground floor. . . . The President had been shot a few minutes past ten. The wound would have brought instant death to most men, but his vital tenacity was extraordinary. . . . At twenty-two minutes after seven he died. Stanton broke the silence by saying, 'Now he belongs to the ages.' At the same hour in which the President was murdered, an attempt was made by one of Booth's fellow conspirators to kill the Secretary of State. Mr. Seward had been thrown from his carriage a few days before and was prostrated by the serious injuries received. Pretending to bring a prescription from his physician, the assassin, Payne, made his way into the sick-room of the Secretary and stabbed him three times, but not fatally, in the neck and cheek. Two sons, Frederick and Augustus Seward, were seriously wounded in defending their father, and a soldier-nurse who was present struggled bravely with the assassin,

though weaponless, and was stabbed repeatedly. Payne escaped for the time, but was caught a few days later. Booth made his way to Port Tobacco, and thence across the Potomac, into Virginia, assisted and concealed by numerous sympathizers. He eluded his pursuers until the 25th of April, when he was hunted down by a party of soldiers, while sleeping in a barn, below Fredericksburg, and, refusing to surrender, was shot. "The surviving conspirators, with the exception of John H. Surratt, were tried by a military commission sitting in Washington in the months of May and June. . . . Mrs. Surratt, Payne, Herold, and Atzerodt were hanged on the 7th of July; Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlin were imprisoned for life at the Tortugas, though the term was afterwards shortened; and Spangler, the scene shifter at the theater, was sentenced to six years in jail. John H. Surratt escaped to Canada," and thence to England. "He wandered over Europe, enlisted in the Papal Zouaves, deserted and fled to Egypt, where he was detected and brought back to Washington in 1867. His trial lasted two months and ended in a disagreement of the jury."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 14-15.

ALSO IN: H. J. Raymond, *Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 21.—J. G. Holland, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 30.—B. P. Poore, *Reminiscences*, v. 2, ch. 15.—B. Pittman, *Report of the Trial of the Conspirators*.—*Trial of John H. Surratt*.—T. M. Harris, *Assassination of Lincoln: a History*.

**A. D. 1865 (April 15th).—Succession of Andrew Johnson, Vice President, to the Presidency.**—"On the day after the assassination, Mr. Johnson, having been apprised of the event, took the oath of office, at his rooms, in the presence of the Cabinet, and of several members of Congress, and was thus quietly inducted into the high position so summarily vacated by the martyred President. In the few remarks made on the occasion, as to 'an indication of any policy which may be pursued,' he said it 'must be left for development as the administration progresses'; and his own past course in connection with the Rebellion 'must be regarded as a guaranty for the future.' To several delegations which waited upon him he was, however, more explicit. . . . 'I know it is easy, gentlemen [he said to a delegation from New Hampshire], for any one who is so disposed to acquire a reputation for clemency and mercy. But the public good imperatively requires a just discrimination in the exercise of these qualities. . . . The American people must be taught to know and understand that treason is a crime. . . . It must not be regarded as a mere difference of political opinion. It must not be excused as an unsuccessful rebellion, to be overlooked and forgiven.' . . . It is not surprising, therefore, with utterances like these, in such seeming harmony with his antecedents as a Southern Unionist,—antecedents which had secured his nomination and election to the Vice-Presidency,—that many were disposed to regard his advancement to the Presidency at that particular juncture as but another evidence of Providential favor, if not of Divine interposition, by which the nation was to be saved from what many feared might prove Mr. Lincoln's ill-timed leniency and misplaced confidence. . . . Such congratulations, however, were of short continu-

ance. Whatever the cause or design, the new President soon revealed the change that had taken place and the purpose to adopt and pursue a policy the exact reverse of what, with such prompt and unequivocal words, he had indicated."—H. Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in Am.*, v. 3, ch. 43.—"Johnson was inaugurated at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, and was at once surrounded by radical and conservative politicians, who were alike anxious about the situation. I spent most of the afternoon in a political caucus, held for the purpose of considering the necessity for a new Cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln; and while everybody was shocked at his murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the accession of Johnson to the Presidency would prove a godsend to the country. Aside from Mr. Lincoln's known policy of tenderness to the Rebels, which now so jarred upon the feelings of the hour, his well-known views on the subject of reconstruction were as distasteful as possible to radical Republicans. . . . On the following day, in pursuance of a previous engagement, the Committee on the Conduct of the War met the President at his quarters in the Treasury Department. He received us with decided cordiality, and Mr. Wade said to him: 'Johnson we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the government!'"—G. W. Julian, *Political Recollections*, ch. 11.

**A. D. 1865 (April 26th).—General Johnston's surrender.**—On the 11th of April, at Smithfield, North Carolina, General Sherman had news of the surrender of Lee. Entering Raleigh on the 13th, he received, next day, a communication from the Confederate General Johnston proposing a truce "to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war." In reply he invited a conference with Johnston, which occurred on the 17th—the day on which news of the assassination of President Lincoln was received. "Sherman said frankly that he could not recognize the Confederate civil authority as having any existence, and could neither receive nor transmit to Washington any proposition coming from them. He expressed his ardent desire for an end to devastation, and offered Johnston the same terms offered by Grant to Lee. Johnston replied that he would not be justified in such a capitulation, but suggested that they might arrange the terms of a permanent peace. The suggestion pleased General Sherman; the prospect of ending the war without the shedding of another drop of blood was so tempting to him that he did not sufficiently consider the limits of his authority in the matter." The result was that, on the 18th, Sherman and Johnston signed a memorandum of agreement which provided for the disbanding of all the Confederate armies, the recognition of the State governments of the several States lately forming the rebel Confederacy, the complete restoration of their old status in the Union, and complete amnesty to all concerned in the rebellion. This was forwarded to Washington, and, of course, it was disapproved, but with an unnecessary publication of sharp censure of General Sherman, and with expressions that seemed to imply distrust of the loyalty of his motives. General Grant was ordered to proceed to General Sherman's headquarters and to direct



further operations. He executed this mission with great delicacy, and his presence with Sherman was hardly known. The latter held a second conference with Johnston on the 26th, and there General Johnston made the surrender of his army on the same terms that had been granted to Lee.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 12.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, ch. 23 (v. 2).—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 92 (v. 3).—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, ch. 12.

A. D. 1865 (April–May).—The end of the Rebellion.—Fall of Mobile.—Stoneman's Raid.—Wilson's Raid.—Capture of Jefferson Davis.—The final surrenders.—After the surrender of Johnson, "there were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. . . . The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful, but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. . . . Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while 14 guns and nearly 2,000 prisoners were the trophies of his success. Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments—Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city was evacuated. . . . Wilson moved out [from Eastport, Miss.] with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. . . . He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April. . . . Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. . . . Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news was received of

the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting. General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war. Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that, if not captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. . . . Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when he was captured. [Mr. Davis, in his own narrative, and Captain G. W. Lawton, of the 4th Michigan Cavalry, which made the capture, agree in stating that the fugitive chief of the Confederacy wore when taken a lady's 'waterproof,' with a shawl over his head and shoulders. Mr. Davis says that he picked up his wife's waterproof in mistake for his own when he ran from the tent in which he was surprised, while camping, and that his wife threw the shawl over him. Captain Lawton asserts that he carried a tin-pail, that he affected to be bent with age, and that when he stepped out Mrs. Davis asked the soldiers at the tent entrance to let her 'old mother' go to the run for water.] I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. . . . Every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers."—U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ch. 69 (v. 2).—"Davis was taken, via Savannah and the ocean, to Fortress Monroe; where he was long closely and rigorously imprisoned, while his family were returned by water to Savannah and there set at liberty. Secretary Reagan—the only person of consequence captured with Davis—was taken to Boston, and confined, with Vice-President Stephens (captured about this time also in Georgia), in Fort Warren; but each was liberated on parole a few months thereafter."—H. Greeley, *The American Conflict*, v. 2, ch. 35.

ALSO IN: Maj.-Gen. Wilson, *How Jefferson Davis was overtaken*; and J. H. Reagan, *Flight and Capture of Jefferson Davis* (in *Annals of the War by leading Participants*).—G. W. Lawton, "Running at the Heads" (*Atlantic Monthly*, Sept., 1865).—J. Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Gov't*, ch. 54 (v. 2).—C. C. Andrews, *Hist. of the Campaign of Mobile*.

**A. D. 1865 (May). — Feeling of surrendered Confederate officers.** — After the surrender of Johnston, General Jacob D. Cox was put in command of the military district within which the surrender occurred, and had charge of the arrangements made for paroling and disbanding the Confederate forces. In a paper prepared for the Ohio Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, General Cox has given an interesting report of conversations which he had in that connection with General Johnston and General Hardee. Talking with General Hardee of the war, the latter was asked "what had been his own expectation as to the result, and when had he himself recognized the hopelessness of the contest. 'I confess,' said he, laughing, 'that I was one of the hot Southerners who shared the notion that one man of the South could whip three Yankees; but the first year of the war pretty effectually knocked that nonsense out of us, and, to tell the truth, ever since that time we military men have generally seen that it was only a question how long it would take to wear our army out and destroy it. We have seen that there was no real hope of success, except by some extraordinary accident of fortune, and we have also seen that the politicians would never give up till the army was gone. So we have fought with the knowledge that we were to be sacrificed with the result we see to-day, and none of us could tell who would live to see it. We have continued to do our best, however, and have meant to fight as if we were sure of success.' . . . Johnston was very warm in his recognition of the soldierly qualities and the wonderful energy and persistence of our army and the ability of Sherman. Referring to his own plans, he said he had hoped to have had time enough to have collected a larger force to oppose Sherman, and to give it a more complete and efficient organization. The Confederate government had reckoned upon the almost impassable character of the rivers and swamps to give a respite till spring — at least they hoped for this. 'Indeed,' said he, with a smile, 'Hardee here,' giving a friendly nod of his head toward his subordinate, 'reported the Salkehatchie Swamps as absolutely impassable; but when I heard that Sherman had not only started, but was marching through those very swamps at the rate of thirteen miles a day, making corduroy road every foot of the way, I made up my mind there had been no such army since the days of Julius Cæsar.' Hardee laughingly admitted his mistaken report from Charleston, but justified it by saying that all precedent was against such a march, and that he would still have believed it impossible if he had not seen it done." — J. D. Cox, *The Surrender of Johnston's Army (Sketches of War Hist., Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion, U. S., v. 2, pp. 249-256).*

**A. D. 1865 (May). — Statistics of the Civil War.** — "In a statistical exhibit of deaths in the Union army, compiled (1885), under the direction of Adjutant-General Drum, by Joseph W. Kirkley, the causes of death are given as follows: Killed in action, 4,142 officers, 62,916 men; died of wounds received in action, 2,223 officers, 40,789 men, of which number 99 officers and 1,973 men were prisoners of war; died of disease, 2,795 officers and 221,791 men, of which 63 officers and 24,783 men were prisoners; acci-

dental deaths (except drowned), 142 officers and 3,972 men, of which 2 officers and 5 men were prisoners; drowned, 106 officers and 4,838 men, of which 1 officer and 6 men were prisoners; murdered, 37 officers and 483 men; killed after capture, 14 officers and 90 men; committed suicide, 26 officers and 365 men; executed by United States military authorities, 267 men; executed by the enemy, 4 officers and 60 men; died from sunstroke, 5 officers and 308 men, of which 20 men were prisoners; other known causes, 62 officers and 1,972 men, of which 7 officers and 312 men were prisoners; causes not stated, 28 officers and 12,093 men, of which 9 officers and 2,030 men were prisoners. Total 9,584 officers, and 349,944 men, of which 219 officers and 29,279 men were prisoners. Grand aggregate, 359,528; aggregate deaths among prisoners, 29,498. Since 1885 the Adjutant-General has received evidence of the death in Southern prisons of 694 men not previously accounted for, which increases the number of deaths among prisoners to 30,192, and makes a grand aggregate of 360,222." Total number of men furnished to the United States Army and Navy during the War from the several States and Territories, 2,778,304; of which number, 2,494,592 were white troops, 101,207 were sailors and marines, and 178,975 were colored troops. "The work of mustering out volunteers began April 29th and up to August 7th 640,806 troops had been discharged; on September 14th the number had reached 741,107, and on November 15th 800,963. On November 22d, 1865, the Secretary of War reported that Confederate troops surrendered and were released on parole" to the number of 174,223. Official returns show the whole number of men enrolled (present and absent) in the active armies of the Confederacy, as follows: Jan. 1, 1862, 318,011; Jan. 1, 1863, 465,584; Jan. 1, 1864, 472,781; Jan. 1, 1865, 439,675. "Very few, if any, of the local land forces, and none of the naval, are included in the tabular exhibit. If we take the 472,000 men in service at the beginning of 1864, and add thereto at least 250,000 deaths occurring prior to that date, it gives over 700,000. The discharges for disability and other causes and the desertions would probably increase the number (inclusive of the militia and naval forces) to over 1,000,000. Northern writers have assumed that the Confederate losses equalled the Union losses; no data exist for a reasonably accurate estimate." — *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, v. 4, pp. 767-768.* — "In the four years of their service the armies of the Union, counting every form of conflict, great and small, had been in 2,265 engagements with the Confederate troops. From the time when active hostilities began until the last gun of the war was fired, a fight of some kind — a raid, a skirmish, or a pitched battle — occurred at some point on our widely extended front nearly eleven times per week upon an average. Counting only those engagements in which the Union loss in killed, wounded, and missing exceeded 100, the total number was 330, — averaging one every four and a half days. From the northernmost point of contact to the southernmost, the distance by any practicable line of communication was more than 2,000 miles. From East to West the extremes were 1,500 miles apart. During the first year of hostilities — one of preparation on both sides — the battles were . . .



35 in number, of which the most serious was the Union defeat at Bull Run. In 1862 the war had greatly increased in magnitude and intensity, as is shown by the 84 engagements between the armies. The net result of the year's operations was highly favorable to the Rebellion. In 1863 the battles were 110 in number—among them some of the most significant and important victories for the Union. In 1864 there were 73 engagements, and in the winter and early spring of 1865 there were 28. In fact, 1864–65 was one continuous campaign. . . . Not only in life but in treasure the cost of the war was enormous. In addition to the large revenues of the Government which had been currently absorbed, the public debt at the close of the struggle was \$2,808,549,437.55. The incidental losses were innumerable in kind, incalculable in amount. Mention is made here only of the actual expenditure of money—estimated by the standard of gold. The outlay was indeed principally made in paper, but the faith of the United States was given for redemption in coin—a faith which has never been tarnished, and which in this instance has been signally vindicated by the steady determination of the people. Never, in the same space of time, has there been a National expenditure so great. . . . For the three years of the rebellion, after the first year, our War Department alone expended \$603,314,411.82, \$690,391,048.66, and \$1,080,690,400 respectively. . . . At the outbreak of hostilities the Government discovered that it had no Navy at command. The Secretary, Mr. Welles, found upon entering his office but a single ship in a Northern port fitted to engage in aggressive operations. . . . By the end of the year 1863 the Government had 600 vessels of war which were increased to 700 before the rebellion was subdued. Of the total number at least 75 were ironclad.”—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 2, and v. 1, ch. 25.—“Eleven Confederate cruisers figured in the ‘Alabama claims’ settlement between the United States and Great Britain. They were the Alabama, Shenandoah, Florida, Tallahassee, Georgia, Chickamauga, Nashville, Retribution, Sumter, Sallie and Boston. The actual losses inflicted by the Alabama (\$6,547,609) were only about \$60,000 greater than those charged to the Shenandoah. The sum total of the claims filed against the eleven cruisers for ships and cargoes was \$17,900,633, all but about \$4,000,000 being caused by the Alabama and Shenandoah. . . . In the ‘Case of the United States’ . . . it is stated that while in 1860 two-thirds of the commerce of New York was carried on in American bottoms, in 1863 three-fourths was carried on in foreign bottoms. The transfer of American vessels to the British flag to avoid capture is stated thus: In 1861, vessels 126, tonnage 71,673; in 1862, vessels 135, tonnage 64,578; in 1863, vessels 348, tonnage 252,579; in 1864, vessels 106, tonnage 92,052. . . . The cruisers built or purchased in England for the Confederate navy, were the Florida, Alabama, Shenandoah and Rappahannock. The latter never made a cruise, and the others were procured for the government by James D. Bulloch, naval agent. . . . He also had constructed in France the armored ram Stonewall.”—J. T. Scharf, *Hist. of the Confederate States Navy*, ch. 26.—See ALABAMA CLAIMS.—“The greatest of all the lessons afforded to humanity by the

Titanic struggle in which the American Republic saved its life is the manner in which its armies were levied, and, when the occasion for their employment was over, were dismissed. Though there were periods when recruiting was slow and expensive, yet there were others, when some crying necessity for troops was apparent, that showed almost incredible speed and efficiency in the supply of men. Mr. Stanton, in his report for 1865, says: ‘After the disasters on the Peninsula in 1862, over 80,000 troops were enlisted, organized, armed, equipped, and sent into the field in less than a month. Sixty thousand troops have repeatedly gone to the field within four weeks; and 90,000 infantry were sent to the armies from the five States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin within twenty days.’”—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 17.—See, also, PRISONS AND PRISON-PENS, CONFEDERATE.

A. D. 1865 (May—July).—President Johnson's measures of Reconstruction in the insurrectionary States.—“On the 10th of May the President [Andrew Johnson] issued a proclamation declaring substantially that actual hostilities had ceased, and that ‘armed resistance to the authority of the Government in the insurrectionary States may be regarded at an end.’ This great fact being officially recognized, the President found himself face to face with the momentous duty of bringing the eleven States of the Confederacy into active and harmonious relations with the Government of the Union. . . . An extra session of Congress seemed specially desirable at the time, and had one been summoned by the President, many of the troubles which subsequently resulted might have been averted. . . . Declining to seek the advice of Congress, in the embarrassments of his position, President Johnson necessarily subjected himself to the counsel and influence of his Cabinet,” in which he had made no changes since President Lincoln's death. Among the members of the cabinet, the one who succeeded in obtaining ascendancy was Mr. Seward, who had rapidly recovered from his injuries and resumed the direction of the Department of State. Mr. Seward “was firmly persuaded that the wisest plan of reconstruction was the one which would be speediest; that for the sake of impressing the world with the strength and the marvelous power of self-government, with its Law, its Order, its Peace, we should at the earliest possible moment have every State restored to its normal relations with the Union. He did not believe that guarantee of any kind beyond an oath of renewed loyalty was needful. He was willing to place implicit faith in the coercive power of self-interest operating upon the men lately in rebellion. . . . By his arguments and by his eloquence Mr. Seward completely captivated the President. He effectually persuaded him that a policy of anger and hate and vengeance could lead only to evil results. . . . The President was gradually influenced by Mr. Seward's arguments, though their whole tenor was against his strongest predilections and against his pronounced and public committals to a policy directly the reverse. . . . Mr. Seward's influence was supplemented and enhanced by the timely and artful interposition of clever men from the South. . . . He [President Johnson] was not especially open to flattery, but it was noticed that words of commendation

from his native section seemed peculiarly pleasing to him. . . . On the 29th of May . . . two decisive steps were taken in the work of reconstruction. Both steps proceeded on the theory that every act needful for the rehabilitation of the seceded States could be accomplished by the Executive Department of the Government. . . . The first of these important acts of reconstruction, upon the expediency of which the President and Mr. Seward had agreed, was the issuing of a Proclamation of Amnesty and Pardon to 'all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the existing Rebellion,' upon the condition that such persons should take and subscribe an oath—to be registered for permanent preservation—solemnly declaring that henceforth they would 'faithfully support, protect, and defend, the Constitution of the United States and the union of the States thereunder;' and that they would also 'abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing Rebellion, with reference to the emancipation of slaves.' . . . The general declaration of amnesty was somewhat narrowed in its scope by the enumeration, at the end of the proclamation, of certain classes which were excepted from its benefit." Of the thirteen classes thus excepted, the first six were nearly identical with those excepted in President Lincoln's proclamation of December 8, 1863—see above: A. D. 1863 (DECEMBER). The classes that he now added, were: "Seventh, 'All persons who have been, or are, absentees from the United States for the purpose of aiding the Rebellion.' . . . Eighth, 'All officers in the rebel service who had been educated at the United-States Military or Naval Academy.' . . . Ninth, 'All men who held the pretended offices of governors of States in insurrection against the United States.' . . . Tenth, 'All persons who left their homes within the jurisdiction and protection of the United States, and passed beyond the Federal military lines into the pretended Confederate States for the purpose of aiding the Rebellion.' . . . Eleventh, 'All persons who have been engaged in the destruction of the commerce of the United States upon the high seas . . . and upon the lakes and rivers that separate the British Provinces from the United States.' . . . Twelfth, 'All persons who, at the time when they seek to obtain amnesty and pardon, are in military, naval, or civil confinement, as prisoners of war, or persons detained for offenses of any kind either before or after conviction.' . . . Thirteenth, 'All participants in the Rebellion, the estimated value of whose taxable property is over \$20,000.' . . . Full pardon was granted, without further act on their part, to all who had taken the oath prescribed in President Lincoln's proclamation of December 8, 1863, and who had thenceforward kept and maintained the same inviolate. . . . A circular from Mr. Seward accompanied the proclamation, directing that the oath might 'be taken and subscribed before any commissioned officer, civil, military, or naval, in the service of the United States, or before any civil or military officer of a loyal State or Territory, who, by the laws thereof, may be qualified to administer oaths.' Every one who took the oath was entitled to a certified copy of it, . . . and a duplicate, properly vouched, was forwarded to the State Department. . . . With these details complete, a second step of great moment was taken by the Government on

the same day (May 29). A proclamation was issued appointing William W. Holden provisional governor of the State of North Carolina. . . . The proclamation made it the duty of Governor Holden, 'at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for assembling a convention—composed of delegates who are loyal to the United States and no others—for the purpose of altering or amending the Constitution thereof, and with authority to exercise, within the limit of said State, all the powers necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal Government.' . . . It was specially provided in the proclamation that in 'choosing delegates to any State Convention no person shall be qualified as an elector or eligible as a member unless he shall have previously taken the prescribed oath of allegiance, and unless he shall also possess the qualifications of a voter as defined under the Constitution and Laws of North Carolina as they existed on the 20th of May, 1861, immediately prior to the so-called ordinance of secession.' Mr. Lincoln had in mind, as was shown by his letter to Governor Hahn of Louisiana, to try the experiment of negro suffrage, beginning with those who had served in the Union Army, and who could read and write; but President Johnson's plan confined the suffrage to white men, by prescribing the same qualifications as were required in North Carolina before the war. . . . A fortnight later, on the 13th of June, a proclamation was issued for the reconstruction of the civil government of Mississippi, and William L. Sharkey was appointed provisional governor. Four days later, on the 17th of June, a similar proclamation was issued for Georgia with James Johnson for provisional governor, and for Texas with Andrew J. Hamilton for provisional governor. On the 21st of the same month Lewis E. Parsons was appointed provisional governor of Alabama, and on the 30th Benjamin F. Perry was appointed provisional governor of South Carolina. On the 13th of July the list was completed by the appointment of William Marvin as provisional governor of Florida. The precise text of the North-Carolina proclamation, 'mutatis mutandis,' was repeated in each one of those relating to these six States. . . . For the reconstruction of the other four States of the Confederacy different provisions were made." In Virginia, the so-called "Pierpont government"—see VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JUNE—NOVEMBER)—"the shell of which had been preserved after West Virginia's separate existence had been recognized by the National Government, with its temporary capital at Alexandria, was accepted by President Johnson's Administration as the legitimate Government of Virginia. All its archives, property, and effects, as was afterwards said by Thaddeus Stevens, were taken to Richmond in an ambulance. . . . A course not dissimilar to that adopted in Virginia was followed in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee. In all of them the so-called 'ten-per-cent' governments established under Mr. Lincoln's authority were now recognized. . . . The whole scheme of reconstruction, as originated by Mr. Seward and adopted by the President, was in operation by the middle of July, three months after the assassination of Mr. Lincoln. Every step taken was watched with the deepest solic-



tude by the loyal people. The rapid and thorough change in the President's position was clearly discerned and fully appreciated. His course of procedure was dividing the Republican party, and already encouraging the hopes of those in the North who had been the steady opponents of Mr. Lincoln's war policy, and of those in the South who had sought for four years to destroy the Great Republic."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 3-4.

Also in: S. S. Cox, *Three Decades of Federal Legislation*, ch. 18-20.

**A. D. 1865 (July—December).—Reports of Carl Schurz and General Grant on the condition of affairs in the lately rebellious States.**—In the summer of 1865 the Hon. Carl Schurz was commissioned by President Johnson to visit the Southern States and investigate the condition of affairs in them. Mr. Schurz, on returning from this mission, made a report of the result of his observations and inquiries, and the conclusions to which they led him, which was transmitted to the Senate, by the President, on the 18th of December. The views thus submitted were summarized at the close of the report, as follows: "I may sum up all I have said in a few words. If nothing were necessary but to restore the machinery of government in the States lately in rebellion in point of form, the movements made to that end by the people of the south might be considered satisfactory. But if it is required that the southern people should also accommodate themselves to the results of the war in point of spirit, those movements fall far short of what must be insisted upon. The loyalty of the masses and most of the leaders of the southern people consists in submission to necessity. There is, except in individual instances, an entire absence of that national spirit which forms the basis of true loyalty and patriotism. The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old form could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no longer considered the property of the individual master, he is considered the slave of society, and all independent State legislation will share the tendency to make him such. [Between October, 1865, and April, 1866, there were apprenticeship, vagrancy and contract labor laws enacted in several of the States which had that tendency, and were known as "Black Codes."] Practical attempts on the part of the southern people to deprive the negro of his rights as a freeman may result in bloody collisions, and will certainly plunge southern society into restless fluctuations and anarchical confusion. Such evils can be prevented only by continuing the control of the national government in the States lately in rebellion until free labor is fully developed and firmly established, and the advantages and blessings of the new order of things have disclosed themselves. This desirable result will be hastened by a firm declaration on the part of the government, that national control in the south will not cease until such results are secured. Only in this way can that security be established in the south which will render numerous immigration possible, and such immigration would materially aid a favorable development of things. The solution of the problem would be very much facilitated by enabling all the loyal and free-labor elements in the south to exercise a healthy influence upon legislation. It will hardly be

possible to secure the freedman against oppressive class legislation and private persecution, unless he be endowed with a certain measure of political power. As to the future peace and harmony of the Union, it is of the highest importance that the people lately in rebellion be not permitted to build up another 'peculiar institution' whose spirit is in conflict with the fundamental principles of our political system; for as long as they cherish interests peculiar to them in preference to those they have in common with the rest of the American people, their loyalty to the Union will always be uncertain. I desire not to be understood as saying that there are no well-meaning men among those who were compromised in the rebellion. There are many, but neither their number nor their influence is strong enough to control the manifest tendency of the popular spirit. There are great reasons for hope that a determined policy on the part of the national government will produce innumerable and valuable conversions. This consideration counsels lenity as to persons, such as is demanded by the humane and enlightened spirit of our times, and vigor and firmness in the carrying out of principles, such as is demanded by the national sense of justice and the exigencies of our situation." With the report of Mr. Schurz, the President transmitted to the Senate, at the same time, a letter written by General Grant after making a hurried tour of inspection in some of the Southern States, during the last week of November and early in December. General Grant wrote: "Four years of war, during which law was executed only at the point of the bayonet throughout the States in rebellion, have left the people possibly in a condition not to yield that ready obedience to civil authority the American people have generally been in the habit of yielding. This would render the presence of small garrisons throughout those States necessary until such time as labor returns to its proper channel, and civil authority is fully established. I did not meet any one, either those holding places under the government or citizens of the southern States, who think it practicable to withdraw the military from the south at present. The white and the black mutually require the protection of the general government. There is such universal acquiescence in the authority of the general government throughout the portions of country visited by me, that the mere presence of a military force, without regard to numbers, is sufficient to maintain order. The good of the country, and economy, require that the force kept in the interior, where there are many freedmen, (elsewhere in the southern States than at forts upon the seacoast no force is necessary,) should all be white troops. The reasons for this are obvious without mentioning many of them. The presence of black troops, lately slaves, demoralizes labor, both by their advice and by furnishing in their camps a resort for the freedmen for long distances around. White troops generally excite no opposition, and therefore a small number of them can maintain order in a given district. Colored troops must be kept in bodies sufficient to defend themselves. It is not the thinking men who would use violence towards any class of troops sent among them by the general government, but the ignorant in some places might; and the late slave seems to be imbued with the idea that the property of his

late master should, by right, belong to him, or at least should have no protection from the colored soldier. There is danger of collisions being brought on by such causes. My observations lead me to the conclusion that the citizens of the southern States are anxious to return to self-government, within the Union, as soon as possible; that whilst reconstructing they want and require protection from the government; that they are in earnest in wishing to do what they think is required by the government, not humiliating to them as citizens, and that if such a course were pointed out they would pursue it in good faith. It is to be regretted that there cannot be a greater commingling, at this time, between the citizens of the two sections, and particularly of those intrusted with the lawmaking power. . . . In some instances, I am sorry to say, the freedman's mind does not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the right to live without care or provision for the future. The effect of the belief in division of lands is idleness and accumulation in camps, towns, and cities. In such cases I think it will be found that vice and disease will tend to the extermination or great reduction of the colored race. It cannot be expected that the opinions held by men at the south for years can be changed in a day, and therefore the freedmen require, for a few years, not only laws to protect them, but the fostering care of those who will give them good counsel, and on whom they rely."—*39th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Ex. Doc. no. 2, pp. 45-46, 106-107.*

**A. D. 1865 (December).—The end of Slavery.—Proclamation of the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.** See above: A. D. 1865 (JANUARY).

**A. D. 1865-1866.—The creation of the Freedmen's Bureau.**—On the last day of the 38th Congress, March 3, 1865, an Act was passed to establish a bureau for the relief of freedmen and refugees. It was among the last Acts approved by Mr. Lincoln, and was designed as a protection to the freedmen of the South and to the class of white men known as "refugees,"—driven from their homes on account of their loyalty to the Union. The Act provided that the Bureau should have "supervision and management of all abandoned lands, and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel States, or from any district of country within the territory embraced in the operations of the army, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the head of the bureau and approved by the President. The said bureau shall be under the management and control of a commissioner, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . The Secretary of War may direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel as he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen, and their wives and children, under such rules and regulations as he may direct. . . . The President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint an assistant commissioner for each of the States declared to be in insurrection, not exceeding ten. . . . Any military officer may be detailed and assigned to duty under this act without increase of pay or allowances. . . . The commissioner, under the direction of the

President, shall have authority to set apart for the use of loyal refugees and freedmen such tracts of land, within the insurrectionary States, as shall have been abandoned, or to which the United States shall have acquired title by confiscation, or sale, or otherwise. And to every male citizen, whether refugee or freedman, as aforesaid, there shall be assigned not more than 40 acres of such land, and the person to whom it is so assigned shall be protected in the use and enjoyment of the land for the term of three years, at an annual rent not exceeding 6 per centum upon the value of said land as it was appraised by the State authorities in the year 1860. . . . At the end of said term, or at any time during said term, the occupants of any parcels so assigned may purchase the land and receive such title thereto as the United States can convey. . . . On the 20th of May, 1865, Major-Gen. O. O. Howard was appointed Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau. He gave great attention to the subject of education; and after planting schools for the freedmen throughout a great portion of the South, in 1870—five years after the work was begun—he made a report. It was full of interest. In five years there were 4,239 schools established, 9,307 teachers employed, and 247,333 pupils instructed. In 1868 the average attendance was 89,396; but in 1870 it was 91,398, or 79½ per cent. of the total number enrolled. The emancipated people sustained 1,324 schools themselves, and owned 592 school buildings. The Freedmen's Bureau furnished 654 buildings for school purposes."—G. W. Williams, *Hist. of the Negro Race in Am., pt. 8, ch. 21-22 (v. 2)*.—As the original act, "by experience, had proved somewhat inadequate for the ends in view, Congress, in the early part of February, 1866, submitted an act amendatory . . . for executive approval. Its main features consisted in the reservation of three millions of acres of public land in the South from the operation of the homestead and pre-emption laws for occupation by former slaves at a rental to be approved by designated authorities, an extension of the former means of relief in the way of food and clothing, and the punishment, by tribunals composed of the agents and officials of the bureau, of all persons who should violate the rights under this act of its designated beneficiaries. . . . The President, chafing under the non-admission to their representation in Congress of the Southern States which under his policy had been restored, vetoed the bill February 19 on various grounds, among the more important of which, and the only ones of particular import, were that the measure violated constitutional guarantees in that no person by our organic code should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and that taxation should never be imposed without representation. . . . February 21st the bill was again put upon its passage, but not obtaining a two-thirds vote in the Senate, consequently failed to become a law. . . . The third Freedmen's Bureau bill, of July, 1866, was another attempt to amend the original law of March 3, 1865, as to juridical measures for the enforcement thereof, and to perfect the distribution of the abandoned and confiscated lands of the South among the blacks. It was much milder in form than the one vetoed in February of the same year, as it did not make violations of the



proposed law a criminal offence. It proposed to give jurisdiction of such violations, however, to military tribunals, made up of the agents and officers of the bureau, until the Southern States had been restored to their representation in Congress. . . . July 16, 1866, the President vetoed the bill as a matter of course. He could have pursued no other action without self-contradiction. Congress, moreover, could not have reasonably expected a different result. It framed the bill not with an eye for executive approval, but with regard to its ability to pass it over the disapproval of that official, which it did on the same day the veto message was received, thereby making it a law of the land."—O. Skinner, *The Issues of Am. Politics*, pt. 2, ch. 2.—"The law made the agents of this Bureau guardians of freedmen, with power to make their contracts, settle their disputes with employers, and care for them generally. The position of Bureau agent was one of power, of responsibility, capable of being used beneficially, and sometimes, no doubt, it was; but these officials were subjected to great temptation. . . . Nearly every one of these agents who remained South after reconstruction was a candidate for office; and many actually became Governors, Judges, Legislators, Congressmen, Postmasters, Revenue officers, etc."—H. A. Herbert, *Why the Solid South?* ch. 1.

A. D. 1865-1866 (December—April).—The Reconstruction question in Congress.—The Joint Committee of Fifteen.—The shaping of the Fourteenth Amendment.—The "independent measures of the Executive for reconstruction were far from giving satisfaction to the Republican party. Within a few days after the meeting of Congress, in December, 1865, Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, asked leave to introduce a joint resolution which provided that a committee of fifteen members should be appointed—nine of whom were to be members of the House and six to be members of the Senate—for the purpose of inquiring into the condition of the states which had formed the so-called Confederate States of America. This committee was to report whether these states or any of them were entitled to be represented in either house of Congress. Leave was given to report at any time, by bill or otherwise, and until such should be made and finally acted upon by Congress, no member was to be received into either house from any of those states. All papers relating to this representation in Congress were to be referred to this committee without debate. This resolution was adopted in the House by a vote of—yeas 133, nays 36." In the Senate it received amendments which made it a concurrent, instead of a joint resolution, and which struck out the clause relating to the non-admittance of members from the States in question pending the committee's report, and also that which required a reference of papers to the committee without debate.—S. S. Cox, *Three Decades of Federal Legislation*, ch. 18.—The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was constituted by the appointment (December 14), on the part of the House, of Thaddeus Stevens, Elihu B. Washburn, Justin S. Morrill, Henry Grider, John A. Bingham, Roscoe Conkling, George S. Boutwell, Henry T. Blow, and Andrew J. Rogers; and by the appointment (December 21), on the part of the Senate, of William Pitt Fessenden, James

W. Grimes, Ira Harris, Jacob M. Howard, Reverdy Johnson, and George H. Williams. The most serious question connected with the problem of reconstruction was that arising from the great increase of representation in Congress, and consequent augmentation of political weight and power, that must necessarily accrue to the lately rebellious States from the emancipation of their slaves. To this question the Committee gave their attention first. By an original provision of the Constitution, representation is based on the whole number of free persons in each State and three-fifths of all other persons. "When all become free, representation for all necessarily follows. As a consequence the inevitable effect of the rebellion would be to increase the political power of the insurrectionary States, whenever they should be allowed to resume their positions as States of the Union. As representation is by the Constitution based upon population, your committee [said their report, when made, on the 8th of June, 1866] did not think it advisable to recommend a change of that basis. . . . It appeared to your committee that the rights of these persons by whom the basis of representation had been thus increased should be recognized by the general government. . . . It did not seem just or proper that all the political advantages derived from their becoming free should be confined to their former masters, who had fought against the Union, and withheld from themselves, who had always been loyal. . . . Doubts were entertained whether Congress had power, even under the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly on the subject. It was doubtful, in the opinion of your committee, whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached. As the best if not the only method of surmounting the difficulty, and as eminently just and proper in itself, your committee came to the conclusion that political power should be possessed in all the States exactly in proportion as the right of suffrage should be granted, without distinction of color or race. This it was thought would leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage of increased political power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise." To this conclusion the committee arrived as early as the 22d of January, when they made a preliminary report, recommending an amendment to the constitution to the effect that "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided, That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation." Grave objections were found to the proposed exclusion of the colored race as a whole from the basis of representation, in case the suffrage should be denied to any part of it. It was shown, moreover, that disfranchisement might be practically accomplished on other grounds than that of race or color and the intended effect of the constitutional provision evaded. Hence the proposition of the Committee

failed in the Senate (March 9, 1866), though adopted by the House (Jan. 31). On the 20th of February, the Committee on Reconstruction reported a concurrent resolution, "That in order to close agitation upon a question which seems likely to disturb the action of the Government, as well as to quiet the uncertainty which is agitating the minds of the people of the eleven States which have been declared to be in insurrection, no Senator or Representative shall be admitted into either branch of Congress from any of said States until Congress shall have declared such State entitled to such representation." The House adopted this important concurrent resolution the same evening. In the Senate it was debated until the 2d of March, when it was passed by a vote of 29 to 18. On the 30th of April the Reconstruction Committee reported a joint resolution embodying a comprehensive amendment to the Constitution, designed to protect the rights of the freedmen of the South, as citizens of the United States, and to fix the basis of representation in Congress, as well as to settle other questions arising out of the Rebellion. As adopted by Congress in June, and subsequently ratified by the legislatures of the necessary number of States this became what appears as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States—see below: A. D. 1866 (JUNE). "This proposed amendment to the Constitution was accompanied by two bills, one of which provided that when any State lately in insurrection should have ratified the amendment, its Senators and Representatives, if found duly elected and qualified, should be admitted as members of Congress. The other bill declared the high ex-officials of the late Confederacy ineligible to any office under the Government of the United States."—W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, ch. 3, and 13-19.

ALSO IN: *Rept of Joint Com. on Reconstruction*, 39th Cong., 1st sess. *H. R. Rept.*, no. 30.—A. R. Conkling, *Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling*, ch. 14.

A. D. 1866.—The Fenian movement and invasion of Canada. See IRELAND: A. D. 1858-1867; and CANADA: A. D. 1866-1871.

A. D. 1866 (February).—The French warned out of Mexico. See MEXICO: A. D. 1861-1867.

A. D. 1866 (April).—The passage of the first Civil Rights Bill over the President's veto.—"Immediately on the reassembling of Congress after the holidays, January 5, 1866, Mr. Trumbull [in the Senate], in pursuance of previous notice, introduced a bill 'to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication.' This bill, having been read twice, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary." A few days later the bill was reported back from the Committee, and it came up for discussion on the 29th of January. On the 1st of February it passed the Senate and went to the House. In that body it was reported from the Judiciary Committee on the 1st of March, and debate upon the measure began. It passed the House, with some amendments, March 13th, by a vote of 111 to 38. The amendments of the House were agreed to by the Senate, and it went to the President, who returned it with an elaborate veto message on the 27th of March. In the Senate, on the 6th of April, by 33 ayes to 15 nays, and in the House three days later, by 122 affirmative votes to 41 in the nega-

tive, the bill was passed notwithstanding the veto, and became law. As enacted, the Civil Rights Bill declared "that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are . . . citizens of the United States; and such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, . . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory of the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding." Section 2 of the act provided penalties for its violation. The remaining sections gave to the district and circuit courts of the United States cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the provisions of the act; extended the jurisdiction of those courts and enlarged and defined the powers and duties of the district attorneys, marshals, deputy marshals and commissioners of the United States, to that end; made it lawful for the President "to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the due execution of this act;" and, finally, provided that "upon all questions of law arising in any cause under the provisions of this act a final appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States."—W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, ch. 9-11.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 48.

A. D. 1866 (June).—Congressional adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.—The joint resolution, embodying the important amendment to the Federal Constitution which became, when ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment, reported to Congress on the 30th of April, 1866, by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction—see above: A. D. 1865-1866 (DECEMBER-APRIL)—was passed by the House of Representatives on the 10th of May, and by the Senate on the 8th of June, with amendments which the House concurred in on the 13th of June. Having no constitutional power to veto the resolution, President Johnson sent a message to Congress on the 22d expressing his disapproval of it. The proposed constitutional amendment as it passed both Houses of Congress, and as it became part of the constitution of the United States by subsequent ratification of the States, is as follows: "Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not



taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."—W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, ch. 17-18.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 9.

**A. D. 1866 (July).—Restoration of Tennessee to her "former, proper, practical relation to the Union."** See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1865-1866.

**A. D. 1866 (July).—The New Orleans Riot.** See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1865-1867.

**A. D. 1866-1867 (October—March).—The Reconstruction issue before the people.—Congress sustained by the North.—President Johnson and the South.—Rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Southern States.**—In the elections of 1866 the canvass turned upon the issue between Congress and the President concerning Reconstruction, and the popular verdict was overwhelmingly adverse to the Presidential policy, while a new Congress was elected far more Radical in disposition than its predecessor. Every Northern State was swept by the Republicans, with heavily increased majorities. Even those "which had been tenaciously Democratic gave way under the popular pressure. . . . The aggregate majority for the Republicans and against the Administration in the Northern States was about 390,000 votes. In the South the elections were as significant as in the North, but in the opposite direction. Wherever Republican or Union tickets were put forward for State or local offices in the Confederate States, they were

defeated by prodigious majorities. Arkansas gave a Democratic majority of over 9,000, Texas over 40,000, and North Carolina 25,000. The border slave States were divided. Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky gave strong majorities for the Democrats, while West Virginia and Missouri were carried by the Republicans. The unhappy indication of the whole result was that President Johnson's policy had inspired the South with a determination not to submit to the legitimate results of the war, but to make a new fight and, if possible, regain at the ballot-box the power they had lost by war. The result of the whole election was to give to the Republicans 143 representatives in Congress and to the Democrats but 49." But when Congress assembled, in December, the President was found to be inflexibly determined to pursue the line of policy which he had marked out. In his message he reiterated his views "with entire disregard of the popular result which had so significantly condemned him. . . . The President's position . . . excited derision and contempt in the North, but it led to mischievous results in the South. The ten Confederate States which stood knocking at the door of Congress for the right of representation, were fully aware, as was well stated by a leading Republican, that the key to unlock the door had been placed in their own hands. They knew that the political canvass in the North had proceeded upon the basis, and upon the practical assurance (given through the press, and more authoritatively in political platforms), that whenever any other Confederate State should follow the example of Tennessee, it should at once be treated as Tennessee had been treated. Yet, when this position had been confirmed by the elections in all the loyal States, and was, by the special warrant of popular power, made the basis of future admission, these ten States, voting upon the Fourteenth Amendment at different dates through the winter of 1866-67, contemptuously rejected it. In the Virginia Legislature only one vote could be found for the Amendment. In the North-Carolina Legislature only 11 votes out of 148 were in favor of the Amendment. In the South-Carolina Legislature there was only one vote for the Amendment. In Georgia only two votes out of 169 in the Legislature were in the affirmative. Florida unanimously rejected the Amendment. Out of 106 votes in the Alabama Legislature only ten could be found in favor of it. Mississippi and Louisiana both rejected it unanimously. Texas, out of her entire Legislature, gave only five votes for it, and the Arkansas Legislature, which had really taken its action in the preceding October, gave only three votes for the Amendment. . . . It was naturally inferred and was subsequently proved, that the Southern States would not have dared to take this hostile attitude except with the encouragement and the unqualified support of the President."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 10-11.—"No factor in those elections [of 1866] proved more potential than the rejection by Southern Legislatures of the pending Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The clauses on which its acceptance or rejection turned in these assemblies were: Section II, which apportioned Representatives in Congress upon the basis of the voting population; and Section III, which provided that no person should hold office under

the United States who, having taken an oath as a Federal or state officer to support the Constitution, had subsequently engaged in the war against the Union. It was claimed by the friends of the Amendment to be especially unfair that the South should have representation for its freedmen and not give them the ballot. The right, however, of a state to have representation for all its free inhabitants, whether voters or not, was secured by the Constitution, and that instrument even allowed three-fifths representation for slaves. New York, Ohio, and other states denied the ballot to free negroes; some states excluded by property qualification and others by educational tests, yet all enjoyed representation for all their peoples. The reply to this was that the Constitution ought to be amended because the South would now have, if negroes were denied the ballot, a larger proportion of non-voters than the North. Southern people were slow to see that this was good reason for change in the Constitution, especially as they believed they were already entitled to representation, and conceived that they ought to have a voice in proposing as well as in the ratification of amendments. Five of the restored states had already ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, and such ratification had been counted valid. If they were states, they were certainly entitled to representation. So they claimed. It was perhaps imprudent for Southern people at that time to undertake to chop logic with their conquerors, or indeed to claim any rights at all. . . . The insuperable objection, however, to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was to be found in the clause which required the people of the late Confederate States to disfranchise their own leaders, to brand with dishonor those who had led them in peace and in war."—H. A. Herbert, *Why the Solid South?* (*Noted Men on the Solid South*) pp. 15-16.—In a letter addressed, November 25, 1866, to General Richard Taylor, lately of the Confederate army, and brother-in-law of Jefferson Davis, General Grant wrote: "I have talked with several members of Congress who are classed with the Radicals; Schenck and Bidwell for instance. They express the most generous views as to what would be done if the Constitutional amendments proposed by Congress were adopted by the Southern States. What was done in the case of Tennessee was an earnest of what would be done in all cases. Even the disqualification to hold office imposed on certain classes by one article of the amendment would, no doubt, be removed at once, except it might be in the cases of the very highest offenders, such, for instance, as those who went abroad to aid in the Rebellion, those who left seats in Congress, etc. All or very nearly all would soon be restored, and so far as security to property and liberty is concerned, all would be restored at once. I would like exceedingly to see one Southern State, excluded State, ratify the amendments to enable us to see the exact course that would be pursued. I believe it would much modify the demands that may be made if there is delay." "But the President's endeavors did not cease. . . . He used all the authority of his office to dissuade the Southerners from accepting the amendment which the entire North had ratified. . . . He converted good feeling and good will on both sides into discord, and precipitated disasters almost equal to those from

which the State had barely escaped. . . . This view of Johnson's conduct was thenceforth steadily maintained by Grant."—A. Badeau, *Grant in Peace*, ch. 5.

**A. D. 1866-1867 (December—March).—The Tenure-of-Office Bill.**—"Against the early decision of the founders of the Government, . . . against the repeatedly expressed judgment of ex-President Madison, against the equally emphatic judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, and above all, against the unbroken practice of the Government for 78 years, the Republican leaders now determined to deprive the President of the power of removing Federal officers. Many were induced to join in the movement under the belief that it was important to test the true meaning of the Constitution in the premises, and that this could be most effectively done by directly restraining by law the power which had been so long conceded to the Executive Department. To that end Mr. Williams of Oregon, on the first Monday of December, 1866, introduced a bill 'to regulate the tenure of civil offices.'"—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, p. 270.—"After grave consideration and protracted discussion in both houses of Congress, the [Tenure-of-Office bill] was passed near the close of the session. On the 2d of March [1867] the bill encountered the veto of the President, who saw in the measure serious interference with the ability of the Executive to keep his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. The bill was immediately passed over the veto without debate. The act thus passed provides that officers appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall hold their offices until their successors are in like manner appointed and qualified. Members of the Cabinet hold their offices during the term of the President by whom they are appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by consent of the Senate."—W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, p. 560.—Soon after the inauguration of President Grant, in 1868, the Tenure-of-Office act was so far modified as to practically release the President from the restraint which it put upon his power of removal.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 18, and App. B.

**A. D. 1866-1869.—Organization of the Bureau of Education.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1866-1869.

**A. D. 1866-1871.—The Ku-Klux Klan of the Southern States and its outrages.**—"It would have been contrary to the experience of mankind, and an exception to all the teachings of history, if the social and political revolution which the results of the war had imposed on the states then recently insurgent had gone into operation peacefully, harmoniously, and successfully. It was impossible for such to be the case. The transition was from a state in which the superiority and domination of the white race over the colored race existed unquestioned for centuries. It was to a condition of things in which the most prominent whites were disfranchised and deprived of the right to hold public offices. Their late slaves were enfranchised, and the judicial and other offices were largely filled by dishonest and unfriendly strangers from the North. What was worse still, many of these places were filled by ignorant and brutal negroes. The transition was too sudden and violent. It was hard to submit to it quietly. No people, least of all such



a proud and intolerant people as that of the South, could see their local governments transferred from their own hands into the hands of their former slaves without being goaded into violent resistance. This resistance took the form, in most of the Southern States, not of armed opposition to the Federal or the state governments, but of organized intimidation and terrorism. It was directed against the colored people and against their white allies and leaders. It made an objective point of the agents of the Freedmen's Bureau, ministers of the gospel, and school teachers,—all adventurers from the North, or men who had, in quest of fortune, immigrated into these states. All of these classes were regarded as public or private enemies. They were designated by the opprobrious title of 'carpet-baggers.' The history of these outrages fills many volumes of reports made by joint and separate committees of the two houses of Congress. It is from these volumes, from reports of military commanders in the South, and from other official documents, that the following epitome, exhibiting the lawlessness that prevailed in the Southern States during the . . . decade between 1865 and 1875, is made. These documents are so full of the details of crime and violence, and are so voluminous, that it is exceedingly difficult to select from them, or to convey a correct idea of their relations. Very soon after the close of the Civil War, almost as soon as the Reconstruction acts were begun to be put in operation, secret societies were organized in various states of the South. Their object, either secret or avowed, was to prevent the exercise of political rights by the negroes. These societies took various names, such as 'The Brotherhood,' 'The Pale Faces,' 'The Invisible Empire,' 'The Knights of the White Camellia'; but all these were finally merged into, or compounded with, the formidable and dreaded society denominated the 'Ku-Klux Klan.' Their acts of lawlessness and cruelty have passed into local and congressional history as 'Ku-Klux outrages.' The State of Virginia was a remarkable exception to the other states in its exemption from crimes of this character; while the two neighboring States of North Carolina and Tennessee furnished, perhaps, more material for investigation into Ku-Klux outrages than any other portion of the South. This barbarous and bloodthirsty organization is said to have originated in 1866. There is no doubt that the Ku-Klux Klan was organized at first only to scare the superstitious blacks. It is true that it arose out of the frivolities of some young Tennesseans. Horrid tales were told to frighten the negroes from roaming about and pilfering. The testimony before the committee on that subject, of which the writer was a member, showed that they daily visited houses and talked their foolish talk; that they were 'mummicking about,'—whatever that means. . . . There is no doubt that political reasons had their influence after the Ku-Klux were under way. . . . Certain it is, that they soon came to be made use of, in the most arbitrary, cruel, and shocking manner, for the furtherance of political ends, and for the crushing out of Republicanism in the Southern States; to which party the colored people were almost unanimously attached. The crimes and outrages narrated in these pages had their origin, almost exclusively, in political

causes,—in the effort on the part of the whites to set at naught the rights of suffrage guaranteed to the negroes, and to exclude from Federal, state, county, and local offices all persons whose reliance for election to such offices was mainly, if not altogether, on negro votes. General Forrest estimated the strength of the Ku-Klux organization in Tennessee at 40,000. He expressed the belief that it was still stronger in other states. The members were sworn to secrecy, under the penalty of death for breach of fidelity. Their ordinary mode of operation—as gathered from the mass of evidence—was to patrol the country at night. They went well armed and mounted. They wore long white gowns. They masked their faces. Their appearance terrified the timid and superstitious negroes who happened to see them as they rode past, and who then regarded them as ghostly riders. But most frequently they surrounded and broke into the cabins of the negroes; frightened and maltreated the inmates; warned them of future vengeance; and probably carried off some obnoxious negro, or 'carpet-bagger,' whose fate it was to be riddled with murderous bullets, hung to the limb of a tree, or mercilessly whipped and tortured, for some offense, real or imaginary, but generally because he was active in politics or in negro schools or churches. . . . According to the majority report of the Senate select committee of March 10, 1871, the Ku-Klux associations, by whatever name known, were instituted in North Carolina in 1867 or 1868. . . . The report of the Senate committee of the 10th of March, 1871, before referred to, recites a startling number of Ku-Klux outrages. They embrace whipping, mutilation, and murder. These cruelties took place in North Carolina, between December, 1868, and December, 1870. The report gives some of the horrifying details."—S. S. Cox, *Three Decades of Federal Legislation*, ch. 25-26.—"Senator Scott, in a speech in the Senate, gave as the result of the investigation that came to his own knowledge, as follows: In North Carolina, in 14 counties, there were 18 murders and 315 whippings. In South Carolina, 9 counties, 35 murders and 276 other flagrant outrages. In Georgia, 29 counties, 72 murders and 126 whippings. In Alabama, 26 counties, 215 murders and 116 other outrages. In Florida, in one county alone there were 153 cases of homicide. In Mississippi, 20 counties, 23 homicides and 76 other cases of outrage. In 99 counties in different States he found 526 homicides and 2,009 cases of whipping. But the committee state that in Louisiana alone in the year 1868 there were more than 1,000 murders, and most of them were the result of the operations of the Ku Klux."—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 45.

ALSO IN: *Rep't of Joint Select Committee (42d Cong., 2d sess., Senate Rep't, no. 41).*

A. D. 1867 (January).—**Negro Suffrage in the District of Columbia.**—As early as the 18th of January, 1866, the House of Representatives passed a bill extending the suffrage in the District of Columbia, by striking out the word "white" from all laws and parts of laws prescribing the qualification of electors for any office in the District, and declaring that no person should be disqualified from voting at any election in the District on account of color. As it was known that the President would veto the bill if sent to him,

the Senate held it until the next session. In December, 1866, it was called up in that body by Senator Sumner, and after considerable debate was passed, December 13th. On the 7th of January following it was returned by the President with his veto, but was passed over the veto by the Senate (29 to 10) the same day, and by the House (113 to 38) the day following, thus becoming a law. — W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, ch. 4 and 21.

ALSO IN: G. W. Julian, *Political Recollections*, ch. 12.

**A. D. 1867 (March).—The Purchase of Alaska.** See ALASKA: A. D. 1867.

**A. D. 1867 (March).—The Military Reconstruction Acts of Congress.**—"Congress had declared amply enough how the rebel States should not be reinstated. Two years after the close of the war, however, the Union was still unrestored, and while claiming, under the Constitution, absolute jurisdiction of the question, Congress had failed to prescribe the terms on which the Union should be restored. . . . Both the country and Congress were at last convinced by the course of events that affirmative Congressional action was indispensable, involving the sweeping away of Mr. Johnson's ex-rebel State governments and the enfranchisement of the emancipated slaves. Mr. Stevens had been of that opinion ever since the emasculation by the Senate of the Fourteenth Amendment, as adopted by the House [which had proposed to exclude from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress and for Presidential electors, 'until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort'], and immediately thereupon proposed a measure containing the germ of the Military Reconstruction Act. Called up from time to time, and pressed upon the attention of the House by Mr. Stevens, it was passed on the 13th day of February, 1867, after a four weeks' debate upon it in Committee of the Whole. By the 20th both Houses had agreed upon it, and passed it. On the 2d day of March the President returned it to the House with his veto, over which it was at once passed by both Houses; and with only two days of the Thirty-ninth Congress to spare, it became law." — O. J. Hollister, *Life of Schuyler Colfax*, ch. 9.—The Military Reconstruction Act set forth in its preamble that "Whereas, no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property now exists in the rebel States [enumerating all the late Confederate States except Tennessee]; . . . and whereas it is necessary that peace and good order should be enforced in said States until loyal and republican State governments can be legally established: therefore, Be it enacted, . . . That said rebel States shall be divided into military districts and made subject to the military authority of the United States, as herein-after prescribed; and for that purpose Virginia shall constitute the first district, North Carolina and South Carolina the second district, Georgia, Alabama and Florida the third district, Mississippi and Arkansas the fourth district, and Louisiana and Texas the fifth district." Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the act made it the duty of the President to assign to the command of each of the said districts an officer of the army not below the rank of brigadier-general, and defined the duties and powers of such commander, providing for

the assignment to him of an adequate military force. Section 5 provided "That when the people of any one of said rebel States shall have formed a constitution of government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States in all respects, framed by a convention of delegates elected by the male citizens of said State 21 years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such election, except such as may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law, and when such constitution shall provide that the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have the qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates, and when such constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the persons voting on the question of ratification who are qualified as electors for delegates, and when such constitution shall have been submitted to Congress for examination and approval, and Congress shall have approved the same, and when said State, by a vote of its Legislature elected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when said article shall have become a part of the Constitution of the United States, said State shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress, and Senators and Representatives shall be admitted therefrom on their taking the oath prescribed by law, and then and thereafter the preceding sections of this act shall be inoperative in said State." It was further provided that no person excluded from office by the Fourteenth Amendment should be a member of the convention to frame a constitution for any of said rebel States, and that any civil government which might exist in any of the said States prior to the admission of its representatives to Congress should be deemed provisional only, and subject to the paramount authority of the United States. "The friends of this measure were dissatisfied with it on the ground of its incompleteness in not containing provisions for carrying it into effect in accordance with the purpose of its framers. . . . The Fortieth Congress, meeting on the 4th of March, immediately upon the close of its predecessor, proceeded without delay to perfect and pass over the President's veto [March 23, 1867] a bill supplementary to the act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States." By this supplementary act specific instructions were given as to the course of procedure to be followed in making a registration of the voters qualified under the act and in conducting the elections provided for.—W. H. Barnes, *Hist. of the 39th Cong.*, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: *Why the Solid South?* (*Noted Men on the Solid South.*)

**A. D. 1868 (March—May).—Impeachment and Trial of President Johnson.**—"Until the spring of 1866, a year after Mr. Johnson became President, there was entire harmony between him and his Cabinet. . . . No objection was raised even to that part of the President's first message which treated of the suffrage question, by any member of the Cabinet. It was in fact approved by all, and by none more heartily than by Mr. Stanton. A change took place soon after the Civil Rights bill became a law over the President's veto, and bitter con-



troverſy aroſe between the Preſident and Congreſs. In this controverſy, and at its commencement, Mr. Denniſon [Poſtmaſter-general] and Mr. Harlan [Secretary of the Interior] ſided with Congreſs and tendered their reſignations, which were very reluctantly accepted. They reſigned becauſe they could not heartily ſuſtain the Preſident, but there was no breach of the ſocial relations which had exiſted between them. Mr. Speed [Attorney-general] ſoon after followed the example of Denniſon and Harlan. Mr. Stanton [Secretary of War] alſo ſided with Congreſs, but he did not reſign. He was adviſed by prominent political and perſonal friends to 'ſtick,' and he did ſo, contrary to all precedent and in oppoſition to the judgment of conſervative men of his party. . . . He attended the Cabinet meetings, not as an adviſer of the Preſident, but as an opponent of the policy to which he had himſelf been committed, and the Preſident lacked the nerve to diſmiſs him. . . . In this criſis of his political life, Mr. Johnson exhibited a want of ſpirit and deciſion which aſtoniſhed thoſe who were familiar with his antecedents. He knew when the Tenure-of-Office Bill was before Congreſs that the object of its leading ſupporters was to tie his hands, and yet he refrained from uſing them when they were free. . . . When he did act he acted unwiſely. He retained Mr. Stanton in his Cabinet when his right to remove him was unqueſtionable. He ſuſpended him [Auguſt 12, 1867] after the Tenure-of-Office Bill had become a law, and in accordance with its provisions, [directing General Grant to act as Secretary of War ad interim]; and when the Senate reſuſed to approve of the ſuſpension [Januſary 13, 1868], he iſſued orders for his removal and the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary of War ad interim. If he had tried to give his enemies an advantage over him, to furniſh them with weapons for his own diſcomfiture, he could not have done it more effectually. . . . If he had removed Mr. Stanton inſtead of ſuſpending him, and juſtified his action on the ground that his control of the members of his Cabinet was a conſtitutional right of which he could not be deprived by Congreſs, he probably would not have been impeached. The giſt of the charges againſt him was that he had violated a law of Congreſs in removing Mr. Stanton, or iſſuing an order for his removal, after the Senate had reſuſed to ſanction his ſuſpension. In the articles of impeachment there were other charges againſt the Preſident, the moſt ſerious of which were that he had delivered intemperate, inflammatory ſpeeches, which were intended to bring into contempt the Congreſs of the United States and duly enacted laws. The ſpeeches made by the Preſident in Cleveland, St. Louis, and other places in Auguſt and September, 1866—in fact, all his public addreſſes during his conteſt with Congreſs—were in the worſt poſſible taſte, derogatory to himſelf and to his high poſition; but they . . . did not conſtitute good ground for his impeachment; and this was the opinion of the Houſe, which in Januſary, 1867, after they were made, reſuſed to impeach him by the deciſive vote of 108 to 57. Other cauſes for his impeachment were ſubſequentially ſought for. His bank account was examined. His private conduct in Washington was carefully ſcrutinized. Men were employed to investigate his public and private character in

Tenneſſee, but nothing was found to his diſcredit. . . . Nothing was found to juſtify his impeachment but the order which he iſſued for the removal of Mr. Stanton and his appointment of General Thomas to be Secretary of the War Department ad interim after the Senate had reſuſed to ſanction Mr. Stanton's ſuſpension." The formal preſentment by the Houſe of Representatives of its Impeachment againſt the Preſident, at the bar of the Senate, ſitting as a Court of Impeachment, was made on the 5th day of March, 1868. The answer of the Preſident was preſented on the 23d; the trial opened on Monday, the 30th of March, and closed on the 26th of May following. "The trial was a very intereſting one, not only to the people of the United States, but to the people of other countries. . . . It was the firſt inſtance in the hiſtory of nations of the trial of the head of a government before one of the branches of the law-making power, ſitting as a judicial tribunal, on charges preſented by another. The preſiding officer was the Chief Juſtice of the Supreme Court—the ſenators of the reſpective States were the jury—the Houſe of Representatives the proſecutor. The managers to conduct the impeachment for the Houſe were John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, James F. Wilſon, Benjamin F. Butler, Thomas Williams, Thaddeus Stevens and John A. Logan, all members of the Houſe, all lawyers, and ſome of them diſtinguiſhed in the profeſſion. The Preſident entered his appearance by Henry Stanbery, Benjamin K. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A. K. Nelson. William S. Groesbeck, in the courſe of the trial, appeared and took part as counſel for the Preſident in place of Mr. Black." The reſult of the trial was a failure of the Impeachment. The ſenators who voted "guilty" were 35 in number—being leſs than two-thirds of the whole—againſt 19. Of thoſe who voted in the negative, ſeven were Republicans who had ſteadily oppoſed the Preſident's policy; four were Republicans who had adhered to him throughout; eight were Democrats.—H. McCulloch, *Men and Measures of Half a Century*, ch. 26.—In the opinion of Mr. Blaine, "the ſober reflection of later years has perſuaded many who favored Impeachment that it was not juſtifiable on the charges made," and that "the Preſident was impeached for one ſeries of miſdemeanors, and tried for another ſeries."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congreſs*, v. 2, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: *Trial of Andrew Johnson* (Published by Order of the Senate), 3 v.—The ſame, *Cong. Globe, Supplement*, 40th Cong., 2d ſeſs.

A. D. 1868.—The Burlingame Treaty with China. See CHINA: A. D. 1857–1868.

A. D. 1868 (November).—The Twenty-fiſt Preſidential Election.—General Ulyſſes S. Grant, nominated by the Republican party, was elected Preſident in November 1868, by 3,012,833 votes of the people againſt 2,703,249 votes caſt for Horatio Seymour, ex-Governor of New York, the candidate of the Democratic party. The electoral vote returned and counted was 214 for Grant and 80 for Seymour, who carried the States of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Oregon. Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, was elected Vice Preſident, over General Frank P. Blair.—E. Stanwood, *Hiſt. of Preſidential Elections*, ch. 22.

**A. D. 1868-1870. — Reconstruction complete.**—Restoration of all the Southern States to representation in Congress.—“On the 22d of June, 1868, an act was passed, with the following preamble and resolution, for the admission of Arkansas:—‘Whereas the people of Arkansas, in pursuance of an act entitled, An act for the more efficient government of the Rebel States, passed March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, have framed and adopted a constitution of State government, which is republican, and the legislature of said State has duly ratified the amendment of the Constitution of the United States proposed by the XXXIXth Congress, and known as Article XIV.; Therefore, Be it enacted, etc., that the State of Arkansas is entitled and admitted to representation in Congress, as one of the States of the Union, upon the following fundamental condition.’ The ‘fundamental condition,’ as finally agreed upon, was, ‘That there shall never be in said State any denial or abridgment of the elective franchise, or of any other right, to any person by reason or on account of race or color, except Indians not taxed.’ The bill was vetoed by the President on the 20th, but passed over the veto on the 22d in the House by the vote of 111 to 31, and in the Senate by a vote of 30 to 7. On the 25th of June a similar act was passed admitting the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, in pursuance of a similar preamble, with the conditions that they should ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, that they should not deprive ‘any citizen, or class of citizens of the State of the right to vote by the constitution thereof’; and that no person prohibited from holding office by said Amendment should be ‘deemed eligible to any office in either of said States unless relieved from disability as provided in said amendment’; the State of Georgia being also required to declare ‘null and void’ certain provisions of its constitution, and ‘in addition give the assent of said State to the fundamental condition hereinbefore imposed on the same.’ The bill passed the House, May 14,—yeas 110, nays 35; in the Senate, June 9,—yeas 31, nays 5. It was vetoed by the President on the 25th, and passed, the same day, by both houses, over the Presidential veto. On the 27th of January, 1870, Virginia was admitted into the Union by a vote, in the House, of 136 to 58; and in the Senate by a vote of 47 to 10. The following were the preamble, oaths, and conditions precedent: ‘Whereas the people of Virginia have framed and adopted a constitution of State government which is republican; and whereas the legislature of Virginia, elected under said constitution, has ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States; and whereas the performance of these several acts in good faith is a condition precedent to a representation of the State in Congress,’ said State should be admitted to a representation in Congress; with the additional conditions precedent, however, that the constitution should never be so amended as to deprive any class of citizens of the right ‘to vote,’ ‘to hold office,’ on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; neither should there be ‘other qualifications’ required for such reason; nor should any be deprived of ‘school rights or privileges’ on such account. On the 3d of February Mississippi was admitted by a

bill resembling the former in every particular, by substantially the same vote. On the 30th of March Texas was readmitted to the Union on a bill very similar, though not identical with the above. . . . By this act of Congress the last of the ‘wayward sisters’ was brought back and restored to the family of States, and the fractured Union was, outwardly at least, repaired. It was ten years, eight months, and twenty days after South Carolina raised the banner of revolt and led off in ‘the dance of death.’”—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 44.

ALSO IN: S. S. Cox, *Three Decades of Federal Legislation*, ch. 27-31.

**A. D. 1868-1876.**—The reconstructed government of South Carolina. See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1865-1876.

**A. D. 1869.**—Negotiation of the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty and its rejection by the Senate. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1869.

**A. D. 1869.**—Gold Speculation.—Black Friday. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1869.

**A. D. 1869.**—Founding of the Order of Knights of Labor. See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A. D. 1869-1883.

**A. D. 1869-1870.**—The Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment.—“The great defect of the Fourteenth Amendment, as freely charged during its discussion, was its at least tacit recognition of the right of States to disfranchise the ex-slaves, should they so elect. True, they could not do it without sacrificing so much in the basis of their representation in Congress; but if they were willing to make that sacrifice, there was nothing in the amendment to prevent such discrimination. To remedy that defect . . . it was resolved to incorporate into the organic law a new provision for their protection, and to supplement the amendments of the Constitution already adopted by another. There were accordingly introduced into both houses, almost simultaneously, measures for that purpose. . . . In the House, on the 11th of January, 1869, Mr. Boutwell reported from the Committee on the Judiciary a joint resolution proposing an amendment which provided that the right to vote of no citizen should be abridged by the United States or any State by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.” The joint resolution was adopted in the House, 150 affirmative to 42 negative votes, on the 30th of January. Adopted in the Senate with amendments, by 39 to 16 votes, it went to a Committee of Conference, on whose report the joint resolution was finally adopted by both Houses on the 25th of February, and submitted for ratification to the legislatures of the States, in the following form: “Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” “The amendment received the votes of 29 States, constituting the requisite three fourths, and thus became a part of the organic law. On the 30th of March, 1870, President Grant communicated the fact to Congress in a special message.”—H. Wilson, *Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, v. 3, ch. 47.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 16 and 19.



**A. D. 1869-1890.—Recovery of the domination of Whites at the South.—Suppression of the Colored vote.—Prosperity of the Southern States.**—"Between 1869 and 1876, the whites had in every Southern State except South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, regained control of the government, and in 1876 those three States were also recovered. The circumstances were different, according to the character of the population in each State. In some a union of the moderate white Republicans with the Democrats, brought about by the disgust of all property holders at the scandals they saw and at the increase to their burdens as tax-payers, had secured legitimately chosen majorities, and ejected the corrupt officials. In some the same result was attained by paying or otherwise inducing the negroes not to go to the polls, or by driving them away by threats or actual violence. Once possessed again of a voting majority, the whites, all of whom had by 1872 been relieved of their disabilities, took good care, by a variety of devices, legal and extra-legal, to keep that majority safe; and in no State has their control of the government been since shaken. President Hayes withdrew, in 1877, such Federal troops as were still left at the South, and none have ever since been despatched thither. . . . With the disappearance of the carpet-bag and negro governments, the third era in the political history of the South since the war began. The first had been that of exclusively white suffrage; the second, that of predominantly negro suffrage. In the third, universal suffrage and complete legal equality were soon perceived to mean in practice the full supremacy of the whites. To dislodge the coloured man from his rights was impossible, for they were secured by the Federal Constitution which prevails against all State action. The idea of disturbing them was scarcely entertained. Even at the election of 1872 the Southern Democrats no more expected to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment than the English Tories expected at the election of 1874 to repeal the Irish Church Disestablishment Act of 1869. But the more they despaired of getting rid of the amendment, the more resolved were the Southern people to prevent it from taking any effect which could endanger their supremacy. They did not hate the negro, certainly not half so much as they hated his white leaders by whom they had been robbed. 'We have got,' they said, 'to save civilization,' and if civilization could be saved only by suppressing the coloured vote, they were ready to suppress it. . . . The modes of suppression have not been the same in all districts and at all times. At first there was a good deal of what is called 'bulldozing,' i. e. rough treatment and terrorism, applied to frighten the coloured men from coming to or voting at the polls. Afterwards, the methods were less harsh. Registrations were so managed as to exclude negro voters, arrangements for polling were contrived in such wise as to lead the voter to the wrong place so that his vote might be refused; and, if the necessity arose, the Republican candidates were counted out, or the election returns tampered with. 'I would stuff a ballot-box,' said a prominent man, 'in order to have a good, honest government;' and he said it in good faith, and with no sense of incongruity. Sometimes the local negro preachers were warned or paid to keep their flocks away. . . . Not-

withstanding these impediments, the negro long maintained the struggle, valuing the vote as the symbol of his freedom, and fearing to be re-enslaved if the Republican party should be defeated. Leaders and organizers were found in the Federal office-holders, of course all Republicans. . . . After 1884, however, when the presidency of the United States passed to a Democrat, some of these office-holders were replaced by Democrats and the rest became less zealous. . . . Their friends at the North were exasperated, not without reason, for the gift of suffrage to the negroes had resulted in securing to the South a larger representation in Congress and in presidential elections than it enjoyed before the war, or would have enjoyed had the negroes been left unenfranchised. They argued, and truly, that where the law gives a right, the law ought to secure the exercise thereof; and when the Southern men replied that the negroes were ignorant, they rejoined that all over the country there were myriads of ignorant voters, mostly recent immigrants, whom no one thought of excluding. Accordingly in 1890, having a majority in both Houses of Congress and a President of their own party, the Republican leaders introduced a bill subjecting the control of Federal elections to officers to be appointed by the President, in the hope of thus calling out a full negro vote, five sixths of which would doubtless have gone to their party. The measure appeared to dispassionate observers quite constitutional, and the mischief it was designed to remedy was palpable. . . . It passed the House, but was dropped in the Senate under the threat of an obstructive resistance by the (then Democratic) minority. Secure, however, as the dominance of the whites seems now to be against either Northern legislation or negro revolt, the Southern people are still uneasy and sensitive on the subject. . . . This horror of negro supremacy is the only point in which the South cherishes its old feelings. Hostility to the Northern people has almost disappeared. . . . Just because they felt that they had fought well, they submitted with little resentment, and it has become a proverb among them that the two classes which still cherish bitterness are the two classes that did not fight,—the women and the clergy. . . . Not, however, till the whites regained control between 1870 and 1876, did the industrial regeneration of the country fairly begin. Two discoveries coincided with that epoch which have had an immense effect in advancing material prosperity, and changing the current of men's thoughts. The first was the exploration of the mineral wealth of the highland core of the country. . . . The second discovery was that of the possibility of extracting oil from the seeds of the cotton plant, which had formerly been thrown away, or given to hogs to feed on. The production of this oil has swelled to great proportions, making the cultivation of cotton far more profitable. . . . Most of the crop now raised, which averages eight millions of bales, and in 1894 was expected to exceed ten millions (being more than double that which was raised, almost wholly by slave labour, before the war), is now raised by white farmers; while the mills which spin and weave it into marketable goods are daily increasing and building up fresh industrial communities."—J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (3d ed.), ch. 92 (v. 2).

## UNITED STATES, 1870.

## UNITED STATES, 1872.

**A. D. 1870.—The Ninth Census.**—Total population, 38,558,371 (exceeding that of 1860 by 7,115,049), classed and distributed as follows:

**North Atlantic division.**

	White.	Black.
Maine .....	624,809	1,606
New Hampshire.....	317,697	580
Vermont.....	329,613	924
Massachusetts.....	1,443,156	13,947
Rhode Island.....	212,219	4,980
Connecticut.....	527,549	9,668
New York.....	4,330,210	52,081
New Jersey.....	875,407	30,658
Pennsylvania.....	3,456,609	65,294
	12,117,269	179,738

**South Atlantic division.**

Delaware.....	102,221	22,794
Maryland.....	605,497	175,391
District of Columbia.....	88,278	43,404
Virginia.....	712,089	512,841
West Virginia.....	424,033	17,980
North Carolina.....	678,470	391,650
South Carolina.....	289,667	415,814
Georgia.....	688,926	545,142
Florida.....	96,057	91,689
	3,635,238	2,216,705

**North central division.**

Ohio.....	2,601,946	63,213
Indiana.....	1,655,837	24,560
Illinois.....	2,511,096	28,762
Michigan.....	1,167,282	11,849
Wisconsin.....	1,051,351	2,113
Minnesota.....	438,257	759
Iowa.....	1,188,207	5,762
Missouri.....	1,603,146	118,071
Dakota.....	12,887	94
Nebraska.....	122,117	789
Kansas.....	346,377	17,108
	12,698,503	273,080

**South central division.**

Kentucky.....	1,098,692	222,210
Tennessee.....	936,119	322,331
Alabama.....	521,384	475,510
Mississippi.....	382,896	444,201
Louisiana.....	362,065	364,210
Texas.....	564,700	253,475
Arkansas.....	362,115	122,169
	4,227,971	2,204,106

**Western division.**

Montana.....	18,306	183
Wyoming.....	8,726	183
Colorado.....	39,221	456
New Mexico.....	90,393	172
Arizona.....	9,581	26
Utah.....	86,044	118
Nevada.....	38,959	357
Idaho.....	10,618	60
Washington.....	22,195	207
Oregon.....	86,929	346
California.....	499,424	4,272
	910,396	6,380

**Grand total.....** 38,558,377 4,880,009

In addition the census shows 63,199 Chinese, 55 Japanese, and 25,731 civilized Indians, making

a total of 38,558,371, as stated above. In the decade preceding this census the immigrant arrivals numbered 2,466,752, of which 1,106,970 were from the British Islands, and 1,073,429 from other parts of Europe.

**A. D. 1871.—Renewed Negotiations with Great Britain.**—The Joint High Commission, the Treaty of Washington and the Geneva Award. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1869–1871; 1871; and 1871–1872.

**A. D. 1871.—The first Civil-Service Reform Act.** See CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES.

**A. D. 1871 (April).—The Force Bill.**—At the extra session of Congress, which met March 4, 1871 a sweeping Act was passed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. "This Act allowed suit in Federal courts by the party injured against any person who should in any way deprive another of the rights of a citizen; it made it a penal offence to conspire to take away from any person the rights of a citizen; it provided that inability, neglect, or refusal by any State to suppress such conspiracy, to protect the rights of its citizens, or to call upon the President for aid, should be 'deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws' under the XIVth Amendment; it declared such conspiracies, if not suppressed by the authorities, 'a rebellion against the Government of the United States'; it authorized the President, 'when in his judgment the public safety shall require it,' to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any district, and suppress the insurrection by means of the army and navy; and it excluded from the jury-box any person 'who shall, in the judgment of the court, be in complicity with any such combination or conspiracy.' The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was to cease after the end of the next regular Session of Congress."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, 2d ed., p. 214.

ALSO IN: *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1871, p. 228.

**A. D. 1872.—Decision of the San Juan Water Boundary Question by the Emperor of Germany.** See SAN JUAN OR NORTHWESTERN WATER-BOUNDARY QUESTION.

**A. D. 1872.—The Twenty-second Presidential Election.**—The leading candidates for President in 1872 were General Grant, nominated for re-election by the main body of the Republican Party, and Horace Greeley, of New York, put forward by a revolted section of that party and accepted and supported by the Democratic Party. "In 1870 the Republican party in Missouri had split into two parts. The 'Radical' wing wished to maintain for the present the disqualifications imposed on the late rebels by the State Constitution during the war; the 'Liberal' wing, headed by B. Gratz Brown and Carl Schurz, wished to abolish these disqualifications and substitute 'universal amnesty and universal enfranchisement.' Supported by the Democrats, the Liberal Republicans carried the State, though opposed by the Federal office-holders and the influence of the Administration. This success stimulated a reaction in the National Republican party, many of whose members believed that the powers of the Federal Government over the local concerns of the States had already been enforced up to or beyond constitutional limits, that the various enforcement Acts were designed rather for the political advance-



ment of President Grant's personal adherents than for the benefit of the country, the freedmen, or even of the Republican party; and that the efforts to police the Southern States by the force of the Federal Government ought to cease. In the spring of 1871 the Liberal Republicans and Democrats of Ohio began to show symptoms of common feeling on these subjects, and during the summer the 'Liberal' movement continued to develop within the Republican party. January 24th, 1872, the Missouri Liberals issued a call for a National Convention at Cincinnati in the following May." At the meeting in Cincinnati the Liberal Republican Convention nominated Horace Greeley for President, and B. Gratz Brown for Vice President. The Democratic National Convention which met at Baltimore, June 9th, adopted these candidates, with the "platform" on which they were nominated. "A few recalcitrant Democrats met at Louisville, Ky., September 3d, and nominated Charles O'Connor, of New York, and John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, 2d ed., ch. 22.—The Prohibitionists put in nomination James Black, of Pennsylvania, for President, and John Russell, of Michigan, for Vice President. The Republican nominee for Vice President, on the ticket with General Grant, was Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts. The popular vote cast was 3,585,444, or 3,597,132, for Grant, and 2,843,563, or 2,834,125 for Greeley (according to the return that may be counted from Louisiana, where two rival returning boards disputed authority with one another); 29,489 for O'Connor and 5,608 for Black. Mr. Greeley died on the 29th of November, 1872, before the electoral colleges cast their vote, the consequence being that the Democratic votes in the colleges were scattered. The following is the electoral vote for President as counted by Congress: Grant, 286; Thomas A. Hendricks, 42; B. Gratz Brown 18; Charles J. Jenkins 2; David Davis, 1. The votes of Louisiana and Arkansas were rejected, as were three votes cast in Georgia for Horace Greeley, deceased.—E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 23.

ALSO IN: G. W. Julian, *Political Recollections*, ch. 15.—E. McPherson, *Handbook of Politics for 1872 and 1874*.

**A. D. 1872-1873.—The Credit Mobilier Scandal.** See CREDIT MOBILIER SCANDAL.

**A. D. 1873.—The so-called "demonetization of silver."**—"We have heard a great deal in later years about the surreptitious demonetization of silver in 1873. There was, however, vastly too much criticism wasted on the act of 1873; for the real demonetization of silver in the United States was accomplished in 1853. It was not the result of accident; it was a carefully considered plan, deliberately carried into legislation in 1853, twenty years before its nominal demonetization by the act of 1873. . . . In 1853 the single standard was gold. This was a situation which no one rebelled against. Indeed, no one seemed to regard it as anything else than good fortune (except so far as the subsidiary coins had disappeared). . . . In the debates it was proposed that, as the cause of the change in the relative values of gold and silver was the increased product of gold, the proper remedy should be to increase the quantity of gold in the gold coins. . . . There was no discussion as to how a readjustment of the ratio between the

two metals might be reached, for it was already decided that only one metal was to be retained. This decision, consequently, carried us to a point where the ratio between the two metals was not of the slightest concern. And so it remained. The United States had no thought about the ratios between gold and silver thereafter until the extraordinary fall in the value of silver in 1876. . . . In the provisions of the act of 1853 nothing whatever was said as to the silver dollar-piece. It had entirely disappeared from circulation years before, and acquiescence in its absence was everywhere found. No attempt whatever was thereafter made to change the legal ratio, in order that both metals might again be brought into concurrent circulation. Having enough gold, the country did not care for silver. . . . In 1873 we find a simple legal recognition of that which had been the immediate result of the act of 1853, and which had been an admitted fact in the history of our coinage during the preceding twenty years. In 1853 it had been agreed to accept the situation by which we had come to have gold for large payments, and to relegate silver to a limited service in the subsidiary coins. The act of 1873, however, dropped the dollar piece out of the list of silver coins. In discontinuing the coinage of the silver dollar, the act of 1873 thereby simply recognized a fact which had been obvious to everybody since 1849. It did not introduce anything new, or begin a new policy. Whatever is to be said about the demonetization of silver as a fact must center in the act of 1853. Silver was not driven out of circulation by the act of 1873, which omitted the dollar of 412½ grains, since it had not been in circulation for more than twenty-five years. . . . The act of February 12, 1873, is known as the act which demonetized the silver dollar. Important consequences have been attached to it, and it has even been absurdly charged that the law was the cause of the commercial crisis of September, 1873. As if a law which made no changes in the actual metallic standard in use, and which had been in use thus for more than twenty years, had produced a financial disaster in seven months! To any one who knows of the influence of credit and speculation, or who has followed the course of our foreign trade since the Civil War, such a theory is too absurd to receive more than passing mention. To the year 1873 there had been coined of 412½-grain dollars for purposes of circulation, only \$1,439,457, and these were coined before 1806."—J. L. Laughlin, *Hist. of Bimetallism in the U. S.*, pt. 1, ch. 5 and 7.—See, also, MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1848-1893.

**A. D. 1873.—The Panic.**—"The panic of 1873 differed very materially from the other great panics by which this country has been afflicted. Lack of capital was the main difficulty in 1837 and 1857. Population had increased so rapidly that millions of human beings were out of work, and apprehension spread lest there might not be food enough to go around. In 1873, however, men were well employed. Business of all kinds was in excellent condition, and no one doubted for a moment that there would be plenty for every man to eat. The excellent condition of trade, in fact, was the chief factor in the panic of 1873. Every one was busy, and wanted money with which to carry on his trade. For two years before the crash, money had been

in great demand. Railroads had recently been built to an extent such as this country had never known before. Whereas, in 1861, railroad construction amounted to only 651 miles, in 1871 it reached the then unprecedented figure of 7,779 miles. This new mileage, moreover, was mainly in the West, where the immediate remuneration was but slight. Railroads were being pushed forward into regions which could not be expected to return an income for twenty years. The cost of railroad construction in this country during the five years preceding September, 1873, was estimated by the Comptroller of the Currency at no less than \$1,700,000,000. The money to pay for this extravagant building was obtained, not from the earnings of the old portions of the road, but from enormous issues of railroad bonds, placed to a large extent among the banks of this country, but still more among the capitalists of Europe. In the Northern Pacific Company occurred the most flagrant abuse of railroad credit the world has ever known. . . . One after another of the Western roads defaulted in paying the interest on its bonds. The result was, that, by the summer of 1873, the market for new issues of railroad bonds had practically disappeared. Meantime the banks and bankers of New York were loaded down with railroad paper. The railroads had borrowed money for short periods in the expectation that before their notes fell due they would have raised the money to make payment by the sale of bonds. A temporary relief was felt, in June, 1873, through the customary midsummer ease in money. But this temporary respite only made the difficulty worse. Deluded by the momentary calm, the New York banks added still further to their loans. . . . The year before, money had grown tight early in September, and the more cautious banks began gradually to call their loans, fearing that the experience of 1872 might be renewed. But the rates for money did not noticeably increase, and the only cause for excitement early in the month was the failure, on September 8, of the Mercantile Warehouse and Security Company, owing to advances on bonds of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad. This was followed, on the 13th, by the failure of Kenyon Cox & Co., of which firm Daniel Drew was a member, caused by loans to the Canada Southern Railroad. By this time the sky was heavily overcast. Money was now advancing rapidly, the New York banks were calling loans on every hand, and new loans on railroad paper were scarcely to be had at all. Suddenly, on the 18th of September, the tempest burst. On the morning of that dark day, Jay Cooke, the agent of the U. S. Government, with some four millions of deposits from all parts of the country, and his fifteen millions of Northern Pacific paper, declared his inability to meet his debts. The report flew down 'the street' with the ferocity of a cyclone. Railroad shares were thrown upon the market by the bushel, in utter disregard of their intrinsic value. . . . Stock brokers continued to announce their failures all day long. Nothing seemed able to withstand the shock, and when, on September 19, the great banking house of Fisk & Hatch went under, terror became universal. A run was started on the Union Trust Co., which was believed to have close intimacy with Vanderbilt's railroads, and on the Fourth National Bank, whose dealings were

largely with Wall street brokers. The panic was by this time so general that the banks began to refuse one another's certified checks, and on the 20th a considerable number of the New York banks suspended payment. On that day the Union Trust Co., the National Trust Co., and the National Bank of the Commonwealth all closed their doors. At 11 o'clock on the 20th, the New York Stock Exchange, for the first time in its history, closed its doors, and the Governing Committee announced that the board would not be opened till further notice. This high-handed measure caused an outcry for the moment, but on calmer judgment it was generally conceded that the measure was a good one. On the evening of that Saturday, September 20, the Clearing House Association met and adopted a plan similar to that adopted in the panic of 1857, and in substance this: Any bank in the Clearing House Association might deposit with a committee of five persons, to be appointed for that purpose, an amount of its bills receivable, or other securities to be approved by the committee, and the committee were then to issue to that bank certificates of deposit, bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum, to an amount not exceeding 75 per cent. of the securities or bills receivable so deposited. These certificates could be used in settlement of balances at the Clearing House for a period not to extend beyond the 1st of the following November, and they were to be received by creditor banks during that period daily, in the proportion which they bore to the aggregate amount of the debtor balances paid at the Clearing House. The amount of certificates should not exceed \$10,000,000. The legal tenders belonging to the associated banks were to be considered and treated as a common fund held for mutual aid and protection, and the committee were given power to equalize the same by assessment or otherwise in their discretion. This scheme, simple as it was, proved of the utmost efficacy in mitigating the evils that must always follow a distrust among banks. The lull occasioned by the intervening Sunday was employed by President Grant and Secretary of the Treasury Richardson in a visit to New York. All day long they gave audience to business men at the Fifth Avenue Hotel. Suggestions of every description were offered as a remedy for the disease. The most feasible proposition, and that which was finally adopted, was the purchase of Government bonds. . . . Shortly after his return from the Fifth Avenue Hotel, Secretary Richardson announced his intention to buy Government bonds, and, in a few days, \$13,000,000 of the U. S. greenbacks were thus absorbed. . . . On Tuesday, September 30, the Stock Exchange was once more opened. It was expected on all hands that this would be the signal for another onslaught. But so general was this expectation that most persons refrained for the moment from offering their stocks. As a result, the market opened a trifle higher than it had closed ten days before. It continued to advance, moreover, till October 7. On that day a new decline set in, and on October 14 came a fearful drop, which carried prices lower than on September 20. From this reaction there was a gradual improvement till October 31, when the failure of Hoyt, Sprague & Co., the great mill owners of Providence and New York, once more shook the



market and brought stocks, on October 31 and November 1, to the lowest prices of the year. With those prices it became manifest that the panic had reached its end. Money had already begun to flow to New York both from Europe and from the West, and the public, tempted by the excessive decline in stocks, began to purchase freely. The result was a steady though gradual improvement through the remainder of the year."—*The Panic of 1873* (*Banker's Mag.*, Nov., 1891).

**A. D. 1875.—The Whisky Ring.** See WHISKY RING.

**A. D. 1875.—The second Civil Rights Bill and its declared unconstitutionality.**—"Congress, to give full effect to the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, passed an act in 1875, which provided that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and water, theatres and other places of public amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. . . . In 1883 the act was held unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment, says Bradley, J., does not 'invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation, but to provide modes of relief against State legislation or State action of the kinds referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws and the action of State officers, executive and judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3."—T. M. Cooley, *Constitutional Limitations which rest upon the Legislative Power of the States*, 6th ed., pp. 733-734 and foot-note.

**A. D. 1876.—Admission of Colorado into the Union.** See COLORADO: A. D. 1806-1876.

**A. D. 1876.—The Sioux War.—Battle of Little Big Horn.—Death of General Custer.**—Hostilities with a powerful confederation of Sioux or Dakota tribes of Indians, in the north-west, were brought about, in the spring of 1876, by gold discoveries in the Black Hills and the consequent rush of miners into the Indian reservation. To subdue the hostile Indians, three military expeditions were set in motion,—from Fort Fetterman, under General Crook, from Fort Ellis, in Montana, under General Gibbon, and from Bismarck, in Dakota, under General Terry. These were to converge on the upper waters of the Yellowstone, where Sitting Bull, the able chief of the Sioux, had his camp, in the valley of the small stream commonly known as the Little Big Horn. The Sioux warrior used the advantages of his central position like a Napoleon, striking his assailants in turn, as they came near, with far stronger forces than they knew him to possess. Crook was forced back; Gibbon was brought to a halt. Terry came last on the ground. His command included the famous Seventh Cavalry,—the regiment of General Custer. In ignorance of the surprising number of braves which Sitting Bull had collected, Custer was sent to make a

detour and attack the Indian camp from the rear. Doing so, on the 25th of June, he rode into a death trap. Five companies of the regiment, with its heroic commander at their head, were surrounded so overwhelmingly that not one man escaped. The remaining seven companies were too far from the others to cooperate in the attack. They fortified a bluff and held their ground until the 27th, when Terry and Gibbon came to their relief. The Indians retreated toward the mountains. The campaign was soon resumed, and prosecuted through the fall and winter, until Sitting Bull and some of his followers fled into British America and the remaining hostiles surrendered.—F. Whittaker, *Complete Life of General George A. Custer*, v. k. 8, ch. 4-5.

ALSO IN: J. F. Finerty, *War Path and Bivouac*, pt. 1.

**A. D. 1876.—The Centennial Exhibition at Philadelphia.**—In 1871, the Congress of the United States passed an act to provide for the commemoration, in 1876, of the centennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, by holding an exhibition, at Philadelphia, "of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures." The act created a commission, composed of one delegate from each state and territory of the United States, to which commission was committed the "exclusive control" of the contemplated exhibition; though the State of Pennsylvania was required to make provision for the erection of suitable buildings. "To the surprise of those writers who had contended that there would be no exhibits from abroad, there was shown a universal desire on the part of all nations to co-operate liberally in the World's Fair of 1876. These different governments appropriated large sums of money, selected as commissioners men of the highest standing, loaned to the exhibition their most valuable works of art, and in every sense indicated a desire on the part of the Old World to forget the past and to unite itself closely with the future of the New. Singular as it may seem, there was no disposition on the part of Congress to facilitate and aid in carrying out this grand enterprise. The money had to be raised by private subscription, from all sections of the United States, and it was only by a determined and persistent effort with Congress that at last a government loan was secured of \$1,500,000, which loan has been called up by the government and repaid since that time. The City of Philadelphia appropriated \$1,000,000 and the State of Pennsylvania \$1,500,000, and all other states, notably New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, New Hampshire, etc., subscribed to the stock issued by the Centennial Board of Finance. In 1873, the location so well known as Fairmount Park was selected for the exposition, and immediate possession given by the City of Philadelphia, free from all expense or charge, and who also liberally contributed to the success of the World's Fair 1876 by the erection of two magnificent bridges over the Schuylkill at a cost of over \$2,500,000, in addition to the various improvements made in Fairmount Park. . . . The total number of exhibitors at the World's Fair 1876 was estimated at 30,864, the United States heading the list with 8,175; Spain and her colonies, 3,822; Great Britain and colonies, 3,584; and Portugal, 2,462. . . .

The exhibition opened on the 10th of May, 1876, and from that time until Nov. 10, 1876, there were admitted a grand total of 9,910,966 persons, of whom 8,004,274 paid admission fees amounting to \$3,813,724.49."—*C. B. Norton, World's Fairs, ch. 6.*

**A. D. 1876-1877.—The Twenty-third Presidential Election and its disputed result.—The Electoral Commission.**—Four candidates for the Presidency were named and voted for by as many different parties in 1876, although the contest of the election was practically between the Republicans and Democrats, as in previous years. The former, after a prolonged struggle of rival factions, put in nomination ex-Governor Rutherford B. Hayes, of Ohio, with William A. Wheeler, of New York, for Vice President. The candidates of the Democratic party were ex-Governor Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for President, and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for Vice President. Before these nominations were made, the Prohibition Reform party and the party calling itself the Independent, but popularly known as the "Greenback party," had already brought candidates into the field. The first named put Green Clay Smith, of Kentucky and G. T. Stewart, of Ohio, in nomination; the nominees of the last named were Peter Cooper, of New York, and Samuel F. Cary, of Ohio. "Thirty-eight States participated in the election. Colorado had been admitted to the Union in August, 1876, and, in order to save an additional election, the choice of electors for that occasion was conferred upon the legislature. All the other States appointed them by popular vote. The polls had hardly closed on the day of election, the 7th of November, when the Democrats began to claim the presidency. The returns came in so unfavorably for the Republicans that there was hardly a newspaper organ of the party which did not, on the following morning, concede the election of Mr. Tilden. He was believed to have carried every Southern State, as well as New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The whole number of electoral votes was 369. If the above estimate were correct, the Democratic candidates would have 203 votes, and the Republican candidates 166 votes. But word was sent out on the same day from Republican headquarters at Washington that Hayes and Wheeler were elected by one majority; that the States of South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana had chosen Republican electors. Then began the most extraordinary contest that ever took place in the country. The only hope of the Republicans was in the perfect defence of their position. The loss of a single vote would be fatal. An adequate history of the four months between the popular election and the inauguration of Mr. Hayes, would fill volumes. Space can be given here for only a bare reference to some of the most important events. Neither party was over-scrupulous, and no doubt the acts of some members of each party were grossly illegal and corrupt. . . . In four States, South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, and Oregon, there were double returns. In South Carolina there were loud complaints that detachments of the army, stationed near the polls, had prevented a fair and free election. Although the board of State canvassers certified to the choice of the Hayes electors, who were chosen on the face of the returns, the Democratic candidates for

electors met on the day fixed for the meeting of electors and cast ballots for Tilden and Hendricks. In Florida there were allegations of fraud on both sides. The canvassing board and the governor certified to the election of the Hayes electors, but, fortified by a court decision in their favor, the Democratic electors also met and voted. In Louisiana there was anarchy. There were two governors, two returning boards, two sets of returns showing different results, and two electoral colleges. In Oregon the Democratic governor adjudged one of the Republican electors ineligible, and gave a certificate to the highest candidate on the Democratic list. The Republican electors, having no certificate from the governor, met and voted for Hayes and Wheeler. The Democratic elector, whose appointment was certified to by the governor, appointed two others to fill the vacancies, when the two Republican electors would not meet with him, and the three voted for Tilden and Hendricks. All of these cases were very complicated in their incidents, and a brief account which should convey an intelligible idea of what occurred is impossible. . . . Thus, for the first and only time in the history of the country, the election ended in such a way as to leave the result in actual doubt, and in two States the number of legal votes given for the electors was in dispute. . . . As soon as the electoral votes were cast it became a question of the very first importance how they were to be counted. It was evident that the Senate would refuse to be governed by the 22nd joint rule [under which no electoral vote to which any member of either House objected could be counted unless both Houses agreed to the counting of it]—in fact the Senate voted to rescind the rule,—and it was further evident that if the count were to take place in accordance with that rule it would result in throwing out electoral votes on both sides on the most frivolous pretexts. It was asserted by the Republicans that, under the Constitution, the President of the Senate alone had the right to count, in spite of the fact that the joint rule, the work of their party, had assumed the power for the two Houses of Congress. On the other hand, the Democrats, who had always denounced that rule as unconstitutional, now maintained that the right to count was conferred upon Congress. A compromise became necessary, and the moderate men on both sides determined to effect the establishment of a tribunal, as evenly divided politically as might be, which should decide all disputed questions so far as the Constitution gave authority to Congress to decide them. The outcome of their efforts was the Electoral Commission law of 1877," by which a Commission was created, consisting of fifteen members—the Senate appointing five from its own body, the House five, and four Associate-Justices of the Supreme Court, designated in the bill, appointing a fifth from the same court. The Senators selected were Edmunds, Morton, Frelinghuysen (Republicans), and Thurman and Bayard (Democrats). The Representatives were Payne, Huntton, Abbott (Democrats), and Garfield and Hoar (Republicans). The four Supreme Court Justices designated by the Act were Clifford, Field (Democrats), Strong and Miller (Republicans). They selected for the fifth member of the Commission Justice Bradley, who was a Republican. "The



natural choice of the justices would have been their associate, David Davis; but he had been elected only five days before as senator from Illinois, and it was regarded by him and by others as improper that he should serve. Thus the commission consisted of eight Republicans and seven Democrats. If Judge Davis had been selected, there would have been only seven Republicans, and the result of the operation of the law might have been different. . . . The count had begun on the first day of February, and the final vote upon Wisconsin was not reached until the early morning of March 2. As question after question was decided uniformly in favor of the Republicans, it became evident to the Democrats that their case was lost. They charged gross partisanship upon the Republican members of the Electoral Commission, in determining every point involved in the dual returns for their own party, though as a matter of fact there does not seem to have been much room for choice between the two parties on the score of partisanship. Each member of the commission favored by his vote that view which would result in adding to the electoral vote of his own party. But as the result of the count became more and more certainly a Republican triumph, the anger of the Democrats arose. Some of them were for discontinuing the count; and the symptoms of a disposition to filibuster so that there should be no declaration of the result gave reason for public disquietude. But the conservative members of the party were too patriotic to allow the failure of a law which they had been instrumental in passing to lead to anarchy or revolution, and they sternly discountenanced all attempts to defeat the conclusion of the count. The summing up of the votes [Hayes, 185; Tilden, 184], was read by Mr. Allison of Iowa, one of the tellers on the part of the Senate, at a little after four o'clock, on the morning of the 2d of March, amid great excitement. . . . Mr. Ferry thereupon declared Rutherford B. Hayes elected President, and William A. Wheeler Vice-President, of the United States. The decision was acquiesced in peaceably by the whole country, and by men of every party. But the Democrats have never ceased to denounce the whole affair as a fraud. . . . It is to be hoped that the patriotism of the American people and their love of peace may never again be put to such a severe test as was that of 1876 and 1877." According to the Democratic count, the popular vote stood: Tilden, 4,300,590; Hayes, 4,036,298; Cooper, 81,737; Smith, 9,522. The Republican count gave: Tilden, 4,285,992; Hayes, 4,033,768. —E. Stanwood, *Hist. of Presidential Elections*, ch. 24.

ALSO IN: C. A. O'Neil, *The Am. Electoral System*, ch. 20-21. —A. M. Gibson, *A Political Crime*.—*Congressional Record*, v. 5 (1877), pt. 1-2.

A. D. 1877.—Halifax Fishery Award. See FISHERIES, NORTH AMERICAN: A. D. 1877-1888.

A. D. 1877-1891.—The Farmers' Alliance. —The Farmers' Alliance "is the outcome of a movement which first culminated, shortly after the Civil War had ended, in the formation of the Patrons of Husbandry, or, as they were more commonly called, 'The Grange,' the object of which organization was the mutual protection of farmers against the encroachments of capital. The collapse of the Grange was due to a mistake it had made in not limiting its membership orig-

inally to those whose interests were agricultural. The first 'Alliance' was formed in Texas, to oppose the wholesale buying up of the public lands by private individuals. . . . For about ten years the Alliance remained a Southern organization. In 1887, about ten years after the first local Alliance in Texas was formed, and five after the State Alliance, the 'Farmers' Union' of Louisiana united with it, under the name of the 'Farmers' Alliance and Co-operative Union of America.' Branches were quickly established," in other Southern States. "Later in the same year, the 'Agricultural Wheel,' a similar society operating in the States of Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, was amalgamated with the Alliance, the new organization being called 'The Farmers' and Laborers' Union of America.' The spirit of the movement had simultaneously been embodied in the 'National Farmers' Alliance' of Illinois, which was started in 1877, and quickly extended into Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and Dakota. A minor organization, the 'Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association,' was started in 1887, in the southern part of Illinois. Finally, in 1889, at a meeting held in St. Louis, these different bodies were all practically formed into a union for political purposes, aiming at legislation in the interests of farmers and laborers; and the present name of the 'Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union' was chosen. . . . Its main professed object is the destruction of the money power in public affairs, and the opposition of all forms of monopoly. It demands the substitution of legal tender treasury notes for National bank notes; also an extension of the public currency sufficient for the transaction of all legitimate business, the money to be given to the people on security of their land, at the lowest rates consistent with the cost of making and handling it. It demands government control, not only of money, but of the means of transportation and every other public function."—*Quarterly Register of Current Hist.*, v. 1, p. 132.

ALSO IN: F. M. Drew, *The Present Farmers' Movement* (*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1891).—See, also, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A. D. 1866-1875.

A. D. 1878.—The Bland Silver Bill.—The act familiarly known as the Bland Bill was passed by Congress in 1878. "Although the silver dollar of which the coinage was resumed in 1878 dates back as a coin to the earlier days of the Republic, its reissue in that year marks a policy so radically new that the experience of previous years throws practically no light on its working. The act of 1878 provided for the purchase by the government, each month, of not less than two million dollars' worth, and not more than four million dollars' worth, of silver bullion, for coinage into silver dollars at the rate of 412½ grains of standard silver (or 371½ grains of fine silver) for each dollar. The amount of the purchases, within the specified limits, was left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. As every Secretary of the Treasury, throughout the period in which the act was in force, kept to the minimum amount, the practical result was a monthly purchase of two million dollars' worth of silver bullion. The act is sometimes described as having called for a monthly issue of two million silver dollars; but this was not the exact situation. The amount

of silver obtainable with two million dollars obviously varies according to the price of the metal in terms of the dollars with which the purchases are made. In February, 1878, when the first purchases were made, those dollars were the inconvertible United States notes, or greenbacks, worth something less than their face in gold. . . . When specie payments were resumed, on the first of January, 1879, and the greenbacks became redeemable in gold, the measure of value in the United States became gold, and the extent of the coinage of silver dollars under the act of 1878 became simply a question of how much silver bullion could be bought with two million dollars of gold. The price of silver in 1878 was, in terms of gold, not far from a dollar for an ounce of standard silver. After 1878 it went down almost steadily. . . . The silver dollar of 412½ grains contains less than an ounce (480 grains) of standard silver. The monthly purchase of two million dollars' worth of silver therefore yielded more than two million silver dollars, the amount being obviously greater as the price of silver went lower. On the average, the monthly yield was not far from two and a half millions of silver dollars. So much each month, therefore, or thirty millions of silver dollars a year, was roughly the addition to the currency of the community from the act of 1878. An important provision of the act of 1878 was that authorizing the issue of silver certificates against the deposit of silver dollars. . . . The dollars and certificates between them constitute what we may call the silver currency of the act of 1878. The passage of that act was due to causes easily described. It was part of the opposition to the contraction of the currency and the resumption of specie payments, which forms the most important episode of our financial history between 1867 and 1879. . . . No doubt some additional force was given to the movement in favor of the use of silver from the desire of the silver-mining States and their representatives, that the price of the metal should be kept up through a larger use of it for coinage. But this element, while sometimes prominent in the agitation, was not then, as it has not been in more recent years, of any great importance by itself. The real strength of the agitation for the wider use of silver as money comes from the conviction of large masses of the people that the community has not enough money."—F. W. Taussig, *The Silver Situation in the U. S.*, pt. 1.—See, also, *MONEY AND BANKING*: A. D. 1848-1893.

**A. D. 1880.—The Twenty-fourth Presidential Election.**—For the twenty-fourth Presidential election, in 1880, the Republicans, meeting at Chicago, June 2, named General James A. Garfield, of Ohio, as its candidate for President and Chester A. Arthur, of New York, for Vice President. The so-called Greenback party (which had appeared four years before, in the election of 1876), meeting at Chicago on the 9th of June, put in nomination, for President, James B. Weaver of Iowa, and, for Vice President, B. J. Chambers, of Texas. The main object and principle of the Greenback party was set forth in the following declarations of its platform: "That the right to make and issue money is a sovereign power to be maintained by the people for the common benefit. The delegation of this right to corporations is a surrender of the central attribute of sovereignty. . . . All money, whether

metallic or paper, should be issued and its volume controlled by the government, and not by or through banking corporations, and, when so issued, should be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private. . . . Legal tender currency [the greenback notes of the civil-war period] should be substituted for the notes of the national banks, the national banking system abolished, and the unlimited coinage of silver, as well as gold, established by law." The Prohibitionists (Temperance), in convention at Cleveland, June 17, nominated Neal Dow, of Maine, for President, and A. M. Thompson, of Ohio, for Vice President. On the 22d of June, at Cincinnati, the Democratic party held its convention and nominated General Winfield S. Hancock, of Pennsylvania, for President, and William H. English, of Indiana, for Vice President. At the election, in November, the popular vote cast was 4,454,416 for Garfield, 4,444,952 for Hancock, 308,578 for Weaver, and 10,305 for Dow. The electoral votes were divided between Garfield and Hancock, being 214 for the former and 155 for the latter. Every former slave-state was carried by the Democratic party, together with New Jersey, California and Nevada.—E. McPherson, *Handbook of Politics for 1880 and 1882*.

ALSO IN: J. C. Ridpath, *Life and Work of James A. Garfield*, ch. 10-11.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, ch. 29.

**A. D. 1880.—The Tenth Census.**—Total population, 50,155,783 (exceeding that of 1870 by 11,597,412), classed and distributed as follows:

#### North Atlantic division.

	White.	Black.
Maine . . . . .	646,852	1,451
New Hampshire . . . . .	346,229	685
Vermont . . . . .	331,218	1,057
Massachusetts . . . . .	1,763,782	18,697
Rhode Island . . . . .	269,939	6,488
Connecticut . . . . .	610,769	11,547
New York . . . . .	5,016,022	65,104
New Jersey . . . . .	1,092,017	38,853
Pennsylvania . . . . .	4,197,016	85,535
	14,273,844	229,417

#### South Atlantic division.

Delaware . . . . .	120,160	26,442
Maryland . . . . .	724,693	210,230
District of Columbia . . . . .	118,006	59,596
Virginia . . . . .	880,858	631,616
West Virginia . . . . .	592,537	25,886
North Carolina . . . . .	867,242	531,277
South Carolina . . . . .	391,105	604,332
Georgia . . . . .	816,906	725,133
Florida . . . . .	142,605	126,690
	4,654,112	2,941,202

#### North Central division.

Ohio . . . . .	3,117,920	79,900
Indiana . . . . .	1,938,798	39,228
Illinois . . . . .	3,031,151	46,368
Michigan . . . . .	1,614,560	15,100
Wisconsin . . . . .	1,309,618	2,702
Minnesota . . . . .	776,884	1,564
Iowa . . . . .	1,614,600	9,516
Missouri . . . . .	2,022,826	145,350
Dakota . . . . .	133,147	401
Nebraska . . . . .	449,764	2,385
Kansas . . . . .	952,155	43,107
	16,961,423	385,621



## South Central division.

	White.	Black.
Kentucky.....	1,377,179	271,451
Tennessee.....	1,138,831	403,151
Alabama.....	662,185	600,103
Mississippi.....	479,398	650,291
Louisiana.....	454,954	483,655
Texas.....	1,197,237	393,384
Arkansas.....	591,531	210,666
	5,901,315	3,012,701

## Western division.

Montana.....	35,385	346
Wyoming.....	19,437	298
Colorado.....	191,126	2,435
New Mexico.....	108,721	1,015
Arizona.....	35,160	155
Utah.....	142,423	232
Nevada.....	53,556	488
Idaho.....	29,013	53
Washington.....	67,199	325
Oregon.....	163,075	487
California.....	767,181	6,018
	1,612,276	11,852

Grand total..... 43,402,970 6,580,793

In addition the census shows 105,465 Chinese, 148 Japanese, and 66,407 civilized Indians, making a total of 50,155,783, as stated above. The immigrants arriving in the country during the preceding ten years numbered 2,944,695, of whom 989,163 were from the British Islands and 1,357,801 from other parts of Europe.

A. D. 1881.—The brief administration of President Garfield.—His assassination.—“President Hayes had left the new administration a heritage of hatred from the Stalwart element of the Republican party. It was President Garfield’s chief wish, politically, to heal up the chasm which the past had opened, and not to recognize one faction more than another. . . . The defeat of the Stalwarts at Chicago [see STALWARTS AND HALF-BREEDS], by Garfield, naturally tended to transfer their hostility from the outgoing to the incoming President. For months before the inauguration, the embarrassment which threatened Garfield was foreseen by the country.” The inevitable outbreak of hostilities occurred the moment that the President made a nomination in New York which was distasteful to the arrogant Senator from that State, Roscoe Conkling, who imperiously led the Stalwart forces. This happened upon the presentation of the name of William H. Robertson for Collector of the Port of New York. In order to force a division in the Republican party upon the quarrel between himself and President Garfield, Senator Conkling resigned his seat in the Senate of the United States and presented himself to the Legislature of New York as a candidate for re-election. He counted, without doubt, upon an easy triumph, expecting to be returned to Washington, bearing the mandate of his party, so to speak, and humbling the President into submissive obedience to his behests. He was disappointed; his re-election was defeated; but the furious contest which went on during some weeks, engendered bitter passions, which had their effect, no doubt, in producing the awful tragedy that soon ensued. By the end of June the clamor of the strife had greatly subsided; the Senate had adjourned, and the weary President made ready

to join Mrs. Garfield at Long Branch, where she was just recovering from a serious illness. “On the morning of the 2d of July . . . the President made ready to put his purpose into execution. Several members of the Cabinet, headed by Secretary Blaine, were to accompany him to Long Branch. A few ladies, personal friends of the President’s family, and one of his sons, were of the company; and as the hour for departure drew near they gathered at the dépôt of the Baltimore and Potomac Railway to await the train. The President and Secretary Blaine were somewhat later than the rest. . . . When the carriage arrived at the station at half-past nine o’clock, the President and Mr. Blaine left it and entered the ladies’ waiting-room, which they passed through arm in arm. A moment afterwards, as they were passing through the door into the main room, two pistol shots suddenly rang out upon the air. Mr. Blaine saw a man running, and started toward him, but turned almost immediately and saw that the President had fallen. It was instantly realized that the shots had been directed with fatal accuracy at the beloved President. Mr. Blaine sprang toward him, as did several others, and raised his head from the floor. . . . A moment after the assassin was discovered . . . and, in the middle of B Street, just outside of the dépôt, was seized by the policemen and disarmed. A pistol of very heavy caliber was wrenched out of his hand, and it became clear that a large ball had entered the President’s body. The assassin gave his name as Charles Jules Guiteau. . . . [He] was found to be a mixture of fool and fanatic, who, in his previous career, had managed to build up, on a basis of total depravity, a considerable degree of scholarship. He was a lawyer by profession, and had made a pretense of practicing in several places—more particularly in Chicago. . . . In the previous spring, about the time of the inauguration, he had gone to Washington to advance a claim to be Consul-General at Paris. . . . Hanging about the Executive Mansion and the Department of State for several weeks, he seemed to have conceived an intense hatred of the President, and to have determined on the commission of the crime.” The wounded President lingered for eighty days, during which long period of suffering there were many alternations of hope and fear in his case. He died on the 19th of September. His assassin was tried and executed for the crime, though much doubt of his sanity exists. The Vice-President, Chester A. Arthur, became President for the remainder of the term.—J. C. Ridpath, *Life and Work of James A. Garfield*, ch. 12–13.

A. D. 1882.—Passage of the Edmunds Bill, to suppress Polygamy in Utah. See UTAH: A. D. 1882–1893.

A. D. 1883.—Passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Bill. See CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES.

A. D. 1884.—Financial Disasters.—“The month of May, 1884, concludes the prosperous period which followed the crisis of 1873. During this period the most gigantic speculations in railroads occurred; the zenith of the movement was in 1880, and as early as 1881 a retrograde movement began, only to end in the disasters in question. The decline in prices had been steady for three years; they had sunk little by little under the influence of a ruinous competition, caused by the number of new lines and the

lowering of rates, but above all through the manipulations by the managers on a scale unexampled until now. In connection with the disasters of May, 1884, the names of certain speculators who misused other people's money, such as Ward, of Grant & Ward; Fish, President of the Marine Bank; and John C. Eno, of the Second National Bank, will long be remembered. General Grant, who was a silent partner in Ward's concern, was an innocent sufferer, both in fortune and reputation."—C. Juglar, *Brief Hist. of Panics*, pp. 102-103.

**A. D. 1884.—The Twenty-fifth Presidential Election.—Appearance of the Independents or "Mugwumps."**—James G. Blaine, of Maine, and General John A. Logan, of Illinois, nominated at Chicago, June 3, were the Republican candidates for President and Vice President, in the election of 1884. The Democratic National Convention, held, likewise, at Chicago, July 8, put forward Governor Grover Cleveland, of New York, as its candidate for President, with Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for Vice President. General Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, and General A. M. West, of Mississippi, received double nominations, from the National or Greenback party and an Anti-Monopoly party (so-called) for President and Vice President, respectively; while the Prohibitionists put in nomination John P. St. John, of Kansas, and William Daniel, of Maryland. The election was an exceedingly close one, its result turning upon a plurality of only 1,149 in New York, by which that state was given to Cleveland, with its 36 electoral votes, securing his election. The total popular vote counted as follows: Cleveland, 4,874,986; Blaine, 4,851,981; Butler, 175,370; St. John, 150,369. The electoral vote was divided between Cleveland and Blaine, 219 for the former and 182 for the latter. —E. McPherson, *Hand-book of Politics*, 1884 and 1886. —*Annual Cyclopædia*, 1884. —"At the presidential election of 1884 a section of the Republican party, more important by the intelligence and social position of the men who composed it than by its voting power, 'bolted' (to use the technical term) from their party, and refused to support Mr. Blaine. Some simply abstained, some, obeying the impulse to vote which is strong in good citizens in America, voted for Mr. St. John, the Prohibitionist candidate, though well aware that this was practically the same thing as abstention. The majority, however, voted against their party for Mr. Cleveland, the Democratic candidate; and it seems to have been the transference of their vote which turned the balance in New York State, and thereby determined the issue of the whole election in Mr. Cleveland's favour." This group "goes by the name of Mugwumps. . . . The name is said to be formed from an Indian word denoting a chief or aged wise man, and was applied by the 'straight-out' Republicans to their bolting brethren as a term of ridicule. It was then taken up by the latter as a term of compliment; though the description they used formally in 1884 was that of 'Independent Republicans.' . . . The chief doctrine they advocate is . . . the necessity of reforming the civil service by making appointments without reference to party, and a general reform in the methods of politics by selecting men for Federal, State, and municipal offices, with reference rather to personal

fitness than to political affiliations."—J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (3d ed., rev.), ch. 56, with foot-note (v. 2).

**A. D. 1885-1888.—Termination of the Fishery Articles of the Treaty of Washington. —Renewed controversies. —The rejected Treaty.** See FISHERIES, NORTH AMERICAN: A. D. 1877-1888.

**A. D. 1886.—Act to provide successions to the Presidency in case of death.**—"An act of 1791 provided that in case of the death, resignation, or disability of both president and vice-president, the succession should devolve first upon the president pro tempore of the Senate and then upon the speaker of the House of Representatives, until the disability should be removed or a new election be held. But supposing a newly elected president to die and be succeeded by the vice-president before the assembling of the newly elected Congress; then there would be no president pro tempore of the Senate and no speaker of the House of Representatives, and thus the death of one person might cause the presidency to lapse. Moreover the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress might be members of the party defeated in the last presidential election; indeed, this is often the case. Sound policy and fair dealing require that a victorious party shall not be turned out because of the death of the president and vice-president. Accordingly an act of 1886 provided that in such an event the succession should devolve upon the members of the cabinet in the following order: secretary of state, secretary of the treasury, secretary of war, attorney-general, postmaster-general, secretary of the navy, secretary of the interior. This would seem to be ample provision against a lapse."—J. Fiske, *Civil Government in the United States*, ch. 8.

**A. D. 1886-1887.—Repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act.**—The question of the force and validity of the Tenure-of-office Act [see A. D. 1866-1867 (DEC.—MARCH)] in its interference with the power of the Executive to make removals from office, was brought to a sharp issue with the Senate by President Cleveland. He had suspended from office a district attorney in Alabama, and the Senate, when Congress came together, called on him for the grounds of his action, and for the papers relating to the case. He refused to comply with the demand in an able message, which strenuously asserted that the accountability of the President for such action was to the people alone. "On behalf of the President it was contended that his power of removal was absolute and not in any way subject to the consent of the Senate; that the Senate had no right to call for papers relating to a subject as to which it could take no action, and that the papers relating to suspensions were not official but were private. . . . On behalf of the Senate it was contended that the power of removal was not involved; that the suspensions and the appointments under consideration were made under the Tenure-of-office Act, and were expressly referred, by the President in the nomination messages, to that law; that under that law the removal of an officer was subject to the approval of the Senate; that such officer would resume his office, if the Senate took no action, at the end of the session; that the removal of an officer and the appointment of a successor were connected subjects, to be considered together;



that the right of the Houses of Congress to be informed as to the acts of the Executive Department could not be limited as claimed; and, finally, that the particular resolution called for papers relating to the management of his office by the officer suspended, which was a proper subject of inquiry."—B. Harrison, *This Country of Ours*, ch. 6.—The effect of the discussion raised was to bring about, in March, 1887, the passage of a bill repealing the Tenure-of-office Act.—Grover Cleveland, *The Independence of the Executive* (*Atlantic Monthly*, June-July, 1900).

**A. D. 1886-1893.—The Bering Sea controversy and arbitration.**—"Four serious international controversies have arisen out of the rival claims of Russia, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States to the shores and waters of the northwest coast of the continent of North America. The first of these was in consequence of an attempt of the Spanish Government, in 1790, to prevent the British from trading with the natives of that coast. It was settled by the Nootka Sound Convention of October 28, 1790, by which the subjects of both powers enjoyed equal privileges of trade to all points not already occupied. The second controversy was the result of an attempt of Russia in 1821 to prohibit England and the United States from trading anywhere north of the 51st parallel, or to approach within 100 Italian miles of the coast. Both governments energetically protested and secured treaties in 1824 and 1825, by which they retained the right of fishing and of landing on unoccupied points of that coast. The third controversy was as to the division of the coast between Great Britain and the United States, Spain having by the treaties of 1824 and 1825 accepted the parallel of 54° 40' as her southern boundary. The rival claims of the two remaining powers, after long diplomatic discussion, were settled by the treaty of July 17, 1846, according to which the parallel of 49° was made the dividing line. By the treaty of March 30, 1867, with Russia, all the dominions and claims of that country on the continent of North America and the outlying islands thereof were transferred to the United States. A further, and still pending, controversy arose in 1886 through the seizure by United States vessels of Canadian vessels engaged in the taking of seals in waters not far distant from the Aleutian Islands. The claim of the United States was that it had acquired from Russia exclusive rights in Behring Sea, at least with regard to seal fishing. The British Government representing the Canadians denied that there could be any exclusive rights outside three miles off shore. By an agreement of February 29, 1893, the question has been submitted to arbitration," the arbitrators to give "a distinct decision" upon each of the following five points: "1. What exclusive jurisdiction in the sea now known as the Behring's Sea, and what exclusive rights in the seal fisheries therein, did Russia assert and exercise prior and up to the time of the cession of Alaska to the United States? 2. How far were these claims of jurisdiction as to the seal fisheries recognized and conceded by Great Britain? 3. Was the body of water now known as the Behring's Sea included in the phrase 'Pacific Ocean,' as used in the treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia, and what rights, if

any, in the Behring's Sea, were held and exclusively exercised by Russia after said treaty? 4. Did not all the rights of Russia as to the jurisdiction and as to the seal fisheries in Behring's Sea east of the water boundary, in the treaty between the United States and Russia of the 30th of March, 1867, pass unimpaired to the United States under that treaty? 5. Has the United States any right, and if so, what right, of protection or property in the fur-seals frequenting the islands of the United States in Behring's Sea, when such seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit?"—*American History Leaflets*, no. 6.—The arbitrators to whom these points of the question were submitted under the treaty were seven in number, as follows: Justice John M. Harlan, of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama, appointed by the United States; Rt. Hon. Lord Hannan, and Sir John S. D. Thompson, Prime Minister of Canada, appointed by Great Britain; Senator Baron Alphonse de Courcelles, formerly French Ambassador at Berlin, appointed by the French government; Senator Marquis E. Visconti Venosta, appointed by the Italian government; and Judge Mons. Gregers Gram, Minister of State, appointed by the government of Sweden. The Court of Arbitration met at Paris, beginning its sessions on March 23, 1893. The award of the Tribunal, signed on the 15th of August, 1893, decided the five points submitted to it, as follows: (1) That Russia did not, after 1825, assert or exercise any exclusive jurisdiction in Bering Sea, or any exclusive rights in the seal fisheries; (2) that no such claims on the part of Russia were recognized or conceded by England; (3) that the body of water now known as Bering Sea was included in the phrase "Pacific Ocean," as used in the treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia, and that no exclusive rights of jurisdiction in Bering Sea or as to the seal fisheries there were held or exercised by Russia after the treaty of 1825; (4) that all the rights of Russia as to jurisdiction and the seal fisheries in Bering Sea east of the water boundary did pass unimpaired to the United States under the treaty of March 30, 1867; (5) that the United States has not any right of protection or property in the fur seals frequenting the islands of the United States in Bering Sea, when such seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit. Mr. Morgan alone dissented from the decision rendered on the first and second points, and on the second division of the third point. Justice Harlan and Mr. Morgan both dissented on the fifth point. On the fourth point, and on the first division of the third, the decision was unanimous. These points of controversy disposed of, the Arbitrators proceeded to prescribe the regulations which the Governments of the United States and Great Britain shall enforce for the preservation of the fur seal. The regulations prescribed prohibit the killing, capture or pursuit of fur seals, at any time or in any manner, within a zone of sixty miles around the Pribilof Islands; prohibit the same from May 1 to July 31 in all the part of the Pacific Ocean, inclusive of Bering Sea, which is north of 35° north latitude and eastward of the 180th degree of longitude from Greenwich till it strikes the water boundary described in Article I. of the Treaty of 1867 between the United States and Russia; and following that line up to Bering

Straits; allow only sailing vessels, with licenses, to take part in fur seal fishing operations, and forbid the use of nets, firearms and explosives, except as to shot guns outside of Bering Sea. As promulgated, the Award bore the signatures of all the Arbitrators.—*The Behring Sea Arbitration: Letters to The Times.*

**A. D. 1887.—The Electoral Count Act.**—To avoid the recurrence of any such dangerous question as that which arose in 1876, relative to the counting of electoral votes for President and Vice-President (see A. D. 1876-1877), Congress passed an Act, approved Feb. 3, 1887, which provides that any contest regarding the choice of electors must be decided, as provided by the laws of the State, at least six days before the meeting of the electors on the second Monday in January; that a certificate of election must be issued by the State Executive in triplicate to the electors and transmitted by them to the President of the Senate with their votes for President and Vice-President; that objection to the reception of any return must be in writing, and signed by one member of each House. In the language of the Act: "No electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified to, according to Section 3 of this Act, from which but one return has been received, shall be rejected, but the two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that such vote or votes have not been so regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certified. If more than one return, or paper purporting to be a return, from a State shall have been received by the President of the Senate, those votes, and those only, shall be counted which shall have been regularly given by the electors who are shown by the determination mentioned in Section 2 of this Act to have been appointed, if the determination in said section provided for shall have been made. . . . But in case there shall arise the question which of two or more of such State authorities determining what electors have been appointed, as mentioned in Section 2 of this Act, is the lawful tribunal of such State, the votes regularly given of those electors, and those only, of such State shall be counted whose title as electors the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide is supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its laws. And in such case of more than one return, or paper purporting to be a return, from a State, if there shall have been no such determination of the question in the State aforesaid, then those votes, and those only, shall be counted which the two Houses shall concurrently decide were cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with the laws of the State, unless the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide such votes not to be the lawful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State." If the two Houses disagree, the votes of those electors holding the certificate of the State Executive shall be counted.

**A. D. 1887.—Inter-State Commerce Act.**—By an Act of Congress approved February 4, 1887, the railroads of the country passing through more than one State were placed under the supervision of the general government in certain particulars. The Act forbade special rates to special shippers, and the charging for the carriage of passengers or a given class of freight—con-

ditions being the same—any greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul over the same line in the same direction.

**A. D. 1887-1888.—Tariff Message of President Cleveland.**—Attempted revision of the Tariff.—Defeat of the Mills Bill. See **TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1884-1888.**

**A. D. 1888.—The Twenty-sixth Presidential election.**—President Cleveland was nominated for re-election by the Democratic National Convention, held at St. Louis, June 5, with Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, for Vice President. The Republican Convention, at Chicago, June 19, named Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, for President, and Levi P. Morton, of New York, for Vice President. At Indianapolis, May 30, the Prohibition party had already put in nomination General Clinton B. Fisk, of New Jersey, and John A. Brooks, of Missouri, for President and Vice President, respectively. The Union Labor Party, convening at Cincinnati, May 15, had nominated Alson J. Streeter, of Illinois, and Charles E. Cunningham, of Arkansas; the United Labor Party, a rival organization, had put forward Robert H. Cowdrey, of Illinois, and William H. T. Wakefield, of Kansas; and still another labor ticket had been brought forward in February, at Washington, where an organization calling itself the Industrial Reform party, put Albert E. Redstone, of California, and John Colvin, of Kansas, in nomination. At Des Moines, Iowa, May 15, the National Equal Rights party had named a woman for the Presidency, in the person of Mrs. Belya Lockwood, of Washington, with Alfred H. Love, of Philadelphia, named for Vice President. Finally, in August, an organization attempting to revive the American Party of former days, convening at Washington, presented James L. Curtis, of New York, for President, and James R. Greer of Tennessee (who declined the honor) for Vice President. In the ensuing election, the popular vote was distributed as follows: Cleveland 5,540,329; Harrison, 5,439,853; Fisk, 249,506; Streeter, 146,935; Cowdrey, 2,818; Curtis, 1,591. Notwithstanding the greater number of votes cast for Cleveland (his plurality being 100,476), Harrison was chosen President by the electoral votes, receiving 233, while 168 were given for Cleveland.—*Appletons' Annual Cyclopædia*, 1888, pp. 773-782, and 799-828.

**A. D. 1889-1890.—The opening of Oklahoma.—The Johnstown Flood.—The Pan-American Congress.—Admission of seven new States.**—"In the centre of Indian Territory there is a large district called, in the Indian language, Oklahoma, or the 'Beautiful Land.' This tract was finally purchased from the Indians by the United States, early in 1889. On the 22d of April, of that year, some 50,000 persons were waiting impatiently on the borders of Oklahoma for President Harrison's signal, giving them permission to enter and take up lands in the coveted region. At precisely twelve o'clock, noon, of that day, the blast of a bugle announced that Oklahoma was open to settlement. Instantly an avalanche of human beings rushed wildly across the line, each one eager to get the first chance. Towns made of rough board-shanties and of tents sprang up in all directions. The chief of these were Oklahoma City and Guthrie. At the end of four months, the latter had a population of about 5,000, with four daily



papers and six banks; and arrangements, doubtless since completed, were being made to start a line of street cars, and light the city with electricity. A week after the opening of Oklahoma, the centennial anniversary of the inauguration of Washington, and of the beginning of our government under the Constitution, was celebrated in New York City [April 29—May 1]. . . . In a little less than a month from that occasion, the most terrible disaster of the kind ever known in our history occurred (May 31, 1889) in Western Pennsylvania. By the breaking of a dam, a body of water forty feet high and nearly half a mile in width swept down through a deep and narrow valley. In less than fifteen minutes, the flood had traversed a distance of eighteen miles. In that brief time, it dashed seven towns out of existence, and ended by carrying away the greater part of Johnstown. The whole valley at that place was choked with ruins; at least 5,000 persons lost their lives, and property worth ten million dollars was utterly destroyed. In the autumn (October 2, 1889), representatives of the leading governments of Central and of South America, together with the Republic of Mexico, met representatives chosen by the United States in a conference or congress held at Washington. The object of the congress was to bring about a closer union of the Americas, for purposes of trade, and of mutual advantage. The delegates spent six weeks in visiting the principal commercial and manufacturing cities of the United States. They then returned to Washington, and devoted the greater part of the remainder of the year and part of 1890 to the discussion of business."—D. H. Montgomery, *Leading Facts of Am. History*, sect. 390-392.—"An act to provide for the division of Dakota into two States, and to enable the people of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, to form constitutions and State governments . . . was approved by President Cleveland, February 22, 1889. This act provided that the Territory of Dakota should be divided on the line of the seventh standard parallel. . . . On the 4th of July, 1889, the four conventions assembled—for North Dakota at Bismarck, for South Dakota at Sioux Falls, for Montana at Helena, and for Washington at Olympia."—F. N. Thorpe, *Recent Constitution-making in the U. S. (Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Sept., 1891)*.—Acceptable constitutions having been framed and adopted in the several proposed new states, North Dakota and South Dakota were admitted to the Union by proclamation of President Harrison, November 3, 1889, Montana, November 8, and Washington, November 11, in the same year. "Early in the session of the fifty-first Congress, Wyoming presented her claims for Statehood, asking for admission to the Union under the Constitution of September, 1889, which was adopted by the people on Nov. 5 following. The bill for admission passed the House of Representatives on March 27, 1890, passed the Senate on June 27, and received the President's signature on July 10. By its terms Wyoming became a state from and after the date of the President's approval." Idaho had previously been admitted, by a bill which received the President's signature on the 3d of July, 1890.—*Appletons' Annual Cyclopædia*, 1890 and 1889.

**A. D. 1890.—McKinley Tariff Act.** See **TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1890.**

**A. D. 1890.—The Eleventh Census.—Total population 62,622,250 (exceeding that of 1880 by 12,466,467, classed and distributed as follows:**

North Atlantic division.		
	White.	Black.
Maine . . . . .	659,268	1,190
New Hampshire . . . . .	375,840	614
Vermont . . . . .	331,418	937
Massachusetts . . . . .	2,215,373	22,144
Rhode Island . . . . .	337,859	7,393
Connecticut . . . . .	733,438	12,302
New York . . . . .	5,923,952	70,092
New Jersey . . . . .	1,396,581	47,638
Pennsylvania . . . . .	5,148,257	107,596
	17,121,981	269,906
South Atlantic division.		
Delaware . . . . .	140,066	28,386
Maryland . . . . .	826,493	215,657
District of Columbia . . . . .	154,695	75,572
Virginia . . . . .	1,020,122	635,438
West Virginia . . . . .	730,077	32,690
North Carolina . . . . .	1,055,382	561,018
South Carolina . . . . .	462,008	688,934
Georgia . . . . .	978,357	858,815
Florida . . . . .	224,949	166,180
	5,592,149	3,262,690
North Central division.		
Ohio . . . . .	3,584,805	87,113
Indiana . . . . .	2,146,736	45,215
Illinois . . . . .	3,768,472	57,028
Michigan . . . . .	2,072,884	15,223
Wisconsin . . . . .	1,680,473	2,444
Minnesota . . . . .	1,296,159	3,683
Iowa . . . . .	1,901,086	10,685
Missouri . . . . .	2,528,458	150,184
North Dakota . . . . .	182,123	373
South Dakota . . . . .	327,290	541
Nebraska . . . . .	1,046,888	8,913
Kansas . . . . .	1,376,553	49,710
	21,911,927	431,112
South Central division.		
Kentucky . . . . .	1,590,462	268,071
Tennessee . . . . .	1,336,637	430,678
Alabama . . . . .	833,718	678,489
Mississippi . . . . .	544,851	742,559
Louisiana . . . . .	558,395	559,193
Texas . . . . .	1,745,935	488,171
Oklahoma . . . . .	58,826	2,973
Arkansas . . . . .	818,752	309,117
	7,487,576	3,479,251
Western division.		
Montana . . . . .	127,271	1,490
Wyoming . . . . .	59,275	922
Colorado . . . . .	404,468	6,215
New Mexico . . . . .	142,719	1,956
Arizona . . . . .	55,580	1,357
Utah . . . . .	205,899	588
Nevada . . . . .	39,084	242
Idaho . . . . .	82,018	201
Washington . . . . .	340,513	1,602
Oregon . . . . .	301,758	1,186
California . . . . .	1,111,672	11,322
	2,870,257	27,081
<b>Grand total . . . . .</b>	<b>54,983,890</b>	<b>7,470,040</b>

In addition the census shows 107,475 Chinese, 2,039 Japanese, and 58,806 civilized Indians, making a total of 62,622,250, as stated above.

Immigration in the preceding decade rose to 5,246,613 in the total arrivals, 1,462,839 being from the British Islands and 3,258,743 from other European countries. In the single year ending June 30, 1890, the immigrants arriving from Europe numbered 443,225 (273,104 males, 170,121 females), of whom 57,020 were from England; 53,024 from Ireland; 12,041 from Scotland; 92,427 from Germany; 22,062 from Hungary; 11,073 from Poland; 33,147 from Russia; 51,799 from Italy; 29,632 from Sweden; 11,370 from Norway; 9,366 from Denmark; 6,585 from France.

**A. D. 1890-1893.—The Silver Bill and its effect.—Financial Panic.—Extra Session of Congress.—Repeal of the Sherman Act.**—“The act of July 14, 1890 [known as the Sherman Act], repealed the silver act of 1878, and so brought to a close the precise experiment tried under that measure. . . . But the new act . . . is even more remarkable than that of 1878. It is unique in monetary history. It provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall purchase each month at the market price four and a half million ounces of silver bullion. In payment he shall issue Treasury notes of the United States, in denominations of between one dollar and one thousand dollars. These Treasury notes, unlike the old silver certificates, are a direct legal tender for all debts, public or private, unless a different medium is expressly stipulated in the contract. They differ from the silver certificates in another respect; they are redeemable either in gold or silver coin, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. The indirect process of redemption which, as we have seen, was applied to the silver certificates, is replaced for the new notes by direct redemption. The avowed object is to keep the silver money equal to gold, for it is declared to be ‘the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals at a parity with each other on the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law.’ The act of 1878 is repealed; but the coinage of two million ounces of silver into dollars is to be continued for a year (until July 1, 1891). Thereafter it is directed that only so many silver dollars shall be coined as may be needed for redeeming any Treasury notes presented for redemption. Practically, this means that the coinage shall cease; redemption in silver dollars will not be called for. The coinage of silver dollars accordingly was suspended by the Treasury on July 1, 1891; a change which was the occasion of some vociferous abuse and equally vociferous praise, but which in reality was of no consequence whatever. The monthly issues of the new Treasury notes vary, like those of the old silver certificates, with the price of silver. But the new issues vary directly with the price of silver, while, as we have seen, the old issues varied inversely with the price. The volume of Treasury notes issued is equal to the market price of four and one half million ounces of silver. If silver sells at \$1.20 an ounce, the monthly issue of notes will be \$5,400,000; if at \$1.00 an ounce, \$4,500,000. For a month or two after the passage of the act, the price of silver advanced rapidly, and at its highest, in August, 1890, touched \$1.21. But the rise proved to be

but temporary. After September a steady decline set in, and continued almost without interruption through the rest of 1890, through 1891, and through 1892. The year 1891 opened with silver at a price of about \$1.00 an ounce; by the close of the year the price had fallen to about 95 cents. In 1892 a still further and more marked decline set in, and by the close of the year the price had gone as low as 85 cents.”—F. W. Taussig, *The Silver Situation in the U. S.*, ch. 6. —“On June 5 [1893] President Cleveland publicly declared his purpose to call an extra session of Congress to meet in the first half of September for the consideration of the country's financial conditions, which seemed critical. On the 26th of June the authorities of India closed the mints in that empire to the free coinage of silver. The signs of a panic immediately multiplied and four days later appeared the president's proclamation summoning Congress to meet in extra session August 7. The call was based on the ‘perilous condition in business circles,’ which was declared to be largely the result of a ‘financial policy . . . embodied in unwise laws, which must be executed until repealed by Congress.’ The issue of this proclamation was the signal for much excitement among the Populists and in silver-producing circles. Silver conventions were held in Denver, July 11, and in Chicago, August 2, in which addresses were made and resolutions adopted denouncing with much energy any proposition to repeal the Sherman Act without some provision for the free coinage of silver, and claiming that the existing financial crisis was a deliberately devised scheme of British and American bankers, with President Cleveland as their ally, to bring about the exclusion of silver from use as money. The president's message, presented to the houses August 8, brought the question before Congress. The message embodied an exposition of what Mr. Cleveland considered the evils of the Sherman Act, concluding with an earnest recommendation that its purchase clause be immediately repealed. While still holding that tariff reform was imperatively demanded, the president considered that it should be postponed to action on the silver law. In Congress the silver men, without reference to party lines, took an attitude of energetic resistance to any project for unconditional repeal of the purchase clause.”—*Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1893.—In the House, the resistance was soon overcome by strong pressure of unmistakable public opinion, and the repeal was carried on the 28th of August. In the Senate the Silver faction proved so much stronger that it blocked the bill until the end of October, indifferent to the ruinous effect which this action was having on the business and the industries of the country. In September, while the fate of the bill remained in doubt, the “Banker's Magazine” reported that the doubt had “aggravated the money stringency, until it absolutely became impossible for the great majority of business men to obtain the necessary funds, or credit to transact their affairs. In this respect, probably, no panic within the memory of the present generation has been so severe; and yet, it has been the least violent for one so universal and protracted. But it is the collapse that follows an acute attack of disease, which leaves its victim prostrated, after the crisis has been passed, and which must precede ultimate recovery, by giving



time to restore exhausted strength. . . . This was different from most panics this country has experienced, inasmuch as it was strictly an artificial one, caused by bad legislation, rather than general financial kite flying, while commercial affairs were seldom, if ever, on a sounder or safer basis, from the fact that they had, for a long time, been more free from speculation, with but few exceptions, than for years. Hence it has been the financial machinery by which commerce is transacted, rather than commerce itself, that has been deranged; and, for this reason, trade will revive much more rapidly when this artificial pressure is removed, than it has revived after former panics, which were either purely financial, or commercial, or both, as the result of wild speculation and general inflation of prices."—H. A. Pierce, *A Review of Finance and Business* (*Banker's Magazine*, Sept., 1893).—The repeal measure was finally carried in the Senate, becoming law by the President's signature November 1, when a slow recovery of business confidence began, much retarded and disturbed, however, by the uncertainty attending expected action of Congress on tariff and currency questions. See, also, MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1848-1893.

ALSO IN: L. R. Ehrich, *The Question of Silver*, p. 23.

**A. D. 1892.—Chinese Exclusion Act.**—A bill "to absolutely prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States," reported by Mr. Geary, of California, was passed by the House, April 4, 1892, yeas 179, nays 43, 107 not voting. In the Senate, a substitute, going little further than to continue the then existing laws for the regulation of Chinese immigration, was reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations and adopted. The two bills were referred to a Conference Committee, with the result that a compromise measure, slightly modified from the House bill, was passed by both branches of Congress, on the 3d and 4th of May, and signed by the President on the 5th. It continues former laws for ten years. It directs "that any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent when convicted and adjudged under any of said laws to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States," shall be removed to China, or to such other country as he may prove to be a subject or citizen of. It declares that any such person under arrest "shall be adjudged to be unlawfully within the United States, unless such person shall establish, by affirmative proof, . . . his lawful right to remain in the United States"; and that any such person "convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided." The act denies bail, on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, by a Chinese person seeking to land in the United States. It requires all Chinese laborers who were within the limits of the United States at the time of the passage of the act, and who were entitled to remain, to obtain certificates of residence, from district collectors of internal revenue, and orders the deportation of those who had failed to do so at the expiration of one year. This extraordinary measure of exclusion has been commonly known as the "Geary Act."—E. McPherson, *Hand-book of Politics*, 1892.

**A. D. 1892.—Settlement of the Alaskan Boundary.**—A convention between the governments of the United States and Great Britain was entered into and ratifications exchanged in August, 1892, providing for a coincident or joint survey, "as may in practice be found most convenient," to determine the boundary line between Alaska and the Canadian provinces.

**A. D. 1892.—Controversy with Chile.**—**Warlike Presidential Message.** See CHILE: A. D. 1891-1892.

**A. D. 1892.—First commissioning of a Papal Delegate.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1892.

**A. D. 1892.—The Twenty-seventh Presidential Election.**—Five parties presented candidates in the presidential election held November 8, 1892—namely: the Democratic, the Republican, the People's, or Populist, the Prohibitionist, and the Socialistic Labor. The nominees of the Democratic Party were Grover Cleveland, for President, and Adlai E. Stevenson, for Vice President; of the Republican Party, Benjamin Harrison and Whitelaw Reid, for President and Vice President, respectively; of the Populist Party, James B. Weaver and James G. Field; of the Prohibition Party, John Bidwell and James B. Cranfill; of the Socialistic Labor Party, Simon Wing and Charles H. Matchett. The dominant issues in the canvass were the tariff question and the silver question. "The Democrats named no electoral tickets in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, and Wyoming, but voted for the people's party electors with the object of taking those States away from the Republicans. They put out an electoral ticket in Nevada, but still voted mostly for the Populist electors. In North Dakota also there was a partial fusion between the Democrats and the People's party, and in Minnesota a part of the Weaver electoral ticket was accepted by the Democrats. In Louisiana there was a fusion of the Republicans and the People's party, each nominating half of the 8 electors. In Alabama there was a fusion of some of the Republicans with the People's party. In Texas a Republican ticket called the Lily White was set up, which differed from the regular ticket. In Michigan a new electoral law, which was declared constitutional by the United States Supreme Court on Oct. 17, 1892, provided for the separate election of a Presidential elector in each Congressional district, and in consequence the electoral vote of the State was divided. In Oregon the name of one of the four electors on the People's ticket was also placed on the Democratic ticket. . . . The total popular vote cast was reported as 12,154,542," of which Cleveland received 5,556,553; Harrison, 5,175,577; Weaver, 1,122,045; Bidwell 279,191; Wing, 21,191. The electoral votes of the States were cast as follows: Cleveland, 277; Harrison, 145; Weaver, 23; giving Cleveland a clear majority of 110.—*Appletons' Annual Cyclopædia*, 1892.—"The most striking feature of the elections was the great losses of the Republicans in the West. Illinois and Wisconsin went Democratic by large majorities, California and Ohio were very close, and Colorado, Idaho, Kansas and Nevada chose Populist electors. The Democrats carried all the Northern states generally regarded as doubtful, viz., Connecticut, New York and Indiana, but they nearly lost Delaware. An unusual incident of the result was the division of the electo-

ral votes in several states, owing to the closeness of the popular vote. Thus in Ohio one Cleveland elector and in Oregon one Weaver elector was chosen, the others being Republican; and in California and North Dakota Mr. Harrison secured single votes in the same way. From the conditions of fusion between the Democrats and Populists in the last-named state, it resulted that one of her three electoral votes was given to each of the three candidates. In Michigan, under the district method of choosing electors recently established, Harrison got nine votes and Cleveland five."—*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1893.

**A. D. 1893.—Abandonment of Polygamy by the Mormons.** See UTAH: A. D. 1882-1893.

**A. D. 1893.—Revolution in the Hawaiian Islands and proposed annexation.** See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

**A. D. 1894.—The Wilson Tariff Act.** See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1894.

**A. D. 1894.—The Strike at Pullman.—The Coxey Movement.** See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A. D. 1894.

**A. D. 1894-1895.—Provision for the admission of Utah as a State.**—On the 17th of July, 1894, the President, by his signature, gave effect to a bill which provides for the admission of Utah to the Union as a State. The admission, however, cannot become a completed fact before the later part of the year 1895, since the bill provides for the holding of a convention in March, 1895, to frame a constitution for the proposed new State, and for submitting such constitution to the people at the election in November, 1895.

**A. D. 1895.—The Status of Civil-service Reform.—Commissioner Roosevelt's Review.**—"In 1883 the civil service law was established at Washington, and in the larger post-offices and custom-houses throughout the country, taking in a total of some 14,000 employees. The great extensions since have all taken place during the last six years, a period which happens to include my own term of service with the Commission, so that I write of them at first hand. In 1889 the railway mail service was added, in 1893 all the free delivery post-offices, and in 1894 all the smaller custom-houses and the internal revenue service. Other important but smaller extensions have been made, and the larger offices have grown, so that now about 50,000 employees are under the protection of the law. There are, of course, and there always must be in a body so large, individual cases where the law is evaded, or even violated; and as yet we do not touch the question of promotions and reductions. But, speaking broadly, and with due allowance for such comparatively slight exceptions, these 50,000 places are now taken out of the political arena. They can no longer be scrambled for in a struggle as ignoble and brutal as the strife of pirates over plunder; they no longer serve as a vast bribery chest with which to debauch the voters of the country. Those holding them no longer keep their political life by the frail tenure of service to the party boss and the party machine; they stand as American citizens, and are allowed the privilege of earning their own bread without molestation so long as they faithfully serve the public. The classified service, the service in which the merit system is applied, has grown fast. It is true that the outside ser-

vice where the spoils theories are still applied in all their original nakedness, has grown only less fast. The number of offices under the government has increased very rapidly during the last twenty years; but the growth of the classified service has been even more rapid, so that a constantly increasing percentage of the whole is withdrawn from the degrading grasp of the spoils system. Now, something like a quarter of all the offices under the federal government in point of numbers, representing nearly a half in point of salaries, has been put upon the basis of decency and merit. This has been done by the action of successive Presidents under the law of 1883, without the necessity of action by Congress. There still remain some things that can be done without further legislation. For instance, the labor force in the navy yards was put on a merit basis, and removed from the domain of politics, under Secretary Tracy. This was done merely by order of the Secretary of the Navy, which order could have been reversed by his successor, Secretary Herbert. Instead of reversing it, however, Secretary Herbert has zealously lived up to its requirements, and has withstood all pressure for the weakening of the system in the interests of the local party machines and bosses. It is unsafe to trust to always having Secretaries of the Navy like Messrs. Tracy and Herbert. The Civil Service Commission should be given supervision over the laborers who come under the direction of Cabinet officers. Indeed, all the laboring force and all the employees of the District of Columbia employed by the federal government should be put under the Commission. When this has been done, and when a few other comparatively slight extensions have been made, all that can be accomplished by the unaided action of the executive will have been accomplished. Congress must then itself act by passing some such bill as that of Senator Lodge in reference to fourth-class postmasters; by passing some bill in reference to the consular service on the outlines of that suggested by Senator Morgan (but giving power to the Civil Service Commission itself in the matter); and then by providing that all postmasters and similar officers shall hold office during good behavior, including as well those nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as those appointed by the President alone. Of all the offices under the federal government, not one in a hundred can properly be called political."—T. Roosevelt, *The Present Status of Civil Service Reform* (Atlantic, Feb., 1895).

**A. D. 1895.—President Cleveland's Special Message on the condition of the National Finances.**—In a special message to Congress, on the 28th of January, 1895, President Cleveland renewed an earnest appeal which he had made at the opening of the session, for legislation to correct the mischievous working of the existing currency system of the country. The condition of the national finances, produced by unwise laws, was set forth clearly in this message, as follows: "With natural resources unlimited in variety and productive strength, and with a people whose activity and enterprise seek only a fair opportunity to achieve national success and greatness, our progress should not be checked by a false financial policy and a heedless disregard of sound monetary laws, nor should the timidity and fear which they engender stand



in the way of our prosperity. It is hardly disputed that this predicament confronts us to-day. Therefore, no one in any degree responsible for the making and execution of our laws should fail to see a patriotic duty in honestly and sincerely attempting to relieve the situation. . . . The real trouble which confronts us consists in a lack of confidence, widespread and constantly increasing, in the continuing ability or disposition of the Government to pay its obligations in gold. This lack of confidence grows to some extent out of the palpable and apparent embarrassment attending the efforts of the Government under existing laws to procure gold, and to a greater extent out of the impossibility of either keeping it in the Treasury or canceling obligations by its expenditure after it is obtained. The only way left open to the Government for procuring gold is by the issue and sale of its bonds. The only bonds that can be so issued were authorized nearly twenty-five years ago, and are not well calculated to meet our present needs. Among other disadvantages, they are made payable in coin, instead of specifically in gold, which, in existing conditions, detracts largely and in an increasing ratio from their desirability as investments. It is by no means certain that bonds of this description can much longer be disposed of at a price creditable to the financial character of our Government. The most dangerous and irritating feature of the situation, however, remains to be mentioned. It is found in the means by which the Treasury is despoiled of the gold thus obtained without canceling a single Government obligation and solely for the benefit of those who find profit in shipping it abroad or whose fears induce them to hoard it at home. We have outstanding about five hundred millions of currency notes of the Government for which gold may be demanded, and, curiously enough, the law requires that when presented and, in fact, redeemed and paid in gold, they shall be reissued. Thus the same notes may do duty many times in drawing gold from the Treasury; nor can the process be arrested as long as private parties, for profit or otherwise, see an advantage in repeating the operation. More than \$300,000,000 in these notes have already been redeemed in gold, and notwithstanding such redemption they are all still outstanding. Since the 17th day of January, 1894, our bonded interest-bearing debt has been increased \$100,000,000 for the purpose of obtaining gold to replenish our coin reserve. Two issues were made amounting to fifty millions each—one in January and the other in November. As a result of the first issue there was realized something more than \$58,000,000 in gold. Between that issue and the succeeding one in November, comprising a period of about ten months, nearly \$103,000,000 in gold were drawn from the Treasury. This made the second issue necessary, and upon that more than fifty-eight millions in gold was again realized. Between the date of this second issue and the present time, covering a period of only about two months, more than \$69,000,000 in gold have been drawn from the Treasury. These large sums of gold were expended without any cancellation of Government obligations or in any permanent way benefiting our people or improving our pecuniary situation. The financial events of the past year suggest facts and condi-

tions which should certainly arrest attention. More than \$172,000,000 in gold have been drawn out of the Treasury during the year for the purpose of shipment abroad or hoarding at home. While nearly one hundred and three millions of this amount was drawn out during the first ten months of the year, a sum aggregating more than two-thirds of that amount, being about sixty-nine millions, was drawn out during the following two months, thus indicating a marked acceleration of the depleting process with the lapse of time. The obligations upon which this gold has been drawn from the Treasury are still outstanding and are available for use in repeating the exhausting operation with shorter intervals as our perplexities accumulate. . . . It will hardly do to say that a simple increase of revenue will cure our troubles. The apprehension now existing and constantly increasing as to our financial ability does not rest upon a calculation of our revenue. The time has passed when the eyes of investors abroad and our people at home were fixed upon the revenues of the Government. Changed conditions have attracted their attention to the gold of the Government. There need be no fear that we cannot pay our current expenses with such money as we have. There is now in the Treasury a comfortable surplus of more than \$63,000,000, but it is not in gold, and therefore does not meet our difficulty. . . . Whatever ideas may be insisted upon as to silver or bimetallism, a proper solution of the question now pressing upon us only requires a recognition of gold as well as silver, and a concession of its importance, rightfully or wrongfully acquired, as a basis of national credit, a necessity in the honorable discharge of our obligations payable in gold, and a badge of solvency. . . . In my opinion the Secretary of the Treasury should be authorized to issue bonds of the Government for the purpose of procuring and maintaining a sufficient gold reserve and the redemption and cancellation of the United States legal-tender notes and the Treasury notes issued for the purchase of silver under the law of July 14, 1890. . . . The principal and interest of these bonds should be payable on their face in gold, because they should be sold only for gold or its representative, and because there would now probably be difficulty in favorably disposing of bonds not containing this stipulation. . . . National banks should not be allowed to take out circulating notes of a less denomination than \$10, and when such as are now outstanding reach the Treasury, except for redemption and retirement, they should be canceled and notes of the denomination of \$10 and upward issued in their stead. Silver certificates of the denomination of \$10 and upward should be replaced by certificates of denominations under \$10. As a constant means for the maintenance of a reasonable supply of gold in the Treasury our duties on imports should be paid in gold, allowing all other dues to the Government to be paid in any other form of money. I believe all the provisions I have suggested should be embodied in our laws if we are to enjoy a complete reinstatement of a sound financial condition." The President's recommendations were not acted upon. The silver interest in Congress defeated all measures introduced for the purpose and left the situation unchanged. The Government was forced to a new issue of bonds under the old act, for the replenishing of its gold reserve.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Historical Geography.**—Between the exterior and the interior historical geography of the United States the relation differs from that in most other countries. The internal historical geography of the Old World nations, barring the feudal period, involves so largely questions concerning mere provincial administration that it has no claim, from a geographical standpoint, to an importance equal to the shifting of the great national frontiers. Examples of this are found in the Roman and Byzantine empires, and in the majority of the modern states. In our own case however the order of interest is reversed. Our internal geography has attracted the chief attention of the student, not so much from the greater difficulty of the subject as from its vast importance in the early history of our government. It is not, indeed, too much to say that the organization of the present government under the constitution is an event of scarcely greater importance than the determination of the final policy of the states and the nation concerning the unoccupied western lands. It is this fact alone which gives the higher degree of relative importance to our internal historical geography. The general facts concerning our external geography are quickly told. The outlines of the entire subject are contained in the enumeration of the eight cessions, as follows: the original territory ceded by Great Britain at the peace of Paris in 1783 (see page 3403); the Louisiana purchase from France in 1803 (pages 2093, and 3443); the acquisition of Florida from Spain by the treaty of 1819 (page 1184); the admission of Texas in 1845 (page 3187); the undisputed acquisition of the Oregon country by treaty with Great Britain in 1846 (page 2454); the first Mexican cession by the peace of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (page 2219); the second Mexican cession, known as the Gadsden purchase, in 1853 (page 140); and the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 (page 37). The enumeration of these eight acquisitions, all of which, save the final one, are shown on the first United States map, affords a complete picture of the successive stages of our territorial growth. The occasion of these different annexations, as well as their exact territorial extent, would involve us in a series of details which are beyond the purpose of the present article. It should be observed, however, that in several cases the map shows the territories in question as finally determined by treaty or survey, rather than their actual extent as understood at the time the annexations were made. This is one of the inevitable disadvantages in the purely cartographic treatment of such a subject. The historical map is compelled from its nature to give a tangible appearance to matters which are often very intangible in fact. In the case, for example, of what we may call the first United States, the country as recognized by the treaty of Paris, the western line of the Mississippi was the only boundary which was not the subject of future discussion. The southern frontier as arranged at Paris was affirmed by treaty with Spain in 1795. On the other side, however, Great Britain retained a number of posts in the Old Northwest up to the Jay treaty of 1794; the boundary between the upper Mississippi and the Lake of the Woods, imperfectly described in the Paris treaty, was not settled until 1818; the line from the intersec-

tion of the St. Lawrence to the Sault Ste. Marie was established in 1822 by joint commission under the treaty of Ghent; while the Maine frontier question, the most difficult and obstinate of all our boundary disputes, was not finally settled until the year 1842. The Louisiana purchase of 1803 brought in fresh questions concerning our territorial limits. On three sides, the North, West and Southwest the frontiers of this vast area were undefined. On the northern side the boundary was settled with Great Britain by the treaty of 1818 which carried the line along the forty-ninth parallel to the Rocky Mountains, while the treaty of 1819 with Spain, which ceded Florida to the United States, also defined the limits of Louisiana on the Southwest. This line of 1819 has an additional importance, in that it drew the frontier between Spain and the United States along the forty-second parallel to the Pacific coast. The importance of this lay in the fact that it gave us a clear title on the Spanish side to the so-called Oregon country. The exact connection, real or supposed, between this territory and the Louisiana country was for many years one of the disputed points in American historical geography. The belief in this connection, at one time general, undoubtedly had its origin in the undefined character of Louisiana at the time of the purchase, and the fact that our government turned this indefiniteness to its own purpose in advancing its Oregon claims. It is now clear, however, from the evidence of the old maps, the official statement of the limits of the region, of which there is but one in existence (the Crozat grant of 1712) and lastly the understanding of France herself at the time of the cession, that Louisiana did not include in its limits any part of the Pacific watershed. A map published in a subsequent work of the French plenipotentiary placed the western boundary of Louisiana at the one hundred and tenth meridian. A line drawn in this arbitrary fashion and unsanctioned by the terms of the treaty itself may be regarded merely as one of convenience. If this view is correct it is certainly more convenient and, at the same time, more logical, to consider the western boundary as extending to the Rocky Mountain watershed,—a line which would not deviate to any radical extent from the meridian in question. The historical connection however between the Louisiana purchase and our subsequent acquisition of the Oregon country is perfectly clear. The exploration of the latter followed almost immediately but its final annexation was delayed by the opposing claim of Great Britain. In this controversy the claim of the United States was merely relative as opposed to that of England. The just claimant was undoubtedly the king of Spain, whose rights, based on discovery, antedated those of either of the contesting powers. The Spanish title, however, having, as we have seen, been relinquished by the treaty of 1819, the issue between Great Britain and the United States became clearly defined. A joint occupation of the disputed territory by the two powers ensued from 1818 to 1846. In the latter year was negotiated the compromise treaty, which continued our northern line of 1818 on the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific coast. From the treaty of 1846 we may date the completion of our northern frontier, although the ownership of certain islands be-



tween Vancouver and the mainland was not settled until 1872. A few more years witnessed the completion of our southern frontier, as well. In 1845 Texas was admitted to the Union. The western boundary of the Rio Grande, claimed by the new state under her constitution of 1836, led directly to the war with Mexico, and by that war to the great additional cession at Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. The southern boundary was finally completed by the Gadsden purchase of 1853. Coming now to the study of our internal geography, we find ourselves in contact with what is practically a distinct subject. Here we encounter a whole series of those weighty questions, the solution of which figures so prominently in the early history of the American government. We have already noted that the first western boundary of the United States was placed by the treaty of 1783 at the Mississippi river. But during the Paris negotiations our ally France and quasi ally Spain both opposed this westward extension of our territory and it was long an open question, even after our independence itself was assured, whether we should not be compelled to accept a western boundary on the Appalachian range. Years before the final settlement of the question at Paris, the expectancy of the Mississippi boundary had given rise to questions which caused an undercurrent of dissension between the states during the entire period of the Revolutionary War. In their relation to the western land question, the thirteen original states divide themselves into two classes, the claimant and non-claimant states. In the first class were Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia; in the second, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland. The claims of the seven first named states covered every inch of our prospective western domain and in the country north of the Ohio, known as the Old Northwest, there were opposing claims of two and in some districts of even three states to the same territory. The extent of these claims is indicated on the map of the Federated states in 1783. They rested for the most part upon the royal grants and charters to the colonies, and, in the case of New York, upon the treaties with the Iroquois. Their relative merits where conflicting, or their collective merit as a whole, are questions which we will not attempt to discuss. It is sufficient to observe that if insisted upon in their entirety they would have presented an insuperable obstacle to the formation of an American federate government. In the proceedings of the Continental Congress, as well as in the state legislative bodies, touching this western domain, we may find the germs of nearly all the political and constitutional questions which have made the greater part of our subsequent history. The relative rank and power of the states, the obligation of one state towards another, the individual rights of states as opposed to the collective rights of the Union; all of these questions entered into the great problem which the nation was now called upon to solve. The objections to the western claims by the non-claimant states, though urged with varying degrees of vehemence and accompanied with many widely differing alternatives, may be fairly resolved into the two following contentions: that it was unjust that so vast a domain, whose acquisition at the

peace could only be insured through the joint labor of all the states, should thereafter become the property of a certain favored few, and also that the claims if allowed would in the end give the claimant states a preponderating power which would be extremely prejudicial if not dangerous to the others. Of all the non-claimant states, Maryland was the most determined in her opposition, and it is to her that Professor Herbert B. Adams in his monograph on "Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States," assigns the chief credit for the final creation of the first national domain (see page 3396). The claim though a just one cannot be asserted without an important qualification. The proposition advanced by Maryland, that a national title to the western lands be asserted by a clause in the Articles of Confederation, was manifestly one to which the claimant states would never give their consent. It was due, however, to the action of Maryland, — which refused for more than three years, from November 1777 to March 1781, to ratify the articles, — that the question was kept open until the claimant states, in order to complete the circle of the Union, found it necessary to adopt the policy of voluntary cessions, suggested by Congress. The history in detail of the several state cessions involves many questions concerning the distribution and sale of public lands which need not concern us. Some of the offers of cession, at first conditional and partial, were made absolute and final, as, one by one, the besetting difficulties were cleared away. The dates of the final cessions by the seven claimant states in order were as follows: New York 1781, Virginia 1783, Massachusetts 1785, Connecticut 1786, South Carolina 1787, North Carolina 1790, Georgia 1802. Certain land reservations north of the Ohio, as shown on the map of the United States in 1790, were made by both Virginia and Connecticut; but Virginia renounced jurisdiction over these lands in the cession, and Connecticut did likewise in 1800, the two states reserving merely the property rights. The territory south of the Ohio was not included in the Virginia cession of 1783 but the district of Kentucky was made the subject of a second cession in 1789. The completion of this list closed the interesting chapter in our history covered by the state cessions and gave to the United States the sovereignty over its first great western public domain. Before pursuing this subject further, let us see in what relation the cessions stand to the present form of the thirteen original states. Some boundary contentions still remained, but these are not of historic importance. The claim of Massachusetts in what is now Western New York was settled by joint commission in 1786, while Pennsylvania purchased a tract of land on lake Erie from the general government in 1792. At the present day sixteen states stand upon the territory which remained to the original thirteen, the three additional ones each springing from the partition of one of the older states. In 1790 New York assented to the independence of Vermont, which was admitted to the Union in the following year; in 1820 Maine was separated from Massachusetts and admitted; and finally, in 1862, West Virginia was set off from Virginia and became a state in 1863. We will now resume the subject of the disposition of the western lands. We have already noted the termination

of that stage of their history which involves the territorial claims of individual states. The second stage concerns itself with the evolution of what may be called the American system of territorial government. The first, indeed, had not reached its completion before the second began to receive the greater measure of public attention. The western land cessions to the government were made with the general understanding, tacit in most cases, but in that of Virginia explicitly stated, that the ceded territory should eventually be formed into additional states. The first national domain may therefore be regarded as a district held in trust by the government for a special purpose. This view, which was not only required by the terms of the Virginia cession, but also represented the general sentiment of the time, has formed the basis of our entire subsequent policy in dealing with the national domain,—a policy which has remained unaltered even in the case of the immense territories that afterwards came into the direct possession of the government by treaty with foreign powers. The one question remaining was the erection of the legislative machinery which should provide for the government of the territories during their preparation for statehood. The problem was finally solved by the Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest territory. This famous ordinance, the first of the long series of acts concerning territorial government, was the last noteworthy piece of legislation under the old Articles of Confederation, and the year which witnessed both the successful inauguration of our territorial policy and the adoption of the new constitution is the most memorable in the entire history of American institutions. The history of the enactment of the Ordinance, for many years veiled in obscurity, has been fully elucidated by the late W. F. Poole (monograph on "The Ordinance of 1787"); the full text is printed in its proper place in this work (page 2432). Many of its provisions, suited only for the special occasion of their use, are now antiquated and obsolete, and neither their letter nor spirit find a place in subsequent territorial legislation. But the fact remains that this act was in a certain sense the great prototype; it was the first to organize and set in motion the machinery of our territorial policy. A policy that has provided without friction for the tremendous national expansion which has ensued during the present century may justly be regarded as one of the greatest achievements in the political history of the American government. In our own day, when the admission of a new state or the erection of a new territory is regarded as hardly more than a routine event in the working of our political system, it is easy for us to underestimate the vital importance of the first steps which were taken concerning the regulation of the national domain. It was because those steps were to determine in a measure our entire future policy, that the history of the old Continental Congress should form an absorbing theme for every student of our internal geography. It is unnecessary to follow this subject in detail through its later history, which is simply a monotonous record of legislative enactments for the organization of new territories or the admission of new states. The principle had been fully established; the history of the next century, followed step by step, can show very

little beyond its consistent application. Political considerations have, it is true, often delayed or prematurely hastened the admission of new states, but there has been one case only where we have been called upon again to face a question similar to that which was solved by the old congress. The circumstances of the admission of the republic of Texas bear no analogy to that of any other state received into the Union since the formation of the government. Here was, not a state created by mere legislative enactment, but an independent foreign sovereignty, admitted to the Union at its own solicitation, bringing with it as a dower a territory immeasurably greater than the national policy had ever before assigned to a single state. Once more therefore we have the old question of a troublesome state sovereignty in immense unoccupied lands. The comparative absence of friction in the solution of this new problem proves again the efficiency of the old policy in dealing with all such questions. No cession of territory was wrung from Texas or in this case even solicited. The state was admitted to the Union in 1845 claiming a continuous western boundary on the Rio Grande. In 1850, after the peace of Guadalupe Hidalgo had determined our boundary on the Mexican side, Texas sold to the General Government, for the sum of \$10,000,000, all of her territorial claims north and west of her present boundaries. With some modifications the history of the original cessions repeats itself in this transaction, which was the last occasion of a great transfer of territory to the Union by one of its members. There are many other features in our internal geography, among the most notable the institution of slavery, which would be worthy of attention were the space to permit. In view of this limitation, however, we cannot pursue the subject beyond this general review of its main outlines. There is a dearth of works on American historical geography subsequent to the Declaration of Independence. It is a subject, indeed, which cannot be very satisfactorily studied simply through the literature dealing exclusively with the topic. Of the atlases Professor Albert Bushnell Hart's "Epoch Maps Illustrating American History" is the best; the most serviceable of the text works is Henry Gannett's pamphlet on "Boundaries of the United States and of the several States and Territories, with a Historical Sketch of the Territorial Changes," published as bulletin No. 13 of the United States Geological Survey. Townsend MacCoun's "Historical Geography of the United States" and the later chapters of Walter B. Scaife's "America, its Geographical History" are also useful. An excellent account of our geographical history during the early years of the Government, covering the period of the state cessions, may be found in B. A. Hinsdale's "Old Northwest, with a View of the Thirteen Colonies as constituted by the Royal Charters." For a more careful study there is of course no substitute for the texts of the grants, charters, treaties and legislative acts of Congress, and the more important of these are freely quoted from in Mr. Gannett's work.—Alan C. Reiley.

A selected bibliography of historical geography in general, including that of the United States, will be found appended to this volume.—Appendix H.



**UNITED STATES BANK.** See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816, 1817-1833; and UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1833-1836.

**UNITED STATES CHRISTIAN COMMISSION.** See SANITARY COMMISSION.

**UNITED STATES CONGRESS.** See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

**UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL.** See BRAZIL: A. D. 1889-1891.

**UNITED STATES OF COLOMBIA.** See COLOMBIAN STATES.

**UNITED STATES PRESIDENT.** See PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

**UNITED STATES SANITARY COMMISSION.** See SANITARY COMMISSION.

**UNITED STATES SENATE.** See SENATE, UNITED STATES.

**UNITED WORKMEN, Ancient Order of.** See INSURANCE.

**UNIVERSALISM.**—"Universalism, using the word in its present theological meaning, is the doctrine or belief that it is the purpose of God, through the grace revealed in our Lord Jesus Christ, to save every member of the human race from sin. The word suggests nothing with regard to any human founder, any place where it was first promulgated, any particular form of church polity, any rite or ordinance, any opinion of the equality or the subordination of the Son to the Father. Universalism is not dependent on these. It may be, and to some extent has been, and is still, embraced by those in Christian sects whose denominational titles emphasize these respective peculiarities. . . . The presence of Universalism may be traced to the earliest period of Christian history. The existence of the Universalist denomination reaches but little beyond a century. . . . Organized Universalism, the creation and establishment of the Universalist Church, had its chief, but not exclusive, incitement in the ministry of Rev. John Murray, who, born in Alton, England, December 10 (O. S.), 1741, landed in America in the latter part of September, 1770."—R. Eddy, *Hist. of Universalism*, ch. 1 and 4 (*Am. Church Hist. Series*, v. 10).—"Mr. Murray arrived in America in 1770, and after much going to and fro organized, in 1779, at Gloucester, Mass., the first congregation in America on distinctly Universalist principles. But other men, along other lines of thought, had been working their way to somewhat similar conclusions. In 1785 Elhanan Winchester, a thoroughly Calvinistic Baptist minister in Philadelphia, led forth his excommunicated brethren, one hundred strong, and organized them into a 'Society of Universal Baptists,' holding to the universal restoration of mankind to holiness and happiness. The two differing schools fraternized in a convention of Universalist churches at Philadelphia in 1794, at which articles of belief and a plan of organization were set forth, understood to be from the pen of Dr. Benjamin Rush; and a resolution was adopted declaring the holding of slaves to be 'inconsistent with the union of the human race in a common Saviour, and the obligations to mutual and universal love which flow from that union.'"—L. W. Bacon, *A Hist. of American Christianity*, ch. 13 (*Am. Church Hist. Series*, v. 13).

**UNIVERSITIES.** See EDUCATION.

**UNIVERSITY EXTENSION.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS, &c.; A. D. 1873-1889; and 1887-1892.

**UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1769-1884.

**UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Regents of.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1746-1787.

**UNKIAR-SKELESSI, Treaty of (1833).** See TURKS: A. D. 1831-1840.

**UNSTRUTT, Battle of the (1075).** See SAXONY: A. D. 1073-1075.

**UPCHURCH POTTERY.**—The Upchurch marshes, on the Medway, above Sheerness, were the site of extensive potteries in the time of the Roman occupation of Britain, and remains of the ware are abundant in the neighborhood.

**UPPER HOUSE.** See LORDS, BRITISH HOUSE OF.

**UPSALA, Battle of (1520).** See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1397-1527.

**UPSAROKAS, OR CROWS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

**UR OF THE CHALDEES.**—"The Ur Kasdim, i. e. 'Ur of the Chaldeans' in the Hebrew Scriptures, is the modern Mugheir, south-east of Babylon; on clay-tablets discovered in the ruins of this place we find cuneiform symbols, which are to be read as Uru."—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 2, ch. 1.

**URARDA.—ARARAT.** See ALARODIANS.

**URBAN II., Pope, A. D. 1088-1099. . . . Urban III., Pope, 1185-1187. . . . Urban IV., Pope, 1261-1264. . . . Urban V., Pope, 1362-1370. . . . Urban VI., Pope, 1378-1389. . . . Urban VII., Pope, 1590, September, 15-27. . . . Urban VIII., Pope, 1623-1644.**

**URBARIUM, of Maria Theresa, The.** See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1849-1859.

**URBINO: Annexation to the States of the Church.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1605-1700.

**URICONIUM, OR VIROCONIUM.**—An important Roman town in Britain, extensive remains of which have been unearthed at modern Wroxeter. It was totally destroyed by the West Saxons in 583. "A British poet in verse still left to us sings piteously the death-song of Uriconium, 'the white town in the valley,' the town of white stones gleaming among the green woodlands."—J. R. Green, *The Making of England*, ch. 5.

**URSINI, The.** See ROME: 13-14TH CENTURIES.

**URSULINES, The.**—The origin of the order of the Ursulines "is ascribed to Angela di Brescia, about the year 1537, though the Saint from whom it received its name, Ursula Benincasa, a native of Naples, was born ten years afterwards. . . . The duties of those holy sisters were the purest within the circle of human benevolence—to minister to the sick, to relieve the poor, to console the miserable, to pray with the penitent."—G. Waddington, *Hist. of the Church*, ch. 19, sect. 6.

**URUGUAY: The name.**—"The Uruguay is called so after a bird, the Uru, which is found in the woods on its banks, and the term Uruguay signifies the country of the Uru."—T. J. Hutchinson, *The Parana*, p. 44.

**A. D. 1714-1777.**—The settlement — The contest for, between Spain and Portugal.—Relinquishment by the latter.—Inclusion in the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: A. D. 1580-1777.

**A. D. 1826-1828.**—Independence established. See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: A. D. 1819-1874.

**USBEGS.**—A Turkish branch of the Tatars of Turkestan.

**USCOCKS, The.**—“During the reign of Ferdinand [Emperor, 1558-1564], several bodies of Christians, quitting the provinces which had been recently conquered by the Turks, obtained from the Austrian sovereigns a refuge at Clissa, in Dalmatia, under the condition of forming themselves into a frontier militia continually in arms against the infidels, and, from their emigration, received the name of Uscocks, which, in the language of the country, signifies wanderers. They fulfilled the purpose of their establishment; and, being at length expelled by the Turks, received a new asylum at Segna, a ruined fortress in Croatia, on the coast of the Adriatic gulph. Here, their numbers increasing by the accession of Italian banditti and other marauders, they were rendered more formidable than before; for they no longer confined their predatory incursions to the land, but became pirates by sea. . . . Their audacity increasing with success and plunder, they pillaged, without distinction, the vessels of all the nations who traded in the Adriatic.” They were attacked by the Turks and the Venetians, and the latter, at length, in the early part of the 17th century, forced the Duke of Styria, who had protected the freebooters, to allow their stronghold at Segna to be demolished. “The Uscocks, being transplanted to Carlstadt, soon lost their name and distinction.”—W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 42 (v. 2).

**USDÆ, The.** See IRELAND: TRIBES OF EARLY CELTIC INHABITANTS.

**USES, The Statute of.** See LAW, COMMON: A. D. 1535, and 1557.

**USHANT, Naval battle off (1794).** See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH—JULY).

**USIPETES AND TENCATHERI, Cæsar's overthrow of.**—The Usipetes and Tenctheri, two German tribes, whose home was on the lower course of the Rhine, north and south of the Lippe, being hard pressed by the Suevi, crossed the Rhine, B. C. 55, and began to spread themselves along the Valley of the Meuse. Cæsar marched against them with great promptitude, refused to parley with them, accused them of treacherous attempts to gain time, and was himself charged with wicked treachery, in seizing their chiefs who met him with pacific propositions. It is certain, at all events, that he was able to attack them when they were deprived of leaders, and to slaughter them with so little resistance that not one Roman soldier was killed. Those who escaped the sword were driven into the Rhine (probably at its point of junction with the Moselle) and almost the entire mass of 180,000 are said to have perished. The remnant took refuge with the Sicambri or Sigambri, on the farther shore of the Rhine. Cæsar demanded the surrender of them, and, when refused, he caused his engineers to bridge the river in ten days, led his army across it and laid waste the country of the Sigambri. This was the first crossing of the Rhine by the Romans. The Suevi offered battle to the Roman invaders, but Cæsar prudently returned, and destroyed the bridge.—Cæsar, *Gallie Wars*, bk. 4, ch. 1-19.

ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 10 (v. 1).

**UTAH: A. D. 1847.**—Migration of Mormons from Nauvoo and their settlement on the Great Salt Lake. See MORMONISM: A. D. 1846-1848.

**A. D. 1848.**—Acquisition from Mexico. See MEXICO: A. D. 1848.

**A. D. 1849-1850.**—The proposed State of Deseret.—Organization of the Territory of Utah.—Its name.—“Until the year 1849 the Mormons were entirely under the control of their ecclesiastical leaders, regarding the presidency not only as their spiritual head, but as the source of law in temporal matters. . . . There was already in their midst a small percentage of gentile citizens, gathered . . . from nearly all the civilized nations of the earth. . . . Not infrequently litigation arose among the gentiles, or between Mormon and gentile; and though strict justice may have been done by the bishops, it was difficult for the latter to believe that such was the case. . . . Thus it became advisable to establish for the benefit of all some judicial authority that could not be questioned by any, whether members of the church or not, and this authority must be one that, being recognized by the government of the United States, would have the support of its laws and the shield of its protection. Further than this, if the Mormons neglected to establish such government, the incoming gentiles would do so ere long. Early in 1849, therefore, a convention was summoned of ‘the inhabitants of that portion of Upper California lying east of the Sierra Nevada Mountains,’ and on the 4th of March assembled at Salt Lake City. A committee was appointed to draught a constitution, under which the people might govern themselves until congress should otherwise provide by law. A few days later the constitution was adopted, and a provisional government organized, under the name of the State of Deseret. An immense tract of country was claimed, extending from latitude 33° to the border of Oregon, and from the Rocky Mountains to the Sierra Nevada, together with a section of the territory now included in southern California, and the strip of coast lying between Lower California and 118° 30’ of west longitude. The seat of government was to be at Salt Lake City.” In July Almon W. Babbitt was elected delegate to Congress, and that body was petitioned to admit the provisionally organized State into the Union. The delegate and his petition met with a cool reception at Washington; but in September, 1850, Congress passed an act organizing the Territory of Utah, and Brigham Young was appointed Governor. “The act to establish a territorial government for Utah placed the southern boundary at the 37th parallel, the section between that limit and the 33d parallel being included in the Territory of New Mexico [organized at the same time], with the exception of the part transferred to California, by which State Utah was to be bounded on the west. On the north, Oregon was to remain as the boundary, and on the east the Rocky Mountains.” “The word Utah originated with the people inhabiting that region. Early in the 17th century, when New Mexico was first much talked of by the Spaniards, the principal nations of frequent mention as inhabiting the several sides of the locality about that time occupied were the Navajos, the Yutas, the Apaches, and the Comanches. Of the Utah nation, which belongs to the Shoshone



family, there were many tribes. . . . The early orthography of the word Utah is varied." "Yuta" "was a common spelling by the early Spaniards, and might be called the proper one. Later we have 'Youta,' 'Eutaw,' 'Uta,' and 'Utah.'"—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, v. 21 (*Utah*), ch. 17, and foot-note, p. 84.—See, also, AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

#### A. D. 1857-1859.—The Mormon Rebellion.

—"To this would-be 'State of Deseret' President Fillmore had assigned Brigham Young, the spiritual head of the church, as territorial governor; and by 1857, when a Democratic President showed the disposition to apply the usual temporal rule of rotation to the office, Young was rebellious, and the whole Mormon population, refusing allegiance to any one but their consecrated head, began to drill and gird on their armor for resistance. Judges of the territorial courts had to flee for their lives; justice, which had long been tampered with to absolve church members from punishment, was deprived of process. It was charged that the Mormon hierarchy had leagued with Indian tribes to impel them to atrocities against the Gentile inhabitants, while their own Danites, or destroying angels, were secretly set apart and bound by horrid oath to pillage and murder such as made themselves obnoxious to the theocracy. . . . President Buchanan appointed as the new governor of Utah Alfred Cumming, a man combining courage with discretion, and filled the judicial and other vacancies which existed. To protect those new officers and aid them in discharging their functions, he ordered a detachment of regulars to accompany them to the Salt Lake region. The need of this was soon apparent. Early in September, 1857, a part of the troops left Fort Laramie, and on the 15th of the same month Brigham Young, parading audaciously the commission he still held from the United States, forbade all armed forces from entering the territory, and called upon his people to defend themselves against the 'armed mercenary mob' of invaders. His legislature, meeting later, sustained him in his bitter diatribe against the 'profane, drunken, and corrupt officials,' which a Washington administration was trying to force upon Utah territory at the point of the bayonet. A Mormon force had meanwhile advanced to impede the approach of our regulars, capturing and burning three supply trains of wagons laden with tents and provisions, stampeding the horses, and so crippling Fort Bridger, which was distant some twelve days' march from Salt Lake city, as to deprive our army, on its arrival, of a proper winter's shelter after its long and fatiguing march, and compel General Johnston, who commanded this important post, to despatch part of his forces upon a dreary and hazardous expedition to New Mexico for further supplies. Johnston's despatches in October showed the President that unless a large force was quickly sent out, a long conflict would be inevitable. Buchanan and his Secretary of War asked from the present Congress ten new regiments, of which five might be used to bring the Mormons to subjection. But the Le-compton controversy was raging; and the use of Federal troops to put down the free-State movement in Kansas had caused such mistrust and irritation that none but the President's

unshaken supporters felt inclined to place more troops at his disposal. The bill for an army increase was lost, though both Houses passed a measure authorizing the President to accept for the Utah disturbances two regiments of volunteers. The volunteers were not called out; but Buchanan mustered a military force out of the regulars strong enough to overawe and overpower Utah's rebellious inhabitants. Two peace commissioners also bore to Utah a proclamation from the President, dated April 6th, which offered free pardon, except to those who persisted still in disloyal resistance. Governor Cumming, upon his arrival, made a like announcement. These conciliatory efforts, backed by an irresistible show of military strength, brought the Mormons to a speedy acknowledgment of allegiance. They fought not a battle, but manifested a purpose to burn their houses and make a new and peaceable retreat into the wilderness. From this purpose, after some conferences, they were at length dissuaded; and it was agreed in June between the Mormon leaders and our commissioners that the United States soldiery should be kept out of sight as much as possible while Utah remained tranquil. On the last day of the same month the new governor, accompanied by Brigham Young, came back to Salt Lake city to assume functions which were fully recognized. A few days earlier, and before the Mormons had begun to return to their homes, General Johnston and his troops, leaving Fort Bridger, reached the desolate city, marched through its streets, and, crossing its river Jordan, encamped on the opposite bank. While abandoning all further effort at violent resistance, the Mormons still clung to the hope of being left to govern themselves and preserve their institutions against the world's contaminating touch, by gaining the indispensable condition of practical isolation and independence. To this Congress in its next winter's session they renewed the former petitions they had presented for immediate admission to the Union as the 'State of Deseret.' And should this request be denied, they prayed that the organic act of the territory might be so amended as to give the inhabitants the right to choose their own governor, judges, and other officers. All this Congress quietly ignored; and in military circles it was still generally believed that, for all this outward show of loyal acquiescence, the Mormons felt at heart no more affection for the United States than for any foreign nation; that the only rule they really recognized was that of their religion and the will of their hierarchy; and that force must still be used to compel them. Such views were entertained by General Albert Sidney Johnston, the military commander at Utah, destined to later distinction in the art of war. But Cumming, the governor, who had the temporizing instincts of a civilian, thought differently. The two came into collision when Mormons were brought to trial in the courts for a slaughter of emigrants in 1857, known as the Mountain Meadow massacre. [This was the massacre, by Indians and Mormons, of a party of 136 emigrants, from Arkansas and Missouri, who were passing through Utah to California; it occurred in September, 1857, in a valley called the Mountain Meadows, about 300 miles south of Salt Lake city; only 17 young children were saved from the slaughter.] At the request of the

Federal judge, Johnston furnished a military detachment to guard the prisoners; and when Cumming, the governor, interposed because of the angry remonstrance of the people, Johnston would not remove them. Buchanan, being appealed to, sustained the governor's authority."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 22 (v. 5).

Also in: H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, v. 21, ch. 18-21.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 13.—Mrs. T. B. H. Stenhouse, *Tell it All*, ch. 23.—*Report of U. S. Sec. of the Interior*, 36th Congress, 1st sess., *Senate Ex. Doc.*, no. 42 (v. 11).

**A. D. 1882-1893.—The Edmunds Act and its enforcement.—Abandonment of Polygamy by the Mormons.—Proclamation of Amnesty for past offenses against the law.**—In March, 1882, an Act of Congress (known as the Edmunds Act) was passed for the purpose of making efficient the law against polygamy in the territories, which had stood among the statutes of the United States for twenty years, without power on the part of the federal courts or officials in Utah to enforce it, as against Mormon juries. Besides repeating the penalties prescribed in the Act of 1862, the Act of 1882 provides, in its eighth section, that "no polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabiting with more than one woman, and no woman cohabiting with any of the persons described as aforesaid in this section, in any Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in any such Territory or other place, or be eligible for election or appointment to or be entitled to hold any office or place of public trust, honor, or emolument in, under, or for any such Territory or place, or under the United States." The ninth and last section is as follows: "Sec. 9. That all the registration and election offices of every description in the Territory of Utah are hereby declared vacant, and each and every duty relating to the registration of voters, the conduct of elections, the receiving or rejection of votes, and the canvassing and returning of the same, and the issuing of certificates or other evidence of election, in said Territory, shall, until other provisions be made by the legislative assembly of said Territory, as is hereinafter by this section provided, be performed, under the existing laws of the United States and said Territory, by proper persons, who shall be appointed to execute such offices and perform such duties by a Board of five persons, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of one political party, and a majority of whom shall be a quorum. The members of said Board so appointed by the President shall each receive a salary at the rate of three thousand dollars per annum, and shall continue in office until the legislative assembly of said Territory shall make provision for filling said offices as herein authorized. The Secretary of the Territory shall be the secretary of said Board and keep a journal of its proceedings, and attest the action of said Board under this section. The canvass and return of all the votes at elections in said Territory for members of the legislative assembly thereof shall also be returned to said Board, which shall canvass all such returns and issue certificates of election for those persons who, being eligible for such election, shall appear to

have been lawfully elected, which certificates shall be the only evidence of the right of such persons to sit in such assembly: Provided, That said Board of five persons shall not exclude any person otherwise eligible to vote from the polls on account of any opinion such person may entertain on the subject of bigamy or polygamy, nor shall they refuse to count any such vote on account of the opinion of the person casting it on the subject of bigamy or polygamy, but each house of such assembly, after its organization, shall have power to decide upon the elections and qualifications of its members. And at or after the first meeting of said legislative assembly whose members shall have been elected and returned according to the provisions of this act, said legislative assembly may make such laws, conformable to the organic act of said Territory, and not inconsistent with other laws of the United States, as it shall deem proper concerning the filling of the offices in said Territory declared vacant by this act."—The following Proclamation, issued by the President of the United States on the 4th day of January, 1893, may be looked upon as the sequel and consequence of the legislation recorded above: "Whereas Congress, by a statute approved March 22, 1882, and by statutes in furtherance and amendment thereof, defined the crimes of bigamy, polygamy, and unlawful cohabitation in the Territories and other places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and prescribed a penalty for such crimes; and Whereas, on or about the 6th day of October, 1890, the Church of the Latter-Day Saints, commonly known as the Mormon Church, through its president, issued a manifesto proclaiming the purpose of said church no longer to sanction the practice of polygamous marriages and calling upon all members and adherents of said church to obey the laws of the United States in reference to said subject-matter; and Whereas it is represented that since the date of said declaration the members and adherents of said church have generally obeyed said laws and have abstained from plural marriages and polygamous cohabitation; and Whereas, by a petition dated December 19, 1891, the officials of said church, pledging the membership thereof to a faithful obedience to the laws against plural marriage and unlawful cohabitation, have applied to me to grant amnesty for past offenses against said laws, which request a very large number of influential non-Mormons, residing in the Territories, have also strongly urged; and Whereas, the Utah Commission, in their report bearing date September 15, 1892, recommended that said petition be granted and said amnesty proclaimed, under proper conditions as to the future observance of the law, with a view to the encouragement of those now disposed to become law abiding citizens; and Whereas, during the past two years such amnesty has been granted to individual applicants in a very large number of cases, conditioned upon the faithful observance of the laws of the United States against unlawful cohabitation; and there are now pending many more such applications: Now therefore, I, Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested, do hereby declare and grant a full amnesty and pardon to all persons liable to the penalties of said act by reason of unlawful cohabitation under the color of polygamous or plural marriage, who have since November 1,



1890, abstained from such unlawful cohabitation; but upon the express condition that they shall in the future faithfully obey the laws of the United States hereinbefore named, and not otherwise. Those who shall fail to avail themselves of the clemency hereby offered will be vigorously prosecuted. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington this 4th day of January, in the year of our Lord 1893, and of the Independence of the United States the 117th. Benjamin Harrison."

**A. D. 1894-1895.**—Provision for admission to the Union as a State. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1894-1895.

**UTAHS, UTES, PIUTES, etc.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

**UTICA: Origin.**—"The most ancient Phœnician colonies were Utica, nearly on the northernmost point of the coast of Africa, and in the same gulf (now known as the gulf of Tunis) as Carthage, over against Cape Lilybæum in Sicily, — and Gades, or Gadeira, on the south-western coast of Spain; a town which, founded perhaps near one thousand years before the Christian era, has maintained a continuous prosperity, and a name (Cadiz) substantially unaltered, longer than any town in Europe. How well the site of Utica was suited to the circumstances of Phœnician colonists may be inferred from the fact that Carthage was afterwards established in the same gulf and near to the same spot, and that both the two cities reached a high pitch of prosperity."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 18.

**Relations to Carthage.** See CARTHAGE, THE DOMINION OF.

**Curio's defeat.**—Curio, the legate or lieutenant sent first by Cæsar to Africa (B. C. 49), to attack the Pompeian forces in that quarter, undertook with two legions to reduce the city of Utica, which had become the capital of the Roman Province. Juba, king of Numidia, who was personally hostile to both Curio and Cæsar, came to the assistance of the Pompeians and forced Curio to withdraw from its besieging lines into the neighboring Cornelian camp, which was a famous military entrenchment left by Scipio Africanus. There he might have waited in safety for re-enforcements; but the wily Numidian tempted him out by a feigned retreat and then overwhelmed him. Curio and most of his men were slain.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 16.

**Last stand of the opponents of Cæsar.** See ROME: B. C. 47-46.

**UTOPIAS.** See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: UTOPIAS, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

**UTRAQUISTS, The.** See BOHEMIA: A. D. 1419-1434.

**UTRECHT: The Episcopal Principality.**—"At the last ford of the Rhine a hamlet had in Roman times been built, possibly a fort also. Nothing is preserved regarding it but the name, which, in the mutations of language, passed from Ultrajectum into Utrecht. Towards the conclusion of the 7th century, Clement Willbrod, an English priest, who had been educated at the monastery of Ripon, coming as a missionary into those parts, succeeded, with the

aid of eleven of his fellow-countrymen, in winning over the Frisian people to the Christian faith. He fixed his abode at Utrecht, of which he was afterwards appointed bishop; and gifts of land, at the time of little worth, were made to his successors by Pepin and Charlemagne. Such was the commencement of the temporal grandeur of the prince-bishops, whose dynasty attained to a power little less than sovereign during the middle ages. . . . With ready access to the sea, and not without an early disposition towards these pursuits which their kinsmen of the Rhineland towns were beginning to follow, the inhabitants of Utrecht soon became good sailors and good weavers, and their city threw apace. Enriched by successive grants of privileges and lands, the bishops of Utrecht gradually became powerful feudal lords."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial Hist. of Free Nations*, ch. 8 (v. 2).

**A. D. 1456.**—The bishopric grasped by the House of Burgundy.—"Utrecht was still a separate state, governed by its sovereign bishop, who was elected by the votes of the chapter, subject to the approval of the Pope. On the vacancy which occurred towards the end of the year 1455, the choice of the canons fell upon Gisbert van Brederode, who had previously been archdeacon of the cathedral, and was held in general esteem amongst the people as well as the clergy. The Duke of Burgundy coveted so rich a prize, rather for its political importance, however, . . . than for any direct or immediate gain." The Duke appealed to Rome; Gisbert was put back into his archdeaconry, with an annuity for life, and David, a natural son of Duke Philip, was made bishop. "Thus the foundation was laid for the permanent union of Utrecht to the other provinces, although its final accomplishment was destined to be deferred yet many years."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial Hist. of Free Nations*, ch. 10 (v. 2).

**A. D. 1576.**—The Spanish Fury. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1575-1577.

**A. D. 1579.**—The Union of the Seven Provinces. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1577-1581.

**A. D. 1712-1714.**—The Treaties which ended the War of the Spanish Succession, forming the Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.—The long War of the Spanish Succession was brought to a close (except as between Germany and France) by negotiations at Utrecht, which resulted in the concluding of a number of treaties between the several powers concerned, constituting collectively what is known as the Peace of Utrecht. Negotiations to this end were begun by England and France early in 1711, and preliminaries were settled between them and signed in October of that year. This action of the English compelled the other allies to consent to a general conference, which opened at Utrecht January 29, 1712. The discussion of terms lasted more than a year, while the war went on. Between Germany and France the war still continued and it was at Rastadt (March, 1714), not Utrecht, that the last named powers came to their agreement of peace. The several treaties concluded at Utrecht were most of them signed on the 31st day of March, O. S., or April 11, N. S., in the year 1713, "by the plenipotentiaries of France, England, Portugal, Prussia, Savoy, and the United Provinces; the emperor resolving to continue the war, and the

king of Spain refusing to sign the stipulations until a principality should be provided in the Low Countries for the princess Ursini, the favourite of his queen [a demand which he subsequently withdrew]. The chief articles of this memorable pacification were to the following purport: It was stipulated that, . . . Philip, now established on the Spanish throne, should renounce all right to the crown of France; that the dukes of Berry and Orléans, the next heirs to the French monarchy after the infant dauphin, should in like manner renounce all right to the crown of Spain, in the event of their accession to the French throne; that, on the death of Philip, and in default of his male issue, the succession of Spain and the Indies should be secured to the duke of Savoy; that the island of Sicily should be instantly ceded by his Catholic majesty to the same prince, with the title of king; that France should also cede to him the valleys of Pragelas, Oulx, Sezanne, Bardonnache, and Châteaudauphin, with the forts of Exilles and Fenestrelles, and restore to him the duchy of Savoy and the county of Nice; and that the full property and sovereignty of both banks and the navigation of the Marañon, or river of Amazons, in South America, should belong to the king of Portugal. It was declared that the king of Prussia should receive Spanish Guelderland, with the sovereignty of Neufchâtel and Valengin, in exchange for the principality of Orange and the lordship of Châlons, and that his regal title should be acknowledged; that the Rhine should form the boundary of the German empire on the side of France; and that all fortifications, beyond that river, claimed by France, or in the possession of his most Christian majesty, should either be relinquished to the emperor or destroyed; that the kingdom of Naples, the duchy of Milan, and the Spanish territories on the Tuscan shore, should be ceded to the house of Austria; that the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands should likewise be secured to that family; but that the elector of Bavaria (to whom they had been granted by Philip) should retain such places as were still in his possession, until he should be reinstated in all his German dominions, except the Upper Palatinate, and also be put in possession of the island of Sardinia, with the title of king; that Luxemburg, Namur, and Charleroy should be given to the states-general as a barrier, together with Mons, Menin, Tournay, and other places; and that Lisle, Aire, Bethune, and St. Venant, should be restored to France. It was agreed that the French monarch should acknowledge the title of queen Anne, and the eventual succession of the family of Hanover to the British throne; that the fortifications of Dunkirk (the cause of much jealousy to England, and raised at vast expense to France) should be demolished, and the harbour filled up; that the island of St. Christopher (which had long been possessed jointly by the French and English, but from which the French had been expelled in 1702) should be subject to this country [England]; that Hudson's Bay and Straits (where the French had founded a settlement, but without dispossessing the English, and carried on a rival trade during the war), the town of Placentia, and other districts of the island of Newfoundland (where the French had been suffered to establish themselves, through the negligence of government), and the long-disputed province

of Nova Scotia (into which the French had early intruded, out of which they had been frequently driven, and which had been finally conquered by an army from New England in 1710), should be considered as the dependencies of the British crown: that Minorca and the fortress of Gibraltar (conquered from Spain) should remain in the possession of Great Britain; and that the Asiento, or contract for furnishing the Spanish colonies in South America with negroes, should belong to the subjects of Great Britain for the term of thirty years. That these conditions, especially on the part of Great Britain, were very inadequate to the success and expense of the war, will be allowed by every intelligent man, whose understanding is not warped by political prejudices. . . . The other confederates had greater cause to be satisfied, and the emperor [Charles VI.] as much as any of them; yet was he obstinate in refusing to sign the general pacification, though two months were allowed him to deliberate on the terms. But he had soon reason to repent his rashness in resolving to continue the war alone. . . . The imperial army on the Rhine, commanded by prince Eugene, was not in a condition to face the French under Villars, who successively took Worms, Spire, Keiserlautern, and the important fortress of Landau. He forced the passage of the Rhine . . . and reduced Freyburg, the capital of the Breisgau. Unwilling to prosecute a disastrous war, the emperor began seriously to think of peace; and conferences, which afterward terminated in a pacific treaty, were opened between prince Eugene and Villars, at Ranstadt. The terms of this treaty, concluded on the 6th of March (N. S.) 1714 [but ratified at Baden the next September, and sometimes called the Treaty of Baden], were less favourable to the emperor than those which had been offered at Utrecht. The king of France retained Landau, which he had before proposed to cede, with several fortresses behind the Rhine, which he had agreed to demolish [but restored Freiburg]. He procured the full re-establishment of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne in their dominions and dignities; the former prince consenting to relinquish Sardinia to the emperor, in return for the Upper Palatinate. . . . The principal articles in regard to Italy and the Low Countries were the same with those settled at Utrecht. Relaxing in his obstinacy, the king of Spain also acceded to the general pacification."—W. Russell, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, pt. 2, letter 23 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: J. W. Gerard, *The Peace of Utrecht*, ch. 24-29.—T. Macknight, *Life of Bolingbroke*, ch. 8-9.—G. W. Cooke, *Memoirs of Bolingbroke*, v. 1, ch. 13.—W. Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough*, ch. 108-110.—J. C. Collins, *Bolingbroke*, sect. 1.—A. Hassall, *Life of Bolingbroke*, ch. 3.—See, also, ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713; SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1698-1776; CANADA: A. D. 1711-1713; and NEWFOUNDLAND: A. D. 1713.

#### UTRECHT SCHOOL OF ST. MARTIN.

See EDUCATION, MEDIEVAL: NETHERLANDS.

UXBRIDGE, Attempted Treaty of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1645 (JANUARY—FEBRUARY).

UXELLODUNUM, Siege of. See GAUL: B. C. 58-51.

UXMAL, Ruins of. See MEXICO: ANCIENT.

UZBEGS. See USBEKS.

UZES, The. See PATCHINKAS.



## V.

**VACALUS, The.**—The ancient name of the river Waal.

**VACCÆI, The.**—One of the tribes of the Celtiberians in ancient Spain.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 1.

**VACCINATION, The discovery of.** See MEDICAL SCIENCE: 18TH CENTURY.

**VACOMAGI, The.**—A tribe in ancient Caledonia, whose territory extended along the border of the Highlands, from the Moray Firth to the Tay. See BRITAIN: CELTIC TRIBES.

**VACSLAV.** See WENCESLAUS.

**VADIMONIAN LAKE, Battle of the.** See ROME: B. C. 295-191.

**VAISYAS.** See CASTE SYSTEM OF INDIA.

**VALDEMAR I. (called The Great), King of Denmark,** A. D. 1157-1182....**Valdemar I., King of Sweden,** 1266-1275....**Valdemar II., King of Denmark,** 1202-1241....**Valdemar III., King of Denmark,** 1340-1375.

**VALDEVEZ, The Tourney of.** See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1095-1325.

**VALEA ALBA, Battle of (1476).** See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14-18TH CENTURIES (ROUMANIA, ETC.)

**VALENCIA: A. D. 1031-1092.**—The seat of a Moorish kingdom. See SPAIN: A. D. 1031-1086.

**Valenciennes: A. D. 1566.**—Crushing of the first revolt against Spanish tyranny in the Netherlands. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1566-1568.

**A. D. 1576.**—The Spanish Fury. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1575-1577.

**A. D. 1583.**—Submission to Spain. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1584-1585.

**A. D. 1656.**—Siege and failure of Turenne. See FRANCE: A. D. 1653-1656.

**A. D. 1677.**—Taken by Louis XIV. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1674-1678.

**A. D. 1679.**—Cession to France. See NIMÉGUEN, THE PEACE OF.

**A. D. 1793.**—Siege and capture by the Austrians. See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (JULY-DECEMBER) PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

**A. D. 1794.**—Recovery by the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).

**VALENS, Roman Emperor (Eastern),** A. D. 364-378.

**VALENTIA.**—One of the Roman provinces formed in Britain, extending from the wall of Hadrian to the wall of Antoninus, covering southern Scotland. It was named in honor of the Emperor Valentinian. See BRITAIN: A. D. 323-337; and 367-370.

**VALENTINE, Pope,** A. D. 827, September to October.

**VALENTINIAN I., Roman Emperor (Western),** A. D. 364-375....**Valentinian II., Roman Emperor (Western),** 375-392....**Valentinian III., Roman Emperor (Western),** 425-455.

**VALERIAN, Roman Emperor,** A. D. 253-260.

**VALERIAN LAWS.** See ROME: B. C. 509.

**VALERIO-HORATIAN LAWS, The.** See ROME: B. C. 449.

**VAL-ES-DUNES, Battle of (1047).** See NORMANDY: A. D. 1035-1063.

**VALLACHIA.** See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES.

**VALLACHS, The.** See WALLACHS.

**VALLADOLID, Battle of (1813).** See MEXICO: A. D. 1810-1819.

**VALLANDIGHAM, Clement L., The arrest of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (MAY-JUNE).

**VALLEY FORGE: Washington's army in winter quarters.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY-DECEMBER).

**VALLI.-VALLUM.** See CASTRA.

**VALMY, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER).

**VALOIS, The House of.**—The direct line of the Capetian kings of France, descendants of Hugh Capet, ended in 1328, with the death of Charles IV. The crown then passed to the late king's cousin, Philip of Valois, son of Charles Count of Valois, who was the second son of Philip III. He became Philip VI. in the series of French kings, and with him began the royal dynasty or House of Valois, which came to an end in 1589, on the assassination of Henry III, yielding the throne to the Bourbon family. See FRANCE: A. D. 1314-1328. For source of the name, see BOURBON, THE HOUSE OF.

**VALOUTINA, Battle of.** See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (JUNE-SEPTEMBER).

**VALTELLINE, Annexation to the Cisalpine Republic.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).

**VALTELLINE WAR.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.

**VAN BUREN, Martin.**—Presidential election and administration. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1836, to 1841....**Defeat in Presidential Election.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1840....**The Free Soil Movement.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1848.

**VANCOUVER'S ISLAND.** See BRITISH COLUMBIA.

**VANDALIA, The proposed western colony of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1765-1768.

**VANDALS: Origin and early movements.**—"Gibbon declares that a striking resemblance, in manners, complexion, religion, and language, indicates that the Goths and Vandals were originally one great people; and he cites the testimony of Pliny and Procopius in support of this belief. According to this theory, therefore, the Vandals are of the Teutonic stock. Other learned men have endeavoured to identify them with the Wendes; and the Wendes, as we have seen, according to the authority of Jornandes and others, were members of the Slavic race. The question has been examined, with great learning and ingenuity, by M. L. Marcus, Professor at the College of Dijon, in a work upon Vandal history. His conclusion, drawn from a comparison of what Tacitus, Pliny, Procopius, and Jornandes have left us upon the subject, is favourable to the hypothesis of Gibbon. Between the Wendes and the Vindili of Pliny, who were undoubtedly Vandals, he considers that no nearer point of union can be found than that of the Asiatic origin common to all nations of Slavic and Teutonic blood. He accounts for the fact that some confusion upon the subject subsists in ancient

writers, by the supposition that the Slaves, after the great migration of Goths and Vandals to the South, occupied the locality they had abandoned on the coasts of the Baltic, and became inheritors of the name, as well as of the land, of their predecessors. Hence they were commonly, though incorrectly, called Vindili, or Vandals. . . . The earliest locality of the tribe, so far as authentic history can trace them, seems to have been the district between the Vistula and the Elbe. Here they were found by the Langobardi, in their migration towards the South. . . . In the time of Pliny, we have that writer's testimony to the fact that the Vandals were still to be found between the two rivers. But during the next two centuries their unwarlike habits must have tended to diminish their importance among their fierce and active neighbours, of whom the Goths were the most formidable, and probably the most aggressive. Tacitus, at any rate, in his tractate upon the Germans [A. D. 100], merely notices them by name. . . . Another half-century finds them in a strong position among the mountains which form the northern frontier of Bohemia. It is certain that they took part in the great Marcomannic war [A. D. 168-180]. . . . In the treaty made by Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius, with the Marcomanni [A. D. 180], the Vandals are one of the tribes secured from the hostility of those persevering enemies of the Roman empire. At this time, Ptolemy informs us that the Vandals occupied the districts lying around the sources of the Elbe; and all other investigation confirms the statement." A hundred years later, the Vandals appear to have been planted in a district on the Danube, east of the Theiss; from which they were soon afterwards driven by the Goths. They were then permitted by the emperor Constantine to pass the frontiers of the empire and settle in Pannonia, where they accepted Christianity and exhibited "the greatest aptitude for commerce and the arts of peace." Despite their Christianity, however, and despite their aptitude for the "arts of peace," the Vandals, after seventy years of friendly neighboring with the Romans, joined the savage pack of Alans, Sueves and Burgundians which, on the last day of the year 406, broke into Gaul and shattered the empire and the civilization of Rome beyond the Alps.—J. G. Sheppard, *The Fall of Rome*, lect. 7.

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, bk. 3, ch. 2 (v. 2).

A. D. 406-409.—Final Invasion of Gaul. See GAUL: A. D. 406-409.

A. D. 409-414.—Settlement in Spain. See SPAIN: A. D. 409-414.

A. D. 428.—Conquests in Spain.—"After the retreat of the Goths [A. D. 418] the authority of Honorius had obtained a precarious establishment in Spain, except only in the province of Galicia, where the Suevi and the Vandals had fortified their camps in mutual discord and hostile independence. The Vandals prevailed, and their adversaries were besieged in the Nervasian hills, between Leon and Oviedo, till the approach of Count Asterius compelled, or rather provoked, the victorious barbarians to remove the scene of war to the plains of Bætica. The rapid progress of the Vandals soon required a more effectual opposition, and the master-general Castinus marched against them with a numerous army of Romans and Goths. Vanquished in battle by an

inferior enemy, Castinus fled with dishonour to Tarragona. . . . Seville and Carthagena became the reward, or rather the prey, of the ferocious conquerors."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 33.—Southern Spain, the ancient Bætica, acquired from the Vandals the name Vandalusia, which became Andalusia.—R. G. Latham, *Ethnology of Europe*, ch. 2.

A. D. 429-439.—Conquests in Africa.—In May, A. D. 429, the Vandals passed from Spain into Africa, invited by Count Boniface, the Roman governor of the African province. The latter had been deceived by an intriguing rival, Count Aetius, who persuaded him that the imperial Court at Ravenna were planning his disgrace and death. Thus incited to rebellion, as an act of self defense, he called the Vandals to his help. The latter had just fallen under the leadership of a new and terrible king—the bold and ruthless Genseric, who was destined to make the name of his people a proverb through all time for ferocity and barbarism. To the Vandals were united the Alans, and Genseric invaded Africa with some 80,000 men. He was joined, moreover, by great numbers of disaffected native Mauritanians, or Moors, and was welcomed by swarms of the fanatical Donatists, whose "vandalism" could quite equal his own. Count Boniface shrank aghast from the terrible invasion he had summoned, and learning, too late, how foully he had been played upon, returned to his allegiance with penitent energy and zeal. He turned his arms against Genseric; but it was in vain. "The victorious barbarians insulted the open country; and Carthage, Cirta, and Hippo Regius were the only cities that appeared to rise above the general inundation. . . . The seven fruitful provinces, from Tangier to Tripoli, were overwhelmed. . . . The Vandals, where they found resistance, seldom gave quarter; and the deaths of their valiant countrymen were expiated by the ruin of the cities under whose walls they had fallen. Careless of the distinctions of age or sex or rank, they employed every species of indignity and torture to force from the captives a discovery of their hidden wealth." Defeated in a battle which he ventured, Boniface retired into Hippo Regius and stood a siege of fourteen months. A second battle, won by the Vandals, decided the fate of the city, but its inhabitants escaped, for the most part, by sea, before the barbarians broke in. The great Bishop of Hippo, the venerable St. Augustine, was in the city when the siege began, but died before it ended, in his seventy-sixth year. "When the city, some months after his death, was burned by the Vandals, the library was fortunately saved which contained his voluminous writings." Hippo fell in the summer of A. D. 431. It was not until eight years later that Carthage succumbed,—taken treacherously, by surprise, on the 9th of October, 439; being 585 years after the destruction of the ancient city by the younger Scipio. The provinces of Africa were now fully in the possession of the Vandals, and the loss of their corn supply carried famine to Rome and Italy.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 33.

ALSO IN: J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 7.—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 3, ch. 2.

A. D. 429-477.—In Sicily. See SICILY: A. D. 429-525.



**A. D. 431-533.—Ruin of Africa under their dominion.**—"The Vandals were bigoted Arians and their government was peculiarly tyrannical; they always treated the Roman inhabitants of Africa as political enemies, and persecuted them as religious opponents. The Visigoths in Spain had occupied two thirds of the subjugated lands, the Ostrogoths in Italy had been satisfied with one third; and both these people had acknowledged the civil rights of the Romans as citizens and Christians. The Vandals adopted a different policy. Genseric reserved immense domains to himself and to his sons. He divided the densely peopled and rich districts of Africa proper among the Vandal warriors, exempting them from taxation and binding them to military service. . . . They seized all the richest lands, and the most valuable estates, and exterminated the higher class of the Romans. Only the poorer proprietors were permitted to preserve the arid and distant parts of the country. Still, the number of the Romans excited the fears of the Vandals, who destroyed the walls of the provincial towns in order to prevent the people from receiving succours from the Eastern Empire. . . . When Genseric conquered Carthage, his whole army amounted only to 50,000 warriors; yet this small horde devoured all the wealth of Africa in the course of a single century, and, from an army of hardy soldiers, it was converted into a caste of luxurious nobles living in splendid villas round Carthage. In order fully to understand the influence of the Vandals on the state of the country which they occupied, it must be observed that their oppressive government had already so far lowered the condition and reduced the numbers of the Roman provincials, that the native Moors began to reoccupy the country from which Roman industry and Roman capital had excluded them. . . . As the property of the province was destroyed, its Roman inhabitants perished."—G. Finlay, *Greece Under the Romans*, ch. 3, sect. 5.

**A. D. 455.—The sack of Rome by Genseric.** See **ROME**: A. D. 455

**A. D. 533-534.—End of the kingdom and nation.**—"The weakened and disordered state of the Vandal kingdom, concurring with the revival of a military spirit in the eastern Roman empire, which the great soldier Belisarius had brought about, encouraged the Emperor Justinian to attempt, A. D. 533, a reconquest of the lost Roman provinces in Africa. With a fleet of six hundred ships, bearing 37,000 men, Belisarius set sail from Constantinople in the month of June and landed early in September on the African coast, about five days journey from Carthage,—having halted at a port in Sicily on the voyage. A few days later, he defeated the Vandal king, Gelimer, in a battle (Ad Decimus) fought at ten miles distance from his capital, and entered Carthage in triumph (September 15, A. D. 533), received with joy by its Roman and Catholic inhabitants, long persecuted and humiliated by the Arian Vandals. A second and decisive battle was fought some weeks afterwards at Tricamarum, twenty miles away from Carthage, and there and then the Vandal kingdom came to its end. Gelimer fled into the wilds of Numidia, was pursued, and, having surrendered himself in the March following, was sent to Constantinople, and passed the remainder of his days in peace and modest luxury on a comfortable estate in Galatia.

"The fall of the Vandal monarchy was an event full of meaning for the future history of Africa. There can be little doubt that in destroying it Justinian was unconsciously removing the most powerful barrier which might in the next century have arrested the progress of Mohammedanism."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 4, ch. 15 (v. 3).—"The bravest of the Vandal youth were distributed into five squadrons of cavalry, which adopted the name of their benefactor. . . . But these rare exceptions, the reward of birth or valour, are insufficient to explain the fate of a nation whose numbers, before a short and bloodless war, amounted to more than 600,000 persons. After the exile of their king and nobles, the servile crowd might purchase their safety by abjuring their character, religion, and language; and their degenerate posterity would be insensibly mingled with the common herd of African subjects. Yet even in the present age, and in the heart of the Moorish tribes, a curious traveller has discovered the white complexion and long flaxen hair of a northern race; and it was formerly believed that the boldest of the Vandals fled beyond the power, or even the knowledge, of the Romans, to enjoy their solitary freedom on the shores of the Atlantic ocean."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 41.

**VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.** See **EDUCATION**, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1769-1884.

**VAN DIEMEN'S LAND, OR TASMANIA.** See **TASMANIA**; and **AUSTRALIA**: A. D. 1601-1800.

**VANGIONES.—TRIBOCI.—NEMETES.**—"These tribes dwelt on the west bank of the Rhine, in what is now Rhenish Bavaria."—Tacitus, *Germany*; tr. by Church and Brodrick, with *genl. note*.

**VANNES, Origin of.** See **VENETI OF WESTERN GAUL**.

**VAN RENSSELAER, Patroon Killian,** The land purchases of. See **NEW YORK**: A. D. 1621-1646.

**VAN RENSSELAER, General Stephen,** and the Battle of Queenston Heights. See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1813 (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER).

**VAN RENSSELAER MANOR.** See **NEW YORK**: A. D. 1621-1646; and **LIVINGSTON MANOR**.

**VAN TWILLER, Wouter,** The governorship of. See **NEW YORK**: A. D. 1638-1647.

**VARANGIAN SEA.**—One of the ancient names of the Baltic.—R. G. Latham, *Native Races of Russian Empire*, ch. 16.

**VARANGIANS, OR WARINGS.—THE WARING GUARD.**—Varangians "was the name of the Byzantine equivalent to the 'soldiers of a free-company' in the 11th and 12th centuries. The soldiers were almost wholly Scandinavians—to a great extent the Swedes of Russia. The reasons against believing Varangian to be the same word as Frank, are: 1. The mention of Franci along with them, as a separate people. 2. The extent to which the Varangians were Scandinavians, rather than Germans of the Rhine. In favour of it is: The form of the present Oriental name for Europeans—Feringi. This, in my mind, preponderates. Connected by name only with the Franks, the truer ethnological affinities of the Varangians

were with the Scandinavians of Russia."—R. G. Latham, *The Germania of Tacitus, Epilegomena*, sect. 17.—"Many of the Warings and probably of the English also had taken military service at an early period under the Byzantine emperors. They formed a body-guard for the Emperor, and soon gained for themselves a renown greater than that possessed by the earlier imperial guard of the Immortals. The Byzantine writers usually speak of them as the barbarian guard or as the axe-bearers. Their weapon was the Danish battle-axe, or rather bill, and seems not to have had two blades turning different ways like those of a halberd, but to have had one with a sharp steel spike projecting, so that the weapon could be used either to strike or to thrust. Anna, the daughter of Alexis the First, calls them Warings or Varangians. Nicetas speaks of them as Germans. The Western writers call them usually Danes, or 'English and Danes.' The conquest of England by William the Norman caused many of the English to emigrate to Russia and so to Constantinople, where they joined the Waring guard. . . . Warings and English, while occupants of the Greek palace, still spoke their own language, had their own laws, and chose, with certain exceptions, their own officers. The one in command was called the acolyth, or follower, because his place was immediately behind the Emperor."—E. Pears, *The Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 6, sect. 3.

Also in: V. Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia*, lect. 3.—See, also, RUSSIA: A. D. 862.

**VARAVILLE, Battle of.**—A decisive victory over the French, invading Normandy, by Duke William—afterwards the Conqueror of England—A. D. 1058.—E. A. Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, ch. 12, sect. 2 (v. 3).

**VARCHONITES, The.** See AVARS.

**VARIAN LAW.** See MAJESTAS.

**VARIAN MASSACRE, The.** See GERMANY: B. C. 8—A. D. 11.

**VARINI, The.** See AVIONES.

**VARKANA.** See HYRCANIA.

**VARNA, The battle of (1444).** See TURKS: A. D. 1402-1451. . . . **Siege and capture (1828).** See TURKS: A. D. 1826-1829.

**VARUS, and his Legions, The destruction of.** See GERMANY: B. C. 8—A. D. 11.

**VASCONES, The.** See BASQUES.

**VASSAL.** See FEUDALISM.

**VASSAR COLLEGE.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS, &c.: A. D. 1804-1891.

**VASSILI.** See BASIL.

**VASSY, The Massacre of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1560-1563.

**VATICAN, THE.—THE LEONINE CITY.**—"The name Vatican was applied by the writers of the Augustan age to the whole range of hills extending along the western bank of the Tiber, including the Janiculum and the Monte Mario. . . . But the name Vaticanus has now been restricted to the small hill standing behind the Basilica of St. Peter's, upon which the Vatican Museum and the Papal Gardens are situated. This hill is a small projecting portion of the range which includes the Janiculum and Monte Mario, and it is separated from the Janiculum by a depression, along which the street of the Borgo S. Spirito runs. The derivation of the name Vatican is lost. Gellius has preserved a quotation from Varro, in which the word

is said to be derived from a deity Vaticanus, the presiding god of the first rudiments of speech ('vagire,' 'vagitanus'). Paulus Diaconus gives a different explanation, founded on the supposed expulsion of the Etruscans in fulfilment of an oracle ('vatum responso expulsis Etruscis'); and from this Niebuhr and Bunsen, following him, have supposed that an Etruscan city existed here in ancient times. There appears to be no sufficient evidence of such a settlement."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 11.—In the ninth century, at the time of the pontificate of Leo IV., "the nations of the West and North who visited the threshold of the apostles had gradually formed the large and populous suburb of the Vatican, and their various habitations were distinguished, in the language of the times, as the 'schools' of the Greeks and Goths, of the Lombards and Saxons. But this venerable spot was still open to sacrilegious insult: the design of enclosing it with walls and towers exhausted all that authority could command or charity would supply: and the pious labour of four years was animated in every season and at every hour by the presence of the indefatigable pontiff. The love of fame, a generous but worldly passion, may be detected in the name of the Leonine City, which he bestowed on the Vatican; yet the pride of the dedication was tempered with Christian penance and humility."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 52.

**VATICAN COUNCIL, The.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1869-1870.

**VATICAN LIBRARY, The.** See LIBRARIES, MODERN: EUROPE, and ITALY.

**VAUCHAMP, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY—MARCH).

**VAUDOIS.** See WALDENSES.

**VAUGHT'S HILL, Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: TENNESSEE).

**VAVASSOR, OR VAVASOUR.** See FEUDAL TENURES; also CATTANI.

**VECTIGAL, THE.—VECTIGALIA.**—"Pascua—Vectigalia—Publicum—are the terms employed to denote generally the Revenues of Rome, from whatever source derived. Pascua, i. e. Pasture lands, signified Revenue; because, in the earliest ages, the public income was derived solely from the rent of pastures belonging to the state. . . . Vectigal is the word used more frequently than any other to denote the Revenue of the state generally. . . . Publicum, in its widest acceptation, comprehended every thing which belonged to the community at large."—W. Ramsay, *Manual of Roman Antiq.*, ch. 8.—"Cicero states that there was a difference between Sicily and all the other Roman provinces in the management of the Vectigal, which is the name for the contribution which the provinces made to the Roman State. All the provinces except Sicily paid either a fixed land-tax (vectigal stipendiarium) or tenths [decumæ] or other quote of their produce, and these tenths were let at Rome by the censors to the Publicani, who paid the State a certain sum for the privilege of collecting the tenths and made out of them what profit they could. . . . The tenths of wheat and barley were let in Sicily to the Publicani, but sometimes a community would bid for its tenths and pay them itself."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 3, ch. 4.



**VECTIS.**—The ancient name of the Isle of Wight.—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geog.*, ch. 24, sect. 2 (v. 2).

**VEDAS.—VEDIC HYMNS.—VEDISM.** See INDIA: THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS, and IMMIGRATION AND CONQUESTS OF THE ARYAS.

**VEHMERICHTS.—VEHMIC COURTS.**—"In times when political, social, and legal life are in process of fermentation, and struggling towards a new order of things, the ordinary tribunals lose their authority, and from the body of the people men spring up to protect the right in a primitive fashion, and to punish the criminal who has escaped the ordinary penalties of the law. Thus, at the close of the Middle Ages, or, more precisely, the first half of the 15th century, the Vehmgerichts (or Vehmlic Courts, also called Free Courts, Franchise Courts, Secret Courts) rose to an authority which extended all over Germany, which knew no respect of persons, and before which many evil-doers in high places, who had bade defiance to the ordinary tribunals, were made to tremble. The name 'Vehme' is derived from the old German 'ver-vehmen,' which means to ban, or to curse. The Vehmlic courts were peculiar to Westphalia, and even there could only be held on the 'Red Land'—that is, the district between the Rhine and the Weser. They were dependent on the German Emperor alone, and their presidents, the Free-counts, received from the Emperor in person, or from his representative, the Elector of Cologne, the power of life and death. They traced their origin to Charlemagne, who, respecting the legal customs of the old heathen Saxons, introduced county courts among them after they had been converted to Christianity. For, even in the most ancient times, the Saxon freemen used to assemble at an appointed season, after they had held their great sacrifice, and hold a 'Thing' under the presidency of one of their oldest members, called the Grave, or Count, where they inflicted punishment and administered justice. The Vehmlic court consisted of a Free-count and a number of assessors, who were called 'The Initiated,' because they knew the secrets of the holy Vehme. There must be at least fourteen of these assessors, but there were generally twice that number. As it was no secret when a man was an assessor, and as it contributed greatly to the safety of his person, since people took good care not to molest a member of the holy Vehme, it gradually came about that men from every German province obtained admission into the number of assessors. When the Emperor Sigismund was elected into the number of 'The Initiated' at the Franchise Court of Dortmund, the number of assessors is said to have amounted to 100,000, among whom were many princes and nobles. And about a thousand assessors are said to have been present when the ban was issued against Duke Henry of Bavaria in 1429. . . . There was a 'secret court' to which only the initiated had access, and a 'public court' which was held in the morning in the light of day at a known court-house. The presidents' chairs were always set in the open air under a lime, oak, pear, or hawthorn tree, and often near a town, castle, or village. At Dortmund the president's chair was placed close to the town wall under a lime-tree, which, though sadly shattered, is still standing between the rails inside the railway station. Round the stone table were ranged three stone

benches for the assessors; on the table there was carved in relief the German imperial eagle, and on it was placed the sword of justice. . . . The Vehmlic court which was originally, and was bound to be, a public one, gradually altered its character, enveloped itself in mysterious darkness, and under the cloak of secrecy lent itself to all sorts of unrighteous objects. In 1461, accordingly, princes and cities leagued together to suppress the irregularities of these courts, and as soon as the orderly administration of justice came into existence with the rise of the new princely authority, they perished from their own impotence."—A. W. Grube, *Heroes of History and Legend*, ch. 13.

Also in: Sir W. Scott, *Introd. to "Anne of Geierstein."*—A. P. Marras, *Secret Fraternities of the Middle Ages*, ch. 5.

**VEII.—VEIENTINE WARS.** See ROME: B. C. 406–396.

**VELABRUM, The.** See FORUM BOARIUM.

**VELETRI, Battle of.** See ITALY: A. D. 1744. . . . **Battle of (1849).** See ITALY: A. D. 1848–1849.

**VELIBORI, The.** See IRELAND, TRIBES OF EARLY CELTIC INHABITANTS.

**VELITES.**—The light infantry of the Roman army, as distinguished from the heavy-armed legionaries. "The velites did not wear any corslet or cuirass, but their tunic appears to have been formed of leather. . . . It is possible also that the velites sometimes wore, instead of leather, a tunic of quilted linen."—C. Boutell, *Arms and Armour*, ch. 4.

**VELLICA, Battle of.** See CANTABRIANS.

**VELLINGHAUSEN, OR KIRCH-DEN-KERN, Battle of (1761).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1761–1762.

**VELLORE, Sepoy mutiny and massacre at (1806).** See INDIA: A. D. 1805–1816.

**VELOCASSES, The.** See BELGÆ.

**VENATIONES.**—Contests of wild beasts with each other or with men, in the Roman amphitheatres, were called Venationes.—W. Ramsay, *Manual of Roman Antig.*, ch. 10.

**VENDEE, The War in La.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (MARCH—APRIL), (JUNE), (JULY—DECEMBER); 1793–1794 (OCTOBER—APRIL); and 1794–1796.

**VENDEMIARE, The month.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (OCTOBER) THE NEW REPUBLICAN CALENDAR. **The 13th.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1795 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

**VENEDI, The.**—"The Venedi extended beyond the Peucini and Bastarnæ [around the mouths of the Danube] as far as the Baltic Sea; where is the Sinus Venedicus, now the Gulf of Dantzig. Their name is also preserved in Wenden, a part of Livonia. When the German nations made their irruption into Italy, France, and Spain, the Venedi, also called Winedi, occupied their vacant settlements between the Vistula and Elbe. Afterward they crossed the Danube, and seized Dalmatia, Illyricum, Istria, Carniola, and the Noric Alps. A part of Carniola still retains the name of Windismarck derived from them. This people were also called Slavi."—Tacitus, *The Germans*, note to Oxford Translation, ch. 46.—"The Venedi [of Tacitus] . . . are obviously the Wends—the name by which the Germans always designate the neighbouring Slavonian populations; but which is no more a national name than that of Wälsch, which

they apply in like manner to the Latin races on their southern frontiers."—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geography*, ch. 26, sect. 2, foot-note (v. 2).—See, also, SLAVONIC PEOPLES; and VANDALS.

**VENEDI OF BOHEMIA**, The. See AVARS: 7TH CENTURY.

**VENEDOTIA**. See BRITAIN: 6TH CENTURY.

**VENETA**. See TRADE: MEDIEVAL.

**VENETI OF CISALPINE GAUL**, The. —One of the tribes or nations of Cisalpine Gaul bore the name of the Veneti. The Veneti occupied the country between the rivers Adige and Plavis and seem to have been considerably civilized when they first appear in history. They became allies of the Romans at an early day and were favorably dealt with when Gallia Cisalpina was added to the dominions of Rome. "No ancient writer distinctly states to what race the Veneti belonged. They are said to have resembled the Illyrians in dress and manners; but the very way in which this statement is made shows that its author did not regard them as Illyrians. . . . I have no doubt that the Veneti belonged to the race of the Liburnians, and that accordingly they were a branch of the widespread Tyrrheno-Pelasgians, in consequence of which they also became so easily Latinized." The capital city of the Veneti was Patavium (modern Padua). "Patavium was a very ancient and large town, and it is strange that it appears as such in Roman history all at once. It is mentioned as early as the fifth century [B. C.], during the expedition of the Spartan Cleonymus; it is also spoken of at the time of Caesar and of the triumvirs. But Strabo is the first who describes Patavium as a large town, and in such a manner as to make it evident that it was an ancient place. He says that, next to Rome, it was the wealthiest city of Italy. . . . In the time of Augustus it was a large commercial and manufacturing place."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lects. on Ancient Ethnogr. and Geog.*, v. 2, p. 246.

**VENETI OF WESTERN GAUL**, The. —"The Veneti were one of the Armorican states of the Celtæ. Their neighbours on the south were the Namnetes or Nannetes (Nantes), on the east the Redones, and on the north the Curiosolitæ, and the Osismi in the north-west part of Bretagne, in the department of Finistère. The chief town of the Veneti was Dorigium, now Vannes, on the bay of Morbihan in the French department of Morbihan, which may correspond nearly to the country of the Veneti. The Veneti were the most powerful of all the maritime peoples who occupied the peninsula of Bretagne. They had many vessels in which they sailed to the island Britannia, to Cornwall and the parts along the south coast of England, as we may assume. They surpassed all their neighbours in skill and experience in naval affairs."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 6.—The Veneti, "together with the Auleri, Rhedones [or Redones], Carnutes, Andi and Turones, occupied the whole space between the lower Seine and the lower Loire, and were apparently closely united among themselves."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 7.—"The Andes [Andi] are the people whom Tacitus names the Andecavi, and the copyists of Ptolemy have named Ondicavæ. They were west of the Turones, and their position is defined by the

town Juliomagus or Civitas Andecavorum, now Angers on the Mayenne."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 6.—"In my opinion these Veneti were the founders of the Veneti in the Adriatic, for almost all the other Celtic nations in Italy have passed over from the country beyond the Alps, as for instance the Boii and Senones. . . . However, I do not maintain my opinion positively; for in these matters probability is quite sufficient."—Strabo, *Geography*; tr. by Hamilton and Falconer, bk. 4, ch. 4, sect. 1.

**Cæsar's campaign**.—Cæsar's third campaign in Gaul, B. C. 56, was directed against the Veneti and their Armorican neighbors. These tribes had submitted themselves in the previous year to Cæsar's lieutenant, the younger Crassus; but the heavy exactions of the Romans provoked a general rising, and Cæsar was called to the scene in person. The Veneti were so amphibious a race, and their towns were generally placed so much out of the reach of a land army, that he found it necessary to build a fleet at the mouth of the Loire and bring it up against them. But the Veneti were better sailors than the Romans and their ships were more strongly built, so that the advantage would have still remained to them if Roman inventiveness had not turned the scale. Cæsar armed his men with hooked knives at the end of long poles, with which they cut the rigging of the Venetian ships and brought down their clumsy sails, which were of leather. By this means he overcame and destroyed them, in a great naval fight. When the survivors submitted, he ruthlessly slew the senatorial elders and sold the remnant of the people into slavery.—Cæsar, *Gallie Wars*, bk. 3, ch. 7-16.

ALSO IN: G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 6.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 7.—Napoleon III., *Hist. of Cæsar*, bk. 3, ch. 6.

**VENETIA**. See VENICE.

**VENEZUELA**: Aboriginal inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIBS AND THEIR KINDRED, and COAJIRO.

A. D. 1499-1550.—Discovery and naming of the province.—Its first occupation by German adventurers.—"The province contiguous to Santa Martha on the east was first visited by Alonso de Ojeda, in the year 1499 [see AMERICA: A. D. 1499-1500]; and the Spaniards, on their landing there, having observed some huts in an Indian village, built upon piles, in order to raise them above the stagnated water which covered the plain, were led to bestow upon it the name of Venezuela, or little Venice. . . . They made some attempts to settle there, but with little success. The final reduction of the province was accomplished by means very different from those to which Spain was indebted for its other acquisitions in the new world. The ambition of Charles V. often engaged him in operations of such variety and extent that his revenues were not sufficient to defray the expense of carrying them into execution. Among other expedients for supplying the deficiency of his funds, he had borrowed large sums from the Velsers of Augsburg, the most opulent merchants at that time in Europe. By way of retribution for these, or in hopes, perhaps, of obtaining a new loan, he bestowed upon them the province of Venezuela, to be held



as an hereditary fief from the crown of Castile, on condition that within a limited time they should render themselves masters of the country, and establish a colony there. . . . Unfortunately they committed the execution of their plan to some of those soldiers of fortune with which Germany abounded in the 16th century. These adventurers, impatient to amass riches, that they might speedily abandon a station which they soon discovered to be very uncomfortable, instead of planting a colony in order to cultivate and improve the country, wandered from district to district in search of mines, plundering the natives with unfeeling rapacity, or oppressing them by the imposition of intolerable tasks. In the course of a few years, their avarice and exactions, in comparison with which those of the Spaniards were moderate, desolated the province so completely that it could hardly afford them subsistence, and the Velsers relinquished a property from which the inconsiderate conduct of their agents left them no hope of ever deriving any advantage. When the wretched remainder of the Germans deserted Venezuela, the Spaniards again took possession of it."—W. Robertson, *Hist. of America*, bk. 7.

ALSO IN: F. Depous, *Travels in S. Am.*, ch. 1. — See, also, EL DORADO.

**A. D. 1718-1731.**—Embraced in the viceroyalty of New Granada.—Raised to a distinct captain-generalship. See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1536-1731.

**A. D. 1810-1819.**—The War of Independence. Miranda and Bolivar.—The great Earthquake. See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1810-1819.

**A. D. 1821.**—Beginning of the Emancipation of Slaves. See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1821-1854.

**A. D. 1821-1826.**—Confederation with New Granada and Ecuador in the Republic of Colombia, and the breaking of the Confederacy. —See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1819-1830.

**A. D. 1829-1836.**—Summary record of revolutions and civil wars.—The strife of the Yellows and the Blues.—"In all countries, under whatever name they may be known, there are two great political parties; the conservatives and the reformers. . . . Venezuela is no exception to the general rule; there is the 'Oligarquía,' which desires to let things alone, and the 'Liberal' party, which wishes to remould them in accordance with the spirit of the age. The Spanish misgovernment left a legacy of bitterness and anarchy that has been the cause of much misery. Political passion runs very high in the country, and its history for a generation between these two parties has been a continual struggle, always more or less warlike. The existence of Venezuela in an independent capacity is due, in a large measure, to the personal ambition of Paez, by whose influence the great Liberator was exiled from his fatherland, and the republic separated from Colombia. Whatever may have been the real wishes of the people, the death of Bolivar put an end to all thoughts of re-union; and Paez became its first constitutional president. The second president was the learned Dr. José María Vargas, whose election in March 1835 was said to have been irregular, and led to the 'Revolucion de las Reformas.' He was deposed and expelled in July, but in August recalled to power! General Paez now took the field against the 'reformistas,' and a civil war ensued, continuing un-

til March 1836, when they were completely subjugated, and treated with great rigour by order of the Congress, but against the desire of Paez, who entreated to be allowed to deal with them clemently. In 1836, Dr. Vargas resigned the presidency, and after the remainder of his term had been occupied by three vice-presidents, General Paez, in 1839, became again the legitimate head of the nation. Now that the grave had closed over Simon Bolivar, the passions which had prevented the recognition of his greatness died also, and on the 17th of December 1842, the ashes of the immortal Liberator were transferred from Santa Maria with every mark of public respect and honour and received a magnificent national funeral, in the Temple of San Francisco, in Caracas. The fifth president was General Soublette, and the sixth General José Tadeo Monagas, who was elected in 1847. A great part of the Venezuelan people believe that all the evils that have fallen upon the republic since 1846 have had their origin in the falsification of votes, said to have taken place during the election of Monagas for president. The liberal candidate was Antonio Leocadio Guzman; and it is asserted that he had a majority of votes. . . . Monagas did not have an easy tenure of office, for the opposition of Paez led to two years of civil war. Here it may be noted to the credit of the liberal party that, at a time when many of its opponents were prisoners, it abolished the penalty of death for political offences. To his brother, General José Gregorio Monagas, afterwards president of the republic, was due the emancipation of the slaves. The famous law of March 24th, 1854, conceded liberty and equal rights to all; but by a strange irony of fortune, he who had given the precious boon of freedom to thousands died himself incarcerated in a political prison. . . . At the beginning of 1859 the discontent of the liberals had reached a pitch which led to the outbreak of the War of the Federation. It was in this struggle that the present leader of the liberal party first displayed his military skill." Antonio Guzman Blanco, born in 1830 and educated for the law, lived some years in the United States, part of the time as Secretary of Legation at Washington. Driven from Venezuela in 1858, "his expatriation soon after brought him in contact, first in St. Thomas and afterwards in Curazao, with General Falcon, then the head of 'los liberales.' Falcon landed in Venezuela in July 1859, and proclaimed the Federal Republic. Many rose to support him, and in Caracas, on the 1st of August, the president, Monagas, was arrested; the next day the same troops declared against the Federation, and fired upon the people! So commenced the five years' War of the Federation, which has left, even to the present day, its black and ruined tracks across the face of the country. On the 30th of September was fought the battle of Sabana de la Cruz, resulting in the fall of Barquisimeto. In this action, so fortunate for the liberals, Guzman Blanco made his acquaintance with war, and showed so much military talent and energy that he was induced to leave his civil duties and take a 'comandante's' commission. The victory of Santa Ines, in December of the same year, followed. . . . The attack on San Carlos followed soon after, and was a disaster for the federals, who lost their general, Zamora, and were forced to retreat. Falcon sought aid in Nueva Gran-

ada." The next year Guzman Blanco won the victory of Quebrada-seca, October 21, 1862. "Other victories followed, and were crowned by the grand and decisive combat of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of April, which gave the province of Caracas to the Federals, and led to a treaty between the two parties. The peace of Coche was arranged by Señor Pedro José Rojas, secretary to the Dictator, as Paez was sometimes called, and Guzman Blanco, as representative of Falcon, the chief of the revolution. Paez, by this treaty, undertook to abdicate 30 days later, when an assembly of 80, nominated in equal parts by the chiefs of each party, was to decide on a programme for the future. The assembly met in Victoria, and nominated Falcon President and Guzman Blanco provisional vice-president of the Federation. Falcon entered Caracas in triumph on July 24, 1863, and Guzman Blanco became Minister of Finance and of Foreign Relations." Guzman Blanco visited Europe in 1864 and 1867 to negotiate loans. "Meanwhile, in Caracas, the 'oligarquia,' which now assumed the name of the Blue party (El Partido Azul), was not idle, and its activity was increased by dissensions in the opposition. A section of the liberal party [or 'los amarillos'—'Yellows'] had become greatly disaffected to Marshal Falcon, who abdicated in favour of two revolutionary chiefs, Bruzual and Urrutia. This led to the treaty of Antimano, by which the 'partido azul' recognized the new government, but directly afterwards proclaimed the presidency of General José Tadeo Monagas. Three days' sanguinary combat, at the end of July 1868, gave it possession of Caracas." Guzman Blanco, returning at this juncture from Europe, was driven to take refuge in the island of Curazao; but in February, 1870, he reappeared in Venezuela; was supported by a general rising; took Caracas by assault, and defeated the Blues in several battles. "The congress of plenipotentiaries of the states met at Valencia, and nominated Guzman Blanco provisional president, and by the end of the year the enemy was nearly everywhere defeated."—J. M. Spence, *The Land of Bolívar*, v. 1, ch. 8.—From the liberation of Venezuela to the present time, "every successive President seems to have been employed, during his short lease of power, in trying to enrich himself and his adherents, without the least consideration for his unfortunate country. On paper all the laws are perfect, and the constitution all that could be desired, but experience has shown that the influence of the executive power is able to subdue and absorb every other power, legislative or judicial. One law which the Congress passed, viz:—that of division of the National property among the defenders of the country, as the only way of rewarding their heroic services, has become a precedent of very bad import. At first, those who had risen and driven out the Spaniards divided the land among themselves, but as successive Generals strove for and gained the Presidency they again forfeited the property of the opposing party, and divided their possessions among their own followers. . . . Paez, Vargas, Paez, Zea, Soublette, Paez, Gil, Monagas, Falcon, Monagas, Polidor, Pulgar, Blanco, Linares, Blanco, Crespo, and again Blanco, have succeeded each other with marvellous rapidity, the principal occupation of the deposed President being to conspire against his successor. Some of them succeeded

to power more than once, but Don Gusman Blanco alone, since Bolivar, seems to have got a firm hold of the Government, and although, by the letter of the Constitution, he can only hold power for two years at a time, and cannot possibly hold two terms consecutively, yet the intervening Presidents were little more than dummies to keep his seat warm. . . . At present [1886] Don Gusman Blanco is supreme. He is reported to be immensely wealthy, and is a man of great capacity and intelligence."—W. Barry, *Venezuela*, ch. 5.

A. D. 1869-1892.—The constitution.—The rule of General Blanco.—The Revolution of 1889.—"The Venezuelan Constitution is modelled after the American Constitution, with modifications grounded upon the Calhoun doctrine of State rights [see CONSTITUTION OF VENEZUELA]. The confederation consists of eight States, which are supreme and coördinate in their sovereign rights. The National Government represents, not the people, but the States. . . . In 1869 opened an era of peace and progress under the political domination of General Guzman Blanco. For 20 years, whether he was the head of a Provisional Government established by force of arms, or the constitutional Executive, or Minister to France, his will was the supreme force in the State. . . . He suppressed Clericalism and established genuine religious liberty. He built rail-ways, improved the public roads, and adorned the cities. . . . He developed the industries and commerce of the country, and promoted its prosperity by a policy at once strong and pacific. It was a system of political absolutism. . . . A reaction against it was inevitable. . . . The signal for a political revolution was raised by university students in October, 1889. They began operations by flinging stones at a statue of Guzman Blanco in Caracas. . . . It was a singularly effective revolution, wrought without bloodshed or excitement. This political movement was successful because Guzman Blanco was in Paris, and his personal representative in the executive office was not disposed to resent public affronts to his patron. The President, Dr. Rojas Paul, was a wise and discreet man. . . . He reorganized his Cabinet so as to exclude several of the devoted partisans of Guzman Blanco, and brought Dr. Anduesa Palacio into the field as a candidate for the Presidency. . . . Anduesa's administration, instead of being an era of reform, reproduced all the vices and corruption of the old order, and none of its progressive virtues. After two years it ended in civil war, usurpation, and the enforced resignation of Anduesa."—I. N. Ford, *Tropical America*, ch. 12.

A. D. 1892-1893.—Constitutional Government restored.—Anduesa Palacio resigned in favor of Vice President Villegas, and the legality of the succession was disputed by the opposition, under ex-President Joaquin Crespo. The civil war continued, and three short-lived dictatorships were set up in succession; but in June, 1893, a new constitution was adopted. Crespo was elected President for a term of four years.

VENGEUR, The myth of the. See FRANCE: A. D. 1789-1794.

VENI, VIDI, VICI. See ROME: B. C. 47-46.



## VENICE.

**A. D. 452.—The origin of the republic.**—When Attila the Hun, in the year 452, crossed the Alps and invaded Italy, “the savage destroyer undesignedly laid the foundations of a republic which revived, in the feudal state of Europe, the art and spirit of commercial industry. The celebrated name of Venice, or Venetia, was formerly diffused over a large and fertile province of Italy, from the confines of Pannonia to the river Addua, and from the Po to the Rætian and Julian Alps. Before the irruption of the barbarians, fifty Venetian cities flourished in peace and prosperity. . . . Many families of Aquileia, Padua, and the adjacent towns, who fled from the sword of the Huns, found a safe though obscure refuge in the neighbouring islands. At the extremity of the Gulf, where the Adriatic feebly imitates the tides of the ocean, near a hundred small islands are separated by shallow water from the continent, and protected from the waves by several long slips of land, which admit the entrance of vessels through some secret and narrow channels. Till the middle of the 5th century these remote and sequestered spots remained without cultivation, with few inhabitants, and almost without a name. But the manners of the Venetian fugitives, their arts and their government, were gradually formed by their new situation; and one of the epistles of Cassiodorus, which describes their condition about seventy years afterwards, may be considered as the primitive monument of the republic. . . . Fish was the common, and almost the universal, food of every rank: their only treasure consisted in the plenty of salt which they extracted from the sea.”—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 35.—“The inhabitants of Aquileia, or at least the feeble remnant that escaped the sword of Attila, took refuge at Grado. Concordia migrated to Caprularia (now Caorle). The inhabitants of Altinum, abandoning their ruined villas, founded their new habitations upon seven islands at the mouth of the Piave, which, according to tradition, they named from the seven gates of their old city. . . . From Padua came the largest stream of emigrants. They left the tomb of their mythical ancestor, Antenor, and built their humble dwellings upon the islands of Rivas Altus and Methamaucus, better known to us as Rialto and Malamocco. This Paduan settlement was one day to be known to the world by the name of Venice. But let us not suppose that the future Queen of the Adriatic sprang into existence at a single bound like Constantinople or Alexandria. For 250 years, that is to say for eight generations, the refugees on the islands of the Adriatic prolonged an obscure and squalid existence,—fishing, salt-manufacturing, damming out the waves with wattled vine-branches, driving piles into the sand-banks; and thus gradually extending the area of their villages. Still these were but fishing villages, loosely confederated together, loosely governed, poor and insignificant. . . . This seems to have been their condition, though perhaps gradually growing in commercial importance, until at the beginning of the 8th century the concentration of political authority in the hands of the first doge, and the recognition of the Rialto cluster of islands as the capital of the confederacy, started the Republic on a career of success and

victory.”—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 2, ch. 4 (v. 2).

**A. D. 554-800.—A dukedom under the Exarchs of Ravenna.** See ROME: A. D. 554-800.

**A. D. 568.—A refuge from the invading Lombards.** See LOMBARDS: A. D. 568-573.

**A. D. 697-810.—The early constitution of government.—Origin of the Doges.—Resistance to Pippin, king of the Lombards.—Removal to the Rialto and founding of the new capital city.**—“Each island had at first its own magistrate: the magistrates of the most considerable being called Tribunes Major, the others, Tribunes Minor, and the whole being equally subject to the council-general of the community; which thus constituted a kind of federal republic. This lasted nearly three hundred years, when it was found that the rising nation had fairly outgrown its institutions. Dangerous rivalries arose among the tribunes. . . . At a meeting of the Council-General in A. D. 697, the Patriarch of Grado proposed the concentration of power in the hands of a single chief, under the title of Doge or Duke. The proposition was eagerly accepted, and they proceeded at once to the election of this chief. ‘It will be seen (remarks Daru) that the Dogeship saved independence and compromised liberty. It was a veritable revolution, but we are ignorant by what circumstances it was brought about. Many historians assert that the change was not effected till the permission of the Pope and the Emperor was obtained.’ The first choice fell on Paolo Luca Anabesto. It was made by twelve electors, the founders of what were thenceforth termed the electoral families. The Doge was appointed for life: he named his own counsellors: took charge of all public business; had the rank of prince, and decided all questions of peace and war. The peculiar title was meant to imply a limited sovereignty, and the Venetians uniformly repudiated, as a disgrace, the bare notion of their having ever submitted to a monarch. But many centuries passed away before any regular or well-defined limits were practically imposed; and the prolonged struggle between the people and the Doges, depending mainly on the personal character of the Doge for the time being, constitutes the most startling and exciting portion of their history.” The third Doge, one Urso, alarmed the people by his pretensions to such a degree that they slew him, and suppressed his office for five years, substituting a chief magistrate called “maestro della milizia.” “The Dogeship was then [742] restored in the person of Theodal Urso (son of the last Doge), who quitted Heraclea [then the Venetian capital] for Malamocco, which thus became the capital.” In his turn, Theodal Urso lost the favor of the people and was deposed and blinded. “It thenceforth became the received custom in Venice to put out the eyes of deposed Doges.” Later in the 8th century the Dogeship was secured by a family which went far towards making it hereditary, and rendering it boldly tyrannical; but the yoke of the would-be despots—Giovanni and Maurice, father and son—was broken in 804, and they were driven to flight. The head of the conspiracy which expelled them, Obelerio, was then proclaimed Doge. “The events of the next five

years are involved in obscurity. One thing is clear. Pepin, King of the Lombards [son of Charlemagne], either under the pretence of a request for aid from the new Doge, or to enforce some real or assumed rights of his own, declared war against the Republic, and waged it with such impetuosity that his fleet and army, after carrying all before them, were only separated from Malamocco, the capital, by a canal. In this emergency, Angelo Participazio, one of those men who are produced by great occasions to mark an era, proposed that the entire population should remove to Rialto, which was separated by a broader arm of the sea from the enemy, and there hold out to the last. No sooner proposed than done. They hastily embarked their all; and when Pepin entered Malamocco, he found it deserted. After losing a large part of his fleet in an ill-advised attack on Rialto, he gave up the enterprise, and Angelo Participazio was elected Doge in recognition of his services, with two tribunes for counsellors. One of his first acts was to make Rialto the capital, instead of Malamocco or Heraclea, which had each been the seat of Government at intervals. "There were round Rialto some sixty islets, which the Doge connected by bridges. They were soon covered with houses. They were girt with a fortification; and it was then that this population of fugitives gave to this rising city, which they had just founded in the middle of a morass, the name of Venetia, in memory of the fair countries from which their fathers had been forcibly expatriated. The province has lost its name, and become subject to the new Venice."—*The Republic of Venice* (*Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1874, v. 137), pp. 417-420. In 803 Charlemagne concluded a treaty, at Aix-la-Chapelle, with Nicephorus I. the Byzantine or Eastern Emperor, establishing boundaries between the two empires which disputed the Roman name. "In this treaty, the supremacy of the Eastern Empire over Venice, Istria, the maritime parts of Dalmatia, and the south of Italy, was acknowledged; while the authority of the Western Empire in Rome, the exarchate of Ravenna, and the Pentapolis, was recognised by Nicephorus. The commerce of Venice with the East was already so important, and the Byzantine administration afforded so many guarantees for the security of property, that the Venetians, in spite of the menaces of Charlemagne, remained firm in their allegiance to Nicephorus. . . . Venice, it is true, found itself in the end compelled to purchase peace with the Frank empire, by the payment of an annual tribute of thirty-six pounds of gold, in order to secure its commercial relations from interruption; and it was not released from this tribute until the time of Otho the Great. It was during the reign of Nicephorus that the site of the present city of Venice became the seat of the Venetian government, Rivalto (Rialto) becoming the residence of the duke and the principal inhabitants, who retired from the continent to escape the attacks of Pepin [king of Italy, under his father, Charlemagne]. Heraclea had previously been the capital of the Venetian municipality. In 810 peace was again concluded between Nicephorus and Charlemagne, without making any change in the frontier of the two empires."—G. Finlay, *Byzantine Empire*, 716-1057, bk. 1, ch. 2, sect. 1.

ALSO IN: H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 1-2.

8th Century: Still subject to the Eastern Empire. See ROME: A. D. 717-800.

A. D. 810-961.—Spread of commerce and naval prowess.—Destruction of Istrian pirates.—Conquests in Dalmatia.—"During the ninth, and the first sixty years of the tenth centuries,—from the government of Angelo Participazio, to the coming into Italy of Otho the Great,—the Venetian affairs, with brief intervals of repose, were wholly occupied with civil commotions and naval wars. The doges of the republic were often murdered; its fleets were sometimes defeated; but, under every adverse circumstance, the commercial activity, the wealth, and the power of the state were still rapidly increasing. In the ninth century the Venetians, in concert with the Greeks, encountered, though with indifferent success, the navies of the Saracens; but the Narentines, and other pirates of Dalmatia, were their constant enemies, and were frequently chastised by the arms of the republic. The Venetian wealth invited attacks from all the freebooters of the seas, and an enterprise undertaken by some of them who had established themselves on the coast of Istria deserves, from its singularity and the vengeance of the republic, to be recorded in this place. According to an ancient custom, the nuptials of the nobles and principal citizens of Venice were always celebrated on the same day of the year and in the same church. . . . The Istrian pirates, acquainted with the existence of this annual festival, had the boldness [A. D. 944] to prepare an ambush for the nuptial train in the city itself. They secretly arrived over night at an uninhabited islet near the church of Olivolo, and lay hidden behind it with their barks until the procession had entered the church, when darting from their concealment they rushed into the sacred edifice through all its doors, tore the shrieking brides from the arms of their defenceless lovers, possessed themselves of the jewels which had been displayed in the festal pomp, and immediately put to sea with their fair captives and their booty. But a deadly revenge overtook them. The doge, Pietro Candiano III., had been present at the ceremony: he shared in the fury and indignation of the affianced youths: they flew to arms, and throwing themselves under his conduct into their vessels, came up with the spoilers in the lagunes of Caorlo. A frightful massacre ensued: not a life among the pirates was spared, and the victors returned in triumph with their brides to the church of Olivolo. A procession of the maidens of Venice revived for many centuries the recollection of this deliverance on the eve of the purification. But the doge was not satisfied with the punishment which he had inflicted on the Istriots. He entered vigorously upon the resolution of clearing the Adriatic of all the pirates who infested it: he conquered part of Dalmatia, and he transmitted to his successors, with the ducal crown, the duty of consummating his design."—G. Procter, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 1, pt. 2.

A. D. 829.—The translation of the body of St. Mark.—The Winged Lion of St. Mark.—"In the second year of the reign of Doge Giustiniano Particiacio there was brought to Venice from Alexandria the body of the holy evangelist St. Mark. For, as Petrus Damianus says, Mark was brought from Alexandria into Venice, that he who had shone in the East like the morning



star might shed his rays in the regions of the West. For Egypt is held to be the East and Venice the West. There he had held the rule of the Church of Alexandria, and here, being, as it were, born again, he obtained the sovereignty of Aquileia. Now this is how the thing was done. The king of the Saracens wishing to build himself a palace in Babylon, gave command that stones should be taken from the Christian churches and other public places, that they might build him a splendid house. And at that time there came by chance to the Church of St. Mark, Bon, tribune of Malamocco, and Rustico da Torcello, who had been forced by the wind, contrary to the edicts of Venice, to put in to the harbour of Alexandria with ten ships laden with merchandise, and they observing the sadness of the guardians of the church (two Greeks, by name Stauratio, a monk, and Theodoro, a priest), inquired the cause. And they answered that by reason of the impious edict of the king they feared the ruin of the church. Thereupon they prayed them to give them the holy body that they might carry it to Venice, promising them that the Doge of Venice would receive it with great honour. But the keepers of the church were filled with fear at their petition, and answered reproaching them and saying: 'Know ye not how the blessed St. Mark, who wrote the Gospel, St. Peter dictating at his request, preached in these parts and baptised into the faith the men of these regions? If the faithful should become aware, we could not escape the peril of death.' But to that they answered: 'As for his preaching, we are his firstborn sons, for he first preached in the parts of Venetia and Aquileia. And in peril of death it is commanded, "If they persecute you in one city, flee ye to another," which the evangelist himself obeyed when in the persecution at Alexandria he fled to Pentapolis.' But the keepers said: 'There is no such persecution now that we should fear for our persons.' But while they spake, came one and broke down the precious stones of the church, and when they would not suffer it they were sorely beaten. Then the keepers seeing the devastation of the church, and their own great danger, listened to the prayer of the Venetians and appointed them a day when they should receive the holy body. Now the body was wrapped in a robe of silk sealed with many seals from the head to the feet. And they brought the body of St. Claudia, and having cut the robe at the back and taken away the body of St. Mark, they placed in its stead the blessed Claudia, leaving the seals unbroken. But a sweet odour quickly spread into the city, and all were filled with astonishment, and not doubting that the body of the evangelist had been moved, they ran together to the church. But when the shrine was opened and they saw the garment with the seals unbroken, they returned quickly to their homes. And when the body should be borne to the boats, they covered it with herbs and spread over it pork-flesh for the passers-by to see, and went crying, 'Khanzir, khanzir!' which is the Saracen's abomination. And when they reached the ships they covered it with a sail while they passed through the Saracen ships. And as they sailed to Venice the ship which bore it with many others was saved from peril of shipwreck. For when the ships had been driven in the night

by a tempestuous wind and were not far from Monte, the blessed St. Mark appeared to the Monk Dominic and bade him lower the sails of the ships. Which, when they had done, the dawn appearing, they found themselves close to the island which is called Artalia. And ten of them, having asked and obtained pardon for breaking the edicts of the Doge, they came to the port of Olivola. And the Doge, and the clergy, and the people came to meet them, and brought the body, with songs of thanksgiving, to the Doge's chapel."—*Old Chronicle; translated in "The City in the Sea," by the Author of "Bell and Spur," ch. 3.*—"Our fathers did not welcome the arrival of the captured eagles of France, after the field of Waterloo, with greater exultation than the people of Venice the relics of the blessed Evangelist. They abandoned themselves to processions, and prayers, and banquets, and public holidays. . . . The winged 'Lion of St. Mark' was blazoned on the standards, and impressed on the coinage of the Republic. . . . The Lion became the theme of many political symbols. Thus it was represented with wings to show that Venetians could strike with promptitude; sitting, as a sign of their gravity in counsel—for such is the usual attitude of sages; with a book in its paws, to intimate their devotion to commerce; in war time the book was closed, and a naked sword substituted."—W. H. D. Adams, *The Queen of the Adriatic*, pp. 42-43.—See, also, LION OF ST. MARK.

A. D. 1032-1319.—Development of the constitution of the aristocratic Republic.—The Grand Council.—The Council of Ten.—The Golden Book.—"It was by slow and artfully disguised encroachments that the nobility of Venice succeeded in substituting itself for the civic power, and investing itself with the sovereignty of the republic. During the earlier period, the doge was an elective prince, the limit of whose power was vested in assemblies of the people. It was not till 1032 that he was obliged to consult only a council, formed from amongst the most illustrious citizens, whom he designated. Thence came the name given them of 'pregadi' (invited). The grand council was not formed till 1172, 140 years later, and was, from that time, the real sovereign of the republic. It was composed of 480 members, named annually on the last day of September, by 12 tribunes, or grand electors, of whom two were chosen by each of the six sections of the republic. No more than four members from one family could be named. The same counsellors might be re-elected each year. As it is in the spirit of a corporation to tend always towards an aristocracy, the same persons were habitually re-elected; and when they died their children took their places. The grand council, neither assuming to itself nor granting to the doge the judicial power, gave the first example of the creation of a body of judges, numerous, independent, and irremovable; such, nearly, as was afterwards the parliament of Paris. In 1179, it created the criminal 'quarantia'; called, also, the 'vecchia quarantia,' to distinguish it from two other bodies of forty judges, created in 1229. The grand council gave a more complete organization to the government formed from among its members. It was composed of a doge; of six counsellors of the red robe, who remained only eight months in office, and who, with the doge, formed the 'signoria';

and of the council of *pregadi*, composed of 60 members, renewed each year. . . . In 1249, the sovereign council renounced the election of the doge, and intrusted it to a commission drawn by lot from among the whole council; this commission named another: which, reduced by lot to one fourth, named a third; and by these alternate operations of lot and election, at length formed the last commission of 41 members, who could elect the doge only by a majority of 25 suffrages. It was not till towards the end of the 13th century that the people began to discover that they were no more than a cipher in the republic, and the doge no more than a servant of the grand council,—surrounded, indeed, with pomp, but without any real power. In 1289, the people attempted themselves to elect the doge; but the grand council obliged him whom the popular suffrages had designated to leave Venice, and substituted in his place Pietro Gradenigo, the chief of the aristocratic party. Gradenigo undertook to exclude the people from any part in the election of the grand council, as they were already debarred from any participation in the election of a doge. . . . The decree which he proposed and carried on the 28th of February, 1297, is famous in the history of Venice, under the name of ‘*serrata del maggior consiglio*’ (shutting of the grand council). He legally founded that hereditary aristocracy,—so prudent, so jealous, so ambitious,—which Europe regarded with astonishment; immovable in principle, unshaken in power; uniting some of the most odious practices of despotism with the name of liberty; suspicious and perfidious in politics; sanguinary in revenge; indulgent to the subject; sumptuous in the public service, economical in the administration of the finances; equitable and impartial in the administration of justice; knowing well how to give prosperity to the arts, agriculture, and commerce; beloved by the people who obeyed it, whilst it made the nobles who partook its power tremble. The Venetian aristocracy completed its constitution, in 1311, by the creation of the Council of Ten, which, notwithstanding its name, was composed of 16 members and the doge. Ten counsellors of the black robe were annually elected by the great council, in the months of August and September; and of the six counsellors of the red robe, composing a part of the *signoria*, three entered office every four months. The Council of Ten, charged to guard the security of the state with a power higher than the law, had an especial commission to watch over the nobles, and to punish their crimes against the republic. In this they were restrained by no rule: they were, with respect to the nobility, the depositaries of the power of the great council, or rather of a power unlimited, which no people should intrust to any government. Some other decrees completed the system of the ‘*serrata del maggior consiglio*.’ It was forbidden to the *quarantia* to introduce any ‘new man’ into power. In 1315, a register was opened, called the Golden Book, in which were inscribed the names of all those who had sat in the great council. In 1319, all limitation of number was suppressed; and, from that period, it sufficed to prove that a person was the descendant of a counsellor, and 25 years of age, to be by right a member of the grand council of Venice.”—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 5.—“When the Republic was hard pressed for

money, inscriptions in the Golden Book were sold at the current price of 100,000 ducats. . . . Illustrious foreigners were admitted, as they are made free of a corporation amongst us. . . . The honour was not disdained even by crowned heads. . . . The original ‘*Libro d’oro*’ was publicly burned in 1797, but extracts, registers, and other documents are extant from which its contents might be ascertained.”—*The Republic of Venice* (*Quart. Rev.*, v. 137, p. 433).

ALSO IN: E. Flagg, *Venice, the City of the Sea*, introd.—Mrs. Oliphant, *The Makers of Venice*, ch. 4.—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 5 and 9.

A. D. 1085.—Acquires the sovereignty of Dalmatia and Croatia. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 1081-1085.

A. D. 1099-1101.—The first Crusade.—“The movement of the crusades brings Venice to the very forefront of European history. Her previous development had been slowly preparing the way for her emergence. The Council, held at Clermont in 1095, resolved that the armament should leave Europe early in the following year. The Pope and the leaders of the Crusades were obliged to turn their attention to the question of transport for the vast and amorphous mob, which, without discipline, with no distinction of ranks, with no discrimination between soldier and monk, between merchant and peasant, between master and man, was now bent on reaching the Holy Land, almost as eager to die there as to achieve the object of their mission, the recovery of the Sepulchre. The three maritime states of Italy—Genoa, Pisa, and Venice—were each ready to offer their services. Each was jealous of the other, and each determined to prevent the other from reaping any signal commercial advantage from the religious enthusiasm of Europe. Venice was not only the most powerful, but also the most eastern, of the three competitors. It was natural that the choice should fall on her. When the Pope’s invitation to assist in the Crusade reached the city, however, it seems that the Government did not at once embrace the cause officially in the name of the whole Republic. There was, at first, a tendency to leave the business of transport to private enterprise. But on receipt of the news that Jerusalem had fallen, the Venetian Government began to take active steps in the matter. . . . The Crusade was accepted with enthusiasm. The whole city engaged in preparing a fleet which should be worthy of the Republic. Then, after a solemn mass in S. Mark’s, at which the standard of the Cross and the standard of the Republic were presented to the leaders, the soldiers of the Cross embarked on the fleet which numbered 200 ships, and set sail down the Adriatic, making for Rhodes, where they were to winter. At Rhodes two incidents of great significance in Venetian history took place. The Eastern Emperors had never viewed with favour the incursion of the Crusaders. The creation of the kingdom of Jerusalem was really a usurpation of Imperial territory. Alexius I. now endeavoured to persuade the Venetians to withdraw from the enterprise. In this he failed; Venice remained true to the Cross, and to her commercial interests. It is at this point that we find the beginnings of that divergence between Constantinople and the Republic, which eventually declared itself in open hostility, and led up to the sack of Constantinople in the fourth Cru-



sade. Alexius, finding that the Venetians were not inclined to obey him, resolved to punish them. An instrument was ready to his hand. The Pisans saw with disfavour the advent of their commercial rivals in Eastern waters. They were willing to hoist the Imperial standard as opposed to the crusading cross, and to sail down upon the Venetians at Rhodes. They were defeated. The Venetians released all the prisoners except thirty of the more prominent among them who were detained as hostages. The first fruits of the Crusade, as far as Venice was concerned, were the creation of two powerful enemies, the Emperor and the Pisans."—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 6.

A. D. 1102.—Hungarian conquest of Dalmatia. See HUNGARY: A. D. 972-1114.

A. D. 1114-1141.—Wars for Dalmatia with the Hungarians. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1114-1301.

A. D. 1127-1128.—Beginning of quarrels with the Byzantine Empire.—"Previous to this time [about 1127], the Venetian republic had generally been a firm ally of the Byzantine empire, and, to a certain degree, it was considered as owing homage to the Emperor of Constantinople. That connection was now dissolved, and those disputes commenced which soon occupied a prominent place in the history of Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Crusaders in Palestine had opened a new field for the commercial enterprise of the Venetians, and in a great measure changed the direction of their maritime trade; while the frequent quarrels of the Greeks and Franks compelled the trading republics of Italy to attach themselves to one of the belligerent parties, in order to secure a preference in its ports. For a short time, habit kept the Venetians attached to the empire; but they soon found that their interests were more closely connected with the Syrian trade than with that of Constantinople. They joined the kings of Jerusalem in extending their conquests, and obtained considerable establishments in all the maritime cities of the kingdom. From having been the customers and allies of the Greeks, they became their rivals and enemies. The commercial fleets of the age acted too often like pirates; and it is not improbable that the Emperor John had good reason to complain of the aggressions of the Venetians. Hostilities commenced; the Doge Dominico Michieli, one of the heroes of the republic, conducted a numerous fleet into the Archipelago, and plundered the islands of Rhodes and Chios, where he wintered. Next year he continued his depredations in Samos, Mitylene, Paros, and Andros. . . . Peace was re-established by the emperor reinstating the Venetians in the enjoyment of all the commercial privileges they had enjoyed before the war broke out."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine and Greek Empires*, bk. 3, ch. 2, sect. 2.

A. D. 1177.—Pretended Papal Grant of the sovereignty of the Adriatic.—Doubtful story of the humiliation of Frederick Barbarossa.—A "notable epoch in early Venetian history is the grant on which she based her claim to the sovereignty of the Adriatic. In the course of the fierce struggle between Alexander III. and Frederick Barbarossa [see ITALY: A. D. 1174-1183], the Pope, when his fortunes were at the lowest, took refuge with the Venetians, who, after a vain effort at reconciliation, made common

cause with him, and in a naval encounter obtained so signal a victory that the Emperor was compelled to sue for peace and submit to the most humiliating terms. The crowning scene of his degradation has been rendered familiar by the pencil, the chisel, and the pen. . . . The Emperor, as soon as he came into the sacred presence, stripped off his mantle and knelt down before the Pope to kiss his feet. Alexander, intoxicated with his triumph and losing all sense of moderation or generosity, placed his foot on the head or neck of his prostrate enemy, exclaiming, in the words of the Psalmist, 'Super aspidem et basiliscum ambulabis' &c ('Thou shalt tread upon the asp and the basilisk'. . .). 'Non tibi, sed Petro' ('Not to thee, but Peter'), cried the outraged and indignant Emperor. 'Et mihi et Petro' ('To both me and Peter'), rejoined the Pope, with a fresh pressure of his heel. . . . Sismondi (following a contemporary chronicler) narrates the interview without any circumstance of insult, and describes it as concluding with the kiss of peace. There are writers who contend that Alexander was never at Venice, and that the Venetians obtained no victory on his behalf. But the weight of evidence adduced by Daru strikes us to be quite conclusive in favour of his version. . . . In return for the good offices of Venice on this occasion. . . . Alexander presented the reigning Doge, Ziani, with a ring, saying, 'Receive this ring, and with it, as my donation, the dominion of the sea, which you, and your successors, shall annually assert on an appointed day, so that all posterity may understand that the possession of the sea was yours by right of victory, and that it is subject to the rule of the Venetian Republic, as wife to husband'. . . . The well-known ceremony of wedding the Adriatic, religiously observed with all its original pomp and splendour during six centuries, was in itself a proclamation and a challenge to the world. It was regularly attended by the papal nuncio and the whole of the diplomatic corps, who, year after year, witnessed the dropping of a sanctified ring into the sea, and heard without a protest the prescriptive accompaniment: 'Desponsamus te, mare, in signum veri perpetuæque domini' (we espouse thee, sea, in sign of true and perpetual dominion)."—*The Republic of Venice* (*Quart. Rev.*, Oct., 1874, v. 137), pp. 421-423.

ALSO IN: G. B. Testa, *Hist. of the War of Fred'k I. against the Communes of Lombardy*, bk. 11.—Mrs. W. Busk, *Mediæval Popes, Emperors, Kings, and Crusaders*, bk. 2, ch. 8 (v. 2).

A. D. 1201.—Cause of Hostility to Constantinople.—"Of late years the Venetians had had difficulties with the New Rome. . . . These difficulties arose, in great measure, from the fact that the influence of Venice in Constantinople was no longer sufficient to exclude that of the other Italian republics. . . . But the hostility to Constantinople reached its height when the Venetians learned that Alexis had, in May 1201, received an embassy from Genoa, and was negotiating with Ottobono della Croce, its leader, for the concession of privileges for trade in Romania which Venice had hitherto regarded as exclusively her own. From this time the Doge appears to have determined to avenge the wrongs of his state on the ruler who had ventured to favour his rivals."—E. Pears, *The Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 8.

**A. D. 1201-1203.**—Perfidious part in the conquest of Constantinople. See **CRUSADES**: A. D. 1201-1203.

**A. D. 1204.**—Share of the Republic in the partition of the Byzantine Empire. See **BYZANTINE EMPIRE**: A. D. 1204-1205.

**A. D. 1216.**—Acquisition of the Ionian Islands. See **CORFU**: A. D. 1216-1880; and **IONIAN ISLANDS**: To 1814.

**A. D. 1256-1258.**—Battles with the Genoese at Acre.—“At the period of the Crusades, it was usual in those cities or towns where the Christians held sway, to assign to each of the mercantile communities which had borne a part in the conquest or recovery of the particular district, a separate quarter where they might have their own mill, their own oven, their own bath, their own weights and measures, their own church, and where they might be governed by their own laws, and protected by their own magistrates. . . . At Saint Jean d’Acre, however, the Church of Saint Sabbas was frequented by the Venetians and the Genoese in common; and it happened that, in course of time, both nations sought to found a right to the exclusive property of the building.” Collisions ensued, in one of which (1256), the Genoese drove the Venetians from their factory at Acre and burned the church of Saint Sabbas. The Venetians retaliated by sending a squadron to Acre which destroyed all the Genoese shipping in the port, burned their factory, and reduced a castle near the town which was held by a Genoese garrison. Early in 1257 the fleets of the two republics met and fought a battle, between Acre and Tyre, in which the Venetians were the victors. On the 24th of June, 1258, a second battle was fought very nearly on the same spot, and again Venice triumphed, taking 2,600 prisoners and 25 galleys. Through the efforts of the Pope, a suspension of hostilities was then brought about; but other causes of war were working in the east, which soon led to fresh encounters in arms between the two jealous commercial rivals.—W. C. Hazlitt, *Hist. of the Venetian Republic*, ch. 11 (v. 1).

**A. D. 1261-1263.**—The supplanting of the Venetians by the Genoese at Constantinople and in the Black Sea.—War between the Republics.—The victory at Malvasia. See **GENOA**: A. D. 1261-1299.

**A. D. 1294-1299.**—War with Genoa.—Disastrous defeat at Curzola. See **GENOA**: A. D. 1261-1299.

**14th Century.**—Fleets.—Commerce.—Industries.—“In the 14th century Venice had 3,000 merchantmen manned by 25,000 sailors. A tenth part of these were ships exceeding 700 tons burden. There were besides 45 war-galleys manned by 11,000 hands; and 10,000 workmen, as well as 36,000 seamen, were employed in the arsenals. The largest of the war-galleys was called the Bucentaur; it was a state vessel of the most gorgeous description. Every year the Doge of Venice, seated upon a magnificent throne surmounted by a regal canopy, dropped from this vessel a ring into the Adriatic, to symbolise the fact that land and sea were united under the Venetian flag. This ceremony commemorated the victory gained over the fleet of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa in 1177, when the Venetians obliged him to sue for peace [see above: A. D. 1177]. Ascension Day was selected for its celebration, and the Bucentaur, glorious

with new scarlet and gold, its deck and seats inlaid with costly woods, and rowed with long banks of burnished oars, for many years bore the Doge to plight his troth with the words, ‘We espouse thee, O Sea! in token of true and eternal sovereignty.’ The merchant fleet of Venice was divided into companies sailing together according to their trade. Their routes, and the days for departure and return, their size, armament, crew, and amount of cargo, were all defined. In those times the seas were as much infested with pirates as the deserts with robbers; each squadron therefore hired a convoy of war-galleys for its protection on the voyage. There were six or seven such squadrons in regular employment. The argosies of Cyprus and Egypt, and the vessels engaged in the Barbary and Syrian commerce, concentrated their traffic chiefly at Alexandria and Cairo. The so-called Armenian fleet proceeded to Constantinople and the Euxine, visiting Kaffa and the Gulf of Alexandretta. A Catalonian fleet traded with Spain and Portugal, and another with France; while the most famous of all, the Flanders galleys, connected the seaports of France, England, and Holland with the great commercial city of Bruges. The internal traffic with Germany and Italy was encouraged with equal care, oriental produce arriving from Constantinople and Egypt, and many other commodities being distributed, at first by way of Carinthia, and afterwards of the Tyrol. Germans, Hungarians, and Bohemians conducted this distribution. In Venice a bonded warehouse (*fondaco dei tedeschi*), or custom-house, was accorded to the Germans, where they were allowed to offer their wares for sale, though only to Venetian dealers. Similar privileges were granted to the Armenians, Moors, and Turks, but not to the Greeks, against whom a strong animosity prevailed. . . . The ancient industries of preparing salt and curing fish were never disregarded. The Adriatic sands supplied material adapted for a glass of rare beauty and value, of which mirrors and other articles of Venetian manufacture were made. Venetian goldsmiths’ work was universally famed. Brass and iron foundries prepared the raw material for the armourers, whose weapons, helmets, and bucklers were unsurpassed for strength and beauty. Ship-building, with a people whose principle it was always to have more ships than any other state, was necessarily a very important branch of industry. Not satisfied with penetrating to every part already opened to enterprise, the Venetians travelled into regions before unknown, and gave to the world the record of their daring adventures. Maffeo and Nicolo Polo spent fifteen years visiting Egypt, Persia, India, the Khan of Tartary, and the Grand Khan or Emperor of China. Marco Polo, son of Nicolo, as well as Barthema and Joseph Barbaro, extended the knowledge obtained by their precursors in northern Europe and Asia.”—J. Yeats, *Growth and Vicissitudes of Commerce*, pp. 98-101.—For some further account, see **TRADE**: **MEDIEVAL**.

ALSO IN: A. Anderson, *Origin of Commerce*, v. 1.—*Venetian Commerce* (*Hunt’s Merchants’ Mag.*, v. 5, pp. 393-411).

**A. D. 1336-1338.**—Alliance with Florence against Mastino della Scala.—Conquest of Treviso and other territory on the mainland. See **VERONA**: A. D. 1260-1338.



**A. D. 1351-1355.—Alliance with the Greeks and Aragonese in war with Genoa.** See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1348-1355.

**A. D. 1358.—Loss of Dalmatia.** See HUNGARY: A. D. 1301-1442.

**A. D. 1378-1379.—Renewed war with Genoa.—The defeat at Pola.**—The treaty of June, 1355, between Venice and Genoa (see CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1348-1355), established a peace which lasted only until April, 1378, when, "a dispute having arisen between the rival States in relation to the island of Tenedos, which the Venetians had taken possession of, the Signory formally declared war against Genoa, which it denounced as false to all its oaths and obligations. On the 26th of this month, Vettore Pisani was invested with the supreme command of the naval forces of the republic. . . . The new commander-in-chief was the son of Nicolo Pisani, and had held a commission in the Navy for 25 years. . . . Of the seamen he was the idol. . . . Pisani sailed from Venice early in May, with 14 galleys; and, on the 30th of the month, while cruising off Antium, came across a Genoese squadron of 10 galleys, commanded by Admiral Fieschi. It was blowing a gale at the time, and five of Pisani's vessels, which had parted company with him, and fallen to leeward, were unable to rejoin him, while one of Fieschi's drifted ashore, and was wrecked. Thus the battle which immediately ensued was between equal forces; but the Genoese admiral was no match for Vettore Pisani," and sustained a disastrous defeat, losing four vessels, with all their officers and crew. "During the summer, Pisani captured great numbers of the enemy's merchantmen; but was unable to find their fleet, which, under Luciano Doria, was actively engaged in cutting up Venetian commerce in the East. In November he asked permission to return to Venice to refit his vessels, which were in a very bad condition, but this was denied him; and, being kept constantly cruising through the winter, at its expiration only six of his vessels were found to be seaworthy. Twelve others, however, were fitted out at their own expense and sent to him by his friends, who perceived that his political enemies were making an effort to ruin him. At the end of February, 1379, Michele Steno and Donato Zeno were appointed by the Government 'provveditori' of the fleet. These officers, like the field deputies of the Dutch republic in later times, were set as spies over the commander-in-chief, whose operations they entirely controlled. On the 1st of May, Pisani left Brindisi, bound to Venice, having a large number of merchantmen in charge, laden with wheat; and, on the 6th instant, as the weather looked squally, put into Pola, with his convoy, for the night. On the following morning, at day-break, it was reported to him that Doria was off the port with 25 vessels; whereupon he determined not to leave his anchorage until Carlo Zeno, whom he was expecting with a reinforcement of 10 galleys, should be seen approaching. But the Provveditori, loudly denouncing such a determination as a reflection upon the valor of his officers and men, ordered him, peremptorily, in the name of the Senate, to engage the enemy without delay." The result was an overwhelming defeat, out of which Pisani brought six galleys, only—"which were all that were saved from this most terrible engagement, wherein 800 Venetians perished and 2,000 were

taken prisoners. . . . Pisani was now violently assailed by his enemies; although they well knew that he had fought the battle of Pola against his own judgment, and agreeably to the wishes of the government, as made known to him by its accredited agents, Michele Steno and Donato Zeno. The Great Council decreed his immediate removal from the supreme command, and he was brought to Venice loaded with chains." Condemned, upon trial before the Senate, he was sentenced to imprisonment for six months.—F. A. Parker, *The Fleets of the World*, pp. 100-105.

**A. D. 1379-1381.—The war of Chioggia.—The dire extremity of the Republic and her deliverance.**—After the great victory of Pola, which cost the Genoese the life of Luciano D'Oria, they lost no time in pressing their beaten enemy, to make the most of the advantage they had won. "Fresh galleys were forthwith placed under the command of Pietro, another of the noble D'Oria family; and before the eyes of all Genoa, and after the benediction of the archbishop, the fleet sailed from the harbour, and a great cry was raised from roof to roof, and from window to window, and each alley and each street re-echoed it with enthusiasm, 'to Venice! to Venice!' On arriving in the Adriatic, Pietro D'Oria joined the fleet already there, and prepared for his attack on Venice. These were pitiful days for the Queen of the Adriatic, the days of her greatest peril and humiliation. The Lord of Padua joined the Genoese; the King of Hungary sent troops, as did also the Marquis of Friuli, and all seemed lost to her both by sea and land. Everywhere within the city was misery and dismay. . . . To possess himself of Chioggia, which was 25 miles distant from Venice, was D'Oria's first plan. It was the key of the capital, commanded the entrance to the harbour, and cut off any assistance which might come from Lombardy. Chioggia was very strong in itself, defended by bastions on all sides; its weak point lay in being built on two sides of a river, which was spanned by a large wooden bridge. It was the first care of the defenders to block up the mouth of this river. After a few days of gallant defence, and a few days of gallant attack by sea and land, the defenders of Chioggia were reduced to the last extremity. The entrance to the river was broken open, and the bridge, which for some time was a stumbling-block to the besiegers, was destroyed with all the soldiers upon it by the bravery of a Genoese sailor, who took a boat laden with tar and wool and other combustible materials, and set fire to it, escaping by means of swimming. The defenders having thus perished in the flames, and Chioggia being taken [August, 1379], the triumph of the Genoese was at its height. It now seemed as if Pietro D'Oria had but the word of command to give, and Venice would have met with the same fate as Pisa had but a century before. But with this the fortune of the Ligurians began to wane. One small cannon of leather, with a wooden car, brought from Chioggia as a trophy to Genoa, is all that exists to-day to testify to their victory." The Venetians, in consternation at the fall of Chioggia, sent a deputation to D'Oria humbly offering to submit to any terms of peace he might dictate; but the insolent victor ordered them home with the message that there could be

no peace until he had entered their city to bridle the bronze horses which stand on the Piazza of St. Mark. This roused the indignation and courage of Venice anew, and every nerve was strained in the defense of the port. "Vettor Pisani, who since the defeat at Pola had languished in prison, was brought out by unanimous consent, and before an assembled multitude he quietly and modestly accepted the position of saviour of his country. . . . The one saving point for Venice lay in the arrival of a few ships from Constantinople, which . . . Carlo Zeno had under his command, endeavouring to make a diversion in the favour of the Venetians at the Eastern capital. Pending the return of this fleet, the Venetians made an attack on Chioggia. And an additional gleam of hope raised the spirits of Pisani's men in the disaffection of the King of Hungary from the Genoese cause; and gradually, as if by the magic hand of a fickle fortune, Pietro D'Oria found himself and his troops besieged in Chioggia, instead of going on his way to Venice as he had himself prophesied. But the Genoese position was still too strong, and Pisani found it hopeless to attempt to dislodge them; his troops became restless: they wished to return to Venice, though they had sworn never to go back thither except as conquerors. It was in this moment of dire distress that the ultimate resort was vaguely whispered from the Venetian Council Hall to the Piazza. A solemn decree was passed, 'that if within four days the succour from Carlo Zeno did not arrive, the fleet should be recalled from Chioggia, and then a general council should be held as to whether their country could be saved, or if another more secure might not be found elsewhere.' Then did the law-givers of Venice determine that on the fifth day the lagunes should be abandoned, and that they should proceed en masse to Crete or Negropont to form for themselves a fresh nucleus of power on a foreign soil. It is indeed hard to realize that the fate of Venice, associated with all that is Italian, the offspring of the hardy few who raised the city from the very waves, once hung in such a balance. But so it was, when towards the evening of the fourth day [January 1, 1380] sails were descried on the horizon, and Carlo Zeno arrived to save his country from so great a sacrifice. Meanwhile, at Chioggia the Genoese were day by day becoming more careless; they felt their position so strong, they talked merrily of fixing the day when they should bivouac on the Piazza of St. Mark. Little did they dream of the net of misfortune into which they were being drawn so fast. Besides reinforcements by sea, assistance by land flocked in towards Venice. Barnabo Visconti, and his company of the Star, a roving company of Germans, and the celebrated Breton band under Sir John Hawkwood, the Englishman, all hurried to assist the fallen banner of St. Mark. Pietro D'Oria did all he could to maintain discipline amongst his troops; but when he fell one day in an engagement, through being struck by a Venetian arrow, a general demoralization set in, and their only thought was how to save themselves and abandon Chioggia. . . . On the 18th of February, 1380, the Venetians made another gallant attack. Both sides fought with desperation, the Genoese for life, their rivals for their country and their country's fame. Fearful slaughter occurred amongst the Genoese, and they were obliged to

retire within the walls. . . . Driven to extremities, on the 22nd of June in that year, 4,000 Genoese were taken to the public prisons in Venice. . . . Since both parties were tired of war, and weakened with these extreme efforts, it was no difficult matter to establish a peace [August 8, 1381]."—J. T. Bent, *Genoa*, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: W. C. Hazlitt, *Hist. of the Venetian Republic*, ch. 20 (v. 3).—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 12.

A. D. 1386.—Acquisition of Corfu. See Corfu: A. D. 1216-1880.

A. D. 1406-1447.—Acquisition of neighboring territory in northeastern Italy.—On the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the first Duke of Milan (see MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447), the eastern parts of his duchy, "Padua, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, were gradually added to the dominion of Venice. By the middle of the 15th century, that republic had become the greatest power in northern Italy."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, p. 241.—See ITALY: A. D. 1402-1406.

A. D. 1426-1447.—League with Florence, Naples, Savoy, and other States against the Duke of Milan. See ITALY: A. D. 1412-1447.

A. D. 1450-1454.—War with Milan and Florence.—Alliance with Naples and Savoy. See MILAN: A. D. 1447-1454.

A. D. 1454-1479.—Treaty with the Turks, followed by war.—Loss of ground in Greece and the islands. See GREECE: A. D. 1454-1479.

A. D. 1460-1479.—Losing struggle with the Turks in Greece and the Archipelago. See TURKS: A. D. 1451-1481; and ITALY: A. D. 1447-1480.

A. D. 1469-1515.—The early Printers.—The Aldine Press. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: A. D. 1469-1515.

A. D. 1489.—Acquisition of Cyprus. See CYPRUS: A. D. 1489-1570.

A. D. 1492-1496.—The invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. of France.—Alliance with Naples, Milan, Spain, the Emperor and the Pope.—Expulsion of the French. See ITALY: A. D. 1492-1494; and 1494-1496.

A. D. 1494-1503.—The rising power and spreading dominion of the republic.—The fears and jealousies excited.—"The disturbances which had taken place in Italy since Charles VIII.'s advent there [see ITALY: A. D. 1494-1496; 1499-1500; 1501-1504], came very opportunely for their [the Venetians'] plans and policy. On every available occasion the Venetians spread their power all round about them. In the struggle between Charles and Ferrantino [or Ferdinand, of Naples] they acquired five fine cities in Apulia, excellently situated for their requirements, which they peopled by the reception of fugitive Jews from Spain. Moreover, in the kingdom of Naples, one party had declared for them. . . . Tarento raised their standard. During the Florentine disorders they were within an ace of becoming masters of Pisa. In the Milanese feuds they acquired Cremona and Ghiara d'Adda. Their power was all the more terrible, as they had never been known to lose again anything which they had once gotten. No one doubted that their aim was the complete sovereignty over the whole of Italy. Their historians always talked as if Venice was the ancient Rome once more. . . . The Turkish war,



which had kept them a while employed, now at an end, they next tried their fortune in Romagna, and endeavoured, availing themselves of the quarrels between the returning nobles and Cesar [Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI.], to become, if not the sole, at all events the most powerful, vassals of the papal chair. . . . The Venetians prepared to espouse the cause of those whom Cesar had suppressed. The cities reflected how genuine and substantial that peace was that the lion of Venice spread over all its dependencies. Having appeared in this country at the end of October, 1503, and having first promised the Malatesti other possessions in their own country, they took Rimini, with the concurrence of the prince and citizens. Without ado they attacked Faenza. . . . They continued their conquests, and, in the territories of Imola, Cesena, and Forli, took stronghold after stronghold. . . . Then it was that the first minister of France stated his belief that, 'had they only Romagna, they would forthwith attack Florence, on account of a debt of 180,000 guilders owing them.' If they were to make an inroad into Tuscany, Pisa would fall immediately on their arrival. Their object in calling the French into the Milanese territory was, that they considered them more fitted to make a conquest than to keep it; and, in the year 1504, they were negotiating how it were possible to wrest Milan again from them. Could they only succeed in this, nothing in Italy would be able longer to withstand them. 'They wanted,' as Macchiavelli said, 'to make the Pope their chaplain.' But they met with the staunchest resistance in Julius [the Pope, Julius II.], as in him they could discover no weak point to attack. As pointedly as he could express himself, he declared to them, on the 9th November, 1503, that, 'though hitherto their friend, he would now do his utmost against them, and would besides incite all the princes of Christendom against them.'—L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Latin and Teutonic Nations*, bk. 2, ch. 3.

**A. D. 1498-1502.—War with the Turks.** See **TURKS**: A. D. 1498-1502.

**A. D. 1499-1500.—Alliance with France against the Duke of Milan.—French conquest of the duchy.—Acquisition of Cremona.** See **ITALY**: A. D. 1499-1500.

**15-17th Centuries.—The decline of Venetian commerce and its causes.**—"Commerce was for a long time free at Venice; and the republic only began to decline when its government had caused the source of its prosperity to be exhausted by monopoly. At first all the young patricians were subjected to the most severe ordeals of a commercial training. They were often sent as novices on board state-vessels to try fortune with a light venture, so much did it enter into the views of the administration to direct all citizens toward industrial occupations! The only reproach that can be brought against the Venetians, is the effort to exclude foreigners from all competition with them. Although commercial jealousy had not yet erected prohibitions into a system, and the ports of the republic were open to all the merchandise of the world, yet the Venetians only permitted its transportation in their own ships; and they reigned as absolute masters over all the Mediterranean. War had given them security from the Pisans, the Sicilians and the Genoese. Spain, long occupied by the

Moors, gave them little occasion of offence. France disdained commerce; England had not yet begun to think of it; the republic of Holland was not in existence. Under cover of the right of sovereignty on the gulf, which she had arrogated to herself, Venice reserved the almost exclusive right to navigate. Armed flotillas guarded the mouths of all her rivers, and allowed no barque to enter or depart without being vigorously examined. But what profited that jealous solicitude for the interests of her navigation? A day came when the Portuguese discovered the Cape of Good Hope, and all that structure of precautions and mistrust suddenly fell to pieces. Here begin the first wars of customs-duties, and political economy receives from history valuable instruction. The Venetians had levelled all obstacles, but for themselves alone, and to the exclusion of other nations. Their legislation was very strict in respect to foreigners, in the matter of commerce. The laws forbade a merchant who was not a subject of the republic to be even received on board a vessel of the state. Foreigners paid customs-duties twice as high as natives. They could neither build nor buy vessels in Venetian ports. The ships, the captains, the owners, must all be Venetian. Every alliance between natives and strangers was interdicted; there was no protection, no privileges and no benefits save for Venetians: the latter, however, all had the same rights. In Venice itself, and there alone, was it permitted to negotiate with the Germans, Bohemians and Hungarians. As national manufactures acquired importance, the government departed from the liberal policy it had hitherto pursued, and the manufacturers obtained an absolute prohibition of such foreign merchandise as they produced. In vain, in the 17th century, did declining commerce urge the reestablishment of former liberties and the freedom of the port: the attempt was made for a brief moment, but the spirit of restriction won the day, and the prohibitory régime early prepared the way for the death of the republic. The people of Italy, however, pardoned the Venetians for their commercial intolerance, because of the moderate price at which they delivered all commodities. The Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Germans flocked to Venice and engaged with safety in speculations, which were always advantageous, because of the security which the credit institutions gave and the recognized probity of the merchants. But soon Venice saw numerous manufactures spring up in Europe rivaling her own, and her commerce encountered most formidable competition in that of the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and English. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope [see **PORTUGAL**: A. D. 1463-1498] took away from her the monopoly of the spices of the Indies. The taking of Constantinople, by Mahomet II, had already deprived her of the magnificent privileges which her subjects enjoyed in that rich capital of the Orient. But the discovery of America and the vigorous reprisals of Charles V, who, at the commencement of his reign, in 1517, doubled the customs-duties which the Venetians paid in his states, completed the ruin of that fortunate monopoly which had made all Europe tributary. Charles V raised the import and export duties on all Venetian merchandise to twenty per cent; and this tariff, which would to-day appear mod-

erate, sufficed then to prevent the Venetians from entering Spanish ports. Such was the origin of the exclusive system, the fatal invention which the republic of Venice was so cruelly to expiate. So long as she sought fortune only in the free competition of the talent and capital of her own citizens, she increased from age to age and became for a moment the arbiter of Europe; but as soon as she wished to rule the markets by the tyranny of monopoly, she saw a league formed against her commerce, formidable for a very different reason from that of Cambrai."—J.-A. Blanqui, *Hist. of Pol. Economy in Europe*, ch. 20. For some further account, see **TRADE: MODERN**.

**A. D. 1501.—Hostile schemes of the Emperor and the King of France.** See **ITALY: A. D. 1501-1504**.

**A. D. 1508-1509.—The League of Cambrai.**—The republic despoiled of her continental provinces.—"The craving appetite of Louis XII., . . . sharpened by the loss of Naples, sought to indemnify itself by more ample acquisitions in the north. As far back as 1504 [see **ITALY: A. D. 1504-1506**], he had arranged a plan with the emperor for the partition of the continental possessions of Venice. . . . The scheme is said to have been communicated to Ferdinand [of Aragon] in the royal interview at Savona [1507]. No immediate action followed, and it seems probable that the latter monarch, with his usual circumspection, reserved his decision until he should be more clearly satisfied of the advantages to himself. At length the projected partition was definitely settled by the celebrated treaty of Cambrai, December 10th, 1508, between Louis XII. and the emperor Maximilian, in which the Pope, King Ferdinand, and all princes who had any claims for spoiliations by the Venetians, were invited to take part. The share of the spoil assigned to the Catholic monarch [Ferdinand] was the five Neapolitan cities, Trani, Brindisi, Gallipoli, Pulignano, and Otranto, pledged to Venice for considerable sums advanced by her during the late war. The Spanish court, and, not long after, Julius II., ratified the treaty, although it was in direct contravention of the avowed purpose of the pontiff, to chase the 'barbarians' from Italy. It was his bold policy, however, to make use of them first for the aggrandisement of the church, and then to trust to his augmented strength and more favorable opportunities for eradicating them altogether. Never was there a project more destitute of principle or sound policy. There was not one of the contracting parties who was not at that very time in close alliance with the state, the dismemberment of which he was plotting. As a matter of policy, it went to break down the principal barrier on which each of these powers could rely for keeping in check the overweening ambition of its neighbors, and maintaining the balance of Italy. The alarm of Venice was quieted for a time by assurances from the courts of France and Spain that the league was directed solely against the Turks, accompanied by the most hypocritical professions of good will, and amicable offers to the republic. The preamble of the treaty declares that, it being the intention of the allies to support the pope in a crusade against the infidel, they first proposed to recover from Venice the territories of which she had despoiled the church and other powers, to the

manifest hindrance of these pious designs. . . . The true reasons for the confederacy are to be found in a speech delivered at the German diet, some time after, by the French minister Héllan. 'We,' he remarks, after enumerating various enormities of the republic, 'wear no fine purple; feast from no sumptuous services of plate; have no coffers overflowing with gold. We are barbarians. Surely,' he continues in another place, 'if it is derogatory to princes to act the part of merchants, it is unbecoming in merchants to assume the state of princes.' This, then, was the true key to the conspiracy against Venice; envy of her superior wealth and magnificence, hatred engendered by her too arrogant bearing, and lastly the evil eye with which kings naturally regard the movements of an active, aspiring republic. To secure the co-operation of Florence, the kings of France and Spain agreed to withdraw their protection from Pisa, for a stipulated sum of money [see **PISA: A. D. 1494-1509**]. There is nothing in the whole history of the merchant princes of Venice so mercenary and base as this bartering away for gold the independence for which this little republic had been so nobly contending for more than 14 years. Early in April, 1509, Louis XII. crossed the Alps at the head of a force which bore down all opposition. City and castle fell before him, and his demeanor to the vanquished, over whom he had no rights beyond the ordinary ones of war, was that of an incensed master taking vengeance on his rebellious vassals. In revenge for his detention before Peschiera, he hung the Venetian governor and his son from the battlements. This was an outrage on the laws of chivalry, which, however hard they bore on the peasant, respected those of high degree. . . . On the 14th of May, 1509, was fought the bloody battle of Agnadell, which broke the power of Venice and at once decided the fate of the war. Ferdinand had contributed nothing to these operations, except by his diversion on the side of Naples, where he possessed himself without difficulty of the cities allotted to his share. They were the cheapest, and, if not the most valuable, were the most permanent acquisitions of the war, being reincorporated in the monarchy of Naples. Then followed the memorable decree by which Venice released her continental provinces from their allegiance, authorizing them to provide in any way they could for their safety; a measure which, whether originating in panic or policy, was perfectly consonant with the latter. The confederates, who had remained united during the chase, soon quarrelled over the division of the spoil. Ancient jealousies revived. The republic, with cool and consummate policy, availed herself of this state of feeling. Pope Julius, who had gained all that he had proposed, and was satisfied with the humiliation of Venice, now felt all his former antipathies and distrust of the French return in full force. The rising flame was diligently fanned by the artful emissaries of the republic, who at length effected a reconciliation on her behalf with the haughty pontiff. The latter . . . planned a new coalition for the expulsion of the French, calling on the other allies to take part in it."—W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella*, pt. 2, ch. 22 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 9, ch. 10 (v. 4).—The



*City in the Sea*, ch. 21.—M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation*, bk. 5, ch. 14.—L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514*, bk. 2, ch. 3.—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 17-18.

**A. D. 1510-1513.**—The breaking of the League of Cambrai.—The "Holy League" of Pope Julius with Venice, Ferdinand, Maximilian, and Henry VIII. against France.—The French expelled from Italy.—The Republic recovers its domain. See ITALY: A. D. 1510-1513.

**A. D. 1517.**—Peace with the Emperor Maximilian.—Recovery of Verona. See FRANCE: A. D. 1516-1517.

**A. D. 1526.**—The Holy League against the Emperor, Charles V. See ITALY: A. D. 1523-1527.

**A. D. 1527.**—Fresh alliance with France and England against the Emperor. See ITALY: A. D. 1527-1529.

**A. D. 1570-1571.**—Holy League with Spain and the Pope against the Turks.—Great battle and victory of Lepanto. See TURKS: A. D. 1566-1571.

**A. D. 1572.**—Withdrawal from the Holy League.—Separate peace with the Turks. See TURKS: A. D. 1572-1573.

**16th Century.**—The Art of the Renaissance.

—"It was a fact of the greatest importance for the development of the fine arts in Italy that painting in Venice reached maturity later than in Florence. Owing to this circumstance one chief aspect of the Renaissance, its material magnificence and freedom, received consummate treatment at the hands of Titian, Tintoretto, and Veronese. To idealise the sensualities of the external universe, to achieve for colour what the Florentines had done for form, to invest the worldly grandeur of human life at one of its most gorgeous epochs with the dignity of the highest art, was what these great artists were called on to accomplish. Their task could not have been so worthily performed in the fifteenth century as in the sixteenth, if the development of the æsthetic sense had been more premature among the Venetians. Venice was precisely fitted for the part her painters had to play. Free, isolated, wealthy, powerful; famous throughout Europe for the pomp of her state equipage, and for the immorality of her private manners; ruled by a prudent aristocracy, who spent vast wealth on public shows and on the maintenance of a more than imperial civic majesty: Venice with her pavement of liquid chrysope, with her palaces of porphyry and marble, her frescoed façades, her quays and squares aglow with the costumes of the Levant, her lagoons afloat with the galleys of all nations, her churches floored with mosaics, her silvery domes and ceilings glittering with sculpture bathed in molten gold: Venice luxurious in the light and colour of a vaporous atmosphere, where sea-mists rose into the mounded summer clouds; arched over by the broad expanse of sky, bounded only by the horizon of waves and plain and distant mountain ranges, and reflected in all its many hues of sunrise and sunset upon the glassy surface of smooth waters: Venice asleep like a miracle of opal or of pearl upon the bosom of an undulating lake:—here and here only on the face of the whole globe was the unique city wherein the pride of life might com-

bine with the lustre of the physical universe to create and stimulate in the artist a sense of all that was most sumptuous in the pageant of the world of sense. . . . The Venetians had no green fields and trees, no garden borders, no blossoming orchards, to teach them the tender suggestiveness, the quaint poetry of isolated or contrasted tints. Their meadows were the fruitless furrows of the Adriatic, hued like a peacock's neck; they called the pearl-shells of their Lido flowers, *fiore di mare*. Nothing distracted their attention from the glories of morning and of evening presented to them by their sea and sky. It was in consequence of this that the Venetians conceived colour heroically, not as a matter of missal-margins or of subordinate decoration, but as a motive worthy in itself of sublime treatment. In like manner, hedged in by no liminary hills, contracted by no city walls, stifled by no narrow streets, but open to the liberal airs of heaven and ocean, the Venetians understood space and imagined pictures almost boundless in their immensity. Light, colour, air, space: those are the elemental conditions of Venetian art; of those the painters weaved their ideal world for beautiful and proud humanity. . . . In order to understand the destiny of Venice in art, it is not enough to concentrate attention on the peculiarities of her physical environment. Potent as these were in the creation of her style, the political and social conditions of the Republic require also to be taken into account. Among Italian cities Venice was unique. She alone was tranquil in her empire, unimpeded in her constitutional development, independent of Church interference, undisturbed by the cross purposes and intrigues of the despots, inhabited by merchants who were princes, and by a free-born people who had never seen war at their gates. The serenity of undisturbed security, the luxury of wealth amassed abroad and liberally spent at home, gave a physiognomy of ease and proud self-confidence to all her edifices. The grim and anxious struggles of the Middle Ages left no mark on Venice. How different was this town from Florence, every inch of whose domain could tell of civic warfare. . . . It is not an insignificant, though a slight, detail, that the predominant colour of Florence is brown, while the predominant colour of Venice is that of mother-of-pearl, concealing within its general whiteness every tint that can be placed upon the palette of a painter. The conditions of Florence stimulated mental energy and turned the forces of the soul inwards. Those of Venice inclined the individual to accept life as he found it. Instead of exciting him to think, they disposed him to enjoy, or to acquire by industry the means of manifold enjoyment. To represent in art the intellectual strivings of the Renaissance was the task of Florence and her sons; to create a monument of Renaissance magnificence was the task of Venice."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: The Fine Arts*, ch. 7.

**A. D. 1606-1607.**—The Republic under the guidance of Fra Paolo Sarpi.—Conflict with the Pope.—The Interdict which had no terrors.—"In the Constitution of the Republic at this time [1606] there were three permanent officials called Counsellors of Law, or State Counsellors, whose duties were to instruct the Doge and Senate on the legal bearings of any question in dispute in which the Republic was involved.

But at the beginning of this year, because of the ecclesiastical element that frequently appeared in these quarrels (for they were mostly between the State and the Pope), the Senate resolved to create a new office, namely, that of 'Teologo-Consulitore,' or Theological Counsellor. In looking about for one to fill this office the choice of Doge and Senate unanimously fell upon Fra Paolo Sarpi. . . . I have called Fra Paolo Sarpi the greatest of the Venetians. . . . Venice has produced many great men—Doges, soldiers, sailors, statesmen, writers, poets, painters, travellers—but I agree with Mrs. Oliphant that Fra Paolo is 'a personage more grave and great, a figure unique in the midst of this ever animated, strong, stormy, and restless race'; and with Lord Macaulay, who has said of him that 'what he did, he did better than anybody.' . . . He was supreme as a thinker, as a man of action, and as a transcript and pattern of every Christian principle. . . . Foreigners who came to Venice sought above all things to see him as 'the greatest genius of his age.' . . . On the 28th of January, 1606, he entered upon his public duties." From that time until his death, seventeen years later, he not only held the office of Theological Counsellor, but the duties of the three Counsellors of Law were gradually transferred to him, as those offices were vacated, in succession, by death. "During this time question after question arose for settlement, many of which were of momentous import, the resolution of which bore, not upon the interests of Venice merely, but of Europe; and affected, not the then living generation only, but a remote posterity. In every case Fra Paolo's advice was sought, in every case it was followed, and in every case it was right. The consequence was that the history of the Republic during these seventeen years was one unbroken record of great intellectual and moral victories. . . . Never was there in any land, by any Government, a servant more honoured and more beloved. The solicitude of the Doge, of the dreaded Council of Ten, of the Senate, of the whole people, for the safety and well-being of their Consulitore, was like that of a mother for her only child. 'Fate largo a Fra Paolo'—'Make room for Fra Paolo,' was often heard as he passed along the crowded Merceria. Fra Paolo loved Venice with an undying devotion, and Venice loved him with a romantic and tender affection. The Pope, whose quarrels with the Republic were the chief cause of the creation of the office of Theological Counsellor, and of Fra Paolo's election to it, was Paul V. . . . Strained relations . . . [had] existed between Venice and the Vatican during the last years of Clement VIII.'s Pontificate. His seizure of the Duchy of Ferrara, his conduct in the matter of the Patriarch Zane's appointment, his attempt to cripple the book-trade of Venice by means of the Index Expurgatorius, all led to serious disputes, in every one of which he got the worst of it. Pope Paul V., who was then Cardinal Borghese, chafed at what he considered Clement's pusillanimity. Talking of these matters to the Venetian ambassador at Rome, Leonardo Donato, he once said, 'If I were Pope, I would place Venice under an interdict and excommunication; 'And if I were Doge,' was the reply, 'I would trample your interdict and excommunication under foot.' Curiously enough, both were called upon to fill these offices, and both

proved as good as their words. . . . Paul V. . . . found several excuses for quarrel. The Patriarch, Matteo Zane—he whose appointment had been a matter of dispute with Clement VIII.—died, and the Senate appointed Francesco Vendramin as his successor. Pope Paul claimed the right of presentation, and demanded that he should be sent to Rome for examination and approval. The Senate replied by ordering his investiture, and forbidding him to leave Venice. Again, money had to be raised in Brescia for the restoration of the ramparts, and the Senate imposed a tax on all the citizens—laymen and ecclesiastics alike. Pope Paul V. claimed exemption for the latter, as being his subjects. The Senate refused to listen to him. . . . These differences were causing both the Pope and the Republic to look to their armoury and to try the temper of their weapons, when two more serious matters occurred which brought them into open warfare. The prologue was passed, the drama was about to open. First, two priests in high position were leading flagrantly wicked and criminal lives. . . . The Senate sent its officers, and had the offenders seized and brought to Venice, and locked up from further mischief in the dungeons of the Ducal Palace. Pope Paul V. angrily remonstrated, and peremptorily demanded their instant liberation, on the ground that being priests they were not amenable to the secular arm. . . . Secondly, two ecclesiastical property laws were in force throughout the Republic; by one the Church was prohibited from building any new monasteries, convents, or churches without the consent of the Government under penalty of forfeiture; and by the other it was disqualified from retaining property which it might become possessed of by donation or by inheritance, but was bound to turn it into money. . . . Pope Paul V. . . . demanded the repeal of these property laws. These two demands, regarding the imprisoned ecclesiastics and the property laws, were first put forward in October, 1605. . . . Early in December, the Pope, impatient to bring the quarrel to a head, threatened to place Venice under interdict and excommunication if it did not yield to his demands. . . . It was at this acute stage of the quarrel that the Republic laid hold of Fra Paolo Sarpi, and, as we have already noted, made him its Theological Counsellor, and the struggle henceforth became, to a large extent, a duel between 'Paul the Pope, and Paul the Friar.' On the very day that Fra Paolo accepted this office he informed the Senate that two courses of action were open to them. They could argue the case either *de jure* or *de facto*. First, *de jure*, that is, they could appeal against the judgment of the Pope to a Church Council. . . . Secondly, the Republic could adopt the *de facto* course; that is, it could rely on its own authority and strength. It could set these over against the Pope's, and whilst willing to argue out the matter in a spirit of reason with him, yet meet his force with opposing force. If he turned a deaf ear to right, there was no help for it but to make it a question of might. The *de facto* course was therefore the one Fra Paolo recommended; adding very significantly, 'He who appeals to a Council admits that the righteousness of his cause may be questioned, whereas that of Venice is indisputable.' The Senate hailed the advice thus given, and instructed him



to draw out a reply to the Pope's brief in accordance with it. . . . From the moment this reply was received a bitter controversy was set on foot. Renewed demands came from Rome, and renewed refusals were sent from Venice. . . . Meanwhile the eyes of all the Courts of Europe were directed to the great struggle, and Venice made them more than spectators by laying its case as prepared by their Consultore fairly and fully before them. The time had not arrived for any nation to enter as a party into the contest, but all frankly expressed their opinions, which were, with the exception of that of Spain, unequivocally on the side of Venice. . . . At last the Pope determined to put into execution the threats contained in the briefs, and to place the Republic under interdict and excommunication. On the 17th of April, 1606, the bull of interdict and excommunication was launched; twenty-four days being allowed Venice for repentance, with three more added of the Pope's gracious clemency. The die was thus cast by Pope Paul V., by which he was either to humble the Republic, or discredit himself and his 'spiritual arms' in the sight of Europe. The bull was a sweeping one. . . . No more masses were to be said. Baptism, marriage, and burial services were to cease. The churches were to be locked up, and the priests could withdraw from the devoted land. All social relationships were dissolved. Marriages were declared invalid, and all children born were illegitimate. Husbands could desert their wives, and children disobey their parents. Contracts of all kinds were declared null and void. Allegiance to the Government was at an end."—A. Robertson, *Fra Paolo Sarpi*, ch. 5, and preface.—"It was proposed in the college of Venice to enter a solemn protest, as had been done in earlier times; but this proposal was rejected, on the ground that the sentence of the pope was in itself null and void, and had not even a show of justice. In a short proclamation, occupying only a quarto page, Leonardo Donato made known to the clergy the resolution of the republic to maintain the sovereign authority, 'which acknowledges no other superior in worldly things save God alone.' Her faithful clergy would of themselves perceive the nullity of the 'censures' issued against them, and would continue the discharge of their functions, the cure of souls and the worship of God, without interruption. No alarm was expressed, no menaces were uttered, the proclamation was a mere expression of confidence and security. It is, however, probable that something more may have been done by verbal communication. By these proceedings, the question of claim and right became at once a question of strength and of possession. Commanded by their two superiors—the pope and the republic—to give contradictory proofs of obedience, the Venetian clergy were now called on to decide to which of the two they would render that obedience. They did not hesitate; they obeyed the republic: not a copy of the brief was fixed up. The delay appointed by the pope expired; public worship was everywhere conducted as usual. As the secular clergy had decided, so did also the monastic orders. The only exception to this was presented by the orders newly instituted, and in which the principle of ecclesiastical restoration was more particularly represented; these were the Jesuits, Theatines, and Capu-

chins. The Jesuits, in so far as they were themselves concerned, were not altogether decided; they first took counsel of their Provincial at Ferrara, and afterwards of their General in Rome, who referred the question to the pope himself. Paul V. replied that they must either observe the interdict, or shake the dust from their feet and leave Venice. A hard decision assuredly, since they were distinctly informed that they would never be permitted to return; but the principle of their institution allowed them no choice. Embarking in their boats, they departed from the city, and took shelter in the papal dominions. Their example influenced the other two orders. A middle course was proposed by the Theatines, but the Venetians did not think it advisable; they would suffer no division in their land, and demanded either obedience or departure. The deserted churches were easily provided with other priests, and care was taken that none should perceive a deficiency. . . . It is manifest that the result was a complete schism. The pope was amazed; his exaggerated pretensions were confronted by the realities of things with the most unshrinking boldness. Did any means exist by which these might be overcome? Paul V. thought at times of having recourse to arms. . . . Legates were despatched, and troops fitted out; but in effect they dared not venture to attempt force. There would have been cause to apprehend that Venice would call the Protestants to her aid, and thus throw all Italy, nay the Catholic world at large, into the most perilous commotions. They must again betake themselves, as on former occasions, to political measures, for the adjustment of these questions touching the rights of the Church. . . . I have neither inclination nor means for a detailed account of these negotiations through the whole course of the proceedings. . . . The first difficulty was presented by the pope, who insisted, before all things, that the Venetian laws, which had given him so much offence, should be repealed; and he made the suspension of his ecclesiastical censures to depend on their repeal. But the Venetians, also, on their part, with a certain republican self-complacency, were accustomed to declare their laws sacred and inviolable. When the papal demand was brought under discussion in January, 1607, although the college wavered, yet at last it was decidedly rejected in the senate. The French, who had given their word to the pope, succeeded in bringing the question forward once more in March, when of the four opponents in the college, one at least withdrew his objections. After the arguments on both sides had again been fully stated in the senate, there was still, it is true, no formal or express repeal of the laws, but a decision was adopted to the effect that 'the republic would conduct itself with its accustomed piety.' However obscure these words appear, the ambassador and the pope thought they discovered in them the fulfilment of their wishes. The pope then suspended his censures."—L. Ranke, *Hist. of the Popes*, bk. 6, sect. 12 (v. 2).—"The moral victory remained with Venice. She did not recall her laws as to taxation of the clergy and the foundation of new churches and monasteries [nor permit the Jesuits to return, until many years later]. . . . The hero of the whole episode, Fra Paolo Sarpi, continued to live quietly in his convent of the Servites at S. Fosca.

The Government received warning from Rome that danger was threatening. In its turn it cautioned Fra Paolo. But he paid little or no heed." On the 25th of October, 1607, towards five o'clock in the evening, as he was returning to his convent, he was attacked by three assassins, who inflicted serious wounds upon him and left him for dead. By great care, however, Fra Paolo's life was saved, and prolonged until 1623. The would-be assassins escaped into the Papal States, where "they found not only shelter but a welcome."—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: The Catholic Reaction*, ch. 10 (v. 2).—T. A. Trollope, *Paul the Pope and Paul the Friar*.—See, also, PAPACY: A. D. 1605-1700.

A. D. 1620-1626.—The Valteline War.—Alliance with France and Savoy against the Austro-Spanish power. See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.

A. D. 1629-1631.—League with France against Spain and the Emperor.—The Mantuan War. See ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631.

A. D. 1645-1669.—The war of Candia with the Turks.—Loss of Crete. See TURKS: A. D. 1645-1669.

A. D. 1684-1696.—War of the Holy League against the Turks.—Siege and capture of Athens.—Conquest of the Morea and parts of Dalmatia and Albania. See TURKS: A. D. 1684-1696.

A. D. 1699.—Peace of Carlowitz with the Sultan.—Turkish Cession of part of the Morea and most of Dalmatia. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1688-1699.

A. D. 1714-1718.—War with the Turks.—The Morea lost.—Defense of Corfu.—Peace

VENICONII, The. See IRELAND, TRIBES OF EARLY CELTIC INHABITANTS.

VENLOO, Surrender of. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1585-1586.

VENNER'S INSURRECTION.—See FIFTH MONARCHY MEN.

VENNONES, The. See RHÆTIA.

VENTA.—Three important cities in Roman Britain bore the name of Venta; one occupying the site of modern Winchester, a second standing near Norwich, the third at Caerwent in Wales. They were distinguished, respectively, as Venta Belgarum, Venta Icenorum and Venta Silurum.—T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon*.

VENTÔSE, The month. See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (OCTOBER) NEW REPUBLICAN CALENDAR.

VERA CRUZ, Mexico: A. D. 1519.—Founded by Cortes. See MEXICO: A. D. 1519 (JUNE—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1839.—Attacked by the French. See MEXICO: A. D. 1828-1844.

A. D. 1847.—Bombardment and capture by the Americans. See MEXICO: A. D. 1847 (MARCH—SEPTEMBER).

VERAGUA: A. D. 1502.—Attempted settlement by Columbus. See AMERICA: A. D. 1498-1505.

A. D. 1509.—Attempted settlement by Nicuesa. See AMERICA: A. D. 1509-1511.

VERCELLI: A. D. 1638-1659.—Siege and capture by the Spaniards.—Restoration to Savoy. See ITALY: A. D. 1635-1659.

of Passarowitz. See TURKS: A. D. 1714-1718.

A. D. 1767.—Expulsion of the Jesuits. See JESUITS: A. D. 1761-1769.

A. D. 1796.—Bonaparte's schemes for the destruction of the Republic.—The picking of the quarrel. See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1797.—The ignominious overthrow of the Republic by Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1796-1797 (OCTOBER—APRIL); and 1797 (APRIL—MAY).

A. D. 1797 (October).—City and territories given over to Austria by the Treaty of Campo-Formio. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1805.—Territories ceded by Austria to the kingdom of Italy. See GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806.

A. D. 1814.—Transfer of Venetian states to Austria.—Formation of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL—JUNE); VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF; AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846; and ITALY: A. D. 1814-1815.

A. D. 1815.—Restoration of the Bronze Horses taken away by Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY—NOVEMBER).

A. D. 1848-1849.—Insurrection.—Expulsion of the Austrians.—Provisional government under Daniel Manin.—Renewed subjugation. See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

A. D. 1859.—Grievous disappointment in the Austro-Italian war. See ITALY: A. D. 1856-1859; and 1859-1861.

A. D. 1866.—Relinquishment by Austria.—Annexation to the kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: A. D. 1862-1866.

VERDUN: A. D. 1552-1559.—Possession taken by France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559.

A. D. 1648.—Ceded to France in the Peace of Westphalia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

VERDUN, The Treaty of: A. D. 843.—The contest and civil war which arose between the three grandsons of Charlemagne resulted in a treaty of partition, brought about in 843, which forever dissolved the great Frank Empire of Clovis, and of the Pippins and Karls who finished what he began. "A commission of 300 members was appointed to distribute itself over the surface of the empire, and by an exact examination of the wealth of each region, and the wishes of its people, acquire a knowledge of the best means of making an equitable division. The next year the commissioners reported the result of their researches to the three kings, assembled at Verdun, and a treaty of separation was drawn up and executed, which gave Gaul, from the Meuse and Saône as far as the Pyrenees, to Karl; which gave Germany, beyond the Rhine, to Ludwig the Germanic; and which secured to Lothar Italy, with a broad strip on the Rhine, between the dominions of Karl and Ludwig, under the names of Lotharingia or Lorraine. This was the first great treaty of modern Europe; it began a political division which lasted for many centuries; the great empire of Karl was formally dismembered by it, and the pieces of it scattered among his degenerate descendants."—P. Godwin, *Hist. of France: Ancient Gaul*, ch. 18.—"The treaty of Verdun, in



843, abrogated the sovereignty that had been attached to the eldest brother and to the imperial name in former partitions; each held his respective kingdom as an independent right. This is the epoch of a final separation between the French and German members of the empire. Its millenary was celebrated by some of the latter nation in 1843."—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 1, pt. 1 (v. 1).—See, also, FRANKS: A. D. 814-962.

**VERGARA, Treaty of (1839).** See SPAIN: A. D. 1833-1846.

**VERGENNES, Count de, and the French alliance with the revolted American Colonies.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776-1778; 1778 (FEBRUARY); 1778-1779, and 1782 (SEPTEMBER) and (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER).

**VERGNAUD AND THE GIRONDISTES.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (OCTOBER), to 1793 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER).

**VERGOBRET, The.**—The chief magistrate of the tribe of Gauls known as the *Ædui* was called the vergobret. "Cæsar terms this magistrate vergobretus, which Celtic scholars derive from the words 'ver-go-breith,' ('homme de jugement,' O'Brien, Thierry). He was elected by a council of priests and nobles, and had the power of life and death. But his office was only annual." Divitiacus, the *Æduian* friend of Cæsar and the Romans, had been the vergobret of his tribe.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 6, foot-note.

**VERMANDOIS, House of.**—The noble House of Vermandois which played an important part in French history during the Middle Ages, boasted a descent from Charlemagne, through his best loved son, Pippin, king of Italy. "Peronne and the Abbey of Saint-Quentin composed the nucleus of their Principality; but, quietly and without contradiction, they had extended their sway over the heart of the kingdom of Soissons; and that antient Soissons, and the rock of Lâon, and Rheims, the prerogative city of the Gauls, were all within the geographical ambit of their territory. In such enclavures as we have named, Vermandois did not possess direct authority. Lâon, for example, had a Count and a bishop, and was a royal domain."—Sir F. Palgrave, *Hist. of Normandy and Eng.*, bk. 1, ch. 5, sect. 6 (v. 1).

**VERMONT: A. D. 1749-1774.**—Beginning of settlement.—The New Hampshire Grants and the conflict with New York.—Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys.—"Among the causes of the controversies which existed between the colonies in early times, and continued down to the revolution, was the uncertainty of boundary lines as described in the old charters. . . . A difficulty of this kind arose between the colony of New York and those of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. By the grant of King Charles II. to his brother, the Duke of York, the tract of country called New York was bounded on the east by Connecticut River, thus conflicting with the express letter of the Massachusetts and Connecticut charters, which extended those colonies westward to the South Sea, or Pacific Ocean. After a long controversy, kept up at times with a good deal of heat on both sides, the line of division between these colonies was fixed by mutual agreement at 20 miles east of Hudson's River, run-

ning nearly in a north and south direction. . . . The Massachusetts boundary was decided much later to be a continuation of the Connecticut line to the north, making the western limit of Massachusetts also 20 miles from the same river. . . . Meantime New Hampshire had never been brought into the controversy, because the lands to the westward of that province beyond Connecticut River had been neither settled nor surveyed. There was indeed a small settlement at Fort Dummer on the western margin of the River, which was under the protection of Massachusetts. . . . Such was the state of things when Benning Wentworth became governor of New Hampshire, with authority from the King to issue patents for unimproved lands within the limits of his province. Application was made for grants to the west of Connecticut River, and even beyond the Green Mountains, and in 1749 he gave a patent for a township 6 miles square, near the north west angle of Massachusetts, to be so laid out, that its western limit should be 20 miles from the Hudson, and coincide with the boundary line of Connecticut and Massachusetts continued northward. This township was called Bennington. Although the governor and council of New York remonstrated against this grant, and claimed for that colony the whole territory north of Massachusetts as far eastward as Connecticut River, yet Governor Wentworth was not deterred by this remonstrance from issuing other patents, urging in his justification, that New Hampshire had a right to the same extension westward as Massachusetts and Connecticut." After the British conquest of Canada, 1760, "applications for new patents thronged daily upon Governor Wentworth, and within four years' time the whole number of townships granted by him, to the westward of Connecticut River, was 138. The territory including these townships was known by the name of the New Hampshire Grants, which it retained till the opening of the revolution, when its present name of Vermont began to be adopted."—J. Sparks, *Life of Ethan Allen* (*Library of Am. Biog.*, v. 1).—"Lieutenant Governor Colden, acting chief magistrate of New York in the absence of General Monckton, perceiving the necessity of asserting the claims of that province to the country westward of the Connecticut river, wrote an energetic letter to Governor Wentworth, protesting against his grants. He also sent a proclamation among the people, declaring the Connecticut river to be the boundary between New York and New Hampshire. But protests and proclamations were alike unheeded by the governor and the people until the year 1764, when the matter was laid before the King and council for adjudication. The decision was in favor of New York. Wentworth immediately bowed to supreme authority, and ceased issuing patents for lands westward of the Connecticut. The settlers, considering all questions in dispute to be thus finally disposed of, were contented, and went on hopefully in the improvement of their lands. Among these settlers in the Bennington township were members of the Allen family, in Connecticut, two of whom, Ethan and Ira, were conspicuous in public affairs for many years, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe. The authorities of New York, not content with the award of territorial jurisdiction over the domain, proceeded, on the decision of able legal authority,

to assert the right of property in the soil of that territory, and declared Wentworth's patents all void. They went further. Orders were issued for the survey and sale of farms in the possession of actual settlers, who had bought and paid for them, and, in many instances, had made great progress in improvements. In this, New York acted not only unjustly, but very unwisely. This oppression, for oppression it was, was a fatal mistake. It was like sowing dragons' teeth to see them produce a crop of full-armed men. The settlers were disposed to be quiet, loyal subjects of New York. They cared not who was their political master, so long as their private rights were respected. But this act of injustice converted them into rebellious foes, determined and defiant. . . . Meanwhile speculators had been purchasing from New York large tracts of these estates in the disputed territory, and were making preparations to take possession. The people of the Grants sent one of their number to England, and laid their cause before the King and council. He came back in August, 1767, armed with an order for the Governor of New York to abstain from issuing any more patents for lands eastward of Lake Champlain. But as the order was not 'ex post facto' in its operations, the New York patentees proceeded to take possession of their purchased lands. This speedily brought on a crisis, and for seven years the New Hampshire Grants formed a theater where all the elements of civil war, except actual carnage, were in active exercise. . . . The hardy yeomanry who first appeared in arms for the defense of their territorial rights, and afterwards as patriots in the common cause when the Revolution broke out, were called Green Mountain Boys."—B. J. Lossing, *Life and Times of Philip Schuyler*, v. 1, ch. 12.

ALSO IN: S. Williams, *Hist. of Vt.*, ch. 9.—W. Slade, ed., *Vermont State Papers*, pp. 1-49.—*Vt. Hist. Soc. Coll.*, v. 1 and 3.

**A. D. 1775.—Ticonderoga surprised by the Green Mountain Boys.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (MAY).

**A. D. 1777.—Stark's victory at Bennington.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1777 (JULY—OCTOBER).

**A. D. 1777-1778.—State independence declared and constitution framed.—Admission to the Union denied.**—"The settlers in the land which this year [1777] took the name of Vermont refused by a great majority to come under the jurisdiction of New York; on the 15th of January 1777, their convention declared the independence of their state. At Windsor, on the 2d of June, they appointed a committee to prepare a constitution; and they hoped to be received into the American union. But, as New York opposed, congress, by an uncertain majority against a determined minority, disclaimed the intention of recognising Vermont as a separate state. . . . On the 2d of July the convention of Vermont re-assembled at Windsor. The organic law which they adopted, blending the culture of their age with the traditions of Protestantism, assumed that all men are born free and with inalienable rights; that they may emigrate from one state to another, or form a new state in vacant countries; that 'every sect should observe the Lord's day, and keep up some sort of religious worship'; that every man may choose that form of religious worship 'which shall seem to him most agree-

able to the revealed will of God.' They provided for a school in each town, a grammar-school in each county, and a university in the state. All officers, alike executive and legislative, were to be chosen annually and by ballot; the freemen of every town and all one year's residents were electors. Every member of the house of representatives must declare his 'belief in one God . . . ; in the divine inspiration of the scriptures; and in the Protestant religion.' The legislative power was vested in one general assembly, subject to no veto. . . . Slavery was forbidden and forever; and there could be no imprisonment for debt. . . . After the loss of Ticonderoga, the introduction of the constitution was postponed [until March, 1778], lest the process of change should interfere with the public defence."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last revision)*, v. 5, pp. 157, and 161-162.

ALSO IN: Ira Allen, *Hist. of Vt. (Vt. Hist. Soc. Coll., v. 1, pp. 375-393).*—*Vt. Hist. Soc. Coll.*, v. 3.—R. E. Robinson, *Vermont: a Study of Independence*, ch. 10-14.

**A. D. 1781.—Negotiations with the British authorities as an independent State.**—Vermont had repeatedly applied for admission into the Union; but the opposition of her neighbors, who claimed her territory, and the jealousy of the southern states, who objected to the admission of another northern state, prevented favorable action in Congress. In 1780 a fresh appeal was made with a declaration that if it failed the people of the Green Mountains would propose to the other New England states and to New York, "an alliance and confederation for mutual defense, independent of Congress and of the other states." If neither Congress nor the northern states would listen to them, then, said the memorial, "they are, if necessitated to it, at liberty to offer or accept terms of cessation of hostilities with Great Britain without the approbation of any other man or body of men." "The British generals in America had for some time entertained hopes of turning the disputes in relation to Vermont to their own account, by detaching that district from the American cause and making it a British province. But the first intimation of their views and wishes was communicated in a letter from Colonel Beverly Robinson to Ethan Allen; dated New York, March 30th, 1780. In July, this letter was delivered to Allen in the street in Arlington, by a British soldier in the habit of an American farmer. Allen perused the letter, and then told the bearer that he should consider it, and that he might return. . . . Allen immediately communicated the contents of this letter to Governor Chittenden and some other confidential friends, who agreed in opinion, that no answer should be returned. Robinson, not receiving a reply to his letter and supposing it to have been miscarried, wrote again to Allen on the 2d of February, 1781, enclosing his former letter. In his second letter, after saying he had received new assurances of the inclination of Vermont to join the king's cause, he said that he could then write with more authority; and assured Allen that he and the people of Vermont could obtain the most favorable terms, provided they would take a decisive and active part in favor of Great Britain. He requested an answer; and that the way might be pointed out for continuing the correspondence; and desired to be informed in what manner the



people of Vermont could be most serviceable to the British cause. Allen returned no answer to either of these letters; but, on the 9th of March, 1781, inclosed them in a letter to Congress, informing them of all the circumstances which had thus far attended the business. He then proceeded to justify the conduct of Vermont in asserting her right to independence, and expressed his determinate resolution to do every thing in his power to establish it. . . . 'I am confident,' said he, 'that Congress will not dispute my sincere attachment to the cause of my country, though I do not hesitate to say, I am fully grounded in opinion, that Vermont has an indubitable right to agree on terms of a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain, provided the United States persist in rejecting her application for an union with them.' . . . During the spring of 1780, some of the scouting parties belonging to Vermont had been taken by the British and carried prisoners to Canada. On the application of their friends to Governor Chittenden, he, in the month of July, sent a flag with a letter to the commanding officer in Canada, requesting their release or exchange. In the fall, the British came up lake Champlain in great force, and a very favorable answer was returned by General Haldimand to Governor Chittenden's letter. A flag was at the same time sent to Ethan Allen, then a brigadier general and commanding officer in Vermont, proposing a cessation of hostilities with Vermont, during negotiations for the exchange of prisoners."—Z. Thompson, *Hist. of the State of Vermont*, ch. 4, sect. 6.—"The immediate results were a truce, which covered not only Vermont but the frontiers of New York to Hudson river; the disbanding of the militia of Vermont; and the retiring of the British troops to winter quarters in Canada. Until the truce became generally known, the results of it occasioned much surprise in New York. It was further agreed, that the commissioners of both parties should meet on the subject of the cartel, and go together to Canada. This was attempted, but failed on account of the difficulty of getting through the ice on Lake Champlain. After contending several days with the elements, the commissioners separated; but 'while their men [wrote Ira Allen] were breaking through the ice, much political conversation and exhibits of papers took place.' Williams ['Hist. of Vermont'] is more definite: 'the British agents availed themselves of this opportunity to explain their views, to make their proposals, and offer as complete an establishment for Vermont, from the royal authority, as should be desired. The commissioners from Vermont treated the proposals with affability and good humor, and though they avoided bringing anything to a decision, the British concluded they were in a fair way to effect their purposes.' The subsequent negotiations at Isle aux Noix, between Ira Allen and the British commissioners, as to matters beyond settling a cartel, were secret, and even the commander of the post had no knowledge of them, although he was associated with the British commissioners on the question of an exchange of prisoners. These facts show that the public had no knowledge except of a truce for a humane and proper attempt to relieve citizens of Vermont, and its officers and soldiers, who were then prisoners in Canada; and the conclusion is that all the suspicion that then existed of the patriot-

ism and fidelity of the great body of the people of the state, and all the obloquy since drawn from the negotiation with Haldimand and cast upon the state, were entirely unjust. If any body was really at fault, the number implicated was very small. Williams asserted that 'eight persons only in Vermont, were in the secret of this correspondence;' and Ira Allen that, in May, 1781, 'only eight persons were in the secret, but more were added as the circumstances required.'"—*Vt. Hist. Soc. Coll.*, v. 2, introd.—"By the definitive treaty between Great Britain and the United States, Sept. 3, 1783, Vermont was included within the boundaries separating the independent American from British territory, and thus the independence of Vermont was acknowledged first by the mother country. The State had been de facto independent from its organization; and therefore the following record, with the other papers contained in this and the first volume of the Historical Society Collections covers the existence of Vermont as an independent and sovereign state."—*The same*, p. 397.

ALSO IN: *Haldimand Papers* (same vol.).—D. Brymner, *Report on Canadian Archives*, 1889, pp. 53–58.—R. E. Robinson, *Vermont: a Study of Independence*, ch. 15.

**A. D. 1790–1791.—Renunciation of the claims of New York and admission of the State to the Union.**—"The rapid increase of the population of Vermont having destroyed all hope on the part of New York of re-establishing her jurisdiction over that rebellious district, the holders of the New York grants, seeing no better prospect before them, were ready to accept such an indemnity as might be obtained by negotiation. Political considerations had also operated. The vote of Vermont might aid to establish the seat of the federal government at New York. At all events, that state would serve as a counterbalance to Kentucky, the speedy admission of which was foreseen. The Assembly of New York [July, 1789] had appointed commissioners with full powers to acknowledge the independence of Vermont, and to arrange a settlement of all matters in controversy. To this appointment Vermont had responded, and terms had been soon arranged. In consideration of the sum of \$30,000, as an indemnity to the New York grantees, New York renounced all claim of jurisdiction [October 7, 1790], consented to the admission of Vermont into the Union, and agreed to the boundary heretofore claimed—the western line of the westernmost townships granted by New Hampshire and the middle channel of Lake Champlain. This arrangement was immediately ratified by the Legislature of Vermont. A Convention, which met at the beginning of the year [1791], had voted unanimously to ratify the Federal Constitution, and to ask admission into the Union. Commissioners were soon after appointed by the Assembly to wait upon Congress and to negotiate the admission. No opposition was made to it, and [February 18, 1791] within fourteen days after the passage of the bill for the prospective admission of Kentucky Vermont was received into the Union, from and after the termination of the present session of Congress. The Constitution under which Vermont came into the Union, originally adopted in 1777, had been slightly altered in 1785. Most of its provisions seem to have been copied from the first

Constitution of Pennsylvania. . . . The revision of 1785 struck out the requirement of Protestantism; another revision in 1793, still following the example of Pennsylvania, released the members of Assembly from the necessity of any religious subscription."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 4, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: H. Beckley, *Hist. of Vt.*, ch. 5-6.—J. L. Heaton, *Story of Vt.*, ch. 4.

A. D. 1812.—Vigorous support of the war with England. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812 (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER).

A. D. 1814.—The Hartford Convention. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1814 (DECEMBER).

A. D. 1864.—The St. Albans Raid. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (OCTOBER) THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

VERMONT UNIVERSITY.—"At the time of the organization of the State government . . . the University of Vermont was endowed with lands which proved subsequently to amount to 29,000 acres. In 1791 the university was organized. . . . The early years of the university, planted as it was in the wilderness, were full of struggles and misfortunes. The State was generous in the extreme at the beginning, but failed to support the university it had created. The land was poor and brought little income, the whole tract bringing but 2,500 dollars at that time. In 1813 the buildings of the university were seized by the Government and used for the storage of United States arms, by which much damage was suffered, and the houseless students all left, most of them to shoulder muskets against the British invaders. The buildings were rented in 1814 for the United States Army. Worse misfortunes occurred in 1824, the buildings being consumed by fire, but were restored by the citizens of Burlington in the following year. For the first ninety-five years of the corporate existence of the university the State never gave anything toward the support of it more than has been set forth in the above statements."—F. W. Blackmar, *Hist. of Federal and State Aid to Higher Education in the U. S.* (Bureau of Ed., Circ. of Information, 1890, no. 1), pp. 125-126.

VERNEUIL, Battle of (1424). See FRANCE: A. D. 1429-1431.

VERNICOMES.—A tribe in ancient Caledonia, whose territory was the eastern half of Fife. See BRITAIN, CELTIC TRIBES.

VEROMANDUI, The. See BELGÆ.

VERONA: A. D. 312.—Siege, battle, and victory of Constantine. See ROME: A. D. 305-323.

A. D. 403.—Defeat of Alaric by Stilicho. See GOTHs (VISIGOTHs): A. D. 400-403.

A. D. 489.—Defeat of Odoacer by Theodoric. See ROME: A. D. 488-526.

A. D. 493-525.—Residence of Theodoric the Ostrogoth.—"Pavia and Verona [as well as his ordinary capital city, Ravenna] were also places honoured with the occasional residence of Theodoric. At both he built a palace and public baths. . . . At Verona, the palace, of which there were still some noble remains incorporated into the castle of the Viscontis, was blown up by the French in 1801, and an absolutely modern building stands upon its site. . . . It seems

probable that Theodoric's residence at both these places depended on the state of Transalpine politics. When the tribes of the middle Danube were moving suspiciously to and fro, and the vulnerable point by the Brenner Pass needed to be especially guarded, he fixed his quarters at Verona. When Gaul menaced greater danger, then he removed to Ticinum [Pavia]. It was apparently the fact that Verona was his coign of vantage, from whence he watched the German barbarians, which obtained for him from their minstrels the title of Dietrich of Bern. Thus strangely travestied, he was swept within the wide current of the legends relating to Attila, and hence it is that the really grandest figure in the history of the migration of the peoples appears in the Nibelungen Lied, not as a great king and conqueror on his own account, but only as a faithful squire of the terrible Hunnish king whose empire had in fact crumbled into dust before the birth of Theodoric."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, bk. 4, ch. 8 (v. 3).

11-12th Centuries.—Acquisition of Republican Independence. See ITALY: A. D. 1056-1152.

A. D. 1236-1259.—The tyranny of Eccelino di Romano and the crusade against him.—"In the north-eastern corner of Italy the influence of the old Lombard lords, which had been extinguished there as in most other parts of the peninsula, was succeeded by that of a family that had accompanied one of the emperors from Germany. . . . The eye of a traveller passing from Verona to Padua may still be struck by one or two isolated hills, which seem as it were designed by nature to be meet residences for the tyrants of the surrounding plains. One of these gave birth to a person destined to become the scourge of the neighbouring country. . . . Eccelino di Romano . . . was descended from a German noble brought into Italy by Otho III. The office of Podesta of Verona had become hereditary in his family. In the wars of the second Frederick [1236-1250], he put himself at the head of the Ghibellines in the surrounding principalities, and became a strenuous supporter of the emperor. Under the protection of so powerful an ally, he soon made himself master of Padua, where he established his headquarters, and built the dungeons, where the most revolting cruelties were inflicted on his victims."—W. P. Urquhart, *Life and Times of Francesco Sforza*, bk. 1, ch. 3 (v. 1).—In 1237, the emperor, Frederick II., "obliged to return to Germany, left under the command of Eccelino a body of German soldiers, and another of Saracens, with which this able captain made himself, the same year, master of Vicenza, which he barbarously pillaged, and the following year of Padua. . . . Eccelino judged it necessary to secure obedience, by taking hostages from the richest and most powerful families; he employed his spies to discover the malcontents, whom he punished with torture, and redoubled his cruelty in proportion to the hatred which he excited." Subsequently, the emperor confided "the exclusive government of the Veronese marches [also called the Trevisan marches] to Eccelino. The hatred which this ferocious man excited by his crimes fell on the emperor. Eccelino imprisoned in the most loathsome dungeons those whom he considered his enemies, and frequently put them to death by torture, or suffered them to perish by hunger. . . . In the



single town of Padua there were eight prisons always full, notwithstanding the incessant toil of the executioner to empty them; two of these contained each 300 prisoners. A brother of Eccelino, named Alberic, governed Treviso with less ferocity, but with a power not less absolute." Eccelino maintained the power which he had gathered into his hands for several years after Frederick's death. At length, the pope, "Alexander IV., to destroy the monster that held in terror the Trevisan march, caused a crusade to be preached in that country. He promised those who combated the ferocious Eccelino all the indulgences usually reserved for the deliverers of the Holy Land. The marquis d'Este, the count di San Bonifazio, with the cities of Ferrara, Mantua, and Bologna, assembled their troops under the standard of the church; they were joined by a horde of ignorant fanatics from the lowest class." Headed by the legate Philip, archbishop of Ravenna, the crusaders took Padua, June 18, 1256, and "for seven days the city was inhumanly pillaged by those whom it had received as deliverers. As soon as Eccelino was informed of the loss he had sustained, he hastened to separate and disarm the 11,000 Paduans belonging to his army; he confined them in prisons, where all, with the exception of 200, met a violent or lingering death. During the two following years, the Guelphs experienced nothing but disasters: the legate, whom the pope had placed at their head, proved incompetent to command them; and the crowd of crusaders whom he called to his ranks served only to compromise them, by want of courage and discipline. . . . The following year, this tyrant, unequalled in Italy for bravery and military talent, always an enemy to luxury, and proof against the seductions of women, making the boldest tremble with a look, and preserving in his diminutive person, at the age of 65, all the vigor of a soldier, advanced into the centre of Lombardy, in the hope that the nobles of Milan, with whom he had already opened a correspondence, would surrender this great city." But, by this time, even his old Ghibelline associates had formed alliances with the Guelphs against him, and he was beset on all sides. "On the 16th of September, 1259, whilst he was preparing to retire, he found himself stopped at the bridge of Cassano. . . . Repulsed, pursued as far as Vimercato, and at last wounded in the foot, he was made prisoner and taken to Soncino: there, he refused to speak; rejected all the aid of medicine; tore off all the bandages from his wounds, and finally expired, on the eleventh day of his captivity. His brother with all his family were massacred in the following year."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 3-4.

ALSO IN: J. Miley, *Hist. of the Papal States*, bk. 7, ch. 1 (v. 3).

**A. D. 1260-1338.—Rise of the House of the Scaligeri.—Successes of Can' Grande della Scala.—Wars and Reverses of Mastino.**—After the death of Eccelino, Verona, by its own choice came under the government of the first Mastino della Scala, who established the power of a house which became famous in Italian history. Mastino's grandson, Cane, or Can' Grande della Scala, "reigned in that city from 1312 to 1329, with a splendor which no other prince in Italy equalled. . . . Among the Lombard princes he was the first protector of literature and the arts.

The best poets, painters, and sculptors of Italy, Dante, to whom he offered an asylum, as well as Ugucione da Faggiuola, and many other exiles illustrious in war or politics, were assembled at his court. He aspired to subdue the Veronese and Trevisan marches, or what has since been called the Terra Firma of Venice. He took possession of Vicenza; and afterwards maintained a long war against the republic of Padua, the most powerful in the district, and that which had shown the most attachment to the Guelph party and to liberty." In 1328, Padua submitted to him; and "the year following he attacked and took Treviso, which surrendered on the 6th of July, 1329. He possessed himself of Feltre and Cividale soon after. The whole province seemed subjugated to his power; but the conqueror also was subdued." He died on the 22d of the same month in which Treviso was taken.—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 6.—Can' Grande was succeeded by his nephew, the second Mastino della Scala, who, in the next six years, "extended his states from the north-eastern frontiers of Italy to the confines of Tuscany; and the possession of the strong city of Lucca now gave him a secure footing in this province. He shortly made it appear to what purpose he meant to apply this new advantage. Under the plea of re-establishing the Ghibelin interests, but in reality to forward his own schemes of dominion, he began to fill all Tuscany with his machinations. Florence was neither slow to discover her danger, nor to resent the treachery of her faithless ally,"—which Mastino had recently been. Florence, accordingly, formed an alliance with Venice, which Mastino had rashly offended by restricting the manufacture of salt on the Trevisan coast, and by laying heavy duties on the navigation of the Po. Florence agreed "to resign to Venice the sole possession of such conquests as might be made in that quarter; only reserving for herself the acquisition of Lucca, which she was to obtain by attacking Mastino in Tuscany, entirely with her own resources. Upon these terms an alliance was signed between the two republics, and the lord of Verona had soon abundant reason to repent of the pride and treachery by which he had provoked their formidable union (A. D. 1336). . . . During three campaigns he was unable to oppose the league in the field, and was compelled to witness the successive loss of many of his principal cities (A. D. 1337). His brother Albert was surprised and made prisoner in Padua, by the treachery of the family of Carrara, who acquired the sovereignty of that city; Feltro was captured by the Duke of Carinthia, Brescia revolted, and fell with other places to Azzo Visconti. . . . In this hopeless condition Mastino artfully addressed himself to the Venetians, and, by satisfying all their demands, detached them from the general interests of the coalition (A. D. 1338). By a separate treaty which their republic concluded with him, and which was then only communicated to the Florentines for their acceptance, Mastino ceded to Venice Treviso, with other fortresses and possessions, and the right of free navigation on the Po; he agreed at the same time to yield Bassano and an extension of territory to the new lord of Padua, and to confirm the sovereignty of Brescia to Azzo Visconti; but for the Florentine republic no farther advantage was stipulated than the enjoyment of a

few castles which they had already conquered in Tuscany."—G. Procter, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 4, pt. 3.

ALSO IN: H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, ch. 19 (v. 2).

A. D. 1351-1387.—Degeneracy and fall of the Scaligeri.—Subjugation by the Visconti of Milan. See MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447.

A. D. 1405.—Added to the dominion of Venice. See ITALY: A. D. 1402-1406.

A. D. 1797.—Massacre of French Soldiers. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (April-May).

A. D. 1814.—Surrender to the Austrians. See ITALY: A. D. 1814.

**VERONA, The Congress of (after Troppau and Laybach).**—"The rapid spread of revolution in Europe inspired serious misgivings among the great powers, and impelled the Holy Alliance [see Holy Alliance] to show its true colours. Austria was especially alarmed by the movement in Naples [see Italy: A. D. 1820-1821], which threatened to overthrow its power in Italy, and Metternich convoked a congress at Troppau, in Upper Silesia (Oct., 1820), at which Austria, Russia, Prussia, France and England were represented. Neapolitan affairs were the chief subject of discussion, and it was soon evident that Austria, Russia and Prussia were agreed as to the necessity of armed intervention. England made a formal protest against such high-handed treatment of a peaceful country; but as the protest was not supported by France, and England was not prepared to go to war for Naples, it was disregarded. The three allied powers decided to transfer the congress to Laybach and to invite Ferdinand I. to attend in person." The result of the conference at Laybach was a movement of 60,000 Austrian troops into Naples and Sicily, in March, 1821, and a restoration of Ferdinand, who made a merciless use of his opportunity for revenge.—R. Lodge, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, ch. 25, sect. 8.—From Laybach, the allied sovereigns issued a circular to their representatives at the various foreign courts, in which portentous document they declared that "useful and necessary changes in legislation and in the administration of states could only emanate from the free will, and from the intelligent and well-weighed convictions, of those whom God has made responsible for power. Penetrated with this eternal truth, the sovereigns have not hesitated to proclaim it with frankness and vigour. They have declared that, in respecting the rights and independence of legitimate power, they regarded as legally null, and disavowed by the principles which constituted the public right of Europe, all pretended reforms operated by revolt and open hostilities." "These principles, stated nakedly and without shame, were too much even for Lord Castlereagh. In a despatch, written early in the year 1821, while admitting the right of a state to interfere in the internal affairs of another state when its own interests were endangered, he protested against the pretension to put down revolutionary movements apart from their immediate bearing on the security of the state so intervening, and denied that merely possible revolutionary movements can properly be made the basis of a hostile alliance. The principles of the Holy Alliance were not intended to remain a dead letter; they were promptly acted upon. Popular movements were suppressed in Naples and

Piedmont; and intervention in Spain, where the Cortes had been summoned and the despotic rule of Ferdinand VII. had been overthrown, was in contemplation. Greece imitated the example set in the western peninsulas of Europe. The Congress of Verona was summoned, and Lord Castlereagh (now the Marquis of Londonderry) was preparing to join it, when in an access of despondency, the origin of which is variously explained, he took his own life." He was succeeded in the British Ministry by Mr. Canning.—F. H. Hill, *George Canning*, ch. 20.—"The first business which presented itself to Mr. Canning was to devise a system by which the Holy Alliance could be gradually dissolved, and England rescued from the consequences of her undefined relations with its members. The adjourned Congress was on the point of assembling at Verona, and as it was necessary to send a representative in place of Lord Castlereagh, who seems to have been terrified at the prospect that lay before him, the Duke of Wellington was selected, and dispatched without loss of time. . . . The very first blow he [Canning] struck in the Congress of Verona announced to the world the attitude which England was about to take, and her total denial of the rights of the Alliance to interfere with the internal affairs of any independent nation. It appeared that France had collected a large army in the south, and not having legitimate occupation for it, proposed to employ it in the invasion of Spain [see Spain: A. D. 1814-1827]. This monstrous project was submitted to Congress, and ardently approved of by Russia. It was now that England spoke out for the first time in this cabal of despots. . . . After some interchanges of notes and discussions agreed to by the allies, the British plenipotentiary, as he was instructed, refused all participation in these proceedings, and withdrew from the Congress. This was the first step that was taken to show the Alliance that England would not become a party to any act of unjust aggression or unjustifiable interference. A long correspondence ensued between Mr. Canning and M. de Chateaubriand. . . . The French king's speech, on opening the Chambers, revealed the real intentions of the government, which Mr. Canning had penetrated from the beginning. The speech was, in fact, a declaration of war against Spain, qualified by the slightest imaginable hypothesis. But, happily for all interests, there was no possibility of disguising the purpose of this war, which was plainly and avowedly to force upon the people of Spain such a constitution as the king (a Bourbon), in the exercise of his absolute authority, should think fit to give them. . . . Against this principle Mr. Canning entered a dignified protest. . . . Although he could not avert from Spain the calamity of a French invasion, he made it clear to all the world that England objected to that proceeding, and that she was no longer even to be suspected of favoring the designs of the Holy Alliance. The French army made the passage of the Bidassoa. From that moment Mr. Canning interfered no farther. He at once disclosed the system which he had already matured and resolved upon. Having first protested against the principle of the invasion, he determined to maintain the neutrality of England in the war that followed. By this course he achieved the end he had in view, of



severing England from the Holy Alliance without embroiling her in any consequent responsibilities. . . . Mr. Canning's 'system' of foreign policy, as described in his own language, resolved itself into this principle of action, that 'England should hold the balance, not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles; that, in order to prevent things from going to extremities, she should keep a distinct middle ground, staying the plague both ways.' . . . The development of this principle, as it applied to nations, was illustrated in the strict but watchful neutrality observed between France and Spain; and, as it applied to principles, in the recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American colonies. The latter act may be regarded as the most important for which Mr. Canning was officially responsible, as that which exerted the widest and most distinct influence over the policy of other countries, and which most clearly and emphatically revealed the tendency of his own. It showed that England would recognize institutions raised up by the people, as well as those which were created by kings. It gave the death-blow to the Holy Alliance." The logic and meaning of Mr. Canning's recognition of the Spanish American republics found expression in one famous passage of a brilliant speech which he made in the House of Commons, December 12, 1826, vindicating his foreign policy. "If France," he said, "occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No, I looked another way—I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."—R. Bell, *Life of the Rt. Hon. George Canning*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: F. H. Hill, *George Canning*, ch. 20.—F. A. Châteaubriand, *The Congress of Verona*.—Sir A. Alison, *Hist. of Europe, 1815-1852*, ch. 8 and 12 (v. 1, —Am. ed.).—S. Walpole, *Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 9 (v. 2).

**VERRAZANO, Voyages of.** See AMERICA: A. D. 1523-1524.

**VERSAILLES.**—Louis XIV. "preferred Versailles to his other châteaux, because Fontainebleau, Chambord, Saint-Germain, were existences ready created, which Francois I. and Henri IV. had stamped with the ineffaceable imprint of their glory: at Versailles, everything was to be made, save the modest beginning left by Louis XIII. . . . At Versailles, everything was to be created, we say,—not only the monuments of art, but nature itself. This solitary elevation of ground, although pleasing enough through the woods and hills that surrounded it, was without great views, without sites, without waters, without inhabitants. . . . The sites would be created by creating an immense landscape by the hand of man; the waters would be brought from the whole country by works which appalled the imagination; the inhabitants would be caused, if we may say so, to spring from the earth, by erecting a whole city for the service of the chateau. Louis would thus make a city of his own, a form of his own, of which he alone would be the life. Versailles and the court

would be the body and soul of one and the same being, both created for the same end, the glorification of the terrestrial God to whom they owed existence. . . . The same idea filled the interior of the palace. Painting deified Louis there under every form, in war and in peace, in the arts and in the administration of the empire; it celebrated his amours as his victories, his passions as his labors. All the heroes of antiquity, all the divinities of classic Olympus, rendered him homage or lent him their attributes in turn. He was Augustus, he was Titus, he was Alexander; he was thundering Jupiter, he was Hercules, the conqueror of monsters; oftener, Apollo, the inspirer of the Muses and the king of enlightenment. Mythology was no longer but a great enigma, to which the name of Louis was the only key; he was all the gods in himself alone. . . . Louis, always served in his desires by the fertility of his age, had found a third artist, Lenotre, to complete Lebrun and Mansart. Thanks to Lenotre, Louis, from the windows of his incomparable gallery of mirrors, saw nought that was not of his own creation. The whole horizon was his work, for his garden was the whole horizon. . . . Whole thickets were brought full-grown from the depths of the finest forests of France, and the arts of animating marble and of moving waters filled them with every prodigy of which the imagination could dream. An innumerable nation of statues peopled the thickets and lawns, was mirrored in the waters, or rose from the bosom of the wave. . . . Louis had done what he wished; he had created about him a little universe, in which he was the only necessary and almost the only real being. But terrestrial gods do not create with a word like the true God. These buildings which stretch across a frontage of twelve hundred yards, the unheard-of luxury of these endless apartments, this incredible multitude of objects of art, these forests transplanted, these waters of heaven gathered from all the slopes of the heights into the windings of immense conduits from Trappes and Palaiseau to Versailles, these waters of the Seine brought from Marly by gigantic machinery through that aqueduct which commands from afar the valley of the river like a superb Roman ruin, and later, an enterprise far more colossal! that river which was turned aside from its bed and which it was undertaken to bring thirty leagues to Versailles over hills and valleys, cost France grievous efforts and inexhaustible sweats, and swallowed up rivers of gold increasing from year to year. . . . Versailles has cost France dearly, very dearly; nevertheless it is important to historic truth to set aside in this respect too long accredited exaggerations. . . . The accounts, or at least the abstracts of the accounts, of the expenditures of Louis XIV. for building, during the greater part of his reign, have been discovered. The costs of the construction, decoration, and furnishing of Versailles, from 1664 to 1690, including the hydraulic works and the gardens, in addition to the appendages,—that is, Clagny, Trianon, Saint-Cyr, and the two churches of the new city of Versailles,—amount to about one hundred and seven millions, to which must be added a million, or a million and a half perhaps, for the expenses of the years 1661-1663, the accounts of which are not known, and three million two hundred and sixty thousand francs

for the sumptuous chapel, which was not built until 1699-1710. The proportion of the mark to the franc having varied under Louis XIV., it is difficult to arrive at an exact reduction to the present currency. . . . The expenses of Versailles would represent to-day more than four hundred millions. This amount is enormous; but it is not monstrous like the twelve hundred millions of which Mirabeau speaks, nor, above all, madly fantastic like the four thousand six hundred millions imagined by Volney."—H. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age of Louis XIV.*, v. 1, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: L. Ritchie, *Versailles*.

**A. D. 1789.**—Opening scenes of the French Revolution. See FRANCE: A. D. 1789 (MAY), and after.

**A. D. 1870.**—Headquarters of the German court and the army besieging Paris. See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

**A. D. 1871.**—Assumption of the dignity of Emperor of Germany by King William of Prussia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1871.

**VERTERÆ.**—A Roman city in Britain, which probably occupied the site of the modern town of Brough, in Westmoreland, where many remains of the Romans have been found.—T. Wright, *Celt, Roman, and Saxon*, ch. 5.

**VERTURIONES, The.**—A name by which one of the Caledonian tribes was known to the Romans.

**VERULAMIUM.**—**VERULAM.**—"The 'oppidum' of Cassivelaunus [the stronghold which Cæsar reduced on his second invasion of Britain] is generally believed to have been situated where the modern town of St. Alban's now stands [but the point is still in dispute]. An ancient ditch can still be traced surrounding a considerable area on the banks of the River Ver, from which the Roman town of Verulam [Verulamium] took its name. This town, which probably originated in the camp of Cæsar, grew into an important city in Roman times. It stands on the opposite side of the River Ver, and is still known for its Roman remains."—H. M. Scarth, *Roman Britain*, ch. 2.—See BRITAIN: B. C. 55-54.

**VERVINS, Treaty of (1598).** See FRANCE: A. D. 1593-1598.

**VESONTIO.**—Modern Besançon, in France; originally the largest of the towns of the Sequani.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 2.

**VESPASIAN, Roman Emperor, A. D. 69-79.**

**VESPUCIUS, Americus (or Amerigo Vespucci), The voyages of.** See AMERICA: A. D. 1497-1498; 1499-1500; 1500-1514; 1503-1504. Also (in Supplement) AMERICA: THE ALLEGED FIRST VOYAGE OF VESPUCIUS.

**VESTAL VIRGINS.**—"The Vestals ('virgines Vestales,' 'virgines Vestæ') were closely connected with the college of pontifices. They are said to have come from Alba soon after the foundation of Rome: at first there were two Vestals for each of the two tribes, Ramnes and Tities; afterwards two others were added for the Luceres, and the number of six was exceeded at no period. The vestal, on being chosen, was not allowed to be younger than six or older than ten years. . . . She was clad in white garments and devoted to the service of Vesta for thirty

years. . . . After this period she was at liberty either to remain in the service of the goddess (which was generally done) or to return to her family and get married. Her dress was always white; round her forehead she wore a broad band like a diadem ('infula'), with ribbons ('vittæ') attached to it. During the sacrifice, or at processions, she was covered with a white veil. . . . She was carefully guarded against insult or temptation; an offence offered to her was punished with death; . . . in public every one, even the consul, made way to the licitor preceding the maiden. At public games and pontifical banquets she had the seat of honour; and a convicted criminal accidentally meeting her was released. Amongst her priestly functions was the keeping of the eternal fire in the temple of Vesta, each Vestal taking her turn at watching. . . . Breach of chastity on the part of the Vestal was punished with death."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 103.

**VESTINIANS, The.** See SABINES.

**VESUVIUS: Great eruption.—Destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum.** See POMPEII.

**VESUVIUS, Battle of (B. C. 338).** See ROME: B. C. 339-338.

**VETERA: A. D. 69.—Siege and Massacre.**—The most important success achieved by the Batavian patriot, Civilis, in the revolt against the Romans which he led, A. D. 69, was the siege and capture of Vetera,—a victory sullied by the faithless massacre of the garrison after they had capitulated.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 58.

**VETO, The Aragon.** See CORTES, THE EARLY SPANISH.

**The Polish Liberum Veto.** See POLAND: A. D. 1578-1652.

**Of the President of the United States.** See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Article I, Section 7.

**VETTONES, The.**—A people who occupied the part of ancient Spain between the Tagus and the Upper Douro at the time of the Roman conquest of that country.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 1.

**VIA SACRA AT ROME, The.**—"The Via Sacra began at the Sacellum Streniæ, which was on the part of the Esquiline nearest to the Colosseum; on reaching the Summa Via Sacra . . . it turned a little to the right, descending the Clivus Sacer; at the foot of the slope it passed under the arch of Fabius, by the side of the Regia; thence it ran in a straight line, passing by the Basilica Æmilia, the arch of Janus, the Curia Hostilia, till it reached the foot of the Capitoline Hill, where, turning to the left, it ascended the Clivus Capitolinus, and reached its termination at the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. The Via Sacra, as Ovid tells us, took its name from the sacred rites which were performed on it. Along this road passed the processions of priests with the sacred animals to be sacrificed at the altar of Jupiter Capitolinus. . . . Along this road also passed the triumphal processions of the victorious Roman generals. The procession entered Rome by the Porta Triumphalis, passed through the Circus Maximus, then, turning to the left, proceeded along the road at the foot of the south-east slope of the Palatine, when it joined the Via Sacra, and again turned to the left and



ascended the Velia; on reaching the Summa Via Sacra it descended the Clivus Sacer, and then passed along the rest of the Via Sacra till it reached its destination at the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, where the victorious general lay before the god the spoils of his conquests."—H. M. Westropp, *Early and Imperial Rome*, p. 121.

ALSO IN: J. H. Parker, *Archæology of Rome*, pt. 6.

**VICARS, or Vice-Præfects, of the Roman Empire.** See DIOCESES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

**VICENZA: A. D. 1237.**—Pillage by Eccelino di Romano. See VERONA: A. D. 1236-1259.

**VICKSBURG: A. D. 1862-1863.**—The defence, the siege and the capture. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—JULY: ON THE MISSISSIPPI), and (DECEMBER: ON THE MISSISSIPPI); 1863 (JANUARY—APRIL: ON THE MISSISSIPPI); and 1863 (APRIL—JULY: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

**VICTOR II., Pope, A. D. 1055-1057.... Victor III., Pope, 1086-1087.... Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, 1630-1637.... Victor Amadeus II., Duke of Savoy, 1675-1730; King of Sicily, 1713-1720; King of Sardinia, 1720-1730.... Victor Amadeus III., Duke of Savoy and King of Sardinia, 1773-1796.... Victor Emanuel I., Duke of Savoy and King of Sardinia, 1802-1821.... Victor Emanuel II., King of Sardinia, 1849-1861; King of Italy, 1861-1878.**

**VICTORIA, Queen of England, A. D. 1837.**

**VICTORIA, The Australian Colony of.**—"The Colony of Victoria comprises that part of the south-easterly portion of the Australian Continent which lies between the parallels of 34° and 39° south latitude, and the meridians of 141° and 150° east longitude. It is bounded on the north and north-east by New South Wales, from which it is separated by the river Murray, and by an imaginary line drawn from Forest Hill, a considerable elevation not far distant from the sources of the Murray, to Cape Howe; on the west by South Australia—the meridian of 141° marking the frontier between the two Colonies; and on the south and south-east by the Southern Ocean, Bass's Strait and the Pacific Ocean. Its extreme length from east to west is 480 miles; its breadth, 240 miles; and its area, 87,884 square miles, or 56,245,760 acres, which is slightly less than the area of the island of Great Britain. The coast-line, which is broken by several inlets, extends from Cape Howe in a south-westerly direction, to Cape Wilson (the most southerly point of the Continent), a distance of 250 miles, thence westwardly to the mouth of the river Glenelg (long. 141°), a further distance of about 420 miles. This is exclusive of the length of the shores of the principal inlets; if these be added, the coast-line falls little short of 1,000 miles in length. The general aspect of Victoria—if we except the Wimmera district, in the north-west, which is flat and somewhat sterile—is greatly diversified, the surface, on the whole, exhibiting greater variety of formation, with more frequent alternation of hill and plain, and a larger proportion of fertile country, than any other of the Colonies on the Australian mainland. The Australian Alps extend from New South Wales into the easterly division of

Victoria... The average height of the mountain summits in this part of the Colony may be taken to be from 4,000 to 5,000 feet. From the Australian Alps high grounds extend, in a more or less westerly direction, throughout the Colony, and, as in New South Wales, separate its seaward division from the plains of the interior. The coast region is watered by rivers of no great length (from 100 to 200 miles) flowing directly into the Pacific and Southern Oceans; while the rivers of the inland region are mostly affluents of the Murray. With the exception of the Murray, none of the Victorian rivers are of very considerable size, and many of them are subject to remarkable fluctuations in their volume of water, often becoming in the hot season mere rivulets, and occasionally drying up altogether, to the great loss of stock-owners, whose cattle perish in great numbers from drought... Of the coast rivers, taking their rise on the southern slope of the Great Dividing Range, the principal are the Snowy, 120 miles long, the Latrobe, 130 miles, the Yarra Yarra, 150 miles, the Hopkins, 155 miles, and the Glenelg, 281 miles. The most important river of Victoria is, however, the Murray, 1,300 miles long, 980 miles of which flow along the Victorian frontier. This river is navigable, as is also its affluent, the Goulburn, 345 miles long... The Colony is divided into four districts, called respectively Gipps Land, the Murray, Wimmera, and Loddon, and 37 counties. The counties form the more thickly populated part of the country."—*Her Majesty's Colonies (Colonial and Indian Exhibition, 1886)*, pp. 181-3.

**A. D. 1836-1855.**—Settlement of Port Philip District, called Australia Felix.—Separated from New South Wales and named Victoria.—Discovery of Gold.—Constitutional organization. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1800-1840; and 1839-1855.

**A. D. 1862-1892.**—Comparative View. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (AUSTRALIA): A. D. 1862-1892; and AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1890.

**A. D. 1885-1892.**—Movements toward Australian Federation. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1885-1892; and 1890.

**A. D. 1893.**—Liberal Land Policy.—Labor Colonies.—Village Settlements.—"Victoria has legislated on the 'back to the land' lines in recent years. In 1893 'The Settlement on Lands Act' was passed for the promotion of village settlements, Labour colonies, and of homestead associations. These practical measures have not yet borne much fruit in this colony in the way of solving the unemployed problem, but they lead the way thereto... Victoria has much less of an area, and consequently less soil for settlements, than any of the other colonies except Tasmania. She has, therefore, paid more attention in the recent past to furthering manufacturing industries than to the opening up of the land for pushing employment in that way... Under the Act of 1893 land not otherwise appropriated, and not of an auriferous nature or permanently reserved, can be appropriated for purposes of homestead associations, Labour colonies, and village settlements. The amount of land set apart for a homestead association cannot exceed 2000 acres. This area is subdivided into holdings of not more than 50 acres, and the number of persons in a particular association must not be less than one member to 50 acres of the total area set

apart for the purposes of such association. The right of permissive occupancy will be given for a period of three years to any member of a society or association seeking such a holding of land. The fulfilment of certain conditions, not difficult or expensive, gives a member over 18 years of age a state lease. The member agrees in this document to carry out certain improvements, in a given time, to pay the rent to the state and such moneys as the Land Board may advance to him for the development of his holding. He must not sublet, assign, or borrow money on the security of the holding. He must reside on his allotment, or near it, and carry on the industry of agriculture, dairying, gardening, grazing, or similar occupation. Land is set apart for the purposes of a township near every association area, and each member of the association can obtain a 'lot' of an acre in extent in such township, on lease, if he applies within one year of the setting apart by the Land Board of the land for such township site. This wise provision prevents the possibility of ground-rent landlordism in connection with such associations. The provisions for the establishment of Labour colonies follow, to some extent, those described in my account of the Murray River Labour Settlements [see SOUTH AUSTRALIA]. . . . Land, however, is much more scarce in Victoria, and there are one or two conditions imposed of an interesting nature. An area for a Labour colony is to consist of 1500 acres. This land is vested in three trustees named by the government. Provision is made for the election of four more trustees, representing persons or bodies subscribing to the funds of such colonies. The joint committee hears applications for membership of a Labour colony, and undertakes the management of same. . . . The state undertakes to donate £2 towards equipping such Labour colonies for every £1 subscribed by members or supporters. . . . Village settlements are also provided for in the Act of 1893."—M. Davitt, *Life and Progress in Australasia*, ch. 28.

**VICTORIA CROSS, The.**—An English naval and military decoration, instituted after the Crimean War, on the 29th of January, 1856, by the command of Queen Victoria.

**VICUS.**—According to Niebuhr, the term "Vicis" in Roman topography—about which there has been much controversy—"means nothing else but a quarter or district [of the city] under the superintendence of its own police officer."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lects. on Ancient Ethnogr. and Geog.*, v. 2, p. 86.—See, also, GENS.

**VIDOMME.** See GENEVA: A. D. 1504-1535.

**VIENNA, Austria: Origin of.** See VINDOBONA.

**12th Century.**—Fortification and commercial advancement by the Austrian Dukes. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 805-1246.

**A. D. 1485.**—Siege, capture, and occupation by Matthias of Hungary. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1471-1487.

**A. D. 1529.**—Siege by the Turks. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1526-1567.

**A. D. 1619.**—Threatened by the Bohemian army. See GERMANY: A. D. 1618-1620.

**A. D. 1645.**—Threatened by the Swedes. See GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645.

**A. D. 1683.**—Siege by the Turks.—**Deliverance by John Sobieski.** See HUNGARY: A. D. 1668-1683.

**A. D. 1805.**—Surrendered to Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH—DECEMBER).

**A. D. 1809.**—Capitulation to Napoleon. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JANUARY—JUNE).

**A. D. 1848.**—Revolutionary riots.—**Bombardment of the city.** See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

**VIENNA, The Congress of.**—"At the end of September [1814] the centre of European interest passed to Vienna. The great council of the Powers, so long delayed, was at length assembled. The Czar of Russia, the Kings of Prussia, Denmark, Bavaria, and Württemberg, and nearly all the statesmen of eminence in Europe, gathered round the Emperor Francis and his Minister, Metternich, to whom by common consent the presidency of the Congress was offered. Lord Castlereagh represented England, and Talleyrand France. Rasumoffsky and other Russian diplomatists acted under the immediate directions of their master, who on some occasions even entered into personal correspondence with the Ministers of the other Powers. Hardenberg stood in a somewhat freer relation to King Frederick William: Stein was present, but without official place. The subordinate envoys and attachés of the greater Courts, added to a host of petty princes and the representatives who came from the minor Powers, or from communities which had ceased to possess any political existence at all, crowded Vienna. In order to relieve the antagonisms which had already come too clearly into view, Metternich determined to entertain his visitors in the most magnificent fashion; and although the Austrian State was bankrupt, and in some districts the people were severely suffering, a sum of about £10,000 a day was for some time devoted to this purpose. The splendour and the gaieties of Metternich were emulated by his guests. . . . The Congress had need of its distractions, for the difficulties which faced it were so great that, even after the arrival of the Sovereigns, it was found necessary to postpone the opening of the regular sittings until November. By the secret articles of the Peace of Paris, the Allies had reserved to themselves the disposal of all vacant territory, although their conclusions required to be formally sanctioned by the Congress at large. The Ministers of Austria, England, Prussia, and Russia accordingly determined at the outset to decide upon all territorial questions among themselves, and only after their decisions were completely formed to submit them to France and the other Powers. Talleyrand, on hearing of this arrangement, protested that France itself was now one of the Allies, and demanded that the whole body of European States should at once meet in open Congress. The four Courts held to their determination, and began their preliminary sittings without Talleyrand. But the French statesman had, under the form of a paradox, really stated the true political situation. The greater Powers were so deeply divided in their aims that their old bond of common interest, the interest of union against France, was now less powerful than the impulse that made them seek the support of France against one another. Two men had come to the Congress with a definite aim: Alex-



ander had resolved to gain the Duchy of Warsaw, and to form it, with or without some part of Russian Poland, into a Polish kingdom, attached to his own crown: Talleyrand had determined, either on the question of Poland, or on the question of Saxony, which arose out of it, to break allied Europe into halves, and to range France by the side of two of the great Powers against the two others. The course of events favoured for a while the design of the Minister: Talleyrand himself prosecuted his plan with an ability which, but for the untimely return of Napoleon from Elba, would have left France, without a war, the arbiter and the leading Power of Europe. Since the Russian victories of 1812, the Emperor Alexander had made no secret of his intention to restore a Polish Kingdom and a Polish nationality. Like many other designs of this prince, the project combined a keen desire for personal glorification with a real generosity of feeling. Alexander was thoroughly sincere in his wish not only to make the Poles again a people, but to give them a Parliament and a free Constitution. The King of Poland, however, was to be no independent prince, but Alexander himself: although the Duchy of Warsaw, the chief if not the sole component of the proposed new kingdom, had belonged to Austria and Prussia after the last partition of Poland, and extended into the heart of the Prussian monarchy. Alexander insisted on his anxiety to atone for the crime of Catherine in dismembering Poland: the atonement, however, was to be made at the sole cost of those whom Catherine had allowed to share the booty. Among the other Governments, the Ministry of Great Britain would gladly have seen a Polish State established in a really independent form; failing this, it desired that the Duchy of Warsaw should be divided, as formerly, between Austria and Prussia. Metternich was anxious that the fortress of Cracow at any rate should not fall into the hands of the Czar. Stein and Hardenberg, and even Alexander's own Russian counsellors, earnestly opposed the Czar's project, not only on account of the claims of Prussia on Warsaw, but from dread of the agitation likely to be produced by a Polish Parliament among all Poles outside the new State. King Frederick William, however, was unaccustomed to dispute the wishes of his ally; and the Czar's offer of Saxony in substitution for Warsaw gave to the Prussian Ministers, who were more in earnest than their master, at least the prospect of receiving a valuable equivalent for what they might surrender. By the treaty of Kalisch, made when Prussia united its arms with those of Russia against Napoleon (Feb. 27th, 1813), the Czar had undertaken to restore the Prussian monarchy to an extent equal to that which it had possessed in 1805. It was known before the opening of the Congress that the Czar proposed to do this by handing over to King Frederick William the whole of Saxony, whose Sovereign, unlike his colleagues in the Rhenish Confederacy, had supported Napoleon up to his final overthrow at Leipzig. Since that time the King of Saxony had been held a prisoner, and his dominions had been occupied by the Allies. The Saxon question had thus already gained the attention of all the European Governments. . . . Talleyrand alone made the defence of the King of Saxony the very centre of his policy, and subordinated all other aims to

this. His instructions, like those of Castlereagh, gave priority to the Polish question; but Talleyrand saw that Saxony, not Poland, was the lever by which he could throw half of Europe on to the side of France; and before the four Allied Courts had come to any single conclusion, the French statesman had succeeded, on what at first passed for a subordinate point, in breaking up their concert. For a while the Ministers of Austria, Prussia, and England appeared to be acting in harmony; and throughout the month of October all three endeavoured to shake the purpose of Alexander regarding Warsaw. Talleyrand, however, foresaw that the efforts of Prussia in this direction would not last very long, and he wrote to Louis XVIII. asking for his permission to make a definite offer of armed assistance to Austria in case of need. Events took the turn which Talleyrand expected. . . . He had isolated Russia and Prussia, and had drawn to his own side not only England and Austria but the whole body of the minor German States. . . . On the 3rd of January, 1815, after a rash threat of war uttered by Hardenberg, a secret treaty was signed by the representatives of France, England, and Austria, pledging these Powers to take the field, if necessary, against Russia and Prussia in defence of the principles of the Peace of Paris. The plan of the campaign was drawn up, the number of the forces fixed. Bavaria had already armed; Piedmont, Hanover, and even the Ottoman Porte, were named as future members of the alliance. It would perhaps be unfair to the French Minister to believe that he actually desired to kindle a war on this gigantic scale. Talleyrand had not, like Napoleon, a love for war for its own sake. His object was rather to raise France from its position as a conquered and isolated Power; to surround it with allies. . . . The conclusion of the secret treaty of January 3rd marked the definite success of his plans. France was forthwith admitted into the council hitherto known as that of the Four Courts, and from this time its influence visibly affected the action of Russia and Prussia, reports of the secret treaty having reached the Czar immediately after its signature. The spirit of compromise now began to animate the Congress. Alexander had already won a virtual decision in his favour on the Polish question, but he abated something of his claims, and while gaining the lion's share of the Duchy of Warsaw, he ultimately consented that Cracow, which threatened the Austrian frontier, should be formed into an independent Republic, and that Prussia should receive the fortresses of Dantzic and Thorn on the Vistula, with the district lying between Thorn and the border of Silesia. This was little for Alexander to abandon; on the Saxon question the allies of Talleyrand gained most that they demanded. The King of Saxony was restored to his throne, and permitted to retain Dresden and about half of his dominions. Prussia received the remainder. In lieu of a further expansion in Saxony, Prussia was awarded territory on the left bank of the Rhine, which, with its recovered Westphalian provinces, restored the monarchy to an area and population equal to that which it had possessed in 1805. But the dominion given to Prussia beyond the Rhine, though considered at the time to be a poor equivalent for the second half of Saxony, was in reality a gift of far greater

value. It made Prussia, in defence of its own soil, the guardian and bulwark of Germany against France. . . . It gave to Prussia something more in common with Bavaria and the South, and qualified it, as it had not been qualified before, for its future task of uniting Germany under its own leadership. The Polish and Saxon difficulties, which had threatened the peace of Europe, were virtually settled before the end of the month of January."—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, v. 2, ch. 1.—"Prussia obtained Posen with the town of Thorn in the east, and in the west all that had been lost by the treaty of Tilsit, the duchies of Jülich and Berg, the old electoral territories of Cologne and Trier with the city of Aachen, and parts of Luxemburg and Limburg. Russia received the whole of the grand-duchy of Warsaw except Posen and Thorn, and Alexander fulfilled his promises to the Poles by granting them a liberal constitution. . . . Swedish Pomerania had been ceded by the treaty of Kiel to Denmark, but had long been coveted by Prussia. The Danish claims were bought off with two million thalers and the duchy of Lauenburg, but Hanover had to be compensated for the latter by the cession of the devotedly loyal province of East Friesland, one of the acquisitions of Frederick the Great. Hanover, which now assumed the rank of a kingdom without opposition, was also aggrandised by the acquisition of Hildesheim, Goslar, and other small districts. Austria was naturally one of the great gainers by the Congress. Eastern Galicia was restored by Russia, and the Tyrol, Salzburg, and the Inn district by Bavaria. As compensation for the Netherlands, Venetia and Lombardy became Austrian provinces. Bavaria, in return for its losses in the east, received Würzburg, Aschaffenburg, and its former possessions in the Palatinate. Long discussions took place about the constitution to be given to Germany, and here the hopes of the national party were doomed to bitter disappointment. . . . Finally a Confederation was formed [see GERMANY: A. D. 1814-1820] which secured the semblance of unity, but gave almost complete independence to the separate states. The members numbered thirty-eight, and included the four remaining free cities, Frankfort, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, and the kings of Denmark and the Netherlands. . . . In Italy the same process of restoration and subdivision was carried out. Victor Emmanuel I. recovered his kingdom of Sardinia, with the addition of Genoa as compensation for the portion of Savoy which France retained. Modena was given to a Hapsburg prince, Francis IV., son of the archduke Ferdinand, and Beatrice the heiress of the house of Este. Tuscany was restored to Ferdinand III., a brother of the Austrian Emperor. Charles Louis, son of the Bourbon king of Etruria, was compensated with Lucca and a promise of the succession in the duchy of Parma, which was for the time given to Napoleon's wife, Maria Louisa. Pius VII. had already returned to Rome, and the Papal states now recovered their old extent. But Pius refused at first to accept these terms because he was deprived of Avignon and the Venaisin, and because Austrian garrisons were in occupation of Ferrara and Comacchio. Naples was left for a time in the hands of Joachim Murat, as a reward for his desertion of Napoleon after the battle of Leipzig. Switzerland was

declared independent and neutral, but its feudal unity was loosened by a new constitution (Aug., 1815). The number of cantons were raised to twenty-two by the addition of Geneva, Wallis (Vallais), and Neuchâtel, the last under Prussian suzerainty. The position of capital was to be enjoyed in rotation by Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne. The kingdom of the Netherlands was formed for the house of Orange by the union of Holland and Belgium and the addition of Luxemburg, which made the king a member of the German Confederation. The professed object of this artificial union of Catholics and Protestants was the erection of a strong bulwark against French aggressions."—R. Lodge, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, ch. 24, sect. 52.

ALSO IN: E. Hertlet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, v. 1, no. 27.—Prince Talleyrand, *Memoirs*, pt. 8 (v. 2).—The same, *Cor. with Louis XVIII. during the Cong. of Vienna*.—Prince Metternich, *Memoirs*, v. 2, pp. 553-599.—J. R. Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein*, pt. 8 (v. 3).—Sir A. Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, 1789-1815, ch. 92 (v. 19).

VIENNA, Imperial Library of. See LIBRARIES, MODERN: EUROPE.

VIENNA, Treaty of (1725). See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725. . . . Treaty of (1735). See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735. . . . Treaty of (1864). See GERMANY: A. D. 1861-1866.

VIENNE, OR VIENNA, on the Rhone. —Vienne, on the Rhone, was the chief town of the Allobroges in ancient times,—subsequently made a Roman colony. It was from Vienne that Lugdunum (Lyons) was originally colonized.

A. D. 500.—Under the Burgundians. See BURGUNDIANS: A. D. 500.

11th Century.—Founding of the Dauphiny. See BURGUNDY: A. D. 1032.

A. D. 1349.—The appanage of the Dauphins of France. See DAUPHINS; also, BURGUNDY: A. D. 1127-1378.

VIGILANCE COMMITTEE OF SAN FRANCISCO, The. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1856.

VIGO BAY, The Destruction of Spanish treasure ships in. See SPAIN: A. D. 1702.

VIKINGS. See NORMANS.—NORTHMEN: 8-9TH CENTURIES.

VILAGOS, Hungarian surrender at (1849). See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

VILLA VICIOSA, OR VIÇOSA, Battle of (1665). See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1637-1668. . . . Battle of (1710). See SPAIN: A. D. 1707-1710.

VILLAFRANCA, Peace of. See ITALY: A. D. 1856-1859; and 1859-1861.

VILLALAR, Battle of (1521). See SPAIN: A. D. 1518-1522.

VILLEIN TAX, OR TAILLE. See TAILLE AND GABELLE.

VILLEINAGE, Tenure in. See FEUDAL TENURES; and MANORS.

VILLEINS.—VILLANI. See SLAVERY, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN (especially under ENGLAND); also, DEBITITUS.

VILLERSEXEL, Battle of (1871). See FRANCE: A. D. 1870-1871.

VILLMERGEN, Battles of (1656, 1712, and 1841). See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1652-1789; and 1803-1848.



**VIMIERO, Battle of (1808).** See SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (AUGUST-JANUARY).

**VIMINAL, The.** See SEVEN HILLS OF ROME.

**VIMORY, Battle of (1587).** See FRANCE: A. D. 1584-1589.

**VINCENNES, Ind.: A. D. 1735.—Founded by the French.** See CANADA: A. D. 1700-1735.

**A. D. 1778-1779.—Taken and retaken from the British by the Virginian General Clark.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778-1779 CLARK'S CONQUEST.

**VINCENTIAN CONGREGATION, The.** See LAZARISTS.

**VINCI, Battle of (A. D. 717).** See FRANKS: A. D. 511-752.

**VINDALIUM, Battle at (B. C. 121).** See ALLOBROGES, CONQUEST OF THE.

**VINDELICIANS, The.** See RHÆTIA.

**VINDOBONA.**—Vindobona, modern Vienna, on the Danube, originally a town of the Celts, in Pannonia, became a Roman military and naval station and a frontier city of importance. Marcus Aurelius died at Vindobona, A. D. 180.

**VINÆ.**—The vinæ of Roman siege operations were "covered galleries, constructed of wicker work (vimina) generally, and sometimes of wood, for the purpose of covering the approach of the besiegers."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 3, foot-note.

**VINLAND.** See AMERICA: 10-11TH CENTURIES.

**VIONVILLE, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (JULY-AUGUST).

**VIRCHOW, and Cellular Pathology.** See MEDICAL SCIENCE: 19TH CENTURY.

**VIRGATE.** See HIDE; also, MANORS.

**VIRGIN ISLANDS.** See WEST INDIES.

## VIRGINIA.

**The aboriginal inhabitants.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES, POWHATAN CONFEDERACY, ALGONQUIAN FAMILY, IROQUOIS TRIBES OF THE SOUTH, and CHEROKEES.

**A. D. 1584.—The name given first to Raleigh's Roanoke settlement, on the Carolina coast.** See AMERICA: A. D. 1584-1586.

**A. D. 1606-1607.—The Virginia Company of London and its charter.—The colony planted at Jamestown.**—"The colonization of the North American coast had now become part of the avowed policy of the British government. In 1606 a great joint-stock company was formed for the establishment of two colonies in America. The branch which was to take charge of the proposed southern colony had its headquarters in London; the management of the northern branch was at Plymouth in Devonshire. Hence the two branches are commonly spoken of as the London and Plymouth Companies. The former was also called the Virginia Company, and the latter the North Virginia Company, as the name of Virginia was then loosely applied to the entire Atlantic coast north of Florida. The London Company had jurisdiction from 34° to 38° north latitude; the Plymouth Company had jurisdiction from 45° down to 41°; the intervening territory, between 38° and 41° was to go to whichever company should first plant a self-supporting colony."—J. Fiske, *The Beginnings of New Eng.*, ch. 2.—"The charter for colonizing the great central territory of the North American continent, which was to be the chosen abode of liberty, gave to the mercantile corporation nothing but a wilderness, with the right of peopling and defending it. By an extension of the prerogative, which was in itself illegal, the monarch assumed absolute legislative as well as executive powers. . . . The general superintendence was confided to a council in England; the local administration of each colony to a resident council. The members of the superior council in England were appointed exclusively by the king, and were to hold office at his good pleasure. Their authority extended to both colonies, which jointly took the name of Virginia. Each of the two was to have its own resident council, of which the members were from time to time to

be ordained and removed according to the instructions of the king. To the king, moreover, was reserved supreme legislative authority over the several colonies, extending to their general condition and the most minute regulation of their affairs. . . . The summer was spent in preparations for planting the first colony, for which the king found a grateful occupation in framing a code of laws. The superior council in England was permitted to name the colonial council, which was independent of the emigrants, and had power to elect or remove its president, to remove any of its members, and to supply its own vacancies. Not an element of popular liberty or control was introduced. Religion was established according to the doctrine and rites of the church within the realm. . . . Then, on the 19th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1606, one hundred and nine years after the discovery of the American continent by Cabot, forty-one years from the settlement of Florida, the squadron of three vessels, the largest not exceeding 100 tons' burden, with the favor of all England, stretched their sails for 'the dear strand of Virginia, earth's only paradise.' . . . The enterprise was ill concerted. Of the 105 on the list of emigrants, there were but 12 laborers and few mechanics. They were going to a wilderness, in which, as yet, not a house was standing; and there were 48 gentlemen to 4 carpenters. Neither were there any men with families. Newport, who commanded the ships, was acquainted with the old passage, and sailed by way of the Canaries and the West India Islands. As he turned to the north, a severe storm, in April, 1607, carried his fleet beyond the settlement of Raleigh, into the magnificent bay of the Chesapeake. The headlands received and retain the names of Cape Henry and Cape Charles, from the sons of King James; the deep water for anchorage, 'putting the emigrants in good Comfort,' gave a name to the northern point; and within the capes a country opened which appeared to 'claim the prerogative over the most pleasant places in the world.' . . . A noble river was soon entered, which was named from the monarch; and, after a search of seventeen days, . . . on the 13th of

May they reached a peninsula about 50 miles above the mouth of the stream, where the water near the shore was so very deep that the ships were moored to trees. Here the council, except Smith, who for no reason unless it were jealousy of his superior energy was for nearly a month kept out of his seat, took the oath of office, and the majority elected Edward Maria Wingfield president for the coming year. Contrary to the earnest and persistent advice of Bartholomew Gosnold, the peninsula was selected for the site of the colony, and took the name of Jamestown."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.*, pt. 1, ch. 6 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: E. D. Neill, *Hist. of the Virginia Co. of London*, ch. 1, and *Virginia Vetusta*, ch. 1-2.—J. Burk, *Hist. of Virginia*, v. 1, ch. 3.—E. M. Wingfield, *Discourse of Virginia*, ed. by C. Deane (*Archæologia Americana*, v. 4).—H. W. Preston, *Doc's Illustrative of Am. Hist.*, p. 1.

A. D. 1607-1610.—The settlement at Jamestown and the services of Captain John Smith.—"Among the leaders of the expedition were Gosnold, the voyager and discoverer, and a prime mover in the affair; Wingfield, one of the first-named patentees, John Smith, Ratcliffe, Martin, Kendall, and Percy. Of these men John Smith has become famous. He has taken place among the founders of states, and a romantic interest has attached itself to his name. For centuries his character and deeds have been applauded, while in late years they have become a theme for censure and detraction. Modern investigation has relentlessly swept away the romance, and torn in pieces many of the long accepted narratives in which Smith recorded his own achievements. Yet it was not wholly by a false and fluent pen that Smith obtained and held his reputation. He was something more than a plausible writer of fiction. He was the strongest and most representative man among the Virginian colonists. . . . With this hopeful company Newport left the Downs on the 1st of January, 1607. The worthy Richard Hakluyt sent them a paper containing much good advice and some ingenious geographical speculations, and Drayton celebrated their departure in clumsy verses filled with high-flown compliments. The advice of the priest and the praise of the poet were alike wasted. By an arrangement ingeniously contrived to promote discord, devised probably by royal sagacity, the box containing the names of the council was not to be opened until the voyagers reached their destination. Dissension broke out almost immediately. Whatever the merits of the differences, this much is certain, that Smith was the object of the concentrated jealousy and hatred of his companions. . . . On the 13th of May, 1607, the settlers landed at Jamestown, sent out exploring parties, and began fortifications. A fortnight later, under the command of Wingfield, they repulsed an attack by the Indians; and on the 22d of June Newport sailed for England, and left them to their own resources. The prospect must have been a dreary one: nothing answered to their expectations. Instead of valuable mines, the adventurers found only a most fertile soil; instead of timid, trusting South American Indians, they encountered wild tribes of hardy, crafty, and hostile savages; instead of rich, defenceless, and barbarian cities, an easy and splendid spoil, they found a wilderness, and the necessity of hard

work. From the miserable character of the settlers, dangerous factions prevailed from the first, until Smith obtained control, and maintained some sort of order—despotically, perhaps, but still effectually. No one would work, and famine and the Indians preyed upon them mercilessly. A small fort and a few wretched huts, built after much quarrelling, represented for many months all that was accomplished. The only relief from this dark picture of incompetent men perishing, without achievement, and by their own folly, on the threshold of a great undertaking, is to be found in the conduct of Smith. Despite almost insurmountable obstacles, Smith kept the colony together for two years. He drilled the soldiers, compelled labor, repaired the fort, traded with the Indians, outwitted them and kept their friendship, and made long and daring voyages of discovery. He failed to send home a lump of gold, but he did send an excellent map of the Company's territory. He did not discover the passage to the South Sea, but he explored the great bays and rivers of Virginia. He did not find Raleigh's lost colonists, but he managed to keep his own from total destruction. The great result of all Smith's efforts was the character of permanency he gave to the settlement. Because he succeeded in maintaining an English colony for two consecutive years in America, the London Company had courage to proceed; and this is what constitutes Smith's strongest claim to the admiration and gratitude of posterity. To suppose that he had the qualities of a founder of a state is a mistake, although in some measure he did the work of one. . . . His veracity as a historian in the later years of his life has been well-nigh destroyed. But little faith can be placed in the 'Generall Historie,' and modern investigation has conclusively relegated to the region of legend and of fiction the dramatic story of Smith's rescue by Pocahontas. The shadow of doubt rests upon all his unsupported statements; but nothing can obscure his great services, to which the world owes the foundation of the first English colony in America. Yet, after all his struggles, Smith was severely blamed by the Company, apparently because Virginia was not Peru. In a manly letter he sets forth the defects of the colony, the need of good men with families, industrious tradesmen and farmers, not 'poor gentlemen and libertines.' Before, however, the actual orders came to supersede him, Smith resigned, or was forced out of the government, and returned to England. The feeble life of the colony wasted fast after his departure and during the sickness of Percy, who succeeded to the command."—H. C. Lodge, *Short Hist. of the Eng. Colonies in Am.*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: Capt. John Smith, *General Historie of Va.*, bk. 2-3.—J. Ashton, *Adventures and Discoveries of Capt. John Smith, newly ordered*, ch. 6-21.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 1, ch. 11.—E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye, *Pocahontas*.

A. D. 1609-1616.—The new Charter.—The colony taking root.—Introduction of Tobacco culture.—"The prospects of the colony were so discouraging at the beginning of the year 1609, that, in the hope of improving them, the Company applied for a new charter with enlarged privileges. This was granted to them, on the 23d of May, under the corporate name of 'The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and



Planters of the City of London for the first Colony in Virginia.' The new Association, which embraced representatives of every rank, trade, and profession, included twenty-one peers, and its list of names presents an imposing array of wealth and influence. By this charter Virginia was greatly enlarged, and made to comprise the coast-line and all islands within 100 miles of it,—200 miles north and 200 south of Point Comfort,—with all the territory within parallel lines thus distant and extending to the Pacific boundary; the Company was empowered to choose the Supreme Council in England, and, under the instructions and regulations of the last, the Governor was invested with absolute civil and military authority. . . . Thomas West (Lord Delaware), the descendant of a long line of noble ancestry, received the appointment of Governor and Captain-General of Virginia. The first expedition under the second charter, which was on a grander scale than any preceding it, and which consisted of nine vessels, sailed from Plymouth on the 1st of June, 1609. Newport, the commander of the fleet, Sir Thomas Gates, Lieutenant-General, and Sir George Somers, Admiral of Virginia, were severally authorized, whichever of them might first arrive at Jamestown, to supersede the existing administration there until the arrival of Lord Delaware, who was to embark some months later; but not being able to settle the point of precedence among themselves, they embarked together in the same vessel, which carried also the wife and daughters of Gates. . . . On the 23d of July the fleet was caught in a hurricane; a small vessel was lost, others damaged, and the 'Sea Venture,' which carried Gates, Somers, and Newport, with about 150 settlers, was cast ashore on the Bermudas. . . . Early in August the 'Blessing,' Captain Archer, and three other vessels of the delayed fleet sailed up James River, and soon after the 'Diamond,' Captain Ratcliffe, appeared, without her mainmast, and she was followed in a few days by the 'Swallow,' in like condition. The Council being all dead save Smith, he, obtaining the sympathy of the sailors, refused to surrender the government of the colony; and the newly arrived settlers elected Francis West, the brother of Lord Delaware, as temporary president. The term of Smith expiring soon after, George Percy—one of the original settlers, a brother of the Earl of Northumberland, and a brave and honorable man—was elected president. . . . Smith, about Michaelmas (September 29), departed for England, or, as all contemporary accounts other than his own state, was sent thither 'to answer some misdemeanors.' These were doubtless of a venial character; but the important services of Smith in the sustenance of the colony appear not to have been as highly esteemed by the Company as by Smith himself. He complains that his several petitions for reward were disregarded, and he never returned to Virginia. . . . At the time of his departure for England he left at Jamestown three ships, seven boats, a good stock of provisions, nearly 500 settlers, 20 pieces of cannon, 300 guns, with fishing-nets, working-tools, horses, cattle, swine, etc. Jamestown was strongly fortified with palisades, and contained between fifty and sixty houses. . . . No effort by tillage being made to replenish their provisions, the stock was soon consumed, and the horrors of famine were added to other calamities.

The intense sufferings of the colonists were long remembered, and this period is referred to as 'the starving time.' In six months their number was reduced to 60, and such was the extremity of these that they must soon have perished but for speedy succor. The passengers of the wrecked 'Sea Venture,' though mourned for as lost, had effected a safe landing at the Bermudas, where, favored by the tropical productions of the islands, they, under the direction of Gates and Somers, constructed for their deliverance two vessels from the materials of the wreck and cedar-wood, the largest of the vessels being of 80 tons burden. . . . Six of the company, including the wife of Sir Thomas Gates, died on the island. The company of 140 men and women embarked on the completed vessels—which were appropriately named the 'Patience' and the 'Deliverance'—on the 10th of May, 1610, and on the 23d they landed at Jamestown. . . . So forlorn was the condition of the settlement that Gates reluctantly resolved to abandon it." The whole colony was accordingly embarked and was under sail down the river, when it met a fleet of three vessels, bringing supplies and new settlers from England, with Lord Delaware, who had resolved to come out in person, as Governor and Captain-General of Virginia. Gates and his disheartened companions turned back with these new comers, and all were set vigorously at work to restore the settlement. "The administration of Delaware, though ludicrously ostentatious for so insignificant a dominion, was yet highly wholesome, and under his judicious discipline the settlement was restored to order and contentment." His health failing, Lord Delaware returned to England the following spring, whither Sir Thomas Gates had gone. Sir Thomas Dale had already been sent out with the appointment of high marshal, bearing a code of extraordinary laws which practically placed the colony under martial rule. Gates returned in June, 1611, with 300 additional settlers and a considerable stock of cows and other cattle. During that year and the next several new settlements were founded, at Dutch Gap, Henrico, and Bermuda Hundred, individual grants of property began to be made, and many signs of prosperity appeared. The year 1612 "was a marked one, in the inauguration by John Rolfe [who married Pocahontas two years later, having lost his first wife] of the systematic culture of tobacco,—a staple destined to exert a controlling influence in the future welfare and progress of the colony, and soon, by the paramount profit yielded by its culture, to subordinate all other interests, agricultural as well as manufacturing." In the spring of 1613, Sir Thomas Gates left the colony, finally, returning to England, and the government fell to the hands of Dale, who remained at the head until 1616.—R. A. Brock, *Virginia, 1606-1689 (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., v. 3, ch. 5).*

ALSO IN: W. Stith, *Hist. of Va., bk. 3.*—J. H. Lefroy, *Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas, v. 1, ch. 1.*—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia, ch. 13-16.*—H. W. Preston, *Doc's Illustrative of Am. Hist., p. 14.*

A. D. 1613.—The French settlements in Acadia destroyed by Argall and the Dutch at New York forced to promise tribute. See CANADA: A. D. 1610-1613; and NEW YORK: A. D. 1610-1614.

**A. D. 1617-1619.—The evil days of Argall, and the better administration that followed.—Meeting of the first provincial Assembly.—**

"A party of greedy and unprincipled adventurers headed by Lord Rich, soon after the Earl of Warwick, acquired sufficient influence in the Company to nominate a creature of their own as Deputy-Governor. Their choice of Argall [Samuel Argall] would in itself have tainted their policy with suspicion. Whether dealing with the Indians, the French, or the Dutch, he had shown himself [see CANADA: A. D. 1610-1613; and NEW YORK: A. D. 1610-1614] able, resolute, and unscrupulous. To do him justice, he seems at least to have understood the principle of Tiberius, that a shepherd should shear his sheep, not flay them. His first measure was to provide a sufficient supply of corn for the maintenance of the colony. With that he appeared to think that his duty to the settlers was at end. . . . An event soon occurred which released Argall from the fear of a superior, and probably emboldened him in his evil courses. Lord Delaware, who had sailed in a large vessel with 200 emigrants," died on the voyage. "Argall now began to show that his care for the well-being of the colony was no better than the charity of the cannibal who feeds up his prisoner before making a meal on him. Trade with the Indians was withheld from individuals, but, instead of being turned to the benefit of the Company, it was appropriated by Argall. The planters were treated as a slave-gang working for the Deputy's own private profit. The Company's cattle were sold, and the proceeds never accounted for. During this time a great change had come over the Company at home. An energetic and public-spirited party had been formed, opposed alike to Sir Thomas Smith and to Lord Rich. Their leader was Sir Edwin Sandys, a member of that country party which was just beginning to take its stand against the corruptions of the court policy. Side by side with him stood one whose name has gained a wider though not a more honourable repute, the follower of Essex, the idol of Shakespeare, the brilliant, versatile Southampton. . . . The . . . year 1619 was remarkable in the annals of the colony. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it witnessed the creation of Virginia as an independent community. From the beginning of that year we may date the definite ascendancy of Sandys and his party, an ascendancy which was maintained till the dissolution of the Company, and during which the affairs of Virginia were administered with a degree of energy, unselfishness, and statesmanlike wisdom, perhaps unparalleled in the history of corporations. One of the first measures was to send out Yeardley to supersede Argall. . . . When Yeardley arrived he found that Argall had escaped. No further attempt seems to have been made to bring him to justice. In the next year he was commanding a ship against the Algerines." Soon afterwards, Sir Edwin Sandys was placed officially at the head of the Company, by his election to be Treasurer, in the place of Sir Thomas Smith. "About the same time that these things were doing in England, a step of the greatest importance was being taken in Virginia. Yeardley, in obedience to instructions from the Company, summoned an Assembly of Burgesses from the various hundreds and plantations. At one step Virginia,

from being little better than a penal settlement, ruled by martial law, became invested with important, though not full, rights of self-government. Though we have no direct evidence of the fact, there is every probability that during the administrations of Yeardley and Argall the number of independent planters possessing estates of their own, with labourers employed in the service of their masters, not of the Company, had increased. Unless such an influence had been at work, it is scarcely possible that the experiment of constitutional government should have succeeded, or even have been tried. On the 30th of July, 1619, the first Assembly met in the little church at Jamestown. . . . In England the Company under its new government set to work with an energy before unknown to it, to improve the condition of the colony. . . . To check the over-production of tobacco a clause was inserted in all fresh patents of land binding the holder to cultivate a certain quantity of other commodities. Everything was done to encourage permanent settlers rather than mere traders. Apprentices, unmarried women, and neat cattle were sent out. New forms of industry, too, were set on foot, such as timber yards, silk manufactures, iron foundries, and vineyards. . . . In the year 1619 alone over 1,200 persons were sent out, half as private settlers or servants, half at the expense of the Company." —J. A. Doyle, *The English in Am.: Virginia, &c., ch. 6.*

**A. D. 1619.—Introduction of Negro Slavery.**—"In the month of August, 1619, five years after the commons of France had petitioned for the emancipation of every serf in every fief, a Dutch man-of-war entered James River and landed 20 negroes for sale. This is the sad epoch of the introduction of negro slavery; but the traffic would have been checked in its infancy had it remained with the Dutch. Thirty years after this first importation of Africans, Virginia to one black contained fifty whites; and, after seventy years of its colonial existence, the number of its negro slaves was proportionably much less than in several of the northern states at the time of the war of independence."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (Author's last rev.)*, pt. 1, ch. 8 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: G. W. Williams, *Hist. of the Negro Race in Am.*, pt. 2, ch. 12 (v. 1).—G. P. Fisher, *The Colonial Era*, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1622-1624.—Plot and Massacre by the Indians.—Arbitrary dissolution of the Virginia Company by King James.**—"On the 22nd of March, 1622, a memorable massacre occurred in the Colony. . . . On the evening before, and on that morning, the savages as usual came unarmed into the houses of the planters, with fruits, fish, turkies and venison to sell. In some places they actually sate down to breakfast with the English. At about the hour of noon, the savages rising suddenly and everywhere at the same time, butchered the colonists with their own implements, sparing neither age, sex, nor condition. Three hundred and forty-seven men, women and children fell in a few hours. . . . The destruction might have been universal but for the disclosure of a converted Indian, named Chanco, who, during the night before the massacre, revealed the plot to one Richard Pace, with whom he lived. Pace . . . repaired before day to Jamestown and gave the alarm to Sir



Francis Wyatt, the Governor. His vigilance saved a large part of the Colony. . . . The court of James I., jealous of the growing power of the Virginia Company and of its too republican spirit, seized upon the occasion of the massacre to attribute all the calamities of the Colony to its mismanagement and neglect, and thus to frame a pretext for dissolving the charter." The Company, supported by the colonists, resisted the high-handed proceedings of the King and his officers, but vainly. In November, 1624, "James I. dissolved the Virginia Company by a writ of Quo Warranto, which was determined only upon a technicality in the pleadings. The company had been obnoxious to the ill will of the King on several grounds. The corporation had become a theatre for rearing leaders of the opposition, many of its members being also members of parliament. . . . Charles I. succeeding [1625] to the crown and principles of his father, took the government of Virginia into his own hands. The company thus extinguished had expended £150,000 in establishing the Colony, and transported 9,000 settlers without the aid of government. The number of stockholders, or adventurers, as they were styled, was about 1,000, and the annual value of exports from Virginia was, at the period of the dissolution of the charter, only £20,000. The company embraced much of the rank, wealth, and talent of the kingdom. . . . As the act provided no compensation for the enormous expenditure incurred, it can be looked upon as little better than confiscation effected by chicanery and tyranny. Nevertheless the result was undoubtedly favorable to the Colony."—C. Campbell, *Introd. to the Hist. of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Va.*, ch. 15-16.

ALSO IN: W. Stith, *Hist. of Va.*, bk. 4-5.—E. D. Neill, *Hist. of the Virginia Co. of London*, ch. 14-17.

A. D. 1628.—Attempted settlement by Lord Baltimore. See MARYLAND: A. D. 1632.

A. D. 1635-1638.—The Clayborne quarrel with Lord Baltimore and the Maryland colony. See MARYLAND: A. D. 1635-1638.

A. D. 1639-1652.—Loyalty to King Charles.—The Refuge of the Cavaliers.—"Under Charles I. little worthy of notice occurred in the political history of Virginia. . . . Attempts were made to raise a revenue on tobacco, and subsequently to establish a royal monopoly of the tobacco trade. The attempts were averted, and the king contented himself with the pre-emption of the Virginian tobacco, and with enacting that no foreign vessel should be allowed to trade with Virginia, or to carry Virginian goods. In 1639 an attempt was made to re-establish the authority of the company, but was strenuously and successfully opposed by the assembly. That the royal government sat lightly on Virginia may be inferred from the loyal tone which had thus early become a characteristic of the colony. After the establishment of the commonwealth, 'Virginia was whole for monarchy and the last country belonging to England that submitted to obedience to the commonwealth of England,' and under Berkeley's government the plantation was a safe refuge for the defeated cavaliers. . . . But as soon as two or three parliamentary ships appeared [1652] all thoughts of resistance were laid aside. Yet, whether from lenity or caution, the parliament was satisfied

with moderate terms. The submission of the colonists was accepted as free and voluntary."—J. A. Doyle, *The American Colonies*, ch. 2.

A. D. 1644.—Fresh Indian outbreak and massacre of whites.—"After a peace of five or six years, the Indians, provoked by continued encroachments on their lands, and instigated, it is said, by the aged chief Opechancanough, formed a new scheme for the extermination of the colonists. They were encouraged by signs of discord among the English, having seen a fight in James River between a London ship for the Parliament and a Bristol ship for the king. Five hundred persons perished in the first surprise, which took place, according to Winthrop, the day before Good Friday, appointed by the governor, 'a courtier, and very malignant toward the way of our churches,' to be observed as a fast for the good success of the king. For defense, the planters were concentrated in a few settlements; . . . forts were built at the points most exposed; and a ship was sent to Boston for powder, which, however, the General Court declined to furnish. This occasion was taken by 'divers godly-disposed persons' of Virginia to remove to New England. . . . The Indians were presently driven from their fastnesses. Opechancanough, decrepit and incapable of moving without assistance, . . . was taken prisoner and carried to Jamestown, where he was shot in the back by a vindictive soldier appointed to guard him. The Indian towns were broken up, and their 'clear lands possessed by the English to sow wheat in.' Opechancanough's successor submitted; and a peace was made by act of Assembly, the Indians ceding all the lands between James and York Rivers. No Indian was to come south of York River under pain of death. The Powhatan confederacy was dissolved. The Indians of lower Virginia sunk into servile dependence, and dwindled away, or, migrating to the south and west, were mingled and confounded with other tribes."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 11 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 2, ch. 5.

A. D. 1650-1660.—Under the Commonwealth and Cromwell, and the Stuart Restoration.—Two sides of the story.—Origin of the name of "The Old Dominion."—"After this, Sir William Berkeley [governor] made a new peace with the Indians, which continued for a long time unviolated. . . . But he himself did not long enjoy the benefit of this profound peace; for the unhappy troubles of king Charles the first increasing in England, proved a great disturbance to him and to all the people. They, to prevent the infection from reaching that country, made severe laws against the Puritans, though there were as yet none among them. But all correspondence with England was interrupted, supplies lessened, and trade obstructed. . . . At last the king was traitorously beheaded in England, and Oliver installed Protector. However, his authority was not acknowledged in Virginia for several years after, till they were forced to it by the last necessity. For in the year 1651, by Cromwell's command, Captain Dennis, with a squadron of men of war, arrived there from the Caribbee islands, where they had been subduing Bardoos. The country at first held out vigorously against him, and Sir William Berkeley, by the assistance of such Dutch vessels as were then there, made

a brave resistance. But at last Dennis contrived a stratagem which betrayed the country. He had got a considerable parcel of goods aboard, which belonged to two of the Council, and found a method of informing them of it. By this means they were reduced to the dilemma, either of submitting or losing their goods. This occasioned factions among them; so that at last, after the surrender of all the other English plantations, Sir Wm. was forced to submit to the usurper on the terms of a general pardon. However, it ought to be remembered, to his praise, and to the immortal honor of that colony, that it was the last of all the king's dominions that submitted to the usurpation; and afterwards the first that cast it off, and he never took any post or office under the usurper. Oliver had no sooner subdued the plantations, but he began to contrive how to keep them under, that so they might never be able for the time to come to give him farther trouble. To this end, he thought it necessary to break off their correspondence with all other nations, thereby to prevent their being furnished with arms, ammunition, and other warlike provisions. According to this design, he contrived a severe act of Parliament [1651], whereby he prohibited the plantations from receiving or exporting any European commodities but what should be carried to them by Englishmen, and in English built ships [see NAVIGATION ACT, ENGLISH]. . . . Notwithstanding this act of navigation, the Protector never thought the plantations enough secured, but frequently changed their governors, to prevent their intriguing with the people. So that, during the time of the usurpation, they had no less than three governors there, namely, Digges, Bennet and Matthews. The strange arbitrary curbs he put upon the plantations exceedingly afflicted the people . . . and inspired them with a desire to use the last remedy, to relieve themselves from this lawless usurpation. In a short time afterwards a fair opportunity happened; for Governor Matthews died, and no person was substituted to succeed him in the government. Whereupon the people applied themselves to Sir William Berkeley (who had continued all this time upon his own plantation in a private capacity) and unanimously chose him their governor again [March, 1660]. Sir William . . . told the people . . . that if he accepted the government it should be upon their solemn promise, after his example, to venture their lives and fortunes for the king, who was then in France. This was no great obstacle to them, and therefore with an unanimous voice they told him they were ready to hazard all for the king. . . . Sir William Berkeley embraced their choice, and forthwith proclaimed Charles II. king of England, Scotland, France, Ireland and Virginia, and caused all process to be issued in his name. Thus his majesty was actually king in Virginia before he was so in England. But it pleased God to restore him soon after to the throne of his ancestors."—R. Beverley, *Hist. of Va.*, bk. 1, ch. 4. —"The government of Virginia, under the Commonwealth of England, was mild and just. While Cromwell's sceptre commanded the respect of the world, he exhibited generous and politic leniency towards the infant and loyal colony. She enjoyed during this interval free trade, legislative independence and internal peace. The governors were men who by their

virtues and moderation won the confidence and affections of the people. No extravagance, rapacity, or extortion, could be alleged against the administration. Intolerance and persecution were unknown, with the single exception of a rigorous act banishing the quakers. But rapine, extravagance, extortion, intolerance and persecution were all soon to be revived under the auspices of the Stuarts. . . . Richard Cromwell resigned the protectorate in March, 1660. Matthews, governor-elect, had died in the January previous. England was without a monarch; Virginia without a governor. Here was a two fold interregnum. The assembly, convening on the 13th of March, 1660, declared by their first act that, as there was then in England 'noe resident absolute and generall confessed power,' therefore the supreme government of the colony should rest in the assembly. By the second act, Sir William Berkeley was appointed governor, and it was ordered that all writs should issue in the name of the assembly. . . . No fact in our history has been more misunderstood and misrepresented than this reappointment of Sir William Berkeley, before the restoration of Charles II. . . . Sir William was elected, not by a tumultuary assemblage of the people, but by the assembly; the royal standard was not raised upon the occasion, nor was the king proclaimed. Sir William, however, made no secret of his loyalty. . . . Sir William was elected on the 21st of the same month, about two months before the restoration of Charles II. Yet the word king, or majesty, occurs no where in the legislative records, from the commencement of the Commonwealth in England until the 11th of October, 1660—more than four months after the restoration. Virginia was indeed loyal, but she was too feeble to express her loyalty."—C. Campbell, *Introd. to the Hist. of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Va.*, ch. 21-22. —"There is no doubt whatever that if the Virginians could have restored the King earlier they would have done so; and Berkeley, who is known to have been in close communication and consultation with the leading Cavaliers, had sent word to Charles II. in Holland, toward the end of the Commonwealth, that he would raise his flag in Virginia if there was a prospect of success. This incident has been called in question. It is testified to by William Lee, Sheriff of London, and a cousin of Richard Lee, Berkeley's emissary, as a fact within his knowledge. Charles declined the offer, but was always grateful to the Virginians. The country is said to have derived from the incident the name of the 'Old Dominion,' where the King was King, or might have been, before he was King in England."—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 2, ch. 10.

A. D. 1651-1672.—The English Navigation Acts and trade restrictions. See NAVIGATION LAWS; also UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1651-1672.

A. D. 1660-1677.—The Restoration and its rewards to Virginia loyalty.—Oppression, discontent, and Bacon's Rebellion.—At the time of the restoration of the English monarchy, in the person of Charles II., the colony of Virginia "numbered not far from 50,000 souls, a large proportion of whom, especially, we may suppose, those of middle life and most active habits, were natives of the soil, bound to it by the strongest ties of interest and affection, and by their hopes of what it was destined to become in the opening



future. Here was a state of things, comprising, in the apprehensions of the people, many of the elements of the highest happiness and prosperity. . . . But all this was totally and suddenly changed, and universal distress brought upon the land, by the new restrictive clauses added to the original Navigation Act, by the first Parliament of Charles. By the act of the Long Parliament it had been simply provided that foreign vessels should import into England no other products than such as were grown or manufactured in their own country; a shaft aimed principally at the Dutch. . . . By Charles's Commons this first hint was . . . expanded into a voluminous code of monopolizing enactments, by which the trade of the world was regulated on the principle of grasping for England every possible commercial advantage, and inflicting upon all other nations the greatest possible commercial injury. . . . Upon the colonies, one and all, this cruel policy bore with a weight which almost crushed them. . . . From 1660, when this monopolizing policy took its beginning, the discontent of the people increased day by day, as each new prohibition was proclaimed. Commerce lay dead. Tobacco would no longer pay for its cultivation, much less enrich the laborious planter; manufactures, as that of silk, after being attempted, failed to bring the hoped-for relief, and there seemed no prospect but starvation and ruin. What wonder that mischief lay brewing in the hearts of a people who, for their almost slavish loyalty, met only these thankless returns of injury and injustice; for the Virginians of that day were monarchists in the full meaning of the term. . . . Other causes conspired with these purely political ones to bring the public mind of Virginia into such a state of deep exasperation as to find its relief only in insurrection. Of these, one was particularly a source of irritation; namely, the grants of vast tracts of territory, made by the wasteful and profligate King to his needy and profligate favorites, made wholly irrespective of present owners and occupiers, who were transferred, like serfs of the soil, to any great patentee to whom the caprice of Charles chose to consign them." The discontent culminated in 1676, under the influence of an excitement growing out of trouble with the Indians. After more than thirty years of quiet, the natives became hostile and threatening. "Various outrages were first committed by the Indians, on whom the whites, as usual, retaliated; murder answered to murder, burning to burning, till, throughout the whole border country, were kindled the flames of an exterminating Indian war, accompanied by all its peculiar horrors. In the excited state of the public mind, these new calamities were laid at the door of the government." Governor Berkeley was accused of having an interest in the profits of trade with the Indians which restrained him from making war on them. Whether the charge was true or false, he gave color to it by his conduct. He took no steps to protect the colony. Nor would he authorize any self-defensive measures on the part of the people themselves. They "went so far as to engage that, if the Governor would only commission a general, whomsoever he would, they would 'follow him at their own charge.' Still they were not heard. Under such circumstances of neglect and excessive irri-

tation, they took the case into their own hands." They chose for their leader Nathaniel Bacon, a young Englishman of education, energy and talent, who had been in the colony about three years, and who had already attained a seat in the Governor's Council. Bacon accepted the responsibility, "commission or no commission," and, in the spring of 1676, put himself at the head of 500 men, with whom he marched against the Indians. The governor, after formally proclaiming him a rebel, raised another army and marched, not against the Indians, but against Bacon. He was hardly out of Jamestown, however, before the people of that neighborhood rose and took possession of the capital. On learning of this fresh revolt, he turned back, and found himself helpless to do anything but submit. The result was the summoning of a new Assembly, to which Bacon was elected from his county, and the making of some progress, apparently, towards a curing of abuses and the removing of causes of discontent. But something occurred—exactly what has never been made clear—which led to a sudden flight on Bacon's part from Jamestown, and the gathering of his forces once more around him. Re-entering the capital at their head, he extorted from Governor Berkeley a commission which legalized his military office, and armed with this authority he proceeded once more against the Indians. "But as soon as he was sufficiently distant to relieve the Governor and his friends from their fears, all that had been granted was revoked; a proclamation was issued, again denouncing Bacon as a rebel, setting a price upon his head, and commanding his followers to disperse." Again, Bacon and his army retraced their steps and took possession of Jamestown, the governor flying to Accomac. A convention of the inhabitants of the colony was then called together, which adopted a Declaration, or Oath, in which they fully identified themselves with Bacon in his course, and swore to uphold him. The latter then moved once more against the Indians; Berkeley once more got possession of the seat of government, and, once more, Bacon (who had fought the Indians meantime at Bloody Run and beaten them) came back and drove him out. "The whole country . . . was with Bacon, and merely a crowd of cowardly adventurers about the Governor. Nothing would seem, at this moment, to have stood between Bacon and the undisputed, absolute control of the colony, had no unforeseen event interposed, as it did, to change the whole aspect of affairs." This unforeseen event was the sudden death of Bacon, which occurred in January, 1677, at the house of a friend. "Some mystery attaches to the manner of it," and there were, of course, sinister whispers of foul play. "But, however and wherever Bacon died, it could never be discovered where he was buried, nor what disposition had been made of his body. . . . The death of Bacon was, in effect, the restoration of Sir William Berkeley to his lost authority, and the termination of the war; there being not an individual, among either his counsellors or officers, of capacity sufficient to make good his place. . . . Berkeley, gradually subduing all opposition, and making prisoners of many of the prime movers of the revolt, in a short time saw the authority of his government completely reestablished. . . . The historians of the period inform us that no less than 25 per-

sons were executed during the closing period of the rebellion and the few next succeeding months."—W. Ware, *Memoir of Nathaniel Bacon* (*Library of Am. Biog.*, series 2, v. 3).

ALSO IN: J. A. Doyle, *The English in Am.: Virginia, &c.*, ch. 9.—J. Burk, *Hist. of Va.*, v. 2, ch. 4.—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (*Author's last revision*), pt. 2, ch. 10-11.—E. Eggleston, *Nathaniel Bacon* (*Century Mag.*, July, 1890).

A. D. 1689-1690.—King William's War.—The first Colonial Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1690; and CANADA: A. D. 1689-1690.

A. D. 1691.—The founding of William and Mary College. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1619-1819.

A. D. 1696-1749.—Suppression of colonial manufactures. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1696-1749.

A. D. 1710.—Colonization of Palatines. See PALATINES.

A. D. 1710-1716.—Crossing the Blue Ridge.—The Knights of the Golden Horseshoe.—Possession taken of the Shenandoah Valley.—"Lord Orkney is made Governor, but as usual sends his deputy, and in the year 1710 appears the stalwart soldier and ruler, Sir Alexander Spotswood. Alexander Spotswood, or Spottiswoode, as his family were called in Scotland, rises like a landmark above the first years of the century. When he came to Virginia he was only 34 and in the bloom of his manhood. But he had already fought hard, and his faculties as a soldier and ruler were fully developed. . . . The Virginians received Spotswood with open arms. He was a man after their own heart, and brought with him when he came (June 1710) the great writ of habeas corpus. The Virginia people had long claimed that this right was guaranteed to them by Magna Charta, since they were equally free Englishmen with the people of England. Now it was conceded, and the great writ came,—Spotswood's letter of introduction. It was plain that he was not a new Berkeley looking to the King's good pleasure as his law, or a new Nicholson ready to imprison people or put halters around their necks; but a respecter of human freedom and defender of the right. . . . In . . . 1716, Governor Alexander Spotswood set out on an expedition which much delighted the Virginians. There was a very great longing to visit the country beyond the Blue Ridge. That beautiful unknown land held out arms of welcome, and the Governor, who had in his character much of the spirit of the hunter and adventurer, resolved to go and explore it. Having assembled a party of good companions, he set out in the month of August, and the gay company began their march toward the Blue Ridge Mountains. The chronicler of the expedition describes the picturesque cavalcade followed by the pack-horses and servants,—'rangers, pioneers, and Indians'; how they stopped to hunt game; bivouacked 'under the canopy'; laughed, jested, and regaled themselves with 'Virginia wine, white and red, Irish usquebaugh, brandy, shrub, two kinds of rum, champagne, canary, cherry-punch, and cider.' In due time they reached the Blue Ridge, probably near the present Swift Run Gap, and saw, beyond, the wild valley of the Shenandoah. On the summit of the mountain they drank the health of the King, and named two neighboring peaks

'Mt. George' and 'Mt. Alexander,' after his Majesty and the Governor; after which they descended into the valley and gave the Shenandoah the name of the 'Euphrates.' Here a bottle was buried—there were, no doubt, a number of empty ones—containing a paper to testify that the valley of the Euphrates was taken possession of in the name of his Majesty, George I. Then the adventurers reascended the mountain, crossed to the lowland, and returned to Williamsburg. This picturesque incident of the time gave rise to the order of the 'Knights of the Golden Horseshoe.' The horses had been shod with iron, which was unusual, as a protection against the mountain roads; and Spotswood sent to London and had made for his companions small golden horseshoes set with garnets and other jewels, and inscribed 'Sic juvat transcendere montes.'—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 2, ch. 21-22.

A. D. 1744.—Treaty with the Six Nations and purchase of the Shenandoah Valley.—"The Six Nations still retained the right to traverse the great valley west of the Blue Ridge. Just at this inopportune moment [1743], some of their parties came into bloody collision with the backwoodsmen of Virginia, who had penetrated into that valley. Hostilities with the Six Nations, now that war was threatened with France, might prove very dangerous, and Clinton [governor of New York] hastened to secure the friendship of these ancient allies by liberal presents; for which purpose, in conjunction with commissioners from New England, he held a treaty at Albany. . . . The difficulties between Virginia and the Six Nations were soon after [1744] settled in a treaty held at Lancaster, to which Pennsylvania and Maryland were also parties, and in which, in consideration of £400, the Six Nations relinquished all their title to the valley between the Blue Ridge and the central chain of the Allegany Mountains."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 25 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest*, p. 59.

A. D. 1748-1754.—First movements beyond the mountains to dispute possession with the French. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754.

A. D. 1754.—Opposing the French occupation of the Ohio Valley.—Washington's first service. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1754.

A. D. 1755-1760.—The French and Indian War.—Braddock's defeat and after. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754, 1754, 1755; CANADA: A. D. 1750-1753, to 1760; NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755, 1755; and CAPE BRETON ISLAND: A. D. 1758-1760.

A. D. 1756.—Number of Slaves. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1759-1761.—The Cherokee War. See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1759-1761.

A. D. 1763.—The Parsons' Cause and Patrick Henry.—"In Virginia as well as in Pennsylvania, a vigorous opposition to vested rights foreshadowed what was to come. A short crop of tobacco having suddenly enhanced the price of that staple, or, what is quite as likely, the issue of paper money in Virginia, first made that same year [1755], having depreciated the currency, the Assembly had passed a temporary act, authorizing the payment of all tobacco debts in money at twopence per pound—the old rate, long established by usage. Three years



after, under pretence of an expected failure of the crop, this tender act was renewed. Francis Fauquier, who had just succeeded Dinwiddie as lieutenant governor, a man of more complying temper than his predecessor, readily consented to it. The salaries of the parish ministers, some sixty-five in number, were payable in tobacco. They were likely to be considerable losers by this tender law; and, not content with attacking it in pamphlets, they sent an agent to England, and by the aid of Sherlock, bishop of London, procured an order in council pronouncing the law void. Suits were presently brought to recover the difference between twopence per pound in the depreciated currency and the tobacco to which by law the ministers were entitled. In defending one of these suits [1763], the remarkable popular eloquence of Patrick Henry displayed itself for the first time. Henry was a young lawyer, unconnected with the ruling aristocracy of the province, and as yet without reputation or practice. The law was plainly against him, and his case seemed to be hopeless. He had, however, a strong support in the prevailing prejudice in favor of the tender law, and in the dissatisfaction generally felt at the king's veto upon it. Addressing the jury in a torrent of eloquence as brilliant as it was unexpected, he prevailed upon them to give him a verdict. The Assembly voted money to defend all suits which the parsons might bring; and, notwithstanding their clear legal right in the matter, they thought it best to submit without further struggle."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 27 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: W. Wirt, *Life of Patrick Henry*, ch. 1.—M. C. Tyler, *Patrick Henry*, ch. 4.

**A. D. 1763-1766.**—The question of taxation by Parliament.—The Stamp Act and Patrick Henry's resolutions.—The First Continental Congress.—The repeal of the Stamp Act and the Declaratory Act. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1760-1775; 1763-1764; 1765; and 1766.

**A. D. 1766-1773.**—Opening events of the Revolution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1766-1767; 1772-1773; and BOSTON: A. D. 1770, to 1773.

**A. D. 1768.**—The boundary treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix.—Pretended cession of lands south of the Ohio. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1765-1768.

**A. D. 1769.**—Attempted prohibition of Slave Trade nullified by George III. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1713-1776.

**A. D. 1769-1772.**—The first settlement of Tennessee.—The Watauga Association. See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1769-1772.

**A. D. 1774.**—Western territorial claims of the Old Dominion.—Lord Dunmore's War with the Indians. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1774; and UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1781-1786.

**A. D. 1774.**—The Boston Port Bill, the Massachusetts Bill, and the Quebec Act.—The First Continental Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1774.

**A. D. 1775.**—The beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Lexington.—Concord.—The country in arms.—Ticonderoga.—The Siege of Boston.—Bunker Hill.—The Second Continental Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775.

**A. D. 1775.—The end of Royal Government.**  
—**Lord Dunmore's flight.**—Not long after the excited demonstrations which followed Governor Dunmore's removal of powder from the public magazine at Williamsburg, the governor received Lord North's "conciliatory proposition," and "he convened the House of Burgesses, on the 1st of June, to take it into consideration. This withdrew Peyton Randolph from Congress, as had been anticipated, and Mr. Jefferson succeeded to the vacancy. But the latter was not permitted to leave the Burgesses before an answer to the ministerial proposition was framed. . . . How much the answer was 'enfeebled' by the doubts and scruples of the moderate members, we cannot say, but it rings true revolutionary metal, and it was a noble lead off for the Assemblies of the other Colonies. . . . The House, after the customary expression of a desire for reconciliation, declare that they have examined it (the Ministerial proposition) minutely, viewed it in every light in which they are able, and that, 'with pain and disappointment, they must ultimately declare that it only changed the form of oppression without lightening its burden.' . . . In the meantime events had transpired which soon afterwards terminated the official career of the Earl of Dunmore, and with it the royal government in Virginia. On the 5th of June, three men who entered the public magazine were wounded by a spring gun placed there by the orders of the Governor, and on the 7th, a committee of the House, appointed to inspect the magazine, found the locks removed from the serviceable muskets, and they also discovered the powder which had been placed in mine. These things highly exasperated the multitude, and on a rumor getting abroad that the same officer who had before carried off the powder was again advancing towards the city with an armed force, they rose in arms. The Governor's assurance that the rumor was unfounded restored tranquillity. He, however, left the city in the night with his family and went on board the *Fowey*, lying at York, twelve miles distant. He left a message declaring that he had taken this step for his safety, and that thenceforth he should reside and transact business on board of the man of war! An interchange of messages, acrid and criminalatory on his part, firm and spirited on the part of the House, was kept up until the 24th of June; when, on his final refusal to receive bills for signature except under the guns of an armed vessel, the House declared it a high breach of privilege, and adjourned to the 12th of October. But a quorum never afterwards attended. . . . We soon find the Earl of Dunmore carrying on a petty but barbarous predatory warfare against the people he had so lately governed."—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 3.

**A. D. 1775-1776.**—Lord Dunmore's warfare.  
—**Norfolk destroyed.**—"Having drawn together a considerable force, Dunmore ascended Elizabeth River to the Great Bridge, the only pass by which Norfolk can be approached from the land side; dispersed some North Carolina militia collected there; made several prisoners; and then, descending the river [November 1775], took possession of Norfolk. The rise of that town had been very rapid. Within a short time past it had become the principal shipping port of Virginia. Its population amounted to several

thousands, among whom were many Scotch traders not well disposed to the American cause. Fugitive slaves and others began now to flock to Dunmore's standard. A movement was made in his favor on the east shore of Maryland, which it required a thousand militia to suppress. The Convention of Virginia, not a little alarmed, voted four additional regiments, afterward increased to seven, all of which were presently taken into continental pay. . . . Woodford, with the second Virginia regiment, took possession of the causeway leading to the Great Bridge, which was still held by Dunmore's troops. An attempt to dislodge the Virginians having failed, with loss, Dunmore abandoned the bridge and the town, and again embarked. Norfolk was immediately occupied by Woodford, who was promptly joined by Howe's regiment from North Carolina. After a descent on the eastern shore of Virginia [January, 1776], to whose aid marched two companies of Maryland minute men, being re-enforced by the arrival of a British frigate, Dunmore bombarded Norfolk. A party landed and set it on fire. . . . The part which escaped was presently burned by the provincials, to prevent it from becoming a shelter to the enemy. Thus perished, a prey to civil war, the largest and richest of the rising towns of Virginia. Dunmore continued, during the whole summer, a predatory warfare along the rivers, of which his naval superiority gave him the command, burning houses and plundering plantations, from which he carried off upward of 1,000 slaves. He was constantly changing his place to elude attack; but watched, pursued, and harassed, he finally found it necessary to retire to St. Augustine with his adherents and his plunder."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 32 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: C. Campbell, *Introd. to Hist. of Va.*, ch. 33.

A. D. 1775-1784.—The exercise of sovereignty over Kentucky. See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1775-1784.

A. D. 1776.—Independence declared and a Constitution adopted.—Declaration of Rights.—"There was a sudden change in public sentiment; and the idea of independence, said to be alarming to Virginians in March [1776] was welcome to them in April. One writes on the 2d: 'Independence is now the talk here. . . . It will be very soon, if not already, a favorite child.' Another, on the 12th, writes: 'I think almost every man, except the treasurer, is willing to declare for independence.'" On the 23d, the Charlotte County Committee charged its delegates in convention to use their best endeavors "that the delegates which are sent to the General Congress be instructed immediately to cast off the British yoke." On the next day, a majority of the freeholders of James City took similar action. "In May, the avowals for independence were numerous. In this spirit and with such aims, a new convention was chosen, and on the 6th of May met in Williamsburg. It contained illustrious men,—among them, James Madison, in the twenty-fifth year of his age; George Mason, in the maturity of his great powers; Richard Bland, Edmund Pendleton, and Patrick Henry, rich in Revolutionary fame. . . . On the 14th of May the convention went into a committee of the whole on the state of the colony, with Archibald Carey in the chair; when Colonel Nelson submitted a preamble and resolutions on

Independence, prepared by Pendleton. These were discussed in two sittings of the committee, and then reported to the House. They were opposed chiefly by delegates from the Eastern District, but were advocated by Patrick Henry, and passed unanimously when 112 members were present,—about 20 absenting themselves. This paper enumerated the wrongs done to the colonies . . . and instructed the delegates appointed to represent the colony in the General Congress 'to propose to that respectable body to declare the United Colonies free and independent States,' and to 'give the assent of the colony to measures to form foreign alliances and a confederation,—provided the power of forming government for the internal regulations of each colony be left to the colonial legislatures.' The same paper also provided for a committee to form a plan of government for Virginia. This action was transmitted by the President to the other assemblies, accompanied by a brief circular. . . . It was hailed by the patriots in other colonies with enthusiasm. . . . The convention agreed (June 12) upon the famous Declaration of Rights declaring all men equally free and independent, all power vested in and derived from the people, and that government ought to be for the common benefit; also that all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience. It also complied with the recommendation of Congress, by forming a constitution and electing a governor and other officers."—R. Frothingham, *The Rise of the Republic*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: H. B. Grigsby, *The Virginia Const. of 1776*.—W. C. Rives, *Life and Times of Madison*, v. 1, ch. 5.—K. M. Rowland, *Life of Geo. Mason*, v. 1, ch. 7.—See, also, UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776-1779.

The following is the text of the Declaration of Rights:

"A Declaration of Rights, made by the Representatives of the good People of Virginia, assembled in full and free Convention, which rights do pertain to them and their posterity as the basis and foundation of government. I. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. II. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them. III. That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that, when a government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal. IV. That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in con-



sideration of public services, which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge to be hereditary. V. That the legislative, executive and judicial powers should be separate and distinct; and that the members thereof may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burthens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain and regular elections, in which all, or any part of the former members to be again eligible or ineligible, as the laws shall direct. VI. That all elections ought to be free, and that all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed, or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented, for the public good. VII. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised. VIII. That in all capital or criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers. IX. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. X. That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted. XI. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury of twelve men is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. XII. That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments. XIII. That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State; that standing armies in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. XIV. That the people have a right to uniform government; and therefore, that no government separate from or independent of the government of Virginia, ought to be erected or established within the limits thereof. XV. That no free government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. XVI. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of

discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other.

A. D. 1776-1779.—The war in the north.—The Articles of Confederation.—Alliance with France. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776, to 1779.

A. D. 1776-1808.—Antislavery opinion and the causes of its disappearance. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1776-1808.

A. D. 1778.—Suppression of the Transylvania Company in Kentucky. See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1765-1778.

A. D. 1778-1779.—Clark's conquest of the Northwest and its organization under the jurisdiction of Virginia. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778-1779 CLARK'S CONQUEST.

A. D. 1779.—British coast raids, at Norfolk and elsewhere. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778-1779 WASHINGTON GUARDING THE HUDSON.

A. D. 1779-1786.—Settlement of boundaries with Pennsylvania.—The Pan-handle.—“In 1779 commissioners appointed by the two States met at Baltimore to agree upon the common boundaries of Pennsylvania and Virginia. . . . On both sides there was an evident desire to end the dispute. Various lines were proposed and rejected. On August 31 the commissioners signed this agreement: ‘To extend Mason and Dixon’s line due west five degrees of longitude, to be computed from the River Delaware, for the southern boundary of Pennsylvania, and that a meridian line drawn from the western extremity thereof to the northern limit of the said State be the western boundary of Pennsylvania forever.’ This contract was duly ratified by the legislatures of the two States. In 1785 Mason and Dixon’s line was extended, and the southwestern corner of Pennsylvania established. The ‘Pan-handle’ is what was left of Virginia east of the Ohio River and north of Mason and Dixon’s line, after the boundary was run from this point to Lake Erie in 1786. . . . It received its name in legislative debate from Hon. John McMillan, delegate from Brooke County, to match the Accomac projection, which he dubbed the Spoon-handle.”—B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest*, p. 109 and foot-note.

A. D. 1780-1783.—The war in the South.—Arnold’s ravages.—Lafayette’s campaign.—Surrender of Cornwallis.—Peace with Great Britain. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1780, to 1783.

A. D. 1784.—Cession of Western territorial claims to the United States. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1781-1786.

A. D. 1787-1788.—The formation and adoption of the Federal Constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787; and 1787-1789.

A. D. 1791-1792.—Separation of Kentucky and its admission to the Union as a State. See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1789-1792.

A. D. 1798.—The Nullifying Resolutions of Madison. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1798.

A. D. 1808.—The Embargo and its effects. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1804-1809; and 1808.

**A. D. 1813.**—The coasts raided by British naval parties. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812-1813 INDIFFERENCE TO THE NAVY.

**A. D. 1831.**—The Nat Turner insurrection of Slaves. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1828-1832.

**A. D. 1859.**—John Brown's invasion at Harper's Ferry. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1859.

**A. D. 1861 (January—June).**—Attempted peace-making.—The State carried into rebellion.—Separation of West Virginia, which adheres to the Union.—“Early in January, 1861, the Virginia Assembly met at Richmond to determine the action of the Commonwealth in the approaching struggle. It was plain that war was coming unless the authorities of the United States and of the seceding States would listen to reason; and the first proceedings of the Assembly looked to peace and the restoration of fraternal union. Virginia recommended to all the States to appoint deputies to a Peace Convention [see UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY) THE PEACE CONVENTION]. . . . Thus ended in failure the first attempt of Virginia to preserve the national peace; and the crisis demanded that she should promptly decide upon her course. On February 13 (1861) a Convention assembled at Richmond, and a Committee was appointed on Federal Relations. On March 10 (1861), this Committee reported fourteen resolutions protesting against all interference with slavery; declaring secession to be a right; and defining the grounds on which the Commonwealth would feel herself to be justified in exercising that right, namely: the failure to obtain guarantees; the adoption of a warlike policy by the Government of the United States; or the attempt to exact the payment of duties from the seceded States, or to reënforce or recapture the Southern forts. These resolves clearly define the attitude of Virginia at this critical moment. After prolonged discussion, all but the last had passed the Convention when intelligence came that war had begun. The thunder of cannon from Charleston harbor broke up the political discussion. . . . Mr. Lincoln had expressed himself in his inaugural with perfect plainness. Secession was unlawful, and the Union remained unbroken; it was his duty to execute the laws, and he should perform it. To execute the laws it was necessary to have an army; and (April 15, 1861) President Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 troops from the States remaining in the Union. The direct issue was thus presented, and Virginia was called upon to decide the momentous question whether she would fight against the South or against the North. . . . As late as the first week in April the Convention had refused to secede by a vote of 89 to 45. Virginia was conscientiously following her old traditions and would not move. Now the time had come at last. . . . On the 17th of April, two days after the Federal proclamation, the Convention passed an ordinance of secession and adhesion to the Southern Confederacy, by a vote of 88 to 55, which was ratified by the people by a majority of 96,750 votes, out of a total of 161,018. West Virginia refused to be bound by the action of the Convention, and became a separate State, but the Virginia of the Tidewater and Valley went with the South.”—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*,

*pt. 3, ch. 22.*—“Of the 46 delegates from the territory now comprising West Virginia, 29 voted against [the ordinance of secession], 9 for it, 7 were absent and one excused. Those who voted against it hastened to leave the city,” and, on reaching their homes, became generally the leaders of a movement to separate their section of the State from the Old Dominion. On the 13th of May a convention of delegates from the counties of Northwestern Virginia was held at Wheeling, by the action of which a more general convention was called and held at the same place on the 11th day of June. The latter convention assumed the power to reorganize the government of the State of Virginia.—V. A. Lewis, *Hist. of West Virginia*, ch. 21-23.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 3, ch. 25, and v. 4, ch. 19.

**A. D. 1861 (April).**—Governor Letcher's reply to President Lincoln's call for troops. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL).

**A. D. 1861 (April).**—Seizure of Harper's Ferry and Norfolk Navy Yard. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL). ACTIVITY OF REBELLION.

**A. D. 1861 (June—November).**—The loyal State government organized in West Virginia.—Steps taken toward separation from the old State.—A Convention held on the 11th of June in West Virginia declared the State offices of Virginia vacant by reason of the treason of those who had been elected to hold them, and proceeded to form a regular State organization, with Francis H. Pierpont for the executive head. Maintaining that the loyal people were entitled to speak for the whole State they declared that their government was the government of Virginia. They subsequently admitted delegates from Alexandria and Fairfax Counties in Middle Virginia and from Accomac and Northampton Counties on the eastern shore. Thus organized, the government was acknowledged by Congress as the government of Virginia and senators and representatives were admitted to seats. The Pierpont Government, as it was called, then adopted an ordinance on the 20th of August, 1861, providing “for the formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of this State.” The ordinance was approved by a vote of the people, and on the 26th of November the Convention assembled in Wheeling to frame a constitution for the new government.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 21.

**A. D. 1861 (July).**—Richmond made the capital of the Southern Confederacy.—“The Conspiracy had no intention originally of establishing its seat of government at Richmond. That was a part of the price exacted by Virginia for her secession, and it was not paid without reluctance. It is to be remembered that at that time every thing seemed to turn on what the Border States would do. . . . By establishing the seat of government at Richmond, it became certain that the most powerful of the Southern armies would always be present in Virginia. If Virginia had been abandoned, all the Border States would have gone with the North. . . . The Confederates having determined on the transfer of their seat of government to Richmond, the necessary preparations were completed, and their Congress opened its first session in that city on the 20th of July, 1861.”—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the Am. Civil War*, ch. 39 (v. 2).



**A. D. 1861-1865.**—The Battleground of the Civil War. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (MAY: VIRGINIA), and after.

**A. D. 1862 (April–November).**—The separation of West Virginia consummated. See WEST VIRGINIA: A. D. 1862 (APRIL–DECEMBER).

**A. D. 1865.**—The last meeting of the Secession Legislature.—President Lincoln's

**VIRGINIA, University of.**—"In 1816 the Legislature of Virginia authorized the president and directors of the Literary Fund to report a plan for a university at the next session of the Assembly. The committee made a full report as requested, but nothing was accomplished beyond bringing the subject of education prominently before the people. At the legislative session of 1817-18 that part of the bill relating to a university and the education of the poor was passed. . . . In the bill authorizing the establishment of the university, it was provided that the sum of \$45,000 per annum should be given for the education of the poor, and \$15,000 to the university. The commissioners having reported in favor of Central College as the most convenient place in Albemarle County, the Legislature decided, after much discussion, to locate the university at Charlottesville, and to assume the property and site of Central College. The commissioners embodied in their report an exhaustive plan for a university, chiefly from the pen of Thomas Jefferson."—F. W. Blackmar, *Bureau of Ed., Circ. of Information*, 1890, no. 1, pp. 174-175.

ALSO IN: H. B. Adams, *Thomas Jefferson and the University of Virginia* (Bureau of Ed., Circ. of Inf., 1888, no. 1).

**VIRGINIA, West.** See WEST VIRGINIA.

**VIRINIUS, Affair of the.** See CUBA: A. D. 1865-1895.

**VISAYAS, The.** See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

**VISCONTI, The House of the.** See MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447.

**VISIGOTHS.** See GOTHS.

**VITALIAN, Pope, A. D. 657-672.**

**VITELLIAN CIVIL WAR.** See ROME: A. D. 69.

**VITELLIUS, Roman Emperor, A. D. 69.**  
**VITEPSK, Battle of.** See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (JUNE–SEPTEMBER).

**VITTORIA, Battle of (1813).** See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.

**VIZIR, OR VIZIER.**—"Like the Sassanian emperors, the Caliph was not only the divinely appointed ruler, but the embodiment of the government itself. His word was literally law, and his caprice might at any moment overturn the most careful calculations of the ministers, or deprive them of life, power, or liberty, during the performance of their most active duties, or at a most critical juncture. It was very seldom, however, that this awful personage condescended to trouble himself about the actual details of the executive government. The Vizier, as the word implies [Vizier, in Arabic Wazir, means 'One who bears a burden,'—Foot-note], was the one who bore the real burden of the State, and it was both his interest and that of the people at large to keep the Caliph himself as inactive as possible, and to reduce him, in fact, to the position of a mere puppet."—E. H. Palmer, *Haroun Al-raschid, Caliph of Bagdad*, ch. 1.—See, also, **SUBLIME PORTE.**

**Permit.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (APRIL: VIRGINIA).

**A. D. 1865.**—Recognition of the Pierpont State Government by President Johnson. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (MAY–JULY).

**A. D. 1865-1870.**—Reconstruction. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (MAY–JULY), to 1868-1870.

**VLADIMIR I. (called The Great) Duke of Kiev, A. D. 981-1015. . . . VLADIMIR II., Duke of Kiev, 1113-1126.**

**VOCATES, The.** See AQUITAINE: THE ANCIENT TRIBES.

**VOCLAD, OR VOUGLÉ, Battle of.** See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 507-509.

**VOCONIAN LAW.**—The object of the Viconian Law, passed at Rome about 169 B. C. under the auspices of Cato the censor, "was to limit the social influence of women, by forbidding rich citizens to make them heiresses of more than one half of their whole estate."—W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 6, ch. 12 (v. 4).

**VODIÆ, The.** See IRELAND: TRIBES.

**VOIVODES, OR WOIVODES.** See POLAND: A. D. 1578-1652; also BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1341-1356 (SERVIA).

**VOLAPUK.** A proposed universal language, invented in 1879 by a Swabian pastor, named Schleyer.

**VOLATERRÆ, Siege of.**—Some remnants of the armies defeated by Sulla, in the civil war, took refuge in the Etruscan town of Volaterræ, and only capitulated after a siege of two years.—W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 7, ch. 19 (v. 5).

**VOLCÆ, The.**—"When the Romans entered the south of France, two tribes occupied the country west of the Rhone as far at least as Tolosa (Toulouse) on the Garonne. The eastern people, named the Volcae Arecomici, possessed the part between the Cebenna or Cevenna range (Cévennes), the Rhone, and the Mediterranean, and according to Strabo extended to Narbonne. The chief town of these Volcae was Nemausus (Nîmes). The Volcae Tectosages had the upper basin of the Garonne: their chief town was Tolosa."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 1, ch. 21.

**VOLSCIAN WARS OF ROME.** See ROME: B. C. 489-450.

**VOLSCIANS, The.** See OSCANS; also ITALY, ANCIENT; and LATIUM.

**VOLTA, Battle of (1848).** See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

**VOLTA, The electrical discoveries of.** See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: A. D. 1786-1800.

**VOLTURNO, Battle of the (1860).** See ITALY: A. D. 1859-1861.

**VOLUNTII, The.** See BRITAIN, CELTIC TRIBES; also, IRELAND: TRIBES OF EARLY CELTIC INHABITANTS.

**VROEDSCHAP, The.** See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1584-1585.—LIMITS OF THE UNITED PROVINCES.

**VULCANAL AT ROME, The.**—"The Vulcanal, or, as it is called by Livy, the Area Vulcani, must have been close to the Senaculum [early meeting place of the Senate], on the slope of the Capitol. It seems to have been originally an open space of some extent, used for public meetings, especially those of the Comitia Tributa, and dedicated to Vulcan. Sacrifices of small

fish were offered to Vulcan here, and a temple dedicated to that god stood also here in the earliest times, but it was afterwards, on the enlargement of the pomerium beyond the Palatine, removed for religious reasons to the Circus

Flaminius, and the Vulcanal became simply a consecrated area."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 6, pt. 1.—C. I. Hemans, *Historic and Monumental Rome*, p. 209.

**VULGAR ERA.** See ERA, CHRISTIAN.

## W.

**WAARTGELDERS.** See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1603–1619.

**WABASH RIVER:** Called the River St. Jerome by the French (1712). See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1698–1712.

**WABENAKIES, OR ABNAKIS.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ABNAKIS.

**WACOS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAWNEE (CADDON) FAMILY.

**WAGER OF BATTLE.—TRIAL BY COMBAT.—JUDICIAL COMBAT.**—"Trial by combat does not seem to have established itself completely in France till ordeals went into disuse, which Charlemagne rather encouraged, and which, in his age, the clergy for the most part approved. The former species of decision may, however, be met with under the first Merovingian kings (Greg. Turon, l. vii. c. 19, l. x. c. 10), and seems to have prevailed in Burgundy. It is established by the laws of the Alemanni or Suabians. Baluz. t. i. p. 80. It was always popular in Lombardy. . . . Otho II. established it in all disputes concerning real property. . . . God, as they deemed, was the judge. The nobleman fought on horseback, with all his arms of attack and defence; the plebeian on foot, with his club and target. The same were the weapons of the champions to whom women and ecclesiastics were permitted to intrust their rights. If the combat was intended to ascertain a civil right, the vanquished party, of course, forfeited his claim and paid a fine. If he fought by proxy, the champion was liable to have his hand struck off; a regulation necessary, perhaps, to obviate the corruption of these hired defenders. In criminal cases the appellant suffered, in the event of defeat, the same punishment which the law awarded to the offence of which he accused his adversary. Even where the cause was more peaceably tried, and brought to a regular adjudication by the court, an appeal for false judgment might indeed be made to the suzerain, but it could only be tried by battle. And in this, the appellant, if he would impeach the concurrent judgment of the court below, was compelled to meet in combat every one of its members; unless he should vanquish them all within the day, his life, if he escaped from so many hazards, was forfeited to the law. If fortune or miracle should make him conqueror in every contest, the judges were equally subject to death, and their court forfeited their jurisdiction for ever. . . . Such was the judicial system of France when St. Louis [A. D. 1226–1270] enacted that great code which bears the name of his Establishments. The rules of civil and criminal procedure, as well as the principles of legal decisions, are there laid down with much detail. But that incomparable prince, unable to overthrow the judicial combat, confined himself to discourage it by the example of a wiser jurisprudence. It was abolished throughout the royal domains." Trial by combat "was never abolished by any positive law, either in France

[at large] or England. But instances of its occurrence are not frequent even in the fourteenth century."—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 2, pt. 2 (v. 1).—"Nor was the wager of battle confined to races of Celtic or Teutonic origin. The Slavonic tribes, as they successively emerge into the light of history, show the same tendency to refer doubtful points of civil and criminal law to the arbitration of the sword. The earliest records of Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Servia, Silesia, Moravia, Pomerania, Lithuania, and Russia, present evidences of the prevalence of the system." The last recorded instance of the wager of battle in France was in 1549. "In England, the resolute conservatism, which resists innovation to the last, prolonged the existence of the wager of battle until a period unknown in other civilized nations. . . . It was not until the time of Elizabeth that it was even abolished in civil cases. . . . Even in the 17th century, instances of the battle ordeal between persons of high station are on record." As late as 1818 the right was claimed and conceded by the judges, in a criminal case which caused much excitement. "The next year the act 59 Geo. III. chap. 46, at length put an end for ever to this last remnant of the age of chivalry."—H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, ch. 2.—See, also, LAW, CRIMINAL: A. D. 1818.

**WAGER OF LAW.**—"This was the remarkable custom which was subsequently known as canonical compurgation, and which long remained a part of English jurisprudence, under the name of the Wager of Law. The defendant, when denying the allegation under oath, appeared surrounded by a number of companions—'juratores,' 'conjuratores,' 'sacramentales,' 'collaudantes,' 'compurgatores,' as they were variously termed—who swore, not to their knowledge of the facts, but as sharers and partakers in the oath of denial. This curious form of procedure derives importance from the fact that it is an expression of the character, not of an isolated sept, but of nearly all the races that have moulded the destinies of Europe. The Ostrogoths in Italy, and the Wisigoths of the South of France and Spain were the only nations in whose codes it occupies no place, and they, . . . at an early period, yielded themselves completely to the influence of the Roman civilization. . . . The church, with the tact which distinguished her dealings with her new converts, was not long in adopting a system which was admirably suited for her defence in an age of brute force."—H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, ch. 1.—On the abolition of the Wager of Law, see LAW, COMMON: A. D. 1833.

**WAGNER, Fort,** The assault on, the siege, and the final reduction of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (JULY: SOUTH CAROLINA), and (AUGUST–DECEMBER: SOUTH CAROLINA).

**WAGRAM, Battle of.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY–SEPTEMBER).



**WAHABEES, The.** "The Wahabees derive their name from Abdul Wahab, the father of Sheikh Muhammad, their founder, who arose about the beginning of the last century, in the province of Najd, in Arabia. The object of the Wahabee movement was to sweep away all later innovations, and to return to the original purity of Islam, as based upon the exact teaching of the Koran and the example of Mahomet. The principles of the sect rapidly spread among the Arab tribes, and were adopted by the sovereign princes of Darayeh, in Najd. Impelled by religious zeal and political ambition, and allured by the prospect of plunder, the Wahabees soon acquired nearly the whole of Arabia, and menaced the neighbouring Pashaliks of Turkey and Egypt. Mecca and Medina soon fell into their hands, the shrine was despoiled of its rich ornaments, and the pilgrim route to the Kaaba closed for some years. Early in this century (1811), Muhammad Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, at the bidding of the Sultan, set himself to check the progress of this aggressive sect; and his son Ibrahim Pasha completed the work (1818). . . . The following particulars of the Wahabee reform need only be added. They reject the decisions of the 'four orthodox doctors,' and the intercessions of saints; they condemn the excessive reverence paid to Mahomet, and deny his mediation, until the last day. They also disapprove of the ornamenting of tombs, &c."—J. W. H. Stobart, *Islam and its Founder*, ch. 10, *with foot-note*.

ALSO IN: W. C. Taylor, *Hist. of Mohammedanism and its Sects*, ch. 11.—T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, p. 103.

**WAHLSTADT, Battle of (1241).** See MONGOLS: A. D. 1229–1294; and LIEGNITZ, THE BATTLE OF.

**WAHPETONS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIÖUAN FAMILY.

**WAILATPUAN FAMILY, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: WAILATPUAN FAMILY.

**WAIKAS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIÉS and their KINDRED.

**WAITANGI, Treaty of.** See NEW ZEALAND: A. D. 1642–1856.

**WAITZEN, Battles of (1849).** See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848–1849.

**WAIWODES, OR WOIWODES, OR VOIVODES.** See POLAND: A. D. 1578–1652; and BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1341–1356 (SERVIA).

**WAKASHAN FAMILY, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: WAKASHAN FAMILY.

**WAKEFIELD, Battle of (1460).**—Queen Margaret, rallying the loyal Lancastrians of the north of England, met her enemy, the Duke of York, and the enemies of her party, on Wakefield Green, December 30, 1460, and defeated them with great slaughter, the Duke of York being found among the slain. But her fruitless victory was soon reversed by young Edward, Earl of March, eldest son of the deceased Duke of York, who deposed King Henry VI. and planted himself on the throne, before the same winter had passed.—See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455–1471.

**WAKEFIELD SYSTEM, The.** See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1800–1840.

**WALCHEREN EXPEDITION, The.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1809 (JULY–DECEMBER).

**WALDEMAR.** See VALDEMAR.

**WALDENSES, OR VAUDOIS, The.—**

"Let me at the outset express my conviction that the whole attempt to ascribe to the Waldenses an earlier date than the latter half of the 12th century, to throw back their origin some two hundred years, or sometimes much more than this, even to the times of Claudius of Turin (d. 839), is one which will not stand the test of historical criticism; while the endeavour to vindicate for them this remote antiquity has introduced infinite confusion into their whole history. The date of Waldo, who, as I cannot doubt, is rightly recognized as their founder, we certainly know. When it is sought to get rid of their relation to him as embodied in the very name which they bear, and to change this name into Vallenses, the Men of the Valleys or the Dalesmen, it is a transformation which has no likelihood, philological or historic, to recommend it. . . . Peter Waldo,—for we will not withhold from him this Christian name, although there is no authority for it anterior to the beginning of the 15th century,—was a rich citizen and merchant of Lyons [in the later half of the 12th century]. Not satisfied with those scanty portions of Scripture doled out to the laity in divine services, and yearning above all for a larger knowledge of the Gospels, he obtained from two friends among the priesthood a copy of these last and of some other portions of Scripture translated into the Romance language; a collection also of sayings from the Fathers. The whole movement remained to the end true to this its first motive—the desire namely for a fuller acquaintance with the Word of God. That Word he now resolved to make the rule of his life. . . . He . . . , as a first step, sells all that he has, and bestows it upon the poor. In the name which he adopts for himself and for the companions whom he presently associates with him, the same fact of a voluntary poverty, as that which above all they should embody in their lives, speaks out. On this side of the Alps they are Poor Men of Lyons; on the Italian, Poor Men of Lombardy. . . . And now he and his began to preach in the streets of Lyons, to find their way into houses, to itinerate the country round. Waldo had no intention herein of putting himself in opposition to the Church, of being a Reformer in any other sense than St. Francis or St. Bernard was a Reformer, a quickener, that is, and reviver of the Church's spiritual life. His protest was against practical mischiefs, against negligences and omissions on the part of those who should have taught the people, and did not. Doctrinal protest at this time there was none. But for Rome all forms of religious earnestness were suspicious which did not spring directly from herself. . . . In 1178 the Archbishop of Lyons forbade their preaching or expounding any more. Such as did not submit had no choice but to quit Lyons, and betake themselves elsewhere. And thus it came to pass that not the city, already so illustrious in ecclesiastical story, where Irenæus taught and Blandina suffered, . . . but the Alpine mountains must shelter these outcasts, and in turn be made famous by their presence." In 1209, Pope Innocent III. made an attempt to absorb Waldo's society in an "Order of Poor Catholics," which he instituted. "Failing this, he repeated, a few years later, at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), the Church's sentence against the Waldenses, including them under a common ban with the

Cathari and the whole rabble rout of Manichæans and others with whom they have so often since been confounded. . . . Enemies have sought to confound, that so there might be imputed to the Waldenses any evil which had been brought home to the Albigenses. . . . Friends have sought to identify them out of the wish to recruit the scanty number of witnesses for Scriptural and Apostolical truth in the dark ages of the Church; as certainly it would prove no small numerical addition if the Albigenses might be counted among these." It seems to be certain that the Waldenses were not spared by the crusaders who exterminated the Albigenses of southern France between 1209 and 1229. They fled before that storm into the recesses of the Alps. "But they were numerous in North Italy as well; and far more widely scattered over the whole of central Europe than their present dwelling place and numbers would at all suggest. They had congregations in Florence, in Genoa, in Venice, above all in Milan; there were Waldensian communities as far south as Calabria; they were not unknown in Arragon; still less in Switzerland; at a later day they found their way to Bohemia, and joined hands with the Hussites there."—R. C. Trench, *Lect's on Mediæval Church Hist.*, lect 17.—"The valleys which the Vaudois have raised into celebrity lie to the west of Piemont, between the province of Pignerol and Briançon, and adjoining on the other side to the ancient Marquisate of Susa, and that of the Saluces. The capital, La Tour, being about 36 miles from Turin, and 14 from Pignerol. The extent of the valleys is about 12 Italian miles, making a square of about 24 French leagues. The valleys are three in number, Luzern, Perouse, and St. Martin. The former (in which the chief town is now Catholic) is the most beautiful and extensive."—J. Bresse, *Hist. of the Vaudois*, pt. 1, ch. 1.—The Waldenses are sometimes confused, mistakenly, with the Albigenses, who belonged to an earlier time.—See ALBIGENSES.

ALSO IN: A. Muston, *The Israel of the Alps*.—E. Comba, *Hist. of the Waldenses of Italy*.

A. D. 1526-1561.—Identification with the Calvinists.—Persecuting war of the Duke of Savoy.—The tolerant treaty of Cavour. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: A. D. 1559-1580.

A. D. 1546.—Massacre of the remnant in Provence and Venaissin. See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.

A. D. 1655.—The second Persecution and Massacre.—Cromwell's intervention.—"They [the Vaudois, or Waldenses] had experienced persecutions through their whole history, and especially after the Reformation; but, on the whole, the two last Dukes of Savoy, and also Christine, daughter of Henry IV. of France, and Duchess-Regent through the minority of her son, the present Duke, had protected them in their privileges, even while extirpating Protestantism in the rest of the Piedmontese dominions. Latterly, however, there had been a passion at Turin and at Rome for their conversion to the Catholic faith, and priests had been traversing their valleys for the purpose. The murder of one such priest, and some open insults to the Catholic worship, about Christmas 1654, are said to have occasioned what followed. On the 25th of January, 1654-5, an edict was issued, under the authority of the Duke of Savoy, 'commanding and enjoining every head of a family, with

its members, of the pretended Reformed Religion, of what rank, degree, or condition soever, none excepted, inhabiting and possessing estates in the places of Luserna . . . &c, within three days, to withdraw and depart, and be, with their families, withdrawn out of the said places, and transported into the places and limits marked out for toleration by his Royal Highness during his good pleasure,' . . . unless they gave evidence within 20 days of having become Catholics. Furthermore it was commanded that in every one even of the tolerated places there should be regular celebration of the Holy Mass, and that there should be no interference therewith, nor any dissuasion of any one from turning a Catholic, also on pain of death. All the places named are in the Valley of Luserna, and the object was a wholesale shifting of the Protestants of that valley out of nine of its communes and their concentration into five higher up. In vain were there remonstrances at Turin from those immediately concerned. On the 17th of April, 1655, the Marquis di Pianezza, entered the doomed region with a body of troops mainly Piedmontese, but with French and Irish among them. There was resistance, fighting, burning, pillaging, flight to the mountains, and chasing and murdering for eight days, Saturday, April 24, being the climax. The names of about 300 of those murdered individually are on record, with the ways of the deaths of many of them. Women were ripped open, or carried about impaled on spikes; men, women, and children, were flung from precipices, hacked, tortured, roasted alive; the heads of some of the dead were boiled and the brains eaten; there are forty printed pages, and twenty-six ghastly engravings, by way of Protestant tradition of the ascertained variety of the devilry. The massacre was chiefly in the Valley of Luserna, but extended also into the other two valleys. The fugitives were huddled in crowds high among the mountains, moaning and starving; and not a few, women and infants especially, perished amid the snows. . . . There was a shudder of abhorrence through Protestant Europe, but no one was so much roused as Cromwell. . . . On Thursday the 17th of May, and for many days more, the business of the Savoy Protestants was the chief occupation of the Council. Letters, all in Milton's Latin, but signed by the Lord Protector in his own name, were despatched (May 25) to the Duke of Savoy himself, to the French King, to the States General of the United Provinces, to the Protestant Swiss Cantons, to the King of Sweden, to the King of Denmark, and to Ragotski, Prince of Transylvania. A day of humiliation was appointed for the Cities of London and Westminster, and another for all England." A collection of money for the sufferers was made, which amounted, in England and Wales, to £38,000—equal to about £137,000 now. Cromwell's personal contribution was £2,000—equivalent to £7,500 in money of the present day. The Protector despatched a special envoy to the court of Turin, who addressed very plain and bold words to the Duke. Meanwhile Blake with his fleet was in the Mediterranean, and there were inquiries made as to the best place for landing troops to invade the Duke's dominions. "All which being known to Mazarin, that wily statesman saw that no time was to be lost. While Mr. Downing [second



commissioner sent by Cromwell] was still only on his way to Geneva through France, Mazarin had instructed M. Servien, the French minister at Turin, to insist, in the French King's name, on an immediate settlement of the Vaudois business. The result was a 'Patente di Gratia e Perdono,' or 'Patent of Grace and Pardon,' granted by Charles Emanuel to the Vaudois Protestants, Aug. 19, in terms of a Treaty at Pignerol, in which the French Minister appeared as the real mediating party and certain Envoys from the Swiss Cantons as more or less assenting. As the Patent substantially retracted the Persecuting Edict and restored the Vaudois to all their former privileges, nothing more was to be done." These events in Piedmont drew from Milton his immortal sonnet, beginning: "Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints."—D. Masson, *Life of John Milton*, v. 5, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 2.

ALSO IN: J. B. Perkins, *France under Mazarin*, ch. 16 (v. 2).—A. Muston, *The Israel of the Alps*, v. 1, pt. 2, ch. 6-9.

A. D. 1691.—Toleration obtained by William of Orange.—"In the spring of 1691, the Waldensian shepherds, long and cruelly persecuted, and weary of their lives, were surprised by glad tidings. Those who had been in prison for heresy returned to their homes. Children, who had been taken from their parents to be educated by priests, were sent back. Congregations, which had hitherto met only by stealth and with extreme peril, now worshipped God without molestation in the face of day. Those simple mountaineers probably never knew that their fate had been a subject of discussion at the Hague, and that they owed the happiness of their firesides and the security of their humble temples to the ascendancy which William [of Orange] exercised over the Duke of Savoy," who had lately joined the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. of France.—Lord Macaulay, *Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 17.

**WALDSHUT: Capture by Duke Bernhard (1637).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

**WALES: Origin of the name.** See WELSH. Ancient tribes. See BRITAIN, CELTIC TRIBES. 6th Century.—The British states embraced in it. See BRITAIN: 6TH CENTURY.

A. D. 1066-1135.—The Norman Conquest. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1087-1135.

A. D. 1282-1284.—The final conquest.—"All the other races had combined on the soil of Britain, the Welsh would not. The demands of feudal homage made by the kings of England were evaded or repudiated; the intermarriages by which Henry II. and John had tried to help on a national agreement had in every case failed. In every internal difficulty of English politics the Welsh princes had done their best to embarrass the action of the kings; they had intrigued with every aspirant for power, had been in league with every rebel. . . . The necessity of guarding the Welsh border had caused the English kings to found on the March a number of feudal lordships, which were privileged to exercise almost sovereign jurisdictions, and exempted from the common operation of the English law. The Mortimers at Chirk and Wigmore, the Bohuns at Hereford and Brecon, the Marshalls at Pembroke, and the Clares in Glamor-

gan, were out of the reach of the King, and often turned against one another the arms which had been given them to overawe the Welsh. . . . So long as the Welsh were left free to rebel the Marchers must be left free to fight. . . . Llewelyn, the prince of North Wales, had, by the assistance given to Simon de Montfort, earned as his reward a recognition of his independence, subject only to the ancient feudal obligations. All the advantages won during the early years of Henry III. had been thus surrendered. When the tide turned Llewelyn had done homage to Henry; but when he was invited, in 1273, to perform the usual service to the new king, he refused; and again, in 1274 and 1275, he evaded the royal summons. In 1276, under the joint pressure of excommunication and a great army which Edward brought against him, he made a formal submission; performed the homage, and received, as a pledge of amity, the hand of Eleanor de Montfort in marriage. But Eleanor, although she was Edward's cousin, was Earl Simon's daughter, and scarcely qualified to be a peacemaker. Another adviser of rebellion was found in Llewelyn's brother David, who had hitherto taken part with the English, and had received special favours and promotion from Edward himself. . . . The peace made in 1277 lasted about four years. In 1282 the brothers rose, seized the border castles of Hawarden, Flint, and Rhuddlan, and captured the Justiciar of Wales, Roger Clifford. Edward saw then that his time was come. He marched into North Wales, carrying with him the courts of law and the exchequer, and transferring the seat of government for the time to Shrewsbury. He left nothing undone that might give the expedition the character of a national effort. He collected forces on all sides; he assembled the estates of the realm, clergy, lords, and commons, and prevailed on them to furnish liberal supplies; he obtained sentence of excommunication from the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Welsh made a brave defence, and, had it not been for the almost accidental capture and murder of Llewelyn in December, England might have found the task too hard for her. The death of Llewelyn, however, and the capture of David in the following June, deprived the Welsh of their leaders, and they submitted. Edward began forthwith his work of consolidation. . . . In 1284 he published at Rhuddlan a statute, called the Statute of Wales, which was intended to introduce the laws and customs of England, and to reform the administration of that country altogether on the English system. The process was a slow one; the Welsh retained their ancient common law and their national spirit; the administrative powers were weak and not far-reaching; the sway of the lords Marchers was suffered to continue; and, although assimilated, Wales was not incorporated with England. It was not until the reign of Henry VIII. that the principality was represented in the English Parliament, and the sovereignty, which from 1300 onwards was generally although not invariably bestowed on the king's eldest son, conferred under the most favourable circumstances little more than a high-sounding title and some slight and ideal claim to the affection of a portion of the Welsh people. The task, however, which the energies of his predecessors had failed to accomplish was achieved by Edward. All Britain south

of the Tweed recognised his direct and supreme authority, and the power of the Welsh nationality was so far broken that it could never more thwart the determined and united action of England."—W. Stubbs, *The Early Plantagenets*, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: D. Hume, *Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 13.—J. Lingard, *Hist. of Eng.*, v. 3, ch. 3.—C. Knight, *Popular Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 25.—C. H. Pearson, *Hist. of Eng. during the Early and Middle Ages*.

**A. D. 1402-1413.**—**Owen Glendower's Rebellion.**—"Since the day when it was conquered by Edward I. Wales had given the kings of England very little trouble. The Welsh remained loyal to the son and grandson of their conqueror, and were the most devoted friends of Richard II., even when he had lost the hearts of his English subjects. But on the usurpation of Henry [IV.] their allegiance seems to have been shaken: and Owen Glendower, who was descended from Llewelyn, the last native prince of Wales, laid claim to the sovereignty of the country [A. D. 1402]. He ravaged the territory of Lord Grey of Ruthin, and took him prisoner near Snowdon; then, turning southwards, overran Herefordshire and defeated and took prisoner Sir Edmund Mortimer, uncle to that young Earl of March, who should have been heir to the crown after Richard according to the true order of descent. In this battle upwards of a thousand Englishmen were slain, and such was the fierce barbarity of the victors that even the women of Wales mutilated the dead bodies in a manner too gross to be described, and left them unburied upon the field till heavy sums were paid for their interment. It was necessary to put down this revolt of Glendower, and the King collected an army and went against him in person. It was the beginning of September; but owing, as the people thought, to magical arts and enchantments practised by the Welshman, the army suffered dreadfully from tempests of wind, rain, snow, and hail before it could reach the enemy. In one night the King's tent was blown down, and he himself would have been killed if he had not retired to rest with his armour on. Finally the enterprise had to be abandoned. . . . Glendower continued as troublesome as ever, and the King was unable from various causes to make much progress against him. At one time money could not easily be raised for the expedition. At another time, when he actually marched into the borders of Wales [A. D. 1405], his advance was again impeded by the elements. The rivers swelled to an unusual extent, and the army lost a great part of its baggage by the suddenness of the inundation. The French, too, sent assistance to Glendower, and took Carmarthen Castle. Some time afterwards [A. D. 1407] the King's son, Henry Prince of Wales, succeeded in taking the castle of Aberystwith; but very soon after Owen Glendower recovered it by stealth. In short, the Welsh succeeded in maintaining their independence of England during this whole reign, and Owen Glendower ultimately got leave to die in peace." On the accession of Henry V. (A. D. 1413), "the Welsh, who had been so troublesome to his father, admired his valour and claimed him as a true prince of Wales, remembering that he had been born at Monmouth, which place was at that time within the principality. They discovered that there was an ancient prophecy that

a prince would be born among themselves who should rule the whole realm of England; and they saw its fulfilment in King Henry V."—J. Gairdner, *The Houses of Lancaster and York*, ch. 4, sect. 3; and ch. 5, sect. 1.

ALSO IN: J. H. Wylie, *Hist. of Eng. under Henry IV.*, v. 1, ch. 14.

**WALES, Prince of.**—"When Edward I. subdued Wales, he is said to have promised the people of that country a native prince who could not speak English, and taking advantage of the fact that his queen, Eleanor, was delivered of a child at Carnarvon Castle, in North Wales, he conferred the principality upon his infant son Edward, who was yet unable to speak. By the death of his eldest brother Alphonso, Edward became heir to the throne, to which he afterwards succeeded as Edward II.; but from this time forward, the principality has been appropriated solely to the eldest sons of the kings of England, who previous to this period had only borne the title of 'Lord Prince.' In 1841, for the first time, the dukedom of Saxony was introduced among the reputed titles of the Prince of Wales. This dignity his Royal Highness derives merely in right of his own paternal descent. . . . Without any new creation, and previous to his acquiring the title of Prince of Wales, the heir-apparent of the sovereign is Duke of Cornwall, the most ancient title of its degree in England. Edward the Black Prince . . . was created the first Duke of Cornwall in 1337. . . . The dukedom merges in the Crown when there is no heir apparent, and is immediately inherited by the prince on his birth, or by the accession of his father to the throne, as the case may be. . . . The earldom of Chester is one of the titles conferred by patent, but it was formerly a principality, into which it had been erected by the 21st of Richard II. In the reign of Henry IV., however, the act of parliament by which it had been constituted was repealed, and it has ever since been granted in the same patent which confers the title of Prince of Wales. As the eldest sons of the kings of Scotland have enjoyed the titles of Duke of Rothesay, Earl of Carrick, Baron Renfrew, and Hereditary Great Steward of Scotland, those dignities are also invariably attributed to the Prince of Wales."—C. R. Dodd, *Manual of Dignities*, pt. 2.

**WALI.**—An Arabian title, given to certain governors of extensive provinces under the caliphate. It seems to have had a viceregal significance, marking the bearer of it as an immediate representative of the caliph.—T. P. Hughes, *Dict. of Islam*.

**WALID I., Caliph, A. D. 705-715.** . . . **Walid II., Caliph, 743-744.**

**WALKER, William: Filibustering in Nicaragua.** See **NICARAGUA**: A. D. 1855-1860.

**WALL IN BRITAIN, Roman.** See **ROMAN WALLS IN BRITAIN**.

**WALL OF CHINA, The Great.** See **CHINA: THE ORIGIN OF THE PEOPLE**.

**WALL OF PROBUS.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 277.

**WALLACE, William, and the Scottish struggle for independence.** See **SCOTLAND**: A. D. 1290-1305.

**WALLACHS, OR WALLACHIANS.—WALLACHIA:** The name.—This is one of the forms of a name which the ancient Germanic



peoples seem to have given to non-Germanic nations whom they associated in any wise with the Roman empire. See **WELSH**. For an account of the Wallachians of southeastern Europe, and their country, see **BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES**.

**WALLENSTEIN, Campaigns of.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1624-1626; 1627-1629; 1630; 1631-1632; and 1632-1634.

**WALLHOF, Battle of (1626).** See **SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN)**: A. D. 1611-1629.

**WALLINGFORD, Treaty of.**—A treaty concluded, A. D. 1153, between King Stephen and Matilda, who claimed the English crown as the heir of her father, Henry I. By the treaty Stephen was recognized as king and Matilda's son Henry (who became Henry II.) was made his heir.

**WALLOONS, The.**—"In Namur, Liege, and Luxembourg, the speech is what is called Walloon, the same word as Welsh, and derived from the German root 'wealth,' a foreigner. By this designation the Germans of the Flemish tongue denoted the Romano-Belgic population whose language was akin to the French, and whom a hilly and impracticable country (the forest districts of the Ardennes) had more or less protected from their own arms. Now the Walloon is a form of the Romano-Keltic so peculiar and independent that it must be of great antiquity, i. e., as old as the oldest dialect of the French, and no extension of the dialects of Lorraine, or Champagne, from which it differs materially. It is also a language which must have been formed on a Keltic basis. . . . The Walloons, then, are Romano-Keltic; whereas the Flemings are Germans, in speech and in blood."—R. G. Latham, *Ethnology of Europe*, ch. 3.—See, also, **NETHERLANDS**: A. D. 1494-1519.

**WALPOLE, The administration of.** See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1714-1721, and 1727-1741.

**WALPOLE COMPANY, The.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1765-1768.

**WALSCH, The.** See **VENEDIC**.

**WALTER, the Penniless, Crusade of.** See **CRUSADES**: A. D. 1096-1099.

**WAMPANOAGS, OR POKANOKETS, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY**; also, **NEW ENGLAND**: A. D. 1674-1675, 1675, 1676-1678.

**WAMPUM.**—"Wampum, or wompam, according to Trumbull was the name of the white beads made from stems or inner whorls of the *Pyrula Carica* or *Canaliculata* periwinkle shells so common on all the south coast of New England. When strung they were called wampum or wampom—peage or peake or peg, equivalent to 'strings of white beads,' for peage means 'strung beads.' Color was the basis of the nomenclature, as well as of the difference in value. 'Wompi' was white; 'Sacki' was black; 'Suckauhock' was the black beads made from the dark part of the poquauhock, the common quahog, *Venus*' mercenaria or round clam shell. The value of the black was generally twice that of the white. . . . The word generally used among the Dutch who led in introducing the bead currency of the Indians, Sewan or Zeewand, was more general in its application than wampum. But whatever the difficult Indian linguistic process may have been, the New England men soon settled on wampum and peage as the working names for

this currency. The shell cylinders, black or white, were about one-eighth of an inch in diameter and one-quarter long. There were shorter beads used for ornaments, but there is hardly any trace of them in the currency. . . . The Indians strung the beads on fibres of hemp or tendons taken from the flesh of their forest meat. . . . The strings of peage were embroidered on strips of deer-skin, making the 'Mâche-quocce,' a girdle or belt 'of five inches thickness,' or more, and to the value of ten pounds sterling or more, which was worn about the waist or thrown over the shoulders like a scarf. More than 10,000 beads were wrought into a single belt four inches wide. These belts were in common use like the gold and jewelry of our day. They also played the same symbolic part which survives in the crown jewels and other regalia of civilized nations. . . . Whenever the Indians made an important statement in their frequent negotiations, they presented a belt to prove it, to give force to their words. . . . It gave to the words the weight of hard physical facts and made the expression an emblem of great force and significance. The philologists call this literary office, this symbolic function of wampum, an elementary mnemonic record. The same was fulfilled by the quippus, knotted strings or quipu of the ancient Peruvians. . . . 'This belt preserves my words' was a common remark of the Iroquois Chief in council. . . . The Iroquois were a mighty nation, almost an incipient state. Their only records were in these mnemonic beads. . . . Tradition gives to the Narragansetts the honor of inventing these valued articles, valuable both for use and exchange. . . . The Long Island Indians manufactured the beads in large quantities and then were forced to pay them away in tribute to the Mohawks and the fiercer tribes of the interior. Furs were readily exchanged for these trinkets, which carried a permanent value, through the constancy of the Indian desire for them. . . . After the use of wampum was established in colonial life, contracts were made payable at will in wampum, beaver, or silver. . . . The use began in New England in 1627. It was a legal tender until 1661, and for more than three quarters of a century the wampum was current in small transactions."—W. B. Weeden, *Indian Money as a Factor in New Eng. Civilization*. See, also, **MONEY AND BANKING: 17TH CENTURY; QUIPU**; and **MASSACHUSETTS**: A. D. 1623-1629.

**WANBOROUGH, Battle of.** See **HWICCAS**.

**WANDIWASH, Battle of (1760).** See **INDIA**: A. D. 1758-1761.

**WAPANACHKIK, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY**.

**WAPENING, The.**—The mediæval armed assembly of Ghent and other Flemish towns.—J. Michelet, *Hist. of France*, bk. 12, ch. 1.

**WAPENTAKE, The.** See **HUNDRED, THE**.

**WAPISIANAS, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIBS AND THEIR KINDRED**.

**WAPPINGERS, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY**.

**WAR OF 1812, The.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1804-1809; 1808; and 1810-1812, to 1815 (JANUARY).

**WAR OF JENKINS' EAR, The.** See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1739-1741.

**WAR OF LIBERATION.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

**WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.** See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740, to 1744-1745; NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1745, and 1746-1747; ITALY: A. D. 1741-1743, to 1746-1747; AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: THE CONGRESS.

**WAR OF THE FEDERATION.** See VENEZUELA: A. D. 1829-1886.

**WAR OF THE LOVERS, The.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1578-1580.

**WAR OF THE QUEEN'S RIGHTS.** See NETHERLANDS (THE SPANISH PROVINCES): A. D. 1667.

**WAR OF THE REBELLION** (of the American Slave States), or War of Secession. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1860 (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER), and after. . . . Statistics. See same: A. D. 1865 (MAY) STATISTICS.

**WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.** See SPAIN: A. D. 1702, and after; NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704, and after; GERMANY: A. D. 1702, and after; ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713; NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1702-1710; and UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

**WAR OF THE THREE HENRYS.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1584-1589.

**WARAUS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIBS AND THEIR KINDRED.

**WARBECK, PERKIN, Rebellion of.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1487-1497.

**WARBURG, Battle of.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1760.

**WARD, General Artemas, and the American Revolution.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (APRIL-MAY), (MAY-AUGUST), and (JUNE).

**WARINGS, The.** See VARANGIANS.

**WARNA, OR VARNA, Battle of (1444).** See TURKS: A. D. 1402-1451.

**WARREN, Dr. Joseph, and the American Revolution.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (MAY), and (JUNE).

**WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE, The.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1560-1563, to 1593-1598.

**WARS OF THE ROSES.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

**WARSAW: A. D. 1656.**—Three days battle with Swedes and Brandenburgers.—Defeat of the Poles. See BRANDENBURG: A. D. 1640-1688; and SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1644-1697.

**A. D. 1792-1794.**—Occupied by the Russians.—Their forces expelled.—Capture of the city by Suvorof.—Its acquisition by Prussia. See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792; and 1793-1796.

**A. D. 1807.**—Created a Grand Duchy, and ceded to the King of Saxony. See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).

**A. D. 1815.**—The Grand Duchy given to Russia. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

**A. D. 1830-1831.**—Revolt.—Attack and capture by the Russians. See POLAND: A. D. 1830-1832.

**WARTBURG, Luther at.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1521-1522.

**German students' demonstration (1817).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1817-1820.

**WARTENBURG, Battle of.** See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

**WARWICK, the King-maker.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

**WARWICK PLANTATION.** See RHODE ISLAND: A. D. 1641-1647.

**WASHINGTON, BOOKER T.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1865-1881.

**WASHINGTON, George: First campaigns.** See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1754, and 1755. . . . In the War of the American Revolution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (MAY-AUGUST), to 1783 (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER). . . . The framing of the Federal Constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787. . . . Presidential election and administration. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1789, to 1796. . . . Farewell Address. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1796. . . . Death. See SAME: A. D. 1799.

**WASHINGTON (City): A. D. 1791.**—The founding of the Federal Capital.—“One important duty which engaged the President's [Washington's] attention during part of the recess [of Congress] related to the purchase and survey of the new Federal city. The site chosen on the Potomac by himself and the commissioners, in conformity with law [see UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1789-1792], lay a few miles to the north of Mount Vernon on the Maryland side of the river, at the confluence of the Eastern Branch, and just below Georgetown. The tradition goes that, while a young surveyor scouring the neighboring country, Washington had marked the advantages of this spot for a great city. . . . The entire soil belonged in large parcels to a few plain, easy, Maryland farmers, who rode over to Georgetown for their flour and bacon. One of these only, David Burns, was obstinate about making terms; and the subsequent rise of land in the western quarter of the city, which his farmhouse now occupied, rendered his little daughter in time the heiress of Washington, and confirmed his claims to historical consideration as the most conspicuous grantor of the National Capital. For procuring this choice spot on behalf of his countrymen, the President conducted the negotiations in person, and the purchase of the Federal city was concluded upon just and even generous terms. Each owner surrendered his real estate to the United States with no restriction except that of retaining every alternate lot for himself. The government was permitted to reserve all tracts specially desired at £25 an acre, while the land for avenues, streets, and alleys should cost nothing. Thus the Federal Capital came to the United States as substantially a free conveyance of half the fee of the soil in consideration of the enhanced value expected for the other half. . . . Major l'Enfant, a French architect, was selected to plan and lay out the new city. The highways were mapped and bounded substantially as they exist at this day, being so spacious and so numerous in comparison with building lots as to have admitted of no later change, in the course of a century, except in the prudent direction of parking, enlarging sidewalks, and leaving little plats in front of houses to be privately cared for. Streets running due north and south from the northern boundary to the Potomac were intersected at right angles by others which extended east and west. To mar the simplicity of this plan, however, which so far resembled that of Philadelphia, great avenues, 160



feet wide, were run diagonally, radiating like spokes, from such main centres as Capitol Hill and the President's house. . . . This new Capital, by the President modestly styled 'the Federal City,' but to which the commissioners, by general acclamation, proceeded in September to affix his illustrious name, was America's first grand essay at a metropolis in advance of inhabitants. . . . The founder himself entered with unwonted ardor into the plans projected for developing this the new Capital. Not only did he picture the city which bore his name as an instructor of the coming youth in lessons of lofty patriotism, but he prophesied for it national greatness apart from its growth as the repository of the nation. He believed it would become a prosperous commercial city, its wharves studded with sails, enjoying all the advantages of Western traffic by means of a canal linking the Potomac and Ohio rivers, so as to bring Western produce to the seaboard. The ten-mile square which comprised the territorial District of Columbia, inclusive of the Capital, stretched across the Potomac, taking Georgetown from the Maryland jurisdiction, and Alexandria from Virginia. . . . The first corner-stone of this new Federal district was publicly laid with Masonic ceremonies, and though the auction sale of city lots in autumn proved disappointing, the idea prevailed that the government would gain from individual purchasers in Washington city a fund ample enough for erecting there all the public buildings at present needed."—J. Schouler, *Hist. of the U. S.*, ch. 2, sect. 2 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: M. Clemmer, *Ten Years in Washington*, ch. 1-3. — C. B. Todd, *The Story of Washington*, ch. 1-2. — J. A. Porter, *The City of Washington* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, series 3, no. 11-12).

A. D. 1814.—In the hands of the British.—Destruction of public buildings. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1814 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1861 (April).—The threatening activity of rebellion.—Peril of the national capital. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL) ACTIVITY OF REBELLION.

A. D. 1861 (April—May).—The coming of the first defenders of the national capital. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL), and (APRIL—MAY: MARYLAND).

A. D. 1862 (April).—Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (APRIL—JUNE).

A. D. 1864.—Approached and threatened by Early. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (JULY: VIRGINIA—MARYLAND).

A. D. 1867.—Extension of suffrage to the Negroes. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1867 (JANUARY).

WASHINGTON, Fort: A. D. 1776.—Capture by the British. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776 (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER).

WASHINGTON, The proposed state, to be formed west of Pennsylvania. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1784.

WASHINGTON (State): A. D. 1803.—Was it embraced in the Louisiana Purchase? —Grounds of American possession. See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1793-1803.

A. D. 1846.—Possession secured. See OREGON: A. D. 1844-1846.

A. D. 1889.—Admission to the Union. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1889-1890.

WASHINGTON, Treaty of (1842). See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1842. — THE ASHBURTON TREATY. . . . Treaty of (1871). See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1871.

WASHINGTON MONUMENT, The. A monument to Washington, of white marble, in plain obelisk form, 55 feet square at the base and 555 feet in height, was begun at the city of Washington in 1848, but stood unfinished for many years. In 1876 Congress made appropriations for the work, and it was completed in 1884.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, St. Louis. See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS, &c.: A. D. 1865-1886.

WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1796.

WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY. See HOLIDAYS.

WASHINGTONIANS. See TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTS.

WASHOAN FAMILY, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: WASHOAN FAMILY.

WAT TYLER'S REBELLION. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1381.

WATAUGA ASSOCIATION, The. See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1769-1772.

WATERFORD: A. D. 1170.—Stormed and taken by Strongbow. See IRELAND: A. D. 1169-1175.

WATER-LILY SECT, The. See TRIAD SOCIETY.

WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, Napoleon's. See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JUNE).

WATERLOO FIELD, in Marlborough's Campaigns. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1705.

WATLING STREET.—The Milky Way was known to our early English ancestors as Watling Street, signifying the road "by which the hero-sons of Wælla marched across" the heavens. When they settled in England they transferred the name to the great Roman road which they found traversing the island, from London to Chester.—See ROMAN ROADS IN BRITAIN.

WATT, James, and the Steam Engine. See STEAM ENGINE: A. D. 1765-1785.

WATTIGNIES, Battle of (1793). See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (JULY—DECEMBER).

WAUHATCHIE, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (OCTOBER—NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE).

WAYNE, General Anthony, at Stony Point. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778-1779.—WASHINGTON GUARDING THE HUDSON. . . . Chastisement of the Northwestern Indians. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1790-1795.

WAYNESBOROUGH, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (FEBRUARY—MARCH: VIRGINIA).

WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

WEALTH. See THEOW.

WEAVING BROTHERS, The. See BE-GUINES.

WEBSTER, Daniel, and the Dartmouth College case. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1754-1769. . . . The Tariff Question. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES):

A. D. 1816-1824; and 1828.... Debate with Hayne. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1828-1833.... In the Cabinet of President Tyler. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1841; and 1842 THE ASHBURTON TREATY.... Seventh of March Speech. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1850.... In the Cabinet of President Fillmore. — The Hulsemann Letter. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1850-1851.

**WECKQUAESGEEKS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

**WEDMORE, Peace of.**—A treaty of peace concluded between King Alfred and the Danes, by which the latter were bound to remain peacefully on that side of England which lay north and east of "Watling Street." See ENGLAND: A. D. 855-880.

**WEHLAU, Treaty of (1657).** See BRANDENBURG: A. D. 1640-1688.

**WEI-HAI-WEI, Japanese capture of.** See KOREA.

**WEIMAR.**—For an account of the origin of the Duchy of Saxe Weimar, see SAXONY: A. D. 1180-1553.—"Small indeed is the space occupied on the map by the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar; yet the historian of the German Courts declares, and truly, that after Berlin there is no Court of which the nation is so proud. . . . 'Small among German princes is mine, poor and narrow his kingdom, limited his power of doing good.' Thus sings Goethe in that poem, so honourable to both, wherein he acknowledges his debt to Karl August. . . . Weimar is an ancient city on the Ilm, a small stream rising in the Thuringian forests, and losing itself in the Saal, at Jena; this stream on which the sole navigation seems to be that of ducks, meanders peacefully through pleasant valleys, except during the rainy season, when mountain-torrents swell its current and overflow its banks. The Trent, between Trentham and Stafford—"the smug and silver Trent" as Shakespeare calls it—will give an idea of this stream. The town is charmingly placed in the Ilm valley, and stands some eight hundred feet above the level of the sea. 'Weimar,' says the old topographer, Mathew Merian, 'is Weinmar, because it was the wine market for Jena and its environs. Others say it was because some one here in ancient days began to plant the vine, who was hence called Weinmayer. But of this each reader may believe just what he pleases.' On a first acquaintance, Weimar seems more like a village bordering a park, than a capital with a Court, having all courtly environments. . . . Saxe-Weimar has no trade, no manufactures, no animation of commercial, political, or even theological activity. This part of Saxony, be it remembered, was the home and shelter of Protestantism in its birth. Only a few miles from Weimar stands the Wartburg, where Luther, in the disguise of Squire George, lived in safety, translating the Bible, and hurling his inkstand at the head of Satan, like a rough-handed disputant as he was. In the marketplace of Weimar stand, to this day, two houses from the windows of which Tetzel advertised his indulgences, and Luther afterwards in fiery indignation fulminated against them. These records of religious struggle still remain, but are no longer suggestions for the continuance of the strife. . . . The theologic fire has long burnt itself out in Thuringia. In Weimar, where Luther preached, another preacher came, whom

we know as Goethe. In the old church there is one portrait of Luther, painted by his friend Lucas Kranach, greatly prized, as well it may be; but for this one portrait of Luther, there are a hundred of Goethe. It is not Luther, but Goethe, they think of here; poetry, not theology, is the glory of Weimar. And, corresponding with this, we find the dominant characteristic of the place to be no magnificent church, no picturesque ancient buildings, no visible image of the earlier ages, but the sweet serenity of a lovely park. The park fills the foreground of the picture, and always rises first in the memory. . . . Within its limits Saxe Weimar displayed all that an imperial court displays in larger proportions: it had its ministers, its army, its chamberlains, pages, and sycophants. Court favour, and disgrace, elevated and depressed, as if they had been imperial smiles, or autocratic frowns. A standing army of six hundred men, with cavalry of fifty hussars, had its War Department, with war minister, secretary, and clerk. As the nobles formed the predominating element of Weimar, we see at once how, in spite of the influence of Karl August, and the remarkable men he assembled round him, no real public for Art could be found there. Some of the courtiers played more or less with Art, some had real feeling for it; but the majority set decided faces against all the beaux esprits. . . . Not without profound significance is this fact that in Weimar the poet found a Circle, but no Public. To welcome his productions there were friends and admirers; there was no Nation. Germany had no public."—G. H. Lewes, *The Life and Works of Goethe*, bk. 1, ch. 1.

**WEISSENBURG, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (JULY—AUGUST).

**WELATABIANS, The.** See WILZEN.

**WELDON RAILROAD, Battles on the.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (AUGUST: VIRGINIA).

**WELFS.** See GUELFES.

**WELLESLEY, MARQUIS OF, The Indian Administration of.** See INDIA: A. D. 1798-1805.

**WELLESLEY COLLEGE.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS &c.: A. D. 1804-1891.

**WELLINGHAUSEN, OR KIRCHDENKERN, Battle of (1761).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1761-1762.

**WELLINGTON, Campaigns of.** See INDIA: A. D. 1798-1805; SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809, to 1812-1814; and FRANCE: A. D. 1815.... Ministry. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1827-1828; 1830.

**WELSH, The Name of the.**—"The Germans, like our own ancestors, called foreign, i. e. non-Teutonic nations, Welsh. Yet apparently not all such nations, but only those which they in some way associated with the Roman Empire: the Cymry of Roman Britain, the Romanized Kelts of Gaul, the Italians, the Roumans or Wallachs of Transylvania and the Principities. It does not appear that either the Magyars or any Slavonic people were called by any form of the name Welsh."—J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 17, foot-note.—"Wealhas, or Welshmen; . . . it was by this name, which means 'strangers,' or 'unintelligible people,' that the English knew the Britons, and it is the name by which the Britons, oddly enough, now know themselves."—J. R. Green, *The Making of England*, p. 122.



**WENCESLAUS, OR WENZEL, OR VACSLAV I., King of Bohemia, A. D. 1230-1253.** . . . **Wenceslaus I., King of Hungary, 1301-1305; III. of Bohemia, 1305-1306.** . . . **Wenceslaus II., King of Bohemia, 1278-1305.** . . . **Wenceslaus IV., King of Bohemia, 1378-1419; King of Germany, 1378-1400.**

**WENDS, The.**—"The Germans call all Slavonians Wends. No Slavonian calls himself so."

—R. G. Latham, *The Germany of Tacitus; Prolegomena*, sect. 15.—See, also, **SLAVONIC PEOPLES; VENEDI; VANDALS; and AVARS: 7TH CENTURY.**

**WENTWORTH, Thomas (Earl of Strafford).** See **ENGLAND: A. D. 1634-1637, 1640, 1640-1641; and IRELAND: A. D. 1633-1639.**

**WENZEL.** See **WENCESLAUS.**

**WERBACH, Battle of.** See **GERMANY: A. D. 1866.**

**WERBEN, The camp of Gustavus Adolphus at.** See **GERMANY: A. D. 1631.**

**WERGILD.**—"The principle that every injury to either person or property might be compensated by a money payment was common to all the northern nations. It was introduced into Gaul by the conquering Franks, and into Britain by the English invaders. Every man's life had a fixed money value, called the 'wergild.' In the case of a freeman, this compensation for murder was payable to his kindred; in that of a slave, to his master. The amount of the wergild varied, according to a graduated scale, with the rank of the person slain."—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *Eng. Const. Hist.*, p. 41.

**WEROWANCE.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: POWHATAN CONFEDERACY.**

**WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.** See **EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1769-1884.**

**WESLEYS, The, and early Methodism.** See **METHODISTS.**

**WESSAGUSSET, Weston's settlement at.** See **MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1622-1628.**

**WESSEX, The Kingdom of.** See **ENGLAND: A. D. 477-527.**

**WEST INDIA COMPANY, The Dutch.** See **NEW YORK: A. D. 1621-1646.**

**WEST INDIA COMPANY, The French.** See **CANADA: A. D. 1663-1674.**

**WEST INDIES, The.**—"The name West Indies recalls the fact that the discovery of the new world originated in an attempt to find a western route to the eastern seas, and that, when Columbus crossed the Atlantic and sighted land on the other side [see **AMERICA: A. D. 1484-1492, and 1492**], he fancied he had reached the further coasts of the Indies. 'In consequence of this mistake of Columbus,' says Adam Smith, 'the name of the Indies has stuck to those unfortunate countries ever since.' The islands, or some of them, have long borne the name of Antilles. Antillia or Antiglia was a mythical island [see **ANTILLES**] which found a place on mediæval maps, and the name was applied by geographers to Hispaniola and Cuba upon their first discovery. In modern times Cuba, Hispaniola or Hayti, Jamaica, and Porto Rico have usually been known as the Greater Antilles; and the ring of smaller islands, including the Windward and the Leeward Islands, as the Lesser Antilles. The terms Windward and Leeward themselves demand some notice. The prevailing wind in the West Indies being the north-east trade wind, the islands which were most exposed to it were known as the Windward islands, and those which were

less exposed were known as the Leeward. Accordingly, the Spaniards regarded the whole ring of Caribbean islands as Windward islands, and identified the Leeward islands with the four large islands which constitute the Greater Antilles as given above. The English sailors contracted the area of Windward and Leeward, subdividing the Caribbean islands into a northern section of Leeward islands and a southern section of Windward islands, which project further into the Atlantic. In 1671 this division was made a political one, and the English Caribbean islands, which had before constituted one government, were separated into two groups, under two Governors-in-chief; the islands to the north of the French colony of Guadeloupe forming the government of the Leeward islands, the islands to the south of Guadeloupe forming the government of the Windward islands. Latterly the signification has been again slightly modified; and, for administrative purposes under the Colonial Office, the Leeward islands group now includes the more northerly section of the Caribbean islands belonging to Great Britain, from the Virgin islands to Dominica [embracing Antigua, St. Christopher or St. Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat, the Virgin Islands, Dominica, Barbuda, Redonda, and Anguilla]; while the Windward islands are artificially restricted to St. Lucia, St. Vincent, the Grenadines, and Grenada, the two most windward of all, Barbados and Tobago, being separated from the group." Barbados is a distinct crown colony, and Tobago is joined with Trinidad to form another. —C. P. Lucas, *Hist. Geog. of the British Colonies*, v. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1, and 4-7.—"The French possessions in the West Indies . . . consist of the following islands: Guadeloupe and its dependencies, Martinique, and St. Bartholomew. Guadeloupe, written by the French Guadeloupe, is the most important of the Leeward Islands belonging to that nation, and is situated between lat. 15° 57' and 16° 30' N., and long. 61° 15' and 61° 45' W. Including dependencies, its area is 625 square miles, with a population of 152,910, three-fourths of whom are coloured." It was colonized by the French in 1635. It has been thrice taken by the English in war, in 1759, 1794 and 1810, and thrice restored. "The Danish possessions in the West Indies consist of the islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John. St. Thomas, one of the Virgin Islands, is situated about 30 miles east of Puerto Rico, and with an area of 35 square miles supports a population of 14,000, one-tenth of whom are white, two-thirds black, and the remainder mixed. A mountain ridge, attaining at one point an elevation of 1480 feet, forms a backbone to the island, and the consequent unevenness of surface renders a large portion of it unfit for cultivation. . . . Negotiations were opened in 1867 for the transfer of St. Thomas to the United States, but the project fell through. St. Croix, or Santa Cruz, is the largest and southernmost of the Virgin Islands, with a length of 25 miles, and a breadth at the widest part of five miles. . . . It has been alternately in the hands of the Dutch, British, Spanish and French. . . . The Dutch possessions in the West Indies consist of the islands of Curaçao, Aruba, St. Martin, Bonaire, St. Eustache, and Saba. . . . Curaçao is exceedingly barren. . . . Water is very scarce. . . . Slavery was abolished in the Dutch West Indies on 1st July, 1863."—C. H. Eden, *The West Indies*, ch. 14. See, also, **CUBA; HAYTI; JAMAICA.**

**WEST POINT.**—Early in the War of Independence, the need of fortifying Hudson River at its narrow passes was seen. In the spring of 1778, "a committee of the New York Legislature, after surveying several sites, unanimously recommended West Point as the most eligible. Works were accordingly commenced there under the direction of Kosciuszko. . . . The principal redoubt, constructed chiefly of logs and earth, was completed before May. . . . At the close of 1779, West Point was the strongest military post in America. In addition to the batteries that stood menacingly upon the hill-tops, the river was obstructed by an enormous iron chain. . . . West Point was considered the keystone of the country during the Revolution, and there a large quantity of powder, and other munitions of war and military stores, were collected. These considerations combined made its possession a matter of great importance to the enemy, and hence it was selected by Arnold as the prize which his treason would give as a bribe [see UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1780 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER)]. When peace returned, it was regarded as one of the most important military posts in the country, and the plateau upon the point was purchased by the United States Government. . . . The Military Academy at West Point was established by an act of Congress which became a law on the 16th of March, 1802. Such an institution, at that place, was proposed by Washington to Congress in 1793; and earlier than this, even before the war of the Revolution had closed, he suggested the establishment of a military school there. But little progress was made in the matter until 1812."—B. J. Lossing, *Field-book of the Revolution*, v. 1, pp. 702-706.

ALSO IN: E. C. Boynton, *Hist. of West Point*.

**WEST VIRGINIA: A. D. 1632.**—Partly embraced in the Maryland grant to Lord Baltimore. See MARYLAND: A. D. 1632.

**A. D. 1861 (April—June).**—Opposition to Secession.—Loyal State Government organized. See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY—JUNE).

**A. D. 1861 (June—July).**—General McClellan's successful campaign.—The Rebels driven out. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (JUNE—JULY: WEST VIRGINIA).

**A. D. 1861 (June—November).**—Steps taken toward separation from Virginia.—Constitutional Convention at Wheeling. See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JUNE—NOVEMBER).

**A. D. 1861 (August—December).**—The campaign of Rosecrans against Lee. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (AUGUST—DECEMBER: WEST VIRGINIA).

**A. D. 1862 (April—December).**—The completed separation from Old Virginia.—Admission to the Union.—The work of the convention at Wheeling which framed a constitution for the new State of West Virginia was satisfactorily performed, and "on the first Thursday of April, 1862, the people approved the constitution by a vote of 18,862 in favor of it with only 514 against it. The work of the representatives of the projected new State being thus ratified, the Governor called the Legislature of Virginia together on the 6th day of May, and on the 13th of the same month that body gave its consent, with due regularity, to 'the formation of a new State within the jurisdiction of the said

State of Virginia.' A fortnight later, on the 28th of May, Senator Willey introduced the subject in Congress by presenting a memorial from the Legislature of Virginia, together with a certified copy of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and the vote of the people. The constitution was referred to the Committee on Territories and a bill favorable to admission was promptly reported by Senator Wade of Ohio. The measure was discussed at different periods, largely with reference to the effect it would have upon the institution of slavery, and Congress insisted upon inserting a provision that 'the children of slaves, born in the State after the 4th day of July, 1863, shall be free; all slaves within the said State who shall at that time be under the age of ten years shall be free when they arrive at the age of twenty-one years; all slaves over ten and under twenty-one shall be free at the age of twenty-five years; and no slave shall be permitted to come into the State for permanent residence therein.' This condition was to be ratified by the convention which framed the constitution, and by the people at an election held for the purpose, and, upon due certification of the approval of the condition to the President of the United States, he was authorized to issue his proclamation declaring West Virginia to be a State of the Union. . . . On the 14th of July, three days before Congress adjourned, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 23 to 17. Mr. Rice of Minnesota was the only Democrat who favored the admission of the new State. . . . Mr. Chandler and Mr. Howard of Michigan voted in the negative because the State had voluntarily done nothing towards providing for the emancipation of slaves; Mr. Sumner and Mr. Wilson, because the Senate had rejected the anti-slavery amendment [proposed by Mr. Sumner, declaring immediate emancipation in the new State]; Mr. Trumbull and Mr. Cowan, because of the irregularity of the whole proceeding. The bill was not considered in the House until the next session. It was taken up on the 9th of December," and was warmly debated. "On the passage of the bill the ayes were 96 and the noes were 55. The ayes were wholly from the Republican party, though several prominent Republicans opposed the measure. Almost the entire Massachusetts delegation voted in the negative, as did also Mr. Roscoe Conkling, Mr. Conway of Kansas and Mr. Francis Thomas of Maryland. The wide difference of opinion concerning this act was not unnatural. But the cause of the Union was aided by the addition of another loyal commonwealth, and substantial justice was done to the brave people of the new State. . . . To the old State of Virginia the blow was a heavy one. In the years following the war it added seriously to her financial embarrassment, and it has in many ways obstructed her prosperity."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 21.—In the legislative Ordinance of 1861 the proposed new State was called Kanawha; but in the Constitutional Convention this name was changed to West Virginia.

ALSO IN: V. A. Lewis, *Hist. of W. Va.*, ch. 25-26.—E. McPherson, *Pol. Hist. of the U. S. during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 377-378.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 14.

**A. D. 1862 (May—June).**—Fremont's Mountain Department. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—JUNE: VIRGINIA).



**WESTERN AUSTRALIA.**—"This great territory, the largest of the Australian Colonies, was formerly known as the Swan River Settlement, and covers an area not far short of a million square miles. The original Swan River Settlement was much less in extent, comprising the south-west corner of the continent only. . . . The first settlement of the Colony was made in 1826, with a party of convicts and a detachment of the 39th Regiment under the command of Major Lockyer. Three years later, i. e. on 1st June, 1829, the Colony was proclaimed by Captain Stirling, who was sent out from England as the first Governor. . . . A paper . . . read [in 1885] . . . at the Royal Colonial Institute, by Sir Frederick Napier Broome [then governor], . . . thus refers to the Colony: . . . 'Western Australia has until lately made but slow progress. She has been the Cinderella of the Australian family; while her more fortunate sisters have got on in the world, have been gay and prosperous, and have received much company in the shape of immigrants, she has led a solitary and unnoticed existence. . . . The most pressing want of the Colony, the one great need, is more people, . . . not only more hands to labour, but more capitalists to employ them.'"—*Her Majesty's Colonies (Colonial and Indian Exhibition, 1886)*, pp. 217-218.—See **AUSTRALIA**: A. D. 1800-1840.

**WESTERN EMPIRE, The.** See **ROME**: A. D. 394-395, and 423-450; and **GERMANY**: A. D. 800.

**WESTERN RESERVE OF CONNECTICUT.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1781-1786; **PENNSYLVANIA**: A. D. 1753-1799; and **OHIO (VALLEY)**: A. D. 1786-1796.

**WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.**—Founded, as a college, at Hudson, O., in 1826; removed to Cleveland, 1882.

**WESTMINSTER, Provisions of.** See **OXFORD, PROVISIONS OF.**

**WESTMINSTER, Statutes of.** See **LAW, COMMON**: A. D. 1275; and 1285.

**WESTMINSTER, Treaty of.** See **NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND)**: A. D. 1674.

**WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY.** See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1643 (JULY); and 1646 (MARCH).

**WESTMINSTER PALACE.**—"Westminster was from the days of Edward the Confessor the recognised home of the great council of the nation as well as of the king. How this came about, history does not record; it is possible that the mere accident of the existence of the royal palace on the bank of the Thames led to the foundation of the abbey, or that the propinquity of the abbey led to the choice of the place for a palace; equal obscurity covers the origin of both. . . . From the very first introduction of representative members the national council had its regular home at Westminster. There, with a few casual exceptions, . . . all the properly constituted parliaments of England have been held. The ancient Palace of Westminster, of which the most important parts, having survived until the fire of 1834 and the construction of the New Houses of Parliament, were destroyed in 1852, must have presented a very apt illustration of the history of the Constitution which had grown up from its early simplicity to its full strength within those venerable walls. It was a curious congeries of towers, halls, churches, and chambers. . . . As time went on, every apartment changed its destination: the chamber became a council room, the

banquet hall a court of justice, the chapel a hall of deliberation. . . . The house of commons met occasionally in the Painted Chamber, but generally sat in the Chapter House or in the Refectory of the abbey, until the reign of Edward VI, when it was fixed in S. Stephen's chapel."—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 20, sect. 735-736 (v. 3).

**WESTMINSTER SCHOOL.** See **EDUCATION, MODERN: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.—ENGLAND.**

**WESTPHALIA:** The country so named. See **SAXONY: THE OLD DUCHY.**

**WESTPHALIA, The Circle of.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1493-1519.

**WESTPHALIA, The Kingdom of.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY); 1813 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER), and (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

**WESTPHALIA, The Peace of.** See **GERMANY**: A. D. 1648.

**WESTPORT, Battle of.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1864 (MARCH—OCTOBER: **ARKANSAS—MISSOURI**).

**WETTIN, House of.** See **SAXONY**: A. D. 1180-1553.

**WEXFORD: Stormed by Cromwell (1649).** See **IRELAND**: A. D. 1649-1650.

**WHIG PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1834.

**WHIGS (WHIGGAMORS): Origin of the name and the English Party.**—"The south-west counties of Scotland have seldom corn enough to serve them round the year: and the northern parts producing more than they need, those in the west come in summer to buy at Leith the stores that come from the north: and from a word 'whiggam,' used in driving their horses, all that drove were called the 'whiggamors,' and shorter the 'whiggs.' Now in that year [1648], after the news came down of Duke Hamilton's defeat [at the battle of Preston—see **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1648 (APRIL—AUGUST)], the ministers animated their people to rise and march to Edinburgh; and they came up marching on [at] the head of their parishes, with an unheard-of fury, praying and preaching all the way as they came. The marquis of Argyle and his party came and headed them, they being about 6,000. This was called the 'whiggamors' inroad; and ever after that all that opposed the court came in contempt to be called 'whiggs': and from Scotland the word was brought into England, where it is now one of our unhappy terms of distinction."—G. Burnet, *Hist. of My Own Time*, bk. 1 (Summary), sect. 43 (v. 1).—"We find John Nicoll, the diarist, in 1666, speaking of the west-country Presbyterians as 'commonly called the Whigs,' implying that the term was new. The sliding of the appellation from these obscure people to the party of the opposition in London a few years later, is indicated by Daniel Defoe as occurring immediately after the affair of Bothwell Bridge in 1679. The Duke of Monmouth then returning from his command in Scotland, instead of thanks for his good service, found himself under blame for using the insurgents too mercifully. 'And Lauderdale told Charles, with an oath, that the Duke had been so civil to the Whigs because he was himself a Whig in his heart. This made it a court-word; and in a little while all the friends and followers of the Duke began to be called Whigs.'"—R.

Chambers, *Domestic Annals of Scotland*, v. 2, p. 172.

ALSO IN: J. H. Burton, *Hist. of Scotland*, ch. 74 (v. 7). See ENGLAND: A. D. 1680.

**WHIPS, Party.**—The "party whips," in English politics, are "an extremely useful and hard-working body of officials. Being charged with the duty of keeping the respective sides in readiness for all emergencies, they are generally to be found in the lobby, where they make themselves acquainted with the incomings and outgoings of members, and learn a good deal as to their prospective movements. The whips are the gentlemen who issue those strongly underlined circulars by which legislators are summoned on important nights; and who, by their watchfulness and attention, can generally convey reliable intelligence to the party chiefs. If the Ministers, for example, are engaged in any controversy, and their whips are not absolutely certain of a majority, they would make arrangements for a succession of men to keep on talking till the laggards could be brought to their places." The whips also arrange "pairs," by which members of opposite parties, or on opposite sides of a given question, agree in couples, not to vote for a certain fixed period of time, thereby securing freedom to be absent without causing any loss of relative strength to their respective parties. This arrangement is common in most legislative bodies. "In addition to these duties, the whips of the opposing forces have to move for the issue of new writs in the place of deceased members—a task never undertaken till they have a candidate ready for the fray."—*Popular Account of Parliamentary Procedure*, p. 18.

ALSO IN: E. Porritt, *The Englishman at Home*, p. 198, and *app. K*.

**WHISKY INSURRECTION, The.** See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1794.

**WHISKY RING, The.**—The Whisky Ring, so called, brought to light in the United States in 1875, "was an association, or series of associations, of distillers and Federal officials for the purpose of defrauding the Government of a large amount of the tax imposed on distilled spirits, and, further, of employing a part of the proceeds in political corruption. On the trial of the indictments a number of Federal officers were convicted."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of Am. Politics*, ch. 23.

ALSO IN: *The Whisky Frauds: Testimony Taken (44th Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. Mis. Doc's, No. 186, v. 9)*.

**WHITE BOYS.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1760–1798.

**WHITE CAMELLIA, Knights of the.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1866–1871.

**WHITE CASTLE OF MEMPHIS, The.** See ATHENS: B. C. 460–449.

**WHITE CITY, The.** See BELGRADE.

**WHITE COCKADE, The.**—"This is the badge at the same time of the House of Stuart and of the House of Bourbon."—E. E. Morris, *The Early Hanoverians*, p. 138.

**WHITE COMPANY, The.** See ITALY: A. D. 1343–1393.

**WHITE CROSS, Order of the.**—An order founded by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 1814.

**WHITE EAGLE, Order of the.**—A Polish order of knighthood, instituted in 1325 by Ladislaus IV., and revived by Augustus in 1705.

**WHITE FRIARS.** See CARMELITE FRIARS.  
**WHITE GUELFs** (Bianchi). See FLORENCE: A. D. 1295–1300, and 1301–1313.

**WHITE HOODS OF FRANCE.**—"The Caputiati, or Capuchons, or White Hoods, [was] a sect originating with a wood-cutter of Auvergne, by name Durand, about the year 1182. Their primary object was the maintenance of peace, and the extermination of the disbanded soldiery, whom the English kings had spread over the south of France, and [who] were now ravaging the country under the name of Routiers or Cotereaux. The members of this religious association were bound by no vow, and made no profession of any particular faith; they were only distinguished by the white head-gear that gave them their name, and wore a little leaden image of the Virgin on their breast. They found favour at first with the bishops, especially in Burgundy and the Berri, and were even, from the best political causes, countenanced by Philip Augustus. They thus rose to such a degree of power that on the 20th of July, 1183, they surrounded a body of 7,000 of the marauding party, and suffered not one man to escape. They were, however, soon intoxicated with success, and threw out some hints about restoring the primeval liberty of mortals and universal equality; thereby incurring the displeasure of Hugo Bishop of Auxerre, who took arms against them, and put an end to the sect by the might of the sword in 1186."—L. Mariotti, *Frà Dolcino and his times*, ch. 1.

**WHITE HOODS OF GHENT, The.** See FLANDERS: A. D. 1379–1381.

**WHITE HOUSE, The.**—The plain white freestone mansion at Washington in which the President of the United States resides during his term of office is officially styled the "Executive Mansion," but is popularly known as the White House. "It was designed by James Hoban in 1792. The corner-stone was laid on October 13, 1792, and its construction went on side by side with that of the Capitol. . . . President John Adams and his wife, on arriving . . . in November, 1800, found it habitable, although but six of its rooms were furnished. . . . In his design Hoban copied closely the plan of a notable Dublin palace, the seat of the Dukes of Leinster."—C. B. Todd, *The Story of Washington*, p. 264.

ALSO IN: M. Clemmer, *Ten Years in Washington*, ch. 19.

**WHITE HUNS, The.** See HUNS, WHITE.

**WHITE MONKS.** See CISTERCIAN ORDER.

**WHITE MOUNTAIN, Battle of the (1620).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1620.

**WHITE OAK ROAD, Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (MARCH–APRIL: VIRGINIA).

**WHITE OAK SWAMP, Retreat through.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE–JULY: VIRGINIA).

**WHITE PENITENTS, OR WHITE COMPANIES.**—"The end of the 14th century witnessed a profound outburst of popular devotion. The miserable condition of the Church, distracted by schism, and the disturbed state of every country in Europe, awoke a spirit of penitence and contrition at the prospect of another great Jubilee, and the opening of a new century. Bands of penitents wandered from place to place, clad in white garments; their faces, except



the eyes, were covered with hoods, and on their backs they wore a red cross. They walked two and two, in solemn procession, old and young, men and women together, singing hymns of penitence, amongst which the sad strains of the 'Stabat Mater' held the chief place. At times they paused and flung themselves on the ground, exclaiming 'Mercy,' or 'Peace,' and continued in silent prayer. All was done with order and decorum; the processions generally lasted for nine days, and the penitents during this time fasted rigorously. The movement seems to have originated in Provence, but rapidly spread through Italy. Enemies were reconciled, restitution was made for wrongs, the churches were crowded wherever the penitents, or 'Bianchi' ['White Penitents,' 'White Companies,' 'Whitemen' are various English forms of the name] as they were called from their dress, made their appearance. The inhabitants of one city made a pilgrimage to another and stirred up their devotion. The people of Modena went to Bologna; the Bolognese suspended all business for nine days, and walked to Imola, whence the contagion rapidly spread southwards. For the last three months of 1399 this enthusiasm lasted, and wrought marked results upon morals and religion for a time. Yet enthusiasm tended to create imposture."—M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation*, v. 1, pp. 145-146.

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, v. 2, p. 297.—See, also, FLAGELLANTS.

**WHITE PLAINS, Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776 (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER).

**WHITE RUSSIA.** See RUSSIA, GREAT, &C.

**WHITE SEA, The.** See ÆGEAN.

**WHITE SHIP, The sinking of the.**—William, the only legitimate son of Henry I. of England, accompanied his father on a visit to Normandy (A. D. 1120). "When they were about to return by the port of Barfleur, a Norman captain, Thomas Fitz-Stephen, appeared and claimed the right of taking them in his ship, on the ground that his father had been captain of the 'Mora,' in which the Conqueror crossed to invade England. The king did not care to alter his own arrangements, but agreed that his son should sail in the 'Blanche Nef' [the White Ship] with Fitz-Stephen. William Ætheling, as the English called him, was accompanied by a large train of unruly courtiers, who amused themselves by making the sailors drink hard before they started, and dismissed the priests who came to bless the voyage with a chorus of scoffing laughter. It was evening before they left the shore, and there was no moon; a few of the more prudent quitted the ship, but there remained nearly 300—a dangerous freight for a small vessel. However, fifty rowers flushed with wine made good way in the waters; but the helmsman was less fit for his work, and the vessel struck suddenly on a sunk rock, the Raz de Catteville. The water rushed in, but there was time to lower a boat, which put off with the prince. When in safety, he heard the cries of his sister, the countess of Perche, and returned to save her. A crowd of desperate men leaped into the boat; it was swamped, and all perished."—C. H. Pearson, *Hist. of Eng. during the Early and Middle Ages*, v. 1, p. 445.

**WHITE TERROR, The.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (JULY—APRIL).

**WHITE TOWER, The.** See TOWER OF LONDON.

**WHITE TOWN, The.** See ROCHELLE.

**WHITE VALLEY, Battle of the (1476).** See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14-18TH CENTURIES.

**WHITMAN, Marcus, and the Winning of Oregon.** See OREGON: A. D. 1844-1846.

**WHITNEY, Eli, and cotton-gin.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1793; and 1818-1821.

**WHITSUNDAY.** See QUARTER DAYS.

**WICHITAS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAWNEE (CADDON) FAMILY.

**WIDE AWAKES.**—In the American presidential canvass of 1860, the younger supporters of Abraham Lincoln formed companies that undertook the parades and torchlight processions of the campaign in a systematic and disciplined way that was then quite new. They took the name of Wide Awakes.

**WIGHT, Isle of: Conquest by the Jutes.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 449-473.

**A. D. 1545.—Occupation by the French.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.

**WILDCAT BANKS.**—"During Jackson's struggle with the Bank of the United States [see UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1833-1836, and 1835-1837] many new banks had been formed in various States, generally with little or no capital to pay the notes which they issued. They bought large quantities of cheaply printed bills. As these bills had cost them very little, they could afford to offer a higher price in paper money for lands in distant States and Territories than others could afford to offer in gold and silver. Having bought the lands for this worthless money, the wildcat bankers sold them for good money, hoping that their own bills would not soon find their way back for payment. If they were disappointed in this hope, the bank 'failed,' and the managers started a new one."—A. Johnston, *Hist. of the U. S. for Schools*, sect. 496.—See, also: MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1837-1841.

**WILDERNESS, Hooker's Campaign in the.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (APRIL—MAY: VIRGINIA).

**Battle of the.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MAY: VIRGINIA) GRANT'S MOVEMENT.

**WILHELMINA, Queen of the Netherlands,** A. D. 1890—.

**WILKES, John, The case of.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1762-1764; and 1768-1774.

**WILKINSON, General James, and Aaron Burr.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1806-1807.... Command on the Northern frontier. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER—NOVEMBER).

**WILLIAM (of Holland), King of Germany:** A. D. 1254-1256.... William (called The Silent), Prince of Orange, Count of Nassau, Stadtholder of the United Provinces, 1558-1584. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1555-1559, to 1581-1584.... William I., German Emperor, 1870-1888; King of Prussia, 1861-1888.... William I. (called The Conqueror), King of England (and Duke of Normandy), 1066-1087.... William I., King of Naples and Sicily, 1154-1166.... William I., King of the Netherlands, 1815-1840.... William II., German Emperor and King of Prussia, 1888—.... William II. (called Rufus or The Red), King of

England, 1087-1100.... William II., King of Naples and Sicily, 1166-1189.... William II., King of the Netherlands, 1840-1849.... William II., Prince of Orange, Stadtholder of the United Provinces, 1647-1650.... William III., King of Naples and Sicily, 1194.... William III., King of the Netherlands, 1849-1890.... William III., Prince of Orange and Stadtholder of the United Provinces, A. D. 1672-1702; King of England (with Queen Mary, his Wife), 1689-1702.... William IV., King of England, 1830-1837.... William IV. (called The Lion), King of Scotland, 1165-1214.

**WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE.** See EDUCATION: MODERN: AMERICA.

**WILLIAM HENRY, Fort:** A. D. 1757.— See CANADA: A. D. 1756-1757.

**WILLIAMS, Roger.** See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1636; and RHODE ISLAND: A. D. 1631-1636, to 1683.

**WILLIAMS COLLEGE.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1793.

**WILLIAMSBURG, Canada, Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER—NOVEMBER).

**WILLIAMSBURG, Virginia, Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY: VIRGINIA).

**WILLOWS, Battle of the.** See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 378.

**WILMINGTON, Delaware:** A. D. 1638. Founded. See DELAWARE: A. D. 1638-1640.

**WILMINGTON, N. C. A. D. 1865.—** Occupied by National forces. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (FEBRUARY—MARCH: NORTH CAROLINA).

**WILMOT PROVISIO, The.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1845-1846.

**WILSON, James, and the framing of the Federal Constitution.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787.

**WILSON TARIFF ACT, The.** See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1894.

**WILSON'S CREEK, Battle of.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (JULY—SEPTEMBER: MISSOURI).

**WILSON'S RAID.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (APRIL—MAY).

**WILZEN, OR WELATABIANS, The.**—"The Wilzen, as the Franks called them, or the Welatabians, as they called themselves, were perhaps the most powerful of the Sclavonian tribes, and [at the time of Charlemagne] occupied the southern coast of the Baltic; their immediate neighbors were the Abodrites, old allies of the Franks, whom they harassed by continual raids." Charlemagne led an expedition into the country of the Wilzen in 789 and subdued them.—J. I. Mombert, *Hist. of Charles the Great*, bk. 2, ch. 4.

**WIMPFEN, Battle of (1622).** See GERMANY: A. D. 1621-1623.

**WINCEBY FIGHT (1643).**—The sharp encounter known as Winceby Fight, in the English civil war, was one of Cromwell's successes, which drove the royalist forces out of the Lincolnshire country, and compelled the Marquis of Newcastle, who was besieging Hull, to abandon the siege. "Cromwell himself was nearer death in this action than ever in any other; the victory,

too, made its due figure, and 'appeared in the world.' Winceby, a small upland hamlet, in the Wolds, not among the Fens, of Lincolnshire, is some five miles west of Horncastle. The confused memory of this Fight is still fresh there." The Fight occurred Oct. 10, 1643.—T. Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, letter 18 (v. 1).—See HULL.

**WINCHESTER, General: Defeat at the Raisin.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812-1813 HARRISON'S NORTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN.

**WINCHESTER, England: Origin of.**—"There can be little doubt that a town, of greater or less importance, has existed since the earliest dawn of English history on the same place where stands the Winchester of to-day. . . . If the first founders of the ancient city were Celtic Britons, covering with their rude dwellings the summit and sides of S. Catherine's Hill they were certainly conquered by the Belgæ, also probably of Celtic origin, who, crossing over from Gaul, established themselves in a large district of southern England. But whether in their time Winchester was called Caer Gwent is doubtful; very probably it was simply Gwin or Gwent, the white place. . . . But as there is no question of the Roman occupation of Britain, first by Julius Cæsar, later on by Claudius and Vespasian, so we know that the settlement on the Itchen was turned into Venta Belgarum, and S. Catherine's Hill converted into a Roman camp. . . . Venta, as well as many other towns, was completely Romanised. . . . But the time arrived when Rome could no longer defend herself at home, and was thus forced to leave Britain to contend with the wild Northmen who had already begun their inroads. The Britons implored their former masters to come back and help them, but in vain. . . . We know how Vortigern, chief among the southern British kings, invited the Saxon adventurers to help him against the Picts and Scots, who encroached more and more in Britain. . . . In 495 (as we learn from the Brito-Welsh Chronicle), there 'came two ealdormen to Britain, Cerdic and Cymric,' who landed at Hamble Creek, and eventually, after many battles much extolled in the Saxon Chronicle, became kings of the West Saxons. Cerdic is said to have been crowned in Venta, to have slaughtered most of the inhabitants and all the priests, and to have converted the cathedral into a heathen temple. . . . The name Venta now becomes Wintana, with the affix of 'ceaster,' Saxon for fortified place."—A. R. R. Bramston and A. C. Leroy, *Historic Winchester*, ch. 1.—See, also, VENTA.

**WINCHESTER, Virginia: A. D. 1862.** Defeat of General Banks. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—JUNE: VIRGINIA).

**A. D. 1864.—Sheridan's victory.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (AUGUST—OCTOBER: VIRGINIA).

**WINCHESTER SCHOOL.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.—ENGLAND.

**WINDSOR CASTLE: Rebuilt by Edward III.** See GARTER, KNIGHTS OF THE.

**WINDWARD ISLANDS, The.** See WEST INDIES.

**WINEDI.** See VENEDI.



**WINGFIELD, Battle of.**—Fought, A. D. 655, between King Oswin of Northumberland and King Penda of Mercia, the latter being defeated and slain.

**WINKELRIED, Arnold von, at the battle of Semпах.** See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1386-1388.

**WINNEBAGOES, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

**WINSLOW, Edward, and the Plymouth colony.** See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1623-1629 (PLYMOUTH), and after.

**WINTHROP, John, and the colony of Massachusetts Bay.** See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1629-1630, and after.

**WINTHROP, John, Jr., and the founding of Connecticut.** See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1634-1637.

**WINTHROP, Theodore: Death at Big Bethel.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (JUNE: VIRGINIA).

**WIPPED'S-FLEET, Battle of.**—The decisive battle fought, A. D. 465, between the Jutes under Hengest and the Britons, which settled the conquest of Kent by the former. See ENGLAND: A. D. 449-473.

**WISBY, Its Code of Maritime Laws.** See HANSA TOWNS.

**WISBY: A. D. 1361.**—Taken and plundered by the Danes. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1018-1397.

**WISCONSIN: The aboriginal inhabitants.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

**A. D. 1634-1673.**—Visited by Nicolet, and traversed by Marquette and Joliet. See CANADA: A. D. 1634-1673.

**A. D. 1763.**—Cession to Great Britain. See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.

**A. D. 1763.**—The King's proclamation excluding settlers. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE U. S. OF AM.: A. D. 1763.

**A. D. 1774.**—Embraced in the Province of Quebec. See CANADA: A. D. 1763-1774.

**A. D. 1784.**—Included in the proposed states of Sylvania, Michigania and Assenisipia. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1784.

**A. D. 1785.**—Partially covered by the western land claims of Massachusetts, ceded to the United States. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1781-1786.

**A. D. 1787.**—The Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory.—Perpetual exclusion of Slavery. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1787.

**A. D. 1805-1848.**—Territorial vicissitudes.—Admission into the Union as a State.—From 1805 to 1809, Wisconsin formed a part of Indiana Territory.

From 1809 to 1818 her territory was embraced in the Territory of Illinois, excepting a small projection at the northeast which was left out of the described boundaries and belonged nowhere. When Illinois became a State, in 1818, and her present boundaries were established, all the country north of them was joined to Michigan Territory. In 1834 that huge Territory was still further enlarged by the temporary addition to it of a great area west of the Mississippi, embracing the present states of Iowa, Minnesota and part of Dakota. It was an unwieldy and impracticable territorial organization, and movements to divide it, which had been on foot long

before this last enlargement, soon attained success. In 1836, the year before Michigan became a State, with her present limits, the remaining Territory was organized under the name of Wisconsin. Two years later, "by act of June 12, 1838, congress still further contracted the limits of Wisconsin by creating from its trans-Mississippi tract the Territory of Iowa. This, however, was in accordance with the original design when the country beyond the Mississippi was attached to Michigan Territory for purposes of temporary government, so no objection was entertained to this arrangement on the part of Wisconsin. The establishment of Iowa had reduced Wisconsin to her present limits, except that she still held, as her western boundary, the Mississippi river to its source, and a line drawn due north therefrom to the international boundary. In this condition Wisconsin remained until the act of congress approved August 6, 1846, enabling her people to form a state constitution. . . . Wisconsin was admitted into the Union, by act approved May 29, 1848, with her present limits."—R. G. Thwaites, *The Boundaries of Wisconsin* (*Wis. State Hist. Soc. Coll's*, v. 11, pp. 455-468).

ALSO IN: B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest*, ch. 17.

**A. D. 1832.**—The Black Hawk War. See ILLINOIS: A. D. 1832.

**A. D. 1854.**—Early formation of the Republican Party. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1854-1855.

**WISCONSIN, University of.**—"In 1838, two years after organization as a Territory, Wisconsin petitioned Congress for aid to establish a university. The request was granted, the usual seventy-two sections of land were set aside for this object, and the Territorial Legislature at once passed a law establishing the University of the Territory of Wisconsin. The organization of a board of trustees was, however, the only other action which took place previous to the adoption of the State Constitution in 1848; this provided for the establishment of a State university 'at or near the seat of government,' and stated, emphatically, that the lands granted for a university should constitute a perpetual fund, the income of which should be devoted to the support of this institution. This declaration was apparently to little purpose, as the State has treated these domains as granted absolutely, and not as held in trust. There is probably no worse example of mismanaged public educational funds on record than is to be found in connection with this institution. . . . The entire sum realized from the 46,080 acres was only 'about \$150,000.' The University of Wisconsin was established in 1850 on the basis of the funds thus secured, but even while passing laws for the sale of the university lands the Legislature realized that the income would be insufficient to support the institution, and they therefore petitioned Congress for seventy-two additional sections in lieu of the saline lands granted to the State in 1848 but never located. Congress granted this petition in 1854. . . . An opportunity to atone for past errors was now afforded the Legislature. It began to be realized, after it was too late to enact suitable laws to remedy the evil, that the best lands had been sold at a disadvantage. It was felt that, whereas the policy pursued had benefited

the State at large, it was not faithful to the increase of the seminary fund. . . . After fully examining the claims of the regents and the condition of the university in 1872 for four years, this body granted \$10,000 annually, to atone for the injustice done by the State in selecting for an endowment unproductive lands."—F. W. Blackmar, *Hist. of Federal and State Aid to Higher Education in the U. S.* (Bureau of Ed., *Circ. of Information*, 1890, no. 1), pp. 250-251.

**WISHOSKAN FAMILY**, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: WISHOSKAN FAMILY.

**WISIGOTHS**. See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS).

**WISMAR**. See HANSA TOWNS.

**WITCHCRAFT**, Salem. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1692; and 1692-1693.

**WITE-THEOW**. See THEOW.

**WITENAGEMOT**, The.—"The Witenagemot or assembly of the wise. This [in old English history] is the supreme council of the nation, whether the nation be Kent or Mercia as in the earlier, or the whole gens Anglorum et Saxonum, as in the later history. The character of the national council testifies to its history as a later development than the lower courts, and as a consequence of the institution of royalty. The folkmoot or popular assembly of the shire is a representative body to a certain extent: it is attended by the representatives of the hundreds and townships, and has a representative body of witnesses to give validity to the acts that are executed in it. . . . The council of the aggregated state is not a folkmoot but a witenagemot. . . . On great occasions . . . we must understand the witenagemot to have been attended by a concourse of people whose voices could be raised in applause or in resistance to the proposals of the chiefs. But that such gatherings shared in any way the constitutional powers of the witan, that they were organised in any way corresponding to the machinery of the folkmoot, that they had any representative character in the modern sense, as having full powers to act on behalf of constituents, that they shared the judicial work, or except by applause and hooting influenced in any way the decision of the chiefs, there is no evidence whatever. . . . The members of the assembly were the wise men, the sapientes, witan; the king, sometimes accompanied by his wife and sons; the bishops of the kingdom, the ealdormen of the shires or provinces, and a number of the king's friends and dependents. . . . The number of the witan was thus never very large."—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 6, sect. 51-52 (v. 1).—The constitution and powers of the witenagemot are very fully discussed by Mr. Kemble, who gives also a list of the recorded witenagemots, with comments on the business transacted in them.—J. M. Kemble, *The Saxons in Eng.*, bk. 2, ch. 6 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: R. Gneist, *The Eng. Parliament*.—See, also, PARLIAMENT, THE ENGLISH: EARLY STAGES OF ITS EVOLUTION; and ENGLAND: A. D. 958.

**WITIGIS**, King of the Ostrogoths. See ROME: A. D. 535-553.

**WITT, John De**, The administration and the murder of. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1647-1650; 1651-1660, to 1672-1674.

**WITTELSBACH**, The House of. See BAVARIA: A. D. 1180-1356.

**WITTENBERG**, Luther at. See PAPACY: A. D. 1517, and after.

**WITTENBERG UNIVERSITY**. See EDUCATION, MEDIEVAL: GERMANY.

**WITTENWEIHER**, Battle of (1638). See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

**WITTSTOCK**, Battle of (1636). See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

**WITUMKAS**, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: MUSEHOGEAN FAMILY.

**WIZA**. See THRACIANS.

**WOCCONS**, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

**WOIPPY**, Battle of. See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

**WOIWODES, OR VOIVODES, OR WAIWODES**. See POLAND: A. D. 1578-1652; and BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1341-1356 (SERVIA).

**WOLFE**, General, Victory and death of. See CANADA: A. D. 1759.

**WOLFENBÜTTEL**, Duchy of. See SAXONY: A. D. 1178-1183.

**WOLSEY**, The ministry and fall of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1513-1529; and 1527-1534.

**WOMAN ORDER**, General Butler's. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—DECEMBER: LOUISIANA).

**WOMAN'S RIGHTS.—WOMAN SUFFRAGE**: A. D. 1790-1849.—The pioneer advocates.—"In 1790, Mary Wollstonecraft's 'Vindication of the Rights of Women,' published in London, attracted much attention from liberal minds. She examined the position of woman in the light of existing civilizations, and demanded for her the widest opportunities of education, industry, political knowledge, and the right of representation. . . . Following her, came Jane Marcet, Eliza Lynn, and Harriet Martineau—each of whom in the early part of the 19th century exerted a decided influence upon the political thought of England. . . . Frances Wright, a person of extraordinary powers of mind, born in Dundee, Scotland, in 1797, was the first woman who gave lectures on political subjects in America. When sixteen years of age she heard of the existence of a country in which freedom for the people had been proclaimed; she was filled with joy and a determination to visit the American Republic where the foundations of justice, liberty, and equality had been so securely laid. In 1820 she came here, traveling extensively North and South. She was at that time but twenty-two years of age. . . . Upon her second visit she made this country her home for several years. Her radical ideas on theology, slavery, and the social degradation of woman, now generally accepted by the best minds of the age, were then denounced by both press and pulpit, and maintained by her at the risk of her life. . . . In 1832, Lydia Maria Child published her 'History of Woman,' which was the first American storehouse of information upon the whole question, and undoubtedly increased the agitation. In 1836, Ernestine L. Rose, a Polish lady—banished from her native country by the Austrian tyrant, Francis Joseph, for her love of liberty—came to America, lecturing in the large cities North and South upon the 'Science of Government.' She advocated the enfranchisement of woman. Her beauty, wit, and eloquence drew crowded houses. About this period Judge Hurlbut, of New York, a leading member of the Bar, wrote a vigorous work on



'Human Rights,' in which he advocated political equality for women. This work attracted the attention of many legal minds throughout that State. In the winter of 1836, a bill was introduced into the New York Legislature by Judge Hertell, to secure to married women their rights of property. This bill was drawn up under the direction of Hon. John Savage, Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court, and Hon. John C. Spencer, one of the revisers of the statutes of New York. It was in furtherance of this bill that Ernestine L. Rose and Paulina Wright at that early day circulated petitions. The very few names they secured show the hopeless apathy and ignorance of the women as to their own rights. As similar bills were pending in New York until finally passed in 1848, a great educational work was accomplished in the constant discussion of the topics involved. During the winters of 1844-5-6, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, living in Albany, made the acquaintance of Judge Hurlbut and a large circle of lawyers and legislators, and, while exerting herself to strengthen their convictions in favor of the pending bill, she resolved at no distant day to call a convention for a full and free discussion of woman's rights and wrongs. . . . In 1840, Margaret Fuller published an essay in the Dial, entitled 'The Great Lawsuit, or Man vs. Woman: Woman vs. Man.' In this essay she demanded perfect equality for woman, in education, industry, and politics. It attracted great attention and was afterward expanded into a work entitled 'Woman in the Nineteenth Century.' . . . In the State of New York, in 1845, Rev. Samuel J. May preached a sermon at Syracuse, upon 'The Rights and Conditions of Women,' in which he sustained their right to take part in political life, saying women need not expect 'to have their wrongs fully redressed, until they themselves have a voice and a hand in the enactment and administration of the laws.' . . . In 1849, Lucretia Mott published a discourse on woman, delivered in the Assembly Building, Philadelphia, in answer to a Lyceum lecture which Richard H. Dana, of Boston, was giving in many of the chief cities, ridiculing the idea of political equality for woman. . . . It was her early labors in the temperance cause that first roused Susan B. Anthony to a realizing sense of woman's social, civil, and political degradation, and thus secured her life-long labors for the enfranchisement of woman. In 1847 she made her first speech at a public meeting of the Daughters of Temperance in Canajoharie, N. Y. The same year Antoinette L. Brown, then a student at Oberlin College, Ohio, the first institution that made the experiment of co-education, delivered her first speech on temperance in several places in Ohio, and on Woman's Rights, in the Baptist church at Henrietta, N. Y. Lucy Stone, a graduate of Oberlin, made her first speech on Woman's Rights the same year in her brother's church at Brookfield, Mass. Nor were the women of Europe inactive."—E. C. Stanton, S. B. Anthony, and M. J. Gage, eds., *Hist. of Woman Suffrage*, ch. 1.

**A. D. 1804-1891.—The higher Education of women in America.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS &c.: A. D. 1804-1891.

**A. D. 1839-1848.—Legal emancipation of women in the United States.** See LAW, COMMON: A. D. 1839-1848.

**A. D. 1840-1890.—The organized agitation.**—"In 1840 a 'World's Antislavery Convention' was held in London, and all Antislavery organizations throughout the world were invited to join in it, through their delegates. Several American societies accepted the invitation, and elected delegates, six or eight of whom were women, Lucretia Mott and Mrs. Wendell Phillips among them. The excitement caused by their presence in London was intense, for the English Abolitionists were very conservative, and never dreamed of inviting women to sit in their Convention. And these women who had come among them had rent the American Antislavery Societies in twain, had been denounced from the pulpit, anathematized by the press, and mobbed by the riffraff of the streets. . . . A long and acrimonious debate followed on the admission of the women. . . . When the vote was taken, the women delegates were excluded by a large majority. William Lloyd Garrison did not arrive in London until after the rejection of the women. When he was informed of the decision of the Convention he refused to take his seat with the delegates. And throughout the ten days' sessions he maintained absolute silence, remaining in the gallery as a spectator. . . . The London Convention marked the beginning of a new era in the woman's cause. Hitherto, the agitation of the question of woman's equal rights had been incidental to the prosecution of other work. Now the time had come when a movement was needed to present the claims of woman in a direct and forcible manner, and to take issue with the legal and social order which denied her the rights of human beings, and held her in everlasting subjection. At the close of the exasperating and insulting debates of the 'World's Antislavery Convention,' Lucretia Mott and Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton agreed to hold a Woman's Rights Convention on their return to America, and to begin in earnest the education of the people on the question of woman's enfranchisement. Mrs. Stanton had attended the Convention as a bride, her husband having been chosen a delegate. Accordingly the first Woman's Rights Convention of the world was called at Seneca Falls, New York, on the 19th and 20th of July, 1848. It was attended by crowds of men and women, and the deepest interest was manifested in the proceedings. 'Demand the uttermost,' said Daniel O'Connell, 'and you will get something.' The leaders in the new movement, Lucretia Mott and Mrs. Stanton, with their husbands, and Frederick Douglass, acted on this advice. They demanded in unambiguous terms all that the most radical friends of women have ever claimed. . . . The Convention adjourned to meet in Rochester, New York, August 2, 1848. . . . A third Convention was held at Salem, Ohio, in 1850; a fourth in Akron, Ohio, in 1851; a fifth in Massillon, Ohio, in 1852; another at Ravenna, Ohio, in 1853, and others rapidly followed. The advocates of woman suffrage increased in number and ability. Superior women, whose names have become historic, espoused the cause—Frances D. Gage, Hannah Tracy Cutler, Jane G. Swisshelm, Caroline M. Severance, Celia C. Burr, who later became Mrs. C. C. Burleigh, Josephine S. Griffing, Antoinette L. Brown, Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, Paulina W. Davis, Caroline H. Dall, Elizabeth Oakes Smith, Ernestine L. Rose, Mrs.

C. H. Nichols, Dr. Harriot K. Hunt; the roll-call was a brilliant one, representing an unusual versatility of culture and ability. The First National Woman Suffrage Convention was held in Worcester, Massachusetts, October 23 and 24, 1850. It was more carefully planned than any that had yet been held. Nine States were represented. The arrangements were perfect—the addresses and papers were of the highest character—the audiences were at a white heat of enthusiasm. The number of cultivated people who espoused the new gospel for women was increased by the names of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Theodore Parker, Bronson and Abby May Alcott, Thomas W. Higginson, William I. Bowditch, Samuel E. and Harriet W. Sewall, Henry Ward Beecher, Henry B. Blackwell, Ednah D. Cheney, Hon. John Neal, Rev. William H. Channing, and Wendell Phillips. . . . A dozen years were spent in severe pioneer work and then came the four years Civil War. All reformatory work was temporarily suspended, for the nation then passed through a crucial experience, and the issue of the fratricidal conflict was national life or national death. The transition of the country from peace to the tumult and waste of war was appalling and swift, but the regeneration of its women kept pace with it. . . . The development of those years, and the impetus they gave to women, which has not yet spent itself, has been wonderfully manifested since that time. . . . It has been since the war, and as the result of the great quickening of women which it occasioned, that women have organized missionary, philanthropic, temperance, educational, and political organizations, on a scale of great magnitude. . . . In 1869, two great National organizations were formed. One styled itself 'The National Woman Suffrage Association,' and the other was christened 'The American Woman Suffrage Association.' The first established its headquarters in New York, and published a weekly paper, 'The Revolution,' which was ably edited by Mrs. Stanton and Miss Anthony. 'The American' made its home in Boston, and founded 'The Woman's Journal,' which was edited by Mrs. Mary A. Livermore, Mrs. Julia Ward Howe, Mrs. Lucy Stone, William Lloyd Garrison and Thomas W. Higginson. . . . After twenty years of separate activities, a union of the two national organizations was effected in 1890, under the composite title of 'The National-American Woman Suffrage Association.'"—M. A. Livermore, *Woman in the State (Woman's Work in America, ch. 10)*.

**A. D. 1842-1892.—Women in the Medical profession.**—"The first advocate for women medical students, Miss Elizabeth Blackwell, after many years of struggle obtained entrance into the medical faculty of Geneva in 1842; in 1847 she received her doctor's degree, and went to England, Germany, and finally to Paris, to complete her studies. Her example fired others. In that same year a medical college for women was founded in Boston, in 1850 a similar one in Philadelphia, one in New York in 1868, and in Chicago in 1870. Soon after, the greater number of universities in America were thrown open to women, and by this their studies were largely extended. The difficulties proved far greater in Europe. The universities of Zürich in 1864, and of Berne in 1872, were the first to receive lady students for the study of medicine.

In 1868 the Medical Faculty of Paris, chiefly through the intervention of the Empress Eugénie, first admitted lady students to follow the medical course. In Italy, in 1876, they obtained equal success; in Russia, an ukase of the Czar Alexander II., of November 2nd, 1872, conferred upon ladies the right to attend the medical courses in the Medico-Chirurgical Academy of St. Petersburg, but this permission was subsequently withdrawn on political grounds, on the accession of a new government. In 1874 the first school of medicine for women was started in London; in 1876 they were admitted to the study of medicine in Dublin. In Germany and Austro-Hungary women are not allowed to enter the universities, although ladies' associations have obtained thousands of signatures to petition both parliaments on the subject. From statistical sources, we learn that there are seventy lady doctors in practice in London, five in Edinburgh, and two in Dublin. Seven hundred lady doctors practise in Russia, of whom fifty-four are the heads of clinical schools and laboratories. In Italy, at the same time, there were only six. Spain has but two qualified lady doctors. Roumania, also, has two. Sweden, Norway, and Belgium have likewise comparatively few. In Berlin there are Dr. Franziska Tiburtius and Dr. Lehmus (who founded a poly-clinical school which is increasing year by year), Dr. Margaret Mengarin-Traube and Fraulein Kuhnnow. In Austria, Dr. Rosa Kerschbaumer is the sole possessor of Government authority to practise her profession. In India, where native religion forbids their women calling in men doctors, there has been a strong movement in favour of ladies, and they have now one hundred lady doctors, three of whom are at the head of the three most important hospitals. The largest number of women practising medicine is in America."—A. Crepaz, *The Emancipation of Women*, pp. 99-103.—"The medical faculty of the University of Paris opened its doors to women in 1868, but at first only a very few availed themselves of the privileges thus offered. In 1878 the number in attendance was 32; during the next ten years (1878-'83) it increased to 114, and is at present 183, of whom the great majority (167) are Russians. The remainder are Poles, Rumanians, Servians, Greeks, and Scotch, and only one German."—*The Nation*, Feb. 14, 1895.

**A. D. 1865-1883.—The higher Education of Women in England.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS &c.: A. D. 1865-1883.

**A. D. 1869-1894.—Progress in Europe and America.**—A certain number of the English cities "occupy a privileged position, under the title of 'municipal boroughs.' These alone are municipal corporations, enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy by virtue of charters of incorporation granted in the pleasure of the crown. . . . The other cities have as such no legal existence: they are simply geographical units. In past times the privilege of incorporation was often granted to wretched little hamlets. But whether they were once of consequence or not, the municipal corporations degenerated everywhere into corrupt oligarchies. The municipal reform of 1835 destroyed these hereditary cliques and extended the municipal franchise to all the inhabitants who paid the poor tax as occupants of realty. But in doing this . . . it was



expressly provided in the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 that the electoral franchise in the municipal boroughs should belong to male persons only. Before long the unorganized condition of the larger towns that were not municipal boroughs received the attention of Parliament. It did not grant them communal autonomy,—there could be no question of that,—but conceded special powers to establish sanitary systems and to undertake works of public utility such as lighting, paving, sewerage, etc. The special acts passed for these purposes from time to time, as the necessity for them arose, were consolidated and made general in two statutes: the Public Health Act of 1848, for a class of towns designated as 'local government districts,' and the Commissioners' Clauses Act of 1847, for the cities described as 'improvement commissions districts.' These acts gave to these urban agglomerations an incipient municipal organization, by establishing boards of health in some, and in others commissions to direct the public works. In both these classes of 'nascent, half-developed municipalities,' which had scarcely emerged from the parochial phase of local self-government, the authorities—i. e. the members of the boards of health and the commissioners—were elected, as in the parishes, by the ratepayers without distinction of sex. As these cities enlarged and developed, they were admitted to the honor of municipal incorporation. But since the Municipal Corporations Act limited the franchise to men, it resulted that while the city which was promoted to the rank of municipal borough saw its rights increased, a part of its inhabitants—the women—saw theirs suppressed. This anomaly gave the advocates of woman suffrage a chance to demand that the ballot be granted to women in the municipal boroughs. In 1869 Mr. Jacob Bright introduced such a measure in the House of Commons, and it was adopted almost without discussion. . . . But when the English legislator placed the administration of the 'nascent, half-developed municipalities'—which were only temporarily such and which might become cities of the first rank—on the same plane, as far as the suffrage of women was concerned, with the government of the parishes, he substituted a fluctuating for a permanent test, and as a result wiped out his own line of demarcation. When this fact was brought out, Parliament could not but recognize and bow to it. This recognition was decisive: it resulted in the overthrow of the electoral barriers against women in the entire domain of local self-government. The clause which, upon the proposal of Mr. Jacob Bright, was inserted in section 9 of the municipal act of 1869, found its way into the revised municipal act of 1882. Section 63 of this latter act reads: 'For all purposes connected with and having reference to the right to vote at municipal elections, words importing in this act the masculine gender include women.' This clause gave women the ballot in the municipal boroughs, but did not make them eligible to office. And as the general qualification for municipal suffrage is the occupancy by the elector in his own name of a house subject to the poor tax, the law includes independent women only, not married women. . . . When in 1881 the municipal suffrage was extended to women in Scotland, the question whether the separated woman could vote was decided in her favor. But

of course this does not change the position of married women in England. A year after the introduction of the municipal suffrage of women they obtained (in 1870) the school vote also, in connection with the establishment of the existing system of primary instruction. . . . It still remained for women to make their way into the local government of the county; but county government, although representative, was not elective. In 1888 county councils were established, chosen by the ratepayers. The analogy of the municipal councils demanded that women should be included among the electors of the new local assemblies. Accordingly the Local Government Act of 1888 admits women to the electorate in England, and the act of 1889 gives them the same right in Scotland. . . . In Sweden local self-government is exercised in first instance, in the city and country communes, by the taxpayers in general assembly, or town meeting, where their votes are reckoned in proportion to the taxes paid, according to a graded scale, just as in the English vestries. In the cities with a population above 3,000 the taxpayers elect a communal council. . . . In the full assemblies of the communes that have no councils, and in the elections at which councillors are chosen, unmarried women have the same right of participation as men. . . . The next higher instance of local self-government consists of provincial councils (landstings). All the municipal electors, women not excepted, vote for the members of these councils. . . . In Norway women have no share in local government, except in the school administration. . . . In Denmark women are entirely excluded from local government; but they have been admitted to it in one Danish dependency—Iceland. . . . Finland, which was attached to Sweden for centuries before it fell under the sway of Russia, is still influenced by the movement of legislation in the former mother-country. . . . The law of February 6, 1865, concerning the rural communes, admitted women to communal rights under almost the same conditions as in Sweden. . . . The law of April 14, 1856, concerning the organization of the rural communes in the six eastern provinces of the kingdom of Prussia (section 6), as well as the analogous law of March 19, 1856, for the province of Westphalia (section 15), provide that persons of female sex who possess real property carrying with it the right to vote shall be represented—the married women by their husbands, the single women by electors of the male sex. A similar provision was adopted for the province of Schleswig-Holstein, after its annexation by Prussia (law of September 22, 1867, section 11). But in the Rhine province, where the administrative and the private law still show deep traces of the French influence, women are expressly excluded from the communal franchise. . . . In Saxony women are admitted to the communal vote in the country districts on the same terms as men. . . . Eligibility to communal office is denied to women in all the countries enumerated above. In Austria, as one consequence of the revolutionary movement of 1848, the legislator endeavored to infuse fresh life into the localities by giving a liberal organization to the rural communes. The law of 1849 granted communal rights to all persons paying taxes on realty and industrial enterprises, and also to various classes of 'capacities'—ministers of religion, university

graduates, school principals and teachers of the higher grades, etc. Among the electors of the first and most important group, based wholly upon property, were included women, minors, soldiers in active service and some other classes of persons who, as a rule, were excluded from suffrage, on condition that their votes be cast through representatives. . . . The Russian village community, the mir, which has come down across the centuries into our own time with very few changes in its primitive organization, is a typical example of rudimentary local self-government, where all who have an interest, not excepting the women, have a right to be heard in the common assemblies. . . . In the Dominion of Canada local suffrage has only recently been granted to women. The first law regulating this matter was passed in the province of Ontario (Upper Canada) in 1884. This law has served as an example, and in part also as a model, for the other provinces. The electoral rights granted to women by the legislation of the province of Ontario may be grouped under four heads: (a) participation in municipal elections, (b) participation in municipal referenda, (c) participation in school-board elections, and (d) eligibility to office. All unmarried women and widows twenty-one years of age, subjects of her Majesty and paying municipal taxes on real property or income, may vote in municipal elections. . . . Finally, all taxpayers resident in the school district are recognized by the laws of 1885 and 1887 as eligible to the office of school trustee. . . . Female suffrage does not exist in the great French-speaking province of Quebec (Lower Canada), in New Brunswick or in Prince Edward Island. . . . In almost all the continental [Australasian] colonies the municipal suffrage rests upon the same basis as does the parish franchise of the mother-country, i. e. the possession or occupation of real property. . . . [In the United States] several States have granted to women simply the right of being elected to school offices, provided always that they possess the qualifications prescribed for men. The question is thus decided in California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. . . . At the present time the system of granting to women both rights—eligibility and suffrage—in school matters has been adopted in the following states besides Massachusetts: Colorado, North and South Dakota, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin and the territory of Arizona. Of course to this list must be added Wyoming, where women vote at all elections, and Kansas, where they possess complete local suffrage. Finally, Kentucky and Nebraska admit women only to the school franchise, and that only under special conditions.”—M. Ostrogorski, *Local Woman Suffrage* (Pol. Science Quarterly, Dec., 1891).—“In three Territories . . . the right of voting at legislative elections was given by the legislature of the Territory, and in one of these, Wyoming, it was retained when the Territory received Statehood in 1890. In Utah it was abolished by a Federal statute, because thought to be exercised by the Mormon wives at the bidding of their polygamous husbands, and thus to strengthen the polygamic party. In Washington Territory the law which conferred it in 1883 was declared invalid by the courts in 1887, be-

cause its nature had not been properly described in the title, was re-enacted immediately afterwards, and was in 1888 again declared invalid by the U. S. Territorial Court, on the ground that the Act of Congress organizing the Territorial legislature did not empower it to extend the suffrage to women. In enacting their State Constitution (1889) the people of Washington pronounced against female suffrage by a majority of two to one; and a good authority declared to me that most of the women were well pleased to lose the privilege. In 1893 the legislature of Colorado submitted to the voters (in virtue of a provision in the Constitution) a law extending full franchise for all purposes to women, and it was carried by a majority of 6,347. . . . In Michigan in 1893, women received the suffrage in all municipal elections. In Michigan, however, the law has since been declared unconstitutional. . . . In Connecticut, the latest State which has extended school suffrage to women (1893), it would appear that the women have not, so far, shown much eagerness to be registered. However, while the advanced women leaders and Prohibitionists started a campaign among the women voters, the husbands and brothers of conservative proclivities urged their wives and sisters to register, and not without success. In Wyoming (while it was still a Territory) women served as jurors for some months till the judges discovered that they were not entitled by law to do so, and in Washington (while a Territory) they served from 1884 to 1887, when the legislature, in granting the right of voting, omitted to grant the duty or privilege of jury service. . . . As respects the suffrage in Wyoming, the evidence I have collected privately is conflicting. . . . No opposition was offered in the Convention of 1889, which drafted the present Constitution, to the enactment of woman suffrage for all purposes. The opinion of the people at large was not duly ascertained, because the question was not separately submitted to them at the polls, but there can be little doubt that it would have been favourable. . . . The whole proceedings of the Convention of 1889 leave the impression that the equal suffrage in force since 1869 had worked fairly, and the summing up of the case by a thoughtful and dispassionate British observer (Mr. H. Plunkett) is to the same effect.”—J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (3d ed.), ch. 96 (v. 2).—“No complete and reliable statistics have ever been obtained of the number of women who register and vote on school questions. This varies greatly in different localities, and in the same localities in different years. With women, as with men, the questions connected with the schools do not suffice to bring out many voters as a rule. Those few who have voted hitherto have been of more than average character and ability, and influenced wholly by public spirit. But comparatively few, even of suffragists, have as yet availed themselves of the privilege. To secure any general participation of women in elections, a wider range of subjects must be thrown open to them. Wherever, as in Kansas, party issues and moral questions are involved, the women show a greater interest. In several States, as in Kansas, Iowa, and Rhode Island, prohibition amendments are said to have been carried by the efforts of women-workers at the polls, although not themselves voters.”—*The Nation*, Apr. 28, 1887, p. 362.



**WOOD'S HALFPENCE.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1722-1724.

**WOOL, General John E.:** In the war of 1812. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812 (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER).

**WOOLLY-HEADS, The.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1850.

**WOOLSACK, The.**—The Woolsack is the seat of the Lord Chancellor, who presides in the House of Lords. In the reign of Elizabeth an Act of Parliament was passed to prevent the exportation of wool, and to keep in mind this source of our national wealth, woolsacks were placed in the House of Lords, whereon the judges sat.—A. C. Ewald, *The Crown and its Advisers*, lect. 3.

**WORCESTER, Marquis of, The inventions of.** See STEAM ENGINE.

**WORCESTER, Battle of.** See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1651 (AUGUST).

**WORCESTER FREE INSTITUTE.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS: A. D. 1865-1893.

**WORDE, Wynkyn de, The Press of.** See PRINTING &C.: A. D. 1476-1491.

**WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION, The.** See CHICAGO: A. D. 1892-1893.

**WORLD'S FAIR, The First.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1851.

**WORMS.**—"Worms (Wormatia) (Borbetomagus), situated on the left bank of the Rhine, existed long before the Roman conquest, and is supposed to have been founded by the Celts, under the name of Borbetomagus. . . . In the 4th and 5th centuries it was a flourishing town in the possession of the Burgundians. Under their King Gundahar, the vicinity of Worms was the scene of the popular legend handed down in the romantic poem known as the Nibelungen-lied. In 496, by the victory of Tolbiacum, it formed a part of the empire of Clovis."—W. J. Wyatt, *Hist. of Prussia*, v. 2, p. 447.

**A. D. 406.**—Destruction by the Germans. See GAUL: A. D. 406-409.

**A. D. 1521.**—The Imperial Diet.—Luther's summons and appearance. See PAPACY: A. D. 1521-1522.

**A. D. 1713.**—Taken by the French. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

**A. D. 1743.**—Treaty between Austria, Sardinia and England. See ITALY: A. D. 1743; and AUSTRIA: A. D. 1743-1744.

**A. D. 1792.**—Occupied by the French Revolutionary Army. See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER).

**WORMS, Concordat of (1122).** See PAPACY: A. D. 1056-1122.

**WORTH, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (JULY—AUGUST).

**WRANGLERS, Senior.**—At Oxford and Cambridge Universities, "by a strange relic of the logical and disputatory studies of the Middle Ages, the candidates for University honors maintained in public some mathematical thesis, about which they disputed in Latin, never, as it may be supposed, of the best. To keep up the illusion of the monkish time, and the seven liberal arts, a little metaphysics and a good deal of theology were thrown in at the time of the examination; but the real business of the 'schools' at Cambridge was mathematics. The disputing,

however, was so important a part of the performances that the first division of those to whom were awarded honors were called by distinction, 'the wranglers'; and the head man—the proud recipient of all the glory which at the end of a four years' course the ancient University showered on the son she possessed most distinguished in her favorite studies—was called the senior wrangler. In process of time, the disputations and Latin were all done away with. An examination from printed papers was made the test. Yet, still, every year, at the end of the arduous eight days' trial, the undergraduate who takes his bachelor's degree in virtue of passing the best examination in mathematics, is called the senior wrangler; and attains the proudest position that Cambridge has to bestow."—W. Everett, *On the Cam*, lect. 2.

**WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.—WRIT OF MAINPRISE.—WRIT DE HOMINE REPLEGIANDO.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1679.

**WRITS OF ASSISTANCE.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1761; and MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1761.

**WROXETER, Origin of.** See URICONIUM.

**WÜRTENBERG: Early Suevic population.** See SUEVI.

**Founding of the Dukedom.**—"Conrad of Beutelsbach, the first of this family that appears upon record, got the County of Württemberg from the Emperor Henry IV. in 1103, and was succeeded by his son Ulrick I. as Count of Württemberg, in 1120. Henry, the fourteenth in lineal descent from Ulrick, was made Duke of Württemberg in 1519. Frederick II., and eighth Duke of Württemberg, succeeded his father in 1797, and was proclaimed King of Württemberg in 1805."—Sir A. Halliday, *Annals of the House of Hanover*, v. 1, p. 430.

**A. D. 1801-1803.**—Acquisition of territory under the Treaty of Luneville. See GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.

**A. D. 1805-1806.**—Aggrandized by Napoleon.—Created a Kingdom.—Joined to the Confederation of the Rhine. See GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806; and 1806 (JANUARY—AUGUST).

**A. D. 1809.**—Incorporation of the rights and revenues of the Teutonic Order with the Kingdom. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY—SEPTEMBER).

**A. D. 1813.**—Abandonment of the Rhenish Confederacy and the French Alliance. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY—MARCH).

**A. D. 1816.**—Accession to the Holy Alliance. See HOLY ALLIANCE.

**A. D. 1866.**—The Seven Weeks War.—Indemnity to Prussia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1866.

**A. D. 1870-1871.**—Treaty of union with the Germanic Confederation, soon transformed into the German Empire. See GERMANY: A. D. 1870 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER); and 1871.

**WÜRTZBURG, Battle of.** See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL—OCTOBER).

**WUZEER, OR VIZIR.** See OUDE; and VIZIR.

**WYANDOT CONSTITUTION, The.** See KANSAS: A. D. 1854-1859.

**WYANDOTS, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: HURONS OR WYANDOTS.

**WYAT'S INSURRECTION.** See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1554.

**WYCLIF'S REFORMATION.** See **ENGLAND**: A. D. 1360-1414; **BOHEMIA**: A. D. 1405-1415, and **BEGUINES**.

**WYOMING: The Name.**—"Wyoming is a corruption of the name given to the locality by the Indians. They called it 'Maughwauwame.' The word is compounded of 'maughwau,' large, and 'wame,' plains. The name, then, signifies 'The Large Plains.' The Delawares pronounced the first syllable short, and the German missionaries, in order to come as near as possible to the Indian pronunciation wrote the name M'chweuwami. The early settlers, finding it difficult to pronounce the word correctly, spoke it Wauwauwamie, then Wiawumie, then Wiomic, and, finally, Wyoming."—G. Peck, *Wyoming: Its History &c., ch. 1.*

**WYOMING (State):** A. D. 1803.—Eastern portion embraced in the Louisiana Purchase. See **LOUISIANA**: A. D. 1798-1803.

A. D. 1890.—Admission to the Union as a State. See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1889-1890.

**WYOMING (Valley):** A. D. 1753-1799.—Connecticut claims and settlements.—The Pennamite and Yankee War. See **PENNSYLVANIA**: A. D. 1753-1799.

A. D. 1755.—The Grasshopper War of the Delaware and Shawanese tribes of American Indians. See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SHAWANESE**.

A. D. 1778.—The Tory and Indian invasion and massacre.—Its misrepresentation by historians and poets. See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1778 (JULY).

## X.

**X, Y, Z, CORRESPONDENCE, The.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM.**: A. D. 1797-1799.

**XENOPHON'S RETREAT.** See **PERSIA**: B. C. 401-400.

**XERES DE LA FRONTERA, Battle of** (A. D. 711). See **SPAIN**: A. D. 711-713.

**XERXES.** See **PERSIA**: B. C. 486-405, and **GREECE**: B. C. 480-479.

## Y.

**YAKOOB BEG, The Dominion of.**—The Chinese obtained possession of Kashgar or Chinese Turkestan (see **TURKESTAN**) about 1760, and held it for a century, overcoming much revolt during the last forty years of that period. In 1862, the revolt assumed a more formidable character than it had borne before. Its beginning was among a neighboring people called, variously, the Tungani, Dungan, or Dungans. These were "a Mahomedan people settled in the north-west province of Kansuh and in a portion of Shensi. Many of them had migrated westward at the time of the wars of Keen Lung, and had colonized various parts of the Chinese conquests. During a century this movement westward had continued, and in 1862 the Tungani represented the majority of the population, not only in parts of Kansuh, but also in the country to the west, as far as Ili and the city of Turfan. Although Mahomedans, they had acted as the soldiers of the Chinese. They had won their battles, laid down their roads, and held the Tartar population in check. From the Tungani the Chinese never for an instant expected danger. They were certainly heretics; but then they were part and parcel of themselves in every other respect. They hated the Khokandians and the people of Kashgar with a hatred that was more bitter than that they bore to the Khitay or Buddhist Chinese. In all essentials the Tungani were treated exactly like the most favoured children of the empire. . . . The only cause that it is possible to assign for their rebellion is that vague one of the religious revival which was then manifesting itself among the Mahomedans all over the world. But whatever the cause, the consequences were clear enough. In 1862 a riot occurred at a village in Kansuh. Order was restored with some small loss of life; and the momentary alarm which had been caused by it passed away. The alarm was, however, only too well founded. A few weeks afterwards a more serious riot took place at the town of Hou-

chow or Salara. This was the signal for the rising of the Tungani in all directions. The unanimity shown by the various Tungani settlements proved that there had been a preconcerted arrangement amongst them; but the Chinese had known nothing of it. . . . The few Imperial troops remaining in the province of Kansuh were unable to withstand the desperate and unanimous assault of the Mahomedans. They were swept out of existence, and with them the larger portion of the Khitay population as well. The Mahomedan priests took the lead in this revolt, and the atrocities which they and their followers enacted were of the most horrible and blood-thirsty character. The butchery of tens of thousands of their Buddhist subjects in Kansuh appealed loudly to the Chinese Government for revenge; and it was not long before their troops restored Kansuh to its allegiance. Those of the Tungani who were captured were given over to the executioner. But a large number escaped, fleeing westward to those cities beyond the desert, where other Mussulmans had imitated, with like success, the deeds of their kinsmen in Kansuh. . . . No sooner then did the tidings of the events in Kansuh reach Hamil and Barkul, Turfan and Manas, than risings at once took place against the Khitay. In all cases the movement was successful. The Manchus were deposed: the 'mollahs' were set up in their stead. After a short interval the other cities of Karashar, Kucha, and Aksu, followed the example, with an identical result. The Tungani revolt proper had then reached its limit. . . . The communications between Pekin and Jungaria were cut, and a hostile territory of nearly 2,000 miles intervened. To restore those communications, to reduce that hostile country, would demand a war of several campaigns; and China was not in a condition to make the slightest effort. All that her statesmen could hope for was, that she would not go irretrievably to pieces. The Tungani flourished on the misfor-



tunes of the empire. . . . During some months after the first successes of the Tunganis, the people of Kuldja and Kashgaria remained quiet, for the prestige of China's power was still great. But when it became evident to all, that communication was hopelessly cut off between the Chinese garrisons and the base of their strength in China, both the Tungan element and the native population began to see that their masters were ill able to hold their own against a popular rising. This opinion gained ground daily, and at last the whole population rose against the Chinese and massacred them. . . . But no sooner had the Chinese been overthrown, than the victors, the Tunganis and the Tarantchis, began to quarrel with each other. Up to the month of January, 1865, the rising had been carried out in a very irregular and indefinite manner. . . . It was essentially a blind and reckless rising, urged on by religious antipathy; and, successful as it was, it owed all its triumphs to the embarrassments of China. The misfortunes of the Chinese attracted the attention of all those who felt an interest in the progress of events in Kashgaria. Prominent among these was a brother of Wali Khan, Buzurg Khan [heir of the former rulers, the exiled Khojas], who resolved to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the civil war for making a bold attempt to regain the place of his ancestors. Among his followers was Mahomed Yakooob, a Khokandian soldier of fortune, already known to fame in the desultory wars and feuds of which Central Asia had been the arena. His previous career had marked him out pre-eminently as a leader of men, and he now sought in Eastern Turkestan that sphere of which Russian conquests had deprived him in its Western region. There is little to surprise us in the fact that, having won his battles, Yakooob deposed and imprisoned his master Buzurg. In several campaigns between 1867 and 1873 he beat back the Tunganis from his confines, and established an independent government in the vast region from the Pamir to beyond Turfan, and from Khoten and the Karakoram to the Tian Shan. He treated on terms of dignity with the Czar, and also with the Government of India. He received English envoys and Russian ambassadors, and his palace was filled with presents from London and St. Petersburg. . . . Urged on by some vague ambition, he made war upon the Tunganis, when every dictate of prudence pointed to an alliance with them. He destroyed his only possible allies, and in destroying them he weakened himself both directly and indirectly. In the autumn of 1876 Yakooob Beg had indeed pushed forward so far to the east that he fancied he held Barkul and Hamil in his grasp; and the next spring would probably have witnessed a further advance upon these cities had not fate willed it otherwise. With the capture of the small village of Chigh-tam, in 92° E. longitude, Yakooob's triumphs closed. Thus far his career had been successful; it may then be said to have reached its limit. In the autumn of 1876, the arrival of a Chinese army on his eastern frontier changed the current of his thoughts. . . . From November, 1876, until March, 1877, the Chinese generals were engaged in massing their troops on the northern side of the Tian Shan range. . . . Yakooob's principal object was to defend the Devan pass against the Chinese; but, while they attacked it

in front, another army under General Chang Yao was approaching from Hamil. Thus out-flanked, Yakooob's army retreated precipitately upon Turfan, where he was defeated, and again a second time at Toksoun, west of that town. The Chinese then halted. They had, practically speaking, destroyed Yakooob's powers of defence. That prince retreated to the town of Korla, where he was either assassinated or poisoned early in the month of May. . . . Korla was occupied on the 9th of October without resistance; and towards the end of the same month, Kucha, once an important city, surrendered. The later stages of the war were marked by the capture of the towns of Aksu, Ush Turfan, and Kashgar. With the fall of the capital, on the 17th of December, 1877, the fighting ceased. The Chinese authority was promptly established in the country as far south as Yarkand, and after a brief interval in Khoten."—D. C. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, ch. 12.

**YALE COLLEGE.** See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1701-1717.

**YALU RIVER,** Naval battle of the. See KOREA.

**YAMASIS AND YAMACRAWES, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: MUSKHOGEAN FAMILY.

**YANACONAS.—MAMACONAS.**—"The Yanaconas were a class existing [in Peru] in the time of the Incas, who were in an exceptional position. They were domiciled in the houses of their masters, who found them in food and clothing, paid their tribute, and gave them a piece of land to cultivate in exchange for their services. But to prevent this from degenerating into slavery, a decree of 1601 ordered that they should be free to leave their masters and take service elsewhere on the same conditions." The Mamaconas of Peru were a class of domestic servants.—C. R. Markham (*Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am.*, v. 8, p. 296).

**YANAN FAMILY, The.** See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: YANAN FAMILY.

**YANG-TZE BASIN, The.** See CHINA.

**YANKEE:** Origin of the term.—"The first name given by the Indians to the Europeans who landed in Virginia was 'Wapsid Lenape' (white people); when, however, afterwards, they began to commit murders on the red men, whom they pierced with swords, they gave to the Virginians the name 'Mechansichan' (long knives), to distinguish them from others of the same colour. In New England they at first endeavoured to imitate the sound of the national name of the English, which they pronounced 'Yengees.'" After about the middle of the Revolutionary War the Indians applied the name "Yengees" exclusively to the people of New England, "who, indeed, appeared to have adopted it, and were, as they still are, generally through the country called 'Yankees,' which is evidently the same name with a trifling alteration. They say they know the 'Yengees,' and can distinguish them by their dress and personal appearance, and that they were considered as less cruel than the Virginians or 'long knives.' The proper English they [for 'they' read 'the Chippeways and some other nations.'—*Editor's foot-note*] call 'Saggenash.'"—J. Heckewelder, *Hist., Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations* (Penn. Hist. Soc. Memoirs, v. 12) pp. 142-143.—"The origin of this term [Yankees],

so frequently employed by way of reproach to the New England people, is said to be as follows. A farmer, by name Jonathan Hastings, of Cambridge, about the year 1713, used it as a cant, favorite word, to express excellency when applied to any thing; as a Yankee good horse, Yankee cider, &c., meaning an excellent horse and excellent cider. The students at college, having frequent intercourse with Mr. Hastings, and hearing him employ the term on all occasions, adopted it themselves, and gave him the name of Yankee Jonathan; this soon became a cant word among the collegians to express a weak, simple, awkward person, and from college it was carried and circulated through the country, till, from its currency in New England, it was at length taken up and unjustly applied to the New Englanders in common, as a term of reproach. It was in consequence of this that a particular song, called 'Yankee doodle,' was composed in derision of those scornfully called Yankees."—J. Thatcher, *Military Journal during the Revolutionary War*, p. 19.—"Dr. William Gordon, in his *Hist. of the American War*, ed. 1789, vol. i., pp. 324, 325, says it was a favourite cant word in Cambridge, Mass., as early as 1713, and that it meant 'excellent.' . . . Cf. Lowland Sc. 'yankie,' a sharp, clever, forward woman; 'yanker,' an agile girl, an incessant speaker; 'yanker,' a smart stroke, a great falsehood; 'yank,' a sudden and severe blow, a sharp stroke; 'yanking,' active, pushing (Jamieson). . . . If Dr. Gordon's view be right, the word 'yankee' may be identified with the Sc. 'yankie,' as above; and all the Scotch words appear to be of Scand. origin, due, ultimately Icel. 'jaga,' to move about. . . . The fundamental idea is that of 'quick motion'; see 'yacht.' But the word cannot be said to be solved."—W. W. Skeat, *Etymolog. Dict.*—"The best authorities on the subject now agree upon the derivation of this term from the imperfect effort made by the Northern Indians to pronounce the word 'English.'"—M. Schele de Vere, *Americanisms*, p. 22.

ALSO IN: *Notes and Queries*, series 1, v. 6, p. 57.

**YANKTONS**, The. See AMERICAN ABO-RIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

**YAP**. See CAROLINE ISLANDS.

**YARD-LAND**. See HIDE OF LAND; and MANORS.

**YATASSEES**, The. See TEXAS: THE ABO-RIGINAL INHABITANTS.

**YEAR BOOKS**, English. See LAW, COMMON: A. D. 1307-1509.

**YEAR OF ANARCHY**, The. See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

**YEAR OF METON**, The. See METON, THE YEAR OF.

**YELLOW FEVER**, Appearance of. See PLAGUE: 18TH CENTURY.

**YELLOW FORD**, Battle of the (1598). See IRELAND: A. D. 1559-1603.

**YELLOW LORD**, The. See CHINA: THE GREAT BASINS.

**YELLOW TAVERN**, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MAY: VIRGINIA)—SHERIDAN'S RAID.

**YELLOW** (of Venezuela), The. See VENEZUELA: A. D. 1829-1886.

**YEMAMA**, Battle of. See ACRABA.

**YEOMEN**.—"A 'yeoman' is defined by Sir Tho. Smith (Rep. Anglor. lib. 1, c. 24) as he whom our law calls 'legalem hominem,' a free-

born man that may dispend of his own free land in yearly revenues to the sum of forty shillings. But it had also a more general application, denoting like 'valet' a higher kind of service, which still survives in the current phrase to do 'yeoman's service.' In the household of the mediæval knight or baron the younger sons of yeomen would form a large proportion of the servitors, and share with the younger sons of knight or squire the common name of 'valetti.' The yeomen too who lived on their own land, but wore the 'livery of company' of some baron or lesser territorial magnate, would also be his 'valets.' The mediæval 'yeoman' was the tenant of land in free socage. The extent of his holding might be large or small."—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *Eng. Const. Hist.*, p. 343, foot-note.—"At the period when the higher gentry began to absorb what remained of the feudal nobility, and established themselves definitely as an upper class, the small landowners—freeholders holding estates of inheritance or for life—long leaseholders and the larger copyholders made corresponding progress, and the yeomen (the common term applied to all of them) began in their turn to fill the position and take the rank of an agricultural middle class. The reign of Henry VI. had marked the zenith of their influence; they had by that time fully realized the fact of their existence as a body. The inferior limit of their class was approximately determined by the electoral qualification of the forty-shilling freeholder (under the Act of 1430), or by the £4 qualification for the office of juror. The superior limit was marked from a legal point of view by the property qualification of a magistrate, but socially there was not on this side any definite boundary line. In 1446 it was considered necessary to forbid the county electors to return 'valetti,' that is yeomen, to the House of Commons, a proof that custom and opinion left to themselves did not look upon the higher section of their class as unworthy of a seat in Parliament, an honour originally confined to the knights. Fortescue testifies almost with triumph to the fact that in no country of Europe were yeomen so numerous as in England."—E. Boutmy, *The English Constitution*, pt. 2, ch. 4.—In later English use the word 'yeoman' has signified "a man of small estate in land, not ranking among the gentry."

**YEOMEN OF THE GUARD**.—"This corps was instituted by Henry VII. in 1485. It now consists of 100 men, six of whom are called Yeomen Hangers, and two Yeomen Bedgoers; the first attending to the hangings and tapestries of the royal apartments, and the second taking charge of all beds during any royal removals. The yeomen of the guard carry up the royal dinner, and are popularly designated as 'beef-eaters,' respecting the origin of which name some differences of opinion exist, for many maintain that they never had any duties connected with the royal beaufet. A yeoman usher and a party of yeomen attend in the great chamber of the palace on drawing-room and levee days, to keep the passage clear."—C. R. Dodd, *Manual of Dignities*, pt. 2, sect. 1.

**YERMOUK**, Battle of (A. D. 636). See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST: A. D. 632-639.

**YEZID I.**, Caliph, A. D. 679-683. . . . **Yezid II.**, Caliph, 720-724. . . . **Yezid III.**, Caliph, 744. **YNCAS**, OR **INCAS**. See PERU.



**YNGAVI, Battle of (1841).** See PERU: A. D. 1826-1876.

**YORK: The Roman capital of Britain.** See EBORACUM.

**The capital of Deira and Northumbria.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 547-633.

**A. D. 1189.—Massacre of Jews.** See JEWS: A. D. 1189.

**A. D. 1644.—Parliamentary siege raised by Prince Rupert.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1644 (JANUARY—JULY).

**YORK, Penn.: A. D. 1777.—The American Congress in session.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY—DECEMBER).

**YORKINOS, The.** See MEXICO: A. D. 1822-1828.

**YORKISTS.** See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

**YORKTOWN: A. D. 1781.—Surrender of Cornwallis and his army to Washington.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1781 (MAY—OCTOBER).

**A. D. 1862.—McClellan's siege.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MARCH—MAY: VIRGINIA).

**YOUNG, Brigham, and the Mormons.** See MORMONISM: A. D. 1830-1846, 1846-1847; and UTAH: A. D. 1849-1850, and 1857-1859.

**YOUNG IRELAND MOVEMENT, The.** See IRELAND: A. D. 1841-1848.

**YOUNG ITALY.** See ITALY: A. D. 1831-1848.

**YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS.**—Although other and earlier movements for the religious association of young men are known to have been made, the existing widespread organization of Young Men's Associations appears to have started from work undertaken in London, England, in 1841, by a young man named George Williams, who went that year to London from Bridgewater, and found employment in a drapery or dry goods house. The story is told in a sketch of the London Association, published in the first volume of the Exeter Hall lectures, by W. E. Shipton, from which the following is derived: "In 1841 this young man, not yet twenty-one years of age, left Bridgewater and went to London, where he obtained a situation as junior assistant in the dry goods establishment of Messrs. Hitchcock & Co., St. Paul's Church Yard. . . . He found among his fellow clerks a few professed followers of Christ. These he gathered, for prayer and Bible study, into one of the bed-rooms on the premises, after the business of the day was over. One by one they invited their careless associates to join them. Many were converted and the bed-room soon became too small to hold those desiring to attend. . . . 'To obtain the permanent and undisturbed use of another room, application to the principal [Mr. Hitchcock] became necessary, and this was a matter of some difficulty. Able and energetic as a man of business, he had shown no signs of religious feeling, he had done nothing to secure the comfort or welfare of his young men, nor did he check the evils which attended the conduct of business in his establishment, in common with many others, at the time. He was only known as the employer, and in that capa-

city, though no worse, was not better than the rest of his class. But the young men had waited on God for His direction and help, and in the strength of faith they went forward with their application. To their surprise it was received with sympathy, with tenderness. . . . The room was granted, the young men were thanked for their past efforts and prayers on behalf of the establishment, and the master became from that hour the father of his household, joining with his godly servants in solicitude for its spiritual welfare, reforming every arrangement inconsistent with the conscientious discharge of the duties or the personal comfort of those he employed, and in all things seeking to make that household an abode of peace, a pattern of godliness, a centre of Christian usefulness.' 'During the period of Mr. Hitchcock's religious anxiety, he had sought the advice of Mr. W. D. Owen, the principal of another large drapery house, whose religious character and benevolent efforts on behalf of their trade had made him generally respected, and to him he described the work of God which had begun amongst his assistants. Mr. Owen mentioned the fact to his principal assistant, Mr. James Smith, 'who immediately commenced similar meetings for prayer and the study of the Holy Scripture amongst their young men.' In the early stages of this movement the late Mr. Edward Beaumont, one of the little band who had been converted in the bed-room meeting, wrote that one Sunday evening, in the latter part of May, 1844, he accompanied Mr. Williams to Surrey Chapel, and that, on the way, Mr. Williams told him that he was deeply impressed with the importance of introducing religious services, such as they were enjoying, into every large establishment in London. This conversation resulted in a conference between a few of the Christian young men in Mr. Hitchcock's establishment, at the close of one of their meetings. They then decided to call a meeting of all the Christian young men of the house for Thursday, June 6, 1844, to consider the importance and practicability of establishing such an association. . . . Mr. Williams attended the meeting and, in response to his invitation, Mr. James Smith was present at the meeting held in the former's bed-room, June 6, 1844. At this meeting it was decided to organize the Young Men's Christian Association. . . . Information of the organization of the London Association soon reached America. The first Association organized on the London basis was that of Montreal, Dec. 9, 1851. . . . Two years elapsed before any systematic effort was made to bring the 26 American Associations, which had by that time been organized, into communication with one another. . . . The first circular, which was issued February 28, 1854, and signed by Oscar Cobb, of Buffalo, and William Chauncy Langdon, of Washington," . . . asked "whether the Associations to which it was issued would favor the proposition to hold a convention of the American societies. Sixteen favorable and four negative replies were received. . . . Buffalo was selected as the place of meeting, and the convention assembled in that city June 7, 1854. Mr. Langdon, in an address delivered at the convention, showed that, as far as ascertained, 250 Associations were in existence, distributed as follows: Germany, 100; Holland, 4; France, 39; Switzerland, 21; Australasia, 3; Turkey, 2; Great Britain and Ire-

land, 42; Canada, 4; United States, 35. This convention at Buffalo, in 1854, was the first . . . conference of the Associations of any kind held in the English-speaking world."—R. R. McBurney, *Historical Sketch of the Y. M. C. A. (Year Book of the Y. M. C. A. of the U. S. and Canada, for 1884-5)*.—The remarkable spread and growth of the Young Men's Christian Associations from those beginnings, half a century ago, are shown by the following statistics, published in the "Year Book of the Young Men's Christian Associations of North America" for 1899: Total number of Y. M. C. Associations in various countries of the world, 5,075; with a total membership numbering 465,902; owning and occupying 619 buildings, valued (with ground) at \$24,542,000. In every one of these items the United States and Canada held the lead, with 1429 Associations, 223,568 members, and owning 344 buildings, valued at \$19,847,930. For England, Ireland and Wales, the number of Associations reported is 371; members, 66,554; buildings, 97; value, \$2,304,410. For Scotland, Associations, 262; members, 25,413; buildings, 28; value, \$740,000. For Germany, Associations, 1405; members, 85,000; buildings, 57; value, \$250,000. For Switzerland, Associations, 457; members, 10,000; buildings, 10; value, \$50,000. For the Netherlands, Associations, 282; members, 7,723; buildings, 40, value, not given. For India, Associations, 102; members, 5,500; buildings, 7; value, \$153,660. For Australia and New Zealand, Associations, 11; members, 2,200; buildings, 6; value, \$335,000. For South Africa, Associations, 7; members, 2,310; buildings, 3; value, \$240,000.

**YPRES:** A. D. 1383.—Unsuccessful but destructive siege by the English. See **FLANDERS:** A. D. 1383.

## Z.

**ZAB, Battle of the (A. D. 750).** See **MAHOMETAN CONQUEST:** A. D. 715-750.

**ZACHARIAS, Pope, A. D. 741-752.**

**ZAGONARA, Battle of (1424).** See **ITALY:** A. D. 1412-1447.

**ZAHERA:** A. D. 1476.—Surprise, capture and massacre by the Moors. See **SPAIN:** A. D. 1476-1492.

**ZALACCA, Battle of (1086).** See **ALMORAVIDES;** and **PORTUGAL:** **EARLY HISTORY.**

**ZAMA, Battle of (B. C. 202).** See **PUNIC WARS:** **THE SECOND.**

**ZAMBESIA, or Matabeleland.** See **SOUTH AFRICA:** A. D. 1885-1893.

**ZAMINDARS, OR ZEMINDARS.** See **TALUKDARS;** also **INDIA:** A. D. 1785-1793.

**ZAMZUMMITES, The.** See **JEWS:** **EARLY HEBREW HISTORY.**

**ZANCLE.** See **MESSENE IN SICILY, FOUNDING OF.**

**ZANZIBAR:** A. D. 1885-1886.—Seizure of territory by Germany. See **AFRICA:** A. D. 1884-1891.

**ZAPORO, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **ANDESIANS.**

**ZAPOTEC, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **ZAPOTEC, etc.**

**ZARA:** A. D. 1203.—Capture and Destruction. See **CRUSADES:** A. D. 1201-1203.

**A. D. 1648.—Taken by the French.** See **NETHERLANDS (SPANISH PROVINCES):** A. D. 1647-1648.

**A. D. 1659.—Restored to Spain.** See **FRANCE:** A. D. 1659-1661.

**A. D. 1679.—Ceded to France.** See **NIMEGUEN, THE PEACE OF.**

**A. D. 1713.—Ceded to Holland.** See **NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND):** A. D. 1713-1715.

**A. D. 1744-1748.—Taken by the French and restored to Austria.** See **AUSTRIA:** A. D. 1743-1744; and **AIX-LA-CHAPELLE:** **THE CONGRESS.**

**A. D. 1794.—Siege and capture by the French.** See **FRANCE;** A. D. 1794 (**MARCH-JULY**).

**YUCATAN:** The aboriginal inhabitants, their civilization and its monuments. See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **MAYAS, and QUICHES;** also **MEXICO, ANCIENT.**

**Discovery.—Disputed origin of the name.** See **AMERICA:** A. D. 1517-1518.

**YUCHI.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **UCHEAN FAMILY.**

**YUGUARZONGO, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **ANDESIANS.**

**YUKIAN FAMILY, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **YUKIAN FAMILY.**

**YUMAN FAMILY, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **YUMAN FAMILY.**

**YUMAS, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **APACHE GROUP.**

**YUNCAS, The.** See **PERU:** **THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.**

**YUNGAY, Battle of (1839).** See **PERU:** A. D. 1826-1876.

**YUROKS, OR EUROCS, The.** See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES:** **MODOC.**

**ZARAGOSSA.** See **SARAGOSSA.**

**ZARAKA, The.** See **SARANGIANS.**

**ZARANGIANS, The.** See **SARANGIANS.**

**ZARATHUSTRA, OR ZOROASTER.** See **ZOROASTRIANS.**

**ZEA.** See **PIREUS.**

**ZEALOTS, The.—**A party among the Jews which forced on the great struggle of that people with the Roman power,—the struggle which ended in the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. A party of ardent patriots in its origin, and embracing the flower of the nation, it degenerated, by enlistment of the passions of the populace, into a fierce, violent, desperate faction, which Ewald (*Hist. of Israel*, bk. 7) compares to that of the Jacobins of the French Revolution.—Josephus, *The Jewish War*.

**ZEEWAND.** See **WAMPUM.**

**ZEGRIS, The.** See **SPAIN:** A. D. 1238-1273; and 1476-1492.

**ZELA, Battle of (B. C. 47).** See **ROME:** B. C. 47-46.

**ZEMINDARS, OR ZAMINDARS.** See **TALUKDARS;** also **INDIA:** A. D. 1785-1793.

**ZEMSTVO, The.—**"The Zemstvo [in Russia] is a kind of local administration which supplements the action of the rural communes [see **MIR**], and takes cognizance of those higher public wants which individual communes cannot



possibly satisfy. Its principal duties are to keep the roads and bridges in proper repair, to provide means of conveyance for the rural police and other officials, to elect the justices of peace, to look after primary education and sanitary affairs, to watch the state of the crops and take measures against approaching famine, and in short to undertake, within certain clearly-defined limits, whatever seems likely to increase the material and moral well-being of the population. In form the institution is parliamentary—that is to say, it consists of an assembly of deputies which meets at least once a year, and of a permanent executive bureau elected by the assembly from among its members. . . . Once every three years the deputies are elected in certain fixed proportions by the landed proprietors, the rural communes, and the municipal corporations. Every province (*guberniya*) and each of the districts (*uyezdi*) into which the province is subdivided has such an assembly and such a bureau.”—D. M. Wallace, *Russia*, ch. 14.

**ZENDAVESTA**, The. See ZOROASTRIANS.

**ZENDECAN**, Battle of (1038). See TURKS: A. D. 999–1183.

**ZENGER'S TRIAL**. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1720–1734.

**ZENO**, Roman Emperor (Eastern). A. D. 474–491.

**ZENOBIA**, The Empire of. See PALMYRA.

**ZENTA**, Battle of (1697). See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683–1699.

**ZEPHATHAH**, Battle of.—Fought by Asa, king of Judah, with Zerah the Ethiopian, whom he defeated.—2 *Chronicles*, xiv. 9–15.

**ZEUGITÆ**, The. See ATHENS: B. C. 594.

**ZEUGMA**. See APAMEA.

**ZIELA**, Battle of.—A battle fought in the Mithridatic War, B. C. 67, in which the Romans were badly defeated by the Pontic king.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 5, ch. 2.

**ZIGANI**.—**ZIGEUNER**.—**ZINCALI**.—**ZINGARRI**. See GYPSIES.

**ZINGIS KHAN**, The conquests of. See MONGOLS: A. D. 1153–1227; and INDIA: A. D. 977–1290.

**ZINGLINS**. See HAYTI: A. D. 1804–1880.

**ZINZENDORF**, Count, and the Moravian Brethren. See MORAVIAN OR BOHEMIAN BRETHREN.

**ZION**. See JERUSALEM: CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION BY DAVID.

**ZNAIM**, Armistice of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY—SEPTEMBER).

**ZOAN**.—**TANIS**.—**SAN**.—These are the names which, at different periods, have been given to an ancient city near the northeastern borders of Egypt, the ruins of which have been identified and are being explored, on the east bank of the canal that was formerly the Tanitic branch of the Nile. Both in Egyptian history and Biblical history Zoan was an important place. “The whole period of the Hebrew sojourn is closely interwoven with the history of Zoan. Here ruled the king in whose name Egypt was governed by the Hebrew, who was no less than regent; here ruled those who still favoured the people of Israel. Under the great Oppression, Zoan was a royal residence.”—R. S. Poole, *Cities of Egypt*, ch. 5.

Also in: W. M. F. Petrie, *Tanis* (2d Mem., *Egypt Expl. Fund*). See, also, JEWS: THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL IN EGYPT.

**ZOBAB**, Kingdom of.—A kingdom of brief importance, extending from the Orontes to the Euphrates, which appears among the allies of the Ammonites, in their war with David King of Israel.—H. Ewald, *Lect's on the Hist. of Israel*, v. 3, pp. 150–152.

**ZOE AND THEODORA**, Empresses in the East (Byzantine, or Greek). A. D. 1042.

**ZOHAR**, The. See CABALA.

**ZOHARITES**, The.—A singular Jewish sect which sprang up in Poland during the seventeenth century, taking its name from the Zohar, one of the books of the Cabala, on which it founded its faith.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of the Jews*, bk. 28.

**ZOLLPARLAMENT**, The. See GERMANY: A. D. 1866–1870.

**ZOLLVEREIN**, The German. See TARIFF LEGISLATION AND CONVENTIONS (GERMANY): A. D. 1833. Also (in Supplement) GERMANY: A. D. 1815–1848.

**ZOQUES**, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ZAPOTECs, etc.

**ZORNDORF**, Battle of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1758.

**ZOROASTRIANS**.—**MAGIANS**.—**PARSEES**.—“The Iranians were in ancient times the dominant race throughout the entire tract lying between the Suliman mountains and the Pamir steppe on the one hand, and the great Mesopotamian valley on the other. . . . At a time which it is difficult to date, but which those best skilled in Iranian antiquities are inclined to place before the birth of Moses, there grew up, in the region whereof we are speaking, a form of religion marked by very special and unusual features. . . . Ancient tradition associates this religion with the name of Zoroaster. Zoroaster, or Zarathrustra, according to the native spelling, was, by one account, a Median king who conquered Babylon about B. C. 2458. By another, which is more probable, and which rests, moreover, on better authority, he was a Bactrian, who, at a date not quite so remote, came forward in the broad plain of the middle Oxus to instil into the minds of his countrymen the doctrines and precepts of a new religion. . . . His religion gradually spread from ‘happy Bactra,’ ‘Bactra of the lofty banner,’ first to the neighbouring countries, and then to all the numerous tribes of the Iranians, until at last it became the established religion of the mighty empire of Persia, which, in the middle of the 6th century before our era, established itself on the ruins of the Assyrian and Babylonian kingdoms, and shortly afterwards overran and subdued the ancient monarchy of the Pharaohs. In Persia it maintained its ground, despite the shocks of Grecian and Parthian conquest, until Mohammedan intolerance drove it out at the point of the sword, and forced it to seek a refuge further east, in the peninsula of Hindustan. Here it still continues, in Guzerat and in Bombay, the creed of that ingenious and intelligent people known to Anglo-Indians—and may we not say to Englishmen generally?—as Parsees [see PARSEES]. The religion of the Parsees is contained in a volume of some size, which has received the name of ‘the Zendavesta.’ . . . Anquetil Duperron introduced the sacred book of the Parsees to the knowledge of Europeans under this name; and the word thus introduced can scarcely be now displaced. Otherwise, ‘Avesta-

Zend' might be recommended as the more proper title. 'Avesta' means 'text,' and Zend means 'comment.' 'Avesta u Zend,' or 'Text and Comment,' is the proper title, which is then contracted into 'Avesta-Zend.' . . . Subjected for the last fifty years to the searching analysis of first-rate orientalists—Burnouf, Westergaard, Brockhaus, Spiegel, Haug, Windischmann, Hübschmann,—this work has been found to belong in its various parts to very different dates, and to admit of being so dissected as to reveal to us, not only what are the tenets of the modern Parsees, but what was the earliest form of that religion whereof theirs is the remote and degenerate descendant. Signs of a great antiquity are found to attach to the language of certain rhythmical compositions called Gáthás or hymns; and the religious ideas contained in these are found to be at once harmonious, and also of a simpler and more primitive character than those contained in the rest of the volume. From the Gáthás chiefly, but also to some extent from other, apparently very ancient, portions of the Zendavesta, the characteristics of the early Iranian religion have been drawn out by various scholars, particularly by Dr. Martin Haug. . . . The most striking feature of the religion, and that which is generally allowed to be its leading characteristic, is the assertion of Dualism. By Dualism we mean the belief in two original uncreated principles, a principle of good and a principle of evil. . . . Both principles were real persons, possessed of will, intelligence, power, consciousness, and other personal qualities. To the one they gave the name of Ahura-Mazda, to the other that of Anglo-Mainyus. . . . The names themselves sufficiently indicated to those who first used them the nature of the two beings. Ahura-Mazda was the 'all-bountiful, all-wise, living being' or 'spirit,' who stood at the head of all that was good and lovely, beautiful and delightful. Anglo-Mainyus was the 'dark and gloomy intelligence' that had from the first been Ahura-Mazda's enemy, and was bent on thwarting and vexing him. And with these fundamental notions agreed all that the sacred books taught concerning either being. . . . The two great beings who thus divided between them the empire of the universe were neither of them content to be solitary. Each had called into existence a number of inferior spirits, who acknowledged their sovereignty, fought on their side, and sought to execute their behests. At the head of the good spirits subject to Ahura-Mazda stood a band of six dignified with the title of Amesha-Spentas, or 'Immortal Holy Ones.' . . . In direct antithesis to these stood the band, likewise one of six, which formed the council and chief support of Anglo-Mainyus. . . . Besides these leading spirits there was marshalled on either side an innumerable host of lesser and subordinate ones, called respectively 'ahuras' and 'devas,' who constituted the armies or attendants of the two great powers, and were employed by them to work out their purposes. The leader of the angelic hosts, or 'ahuras' was a glorious being, called Sraosha or Serosh—'the good, tall, fair Serosh,' who stood in the Zoroastrian system where Michael the Archangel stands in the Christian. . . . Neither Ahura-Mazda nor the Amesha-Spentas were represented by the early Iranians under any material forms. The Zoroastrian sys-

tem was markedly anti-idolatrous; and the utmost that was allowed the worshipper was an emblematic representation of the Supreme Being by means of a winged circle, with which was occasionally combined an incomplete human figure, robed and wearing a tiara. . . . The position of man in the cosmic scheme was determined by the fact that he was among the creations of Ahura-Mazda. Formed and placed on earth by the Good Being, he was bound to render him implicit obedience, and to oppose to the utmost Anglo-Mainyus and his creatures. His duties might be summed up under the four heads of piety, purity, industry, and veracity. Piety was to be shown by an acknowledgment of Ahura-Mazda as the One True God, by a reverential regard for the Amesha-Spentas and the Izeds, or lower angels, by the frequent offering of prayers, praises, and thanksgivings, the recitation of hymns, the occasional sacrifice of animals, and the performance from time to time of a curious ceremony known as that of the Haoma or Homa [see SOMA.—HAOMA]. . . . The purity required of the Iranians was inward as well as outward. . . . The duty of veracity was inculcated perhaps more strenuously than any other. . . . If it be asked what opinions were entertained by the Zoroastrians concerning man's ultimate destiny, the answer would seem to be, that they were devout and earnest believers in the immortality of the soul, and a conscious future existence. . . . The religion of the early Iranians became corrupted after a time by an admixture of foreign superstitions. The followers of Zoroaster, as they spread themselves from their original seat upon the Oxus over the regions lying south and south-west of the Caspian Sea, were brought into contact with a form of faith considerably different from that to which they had previously been attached, yet well adapted for blending with it. This was Magism, or the worship of the elements [see MAGIANS]. The early inhabitants of Armenia, Cappadocia, and the Zagros mountain-range, had, under circumstances that are unknown to us, developed this form of religion, and had associated with its tenets a priest-caste. . . . The four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, were recognised as the only proper objects of human reverence. . . . When the Zoroastrians came into contact with Magism, it impressed them favourably. . . . The result was that, without giving up any part of their previous creed, the Iranians adopted and added on to it all the principal points of the Magian belief, and all the more remarkable of the Magian religious usages. This religious fusion seems first to have taken place in Media. The Magi became a Median tribe, and were adopted as the priest-caste of the Median nation." This "produced an amalgam that has shown a surprising vitality, having lasted above 2,000 years—from the time of Xerxes, the son of Darius Hystaspis (B. C. 485-465) to the present day."—G. Rawlinson, *Religions of the Ancient World*, ch. 3.—"As the doctrines of Zoroaster bear in several points such a striking resemblance to those of Christianity, it is a question of grave importance to ascertain the age in which he lived. . . . Since there can be no doubt that . . . we must assign to Zarathustra Spitama a date prior to the Median conquest of Babylon by a Zoroastrian priest king, the only question remaining to be solved



is, whether he lived only a short time, or long, before that event. I am inclined to believe that he lived only about 100 or 200 years before that time, and that the conquest of Babylon was one of the last consequences of the great religious enthusiasm kindled by him. He preached, like Moses, war and destruction to all idolaters and wicked men. . . . According to this investigation we cannot assign to Zarathustra Spitama a later date than about 2300 B. C. Thus he lived not only before Moses, but even, perhaps, before Abraham. . . . He was the first prophet of truth who appeared in the world, and kindled a fire which thousands of years could not entirely extinguish."—M. Haug, *Lect. on an Original Speech of Zoroaster* (*Yasna* 45), pp. 17, 26.—The same, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings and Religion of the Parsees*.—"Prof. Darmesteter has published a new translation [of the Zend Avesta] with a most ably written introduction, in which he maintains the thesis that not a line of our Avesta text is older than the time of Alexander's conquest, while the greater part belongs to a much later date. We may briefly remind our readers that, according to the traditional view, the old Zoroastrian books, which belong to the times of the Achæmenidæ, were destroyed at the Macedonian conquest, but that portions were preserved by the people, who retained the old faith, during the long period of the Arsacidan rule, though the Court favoured Greek civilization. . . . According to this view, we still possess the genuine remains of the old pre-Alexandrine literature, mutilated and corrupted during the period of Arsacidan indifference, but yet, so far as they go, a faithful representative of the sacred text of the Achæmenian time. . . . Prof. Darmesteter, on the contrary, maintains that all our texts are post-Alexandrine in form and in substance. Some may belong to the 1st century B. C. or A. D., and some, as the legislative parts of the Vendidad, may be founded on older texts now lost; but a large portion was composed by the priests of Ardashir's Court in the 3d century. The Gâthâs, which till now have been generally considered as the ancient nucleus of the whole system and ascribed to Zoroaster himself, are, in the Professor's opinion, certainly modern, and are relegated to the 1st century of our era."—*The Athenæum*, June 30, 1894.

ALSO IN: W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*.—The same, and F. von Spiegel, *The Age of the Avesta*.—D. F. Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsees*.—S. Johnson, *Oriental Religions: Persia*.

ZOTTS. See GYPSIES.

ZOUAVES, The.—During the wars of the French in Algeria, there arose a body of soldiers "who, both in the campaign in Algeria and in the contest in the Crimea, have acquired the very

highest renown. The name of the Zouaves will never be forgotten as long as the story of the siege of Sebastopol endures. . . . They were originally intended to be regiments composed of Frenchmen who had settled in Algeria, or their descendants; but the intermixture of foreigners in their ranks ere long became so considerable, that when they were transported to the shores of the Crimea, though the majority were French, they were rather an aggregate of the 'Dare-devils' of all nations. In their ranks at Sebastopol were some that held Oxford degrees, many those of Göttingen and Paris, crowds who had been ruined at the gaming-table, not a few who had fled from justice, or sought escape from the consequences of an amorous adventure. Yet had this motley crowd, composed of the most daring and reckless of all nations, become, in the rude school of the wars in Algeria, an incomparable body of soldiers, second to none in the world in every military duty, perhaps superior to any in the vehemence and rush of an assault."—Sir A. Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, 1815-1852, ch. 45.

ZÜLPICH, Battle of (A. D. 496). See ALTMANNI: A. D. 496-504; also Franks: A. D. 481-511.

ZULUS, OR AMAZULU.—The Zulu War. See SOUTH AFRICA: ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS; and the same, A. D. 1877-1879.

ZUÑI. See AMERICA, PREHISTORIC; also AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ZUÑIAN FAMILY, and PUEBLOS.

ZURICH: A. D. 1519-1524.—Beginning of the Swiss Reformation, under Zwingli. See PAPACY: A. D. 1519-1524; and SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1528-1531.

A. D. 1799.—Battle of French and Russians.—Carnage in the city. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (AUGUST—DECEMBER).

ZURICH, Treaty of (1859). See ITALY: A. D. 1859-1861.

ZUTPHEN: A. D. 1572.—Massacre by the Spaniards. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1572-1573.

A. D. 1586.—Battle of English and Spaniards.—Death of Sir Philip Sidney. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1585-1586.

A. D. 1591.—Capture by Prince Maurice. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1588-1593.

ZUYDERZEE, Naval battle on the (1573). See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1573-1574.

ZWINGLI, and the Swiss Reformation. See PAPACY: A. D. 1519-1524; and SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1528-1531.

ZYP, Battle of the. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER).











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
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